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Abstract.
The study examines causes of the Middle-Belt movement and its identity
In Northern Nigeria. It relates this identity to Nigerian Politics and
Federation. The study suggests that internal colonialism of the Islamic
society on the M-Belt groups were contributive to activating minorities
identities and the organization of the M-Belt movement. The roots of
internal colonial relationships were from a colonial system which the
British incorporated with the M-Belt groups in 1900. In the processes of
Incorporation before 1940, British adminstration subordinated many M-Belt
groups to Islamic leadership.
The M-Belt movement was a reaction to colonial relationships and
domination by cultural ly different groups. The reaction took the form of
activating tribal support for creation of a M-Belt Region. This was meant
to separate the M-Belt and the Islamic society into different units of the
Federation. Tribal identities developed from chieftancy institutions among
some of the fl-Belt groups were reinforced by modernization, with European
Missionaries dominating the processes and produced Christian political
leadership. The tribal identities, were complemented by a trans-tribal
Christian religious identity, to produce cohesion and collective political
demands. Variation in processes of modernization between the Islamic
society and M-Belt groups in a North, under Islamic leadership, conditioned
support of non-Islamic groups for the M-Belt movement. The combination of
these factors and with the North as an outsized unit, produced conceptions
of regionalism. The thesis studies the futherance of their cause in the
development of Middle-Belt political parties and the UMBC party under the
leadership of J. S. Tarka.
While the causes for the regionalism resulted into re-structuring of
Nigeria in 1967 in which Benue-Plateau State emerged and enclosed prominent
minorities in the M-Belt Movement, sub-regionalism produced localism.
Although localism in the political identity of M-Belt groups, destroyed
conceptions of the M-Belt, its religious identity remains powerful in
Nigerian Politics.
(xiii)
Outline of the thesis
The thesis has two parts: Part I with Chapters 1 and 2 provide the
historical background to the problems of the M-Belt groups and the M-Belt
movement; and Part II with Chapters 3, 4, 5 and an Epilogue, together
produce an account of the M-Belt movement from its social foundations in
Christianity and political origins in the tribal union movements among the
M-Belt groups, to the present shape and nature of the M-Belt political
identity on the contemporary Nigerian political arena. Part I also has an
introduction, which explains the theoretical framework in the analysis of
the research evidence, produces a review of previous research on the M-Belt
movement and explains some of the methodological problems and data base in
the research.
Chapter 1 traces the nature of the historical roots of the M-Belt
problem and places this, in the establishment of an indigenous Islamic
system. The socio-economic and political relationship of the society
established by dan Fodio was not successful in politically and religiously
incorporating all of the non-Islamic groups by conquest in the M-Belt
areas. It left a history of socio-economic and political exploitation and
depopulation by slave raids which affected all of the M-Belt groups in
varying degrees in the period between 1804 and 1900. Chapter 2 examines
socio-political and economic transformation, the groups in the territories
that became the North experienced, upon impact with British conquest and
influences. The British created a political unit of the North, which
enclosed the Islamic society established by dan Fodio, the Islamic Kingdom
of Borno and the non-Islamic groups of the M-Belt areas. The non-Islamic
groups were victims of slave-raids from both Borno and the Sokoto based
Islamic society. While there was an end to exploitative slave raids by the
Islamic societies on the M-Belt groups, upon impact with British
influences, the British prefered to establish authority within the existing
Socieky
framework of the structures of control and leadership of the Islamic/over
most of the North. These subordinated the M-Belt groups to Fulani and
Islamic leadership and increased their cultural influences over the M-Belt
areas, a process that was characterized by the systematic destruction of
the disparate cultures of the M-Belt groups. The cultures of the M-Belt
groups were seen to be underdeveloped and backward. The Fulani and the
Islamic identity became symbols of unity and developed to underline the
ethos in the political identity of the North.
Chapter 3 traces the social foundations and political origins of the
M-Belt movement in the tribal unions as political organizations that were
direct reactions to subordination and processes of modernization in the
M-Belt areas. Modernization by Christian Missionary activities transformed
the traditional world views of groups in the M-Belt areas and created
Christian consciousness with an explicit social identity which became used
for political purposes. While the Christian religion produced a social
movement, Christian social and welfare institutions produced an educated
elite which activated tribal identities to complement the focus of tribal
unity on the Chieftaincies institutions. The tribal union movements became
the instruments which articulated the socio-economic and political
grievances of government in the midst of rapid modernization processes.
Many of the M-Belt groups shared similar socio-economic and political
problems which were independently articulated by the tribal unions.
Chapter 4 traces and examines the political growth and development of
the M-Belt movement from the non-Muslim League (NML) of Northern Nigeria to
the all embracing political organization, the United Middle Belt Congress
(UMBC) which stood as the ostensible political party to form a government
in a M-Belt Region, under the leadership of Joseph Tarka. The Chapter also
examines the conditions under which the support for the movement and
leadership shifted its base from the Plateau, where it was began among the
Birom, to Southern Zaria, Southern Bauchi and Adamawa and then southwardly
to Benue, where it finally settled among the Tiv and the leadership of
Joseph Tarka. The growth and development of the M-Belt movement is examined
in the context of the differences in support and opposition to the demands
for the creation of a M-Belt region. Most of the M-Belt groups were
subordinated to Islamic leadership in government in the North and felt
deprived in the distribution of socio-economic and welfare infrastructure
which were conditioned by support for the ruling NPC party in the North.
One of the means, some of the M-Belt groups used to benefit from the
distribution of amenities from the ruling party, was in their submission to
patron-client relationships with leadership of the ruling party, the
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). Patron-client relationships are examined
in this Chapter as they reflected the extent to which they eroded support
for the M-Belt movement in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region
and in the specific ways they managed to hold the North together, despite
manifest political tensions from the separatist tendencies in the M-Belt
areas. Institutional means in undercutting support for the ideas of the
M-Belt movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North are also
analyzed particularly the Hudson Report in 1957 and the Willink Commission
on Minorities Fears in Nigeria in 1958, which recommended that it was
unnecessary to create more Regions in Nigeria. The 1959 elections are
analyzed as a test of electoral support for the M-Belt areas. The chapter
also producesSome explanatory reasons on why in the period between 1960 and
1965, the M-Belt movement in its phase as the UMBC party was virtually
driven underground with only electoral support still manifest among the
Tiv.
Chapter 5 examines the political influences of the M-Belt movement
when Nigeria came under Military Governments, in the particular period of
the January and July 1966 coups d m etat, the Ad Hoc Constitutional
conferences, through to the creation of states in 1967. The Chapter also
examines the relationships in behaviour and political loyalty of both the
Nigerian army (the majority of whom were M-Belt soldiers) and politicians
with the M-Belt identity in the North and at the National level. While
rejecting the Islamic society in the context of politics in the Northlin
the practice of politics with the M-Belt identity, M-Belt politicians are
as much Northern as their counter parts in the Islamic society when it
comes to issues on the domination of the North by southerners. At the same
time the M-Belt is always prepared to use its socio-religious and political
identity to restrain Northern separatism. The M-Belt identity is, however,
a distinct identity within the Northern political identity: An identity
that always presupposes an alternative Northern identity rather than a
rejection of the Northern political identity, particularly for the purposes
of balancing the sharing of power in the Nigerian Federation. The Chapter
therefore also examines the interplay of these identities and how they
saved the Nigerian Federation and caused the creation of BP state in the
state creation exercise in 1967 by General Yakubu Gowon. In 1967 BP state
was conceived of as the nucleus of a wider conception of the M-Belt Region
that might develop to enclose all of the M-Belt groups.
The Epilogue discusses the aftermath of the M-Belt movement and .tbs
political struggle and examines what happened to conceptions of BP state as
the nucleus of the M-Belt Region of Joseph Tarka. Although optimism
characterized initial politics in BP state, the inertia of elite interests
caused the wider regionalism conceived of in the state to degenerate into
localism and the state tragecally disintegrated into Benue and Plateau
states in 1976. The Epilogue also examines the extent to which the
territorial disintegration of the M-Belt identity affects persisting
conceptions of the socio-religious and political identity of the M-Belt
groups in Nigerian politics.
PART I
Historical Background to the Middle-Belt (M-Belt) Problem
In the North
Introduction: the theoretical framework of analysis and a review of
previous academic literature on the Middle Belt (M-Belt) movement.
I. Introduction.
This study on the M-Belt Movement in Nigerian political development
has two major themes, both themes being concerned with political identity
In politics in the Federation. Firstly, the study examines the extent to
which it is possible to have sub-nationalism in a Federal system focussing
on a separate unit of the Federation, but not directed into a separate
nation. As it will become apparent in the study, the M-Belt identity was an
identity within an identity in both the North and in the political
conception of the Nigerian nation-state as a Federation. The strength of
emotions which surrounded the conceptions of the M-Belt religious and
political identity, in terms of its demands on the system were only
comparable to the Indian Federation where regional and provincial
Identities tend to wish separation with almost equal vigour from the
existing units. The second theme in the study is that of a religious
identity of Christians, supported by non-Moslems against Muslims in the
North in a demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region as a unit of the
Nigerian Federation. However, this Christian religious identity is not able
to express itself overtly on the political arena at both the regional and
national level, except at rare intervals. This is so because both the
British colonial regime and the evolving Nigerian political culture,
discouraged political parties and organizations with explicitly religious
identities. Nevertheless, although the identity is submerged, it is
powerfully reinforced by tribal identities and the unique geographical
setting of the areas it exists on. The religious and political identity of
the M-Belt movement also drew its strength from a situation of percieved
socio-economic and political deprivations and the subordinate status of the
non-Islamic groups in the North. These latter circumstances of the M-Belt
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groups, in some ways conform to a situation of internal colonialism in the
North. The study uses the theory of internal colonialism as a model in the
analysis of researched evidence to explain the causes for the activation of
the M-Belt religious and political identity in the demands for the creation
of a M-Belt region and as a political force in Nigerian politics.
II. The theoretical perspectives of conflict models in the analysis of the
problems of politics in the plural society of Northern Nigeria.
The existence of a plural society is an essential condition for the
analysis of political problems with conflict models. This is particularly
the case with the theory of internal colonialism which suggests that a
situation of plurality exists with inequalities among the group members of
a society. This in turn produces potential and sometimes, actual unequal
socio-economic and political relationships between the different cultural
collectivities and as these relationships polarize interests between the
political groups, they also generate conflict. The conflict is essentially
one between dominant groups who subordinate other groups in the system I .
The North in Nigeria comprised the highest socio-political and
religious plurality of any of the regional units of the Federation. There
were over 200 different tribal groups in the Region. Two universal
religions existed side by side of each other: Islam and Christianity.
Christianity itself in the North was characterized by between seven to
twelve different denominations among three different groups: Roman
Catholics, Protestants and "indigenous African Christianity" (churches).
Furthermore, Protestants had about nine different denominations which
operated in the North 2 . Islam too had its own divisions and these varied
along two main lines: the brotherhoods of the Kadiriya and the Tijania
Muslims. Besides the variety of the two universal religions there were also
many traditional African systems of beliefs and religion, differently
practiced by the over 200 tribal groups, the so called "pagan and
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animiitic" religions. The situation of plurality in the North obviously had
enomous potential for severe political conflict, particularly so when the
cultural groups were unequal in size and socio-ecomimc and political
development.
However most of the plurality in the North was contained in the M-Belt
areas, where the tribal groups were many (over 150), smaller in numerical
size and territory - the most dominant of the minorities being the Tiv
(4.6% of the population in the North in 1952), the Igalla (1.7%), the Idoma
(1.6%) and the Birom (0.7%) 3 . The M-Belt areas comprised 26.3% of the
population of the North in 1952, 35.9% of the land area and 13.5% of the
Nigerian population 4. The Islamic society in the North, was therefore
bigger in territorial size and more homogeneous in culture than the M-Belt
areas. The homogenuity of the Islamic society derived from linguistic
uniformity (the Hausa language), similarities of culture and life style
(from the influences of the Islamic culture established as early as in the
11th century) and most importantly, the Islamic religion submerged tribal
identities between the dominant Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri-Ilorin-Yoruba and Nupe
groups. The Hausa comprised (31.7% of the population of the North), Fulani
(16.5%), the Kanuri (7.5%), the Yoruba of Ilorin (2.4%) and the Nupe
(1.9%) 5 . The territories of te Islamic Society covered about 61.6% of the
land area in the North, excluding the Yoruba irredentist areas of Ilorin
and Kabba Provinces and 30.8% of the Nigerian population 6 . However, the
North as a whole comprised 78% of the land area of Nigeria, over 52% of the
Nigerian population and 50% of the 24 Nigerian Provinces, as the
administrative units of the regional government in 1952.7
 The two broadly
categorized groups in the territories of the North, the Islamic Society and
the M-Belt groups, are the focus of the analysis of political conflict
which this study examines with the provisions of the conflict model as
suggested by the theory of internal colonialism.
The theory of internal colonialism derives from the general theory of
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classical colonialism as a social, economic and political system. It also
has to do with colonization as a process as was practiced in particular by
European nations on Asia, Latin America and Africa, in which there was
forceful occupation of foreign-land, followed by establishment of political
control and domination, exploitation, oppression, discrimination, prejudice
in social relations etc., by a foreign minority over an indigenous
majority. The theory of internal colonialism is the theory of colonialism
applied with some modification to analyze the structural political
relationships between unequal groups, within the same national borders, in
which some groups exist in a colonial situation and who, when they gain
consciousness on their circumstaces, they organize themselves politically
for liberation by demanding separation. This can be separation to
constitute a new nation, as it is the case with the Basque separatist
movement in Spain,Eritrean separatism in Ethiopia and the previous demands
of the SNP for the Scots in British politics; or when the type of political
• system itself conditions the patterns of political demands, as was the case
with the M-Belt groups, where separation was demanded for constitution into
another unit of the Nigerian Federation. The theory has been applied to
countries with minorities problems as diverse in political systems as the
USSR, South Africa, China, Italy, USA, Kenya, the UK, Canada and most of
the South American countries with Indian minority problems8 . According to
George Balandier, the colonial situation is one in which a particular
society exhibits two notable characteristics: there is a colonized society
which has an overwhelming numerical superiority and secondly, such
numerical superiority is characterized by radical domination to which it is
subjected9 . Although in the colonial situation, the colonized society is in
the numerical majority, it is nevertheless a sociological minority. This is
so, because:
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"Colonization means power which entails the
loss of autonomy and a de jure or de facto
trusteeship. The function of each segments of
the colonial society is to ensure domination in
a well defined domain (political, economic and
almost always spiritual). The subordination of
the colonized society, is for along time
absolute, because of its lack of advanced
technology and of material might, other than
that of numbers. This subordination is
expressed both de factor and de jure. It rests
on an ideology, a system of
pseudo-justification and rationalization, it
has more or less avowed or manifest racist
basis. The colonized society is subjected to
the pressure of all the groups constituting the
"colony". All these groups are in some way
superordinate in relation to the colonized
whose subjection is thereby felt all the more.
For the colonials, the colonized are above all
an insturment for the creation of a wealth of
which they retain only a small part, in spite
of their numbers. This role conditions in part,
the relations of the colonized with the various
colonial groups, which derive that economic
privileges from the colonized society. Because
of the lack of unity of the colonized society
and even more so, because of its cultural
heterogeneity, the relationships between the
exploiter and the exploited, between the
dominant and the dominated are anything but
simple... The colonized society is different
from the colonial society by race and
culture.., expressed in the language by
opposition of 'primitive' and civilized,
'pagan' and Christi, 'backward' cultures and
technical cultures" .
One of the most severe critisms the theory of internal colonialism has
faced as avariant of the conflict models in the analysis of problems of
politics in the plural society has been that it is inconcieveable to have
colonialism within the very boundaries of a nation-state
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. It is pointed
out that colonialism and colony are normally associated with a land and a
people subjected to and physically separated geographically from the
'Mother-Country'. The significant empirical differences in the history and
social conditions in the 'Mother-Country and Colony-Country' conception of
colonialism are also pointed to, as obscurantist and misleading in the
analogy 12 . Under colonialism,it is further argued, the colony is a source
of cheaply produced raw materials such as agricultural produce and
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minerals, which the 'Mother-Country' processes into finished products and
sells at high profits sometimes back to the colony 13 . The colony itself is
also a source of cheap labour, both within the 'colony-country', used for
construction work and mining activities, as much as in the 'Mother-Country'
where it is used to work in textile industries, dockyards and other
'low-status' jobs, as was the case in Britian after 1945 when West Indian
immigrants were encouraged to take up new opportunities in Lancaster,
Liverpool, London and Manchester. Obviously, it would be overstretching the
theory of colonialism in internal coloinalism beyond usefulness and forcing
the analogy into a situation that does not fit, if all the elements were to
be applied wholesale without modification on the experiences of the M-Belt
groups in their relations with the Islamic society in the North, in order
to produce explanatory reasons for the causes of the M-Belt movement in the
demands for the creation of a M-Belt region. Suffice to say, the above
features in the critique of internal colonialism from the pattern of
classical colonial types of relationships, do not apply to the
relationships that existed between the Islamic society and the M-Belt
groups in the North of Nigeria. The conventional critiques of the theory of
internal colonialism are useful to the extent that they point to the
significant differences between internal patterns of colonialism, that is,
colonialism within national borders or a unit of a Federation like the
North in Nigeria and the overseas situation in which colonialism is
superimposed over all in the Nation-State. In using the theory of internal
colonialsim, it is the objective colonial relationships which are vital and
which count in the analogy and from which parrallels are drawn rather than
the dramatic geographical differences between European Colonial Creations
and the European Nations. The theory is useful as an analytical category,
because it provides a more adequate framework, when compared to the
conflict - consensus models, in the description of how some groups relate
to the larger whole, not as participants who belong, but as resources to be
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exploited, administered and sometimes mobilized, not as loyal citizens, but
as cannon-fodder, in a situation in which the state can act as an
antonomous factor in transforming or reinforcing the social order 14 .
However, it is not suggested that the theory explains every aspect of the
M-Belt movement and the political identity it activated in the cause of the
demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in Nigerian political
development. The powerful analytical thrust of the theory ends with the
destruction of the control and domination of the Hausa-Fulani Muslims on
the M-Belt areas in 1967, when the North and Nigeria was re-arranged from a
four to a twelve - unit structure of the Nigerian Federation.
There are therefore numerous elements of the general theory of
colonialism, to suggest that the M-Belt groups existed in a situation of
internal colonialism in relation to the Islamic society, within the very
boundaries of the British created North after 1900. These explain the
reaction of the M-Belt groups in the organization of a political movement
that demanded for separation from the Islamic society and their
constitution into a M-Belt Region as a unit of the Nigerian Federation in
the period between 1949 and 1967. In the period predating British
establishment of the North, as from 1804 there existed an indigenous
Islamic colonial system which made socio-economic and political thrusts of
conquest toward the M-Belt areas from Sokoto. This indigenous colonial
system established a centre and a periphery to which it assigned surrogates
to manage the periphery on the claimed territories both those already
conquered and others still unconquered. The conquest of the periphery was
followed in most instances by colonization and this affected the M-Belt
groups in Adamawa, Southern Bauchi, some parts of the Plateau (Kanam, Wase,
Dengi, Lafia, Keffi, Jemaa) as well as the Northern parts of Tiv and Idoma
land. The political rulership and the judicial administration of the
conquered areas with a colonizing population was in most instances
Hausa-Fulani and Islamic. In certain instances, however, the Islamic rulers
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established political control through an 'indirect rule' system, as was the
case with the Angas in Kanam, the Yergam in Wase and Dengi. The Tiv and the
Idoma in the Benue valley and most of the groups on the Plateau, however,
maintained their independence, although occassionally raided for slaves.
Some, more often than others, as was the case with the Plateau group when
compared to the Tiv and Idoma. An indigenous colonial system within the
very political boundaries of the British created North, therefore,
conditioned internal colonialism when the Islamic society and the M-Belt
groups were enclosed into one political unit. In the instance political
power relationships were modified and in certain instances remained
unaltered and were even reinforced to the advantages of the Islamic society
under Muslim leadership in the particular application of the British policy
of indirect rule.
The historical evidence suggests that in an earlier period and in the
particular period between 1804 and 1900 as part of the causes for the
organization of the M-Belt movement and the activated political identities
it used to gain support, the socio-economic and political experiences in
the relationships of the M-Belt groups and societies with the Islamic
Societies (Sokoto and Bomb) in the territories that came to be defined as
the North in Nigeria, might best be described and explained in terms of
imperialism and colonialism. These experiences were latterly recollected
and they reinforced social and political support for the M-Belt movement
and the religious and political identity in the organization in the demands
for the creation of a M-Belt Region. The years between 1900 and 1950,
however, was a period in which both the indigeneous colonial system and
some of its victims, became forcefully incorporated into one political unit
of the North, upon impact with British and European influences through
conquest and persuation. In that period conditions were created from the
military and political measures of the government of British administration
in which the M-Belt groups existed subordinated to the indigenous colonial
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system in the Islamic society. These conditions of subordination, created a
premise for the M-Belt groups to exist as internal colonies in relation to
the Islamic society. Although the period between 1950 and 1967 contained
very many political complexities and was characterized by a measure of
political skills that were meant to reduce political consciousness (by
careful building of patron-client relationships in the political
recruitment of leadership from the M-Belt areas) on the patterns and shapes
in the development of society in the North (the Western European type as
was the case in the M-Belt areas as against the Islamic model in the rest
of the North), it is appropriately described as one in which there was
internal colonialism, with the M-Belt groups existing in a dependent and
subordinate position in relationship to the Islamic Society. The evidence
of that period, which is the main thrust of the study, suggests that there
was not only dependence and subordination, but the M-Belt groups were
considered to be and treated as 'second-class' citizens of the North by the
Islamic society. The increasing methods to consolidate the dominance of the
Islamic society and dependence of the M-Belt groups in the midst of
anxieties over British departure, had an implicit, although at times an
explicit alliance between, on the one hand, the sponsoring imperial power
of Britain and Islamic leadership with roots from the indigenous colonial
system in the Islamic society of the North; and on the other hand, between
clients drawn from among the M-Belt groups and political leadership of the
Islamic Society. This was particularly manifested in the recruitment of
leadership and political participation in governance of the North albeit
the Nigerian Federation which came from the NPC party, the party of the
Northern establishment. There is evidence which suggests that British
imperialism in the North, was not only colonialism between the
metropolitian country and the artificially created North, which
subsequently was part of the Nigerian political state 15 ; but it was also
and resulted into internal colonial relationships of a dominant indigenous
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group in the Islamic society with the British in support as
'joint-political-masters', on the subordinated M-Belt groups who had been
territorially incorporated in the political unit of the North. The
dependency of the M-Belt groups within the dependency of the Islamic
society on the British, resulted into the unequal development of some
sections of the North with concommitant consequences of the failure of
social and political incorporation of some of the M-Belt groups into the
Islamic society and culture, despite the success of territorial
Incorporation. The political struggle of these groups (indirectly involving
the British, but primarily between the Islamic and the M-Belt groups) in
the politics of the North and Nigeria, ultimately led to the development of
control and dependency in the allocation of socio-economic and political
derivations from governments in which political status conceptions rooted
in specific political identities conditioned the rulership of one group
(collectively the M-Belt areas) by the other (the Islamic society). It was
in this situation that the M-Belt groups found themselves as malcontents
and their grievances subsequently became articulated by Christian
leadership in the M-Belt Movement in the demands for the creation of a
M-Belt Region to adjust for their inequalities.
However, compounding the general patterns of inequalities in the
socio-economic and political development of groups and societies in the
North, in the context of the growth of conditions of internal colonial
relations from the period between 1900 and 1950 in the subsequent
functioning of the M-Belt groups as internal colonies in the period between
1950 and 1967, there is also evidence that suggests migration and
colonization from the Islamic Society to territories that were
unequivocally M-Belt. The social effects of this migration was
characterized by a systematic physical subjugation and dehumanization of
the cultures of the non-Islamic, non- Hausa-Fulani groups and in
particular, those of the M-Belt areas in the North. There is evidence which
further suggests that the processes in the systematic destruction of the
cultures of some of the M-Belt groups, took roots from and were shaped by
the ideology of the expansion of the Islamic society after 1804 when it was
in its period of classical colonialism under the Fulani and their surrogate
leadership. However the process was a religious and political parcel of the
political processes of incorporation of the non-Islamic groups that took
place in the region.
These processes were accelerated in the period of British conquest and
by the subsequent political measures in the administrative policies that
were used to control the direction of the incorporation of the M-Belt
groups into the Islamic society and in the evolving political identity of
the North as a premise of unity. The initial policy of indirect rule, for
example, laid exquicit claims to rulership on the colonizing Islamic
population in the M-Belt areas in the period between 1900 and 1930. However
in the late 1930s and in the 1940s, there was resurgence of tribal identity
from among the M-Belt groups which was used to make demands for the
institutions of "Chieftaincies like Emirs", the symbol of the policy of
indirect rule and which also served as the symbol of tribal unity. There is
also evidence to suggest that in the same period, in the midst of
accelerated processes of social and political incorporation of the M-Belt
groups and societies into the Islamic society and culture by the government
of British administration in the North, the social and religious activities
of European Christian Missionaries were encouraged in the M-Belt areas and
these altered the 'World Views' and,created popular consciousness in the
population that was non-Islamic in the M-Belt areas. European Christian
Missionaries established institutions and values that contained attractions
to European and British patterns of transforming society in the M-Belt
areas. It was the Christian religious activities of European Missionaries
that caused popular consciousness on the patterns of dominance and the
developing shape of society in the North, to permeate and activate the
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articulation of the difference in social and political identity between the
M-Belt groups and the Islamic society. This consciousness was reinforced by
a sense of relative deprivation when there existed a developed Islamic
sector with prestigious norms, rooted in a proud cultural tradition of
Islam, universally contesting with Christianity and Western European
culture and a culturally undeveloped M-Belt area developing with
conflictful images of its own culture and the European type. In the midst
of these images there was underdevelopment of socio-economic and welfare
infrastructure in the M-Belt areas. The differences in political roles and
participation in the institutions of society in the North from deprivation
were assumed to be the causes of the underdevelopment of the M-Belt areas.
It was the perceptions of these differences that caused the organizationof
a M-Belt Movement.
The deriveable variables as indicators of these perceptions are used
in the study to suggest that the political demands for separation from the
Islamic society in the North and constitution into a M-Belt Region as
another unit of the Nigerian Federation in the political articulation of
the M-Belt groups in the M-Belt movement was conditioned by socio-economic
and political inequalities. Uneven development in the historical
progression of the development of groups and societies in the territories
that became the North in Nigeria are therefore taken to be the most
determinate factors in the explanation of the causes of the M-Belt movement
and the demands of separation from the Islamic society. The mobilization of
the Christian religious identity as a political identity of minorities
among the M-Belt groups and societies was conditioned by the conceptions of
a minority Christian religion and cultures in relation to their access to
control of political power and participatory roles in decision making in
Goverment in the North and Nigeria as it affected the distribution of
development relative to the Islamic society and as they were related to the
distribution of uneven development in the North which affected the M-Belt
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groups. The initial political force of the Christian religious identity was
reinforced as a political identity of non-Muslims by historical
recollections of experiences in socio-economic and political relationships
of the M-Belt groups with Islamic leadership or its surrogates from the
Islamic society. This was subsequently boosted by perceptions in the
unequal distribution of social-welfare and economic infrastructure in the
modernization patterns that were taking place in the North. The matrix of
the causal variables in the analysis of the M-Belt Movement and the causes
of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt movement therefore centre on:
uneven development of some sections of the North, mainly the M-Belt areas,
which conditioned the activation and mobilization of the Christian
religious identity as a political identity among the European educated
persons, indigenous to the M-Belt areas. These persons then organized a
M-Belt movement in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. The
political problems in the politics of the demands for the creation of a
M-Belt Region, as a unit of the Nigerian Federation, among some of the
causes, was Nigerian political development with Federation itself, whose
unit of the North contained a system of dominance and exploitation (not in
the Marxian economic sense) that developed from the partial political
incorporation of some of the M-Belt groups. This in one respect, was a
result of the state-formation processes that existed in the territories
that became the North in 1900.
However, the system of dominance and exploitation was reinforced and
partially consolidation in the first fifty years of direct British a
administration of the North and Nigeria. A further hypothesis therefore is:
British and European influences in the North laid the foundation of an
unequal modern social order in which a rapidly modernizing and socially
mobilized population in the M-Belt areas accepted European patterns of
development with a Christian religious identity existed in subordination to
a conservative Islamic leadership and society. The existence of the
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Christian religious identity which combined, with already nurtured tribal
political identities subsequently fed into the M-Belt movement, to produce
political consciousness on the internal colonial situation of non-Islamic
groups in the North, particularly those of the M-Belt groups. The M-Belt
groups, therefore, sought political action in the organization of a M-Belt
movement, to demand the creation of a M-Belt Region in the search for
solutions to their socio-economic and political problems in the prestigious
federal arrangements of the Nigerian political state. However, underlining
the conceptions of the M-Belt political identity in Nigerian politics, was
Christian solidarity in the religious identity of the M-Belt movement as it
contrasted with the Islamic identity in the North. Northern Christians,
therefore, developed from this premise to hold a delicate political and
social balance of power, between the Islamic society and Southern Nigerian
groups over the potential of Islamic hegemony in Nigeria.
The analysis of the M-Belt movement with the internal colonial
analogy,	 produces a framework with which the movement is viewed
and explained as one whole collective process of reaction to the dominant
Islamic society by the M-Belt minorities of the North. This is unlike the
case with what has characterized previous studies of the M-Belt movement.
III. Previous Perspectives in the Academic Literature on the M-Belt
Movement
The political influences of the M-Belt movement in Nigerian political
development have never been studied in any systematic way to produce one
whole thematic picture of the interplay of religious and subnational
political identities it activated in the causes of its demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region. The academic literature on the M-Belt
movement, particularly the empirical work of M.J. Dent on the Tiv and the
UMBC party under the leadership of Joseph Tarka 16 , as well as the
non-academic studies of previous research on the M-Belt movement, have
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focussed on particular tribal reactions to domination of the Islamic
society in the North and largely by-passed the analysis of the content and
the political force of the wider religious and political identity of the
M-Belt groups as minorities in Nigerian politics. Except for the research
of Tseayo on the Tiv, which used the sociological theory of 'encapsulation,
incorporation and integration', and that by Okpu on all minorities
movements in Nigeria, which used the 'incompatibility, response and
confrontation' model, most other studies of the movement have been outside
theoretical considerations 17 . The bulk of the academic studies of Nigerian
politics, however, have simply brought to the focus of general knowledge on
the existence of the M-Belt problem in the North in Nigerian politics and
the M-Belt movement alongside of their main themes without analysis of the
political identity of the movement itself 18 . The mode of analysis in most
of these previous studies on the M-Belt movement, however, are underlined
by conflict-consensus models which derive from the theories of politics in
the plural society.
Most plural theories are essentially concerned with the achievement of
stability or "equilibrium" in deeply divided societies, characterized by
organizational interest groups 19 . Plural theories in general are
equilibrium theories of society20 . They predict political premises of
stability or non-stability however conceived. Thus, for example, a
pluralistic model of society emphasizes the divisiveness and conflict
aspect of social life. It also emphasizes the relationships between
deprived minorities and dominant elitist groups as well as an integrative
aspect of society where the emphasis is put on the different functions
groups perform within an overall unified social system 21 . In most
instances, however, this concerns occupational rather than cultural
interest groups and not the interplay of specific loyalties and political
identities over objective cultural sections. This is particularly so for
the conflict-consensus model of politics in the plural society. It has
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emphatic assumptions that social integration is the ultimate goal of
society and that integration is attainable and attained on the basis of
widespread identification with a representative value system 22 . These
assumptions, however, do not adequately take account of a situation where
different groups have been malintegrated into the wider society from
differential paths and patterns of political and territorial incorporation,
In some instances forcefully achieved with bitter recollections.
Furthermore, neither do these assumptions take account of whether the
existing political arrangements as they affect the varying interests of the
plural sections in a given society, have been accepted or imposed and
therefore still contested, even if such a situation was maintained with
force
23
. Plural theories in general, therefore, assume a static conception
of society, where the essence of society is stability for development 24 .
These assumptions are rather idealistic and decidedly optimistic as a model
of social change, particularly in the Third World Nation-States and they do
not seem to square with what was happening in the North in the period
between 1949 and 1967 and with many separatist movements in different parts
of the world today - India for example or Spain and Ethiopia. In other
words, while the plural theory of society predicts that integration takes
place in the society, the reverse is infact perenial. ly the empirical case
of observation25 , particularly in the persistance of the demands of the
M-Belt movement until 1967 and the increasing demands for further
subdivision of the Nigerian Federation in the 1980s although temporarily
suppressed by the Military Regime in 1983.
The contention therefore is that if the theories of the plural society
and their underlining assumptions, as particularly reflected in the
conflict-consensus model explain the conflict management in a deeply
divided society as characterized the North, then we would expect that there
might not have existed a M-Belt movement demanding separation from the
Islamic society and constitution into a M-Belt Region. In other words, a
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moving consensus would have been mediated by the dominant elite from the
different plural sections in the North, to resolve whatever political
tensions existed in the society that generated conflict. This would have
preserved the North as one political entity. However, although plural
theories explain conflict management, as particularly suggested by the
conflict-consensus model, such explanations are only plausible, when, for
example political arrangements (who is leader over who and where) are
accepted by the different plural sections and by the pluralism that may
exist in the given society. Apparantly it is from these perspectives of
plural theories that some of the tribal reactions of the M-Belt groups have
been examined and explained in previous studies of the M-Belt movement.
These studies have emphasized certain singularly specific tribal identities
in the M-Belt movement in the general reaction of the M-Belt groups to
domination from the Islamic society in the North. However, the study of the
M-Belt movement with the theory of internal colonialism as a framework to
guide the collection and analysis of data was more attractive and
acceptable; not only because it adequately handles the analysis of the
whole movement with more variables that affected almost all of the M-Belt
groups and therefore, the study hopes to fill the existing gap, in the
present vacuum of academic knowledge on the movement as one collective
organization, despite its internal variation and unities; bot also because
there is not any previous overall analysis of the causal factors with a
singularly specific theory which produces explanatory reasons for the
fairly uniform reaction to the common grievances of all of the M-Belt
groups. This framework, therefore, fundamentally takes into account the
historical context of socio-economic and political development which
established unequal relationships on the M-Belt groups in the North,
particularly the existence of an indigenous colonial system. However, this
is not an invented variable. James Coleman, in his analysis of factors that
caused nationalism in the M-Belt areas, suggests that British policy in the
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North, unique to the rest of Nigeria: "in the pagan Middle Belt legitimized
an indigenous imperial system"
26
.
However, the existing studies on the M-Belt movement have focussed on
the political roles of the numerical dominant groups in the M-Belt areas,
such as the Tiv, Idoma, Birom and areas like the Kagoro in Southern
Zaria27 . The studies examined how these non-Islamic groups raised specific
socio-economic and political grievances and how they related to themselves
In the political support to the M-Belt movement and supported its demands
for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the period betwen 1949 and 1967 by
building up tribal identities, which they mobilized as support for the
M-Belt movement. The Tiv, for example who constituted "a majority of the
minorities" of the M-Belt groups and who subsequently produced dynamic
political leadership with strong grassroots support in the demands of the
M-Belt movement, have been empirically studied in great detail. This has
been largely done by M.J. Dent, who utilized his personal political
experiences, having been on-the-spot in the period of Tiv 'total' support
for the M-Belt movement during his colonial service as District Officer
(D.O. Tiv) 28 . Dent also used his specialized research techniques to study
and analyze Tiv social structure as it related to their reasons for
commitment to support the leadership of J.S. Tarka of the UMBC party, after
1956 which he suggests also caused the persistence of the demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region, until 1967 when Benue-Plateau State was
created as an autonomous political unit of the Nigerian Federation 29 . In
most of the academic writing of M.J. Dent on Nigerian politics, the Tiv
have been given attention, because of their strategic geographical location
in the "centre" of Nigeria and thus being in a position to influence the
dominant groups in both the North and South of Nigeria. His empirical
studies produced many of the variables in the experiences of the Tiv, which
this study uses to analyze other M-Belt groups in the M-Belt movement. J.I.
Tseayo, has also produced research that focusses on the 1iv 30 . In 1975 he
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analyzed Tiv reaction to forceful political incorporation processes into
the Islamic society that were effected within the very boundaries of the
North upon impact with British influences in 1900. Tseayo produced
explanatory reasons for Tiv reaction to subordination in the North and
their political support for the M-Belt movement in its phase as the UMBC
party after 1956 and particularly, Tiv support for the ideas of the
creation of a M-Belt Region 31 . Other previous academic perspectives in the
literature on the M-Belt movement and its political demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region in the North have relied on the findings of a
single theme: Hausa-Fulani Islamic domination and resistance to Islamic
Institutions, largely introduced by the work of James Coleman 32 . The
variable "domination by Hausa-Fulani" on the M-Belt groups in the North has
hardly been related to other significant causal factors for the
organization of the M-Belt movement, whereas infact, there existed a matrix
of causation to the phenoma. There has been, for example, very little
examination and explanation of the relationships between the nature and
shape of Hausa-Fulani and Islamic domination of the M-Belt groups after the
British creation of the North in 1900 and the historically recollected
experiences from the patterns of dominance on some of the M-Belt groups as
a direct result of the state formation processes that characterized the
region before impact with Western European influences. Similarly there has
been little examination of the M-Belt movement in terms of the political
means that it employed to demonstrate a preference to European Christian
civilization with concomitant consequences of rejection to the increasing
influences of some aspects of Hausa-Fulani and Islamic cultural forms. In
other words, most of the previous studies on the M-Belt movement have
narrowed their researches to examining the events and actions of the period
between1950 and 1967 when there existed "modern forms" of organized
political resistance to Hausa-Fulani and Islamic domination or resistance
to the group described as "the Northern System" consisting of the Hausa,
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Fulani, Nupe and Kanuri 33 . Before 1900 however there is evidence which
suggests that there existed traditional resistance from each of the M-Belt
groups to Hausa-Fulani and Islamic social and political incorporation
processes, processes that were characterized by the establishment of
dominance and subordination of non-Islamic cultures, particularly so, in
the period between 1804 and 1900. In the period between 1900 and 1950,
however, traditional resistance to social and political incorporation into
the Islamic society in the North was mediated by British control of the
state apparatus. This state apparatus was used to enforce law and order, a
premise of control on all groups in the North which produced increased
advantages in the diffusion of the Hausa-Fulani and Islamic culture over
some of the M-Belt groups.
Further to the existing vacuum in knowledge on the political identity
of the M-Belt movement, there has been considerable exclusion of
examination and analysis of the purposes of Christianity and its
socio-political influences on the M-Belt groups. The effects of
Christianity were critical factors that shaped and altered the traditional
world views of the people in the M-Belt areas in relation to the Islamic
religion, culture and patterns of socio-economic and political development.
The study therefore analyzes the influences and effects of Western European
education and Christianity as a fundamental independent factor of change in
the causes for the organization of the M-Belt movement in the demands for
the creation of a M-Belt Region. Two basic factors are therefore analyzed
as they related to the developments in the political organization of the
M-Belt movement: modernization as the causes of minorities Christian
consciousness in the North, with Western European skills and the
perceptions of socio-economic and welfare infrastructural underdevelopment
of the M-Belt areas. This is so, because in the formative phases of the
ft-Belt movement, Christianity was congruent with Western educational
influences. Persons with Western education used the Christian religious
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identity as a political identity which was mobilized and directed at
Christians generally and particularly Christians with Western European
education as well as persons with non-Western European education, who
adhered to traditional systems of African beliefs on religion, in the
perceptions of underdevelopment of the M-Belt areas. The intensions of the
mobilization of the particular identity on the targetted population was
meant to gain the political support for the ideas of the creation of a
M-Belt Region as a unit of the Nigerian Federation. Indeed the founding
fathers of the M-Belt movement saw the initial struggle for the creation of
a M-Belt Region as a struggle for the creation of a Christian Region in the
same sense of the creation of a 'Christian Zone' in the North that was
developed from the purposes of Christianity for Africa whose aims were to
halt the southward advance of Islam in the 'Sudan Belt'. Besides this
intension in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, however, the
variables 'Hausa-Fulani and Islamic domination' of the M-Belt groups, is
admitted into this study as an important causal factor in the explanation
of the political reactions of the non-Islamic groups in the organization of
the M-Belt movement. The evidence in the study suggests that this
domination permeated popular consciousness which subsequently conditioned
political demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region as from 1950, only
after Christianity had developed a European educated elite and leadership
that was indigenous to the M-Belt areas. This domination, however, was
within the context of a historical progression of the exploitative
relationships between the Islamic societies and the . M-Belt groups, a
historical progression of past events that were constantly recollected and
compounded the grievances that were articulated by the M-Belt movement and
which previous studies have curiously ignored in their analysis. In other
words, the internal social and political dynamics of culture contact and
the tensions that derived from the expansion of Islam over some of the
M-Belt groups in the incorporation processes that historically4reaecIthe
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region, as well as the subsequent culture change from traditional systems
to European patterns, developed from the influences of Christian Missionary
activities, which had the concomitant consequence of rejection of Islamic
patterns, were equally causal, as intervening variables as Hausa-Fulani
domination in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region.
Thus, while most previous academic studies of the M-Belt movement
focussed attention on analyzing mono-causal variable relationships, this
study takes a multi-variate approach in producing explanatory reasons for
the emergence of the political organization and its demands for the
subdivison of the Nigerian Federation into smaller units such that in the
process it was anticipated that a M-Belt Region might be created. The
study, therefore, focusses its analysis on the interplay of the following
variables as causes for the M-Belt movement in the specific period between
1949 and 1967: (1) Hausa-Fulani domination, manifested in the composition
and ideology of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) party which controlled
the institutions of governance and government in the Nigerian political
state. (2) The political anxieties that were created by anticipated British
departure after 1950. (3) The socio-religious and political influences of
Christian Missionary activities on the M-Belt groups. (4) The political
consequences of the intrusion of Nigerian Nationalist activities from
Southern Nigerian based political parties, which activated tribal political
organizations among the M-Belt groups. (5) The interplay of these factors
on the perceptions of government activities, the developed sense of
relative deprivation over socio-economic and welfare infrastructure and the
distribution of modern European amenities among the M-Belt groups which
conditioned unequal development of their sections of society in the North..
However, in analyzing the researched evidence, the study was guided by the
awareness that socio-political movements such as the M-Belt movement, are
more complex in their causation than any single or multi-variable causation
may suggest in producing total explanatory reasons of the organization and
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its demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. In the analysis,
particular focus is therefore made on: the structural as well as the
attitudinal aspects of the causes of political tensions in the North; to the
historical antecedents of the social and political attitudes as they
affected the polarization of society in the North and the political
Identity of the regimes that have performed the functions of government in
the North and Nigeria and their effects on the political identity of the
M-Belt.
IV. Methodological issues and data base of the research.
This study of the M-Belt movement is ex-post facto research, although
the current wave of the M-Belt religious and political identity in Nigerian
politics remains a political force. The research was therefore library
based: Libraries in Academic institutions (Jos, Zaria, Ibadan), Government
archives (London, Kaduna, Jos) and personal individual libraries of
dramatis personea on the M-Belt movement as well as Christian Missionary
were msed•
Libraries in Jo)(. The methodology of inquire was therefore focussed on
political history of the North in search for the common causes of the
M-Belt Movement. The facts in the common historical experiences of the
M-Belt groups were interpreted in the particular context of the religious
and political identity under study. The objective of the research were both
modest and at the same time ambitious: that of reorganizing presently
existing data already known to experts in the field such that a wholely
different picture of the M-Belt movement is arrived at and at the same time
the production of new empirical data and new interpretation of previously
ignored aspects of the movement within a different framework of analysis.
Both primary and secondary sources in the political history of the
North that affected the M-Belt groups were used. Political party
manifestoes, party political newspapers: the Middle Belt Hearld and the Tiv
s Icharagh s
 were used. Both sources were subjected to internal as well as
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external criticism. There is an extensive use of direct quotations from the
primary sources. Care was taken to cite only the most unimpeacheable
testimony from the texts.
Official government publications dating from 1904 were also used in
the research and these produced vital statistical source material. This was
vital for the particular period between 1950 and 1965 when there was need
to measure distribution of government benefit as it affected the M-Belt
groups in the North. Two elections were examined and both primary and
secondary sources were used to produce statistical tables for the 1959 and
1979 electoral patterns in the M-Belt areas in the North as well as how
they related to the rest of the country.
These sources were complemented by personal interview discussions with
politicians that participated in the politics of the M-Belt movement from
both the Islamic society and the M-Belt areas. Two political events in the
period of my field work affected the research climate. In December 1980
there was the fanatical Islamic uprising in Kano. Although many people were
killed it was alleged that many more had escaped to other urban centres of
the North including Jos, Makurdi, Yola, Bauchi, Kaduna, Zaria and Gboko,
where I had schedule interviews. Many of the politicians in these areas,
therefore, approached my subject matter with caution, particularly its
religious dimension on the differences between Islam and Christianity.
Secondly in Plateau state there was the curious demand in 1981 for the
creation of 'a middle-belt state' in the Southern parts of the state. Top
government politicians including the Governor of Plateau state were
reluctant to discuss topics with the word 'Middle-Belt' in the subject
matter: "in order not to give the existing political movement undue
publicity in any research with that word!", Where politicians of the
previous period of the M-Belt movement were reluctant to talk of the past
their political party identity was derived from studying their statements
from the Northern House of Assembly Hausards and those of the Federal House
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of Representative in Lagos, which were found in the National Archives in
Kaduna, Ibadan and Jos. As much as there was effort to produce a clean data
set in the report of the study, the historical scope of the study (1804 -
1967), and financial constraints might have impossed obvious limitations on
perfection.
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CHAPTER 5.
The socio-economic and political relationships of an indigenous
Islamic colonial system over the non-Islamic groups and societies
in the territories that became The North upon British creation
in 1900.
"What, have you no slaves in England? What do you then for
servants? God is great! ... You are a beautiful people. I
will give the King of England a place on the coast to build
a town ... God has given me all the land of the infidels."1
I Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the socio-economic
and political consequences in the spread of Islam as part of the
political problems that developed from incorporation processes which
historically affected groups and societies existing before 1900 in
the territories that became defined as The North upon impact with
British influences in 1900. One consequence of the spread of Islam
in the region before 1900, is in the recollected histories of socio-
economic and political relationships and experiences, in which groups
and societies that admitted Islam and accepted it as a religion in
their society developed and became dominant while the non-Islamic
groups and societies remained undeveloped and underdeveloped relative
to the Islamic societies and were subordinated to Islamic political
authority. The majority of the non-Islamic groups and societies in
the territories that became defined as The North were concentrated
in the areas defined BS 'the political M-Belt' in this study, rather
than the geographical middlebelt of the Nigerian Federation. Upon
impact with British influences in 1900, The North developed to become
dominant in politics as well as an outsized political Unit of the
Nigerian Federation.
1.	 Sultan Mohammed Bello to Captain Vimgh Clapperton in Sokoto in 1824,
cited in E.W. Bovill, The Niger Explored, London 1968 p.132-134
In the period before 1804 and between 1804 and 1900, the
political processes of incorporation set into motion by the spread
of Islam in the region successfully integrated the Hausa, Fulani and
Nupe into an Islamic Oulture. These groups and societies were numeri-
cally dominant among others and they developed to become 'a political
society' in the territories of The North. Some of the "majority" of
the "numerical minority (' groups and societies in The North however
experienced partial political incorporation into the Islamic culture.
Many other groups and societies in the region were never religiously
and politically incorporated by Islam into the Islamic culture before
impact with British influences in 1900. Subsequently in the period
between 1900 and 1950 the Kanuri, another numerically dominant Islamic
group and society concentrated in Borno became successfully incor-
porated into the Islamic society established in 1804 by dan Fodio
and into politics of The North with an explicit Islamic identity because
of the Islamic religion. This was so, even when it was the case that
they previously resisted the military, religious and political efforts
of Hausa-Fulani political incorporation processes before 1900.
A political situation like that subsequently raised severe
socio-economic and political problems of integrating different identities
into conceptions of the "Northern Identity", particularly so for the
M-Belt groups and societies. This was so because in the period between
1804 and 1900, while some M-Belt groups and societies became malin-
tegrated into the Islamic culture because of partial incorporation,
others were totally excluded from the process and were outside concep-
tions of the Islamic society and the Islamic culture. This political
exclusion from the incorporation processes into the Islamic society
culture was conditioned by the economic needs of the Islamic society in
which the M-Belt groups and societies and their land became regarded
as functional territory.
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At a more basic level therefore the chapter examines political
incorporation processes by a dominant group and society in The North
that were shaped by the ideology of the Islamic religion. The
processes took roots in the Islamic society and became shaped by an
explicit Islamic religious and political identity. The processes caused
specific types of socio-economic and political experiences in which
some groups and societies became dominant and others subordinate. The
recollected histories of the period between 1804 and 1900 after impact
with British influences became determinate factors which conditioned
the political tensions between Islamic and non-Islamic groups and
societies in The North, particularly so after 1950 when therb was
increased demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. This was a
political situation developed before British departure from control
of political power in The North in the midst of severe inequalities
and deprivation as it affected the distribution of modern European
infrastructural facilities as amenities for development in The North.
This was particularly so because of the specific content of the
nature of socio-economic and political relationship between the Islamic
society and the M-Belt groups and societies. Implicit in a position
like that, it is the proposition of this chapter in the study, that
the socio-economic and political inequalities resulting from the
nature of the relationships which were characteristic of politics and
society in The North in the period between 1804 and 1900 were among
the causes of political tensions and conflict between the Islamic society
and the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1967.
Although these tensions and conflicts were mediated by the government
of British administration in The North during the period between 1900
and 1960, in the period between 1940 and 1967 they caused a resurgence
of "tribal" identities which became fed into a M-Belt Movement that
reflected deeply rooted historical resistance to Islamic political
authority in the socio-economic experiences of the M-Belt groups
and societies. The historical experiences of the period between 1804
and 1900 became recollected by the 'European Educated' and compounded4
the political probleml(incorporation and the integration of the "majority"
of the minority M-Belt groups and societies in the political unit of
The North created from impact with British influences in 1900.
In that connection therefore, we are concerned to examine the
socio-economic and political transformations in the incorporation
processes that took place among the different groups and societies in
The North as a direct political and religious consequence of the
Islamic Reformist Movement in the Region led by the Fulani, which
established a dominant Islamic society and its expansion toward the
M-Belt groups and societies. The Islamic Reformist Movement trans-
formed the politics of groups and societies in The North, from a
situation of autonomous political existence to a centralized pattern
of political and religious authority in the Islamic society based in
Sokoto and then expanded for its socio-economic and political needs
by colonization and military force. When the socio-economic and
political circumstances of groups and societies in the territories of
The North before 1804 is compared to the situation that became trans-
formed in the period between 1804 and 1900 sharp contrasts exist
largely created by the impact and the nature of the Islamic revolutionary
processes.
1
1.	 The subsequent socio-economic and political transformations
which took place after impact with British influences in the
region are tackled in Chapter z
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The transformatory processes developed from the Islamic re-
volution which was led by the Fulani, are held to be responsible for
the establishment of conceptions of core and periphery relationships
among groups and societies and the development of an indigenous colonial
anal
system in The North. This became politically/economically directed
at the exploitation of the M-Belt groups and societies as well as other
non-Islamic groups and societies in the territories in the period between
1804 and 1900. In other words although politics and society among the
groups and societies in the territories that became The North in 1900,
was volatile before 1804, with each of the different groups and
societies existing as an independent and autonomous political unit
with a distinct identity, in the period between 1804 and 1900 the
Islamic revolution established and developed a core centre of religion
and politics with a periphery. This development conditioned new socio-
economic and political relationship between the two. In the instance
there was colonialism of the Islamic society on the M-Belt groups and
societies as well as on other non-Islamic communities in The North.
The processes that established an indigenous colonial system
with its roots in the Islamic society are held to be responsible for
the subordination of some groups and societies by military conquest,
political manipulation and the domination of their political systems
when the exercise of political authority on non-Islamic territory became
the prerogative of Moslems. This was so despite the differences in
social and religious identities in the region because of the cultural
thrust of the Islamic religion. As a result, the M-Belt groups and
societies became undeveloped as much as they were underdeveloped relative
to the Islamic society. The salient features in the development of the
indigenous colonial system with roots in the Islamic society centred on
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Sokoto are therefore taken to be the establishment and expansion of
the Islamic society, the exploitative relationships between the
Islamic society and the M-Belt groups and societies and the develop-
ment of political leadership with an Islamic religious identity over
some of the M-Belt groups and societies and the peripheralization of
non-Islamic communities into functional economic roles to the Islamic
society. Implicit in these propositions is also the assumption that
before the establishment of the Islamic society from the Fulani
Islamic Reformist Movement in 1804 which affected a large part of the
territories that became defined as The North, there existed disparate
and autonomous political units responding differently to the politics
of each other with none permanently assuming political, economic and
religious dominance on the same large scale to developments which
resulted from the establishment of an Islamic Society by the Fulani.
Evidence in support of propositions made in this Chapter largely
derive from secondary sources. These were case studies of the histories
of some of the groups and societies in The North on political and
economic patterns as they affected the development of society before
1900. Few primary sources were used. Statistical evidence, where
it was used also derives from similar secondary sources from the early
accounts of British travellers like Henry Barth and the German Christian
Missionary explorer, Karl Kumm as well as the official accounts of
British military and administrative officers before 1930 on the state
of politics and economy in society upon impact with European influences.
Evidences from interview sources and discussions were also used. These
were derived from politicians and Elders among some of the M-Belt groups
and societies on recollected histories they were able to invoke from
what they heard from ancestors about the state of politics and society
3 4-
and Fulani wars in the M-Belt areas before impact with British influences
in 1900. These sources complimented each other and attempts were made
to balance each piece of evidence from the different sources against
each other to produce accurate interpretations of the events and
actions in the histories of political development in the societies
of the region.
II Society and Politics before 1804
The purpose of this section is to examine whether society and
politics in the territories that came to be defined as The North existed
as distinct and autonomous political units in socio-economic and
political affairs before 1804. It is the proposition in this section
that The North contained distinct political systems that were autonomous
in their socio-economic and political relationships with other groups.
None of these systems established a dominant and permanent socio-
economic and political centre of power and authority on other groups
for a longish period of time. Socio-economic and political differences
in the autonomy and distinctiveness of these societies from each other
are examined along five basic indicators: (a) Structure of political
power and authority (b) Economic patterns and types (c) Social
structure and identity patterns: ethnic types with Islamic and
traditional systems of African religious beliefs and practices comple-
menting the different ethnic group identities (d) The political
volatility in core and periphery relationships in the patterns of
established authority (e) The levels of inequalities in terms of
social, economic and political development that characterized the
different societies in the region.
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These five indicators are in turn used to discuss social,
political and economic characteristics of the three broadly categorized
types of society from the multitudes in The North as used by Margery
Perham but with significant modification for clarity purposes. These
are: Islamic Kingdoms, M-Belt Kingdoms and Autonomous M-Belt groups
and societies. Although these three categories derive from Perham's
works' there is one important factual inaccuracy in her categorizations.
Using essentially socio-economic and political indicators Perham suggests
three categories of societies in The North. 2 In the first category:
"are the peoples of the forest lands or the hills of the centre and
east, who maintained a primitive culture, socially fragmented, all
but self contained economically, nearly all naked and with a very
limited range of material possessions". 3 A second political Unit
type is those found among the Igala, Igbira, Jukun, Nupe and Yoruba
groups. According to Perham: "These are pagan Kingdoms which have
escaped not only the Mohammedan influences which in the Middle-Ages
gradually penetrated the pagan groups in The North, but also that sudden
extension of Mohammedan power early last century which overlaid so many
pagan populations of Central Nigeria". 4 It is here that we point out
Perham's inaccurate fact in this category. While admitting of her
classifications, there is evidence that suggests that the first Nupe
Moslem King reigned from about 1770, and Islamic influences are trace-
able in Nupe, Igbirra and among Igala ruling classes long before the
1. In particular, Margery Perham, Lugard: the years of Authority 
1898-1945, London, 1961; and her, Native Administration in Nigeria,
London 1962.
2. Perham 1962 p.3
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
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Fulani Jihad which established the Islamic society in The North.
This suggests that contrary to what Perham has termed "escaped
Mohammedan influences" among such Kingdoms in these areas in terms
of Islamic influences, Islam was infact known to exist, particularly
so among the ruling classes of these Kingdoms before impact with the
Islamic Reformist Movement led by the Fulani. The really crucial
factor however as it relates to subsequent religious and political
developments in the region is that the more distant Islamic practices
and influences were from the core Islamic centres of the 11th and
13th centuries, like Borno and Kano or Katsina respectively, 2 the more
it was mixed with traditional African systems of beliefs and practices. 3
The third political category type according to Perham: "is
composed of the Moslem Kingdoms of The North of which the greatest are
Kano, Sokoto, Katsina and Zaria and Borno, which has a different race
and history and covers a huge area in the north-east." 4 Subsequently
R.A. Adeleye was to characterize The North in the period before the
Fulani Islamic Reformist Movement into: "Moslem Kingdoms, pagan
centrati3e4
Kingdoms and an array of disparate autonomous units without X political
authority". 5 The categories of Adeleye and those of Perham compliment
each other. This gives justification to the categories used in the
study in this chapter, derived from the above discussion. Thus we
have: Islamic Kingdoms, M-Belt Kingdoms and Autonomous M-Belt groups
and societies.
1. Daryll Ford, P. Brown and R.G. Armstrong, Peoples of the Niger-
Benue Confluence, London 1955 p.18-22, and p.57
2. Perham 1962 p.45; Adeleye 1977 p.5
3t The socio-religious and political consequences of a situation like
that are discussed in more detail in the next sections when infact,
it was discovered that such Islamic malpractices existed within
the ruling classes in the core-centres of Islam in these territories.
4. Perham 1962 p.3
5. Adeleye 1977 p.4
(a) Islamic Kingdoms
The most celebrated of the Islamic Kingdoms in the period before
1804 were the Hausa-City-States and the Kanuri Kingdom of Borno.
Kings and Queens ruled in the Hausa-City-States, while in the Borno
Kingdom, Kings called 'Mais' ruled the Kanuri people. Both these
Kingdoms benefited and enjoyed Arabian Islamic civilization and
Islamic religious influences from North Africa in their socio-
political and economic development from an early period when compared
to other parts of The North and Nigeria. In both Kingdoms leadership
and some subjects became peacefully Islamized by Moslem Missionaries,
traders and scholars, mainly Arabs from North Africa. In the instance
of the Kingdom of Borno, civilizing influences took shape as early as
the 11th century.
1
 The Hausa-City-States had Islam and Arabian
Islamic civilization shaping socio-economic and political develop-
ments in their society from between the 13th and 15th centuries.2
The Kanuri, who were the majority ethnic group in the Kingdom
of Borno, were mainly localized in the geo-political areas surrounding
Lake Chad. The Kingdom was established in those areas by a series
of 'Mais s in context of the specific Kanuri cultural identity. The
legitimacy of their rulers was based on the Arab, non-Sudanic principle
of patrilineal descent.
3
 Subsequently the Kanuri people and their
satellites south of the geo-political area of their concentration
were brought together by the 'Mais' through conquest, tribute payments
and Islam and developed into a strong socio-political identity which
1. Perham 1962 p.45; Adeleye 1971 p.5
2. Perham 1962 p.45; Adeleye 1971 p.5; Mandi Adamu 1978 p.23-58;
see also, Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the 
Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, 1957 p.5-6
3. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.92
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united them under one political authority as early as the 14th
century.
1
 This Unity was strengthened during the 19th century under
the leadership of Mohammed el-Kanemi who repulsed the military,
religious and political thrusts of the Islamic Reformist Movement led
by the Fulani under Usman dan-Fodio. 2 As early as in the beginning
of the 13th century however the Borno Kingdom was unquestionably
the dominant state in the Sudan.
3
 In that century, a sound political
and administrative system of government had been established with a
mixture of Moslem law, traditional African and Arabic types.
4
 There
were four provincial governors, a powerful army and an orderly system
of succession. 5 The 16th century however was what has been described
as the golden-age for Borno because: "the country was triumphant and
prosperous",
6
 Through contact with North Africa in trade, religion
and education, it was able to attain a high degree of Islamic civili-
zation and developed a highly complex system of centralized political
organization. From this it was able to develop a fiscal system
and a trained judiciary, administering Moslem Law with a loyal army
to the King, trained in comparatively advanced military techniques,
when compared to their neighbours.
7
1. Coleman 1963 p.23
2. For examples of the military prowess and the campaigns of Borno,
see Alhaji Ibrahim Imam, A short history of Rabeh Ibri Fadel 
Allah 1838-1900, Lagos, November 1974.
3. Thomas Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives, London 1960 p.4
4. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.92
5. Ibid p.92-93
6. Ibid p.96	
.
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Although Borno was strong militarily and politically united,
its main preoccupation seemed to have been consolidating its socio-
political and economic position by raiding weaker groups for slaves
rather than political expansion and empire building. For example, it
was content with yearly political tribute from the Hausa-City-States
in acknowledgement of its military power rather than superimpose
political authority. 1 This suggests that the Hausa-City-States
maintained their political independence and autonomy when Borno was
the dominant military and political power in the region although it
was the case that they acknowledged the authority of Borno through
the payment of yearly tributes.
The Kingdom of Borno was notorious for its slave catching
activities in order to meet its economic needs in the trans-Saharan
trade with North Africa. As early as in the 11th century a battle
song praised Sultan Gilmi, one of the Kings of Borno, as a successful
slave raider. 2 In the song, it is suggested that Sultan Gilmi:
u ... put to flight a warrior chief of the land of Mobber... captured
his following, a thousand slaves., took them and scattered them in
the open places of Bagirmi.. the best, you took home, as the first
fruits of battle". 3 When Henry Barth travelled in the Kingdom of
Borno in the 17th century, 800 years later, he found the Kings of
Borno still raiding villages and catching slaves. 4 The accounts of
the travels of Barth suggest that the Kings of Borno raided groups
and societies southwardly of the Kingdom. 5 This means that while the
1. Northern Government Submission to The Willink Commission, Kaduna,
1957 p.5-7
2. Perham 1962 p.45
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
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military and political power of the Kingdom of Borno was used to
condition the payment of political tributes from the Islamic Hausa-
City-States, the non-Islamic groups and societies experienced the
might of Borno through its constant military raids for slaves.
The majority of these non-Islamic villages were the subsequent M-Belt
groups and societies concentrated in Adamawa,Gombe and Bauchi.
Barth suggests that he accompanied "a slave-catching-Expedition'
'and observed a raid in which "there was the senseless destruction of
human life and prosperous villages and crops which accompanied the
seizure of a few thousand captives". 1 The accounts of Barth suggest
that although the Kingdom of Borno was preoccupied with meeting its
internal economic and political needs rather than political expansion
over adjacent territory, they also suggest that previously prosperous
villages and communities south of the Kingdom became economically
ruined by military raids. In the instance, while Borno developed
from contact with North Africa and Islamic civilization, it did not
only stand in the way of diffusing that civilization but also con-
ditioned the undevelopment of the groups and societies it raided
for slaves. This means that the undevelopment and underdevelopment
of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa before 1804, for
example, dates from the 11th century, largely because of the conditions
of insecurity, chaos, unpredictable social and economic existence and
depopulation from slave raids.
The trade in slaves and the contacts with North Africa which
brought in Islamic civilization through the trans-Saharan trade routes,
developed the Kingdom of Borno to become a cosmopolitan and wealthy
. 1.	 Perham 1962 p.45
society before the 16th century fdr more than the Hausa-City-
States when compared in the same period. 1 Although the Kingdom
in general became socio-economically developed with Islamic culture
and civilization the Kings and the ruling classes in particular
became very wealthy. 2
 For example, Leo Africanus, the Arab scholar
from North Africa who visited the Kingdom suggests the wealth of the
ruling classes when he described that the King had: "... his spurs,
his bridles, platters, dishes, pots and other vessels wherein his
meats and drinks are brought to the table all in pure gold... Yea
and the chains of his dogs are gold also". 3 The wealth of the Kingdom
of Borno derived from and depended on the export of slaves caught
from among the M-Belt groups and societies that were found in Adamawa,
Gombe and Bauchi and taken to the trans-Saharan market centres of
Egypt and other parts of North Africa. 4 The Kings of Borno became
dependent on slaves for economy and wealth because the slaves were
currency as well as commodities for export. 5 For example, slaves
were used to buy large numbers of horses from the Berber merchants
from North Africa. 6 The horse in that period was the equivalent of
a tank in modern war today and politics, economy and the security of
political control for the ruling classes depended on the size of the
cavalry rather than the numbers in the infantry. In that instance,
about between 15 to 20 slaves were exchanged for a horse. 7 Historical
1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.93-96
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.94
4. Ibid p.92-95
5. Ibid p.94
6. Ibid
7. Ibid
evidence suggests that the Kings of Borno became so dependent on
slaves as currency that they grudged paying for goods from North
Africa in gold and preferred to rather pay in the numbers of slaves. '
This explains the cause for the intensive slave raids of the Kings
of Borno on the M-Belt groups and societies found in Adamawa, Gombe,
and Bauchi before 1804, who were non-Islamic and excluded from both
the Hausa-City-States and the Kingdom of Borno.
The Hausa-City-States evolved and became developed based on
similar socio-economic and political conditions which existed in the
Kingdom of Borno. There was the influence of Islamic civilization
through the establishment of commercial contacts with North Africa
by the trans-Saharan trade routes as well as with the Western Sudanese
Kingdoms of Mali, Ghana andSonAheti • 2 The commercial links conditioned
the development of the Hausa-City-States with Islamic civilization
and culture. The social and political origins of the Hausa-City-
States however ties them to a legend of history through the Kingdom
of Bomb. This has its roots in the history of the founding of Daura,
a city that claims social and political seniority over all the other
Hausa-City-States.3
	
1
According to the legend of history: "A certain man named
Abuyazidu, son of Abdullahi, King of Baghdad, quarrelled with his
father and people of the city .. then Abuyazidu with twenty companies,
journeyed until they came to Bornu and they dwelt there.. the King of
1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.94
2. Ibid p.145-147
3. Ibid
Bornu saw that Abuyazidu was stronger than he... and they counselled
him that he should give Abuyazidu his daughter and he became his
father-in-law .. and he did so and gave his daughter Magira to be wife
and he married her .. and they journeyed until they came to Daura at
night ... their son, Bawo begat the first rulers of the seven Hausa-
States who were the origins of the Hausa race". 1 Furthermore, according
to the legend there were seven "Legitimate Hausa" sons (Hausa bakwai )
and also seven "illegitimate Hausa" sons (Banza bakwai). 2 The "legiti-
mate seven sons" who were the foundations of the Hausa-City-States
Kiatsinct
were Gobir, Kano,pano, Zaria, Bauchi and Daura and these were names
of the children of Bawo.
3
 The legend developed to suggest that the
States and Kingdoms of Kebbi,Zamfara, Nupe, GwarOcad , Yoruba and
Jukun (Kwararafa) were the seven "illegitimate Hausa sons". 4 The period
at which the seven "illegitimate Hausa sons" became produced and
therefore infused with Hausa-blood as a source of social origin is
vague and riddled with both political and academic controversy.
Bawo, the progenitor of the Hausa-City-States assigned to his
legitimate sons, who subsequently developed the City-States, specific
socio-economic and political roles as duties for the welfare of all. 5
Gobir was to serve as a military rampart between peaceful Hausa-land
and the warlike "tribes" of the desert. 6 It was therefore the war
chief of Hausaland with the duties of defending the brethren from the
attacks of the desert tribes. Kano and Rano, safe behind the lines
1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.145-147
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Flora L. Shaw (Lady Lugard), A Tropical Dependency: An outline 
of the ancient History of the Western Sudan with an Account of
the Modern Settlements of Northern Nigeria, London 1905 p.239
5. Lady Lugard 1905 p.239
6. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.132
of attacks from the desert chiefs, were assigned as "Ministers of
Industries", especially for the crafts of dyeing and weaving and
to trade. 1 The Hausa from Kano were to become ubiquitous traders
for many years before the Fulani led Islamic Reformist Movement, 2
and thereafter until this day, Kano developed to be an important
commercial and trade centre in The North and Nigeria. Katsina and
Katsitta
Daura were assigned to be "Ministers of Intercourse" andeeveloped to
•
become a great centre of Islamic learning with a reputation that went
well beyond the political boundaries of the Hausa-City-States. 3 For
example, in 1660 the Yoruba Kingdom of Oyo sought answers from Katsina
over an inquiry into the methods of determining the precise moment of
sunset.
4
 Zaria which was the most southernly of the Hausa-City-States
and founded on the fruitful plains dividing the other states from the
hilly country of Bauchi, was assigned the task of agriculture in order
to feed the rest. 5 Zaria also shared with Bauchi the assigned task
of chief-slaving-states to supply labour to the other Hausa-City-
States for agriculture, industries, military, commercial and domestic
needs. 6
Although the legend of historical origins of the Hausa-City-States
suggests that Bauchi was one of the seven legitimate sons of Bawl, there
is controversy in the historical evidence and interpretation. For
example, Lady Lugard suggests that the hilly country of Bauchi " was
for many centuries the home of the cannibal and the hunting ground
1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.132
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Adeleye 1971 p.16
5. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.132
6. Lady Lugard 1905 p.239
for slaves .. its name which was a corruption of "Bonshy" meaning
the country of the "Bauwa" (the slave). 1 The historical controversy
about the origins of Bauchi might suggest that it developed from
the settlement of a colonizing migrant population in the area which
raided the indigenous groups and societies for slaves rather than
established from the "Seven Hausa Sons". whatever the nature of the
conflict in the evidence and interpretation? Bauchi territory
became tied in political identity to the Hausa-City-States and to the
Fulani Empire centred at Sokoto and subsequently after 1900, to the
dominant Islamic society in The North, except for the groups and
societies south of the territory which it raided for slaves.
The legend of Hausa origins however gives a clear picture of
a political union of states in which there was some form of unity
bein.g
with the northern as well as the southern frontiersAactively defended.
There was an organized economy that became bolstered by the practice
of raiding a cleRned periphery on the south and south-eastern
territories to the Hausa-City-States. These territories had a con-
centration of non-Islamic and non-Hausa groups and societies in
political identity and in the contemporary concern of this study,
they were part of the M-Belt areas. The raids were meant to supply
a
labour in industry, agriculture, domestic work and for military
purposes and were in full force before 1804. For example, the city
walls of the Hausa states in centres of power like Kano and Zaria,
built for defence purposes were constructed with slave labour. 2
 The
legend also suggests that the Hausa-City-States shared a common socio-
1. Lady Lugard 1905 p.239
2. A.C. Burns, History of Nigeria, London 1929
religious and political identity and also with the Kingdom of Borno,
even when it is the case that they became politically autonomous of
each other. Although at some point in their histories, they paid
political tribute to Borno, they were not a functional periphery in
terms of political power relationships and economic needs. This was
the premise from which the Hausa-City-States developed politically
independent of Borno and of each other despite a suggested political
union with cooperation in the economic division of labour by Bawo.
In terms of the organization of society and its governance,
social structure and political institutions in each of the Hausa-City,
States developed to assume a distinctive and durable shape in 1500. 1
This suggests that while Borno achieved the development of the social
organization of society with political institutions and a thriving
economic system as early as in the 13th century, it was in the
16th century that the Hausa-City-States became similarly developed,
again at a time when the historical evidence suggests,that was "the
golden age for Borno because the country was triumphant and prosperous". 2
It was after 1500 that social and political divisions in the structure
of society emerged in the Hausa-City-States in which there was an
established ruling class with a subject following. 3 Similar to the
Kingdom of Borno however socio-economic and political development
in the transformations of society and politics in the Hausa-City-States
were shaped by Islamic civilization and the influences of the Islamic
1. C.S. Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and 
Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966, Princeton 1970 p.21
2. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.96
3. Whitaker 1970 p.21
religion by way of the Western Sudan from North Africa through
Katsina and Borno. 1 This was the premise from which the Hausa-
City-States developed the same forms in the structure of government
and authority with well organized fiscal systems, a trained and
learned judiciary administering the Maliki code of the Islamic law
"with ability and integrity". 2 In the core Hausa-City-Kingdoms of:
"Katsina, Kano, and Zaria, the government and the whole organization
of society was Mohammedan (before the Fulani Jihad) a fact admitted
by the Fulani when they adopted as they subsequently did, the existing
Hausa, or as the conquerors preferred to call them, "Habe" systems
of law, justice and taxation... all these were based on the Koran". 3
There was therefore in the Hausa-City-States, a well developed
system of administration of society and politics based on territorial
subunits, supervised by Royal appointees of the Kings, who acted as
agents. Furthermore there existed in each of the Kingdoms a systematic
tribute and taxation system with a state treasury and presiding over
this structure was the King and his Council of Advisers.
4
 This rather
developed system of organization worked well for the different levels
of society and politics in the Hausa-City-Kingdoms and has so en-
chanted some authorities that it has been described as: "the most
sophisticated political organism which Africans had yet attained since
(the Hausa Kingdoms) had evolved elaborate systems of taxation and a
complex social system based on agriculture". 5 Traditional agriculture
1. Sir Alan Burns, History of Nigeria, London 1972 p.47
2. Burns 1972 p.47
3. Lady Lugard 1905 p.391
4. E. John Flint, Sir George Goldier and the Making of Nigeria,
London 1960 p.15
5. Flint 1960 p.15
pursuits and economic patterns in the Islamic Kingdoms in the period
between the 15th and 18th centuries were combined with crafts that
foreshadowed relatively advanced technology. 1 These included economic
activities like iron-smelting, cloth-weaving and dyeing. 2 A vigorous
trans-Saharan trade therefore resulted which became the conditioning
factor for a slow and a steady infiltration of religious and cultural
influences from the Islamic societies in North Africa to the Hausa-
City-States as was the case with the Kingdom of Borno. 3 From the
North African influences,Kano,for example, became a cosmopolitan
commercial city, with merchants and traders settled and travelling to
and from North Africa as well as to the cities of the Western Sudanese
Empires. 4 Similarly Katsina became a well developed educational centre
and Islamic scholars from Timbuktoo University and Gao as well as
from Cairo visited to exchange ideas and knowledge. 5 Furthermore,
there was developed well organized industrial and agricultural
patterns of production and distribution in the Hausa-City-States.6
For example, cottage industries of weaving and leather works were
developed in Gobir and plantation cultivation of rice was well
organized in Argungu and other parts of Sokoto. 7 This suggests that
there existed a highly mobilized society in the Hausa-City-States
with children, women and men engaged in production and distribution
1. Adeleye 1971 p.7
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that improved social and economic conditions of living in society. '
These activities stretched economic interests to the extra-territorial
market centres of Damagaran, Agades on the trans-Saharan trade route
and linked others with Katsina and Kano which became the metro-ports
for North African goods, among others in both the Hausa-City-States
and the Borno Kingdom. 2
It is however significant that in the politics and society of
Hausaland in the period before 1804, despite common historical origins,
a common set of factors for political identification in the Hausa
culture and language, a common structure of power and authority in
their governments and the critical inter-dependence in military and
the economic division of labour, there was never developed a Hausa-
King over all the Hausa-City-States. Instead, each of the Hausa-City-
States maintained its own dynasty which stood on its own in military,
political and economic interests. Although the Hausa-City-States and
the Islamic Kingdom of Borno were not acephaLou5 separate societies,
since there was socio-cultural homogeneity and similarities in a hier-
archical system of government with Kings, political unity did not exist
before 1804. Borno was however unique among the Islamic Kingdoms ,
1. P. Hill, "Hidden Trade in Hausaland", MAN, Vol.IV No.3 1969
p.393; P. Hill, Rural Hausa: A village and a setting,
London 1972 p.245.
2. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.87; The situational variations in the
socio-economic activities and their development to better standards
of living in the Islamic Kingdoms as they contrasted sharply with
politics, economic activities and society among the M-Belt groups
and societies, where there was slave raiding and slave catching
which drove off people to live in caves and made society less
open, one of the conditions for the undevelopment of the non-
Islamic groups and societies in The North are examined in
Section II(b) and (c).
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developed in the territories that became The North because
there was political unity of a single group and society, the Kanuri
with the Islamic religion. In the period before 1804 there were even
no traces of a political union in the Hausa-City-States, except for
the histories of temporary dominance in military and economic
activities rather than political.
The academic interest in the development of Islamic Kingdoms
before 1804 is not to produce explanatory reasons for the failure of
political incorporation and unity among them. The interest for this
study is to demonstrate and emphasize that a situation of political
disunity existed within their very territorial conceptions before 1804
and that the glories of economic, social and political achievements
went separately to each rather than to a collective Hausa society.
For example after the 15th century the historical evidence suggests
that Zaria under Queen Amina: "enjoyed the fruits of many conquests". '
Zaria was the one Hausa-City-State which left a history of
ambitious military and political attempts at territorial expansion
from which political incorporation processes might have developed to
create unity in Hausaland for a "Hausa-Empire" in the 15th century. 2
The political thrust and the domination of other groups and societies
by Zaria under Queen Amina in that period extended as far apart as from
Benue, over the Niger, extending to Katsina, Kano, Daura, Bauchi, down
to Kwararafa (Jukun territory) and conquered Kingdoms like those of
1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.139
2. Adeleye 1971 p.5
S I
Nupe.
1
 A similar military and political feat was subsequently
attempted at a different period by the Hausa-City-State of Kebbi
under its warrior leader Kanta, who conquered and exercised political
control "over a wide area" in the region although he did not last long. 2
This suggests that in the period between the 15th and 19th century there
were a number of unsuccessful political and military attempts to build
a centralized authority pattern derived from the economic interests of
Kebbi and Zaria in particular, which wielded together temporarily the
numerous city states under one political authority. The non-volatile
features in the political systems of the Hausa-City-States before 1804
were the economic interactions in trade and commerce between themselves,
the Kingdom of Borno and North Africa through the trans-Saharan trade
routes. However, although economic rather than political interactions
were stable between the Islamic Kingdoms, they became factors that
conditioned political quarrels and hostilities between the Kings.
For example, after the 15th century, there was intense rivalry and
conflict over the control of trade routes between Katsina, Kano and
Zaria when Queen Amina expanded her political and military dominance
in the region. 3 Katsina and Kano, it ought to be borne in mind,
thrived in social, religious and economic development in that period
because of the contacts with North African merchants through the
trans-Saharan routes.
1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.119
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
Characteristic of society and politics in the period before 1804
within the territorial boundaries of the Islamic Kingdoms is that when
society rose to a pre-eminence of power it soon became supplanted by
another and political dominance remained volatile. In the same period
the volatility of political dominance became compounded by political
and military developments outside the territories of the Hausa-City-
States and the Islamic Kingdom of Borno. For example, this was so in
the sudden i rapid rise and expansion of the Kwararafa (Jukun) State. 1
Although detailed evidence on the degree of political incorporation
and achieved unity when a particular Hausa-City-State rose to prominence
is incomplete, available historical evidence suggests that before 1804
very little political incorporation processes were in motion and there
was no permanent core and periphery in socio-economic and political
power relationships. Each Kingdom defined its periphery only when it
was in a strong military position of power in relation to others and
temporarily established dominance in the region. When its military
power declined, its economic and political influence also declined
with the concomitant consequence that another developing City-State
replaced the dominance.
This means that society in the Islamic Kingdoms before 1804
was characterized by "banditory politics" in which military adventures,
looting and pleasure seeking took precedence over developing a political
dynasty with permanent authority over vast territories. Queen Amina
of Zaria, more than the other kings of the Hausa-City-States was an
epitome of the pattern of politics in the period, in which there was a
relationship between political control by military methods and pleasure
seeking. Although Queen Amina developed to be an acknowledged military
1.	 This is examined in more detail in Section II (b) of this Chapter.
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and political force in the region, she "earned an undying reputation
as a consumer of lovers ... after each had been enjoyed he would be
destroyed".
1
 Ayandele further suggests that the pursuit of "Empire
Building" in the Hausa-City-States in the period before 1804 depended
for success on continued military supremacy of the conquering state
with the mode of warfare and the weapons chosen being bows, arrows,
spears, swords and a few firearms and these were the same for both victor
and vanquished. 2 This suggests that a devastating defeat of a state
by another did not necessarily prevent rapid military recovery which
caught the victor by surprise. This military situation conditioned
the volatile shifts in political centres of power in the Hausa-City-
States and made wars an endemic feature of their societies. 3 A situation
like that was incompatible with the effective administration of a
conquered territory and made the developmentofacentralized political
unit through incorporation into a "Hausa Empire" elusive.
(b)	 M-Belt Kingdoms
The most celebrated of the Kingdoms among the M-Belt groups and
societies in The North before 1804 were those of the Kwararafa (the
Jukuns) and the Igalla. This section however includes examining the
Islamic Kingdom of Nupe and the subsequently Islamized ruling classes
in the Igbirra Kingdom although it is the case that in this study they
1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.119
2. Adeleye 1977 p.6
3. Ibid
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are outside the political conception of the territories with groups
and societies where M-Belt socio-economic and political problems
existed in The North. This is so because historical evidence suggests
that Nupe and Igbirra trace their historical and social origins from
the Igalla group and society, I although the 'Hausa Legend' suggests
the origins of the Nupe and the Kwararafa (the Jukuns) to be offsprings
of the "illegitimate Hausa Sons" of Bawo. 2 Perham further suggests
that the Igalla group and society trace their historical origins from
the Kwararafa (the Jukun): "when a Jukun Prince founded a ruling
chief and nine Igalla sub-chiefs all of whose offices, with a toleration
common in tribal history, he recognized".
3
 The Igalla political sub-
systems however have controversial, confusing and conflicting accounts
about the histories of their social origins which include links and
traces from the Jukun, Yoruba and the Beni.4
These geneologies of origins, controversial as they are, suggest
exclusion of the Kingdoms of Nupe and Igbirra as part of the Islamic
Hausa-City-States and the Kingdom of Borno before 1804. This is so
because their political and religious identity was ethnic and rooted
in African traditional systems of beliefs rather than in the Islamic
religion. Islam however began to shape the political influences of
the ruling classes among the Nupe and Igbirra groups and societies in
the 16th century and became a dominant force in society after 1804. 5
1. Ford et al (eds), 1955 p.57
2. Lady Lugard 1905 p.239
3. Perham 1962 p.145
4. Ford et al (eds) 1955 p.80
5. This will become apparent in the discussions below and also in
Section II (b) of this Chapter.
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The Gwari and Idoma Kingdoms are however excluded from the analysis
in this section because the historical evidence is thin and controversial
from which to draw meaningful correlations for the period after 1804.
Furthermore the two Kingdoms did not make sufficient political impact
on their neighbours in the region to the same extent as the Nupe,
Jukun and Igalla Kingdoms. The Idoma and Gwari Kingdoms however shared
many socio-economic and political similarities to the Nupe and Igalla
Kingdoms before 1804. In the period between 1804 and 1900 both the
Gwari and the Idoma successfully resisted Fulani conquest for political
inclusion into the Islamic society established by dan Fodio.
If however the 'Igalla Legend' as suggested by Perham is something
to go by which traces their origins to the Jukuns and that Igalla
in turn produced Kings for the Nupe and Igbirra and that the Idoma also
trace their origins from among the Jukun group and society then the
Jukun Kingdom was the most influential in socio-political relationships
among the M-Belt groups and societies before 1804. In terms of the
political definition of the M-Belt areas used in this study however
since Islamic influences existed and shaped politics and society in
Nupe and Igbirra land before 1804 and subsequently became a dominant
force in the period between 1804 and 1900 they are not considered as
Kingdoms among the M-Belt groups and societies. The analytical judge-
ment to exclude Nupe and Igbirra as part of Islamic Kingdoms in The North
is derived from differences in socio-political and economic characteristics
between them and the Islamic Kingdoms of the Hausa-City-States and Borno.
For example, while contact with North Africa l conditioned the socio-
economic and political patterns in the development of the Hausa-City-
States and the Kingdom of Borno, Nupe and Igbirra remained with African
traditional political and economic systems before 1804 even when it
was the case that there existed traceable Islamic influences. Before
5'
1804 however their economic patterns began to be influenced by
European traders from the coast of what came to be Southern Nigeria.
Subsequently in the period between 1940 and 1967 both the Nupe and
Igbirra groups and societies did not share what became known as "the
M-Belt Problems" in The North and remained emotionally outside the
sentiments expressed for its political struggle unlike the Jukun and
the Igalla in 1968. 1
The Jukun and Igalla Kingdoms and those of the Nupe, Igbirra,
Gwari and Idoma were found south of the Islamic Kingdoms of the Hausa-
City-States and the Kingdom of Borno. These are the Kingdoms described
as "the pagan Kingdoms" in political identity in Northern Nigeria. 2
Interspersed in the territories between the Islamic Kingdoms and the
'M-Belt' Kingdoms, were numerous non-Islamic groups and societies that
were politically autonomous of each other. 3
Although socio-political and cultural affinities existed between
the 'M-Belt' Kingdoms and the disparate non-Islamic groups and societies,
each was distinct in its organization of socio-economic and political
patterns. The Kingdoms however, rather than the different groups and
societies were politically organized into comparatively powerful
societies and made attempts at political expansion to build an
Empire through processes similar to those that existed in the Islamic
Kingdoms of the Hausa-City-States and Borno. The significant difference
in the socio-economic and political processes that characterized the
1. The differences in the degrees of political support and identifi-
cation for the ideas of a M-Belt Region before 1967 and thereafter,
from among the M-Belt groups and societies are examined in detail
in Chapters 4- and 5
2. For examples see Lady Lugard 1905; Perham 1962; Hogben and Kirk
Greene 1966; Adeleye 1971 and the various British administrative
reports of provinces in The North in the period between 1900 and
1950.
3. These are examined in more detail in Section II(c) of this Chapter
as 'Autonomous M-Belt groups and societies'.
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M-Belt Kingdoms as they attempted Empire building however was that
it was not bolstered by the civilizing Islamic influences from North
Africa through Moslem scholars, traders and settled Islamic Missionaries
among their communities. For example, the Jukun and a majority of the
M-Belt groups and societies were cut off from any North African contacts
and none of their communities were influenced by local Islamic scholars
and traders before 1804. 1 Miller suggests that this was so because
there was no social and economic scope for the contacts to be
established and become a permanent feature in the processes of society
and "Woe to the Hausa trader or otherwise who went there without
guarantees. His fate was not pleasant; the least undesirable being
to be cooked and eaten". 2
The Kingdoms among the M-Belt groups and societies created
political impact in the territories that became defined as The North
as early as in the 15th century. The military as well as the political
influences of Nupe and Jukun Kingdoms for example, were felt in The
North in the period between 1463 and 1499.
3
 The Igalla Kingdom
developed and reached its political peak in the first half of the
19th century, 4 after it dominated the Igbirra Kingdom in the 18th
century.
5
 The Igbirra Kingdom was however politically autonomous
and independent of both Igalla and the powerful Benin Kingdom in
Southern Nigeria in the same period in the middle of the 18th century
until in the 19th century when parts of its territories became con-
quered by Nupe, Ilorin and Fulani armies as well as totally conquered
by the British in the years before 1900. 6
 In the closing years of the
1. W.R.S Miller, Reflections of a Pioneer, London 1936 p.49
2. Miller 1936 p.49
3. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.139
4. Okpu 1977 p.26
5. Perham 1962 p.148
6. Ibid
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19th century the Igalla Kingdom was weakened and its ruling classes
became corrupted by Kings in the Nupe Kingdom and thereafter:
only British conquest saved Igalla from becoming a prey of the
Fulani from Nupeland". 1 The experiences of 'the Niger Expedition'
from England indicate that the political power of the Attah of Igalla
was strong in 1841 although it was under political pressure from the
Fulani in Nupe besides the persistent slave raids of Rabah from
Kontagora under the political control of Sokoto. 2 This suggests that
the politically significant Kingdoms found among the M-Belt groups
and societies in terms of their numerical size, political cohesion,
military might and territorial gains through military conquest were
the Nupe and Jukun Kingdoms. For example political cohesion in the
Nupe Kingdom is suggested by a chronology of ruling Kings that date
from the 15th century.
3
According to Nupe sources the Kingdom was founded early in the
15th century by Tseodo, a son belonging to the King of Igalla from
a Nupe princess. 4 In about 1770 ie. the 18th century, the Nupe King-
dom became a dominant military and political force in the region.5
This was at a time when Nupe became ruled by its first Islamic King. 6
When an indigenous Islamic King ruled in the 18th century the Kingdom
became powerful and reached the height of its prosperity. 7 This suggests
1. Perham 1962 p.146
2. Charles F. Buxton (Ed), Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, Bart London
(John Murray) 1855 p.554-555; also see M.J. Dent, "Sir Thomas
Fowell Buxton", A series on the Saints, preached at St John's
Parish Church, Keele Village, Summer 1982.
3. Coleman 1963 p.23
4. Forde et al 1955 p.22
5. Ibid
6. Akiga Sai, Akiga's Story: The Tiv Tribe as seen by one of its 
Members, London 1965 p.21
7. Sai 1965 p.21
a correlation between Islamic influences in a particular Kingdom and
the organization of military and political power for the development
of society. In the numerous instances there was developed tendencies
of expansion to adjacent territories. These tendencies laid the
foundations for the ideological force which Islam assumed in the
politics of the region leading to the Fulani Islamic revolution in
1804. For example, although the Nupe Kingdom did not build a
political Empire to dominate, Nupe culture assimilated smaller
cultural identities adjacent to its territories. These smaller
cultural groups and societies have been generally referred to as
"Sub-Nupe groups".
1
 These include the Beni, Bataci, Kyedye, Nupe-
'Zeni', Egbagi, Ebe, Gbedye, Kupa, Cekpa, Kusopa, Benu, Dibu,
Gwagba and Basa-Nge. 2 Similarly in the period between 1804 and 1900,
although the Nupe Kingdom was conquered by the Fulani, the culture
assimilated the Fulani 'Jamaars' who overthrew the indigenous ruling
dynasty.
3
 The Fulani also adopted Nupe institutions and indigenous
ruling titles for their own rulership. 4 This was so because there
was political unity in the Nupe Kingdom based on a common historical
tradition, the unifying symbol of its Kings, the absence of severe
competing economic interests in adjacent territories which became
bolstered by the number of persons in the common culture and language
sufficiently to enable the development of a strong sense of Nupe
consciousness and identification.5
1. Forde et al 1955 p.18-20
2. Ibid
3. Coleman 1963 p.24
4. Adeleye 1971 p.135
5. Coleman 1963 p.24
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The Nupe Kingdom benefited from Islamic and North African Arabic
civilizing influences through the Hausa-City-States as early as in
1770, while it maintained its political autonomy and independence. 1
In the last few decades of the 18th century as well as in the 19th
century, although the Kingdom was overthrown by the Fulani, it also
achieved some development because of contacts from European trading
companies on the Southern Nigerian coast, in particular the Royal
Niger Company. 2 In the instance, both contacts with the Hausa-City-
States and the Royal Niger Company increased the wealth of the ruling
classes in material and intellectual possessions. 3 In the instance
Wixpe
of contact with European Trading companieqbecane interested in the
purchase of European firearms with the political intehtion of dominating
society and politics in the region, a tendency that remained an ambition
until the Kingdom became conquered by the British in the political in-
corporation processes that established The North. 4
The socio-economic and political developments in the Nupe Kingdom
in the period before 1804 and between 1804 and 1900 were achieved
because of the unique geographical location it enjoyed and exploited.
The Kingdom astrided the main internal trade-routes toward the Islamic
Kingdoms of the Hausa-City-States in The North andto the coast in The
South on the Niger River valley as well as on the confluence with the
Benue River. 5 With these geo-political and economic advantages the
Nupe Kingdom developed and remained powerful until the end of the 18th
1. Coleman 1963 p.24
2. Ibid p.23-24
3. Ibid
4. Flint 1960 p.163
5. Adeleye 1971 p.4
century when increased wealth among the ruling classes caused bitter
recriminations and intrigues within the ruling families over succession.1
These rivalries were the crucial political factors that conditioned
Fulani manipulations in the successful overthrow of the Nupe Kingdom
in 1807. 2 Although the Nupe ruling classes became subordinated to
Fulani political authority centred on Sokoto, Nupe people developed
and became Islamized with the concomitant gravitation toward the
Islamic society established by dan Fodio in 1804 and shared the Islamic
identity while maintaining a Nupe identity, particularly so after
impact with British influences. The socio-political characteristic
that became unique to Nupe on a comparable degree to the Kanuri identity
developed in Borno Kingdom, was the success in building and maintaining
a cohesive group-inclusiveness based on the Nupe culture even when
there was fanatical loyalty to Fulani and the Islamic culture.
In sharp contrast to the socio-economic and political develop-
ments in societies and politics in the Nupe Kingdom for the same period,
there existed pure military developments in a belligerent Jukun Kingdom.
In the period before 1804 the Jukun Kings established strong socio-
political and cultural institutions for politics in their society,
then their warriors went on marauding economic adventures and the
military conquests of the Jukun warriors took them to distant territories
as early as in the 15th century from their Wukari capital on the Benue
River. 3 Although conquest by Jukun warriors and the cultural influence
of the Jukuns spread over the vast territories that became defined as
1. Adeleye 1971 p.4
2. Ibid
3. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165
The North in 1900, there was no centralized administration based on
the political authority of their King in Wukari. 1 Where there existed
Jukun influence the effects of political dictatorship of the Jukun war-
riors was short-lived. 2
 This suggests that what appeared to have
happened was that when the Jukun consolidated internal political
stability in the leadership of their society centred on Wukari, war
warriors left and searched for economic adventure because of their
astute military skills and courage on the horse. 3
 It is not clear
whether it was the Jukun King and his men who gave political and
military orders to go out of Jukun land and do battle in outside
territory. This means it was a warrior adventure while the Jukun
Kings enjoyed local political control.
The 'Jukun Empire' which is the equation of where Jukun warriors
C ci r ri ed Ouk
went to, X battles of conquest and won although they never remained
to establish the political authority of the Jukun King from Wukari,
extended over almost all of the territories that came to be defined
as the political unit of Northern Nigeria upon impact with British
influences in 1900. 4
 For example the Jukun marched and rode on horses
from Wukari on the Benue River to conquer Fulani and Hausa armies in
Sociati-ts
Kano, Katsina and Zaria, conquering all the groups anlon its way before
1653. 5
 Although explanatory reasons are difficult to produce on why
1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165
2. Ibid p.165; p.195
3. For examples of this tradition see Barrett 1979 p.4
4. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165; p.195; In the period between
1950 and 4960 the Sardanna persistently used the historically
recollected expansionofthe Jukun to suggest that Jukun Kings,
like his great-grandfather were concerned to create political
unity of The North based on non-religious as much as on religious
factors. This is examined in more detail with evidence in
Chapters 4- o-Act 5
5. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165; p.195
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the Jukun warriors directed their interests to distant territories
rather than those immediate to its society, it is suggested that the
economic wealth in Kano, Katsina and Zaria in the period might have
been factors that conditioned the adventure. In 1653 the Jukun con-
quered Kano, stayed there for three years and suddenly started a
homeward march back to Wukari without entering the city of Kano itself
or establishing political control, nor leaving behind a political
surrogate. 1 Eighteen years later, in 1671 the Jukun warriors visited
Kano again in military conquest, broke into the city gates and slaugh-
tered a large number of the inhabitants including the "Malamai"
(Teachers) although they failed to capture the King of Kano because
he escaped and fled to Daura. 2 When the King of Kano escaped, the
Jukun warriors shifted their pillage to Katsina and attacked the city:
"where many of the inhabitants were seized by the fierce Jukuns and
cast alive into a great pit which is still known as Giwan Rano". 3 The
situation however became saved because upon the urgent prayers of
Mallam Dan Masini the Jukun warriors pushed home no further success. 4
This was so because when the Moslem prayers became answered a "Jukun
general was kicked in the groins as he was mounting his horse for the
final assault (on the city of Katsina) and died on the spot". 5
 Hogben
1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165; p.195
2. Ibid p.165
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
Ibid
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and Kirk Greene suggest that the result of that development caused
other Jukun warriors to flee in dismay. 1 This suggests that besides
economic pillage, in the 17th century the Jukun warriors became more
political in their military adventures since they wanted to capture
kings in order to establish political control like in the instance of
the King of Kano.
This is the premise from which Perham, among others, suggests that
the 'Jukun Empire' was more political rather than a military adventure,
particularly so for the Jukun cultural influences that became trace-
able among some M-Belt groups and societies which it conquered as it
marched to the Hausa-City-States of Kano, Zaria and Katsina. 2 For
example, there were many similar political and magico-religious prac-
tices to Jukun practices among some M-Belt groups and societies on
the Plateau, Adamawa, Benue, and S. Zaria which included: ".. the
existence of chiefs who might not cross water... chiefs who disappear
every seven years.. chiefs who were "imprisoned" so that they might
be fed fat and kept in perfect condition during their short reigns". 3
In other words this means that the Jukun Kingdom lasted longer than
history suggests i since its cultural influences became institutionalized
in some political practices among some groups and societies in the
M-Belt areas. The history of the Jukun Kingdom,however.suggests that
it transformed very little of the socio-economic patterns and political
1. Hogben and Kirk Greene 1966 p.165
2. Perham 1966 p.150
3. Perham 1962 p.150
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relationships in both its society and on the groups and societies it
conquered besides the spread of its culture. The Kingdom remained
poor and undeveloped in economic wealth and did not develop a reading
and writing civilization even when it was the case that it was in contact
with the Hausa-City-States and the Kingdom of Borno through wars.
Furthermore the 3ukun Kingdom managed to keep itself without Islamic
influences. This was so because the Jukuns simply "came and went
away" and only left behind their cultural and magico-religious imprints
on groups and societies they conquered. 1 The historical accounts about
the political impact of the Jukun Kingdom are still riddled with con-
troversy, particular so because the Jukuns tended to have been assimilated
rather than they being cultural and political assimilators. For example,
in the 18th century when the Jukun Kingdom declined, Jukun people mixed
with the Tiv,as well as,with other smaller groups and societies adjacent
to their territories, who were too numerous and virile to be dominated
by Jukun culture even when it was the case that the cultural patterns
of the Jukuns without their language were traceable in the period of the
Fulani Islamic Revolution and upon impact with British influences in
1900. 2 In other words, social and political boundaries in the identities
of groups and societies with Jukun cultural influences did not become
blurred before 1804 and in the period between 1804 and 1900. In 1680
however a Borno King defeated Jukun warriors in a military battle and
thereafter the great political divide in the patterns of socio-economic
and political development between the Islamic Kingdoms and the Jukun
became established and the non-Islamic Kingdom began to decline until
in the 18th century it ceased to exist as a military and political
force in the region.3
1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, December 1980.
2. C.K. Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, Volume I, London 1925
p.81; Margery Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, London
1937 p.144-145.
3. Meek 1925 I p.81
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In the 19th century the Ju kuns lived on the glorious memories
of their past military adventures with little political interests
while interactino independently in socio-economic and political
relationships with their neighbours. ' After impact with British
influences in 1900, and in particular in the period between 1920
and 1940 the government of British administration in The North made
political attempts to resurrect the prominence of the Jukun Kings
and people as a "ruling race" over the M-Belt groups and societies. 2
This was in a period when there were different interpretations of the
policy of Indirect rule among top British officials in the government
of British administration in The North. Perham suggests that this was
intended to help the Jukuns "exercise their imperial techniques before
it had completely atrophied". 3 This explains a further suggestion by
Perham that upon impact with British influences after 1900 there was
"an almost mournful fascination in studying this relic of an Empire
which once extended over almost the whole of the northern Provinces
and sacked Kano and which now is cut off far to the south in the heart
of the pagan bush, still goes through an ancient ritual surrounding a
' very divine King .. living on the memory of the past ... as an effete
remnant".
4
 The Aku Uka of Wukari, the King of the Jukuns, in the
period between 1930 and 1940 was seen to be the political representative
of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North. In that period
he developed socio-economic and political concerns over all of the
M-Belt groups and societies in debates on policies and the activities
of government in the NHC.
5
1. Perham 1937 p.144-145
2. Ibid p.145
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.144-145
5. These political concerns are examined in more detail in Chapter 2.
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(C) Autonomous M-Belt groups.
The autonomous M-Belt groups were found geographically interspersed in
the territories between the politically centralized Islamic Kingdoms of the
Hausa-City-States, the Islamic Kingdoms of Nupe, Igbirra and Bomb and the
Kingdoms with centralized political authority in the M-Belt areas such as
the Jukun, Igalla and Idoma l . The autonomous M-Belt groups before 1804,
were dispirate in socio-political orgnization and mainly existed with
subsistence economic units. Their numbers were Legion. C. L. and O. Temple,
suggest that the most important groups in the M-Belt areas in numerical
size included: the Tiv, Idoma, Gwari, Bassange, Gwandara, Mandara, Jarawa,
Montol, Ankwei, Angas, Yergam, Jukun, Batta, Bachama, Sura (Mahavul), Kaje,
Birom and Katab 2 . There were numerous other groups that existed in the
M-Belt areas and in the North in general. The 1921 census identified about
250 tribes, with over 200 of these in the M-Belt areas alone
3
. The
autonomous and smaller groups of the culturally distinct of the M-Belt
areas have their peak of heterogeneity in Adamawa, Southern Bauchi,
Plateau, Southern Zaria and the northern parts of Benue. More homogeneous
and numerically bigger M-Belt groups were to be found in Southern Benue
Province. These included the Tiv, Idoma, Jukun and the Alago 4 . Of the 416
tribal groups in Nigeria with a population under 100,000 in 1921, about 297
(70%) were in the M-Belt areas, 75 (18%) in Southern Nigeria and 44 (9%) in
the Islamic Society in the North
5
.
Although Islamic civilization penetrated Kanuri and Hausa lands as
early as in the 11th and 15th centuries respectively, the autonomous M-Belt
groups retained their separate identities, untouched by these external
influences, partly for geographical isolation and the lack of conquest and
incorporation. The majority of the people in the M-Belt areas before 1804,
therefore, remained outside the Islamic faith and North African cultural
patterns, which were influencing the Hausa and Bomb Kingdoms. They
continued to practice unique forms of African traditional systems of
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beliefs and worships, that varied as their cultural forms themselves. In
1905, Lady Lugard described the autonomous 'M-Belt' groups as existing in
the North:
"in a belt of formidable pagan strength along
the course of the two rivers (Niger and
BRnue)... the pagan belt stretching from
8"North latitude to the coast, wasapractically
unknown to the early Haussa races".
The groups were concentrated on a small area, relative to the Hausa and
Borno Kingdoms, but the diversities of their tribal customs and languages
were great
7
. The main premises of political and social identification among
these groups was based on Kinship, linguistic differences and claims to
land, rather than culture, because of the enormous similarities in their
cultural patterns
8
. It was not until after impact with British influences
that the groups found a lingua franca, when there was diffusion of the
Hausa language and culture to some parts of the M-Belt areas
9
. Some of
these groups maintained their political and cultural autonomy until upon
impact with British influences. Although there were tribal wars, where
groups failed to contain the military thrust of the Islamic Kingdoms or
that of a more powerful neighbour there was forced migration, a pattern
that was to become increasingly characteristic of the area after the
Islamic revolution in 1804. No organized political authority therefore
claimed political suzerainty over these groups, particularly the majority
of those found in the Benue Valley and on the hilly Plateaul °. However,
vast areas of some of the M-Belt groups in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and
some parts of Plateau, were subsequently colonized by the Fulani and
conquered in the Fulani Islamic Jihad in the period between 1804 and 1900,
who ruled over numerous 'pagan' subjects.
There are certain specific defining social and political features
which characterized these autonomous M-Belt groups that make them distinct
in the North before 1804 and which remained peculiar to some of them until
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impact with British influences. The most important were in socio-political
and economic differences in the organization of society and politics. They
were comparatively small scale organizations of politics and economies over
a smaller area and were undeveloped relative to the institution and
political organization of society in the Islamic Kingdom which were
trans-local. They also tended to be cicephalous state systems unlike the
Hausa and Borno Kingdoms and the subsequent Sokoto caliphate. Tremearne
suggests that although they were undeveloped and relatively backward when
compared to the transformation of society in the Hausa and Borno Kingdoms
with Islamic culture:
"They shared similarities in customs, life
patterns, culture, food, houses, military
formations and strategy and their weapons were
all the Ire despite their linguistic
divides" .
Economic activity seldomly went beyond the family unit since it was mainly
subsistence economy
12
. Furthermore the organization of socio-economic and
political activities was on a daily basis, orally communicated and depended
on memory for records; there was no writing in contrast to the Islamic
scholarship that developed with the written arabic scripts in Islamic
centres of Katsina and Maiduguri as early as in the 16th century. Islamic
civilization which influenced the Hausa and Borno Kingdoms was used to
organize government, commerce and encouraged the acumalation of knowledge.
Furthermore while trade and commercial transactions within and sometimes
between the M-Belt groups was based on exchange by barter, weighted and
measured equivelances of currency were used in the Islamic society. These
developments increased the wealth of the Islamic society while the M-Belt
areas remained poor. The poor societies of the 'North' in the period before
'
1804 therefore existed in the M-Belt areas, particularly those in Adamawa,
S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Plateau, where there were fequent famines
13
. The
poverty of the M-Belt areas contrasted with the wealth of the Islamic
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societies where Kings boasted of gold reserves and gold plated ornaments.
However the wealth of the Islamic society in this period was dependent on a
slave-economy and some of the slaves were extracted from the M-Belt areas.
The undevelopment as much as the underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups
is therefore explained by the social turbulance that was set in motion both
by the economic needs of the Islamic kingdoms in the trans-Sahara as well
as by the extended trans-Atlantic slave trade from the southern parts of
what became Nigeria. Being geographically sandwiched between more powerful
neighbours both to the North and to the South the M-Belt areas became
de-populated by slave raids of the Hausa and Borno Kingdoms who exported
slaves northwardly across the Sahara and by Nupe who in the 16th, 17th and
18th centuries was exporting slaves both for the trans-Saharan trade and
southwardly for the trans-Atlantic trade 14. Before 1804 therefore nearly
the whole of the M-Belt areas was in a flux and was characterized by very
confusing patterns of migration in which many group cultures became
modified by those to which the new group migrated into 15. Thus for example
while some traditions of origins of non Islamic groups in Adamawa (Bachama)
S. Bauchi (Jarawa) and Plateau (Angas) suggest having come from somewhere
in the North, the Benue groups (Tiv) and some of the Plateau groups (Birom)
suggest migration to their present locations from "the south" 16 . This might
not have been unconnected to both the trans-Saharan and the trans-Atlantic
slave trade. The Islamic revolution and the wars it created on the M-Belt
groups was to increase the tempo of migration patterns of non-Islamic
groups in Adamawa, Bauchi and S. Zaria to the Plateau where the Jarawa,
Kaje and Ganawuri took refuge. Meek suggests that as result of the wars and
slave raids on the non-Islamic groups in the period before 1804,
particularly those on the M-Belt areas, society and politics was in
constant flux and each of the groups ceased to exist in the homogeneity of
social practices except for its linguistic differences 17 .
Among the M-Belt groups therefore the relationship between politics
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and society was minimial and only in so far as it threatened day to day
existence of the individual groups members did economy assume a politically
meaningful organization. The groups were politically isolated from each
other in their identities and the structure of authority in each group was
fragmented and only mediated by a 'tribal court' consisting of a council of
elders and spiritual heads who had authority over chief and people. Being
military weaker than their more powerful Islamic neighbours who encircled
them (Borno, the Hausa states and Nupe) they could not create a social
order in their society that guaranteed external interaction and influence.
They were preoccupied with the self-defence of their groups and identities
of their members, which they managed to maintain by living a precarious
existence either by hidding in caves or migration. Tribal group boundaries
were therefore maintained by the unique geography in the location of the
M-Belt groups even before 1804. Where societies are naturally, protected by
physical inaccessibility dissident ideas and religions, different from the
general patterns of social development affecting other groups, flourish in
the highland or forested regions. This was not unique for the M-Belt areas.
The Berbers in North Africa for example, remained Catholic for a long time
in the midst of an Islamic setting, as were the Moors in the Aragon
highlands in Spain who kept their faith in Islam until their expulsion,
while everywhere surrounded by Catholics 18 . In the hilly lands of Adamawa,
Southern Bauchi, Plateau and Southern Zaria and in the forested areas of
Benue, South-East of the Hausa states on the Niger-Benue Valley some M-Belt
groups maintained themselves inviolate from Islamic influences before and
even after 1804
19
.
However, from the economic needs of the Islamic kingdoms, reflected in
the slave raids on the non Islamic groups, most of the M-Belt areas became
underdevelped. The most affected groups were those adjacent to areas of the
Islamic Kingdoms of Borno, the Hausa States and the Nupe Kingdom. This was
particularly the case with groups in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and S.
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Zaria. In Benue, the Junkun and Tiv were least affected while the Idoma
suffered from the raids of the Nupe Kingdom, although they remained equally
undeveloped because they were inaccessible to outside influences. The
socio-economic and political differences between the Islamic Kingdoms and
the M-Belt groups however remained distinct in the period before 1804. They
were to increase after 1804 upon the establishment of the Fulani ruled
Islamic Society in the 19th century when Islamic political leadership
assumed the governance of a cohesively established society with a
centralized religion and political authority in Sokoto over a wider area
with the M-Belt areas defined in functional terms in relation to the
centres of the new power structure. Before 1804, therefore the social and
political frontiers of the M-Belt groups were volatile and political
identities being non Islamic, were limited to the groups concentrated in a
specific area. Similar to the Islamic Kingdoms and some of the non-Islamic
Kingdoms in the M-Belt areas a superimposed core and aperiphery did not
exist. This was altered with the establishment of an Islamic Society by dan
Fodio in 1804 over most of the territories that became the North in 1900.
III. Politics and Society in the period between 1804 and 1900 following
from the Islamic revolution of dan Fodio.
The whole pattern of government and politics in the areas that became
Northern Nigeria in 1900 were changed by the Jihad of 1804, lauched by dan
Fodio. Fodio set out to make Muslims out of the Islamic Kingdoms whose
Muslims had become rather lax in Islamic practices as his reasone detat for
the Jihad. However, economic and political interests in the established
Islamic Society complemented religious goals and subsequently de-emphasized
religion with time and space as conquest and expansion got further away
from the core-Islamic centres of the revolution toward the other areas of
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the North and in particular, toward the M-Belt groups who increasingly
became defined as peripheries to be exploited. dan Fodio was however
committed to transformation of the socio-religious life of communities
living in the region in 180420 . Whatever were the relign otA5 motives in the
establishment of the Islamic Society in the 'North', the revolution of dan
Fodio was another phase in the historical oppression of some of the M-Belt
groups, one factor in the complex range of systemic oppressive forces that
set into motion the underdevelopment of the M-Belt areas, when the religion
of the Islamic society degenerated into something undefineable as it raided
both friend and foe alike.
The religious ideas and political conception of the Islamic revolution
which established an Islamic society in 1804 over most of the territories
that became the North in 1900, was the brain-child of a member of the
Tarika, an Islamic Fulani intelligentsia which had migrated from the
Western Sudanic Empires and settled in Hausa-land early in the 13th
century
21
. In the 15th century, the Fulani were already a distinct group
with a religious and political identity of their own as they penetrated
Hausa-land, bringing with them: "their cattle and carrying books on
divinity" 22 . By the 17th century the Fulani in Hausaland had established
themselves in exclusive colonies 23 . In many of the "Fulani colonies" on
Hausaland, there was intermarriage with the indigenous Hausa population
and some of the Fulani systematically lost their distinctive physical
features as they adopted many of the Hausa customs including the Hausa
language24 . Their academic knowledge and socio-political skills however
caused them to move into the metropolitian centres of Hausa-land where they
controlled important political roles in the institutions of society: the
schools, the courts and the palaces of the Hausa Kings
25
 . By the end of the
18th century Fulani numbers and influence in the Hausa states was
enormous
26
. There was a concomittant increase in the numbers of their
educated members, who automatically assumed positions of influence in the
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metropolitican centres of the Hausa Kingdoms: "The Fulani in Hausa towns
became good traders, teachers and were serving as political advisors"27.
However, it was not until the early years of the 19th century that a
highly educated but relatively small class of the Fulani began to establish
their dominance over the Hausa Kingdoms by both military and political
means. Among other factors in the developing political crisis in the Hausa
city states there was an unchecked increase in the class of influential
religious scholars and preachers who were Fulani and had successfully
achieved a Hausa peasantry following that had Islamized 28 . One of those
Fulani scholars was Usman da Fodio, a teacher and Islamic preacher who had
become prominent and influential and had educated Yunfa, the Hausa King of
Gobir29 . At the age of 33 he had a large Islamic following which attracted
the jealousies and envy of his pupil, Yunfa the King of Gobir. It was
however dan Fodio who sounded the fateful aratory of the Islamic revolution
which charged the Hausa Kings with malformation of the Islamic society and
malignant practices of the Islamic religion:
"One of the ways of their government is their
impostions on the people monies not laid down
by the Sharia being those which they call
Jangali and Kurdin Shari and Kurdin Salla. One
of the ways of their government is their .
intentionally eating whatever food they wish
whether it is religiously permitted or
forbidden, and wearing what ever clothes they
wish whether religiously permitted or forbidden
and drinking whatever beverages (Ta'am) they
wish whether religously permitted or forbidden
and riding whatever riding beasts they wish,
whether religiously permitted or forbidden and
taking what women they wish without marriage
contract and living in decorated places,
spreading soft (decorated) carpets as they Osh
whether religiously permitted or forbidden" '.
The Islamic revolution sprang from an observable failure in governing
according to the Koran, in the practices of the Hausa Kings whom dan Fodio
termed as "Heathen Kings" 31 . The Jihad of dan Fodio therefore in the
classic tradition of puritanic Islamic revivalism and its expressions,
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ended in a war of conquest to reform the irreligiou5
By a political process which carefully selected religious and military
leadership rooted in the indoctrination of some of his personal students,
in order to fulfil Islamic objectives in 'The North', dan Fodio gave
political orders directed at the Islamic Hausa-city-states as well as on
the non-Islamic groups and societies with the urge: "...to spread the faith
and oust the Habe and Kafiri rulers" 32 . To each of the leaders dan Fodio
gave an Islamic religious 'Green-Flag' as the symbol of authority directed
by him33 . Then he commended to them an Islamic prayer that he used before
the critical battle of 'Tabkin Kwatto' to be used before battle:
"If I fight this battle that I may become
greater than my fellow or that my son may
become greater than his or that my slave may
lord it or his, may the 'Kafiri' wipe us from
the land"
This is the premise from which there was developed a relationship between
an Islamic religious ideology in the political identity and the military
battles of Fulani armies to spread Islam over other groups and societies in
'The North' as part of a political process of incorporation. This suggests
that central to the political and religious ideas of dan Fodio when he set
into motion the Islamic revolution was the establishment of Islamic laws as
the basis of government and governing in society in the territories that
became the North in Nigerian politics. The process was meant to replace
political systems which had developed to become riddled with un-Islamic
laws, un-Islamic political practices as was characteristic of the
Hausa-city-states and the Kingdom of Borno.
Usman dan Fodio religiously accused the Hausa-Kings of having gone
astray from the path of 'Allah' and had therefore "raised the flag of the
Kingdom of the world above the flag of Islam and thus were unbelievers"35.
In other words, it was meant that Islam as the religion of the state ought
to take precedence over the nature of political ideologies as the religion
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of the rulers and the ruled. Politics and religion ought to be one in Islam
and politics ought to be guided by the Islamic religion. The pattern in the
conduct of the affairs of society that was now established focussed on the
Islamic religion taking precedence over the policies in politics. This
means that according to dan Fodio the theory and practice of politics is
guided by Islam and its ideological precepts of 'the political society'.
There were therefore strong underlying religious reasons for political
commitment in the overthrow of the Hausa Kings by dan Fodio and his
followers. Whatever the weight of the religious reasons for political
commitment, to engage a religious movement in a struggle to contest for
control of political power meant taking the Islamic religion straight into
politics through the front door. This created political tensions in the
processes of incorporation into the Islamic society established in the
period between 1804 and 1810 because there existed non-Islamic groups and
societies in the territories. Subsequently after 1900 when there was impact
with British influences and the non-Islamic groups and societies became
part of the wider conception of the Islamic society, the Islamic religious
divide conditioned the nature of political conflict in the unit created as
Northern Nigeria.
In the period between 1804 and 1810 when there were religious and
political processes in the establishment of the Islamic society and its
expansion through military methods on the territories that became the
North, dan Fodio accepted and blessed the submission to his authority by
Fulani and other Islamic leadership in the Islamic Reformist Movement 36 .
This suggests that in the early years of the Islamic revolution leadership
of the scattered Fulani (Jama'as) communities that were settled among the
different groups and societies became formally brought under one central
political and religious authority of dan Fodio before there was total
military victory over the Hausa-city-state. Subsequently some of the chosen
leaders were successful in their military and political assignments to
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overthrow the Hausa-Kings. For example Modibbo Adama in Adamawa, Yakubu in
Bauchi, Isiyaku in Daura, Buba Yero in Gombe, Samba in Hadejia, Ali-Limi in
Ilorin, Sulemanu in Kano, Ibrahim Zaki in Katagum, Umaru Dallaji in
Katsina, Dan Tunku in Kazaure, Mamman Manga dan Gwani Mukhtar in Misau,
Malam Dendo in Nupe and Mallam Musa in Zaria 37 . These were all disciples of
Shedu dan Fodio before he commissioned them to carry on the Jihad.
Fulani leaders in the Islamic Reformist Movement like Gwani Mukhtar
assigned to overthrow the Islamic Kingdom of Borno however only partially
succeeded in conquering the western territories and failed to fulfil the
overthrow of the King 38 . The Fulani led Islamic Reformist Movement centered
on Sokoto therefore failed to religiously and politically incorporate the
Islamic Kingdom of Borno into the Islamic Society of dan Fodio by military
means. Within the Borno Kingdom itself the Islamic ruling classes were not
religiously attracted and remained unimpressed by the Islamic reformist
movement of dan Fodio. For example, after halting the Fulani military
advance on the Western territories of the Kingdom of Borno, El-Kanemi
requested dan Fodio to explain the attacks;
"since we profess the same•religion and it is
not fitting th0 our subjects should make war
on each other" '.
Although the explanations that dan Fodio produced suggested a list of evils
in the practices of Islam within the Kingdom of Borno, El Kanemi argued
back that;
"sin does not make au one a pagan when he has
confessed his faith" .
Control over the military situation within the conquered western
territories in the Kingdom of Borno by Fulani armies remained volatile
until after 1903 when British conquest established a superior military
presence in the area.
-78-
On the Northern and Western frontiers of the Hausa-city-states
overthrown by the Fulani, the Islamic revolution of Usman dan Fodio failed
to conquer all the Hausa speaking people in the area
41
. Some of the
Hausa-speaking commities in the area became bitter political enemies of
Fulani leadership in the Islamic revolution because of persistant military
raids for conquest even though in the period between 1804 and 1900 many of
them became Moslems 42 . The northern and western frontiers to the
Hausa-city-states were comprised of the territories of the peoples of
Zaberma, Dendi, Fogha, Yagha and Gurma where there were minorities of
Hausa-speakers and a few being Moslems before 1804 43 . This suggests that
within the very social and economic boundaries of the Hausa-city-states,
political incorporation by Fulani military conquest in the establishment of
the Islamic society was not total because historically recollected
experiences complimented the persistence of non-Islamic identities.
It is not the intention of the study in this chapter to produce
exhaustive explanatory reasons for the underlying motives of the Islamic
revolution, whether they were purely political or religious. The interest
is first and foremost to describe how the Islamic Reformist Movement
established an Islamic Society and how subsequently its leadership became
entrenched to dominate politics in the region to produce specific effects
on the failure of political incorporation on some of the M-Belt groups and
societies in the period between 1804 and 1900. It however suffices to
mention that various underlying socio-political motives have been advanced
as the causes of the Islamic revolution that was ignited by Usman dan
Folio. The strongest that discounts the religious motivations of dan Fodio
is suggested by J. H. Hogben and Anthony Kirk-Greene when they relate the
origins of Islamic religious movements in the Western Sudan to the
developing state systems in the region in general
44
. Explicit in the
correlation they draw between the state of politics and religion within the
Hausa-city-states and the Islamic uprising of dan Fodio is a suggested
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political plot masqueraded under the guise of religious purification to
install the Fulani in the political positions of the Habe Kings 45 . In other
words ethnic political considerations ployed in the Islamic Reformist
Movement and were determining factors in the establishment and political
domination of the Islamic society with Islamic ideological consideration
taking secondary influences in the contest to control power in all of the
Hausa-city-states. This suggests that an Islamic religious ethnic group and
society was the political force that effected change and the shape of
politics within the Hausa-city-states. This interpretation is supported by
new research findings on the relationship between the state of politics in
the 19th century Hausa-city-states as the factors that conditioned the
Islamic revolution and the political ambitions of the Fulani. For example
It has been suggested that the Fulani uprising;
"was preconcieved in the minds of its leaders
long before (they set about) the overthrow of
the Hausa state 6s and the establishment of a new
administration" 4 .
Adeleye suggests a number of social and political indicators to support the
propositions: dan Fodio's students featured prominently in the whole
process and success of the revolution; there was a geographical spread of
his Fulani students before the revolution - these included Buba Yaro,
Yakubu (who was the only non Fulani), Ali-Limi, Mallam Dendo, Adama, and
Gwani Mukhtar who went away from the dan Fodio camp in Gobir to the distant
territories that became affected by the Islamic revolution before its
expansion on non-Islamic groups and societies; There was no Hausa student
of dan Fodio as leader of the Islamic uprising; the students became local
leaders preceeding the revolution and had begun to preach reform and won
fame:
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'...
... and when they heard of dan Fodio's
uprising theyeent back to him for acceptance
and blessing" .
This means that there was political timing of a previously existing plot
developed from religious teachings rather than spontaneous political
activity.
Whatever the nature of the religious zeal in the Islamic revolution it
might have been arare political accident in the whole experience of world
history that it used a religious movement to install new rulers in the
Hausa- City- States who were all Fulani except for Yakubu of Bauchi. Even
then, Yakubu from the Gerawa group and society in Bauchi and the subsequent
founding Emir of the ruling family was a former student of dan Fodio and it
is suggested that he "was the trusted pupil of dan Fodio" 48 . Even when
there was trust between Yakubu and dan Fodio, upon his political and
military assignment to Bauchi, Yakubu had to hide for about two years from
powerful local Fulani leaders in Bauchi as well as from his own Gerawa
tribe, after receiving the flag 49 . Furthermore, Yakubu was to face
considerable opposition from Fulani leaders in Gombe and Adamawa in the
cause of executing the politics of the Islamic revolution. These political
tensions revolved over territorial claims and jurisdiction over territory.
They warranted the intervention of dan Fodio to resolve the parties
involved
50
.
In the period between 1804 and 1810 the Islamic revolution of dan
Fodio successfully overthrew all of the Hausa Kings and established
authority over an area of 250 000 sq. mils 51 . It however failed to
overthrow the Kings of Borno although it conquered half of their territory
on the East of Hadeija. The speed and extent of conquest, made the Fulani
Empire the fastest growing political entity before the coming of Europeans,
with one centre of gravity. Before 1817 it had expanded the political
boundaries of the Hausa states to include the Yoruba of Ilorin and the Nupe
Kingdom. Usman dan Fodio created an emirate system of government on most of
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Hausa-land and subsequently went beyond the Hausa kingdoms and created
about 30 emirates in addition to numerous sub-emirates all under a
centralized Islamic system of government and religious authority in
Sokoto
52
. In all these political and religious developments, Usman dan
Fodio was the source of all authority to other leaders. From his
leadership, the application of Islamic norms, in the governance of society
and political organization, was evolved a structural administrative system.
This provided the common bond which held the component parts together as
one polity. Over the ruins of the numerous polities of the vast areas,
firstly the Hausa city states, the Islamic movement established a new
political system based on Islamic law and values. It had initiated a
political revolution which ultimately swept away the Hausa dynasties and
established an Islamic society, centred at Sokoto radiating political power
and authority to the East, South and South-Eastern territories, from that
centre. The new society was held together by the Islamic institutions and
by the personality of dan Fodio himself. He established a remarkable
ascendency and authority over his appointed rulers 53 . At the same time
cohesion in the society derived from its machinery of government, which
while placing a premium on obedience and subordination to the Caliph, was
sufficiently flexible to allow rulers a great measure of independence,
subject only to their non-infringement of the Sharia and the proper
discharge of their functions delegated to them by dan Fodio: ie. repair
mosques, teach sciences of Islam, improve markets, wage the Jihad as a duty
imposed on Muslims and reporting important events such as the declaration
of war on enemies and the infiltration of foreigners on their land 54. This
was a straight forward case of federalism with an ideological commitment:
autonomy of the units in the state while acknowledging the supreme
authority of the centre, a tradition that has remained strong in the
contemporary pattern of politics in the North with Nigeria. Although the
established Islamic society was run on a highly decentralized form of power
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structure, where each of the flag-bearers took decisions on local matters,
such localism was not contradictory to unity. Usman dan Fodio. himself
remained the ultimate source of all political authority and all powers in
the units under the emirs were exercised in his name 55 • This was the
political and religious element that held the federal Islamic society
together in the North, even after the death of dan Fodio in April 1817 56 .
For all its size, the Islamic society established by the Fulani was
economically and socially integrated through Kano and Katsina and
politically based in Sokoto. Its interaction with the outside world became
more entrenched through these centres. Internal order was secure and
orderly and this gave stability to agritulture, intellectual development,
centred at Katsina and Islamic civilization that looked up to North Africa
thrived
57
. Much more significant for the later political patterns of
identities that developed from the Islamic society of dan Fodio, is that
Islam in the North, became for its adherants in the Islamic society, a
political heritage in which they took a great deal of pride. It also became
for them the source of social life and political creativity to the extent
that they saw themselves as different from and superior to other groups
Including all M-Belt people and people in the South of Nigeria 58 . The
Fulani established Islamic society had a bond of unity which also produced
a cultural unity to a higher degree and with a greater sense of
socio-political identity with more cohesion when compared to the M-Belt
groups and other parts of Nigeria.
However, after the overthrow of the Hausa-city states the Islamic
society developed to become what James Coleman has described as an
indigenous imperial system 59 . This was so because it expanded the political
boundaries of the Hausa kingdoms by colonization and conquest, particularly
toward the M-Belt areas. The pattern in the process was in some ways
similar to the subsequent European rocesses of colonization and conquest of
Africa: claiming territory, systematically colonizing the territory and
-83-
where there was resistance, this was followed by conquest and establishment
of political authority. The instruments of the colonization of territories
outside the Hausa states were the "Fulani Jemaas"60 . The "Fulani Jemaas"
that infiltrated and colonized territories all over the North including the
M-Belt areas were headed by Islamic 'Mallams s
 (teachers) 61 . In the
particular experiences of the M-Belt areas the Fulani usually came
peacefully, asked for a piece of land to settle on and to graze their
cattle and then refused to move out62 . They paid token rent to the
indigenes of the land with milk on a daily basis and also a cow for each
year they stayed to graze their cattle. The indigenes also benefited from
this because cow-dung improved farmland and improved crop yields on land
where the Fulani cows stayed overnight°. In these ways "Fulani colonies"
developed among some of the M-Belt groups, under separate Fulani leaders
known as "Ardos" who were usually independent of the local non-Islamic
chiefs. This was the general pattern in the colonization of the M-Belt
areas of Adamawa, S.Bauchi, S.Zaria, and some parts of Plateau. Where the
"Fulani Jemaas" were concentrated in the M-Belt areas there was total
success in achieving control or some form of partial control over the
M-Belt groups after the Islamic revolution of 1804. In the M-Belt areas
where there were no "Fulani-Jemaas", there was no conquest, although such
groups were raided directly from the Islamic society by Fulani armies or
from a base in a conquered M-Belt area or from pressures on a conquered
M-Belt group who in turn raided other unconquered groups in order to catch
slaves to pay tributes. This was so for M-Belt groups in the areas of
Adamawa, Jukun land, Southern Bauchi, Plateau, Southern Zaria and the
Northern parts of Benue. There were therefore some M-Belt groups that
neither came into contact with the Fulani or Islamic influences for a
longish period of time. M-Belt groups in Benue, like the Tiv who
experienced the raids of Dan Karo, for example, only had minimal experience
of socio-economic and political relations with the Fulani.
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Colonization, colonialism and the imperialism 64
 of the Fulani on the
M-Belt groups had its basic characteristic features manifested in the
period between 1817 and 1900. In that period:
"A domination which was established in the name
of religion and justice had fallen into
tyranny, tempered only by the weakness or the
moderation of personal rule. Under dan Fodio
and Bello, the conquering armies of the Fulani
were enjoined to spread the true faith and to
convert the pagans to Islamism. At a later
period, it was found more profitable to leave
the pagans in a condition in which it was
lawful to make slaves and to exact tributes and
Fulani wars degenerated intp little more than
slave raiding expeditions"".
Conceptions of the Imperialism of the Islamic society on the M-Belt groups
however derived from the dispatches of dan Fodio when he launched the
Jihad. Dan Fodio had written that:
"the waging of Holy war (al-jihad) is
obligatory by assent ... and that to make war
upon the heathen king who will not say 'There
is no God but Allah' is obligatory by assent
and that to take the government from him is
obligatory by assent; and that to make war upon
the heathen king who does not say 'There is no
God but Allah' on account of the custom of his
town (bi-Sababi 'urfi 'L-baladi) and who makes
no profession of Islam is (also) obligatory by
assent; and that to take thedovernment from
him is obligatory by assent" .
The Islamic revolution defined the M-Belt areas as "heathen kings" and as a
direct consequence, Adama, one of the flag-bearers with the title of Lamido
Fombina was assigned the task of conquest to expand the Islamic society
from there Northward to the Nile and southwardly to the Bight of Biafra67.
Intended expansion of the Islamic society over the M-Belt groups was
particularly vigorous in the period between 1830 and 1900. Although there
were Islamic ideals in the intentions they also became underlined by
socio-political and economic interests of the metropolitan centres of the
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established Islamic society. Indeed dan Fodio had instructed his
flag-bearers and followers to make war and take governments from the hands
of the heathen kings and rulers in these areas but had also been careful to
restrain them by pointing out that it was religiously illegal to "enslave
them and devour their property" 68 . When Sultan Bello took over the reins of
religious and political authority things changed. He laid down three social
and religious categories of people in the territories he claimed as
God-given for the purposes of the Islamic society and clearly suggested
that in the third category slaves were to be extracted:
"Firstly there are the pure Moslems; Secondly
there are those that have mingled heathen and
Moslem practices ... the third category are
those of heathen origins who have never entered
Islam ... let their children and women be taken
as slaves and their property divided ... the
Mallamkoare in entire agreement upon this
point".
The nature of the Economy of the established Islamic society and the means
leadership in centres like Yola, Bauchi, Muri, Gombe and Zaria were obliged
to express loyalty to Sokoto conditioned the exploitation of the M-Belt
groups during the Fulani wars of conquest. In the instance, the historic
economic roles of Zaria, as a slave-raider to produce slaves for labour in
the Islamic society and for exchange in the trans-Saharan trade were
redefined by Bello to include Gombe, Yola and Bauchi, whose territories he
conceived of in a letter to Yakubu of Bauchi: "as most important
frontiers" 70 . By this conception the M-Belt areas of Adamawa, S.Bauchi,
S.Zaria, Plateau and Benue became conceived of as the periphery of the
Islamic society to be exploited for the specific needs of the economy of
the Islamic society. This was so because, the economy of the established
Islamic society from the Fulani led revolution was an inherited economy and
society, which remained as it existed in the Hausa states. Although, the
Hausa kings were overthrown and the Fulani successfully centralized
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religious and political power to themselves, they did not alter the
economic structure, which remained heavily dependent on the trans-Saharan
trade as much as on the trans-local trade between the Hausa cities.
Furthermore, political and religious leadership in the Islamic society,
particularly that from its peripheral centres such as Zaria, Bauchi, Gombe
and Yola was expected to show loyalty to Sokoto by yearly visitations.
These visits had to be accompanied by captured slaves and other material
goods as gifts and contributive tribute from conquered areas. Conquered
M-Belt areas were also expected to acknowledge their political status as
subordinated to Islamic rulers by payments of tributes, which were in
slaves, complemented by material presents. In 1846, when the Emir of Zaria
for example, conquered the Gwari and some of the Southern Zaria groups, he
demanded their submission to his authority by the payment of tributes: "in
the form of slaves, mats and locust beans annually sent to the Sultan"
71
.
Slaves and material goods as tributes from sub-Emirs were also obligatory,
particularly from those established in S.Zaria, Adamawa and Plateau, to
superior Emirs in Yola, Gombe, Bauchi and Zaria, to demonstrate political
and religious loyalty. Slaves and slavery in the Islamic society was
therefore wealth, trade, currency and politics, besides its function of
meeting the domestic needs of labour required to work in the Plantations
( s rumadas') of the Emirs 72 . The biggest of these s rumadas s (slave farms)
was at Taban Sani, with a labour force of 3000 slaves who were owned by the
Emir73. Furthermore, when Mamman Sani, the Fulani Emir in Zaria in 1846
died, he owned about 10,000 slaves who had produced corn that lasted Zaria
Emirate for 11 years 74. Slave raiding and slavery were therefore
indispensible military activity on the M-Belt groups for the economy of the
Islamic society. The whole social and economic system of the established
Islamic society was based on slaves and slavery 75 .
The bulk of the slaves for the economic needs of the Islamic society
came through Zaria, an emirate that had extended its influence by the
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establishment of vassal kingdoms in Jemaa, Keffi, Doma and Nassarawa, by
colonization and stationing military garrisons in these centres 76 . Slaves
for the economic needs of the Fulani established Islamic society also came
from Adamawa, Bauchi and Gombe who had similarly extended their influence
deep into the M-Belt areas by establishing authority in Wase, Dengi and
Kanam on the South Eastern parts of the Plateau 77 . The Emirs of Adamawa,
Bauchi and Muri had also penetrated deeply into the M-Belt areas and
established influence among the Bachama, Chamba and the Jukun in Wukari and
Yakubu of Bauchi went as far down as Lafiyan-Berriberi78.
However, while some Islamic communities, directly opposed to the
Islamic revolution of the Fulani flag-bearers, assisted in the conquest,
exploitation and depopulation of the M-Belt groups, others organized
non-Islamic communities against the authority of the Fulani in Zaria,
Bauchi and Gombe. The Habe dynasty overthrown by the Fulani in Zaria, which
escaped to settle in Abuja and the Ningawa in the areas north of Bauchi,
with some of their members sandwiched in the area between Zaria and Bauchi,
performed these contrasting political roles by creating centres of
opposition to the Fulani centres of power. Although the Habe dynasty in
Zaria escaped after 1804 to maintain their independence from the Fulani in
Abuja, they were spared from Fulani raids only on the promise of regular
supply of slaves, which they produced from among the Gwari and other
southern Zaria groups 79 . In the areas north of Bauchi, pagans unconquered
by the Fulani who came under the influence of a Muslim dissident group with
the leadership of Hamza, organized non-Islamic groups to turn the tables on
the Islamic slave raiders and terrorized Bauchi and Zaria Emirates and
actually threatened to cut-off the regular slave imports from southern
Zarian. The Islamic dissident group under the leadership of Mallam Hamza
for unclear reasons had previously been expelled from Kano, Zaria, Bauchi
in the middle of the 1840s 81 . They even took slaves from the Islamic
populations under Zaria, Kano and Bauchi although they were not engaged in
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the trans-Saharan slave trade. Furthermore, they also engaged themselves in
organizing non-Islamic groups to revolt against the political authority of
Bauchi, Kano and Zaria82 . The military raids on Kano, Bauchi and Zaria by
the Ningiwa and organized political revolts among the non-Islamic groups
encouraged by the Ningi chiefs continued until they were conquered by the
British in 190383 .
As much as many pagan parts of the Islamic society remained
politically incorporated into the Fulani Empire, there were also many areas
of the M-Belt groups that remained un-colonized by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims
and unconquered by the armies of the Fulani Islamic revolution. They were,
however, militarily raided in varying degrees by Fulani armies for economic
interests rather than the religious reasons for the establishment of an
Islamic society. These areas remained politically independent and free from
Fulani and Islamic cultural influences until British conquest in the years
after 1900. They included groups found on the hilly and mountanous areas of
the Plateau, Southern Jukun and almost all of Tiv and Idoma land in the
Benue Valley. Similarly, in Adamawa, such groups as those centred around
the Bachama and the Chamba in Numan and Wurkum areas, the Kaje in Southern
Zaria and the Jarawa and Lere districts in Southern Bauchi were also
continuously raided but remained unconquered. Parts of the land of the
groups in Southern Bauchi and Southern Zaria was however colonized and
A
their people forced to migrate to the hilly and militarily secure parts of
the Plateau. All of these groups however had their territories claimed
without conquest and divided between Adamawa, Muri, Gombe, Bauchi and
Zaria. In the period between 1805 and 1903, Fulani armies attempted
conquest to bring the groups under the authority of the particular Emirate.
There were varying degrees in the military success of these attempts. The
success of established political control from the military efforts at
incorporation into the Islamic society was conditioned by the extent of
Fulani and Islamic colonization of the particular M-Belt area, the nature
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of topography, freedom from the Tse-tse fly of the forested areas and
distance from the Islamic centres of religion and politics. Furthermore,
all the M-Belt groups and societies, reacted to the forceful Fulani entry
into their societies for conquest and political incorporation into the
Islamic society by having their roads closed in all directions and going to
farms with weapons slung on their backs (bows and poisoned arrows) 84. As a
direct consequence of the Jihad, the Fulani wars became enemies of the open
society in the M-Belt areas and the British found them as "closed
societies" where the movements of strangers raised fears, suspicions and
apprehension.
However, all the M-Belt groups were either directly or indirectly
affected by Fulani wars. In 1874, for example, when the Emir of Muri,
Mohammed Nya, conquered the Jukuns, he forced Wukari to produce foodstuff
and between 35 and 40 slaves at any time the need arose. The Jukun in turn
raided the Tiv to meet this requirement 85 . Rya was even less successful
when he attempted to conquer the Tiv whom he only raided for slaves using
the Jukuns as a spring-board86 . When Muri was under Emir Hamadu, however,
there were four military attempts to conquer the Tiv and to bring them
under the authority of the Islamic society87 . On one occassion, he
penetrated as far down as Katsina Ala, which he sacked its population,
burned down the buildings and extracted some slaves88 . The Fulani were
however unable to hold the conquest and subsequently withdrew their
garrisons89 . This was not unconnected to the menace of the Tse-tse fly
which killed both the Fulani and their horses. The Idoma also in the Benue
valley, experienced Fulani wars in the period between 1873 and 1900, when
Mohammed Agwe, the sub-Emir in Keffi raided them and penetrated deep down
into their territories for slaves but failed to establish poltical
authority over the group90 .
The Fulani wars on the Plateau and southern Bauchi, first came from
Yakubu I of Bauchi. The most celebrated of battles Yakubu fought with
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non-Islamic groups however were the battles with the Dass and the Lere
districts in Bauchi 91 . Although Yakubu conquered them in battle, he was
never able to establish permanent political control, because they always
revolted and refused to pay him tributes92 . Dass remained an independent
kingdom and was to be so, under British rule, set only some 30 miles from
Bauchi; at least half the population was Muslim by 1900. The Jarawa, in
southern Bauchi were however, conquered and the group forced to migrate to
take refuge among the Buji, Anaguta and the Birom on the Plateau. Largely
because of the mountanous terrain of the Plateau area (hills, rocky caves,
meandearing rivers with grooves etc) the Fulani armies were not successful
in establishing political control, although they fought battles and ended
these by imposing some form of tributes without the means of seeing that
they were paid93 . Thus, for example, the Emirs of Bauchi were only able to
partially conquer the Angas on the plains with whom they made an
arrangement to collect tributes only. He also fought the Montol directly
from Bauchi, settled on their area for sometime, but was subsequently
driven out by a combined force of Pyem people, which was supported by a
huge host of mounted spearmen on ponies from the Sura in Panyam, the Challa
in Bokkos and the Birom in Jos who shared tribal land boundaries94.
However, most of the Plateau groups were saved from Fulani conquest by the
mountanous terrain and the consequent difficulty of finding access to the
groups in hiding from the Fulani cavalry and the ease with which some of
the Plateau groups could find refuge on the hills, mountains and caves for
launching counter attacks on the Fulani garrisons made their resistance all
the more difficult for the Fulani armies to suppress. Some of these groups
therefore remained partially conquered but were intensively raided for
slaves and to enforce the payment of tribute95 .
Besides the distinctive tribal resistance from the M-Belt groups that
were unconquered by the Fulani, there were efforts to federate by the
smaller tribes to constitute a bigger force to repulse the Fulani. These
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were however more of military federations, rather than political unions.
There were attempts at such Federation building under the Birom who tried
to amalgamate the Ron Kulere, Afusare, Ataka, Ganawuri, Katab (From
S.Zaria), Irigwe, Fizere, Jarawa, Anaguta, Buji and Gwandara 96 . Similarly
in about 1830, the Sura (Mahavul) under their Warrior Chief Chertu
attempted to organize the Burrum, Ankwei, Montol, Pyem, Yergam (Tarok) and
Challa from their capital in Panyam, into some form of federated political
unity97 . In the period approximately between 1830 and 1840 this unity
succeeded in repelling numerous Fulani invasions from Bauchi. However the
military ties did not result into a permanent political unity since groups
boundaries resurge when the Fulani were successfully driven off and in most
subsequent invasions each group faced the Fulani alone 98 . In some cases
local Plateau groups fought each other and raided each other for slaves.
Also in Adamawa there was an attempt to Federate the non-Islamic groups
consisting of over 30 different tribes under the leadership of the Mandara
Kingdom99 . Although the union of the tribes under the Mandara persisted
until British conquest, it was more in resistance to the Fulani from Yola
and the Kanuri from Borno, another Islamic society.
By 1900 therefore, most of the unconquered M-Belt groups, identified
themselves as culturally distinct and as non-Muslim and non-Fulani,
different from the pale-skinned, masked Fulani invader and slaver on
horse-back. Both the conquered and unconquered of the M-Belt groups, saw
themselves differently from the slave raiders and as victims of the
externally induced Fulani (cattle owners) wars, a process that set into
motion the movement of people with a shared plight which also affected some
of them. While there was more cultural fusion and assimilation among the
smaller tribal groups in Adamawa and Plateau, as a direct consequence of
the Fulani wars, the Tiv and Idoma seemed to have successfully maintained
their independent worlds, undiluted by external influences. Social and
political identities however remained essentially distinct and fragmented
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on cultural lines and it was inconceivable to think of a M-Belt identity in
that period. However, the experience, among the victims of the Fulani raids
in the 19th century, created the conditions for the creation of a common
M-Belt identity over colonial rule in the 20th century.
The roots of the M-Belt problem, therefore, go back to the 19th
century and even earlier, but particularly to the period of the Jihad of
dan Fodio. The Islamic movement created a very powerful political and
religious identity in vast areas of the territories that subsequently
became the North in Nigerian politics. The Fulani ruled these territories
as an Empire until the British conquered and ruled it. The conceptions of
the Fulani Empire in the British created Northern Nigeria, continued until
independence of Nigeria and well after. But since the Jihad failed to
conquer all the people the British incorporated into the Northern Region,
there was malintegration of those who lived in the unconquered and
inaccessible areas of the Plateau, the forested Benue areas and the hilly
parts of Adamawa, Southern Zaria and Southern Bauchi. These unconquered
people, however, had common experiences of being the victims of slave
raiding by the established Fulani emirates. The descendants of these
groups, subseqently organized political movements in the areas, in
opposition to Hausa-Fulani and Islamic domination. When they were mobilized
by a Christian religious identity, a minorities conception of political
identity developed among them, in the period between 1949 and 1967. These
identities developed from the activities of European Christian
Missionaries, which were concentrated in the areas in the period of British
administration of the North.
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Chapter 2
Social and Political processes of incorporation of the non-Islamic groups
and societies into the Islamic society in the period of British rule and
administration before 1945 in the North.
"J believe myself that the future of the virile
race of this Protectorate lies largely in the
regeneration of the Fulani. Their ceremonial,
their coloured skins, their mode of life and
habits of thought appeal more to the native
population than the prosaic business-like
habits of the Anglo-Saxon can ever do ... nor
have we the means at present to administer so
vast a country. This then is the policy to
which in my view the administration of Northern
Nigeria should give effect, viz: to regenerate
this capable race and mould them to ideas of
justice and mercy, so that in future
generations, if not ;his, they become worthy
instruments of rule"%
I. Introduction
At the beginning of the 20th Century the British sent out an
expedition to Northern Nigeria to bring the territory under British
colonial rule. The British were encouraged to take military action against
the North for three reasons: the murder of Captain Maloney in Keffi, which
received a heroes welcome in Zaria and Kano, the massacres of Gwarram of
"pagans" by the Emir of Bauchi who still openly sold slaves in the markets
of his principal towns and the open declaration of war on the British by
the Sultan of Sokoto 2 . Nonetheless, in the climate of the scramble for
Africa, it was apparent that despite these incidents, the British were
determined and were going to occupy the territory since the Berlin
conference of 1884 had declared the areas as British 3 . The conquest of the
Islamic society was short, sharp and rapid and by 1903 most of the Emirs
had been placed under British authority 4 . While the Fulani Emirs
surrendered without a fight, some were conquered and substituted by those
willing to serve under the British crown.
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When the British established their authority over the North, they
found large scale and hierarchically structured Muslim Emirates more
convenient for the administration of the vast territories of the north than
they did the tribal and oce?Waloms societies of the "pagan" M-Belt areas5.
The British, soon after conquest of the Islamic society, established a
conscious rapport with the Emirs, although it took them a long time to
pacify the "pagan" M-Belt areas 600. This was particularly so, because the
Islamic areas in the North, had certain socio-economic and political
advantages over the M-Belt areas, which were rooted in the history of the
unequal development of groups in the region. From contacts with Islam and
North African influences, for example, the Emirates had developed a
Government tax system, Islamic law and large scale administration that
maintained law and order in the society. Furthermore, they had a large
single language, tied to an identifiable Islamic culture which had
influence over many of their people who were literate and this language
went beyond the boundaries of the Islamic society.
As a result, the British tended to give to the Islamic Society
preferential treatment and prestige7 . The "Holy North", as the Islamic
society was referred to among top British Colonial officers, to describe
the Hausa-Fulani Emirates, as well as the Islamic.society of Borno, was
seen to be and treated as more advanced in civilization, than the "pagan"
areas in the North8 . The result was that in the period of British
administration of the North, far more authority was shared with the Emirs
and other Islamic rulers than was the case with pagan Chiefs9 . But there
were exceptions; most of the British Colonial officers, who rose to the top
of the service in the administrative hierarchy regarded the Muslim parts of
the North as more civilized and cultured, than the pagan areas to which
were in most instances junior British officers were posted1°.
Clearly, therefore, British processes of social and political
incorporation affected the non-Islamic groups, in the sense that political
*I Sea cc c 1 ci,:k lend,' c comm4.445 c.k. 4.e
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advantages were tilted toward the Islamic society in terms of the
leadership of the North in the period between 1900 and 1945. This was a
direct result of British success at territorially incorporating the Islamic
and non-Islamic groups into one political entity by military conquest and
varying political measures that were usedil.
II. British Social and Political Attitudes in the North
The new political unit as the "Protectorate of Northern Nigeria" was a
direct creation from British conquest and included the Islamic Society,
established from the Fulani Islamic revolution of 1804 and the Islamic
society of the ancient Kingdom of Bomb. However, when the British arrived
in Borno, it had already been conquered by an Arab adventurer, called Rabeh
who had earlier been killed in battle by the French. The "Protectorate of
Northern Nigeria" also included territories of the M-Belt groups, who were
in the majority non-Islamic in social and political identity 12 .
The economic activities of the M-Belt groups were local, unlike the
trans-local economic activities that characterized the Islamic centres of
religious power and politics. This was one of the considerations from which
there was British focus of political attention on the Islamic society
established by the Fulani and the Borno Kingdom, with religious and
political authority centred on Sokoto and the township of Bomb itself.
Thus although Lord Lugard had his initial headquaters in Lokoja, then
shifted to Zungeru and finally to Kaduna, well removed from the Islamic
society, in the early years after 1900, Northern Nigeria was conceived of
as being the territories centred on Sokoto, Katsina, Kano and Borno 13 .
Besides these four centres of trade and politics and other Emirates,
British knowledge of other parts of the North was thin until after 1930
when many anthropologists undertook studies of some of the M-Belt groups 14 .
In the period between 1900 and 1940, there was British political
effort with the policy of indirect rule to incorporate the M-Belt groups
-99-
into the structure of power and authority and social ethos of the Islamic
society 15 . There was little effort by the government of British
administration, besides that which encouraged Christian Missionary work, to
develop an entirely new political conception of the North with a new
politial culture within which British civilization might be infused to
shape the patterns of modern European socio-economic and political
developments. The non-Islamic groups were placed under the direct
leadership of Muslims and this leadership was moderated by British
Residents, District Officers (D0s) and Assistant District Officers (ADOs).
This leadership in most instances was Haua-Fulani and other Muslims in
general because it was assumed by the British that the Fulani and Muslims
in the North, held suzerainty by right of recent conquest. That/therefore,
involved the ultimate title to land, the right to appoint Emirs and all
officers of state, the right to legislation and taxation 16 . The Fulani in
particular were seen to posses unique qualities of leadership which had
made them a class in a superior race which had established an Empire and
driven: inferior black races backwards towards the impenetrable regions of
barbarism of equatorial Africa creating a belt of Cannibalism 17 . According
to Lady Lugard besides ruling over a civilized society the Fulani political
leadership had the natural and physical qualities. for rulership:
"The cast of face, even when jet black in
colour, being frequently European in form, with
the high nose, thin lips and deep set eyes
characteristic of the Arab of the Mediterranean
coast ... the Aristocratic thin hand and the
slight, somewhat square shoulders of the Arabs
of the coast are also frequently noticeable ...
this blood no doubt penetrated as far as
climatic conditions would allow ... the
Northern belt of the Soudan has been occupied
by races of a higher than negroid type ... the
operation of these types upon the purely
negroid races was to drive them southwards into
the swamps of the coastal belt in which the
higher type could not live ... (in the North)
their ruling classes are deserving in every way
of the name of cultivated Gentlement. We seem
to be in the presence of one of the fundamental
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facts of history, that there are races which
are born 4 conquer and others to persist under
conquest"' .
Political and religious leadership of the Islamic society was 	 seen to
be stately in appearance, magnificiently dressed and holding itself loyaly,
a conception that moulded the autocratic and overbearing "Rajah" attitudes
to Islamic leadership of some of the British in the North 19 . This
contrasted with the attitudes of the British towards the non-Islamic
leadership of the groups in the M-Belt areas. Obviously the potentialities
of the M-Belt groups were considerably undermined, so much so that they
were considered not to merit any attention in the eyes of the British,
particularly in the early period before the 'age of the Anthropologist -
colonial officers' 20 . As early as in the period between 1903 and 1904, the
mind of Lugard and British officers who accompanied him on the tour of
conquered areas was already made up: the Fulani and Muslims were the
educated classes to be appropriately moulded as the ruling classes in the
North
21
.
One of the first political acts by Lugard which created
differentiation in conceptions of political status, both real and imagined
was to create a ranking order of four categories of chiefs and Emirs in the
North: Chiefs of first and second class in political status and third and
fourth class for minor chiefs 21 . The ranks of first class were reserved for
the Shehu of Bomb and the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emirs of Kano, Gwandu and
Katsina 22 . The ranks as second class chiefs was for the "lesser" Emirs
centred in Bauchi, Katagum, Hadeija and Lapai and Emirs in the midst of
"pagan" communities like those of Argungu, Kiama and Bussa 23 . The ranks as
fourth class chiefs were reserved for Fulani district heads and some Chiefs
of the M-Belt areas, who had been identified at the time, but these were
considered of less importance respectively, although each had executive
authority24 . To complement the social and political status of the
traditional leadership in the Islamic society, salaries larger by African
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standards, especially in comparison to the practice in the territories that
were more directly ruled, were paid to the Emirs in the British
administration of the North. The political and religious leadership in the
Islamic centres of Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Borno, Yola, Ilorin and Zaria,
were paid basic salaries of over £2500 as "establishment charges" 25 . The
Emir of Kano, the Sultan of Sokoto and the Shehu of Borno were paid £6000 a
year as basic salaries and establishment charges of £2500, while the Emirs
of Yola, Ilorin and Zaria received £2000 as basic salaries with an equal
amount to the big Emirs as establishment charges 26 . Emirs and Chiefs at the
bottom of the list of "political status" such as the Emir of Jemaare (which
only ruled about 300 sq. miles), who earned £400 annually and to give them
the appropriate status, meant over-stretching the accumulated internal
revenue
27
. In the particular instance of Jemaare, it meant spending one
fifth of the total revenue collected in the Emirate to maintain the
political status of the Emir 28 . The issue of salary differentiation between
Emirs and non-Islamic chiefs in the M-Belt areas was to become one of the
contested grievances by the M-Belt movement with the Northern government as
discriminatory on the M-Belt groups in the period between 1950 and 1965.
Before 1930, however, the British problems of identifying traditional
chiefs and authority among some of the M-Belt groups were compounded by
some Hausa-Fulani migrants "chiefs" who either claimed rulership of some
groups on alleged conquest or created a false chronology of a particularly
favoured family to be rulers in the group. This was particularly so for
Adamawa, S.Bauchi, S.Zaria and some parts of Plateau, where there had been
spells of Fulani conquest and it was not clear who held political power and
authority. The British depended on the Hausa-Fulani to guide them as
interpreters in the M-Belt areas.
The initial advantage which was given to the leadership of the Islamic
society in terms of their status and wealth was developed into an identity
representative of the Northern political identity. This identity was
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subsequently made visible and symbolic in the organizations of the yearly
Durbar shows in which the Emirs attended as obligatory to the ruling
classes in the North after 1920. In 1922 the ruling classes and the Islamic
identity as the identity of the North were institutionalized in the
creation of the Northern Advisory Council (NAC) of chiefs. In the period ro
.i ro
between 1922 and 1931, there was no single M-Belt chief in the NAC. It wasX
this situation that the administration crystallized the Islamic identity as
representative of the Northern political identity. In the period between
1931 and 1945, however the Attah of Igalla, the Ohenainyo of Igbirra and
the Aku Uka of Wukari were appointed by the British administration into the
NAC as representative of the non-Islamic groups in the North. In the same
period the NAG was converted and became the Northern House of Chiefs (NHC),
the most powerful law making institution in the North. The NHC was an
institution with an overwhelming dominance of Muslim Chiefs and
demonstrated its content of the Islamic political identity by both its
composition and the socio-economic and political issues it brought on the
agenda of legislation.
However in the early period Lugard was also concerned to educate only
the ruling classes with Western European modernizing skills from the
Islamic Society in the North 29 . While it was government policy to educate
the ruling classes in the Islamic society, Christian Missionaries were
encouraged by a direct government policy and financial resources, although
initially meagre,to develpment the M-Belt areas with social and welfare
institutions30 . In 1905 Lugard therefore sketched plans to establish "four
grades of schoolerequired in the North. The 'Nassarawa central schools' in
Kano became the model comprising: A-schools for the sons of Chiefs - to
train men who will be able to administer the country, understand their
people, understand the methods of British administration and be bound to
the British not by fear or by commercial interests only, but by ties of
cooperation and sentiment 31 . A-school also had political and religious
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intentions: "to have a generation of loyal and enlightened rulers without
necessarily foregoing their religion" 32 ; B-schools to train teachers, for
branch schools throughout the country; C-schools for purely technical
training and agriculture, to train "the native artisan classes" carpenters,
blacksmiths, leatherworks, tanners and embroiders. The agricultural branch
of the school was concerned with the teaching of seed selection,
afforestation and the improvement of agriculture and stock raising;
D-schools were concerned with the three-Rs (Reading Writing and Arithmetic)
and Elementary Surveying and Hygiene, to produce "native" clerks. The
schools were meant to form part of the policy of indirect rule in which
they were to be a parcel of "Native Life" 33 . Although Lugard sought the
constant advice of Dr. Walter Miller, the anti-Islamic crusader with the
CMS station at Wusasa in Zaria, he later depended on the advice of Dr. Hans
Vischer, who became Director of Education in the North. The appointment of
Vischer with the British administration of the North was based on his
experience of educating Muslims in the Sudan Republic, an area that shared
many similar features with Northern Nigeria 34. However, before the
educational ideas of Lugard and Vischer were implemented, Mayer Burdon, the
Resident in Sokoto and Captain Temple in Kano started Western type European
Schools in 190635 . In 1908 Western European oriented educational
institutions existed and were functioning in Lokoja, Kontagora, Sokoto,
Katsina and Bauchi with direct encouragement and assistance from the
government of British administration in the North 36 . Except for the
government institution at Lokoja all the new institutions were centred in
the Islamic society established from the Fulani Islamic revolution. While
Bible Schools were the main rudiments of Western educational institutions
that existed in the M-Belt areas besides the subsequent work of Dr. G.P.
Bargery in Kabba in 1914 and at Wannune among the Tiv in 1915, no serious
consideration was given to the education of the M-Belt groups before
1914.37  This was largely due to the fact that most of the groups were still
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unconquered and therefore there was no effective British influence in the
areas besides those of the Christian Missionaries. By 1914 however Vischer
was engaged in extending the established system of government schools to
the M-Belt areas, where previously, European Christian missionaries had
been the sole educational agency. When Toro College in Bauchi was opened in
1928 as a Government institution for "pagans" it was of a lower academic
standard where only the rudiments of education were imparted38 . Although
the educational efforts of Hans Vischer were interrupted during the first
World War (1914-1918), progress had been achieved: there was a total
average attendance in Government schoolvmostly in the Islamic society in
the North l from 354 in 1914 to 750 in 1916.39  The effort to extend the model
of the I Nassarawa Central Schools' to the non-Islamic groups in the North
was abandoned in 1914 and in its place Provincial Primary Schools were
established in Sokoto, Gwandu, Kebbi, Bidda, Zaria and Katsina".
More direct efforts were reinvogorated to educate the ruling classes
in the North after 1918. In the instance Katsina college was opened in 1922
with 50 students in the initial intake 41 . At its official opening ceremony,
Governor Clifford stated the objectives of the five year structured school:
"(to train) young Mohammedan men of birth •and
standing from all the Moslem Emirates in
Nigeria ... to teach those boys not only the
lessons learned from books, which they will
acquire, but also the way that good Mohammedans
should live, the courteous deportment, withW
which mere book learning is of little worth' .
Many of the 50 students admitted to katsina college in 1922 (including
Admadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who became first Premier of the North
and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the first Prime-Minister of Nigeria) were to
occupy the highest offices of government, both in the North and Nigeria in
the years between 1947 and 1966 43 . Furthermore, there were more Katsina
college graduates in the Council of Ministers of the North in the period
between 1952 and 1966, Von there were ever old Etonians in any British
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Cabinet44 . According to the Sardauna, this was no accident since the choice
was based on the old school linkage: "where colleagues in Cabinet had been
schooled in the ideas to give a corporate team spirit ... and to work as
one unit's°.
However, by 1923 the total number of government schools in the North
which were concentrated in the Islamic society had risen to 39 with a total
enrolment of 1,955 boys 45 . Out of the total of 39 government schools in the
North, 2 were in Borno, 4 in Sokoto, 5 in Zaria and 8 in Kano 47 . In other
words, 48.7% of these schools in the Islamic society in the North were
concentrated in the core-centres of Kano (which included Katsina before its
creation into a province in 1926), Sokoto, Borno and Zaria, with the other
51.3% distributed in Ilorin, Bida, Bauchi, Yola and Lokoja48 . It was not
until 1928 that Toro near Jos, was established as "a Government experiment
in pagan education" for the non-Islamic groups in the M-Belt areas. The
Primary schools concentrated in the Islamic society developed into
post-primary institutions, known as "Middle-Schools". Primary and
post-primary education in the North before 1930, therefore, were a monopoly
of the political and religious centres of Islam. These had higher
educational standards, although this was for a selected few, while the
educational policies of the Christian Missionaries in the M-Belt focussed
on the Bible and the Hoe in the specific cultural context of the particular
group. The Government and Provincial Middle-Schools and Colleges in the
M-Belt areas in Kuru, Lafia, Katsina-Ala, Gboko and Otobi were developed
after 1949 49 .
However it was not until after 1930 that Christian Missionaries
adjusted the inequality in the educational standards of their schools, when
compared to the Islamic society. The nucleus of the Gindiri Schools, for
example, were established for these purposes in 1934. By 1950 Christian
Missionary institutions had virtually bridged differences in the gap in
education standards with Government schools. In the 1960s Government
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schools were below the educational standards in the Christian Missionary
schools in places like Baptist High School in Jos, Gindiri in Pankshin
Division, St. Joseph's in Vom on the Plateau; Waka in Adamawa; St. Paul's
in Zaria; the SIM schools in Zonkwa and Kagoro in S.Zaria; Mt. St.
Michael's in Aliade, St. Francis in Oturkpo and Bristow Secondary School in
Gboko in Benue50 . These produced the majority of students who went to
University and Military Acadamies. However Government schools like Keffi in
the M-Belt areas and Barewa college in Zaria were also outstanding and
compared well with the standards of Christian schools in the M-Belt areas.
Before 1930 however, there were no secondary schools in the North for
students from the Middle Schools to develop and enter institutions of
higher learning 5°a . Furthermore, female education in the North was ignored
in the early years, largely for reVsnous reasons. It was not until in 1928
that government policy became practical in establishing the Queen Elizabeth
School in Ilorin for girls, well removed from the core-centres of the
Islamic Society5°b . The majority of the school enrolment in Ilorin,
however, were girls from the M-Belt areas and Southern Nigerian girls,
particularly Yoruba who could claim the Northern identity by asserting they
came from Offa in Southern Ilorin. There was a general reluctance from
Muslims in the North to educate women with Western European modernizing
skills, although dan Fodio emphasized the education of women with Islamic
sciences. Christian Missionary development of education in the M-Belt
areas, for both male and female were severely limited by financial
resources. There were 43 schools in the Yoruba irredentist areas of Ilorin
and Kabba and in the M-Belt areas before 1930 with 354 pupils, run by
Christian Missionaries. These schools were financially unassisted by the
government 51 . The pupils were initially generally taught how to read and
write the scripture, with simple Arithmetic that would enable them to count
the Sunday attendance, collect and record the Sunday offering in the
churches 52 . Educational institutions in the Islamic society taught courses
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of higher mental value and skills required for a modern society 53 . This
initial educational advantage over the M-Belt groups, produced leadership
which was carefully cultivated by the British to take up top posts in
government and this had ramification on the nature and shape of the
development of the social and political identity of the north, which
increasingly emphasized the Islamic religious identity, while there was
increasing Christian consciousness on the Christian identity among the
M-Belt groups.
III. The Application of Indirect Rule Policy on the M .-Belt groups in the
North.
In the period between 1900 and 1920, the establishment of Fulani and
Islamic leadership over the M-Belt groups was a consequence of the
implementation of the policy of indirect rule which was part of the
political processes of incorporation, set into motion by the government of
British administration in the new political unit of the North. The policy
itself underwent numerous political interpretations, which varied from its
conceptions as having Fulani and Muslims ruling over the M-Belt groups and
using the structure ot authority as it existed in the Islamic society, to a
search for indigenous Chiefs in the M-Belt areas, which ended with the
creation of Chieftaincy institutions among some of th numerically important
M-Belt groups 54 . The fundamental axiom of indirect rule policy in all of
British African Dependencies in the period between 1900 and 1940 was that
%
the agents of the British Crown and Parliament at Westminster use
traditional authorities as instruments of political control:
"through which the African peoples may learn to
adapt themselves to social and economic changes
brought about by the impact on primitive
Indigenous societies of European concepts of
government, law, finance and education; British
ideals based upon Christian morals and the
political ideas of personal freedom, equity and
the rights and interests of the governed".
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To achieve these objectives in the conceptions, indirect rule policy meant
that African chiefs were to be subordinates to British authority and not
sovereign authorities or equals: "They are agents and not principals,
valuable and welcome agents" 56 . The procedural political practice in the
application of indirect rule policy on the M-Belt groups were, however,
made clear cut by Lord Lugard as early as in the period between 1900 and
1902:
"Among these tribes, it is my policy to
centralize authority as far as may be, in a
recognized chief and to introduce the
civilizing agency of tE4de while repressing all
inter-tribal quarrels'''.
However, against this background, there were many top British officers in
the North, who were convinced that the Fulani District Head was the ideal
institution in the administration of the M-Belt groups in the practice of
the policy of indirect rule. These views continued to be upheld after the
provincial reorganization in 1927 until 1934 58 . This was so becaue of the
absence of centralized political authority with traditional legitimacy
among the M-Belt groups since many of the ft-Belt groups were acephillous
societies. There were however other political interests which included the
desire to enhance the assimilation of the non-Islamic groups into the wider
Islamic society as part of the political incorporation processes that were
already in motion under Fulani Islamic leadership as well as the desire to
reinforce the social unity from the Hausa language which existed as a
Lingua Franca, beyond the territories where Islam had already blurred
tribal identities and created unity over two thirds of the North 59 . In the
first 30 years of British rule in the North, as the M-Belt groups were
systematically brought under British authority the Fulani and Hausa as well
as others who were Muslims were the main instruments of indirect rule under
British Residents, DOs and ADOs in the M-Belt areas°. This was so because
the British were accompanied by local Fulani leaders or Hausa Government
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Messengers whom they used as interpreters of British political intentions
and "path finders" during conquest and who usually ended up as surrogates
for the British over a particular group 61 . The objective was to have a
hierarchical and centralized structure of political authority focussed on
one individual and who as in the Emirate system would also have a chain of
subordinate district heads, the numbers, depending on the size of the area
of his jurisdiction. The British however had difficulty in finding a local
ruler in the ft-Belt areas and where they found one his claim to exercise
power was over a small area and his exercise of power was not complete as
it was regulated by a council of elders. It was this situation that Lugard
found frustrating and described the M-Belt groups as tribes in the lowest
stage of primitive savagery without any central organization 62 . Lugard also
set out procedures for the establishment of indirect rule on the M-Belt
groups which were based on the patterns that existed in the Islamic
society:
"The first step is to endeavour to find a man
of influence as chief and to group under him as
many villages and districts as possible, to
teach him to delegate powers and to take an
interest in his 'Native Treasury', to support
his authority RIO to inculcate a sense of
responsibility'.
However, where a 'Paramount Chief' was not found to assume political
control and authority among the M-Belt groups, the British administrative
officers ruled directly. Lugard made the provision clear on the role of the
British political officer when he produced the definition of indirect rule
in which he suggested the Government:
"utilizes and works through the native chiefs
and avails itself of the intelligence and
powers of the governing of the Fulani ruling
caste in particular ... but among the wholly
uncivilized pagan tribes, who owe no allegiance
to a paramount Chief it is often difficult to
apply these principles to rule and the
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political officers have to undertake a more
direct responsibility owing to the difficulty
and often impossibility of establishing Native
courts ARd to the lawless habits of the
people"' .
In 1902, however, indirect rule policy was politically flexed to
accomodate Fulani rule with Muslims of other tribes over some of the M-Belt
groups, while the British searched for Chiefs in order to introduce the
hierarchical model of authority65 . This was the premise from which Lugard
suggest that: "the Fulani ruler will be supported in every way, his tribute
from his subordinate villages enforced and his native courts upheld" 66 .
This pattern in the application of indirect rule affected groups that had
been conquered in the period of the Fulani Jihad and who in certain
instances, had used the arrival of the British to revolt from Fulani
political control. This particularly affected M-Belt groups in Adamawa (the
Kilba), S.Bauchi (the Lere), S.Zaria (the Kaje) and some parts of Plateau
(the Mada). In the situation, indirect rule on these M-Belt groups meant
the political consolidation of Fulani authority and this was supported by
the government of British administration. Thus previously existing tribute
payment which had been based on Fulani conquest became enforced by the
British and non-Muslim population subjected to Alkalai and "mixed" Native
Courts with Muslims Presidents. Some of the M-Belt groups that had only
been partially conquered in these areas by the Fulani, came to find
themselves under Fulani and Islamic authority, from British acceptance of
Fulani authoritative claims despite their protestation of independence.
This is the premise from which prior to 1927, the non-Islamic groups
centred around Numan, Muri, were shared out under Islamic authority in
Yola, Gombe and Muri, Plateau under Bauchi and the groups in Southern Zaria
under the Emir of Jemaa, a sub-Emir to the powerful Emir of Zaria while the
pagan groups in Akwanga, Wamba and Keffi were under the Emirs of Keffi and
Nassarawa. From 1927, however, with the creation of Plateau Province, a
large number of Plateau tribes - the Birom, Angas, Sura, Yergam and a host
of other smaller tribes acquired independence, including the Bachama and
the Marghi in Adamawa, the Chawai and Kaje in S.Zaria.
However, the first political casualties 67 of the Provincial
re-arrangements of 1906 (having abandoned the "double provinces" proposed
in 1905) in which 17 provinces were created in the North to enhance the
application of the Lugardian model of indirect rule, were the independent
Chiefdoms of Doma and Keana who became placed under Islamic rule in the
(Kanuri) town of Lafiya 68 . This gave the Emir, political jurisdiction over
numerous other Chiefdoms in the area. These Chiefdoms were previously
unconquered and were independent from the political control of the military
vassals of the garrison towns of Lafia, Keffi, Nassarawa and Jemaa.
Similarly when WAFF troops conquered and established British authority in
Ilorin, Kabba and Nassarawa areas, non-Islamic groups such as the Yoruba
and Igbirra in the South of Ilorin became placed under the Emir and the
Igalla and Bassa-nge in Kabba Province were placed under the Emir of
Nassarawa69 . By 1912, Nassarawa Province contained over seven different
non-Islamic groups previously independent of political control of the
Emirate70 . After 1912 also the Gwari in S.Zaria were placed under the Emir
of Borgu in Kontagora Province. This application of indirect rule was given
justification: "imposition of alien district heads appeared to be more
successful for taxation ... than attempts to combine small independent
groups into districts under one of their own men"71.
The pre-eminence of Residents in Provinces of the Islamic society who
had access to top political decision making and their political
interpretation of indirect rule to mean strict application of the Lugardian
model, imposed limits on the degree of political adaptation that was sought
to be applied over the M-Belt groups. Limits on the extent of political
adaptation became even more restricted when Charles Temple was appointed as
Chief Secretary of the North in 191072 . Later Temple became Lt. Governor of
the North. Furthermore Temple had been almost solely responsible for
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conducting and directing the first round of military conquest of the M-Belt
groups as early as from 1902 in S.Zaria, S.Bauchi and over most of the
Plateau and Adamawa. He subsequently served as Resident of Bauchi upon
British conquest in 1903 where he gained political experience in ruling the
non-Islamic groups through the hierarchical authority structure of the
Emir. This experience produced fanatical commitment to the application of
the Lugardian model of indirect rule over all of the non-Islamic groups in
the North. Although Temple gave wide political discretion on the
application of the policy of indirect rule to Residents in the Provinces in
the Islamic society, he exerted political influences on M-Belt Provinces to
ensure that the Lugardian model was loyally applied in which the Fulani or
Muslim surrogates of the Emirs ruled over the M-Belt groups73 . Among the
Tiv, for example, he caused the policy of gradual penetration to be
abandoned. The policy of gradual penetration advocated delaying
institutional change, implicit in the application of the Lugardian model
until the "civilizing influences" of trade had begun74. After 1910,
however, there was an immediate creation of district heads from among the
Tiv clans and this was accompanied by the imposition of direct taxation75.
The problems in the administration of the Tiv with a hierarchical structure
of authority were further compounded when the Government filled the posts
of district Heads with young men who were not 'Tors' 76 . These young
district heads behaved in a high-handed way on the ordinary people and
their elders because they were supported by British power and authority, a
pattern that was outside traditional political expectations of Tiv leaders
in their society77 . With the imposition of the hierarchical structure of
authority on the Tiv, also came attempts to introduce education on the
designed Lugardian model from the Islamic society 78 . However, when
Christian Missionary educational institutions developed among the Tiv in
the same period, the British administration was critical of their
standards:
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II 
••• because of the tendency to take Natives
out of their normal grooves too suddenly,
instead of inculcating a respect for native
customs and institutions ... the premature
teaching of English is thoroughly in keeping
with this mistaken policy and inevitably leads
to utter disrespect for British ideals and
native ideals alike and	 a denationalized and
disorganized population"".
As laterly as in the 1950s Residents such as McBride were obsessed with
protecting "the Tiv as the British met them", against the Hausa patterns as
much as against Ibos. McBride was concerned to regulate the development of
roads, schools, trade and 'Hausa-Fulani type Chieftaincies', because the
development would bring-in an influx of strangers and influences which
might be detrimental to indigenous Tiv customs and society". This was,
however, at a time when indirect rule had changed its emphasis after 1930
from the application of the Lugardian model to developing indigenous tribal
institutions and leadership among the M-Belt groups.
When Lugard returned to Nigeria in 1912 with the political task of
amalgamating the Northern and Southern protectorates to become the
political state of Nigeria in 1914, he resurrected the Emirate model and
sought to apply it through implementing his 1903 scheme of "double
provinces" in the North81 . In that instace however, the groups in the
Northern territories continued to develop as a distinct unitary
administrative system with the Islamic social and religious identity within
the Nigerian Federation. In the instance "Hausa-Mallams" (Koranic Teachers)
or some form of Islamic leadership were appointed as "Court Presidents"
among some of the M-Belt groups: as a temporary and educational
experiment82 . Audu dan Afoda, for example, became appointed as district
head firstly for Abinsi in 1914 and according to Tseayo, subsequently was
assumed by the administration to be the first Chief of the Tiv although his
authority was concentrated in Makurdi. Dan Afoda was a Yoruba Muslim who
spoke Hausa and the Tiv languages very well. He had also served as
political interpreter for the British with the Tiv in the period of the
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conquest of the Tiv and establishment of British authority 83 . Similarly in
what subsequently became Jos Division on the Plateau, where there were over
25 different tribal groups a Muslim Hausa "Mallam" was appointed as Chief
of Jos84 . It was not until 1935 that Chung Gyang was appointed Chief of the
"Birom Tribal Area"85 . In that period (before 1920), the application of
the Emirate model was justified by Lugard himself suggesting that it
enhanced political incorporation as the non-Islamic groups might be
assimilated through the Islamic religion:
"their conversion (the non-islamic groups) to
the Islamic faith, may be more advanced and
intelligent than anything they are as yet
capable of evolving for themselves ... good
government is noaquivalent for
self-government HUV .
The strong beliefs by Lugard on the application of the Emirate model were
conditioned by his conceived primitivity of the M-Belt groups and saw the
development of centralization of political and administrative systems as
part of a natural process of evolution of man and society that encompassed
developments: "from 'mob-law' to courts, from communal to individual
property and from clan systems to territorial jurisdiction" 87 . In the
instance of the M-Belt groups, however, Lugard had reason and interest to
induce this development. Supported by the majority of his administrative
staff, in the period between 1900 and 1920, Lugard assumed that the
application of the Emirate model over the M-Belt groups and other
non-Islamic societies in the North will enhance assimilation and political
incorporation into the Islamic society and crystalize a Northern political
identity, a process that was already complemented by the gradual but
inevitable replacement of disparate languages of the M-Belt areas with the
Hausa language as a lingua-Franca88 . This was the context from which many
British colonial officers in the North accepted the wholesale application
of the Emirate model over the M-Belt groups before 1920 89 . British
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administrative staff in the North in the period of World War I and after
1918, were so fired by their success in developing what they regarded as a
special type of administration in the indirect rule system because of the
political stability it achieved in the North, particularly in the Islamic
society90 . However, when indirect rule policy was sought to be applied
wholesale with the Lugardian model on the M-Belt groups in the period
between 1900 and 1920, it lacked political foundation of legitimacy and it
was doubly alien. It was doubly alien on the M-Belt groups in that it had
not only Fulani and other Islamic variants of political and juridicial
leadership, but also the hierarchically structured institutions of the
Emirs, Chiefs, district Heads had little political attraction and
legitimacy to the typical collective political and social organization of
society in most of the M-Belt areas, where the political location of
authority was in a conciliar system, rather than in autocratic authority
that was centred in one man, like the Emir.
When Lugard left Nigeria for the second and final time in 1919,
political conceptions of the indirect rule policy for the application on
the M-Belt groups were reinterpreted. The reinterpretations of the policy
after 1919 which was maintained until 1931, still focussed on
centralization of political power with a hierarcical authority pattern.
This time, however, the indigenes of the tribes or the tribal areas were to
constitute the incumbents, rather than Fulani Emirs, Fulani district heads
or a variant of Muslim leadership that was tied to the Fulani ruling class
and controlling the M-Belt groups. The reinterpreted policy of indirect
rule however only became effective in 1931 when Donald Cameron became
Governor of Nigeria. In the period between 1919 and 1931 political views on
the change of the meaning of indirect rule remained theoretical since among
many of the M-Belt groups Fulani Emirs and Fulani district heads still
ruled91 . The pressures to re-interpret the political meaning of indirect
rule policy came largely from British administrative officers in the
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secretariats at Kaduna and Lagos, who objected to the wholesale application
of the Lugardian-Emirate model on the M-Belt groups 92 . This was so because
the British administrators at the Secretariats who advocated political
change, faced opposition from Residents in the North, particularly those in
the Islamic Society and from the British Colonial Office in London.
When Hugh Clifford took over from Lugard in 1919, he was concerned to
open up all of Nigeria to Western modernization, particularly Northern
Nigeria by reforming the policy of indirect rule. He was also concerned to
end the political isolation of the Islamic society in the North from
western modernizing influences, which had also developed tendencies toward
separatism in both British administrators who served in those areas and
from the religious and political leadership of the Islamic society.
Clifford was not the great liberator of the non-Islamic groups in the North
as his policy provisions would seem to suggest. He endorsed the Emirate
model of Lugard on the M-Belt groups, where the Emirs previously ruled by
right of conquest93 . However, Clifford rejected its wholesale application
on the M-Belt groups, where there was no previous conquest or where there
had been a successful political revolt and the group maintained its
independence from the Fulani until the British arrived in 190094. In the
instance, Clifford proposed that the political alternative to the
application of the Emirate model over the unconquered M-Belt groups before
1900, was the District Officer (D.0.):
"I think we should abandon once and for all the
expectation of ever converting primitive tribal
systems (such as they are) into any sort of
semblance to the Mohammedan Emirates and should
content ourselves with making of the former
only such limited use as experience may show to
be at once safe and expedient while causing the
people to feel individually and collectively
that the District Officer is the real 'de
facto' ruler of their country and their secHe
Court of Appeal and Refuge when in trouble"".
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Clifford however faced strong political opposition from high authority on
his decision to implement the re-interpreted policy of indirect rule on the
M-Belt groups. This was particularly the case from the Secretary of State
to the Colonies, Lord Milner, in England. Lord Milner preferred the
Lugardian-Emirate model for the application of indirect rule to be
maintained:
As far as the Northern Province is concerned,
the Lugardian system should be upheld. I think
we should tell Clifford politely but firmly
that we did not send him to Nigeria to upset
everything which his predecessor had done. Why
it should be impossible, while maintaining the
principle of indirect rule, nevertheless to
promote the development of resources of &he
Country, I must say I do not understand'.
As a result of the opposition to the policy proposals by Clifford from
Milner, direct administration by British Officers in the non-Islamic
Provinces of the North and in particular, Provinces that contained the
M-Belt groups (Nassarawa, Benue, Bauchi and Adamawa) was abandoned97 . In
1924, G. J. F. Tomlinson, Assistant Secretary on Native Affairs under the
government of Clifford, produced a report on 'Pagan Administration' in the
Northern Provinces, which pointed to sharp political differences on the
'Various Regimes', which non-Islamic groups, particularly those in the
M-Belt areas were placed under by British administration98 . The report
focused its attention on the non-Islamic. groups in Adamawa, Bauchi, the
hilly Bauchi Plateau, Zaria and Munchi (Tiv) Province (subsequently renamed
as Benue Province by Palmer). Although the report is not explicit on the
'Various Regime' types, three patterns derived from its contents: (1) the
pure Emirate model with Fulani Emirs, district heads and village heads in
Adamawa, Bauchi (S. Bauchi), Zaria (S. Zaria) and some parts of Plateau
(Wase, Kanam, Dengi etc.); (2) the modified Emirate model with British
officers and Fulani district heads and village heads (Jema s a, some parts of
Southern Plateau, 4nd Nassarawa); (3) the adapted Emirate model with
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British officers and centralization of political authority in a
hierarchical structure in a man indigenous to the group but with no roots
whatsoever in traditional claims to leadership99 . The report also
criticized the political use of Fulani district heads, premature political
centralization of leadership in some M-Belt groups and the lack of
continuity of local services of British D.O.s among the M-Belt groups when
compared to the Islamic society in the North.
The 1924 report became the political instrument for the creation of
Plateau Province in 1927, which Palmer used to revive an earlier Clifford
proposal to remove the Plateau groups from the political control of the
Emir of Bauchi 100
 . The creation of Plateau Province was significant in the
sense that it removed non-Muslims, previously under an Emir and brought
them under one administrative system with British Residents, DOs and ADOs
in direct political control. There were, however, underlining economic
interests which complemented the political act of the creation of Plateau
Province. The creation of Plateau Province was meant to stabilize society
in the area and to enhance the administration of the groups for the purpose
of economic operations on the tin mines fields and the Eastern Railway 101 .
Clifford, however, expected that the creation of Plateau Province:
"was politically meant to be in a very real
sense a school of pagan administration
functioning in an atmosphere undiqopbed by the
alien influences of the Emirates"""-.
Previous to the creation of Plateau Province, in the period between 1910
and 1920 similar political reforms were made which culminated in the
creation of Tiv Province in 1917 103 . Tiv Province, had been organized, when
the North-South political boundaries of Nigeria were redrawn on stricter
tribal lines in which all the Tiv were regrouped in the North in 1911
together with the Igala, Idoma and Jukun to constitute one Province'".
Before 1914, Tiv land itself was politically and administratively divided
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by the Benue river, with the northern parts under the British
administration of Northern Nigeria and its Southern parts where the
numerical majority of the tribe existed, under southern Nigerian
administrationl°5.
In 1925 there were changes in the top British administrative
positions, which had ramifications on the reforms in the application of
indirect rule policy on the M-Belt groups, effected by Clifford. The most
critical of these changes was in the appointment of Herbert Richard Palmer
as Lieutenant-Governor of the North 106 . Palmer was a political addict of
the application of indirect rule policy, based on the LUgardian Emirate
model. The political addiction of Palmer to this model was reinforced by
his successes in re-organizing and shaping Katsina Province form Kano,
elevating the political status of the Shehu of Bomb on strict political
procedures of the application of indirect rule and the supervision of the
political extension of indirect rule with the Emirate model on the whole of
the North before 1920 and to southern Nigeria before 1929 107 . In 1925
therefore Palmer focussed his attention in resurrecting the "ruling races"
in the M-Belt areas. This conception was based on his strong beliefs about
the preservation of the historic destinies of ruling races all over
Nigeria 108 . As Lt. Governor of the North, in 1926 Palmer took the
opportunity raised by political rearrangements of Bauchi Province in which
Plateau was created and abolished Tiv, Muri, and Nassarawa Provinces 109 .
Thereafter, Palmer put forward the political paramountcy of the Lamido of
Yola over Muri, by establishing Adamawa Province, elevated the political
prominence of the Aku Uka, the Chief of the Jukun by creating Benue
Province and brought to political focus the Attah of Igalla by the creation
of Kabba Province and claimed that: "...these (areas) were their
traditional spheres of influence" 110 . Palmer like Lugard held extremely
negative social and political attitudes toward some of the M-Belt groups
who had no histories of political conquest and expansion over neighbouring
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groups and attributed their failure to a condition of incapacitated
leadership 111 . In contrast any group with a history of expansion and
conquest was explained as a ruling race since it achieved centralization of
political power and authority. This was the context from which Palmer
failed to even conceal his hatred for the Tiv, among other non-Islamic
groups in the M-Belt areas, and saw them as outside the political
conception of a ruling race. Thus, for example, when he proposed the change
from "Munshi Province" to Benue Province, Palmer minuted:
"I think that of late, there has been a
tendency to give the status of l Opt tribe
rather more than its just due"
Despite his hostilities toward the non-centralized M-Belt groups,
Palmer is credited for introducing what may be termed as "the Age of the
Anthropologists" in the whole of British Colonial administration in the
North. In 1927 he established and encouraged anthropological studies for
the purposes of understanding the social structure and the political
institutions of the M-Belt groups as well as other non-Islamic groups in
the North 113 . Underlining this anthropological interest however, was a
political drive to "discover" the ruling races, among the M-Belt groups,
such as the Jukun, the Igalla and the Idoma. The anthropological
investigations successfully resurrected the past glories in the military
and political thrust, over the neighbours, of groups such as the Jukun and
Igalla114 . From the findings, Palmer became convinced that the Jukun and
Igalla were "Hamitic ruling groups", politically unique among other M-Belt
groups. Subsequently, he tried to evolve political means of giving these
"races" a legitimate outlet for their ascendency and to use them as "a
contact with other lower races" in the M-Belt areas 115 . These political
efforts and initiative by Palmer were meant to create uniformity on the
non-centralized and non-hierarchical patterns of power and authority in the
M-Belt areas as well as other non-Islamic groups with the Lugardian Emirate
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model for the rest of the North. The Palmer reforms on Provincial,
Divisional boundaries and the decisions in the location of their
headquaters as well as the names of the Provinces and the Divisions were
meant to create an aura of centralization. This was also meant to create a
hierarchical structure of authority and emphasize the modified Emirate
model in the applicationg of indirect rule policy on the M-Belt groups. The
incumbents of the Palmer model, however, were to be persons, who in some
way, were from a "ruling race" or tribe. Although Fulani and other variants
of Islamic leadership were de-emphasized in the application of this version
of indirect rule, indigenous social and political institutions of some of
the M-Belt groups were sacrificed. Territorial conceptions of some Chiefs
and even district Heads in a historical context became vigorously
reasserted and affirmed 115 . This was so, whether the Chief was from a
ruling tribe or an "alien" imposition. Once a 'Paramount Cheif' was
identified, the Palmer model extended his authority over adjacent groups
and this was done for all of the M-Belt groups before 1931. To complement
the application of the Palmer model, there was also re-organization of
Native Authority areas (the NAs), such that they reflected the territorial
sizes and political structure of the NAs in the Islamic society. The NAs in
the M-Belt areas between 1920 and 1931 were centered around the location of
the "ruling races" of Palmer. The effects of 'Paramont Chiefs' in the
Palmer model created tribal consciousness and distinct cultural identity in
the tribal groups who gained a Paramount Chief as well as in those who did
not. By 1938 this consciousness erupted firstly among the Tiv and created
demands for a Paramont Chief subsequently followed by the Idoma and the
Birom, among others in the M-Belt areas.
However in the period of the application of indirect rule with the
Palmer model which was concieved of in terms of the ruling races of the
M-Belt groups, the Lamido (Fulani title of the ruler) of Yola (a town) was
renamed the Lamido of Adamawa (a territorial conception) and was given
-122-
authority over several non-Islamic groups in the area, who had resisted the
Fulani and remained unconquered in the period of the Jihad between 1804 and
1900 117 . The Emir of Yola, however, lost authority over the Bachama and the
non-Islamic groups that were centered around Numan and the Wurkum districts
in 1927. However in 1926 when Palmer was Governor of the North he reduced
the territorial size of Numan District, took away some of the non-Islamic
groups in the area and placed them under the authority of the Lamido of
Adamawa with a chain of Fulani district Heads in political control 118 .
Similarly, Wukari Division was created in the same period and the decision
to base the headquaters at Wukari town where there was the Palace of the
Aku Uka (King of the Jukuns), rather than Ibi, was a political decision.
Subsequently, Wukari Division was enlarged, which led to Benue Province,
territorially incorporating the Tiv and the neighbouring groups such as the
Idoma 119 . Akwanga Division was also renamed and politically re-designed on
territoral rather than tribal district basis and became placed under the
political supervision of the Islamic Chief of Wamba 120 . In the instance,
Wamba town became the political headquaters of Akwanga Division with
political jurisdication over numerous non-Islamic groups who were
unconquered by the garrison emirates of Keffi, Lafiya and Jema i a 121 . In
1928, a suggestion to Palmer from the Governor in Lagos to regroup the
'in Set‘h,tRAA 7-01/46 cv
non-Islamic groupqas an autonomous political unit, independent of the Emir
of Jemea after the creation of Plateau Province was dismissed as
impractical 122 . The Jemea areas, which were situated on the south of the
Plateau escarpment therefore, became placed under the direct political
control of the Fulani Emir of Jema'a town, who ruled with a chain of
command of Fulani and Islamic district Heads over such groups as the
Attaka, Chawai, Kaje, Kattab and the Kagoro, until about 1950 123 . The Emir
of Jemea was tied in religious and political loyalty to the Zaria Emirate
and therefore indirectly to Sokoto.
Under the same reorganization of Palmer, Audu dan Afoda, a Yoruba
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Muslim, who had been Chief of Makurdi since 1914 with a surrogate appointee
as the village Head of Taraku in the Northern parts of Tiv, was appointed
as President of the 'Tiv Jir s
 in 1927124 . In 1929, a similar council was
established for the Tiv district of Katsina Ala Division, who were placed
under the hegemony of the Aku Uka of Wukari 125 . Although Jato Aka was the
President of this Council, dan Afoda was regarded as more useful by
Resident Pembleton because he exerted an educational influence on the
hierarchical structure of authority126
 . However, in Katsina Ala town, the
DO was the executive link between the Tiv districts and the Aku Uka of
Wukari 127
 . It was not until 1932 that the Tiv were united under one
Division with a new headquaters built at Gboko 128 . Among the Idoma, British
attention was focussed on the "Ojiri" (the tradition council of clan Heads)
under the British and fond hopes were expressed that 'a Paramount Chief'
will emerge to rule the whole of Idoma129.
After 1930, the Palmer model on the application of indirect rule
through the "ruling races" in the M-Belt areas and the whole emphasis of
the Emirate model on the M-Belt groups was reversed. This was as a direct
consequence of the Warni riots in 1927 and the subsequent Aba riots in
December 1929 in the South of Nigeria. Both riots were interpreted by the
government of British administration in Nigeria as a development from the
political misapplication of indirect rule with the Emirate model in the
governance of non-Islamic groups 130 . The Palmer model was also reserved,
because of the arrival of Donald Cameron in 1931 as Governor-General of
Nigeria 131 . Cameron had served under Clifford as Chief Secretary and also
had political experience of indirect rule with non-Islamic groups in
Tanganyika and these experiences had shaped his strong positions against
the wholesale application of the Emirate model over the M-Belt groups,
prefering it to be restricted to the Islamic society. As a first step in
adjusting the Palmer model, Cameron reversedthe existing trends toward
political autonomy of the North within Nigeria which had vigorously been
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resurfaced by Palmer. Cameron accused his predecessors:
".. .of the unhallowed policy insidiously
Introduced during the latter half of the last
decade of thinking of the M9“em Emirates in
terms of the Indian States"
Cameron subsequently developed indirect rule policy and its applicaton on
the M-Belt groups within context of a Tribal-framework 133 . An instant
problem its application faced, however, was the disparate nature of the
groups in the M-Belt areas, their small numbers and the small areas upon
which they were concentrated except for the Tiv, Jukun, Igalla, Idoma in
Benue, the Bachama in Adamawa and the Birom on the Jos Plateau. It was,
however, the 'tribal model' of indirect rule in the M-Belt areas that
crystallized tribal socio-cultural and political identities among some of
the M-Belt groups. While it reasserted the fragmentation of unity of the
region, the hierarchical structure of power and authority introduced on
each of the groups from the Emirate model, produced acceptance of the
Northern political identity as each "tribe" identified with the aura of its
Paramount Chief.
The tribal model introduced by Cameron in 1931 was in effect British
administration ruling through the Residents, DOs, ADOs and instituted
political leadership of the "tribes" which were either a collective
cultural section concieved of as a political unit in an NA or the
amalgamation of tribes into an NA based on common cultural patterns. Tkrs
politiaLre-interpretation of indirect rule led Cameron into direct
conflict with British officers who were determined to protect the Islamic
eastablishment in the North 134 . However, in 1931, the only group that
fitted the Tanganyikan experiences of Cameron in the development and
application of the tribal model, was the Tiv and they became the focus of
British administration with the new interpretation of indirect rule
policy 135 . This was so, because the Tiv were almost a virgin area with no
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Islamic influences and were numerically the largest group of all the other
M-Belt groups. The Tiv became the political focus of British administration
also because they had proved most intractable to conquer and when British
authority was established over them with the appointments of district
heads, instant tensions developed both between them and the British and
within the group136 . These resulted at times, into widespread anomic
movements of revolt.
In the period between 1934 and 1936 therefore 'Intelligence Reports'
were prepared on districts, tribes and clans of the M-Belt groups,
particularly those of the Tiv. These reports were meant to serve as the
basis for political reorganization with the Cameron mode1 137 . From the
findings of the reports Cameron suggested four types of NA systems for the
practice of indirect rule: A tribal Chief NA; An NA with a Federation of
tribal Chiefs; A tribal Council of Chiefs with a rotating 'Chairman Chief'
or a District Officer as Chairman of the NA Council; and a clan or village
Council of Chiefs 138 . The new political arrangements, as flexible as they
were and although they liberated some of the M-Belt groups from political
control of Fulani and Islamic leadership did not provide for viable NAs.
When Lord Hailey visited the North in 1940 to survey Native Administrations
he was forced to warn that the new model might create "permanent backward
areas" in some parts of Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Plateau139.
However the problems of finance were so enomous that for an extended period
of time there were further attempts at "Federation-building" in the NAs
established from the application of the tribal model of indirect rule 140 .
The problem was most acute in placesclosest to the Islamic society, such as
S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and some parts of Plateau and these were compounded by
the small fragmented units whose contact was limited and political
awareness hardly transcended the village level 141 . In 1935, it became
apparent that Native Treasuries in the Islamic society offered more sources
of funds for development when compared to the finances available to the
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smaller fragmented political units existing in some of the M-Belt areas.
This point became a critical political consideration because government
funds were reduced to a minimum by the world economic recession of the
1930s 142 . As a result Cameron began to abandon the application of the
tribal model by emphasizing the development of a corporate spirit in the
reforms and suggesting that the tribal model was a long range political
objective. Later in 1935 he was blunt on the political objectives of the
tribal model in its application to groups in some parts of Adamawa, S.
Bauchi, some parts of Plateau and S. Zaria:
"...that pagan tribes should be abruptly taken
away from Emirs who have been administerinqu
them for many years
	 that is impossible"
	 .
Although administrative boundaries were redrawn in 1933 on tribal lines for
Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and some parts of Plateau, despite the
hostilities of the Emirs of Zaria, Bauchi and Yola, in 1935, S. Zaria
became restored to the Emir of Zaria under Fulani district Heads along with
some groups in the Southern escarpment of Plateau144 . Except for the Numan
Federation which survived, in 1934 similar arrangements were approved for
the restoration of non-Muslims to the Emirs in Yola, Muri and Gombe. The
tribal model was abandoned in 1935. In 1936 indirect rule policy became
restated as an administrative expedience:
"The basic reason of a reorganization is to
remedy discontent and maladministration. If the
people are content with their present form of
govenment then by all means leave them alone.
There is no point in making changes which
appear to be theoretically cocuct though they
are infact not really needed" .
After 1936 Residents were allowed to pursue their own political
interpretations of indirect rule policy based on the previous experiences
of the conflictful principles that guided the application of the policy in
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the M-Belt areas. In 1940 when Lord Halley visited the North he found a
variety of systems of indirect rule policy in the M-Belt areas. In Adamawa
for example, he found NA-Federations operated with Chiefs from different
groups. The political problem however was that they so disagreed and
persistently quarrelled with each other that they finally settled for the
choimof the Fulani district Heads system over them, mediated by British
political officers 146 . In some parts of Southern Bauchi and the Plateau,
there existed a multiplicity of small village units without traditional
sauctions 147 . In Benue Province there was a 23 page list of NAs in the
gazette, including 55 clan Councils for Tiv Division alone 148 . Among the
Igalla and Bassange in Kabba Province and the Idoma, there were nominal
clan Heads in the NA system149 . On the main hilly Plateau areas such as Jos
and Pankshin Division there existed an assortment of "tribal - Councils",
"Village - group - councils" and "tribal-Chiefs-in-Council", some extremely
confusing in political structure of authority and the location of
traditional political power150 . In Jos Division for example, there was a
Federated NA with "a tribal-Chief-in-Council" under a Birom Chairman-Chief,
presiding over the "Bwong Gwom Duk Shot" (the Big Chief Room of Judgement)
at Ryiom. In 1935 the British hand-picked Chung Gyang as Chief of Birom and
presided over 25 different Chiefs from some of the groups in the Division.
The curious political anomaly was that while the subordinate Chiefs had
traditional legitimacy and each was previously autonomous of the other, the
British appointee had no roots in traditional claims to leadership, even
among the Birom. He was simply a good ex-service man whom the British had
an impressive character record of him in their files, from the first World
War records. However, the reorganization and reforms of 1931 activated
tribal consciousness, which was directed at the improvement of relations
between government and the people. Although it opened the way for groups to
seek to improve themselves by making similar political reorganization in
southern Nigeria, the same processes among some of the M-Belt groups did
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not produce effective local governments 151 . It created "cells" of
underdeveloped areas in Southern Zaria, Southern Bauchi, Adamawa and some
parts of Plateau, where the tribal NAs were financially weak. This was the
socio-economic and political background in which in the 1940s, there
developed the unanticipated political demands from among some of the M-Belt
groups for the British administration to create 'Paramount Chiefs' for
their groups, who were to be used as the focus of unity and development at
the local levels.
IV. Early Political Ideas in the Conceptions of Demands for a 'M-Belt
Region' in the North.
Preceeding the political demands for the creation of 'Paramount
Chiefs', some non-Islamic Chiefs in the M-Belt areas, made requests for the
separation of their areas of authority from Fulani and Islamic leadership.
As early as in 1908, for example, some non-Islamic Chiefs in the Chamba and
Bachama areas of Adamawa, the Lere districts in Southern Bauchi and the
non-Islamic Chiefs of Zangon-Katab in Southern Zaria demanded from British
Residents to be "removed" from the political rulership of Fulani Emirs and
Islamic district Heads 152 . Similarly in the period between 1910 and 1920
British Residents in Adamawa, Bauchi, Zaria and some parts of the Plateau,
reported increased demands by Chiefs for separation and control by Fulani
and Islamic rulers, particularly among areas where British conquest had
succeeded in establishing authority153 . These were areas that had come
under the direct impact of the Fulani Jihad and where partial political
incorporation into the structure of political p ow es of Islamic rule, had
been achieved before 1900. These demands however were not made in terms of
a M-Belt identity or Region, but rather in context of a distinct cultural
identity that was meant to restore indigenous control in the affairs of the
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groups. In the 1940s, the demands by the Chiefs were taken over by the
tribal unions which had emerged from achieved social and political
conciousness from Christian Missionary activities. When this happened the
demands became characterized by violent protests and riots. This was so for
the demands	 for separation from the Emir of Bauchi by the
Sayawa in the Lere districts, the Madagali from the Emir in Mubi, the
Michichika and Kilba, Chamba and Batta under Fulani district Heads,
centered on the Emir in Yola in Adamawa Province 154 . Later in 1958,
however, the Kilba and associated groups won their independence form Yola
after the first refusal of Northern Cameroon in the plebiscite to join
Nigeria. The plebiscite result shocked the Sardauna into realization that
local grievances of control by an "alien" Adamawa NA were basic to turn
support against a Nigerian level interests. Protest and political
hostilities also characterized demands for separation from Fulani and
Islamic leadership in the district Heads among the Katab and other related
non-Islamic groups such as the KareKare and Kika in S. Zaria and the Ngizim
and Arago in the Lafia districts 155 . The politically significant aspects of
these local campaigns which demanded for separation from Fulani and Islamic
leadership in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and some parts of the Plateau
before the organization of a M-Belt movement in 1949, was that British
administration in the North was obliged to introduce some form of elected
representation into the NA councils more fully and much more rapidly than
in other areas of the M-Belt like the main Plateau areas, Jukun, Idoma and
Tiv 156 . However, these demands also suggest that separastist demands
existed among some of the non-Islamic groups in the M-Belt areas before an
over all political movement of separation from the Islamic Society emerged
as a M-Belt Movement. Similarly there were ideas and conceptions of a
non-Islamic Region on the North that preceeded the demands for the creation
of a M-Belt Region by the M-Belt movement. These conceptions developed from
among British officials and associated interests in the North, largely from
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the difficulties of political incorporation processes and the
administration of the non-Islamic groups with the policy of indirect rule,
particularly those of the M-Belt areas. The conceptions of a political
identity in the North which was distinct though among disparate groups,
from the Islamic society were begun by the British themselves and the words
"Middle Belt Areas" were first used by British administrators in reference
to the geographical stretch of the southern parts of the Region157.
Conceptions in the political differences of socio-cultural and religious
identities also underlined the ideas that developed, of a Region that might
contain non-Islamic groups which ought to be separated from a dominant
Islamic society in the North.
The earliest of these ideas and conceptions of a "Middle-Belt Region"
were those of a German Christian Missionary with the British Sudan United
Mission (SUM), Dr. Karl Kumm in 1907, in which he suggested a "Benue
Region" to both Christiendom and the British administration in Nigeria.
Kumm saw and discussed the conceptions of the "Benue Region" in terms of
areas where Christian Missionary Societies might concentrate their social
and religious activities in the causes of halting the southwardly advance
of Is1am158 . The Benue Region in the North was to be comprised of groups in
_
the Niger-Benue Valley: the Igalla, Idoma, Bassange, Tiv, Jukun and
extending northwardly to where Islam had not reached, to such places as the
Bauchi Plateau (Plateau and S. Bauchi) and the Adamawa areas north of the
Benue river159 . However, conceptions of the Benue Region were more
descriptive of the areas where Christian Missionary Bodies might
concentrate their activities rather than of a political and religious
identity for separation from the Islamic society in the North. Kumm,
however, saw the areas as non-Islamic, victims of degradation by Fulani
slave raids and cultural minorities as "pagans" to a well established
Islamic society.
A more serious political conception of an administrative unit in the
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British Protectorate of Nigieria, as a Region for non-Islamic groups and
cultural minorities in the North, which recieved the attention of the
government of British administration before there developed a full-blown
political organization that articulated demands for the creation of a
M-Belt Region, came from E. D. Morel. He was an influential journalist, in
London and Editor of the British African Mail. Morel made his proposals for
the creation of a "Central Region" for non-Muslims and cultural minorities
(which he called pagans) in the North in 1911 in the specific political
context of the anticipated amalgamation of Northern and Southern
Protectorates of Nigeria into one administration 160 . Morel proposed a four
- Provincial - scheme of amalgamation for Nigeria, which according to him,
ought to be based on the political divisions of the country:
" ...that correspond as far as possible with
natural geographical boundaries and existing
political cmlitions involving as few changes
as possible".
The four "Great-Provinces" of Morel for Nigeria consisted of the Northern
Western, Eastern and a Central Province to be created from the Protectorate
of the Northern Region 162 . The Northern (or Sudan) Province was suggested
to comprise areas where Islamic civilization existed for centuries and
where the majority of the people were Muslims. These areas were comprised
of Sokoto, Kano, Bomb, the Zaria Emirate and Kontagora with headquaters in
Kano. The Western Provinces comprised all that was later to become the
Western Region of Nigeria and also extended northward to Borgu, Ilorin and
Kabba and included the right bank of Forcados, and the Niger river formed
the eastern boundary, the boundaries of the Province thus following natural
lines with headquaters at Oshogbo or its immediate neighbourhood. The
Eastern Province, was suggested to be compromised of all that was to become
the Eastern Region of Nigeria, with its Western frontiers conterminous with
the left bank of the Niger and Forcados, while its northern frontiers were
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pushed up to the south bank of the Benue, embracing Bassa, but with parts
of Muri and Yola Provinces left out for political reasons and inclusion in
the Central Region. As for the Central Region, this was suggested to
comprise:
"...the pagan section of the present Zaria
Province le. Zaria outside the limits of the
Emirate proper and the Nassarawa, Bauchi,
Niger, Yola and Muri (north of the Benue river)
Provinces... It is not quite easy to forecast
where the centre of gravity of the Central
Province will ultimately fall, but if as it
possible, the Bauchi highlands become in time a
second simla for the Central Executive, the
headquaters of the Central Provinces would
presumably be fixed at Zungeru, the pent
capital of the Northern Protectorate"
The 'Central Region' of Morel, as a conception of a M-Belt Region,
might not have solved the socio-cultural and political problems that were
articulated by the M-Belt movement in the period betwen 1950 and 1967.
Strong and fanatically loyal Emirates to Sokoto such as Bauchi, Yola and
Nupe were included in the Central Region conception. These Emirates raided
many of the M-Belt groups for conquest and slaves. After British conquest
in 1900, some of these groups in S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Adamawa and some
parts of Plateau had historical recollections of their experiences and did
not wish to be associated with Fulani and Islamic ruling classes.
Futhermore, if the M-Belt conceptions were non-Islamic, then it was
meaningless to divide the Tiv with the Benue river and exclude about 3/4 of
their people in the re-composition of other groups with the same
socio-cultural and political identity in the North. However, although the
'Central Region' proposed by Morel had many groups who were non-Islamic in
religious and political identity, there was also a substantial
concentration of the population which was Islamic, as in the Hausa-Fulani
colonized areas of Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, and some parts of Plateau.
The patterns of political control that existed in the Islamic society might
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have also continued, particularly so, with the strong influences of the
Emirs of Yola, Bauchi and that of Nupe which the proposed region enclosed.
However, the areas of the proposed Region corresponded to the areas where
Christian Missionaries focussed their activities after 1910 and these were
also areas where the M-Belt movement in its various phases concentrated its
political activities in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region,
particularly the parent organizations, the Non-Muslims League (NML) and the
Middle-Zone League (MZL). Futhermore, the 'Central Region' had its
headquaters in the Islamic centre of Zungeru under the Emirate of Bida.
This was very distant from the majority of the M-Belt groups in Benue,
Plateau, S. Bauchi, Adamawa and S. Zaria. This means that political
problems on the distribution of socio-economic and welfare ammenities to
places that were geographically distant from the centre of political
decision making, would still have necessitated demands for the political
subdivision of the Central Region. This was apparent of subsquent political
developments of Nigeria in Benue-Plateau State and even after the State was
split in 1976. While the political proposals of Morel sought to separate
social and political identities among the groups in the North into Islamic
and non-Islamic Regions, they concentrated on the political separation of
-
land and based this on natural geographical divides eg. Benue river, rather
than conceptions of socio-cultural and political identities in the North
and between the North and Southern Nigeria. In otherwords, the political
proposals of Morel for the creation of a 'Central Region' also contained
the contradictions in political identity among th groups it enclosed, on a
similar scale to the existing Protectorate of the North.
After the conceptions of the 'M-Belt Region' from Morel, came the
ideas of C. L. Temple in 1913 who proposed the organization of 'Benue
Provinces' as a distinct political unit in the North to constitute a Region
for non-Islamic groups 164 . Temple proposed the subdivision of Nigeria, such
that besides Lagos Colony territory, the Northern and Southern Provinces
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would be subdivided into three units of Provinces. In the North, these
comprised the Hausa States, the Chad territories and the Benue
Provinces 165 . The Hausa States as a political unit were the areas of the
traditional Hausa Kingdoms which were overthrown by the Fulani in 1804. It
is difficult to concieve, how this unit might have worked without restoring
the Hausa dynasties and risk alienating the Fulani ruling classes. The
political idea on the Chad territories as a political unit stem from the
traditions of the Borno Kingdom, but Temple extended the conception to
include Adamawa Province, the subsequent Sardauna Province and Bauchi
Province166 . Muri areas which were predominantly Islamic were however
excluded. Unlike the political proposals of Morel, Temple proposeathe
division of the Islamic Society on historically rooted sentiments and
political units. The essentially non-Islamic political unit proposed by
Temple was Benue Province. This was meant to enclose groups found on the
Western and Central areas of the North: "fronting the Niger and Benue
rivers" 167 . The Benue Provinces proposal as a political unit enclosed the
non-Islamic groups found on the Plateau, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Wukari and
Benue Province itself with the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla but also enclosing the
Nupe168 . While Nupe an Islamic strong hold was concieved of as part of the
non-Islamic problem in the North, it was apparently contradictory to
exclude Adamawa from the Benue unit which was enclosed in the Chad
territories. The political solutions to the problem of malintegration of
the M-Belt groups in the British created North were compounded by
overlapping socio-cultural and political identities because there was no
clear-cut territorial boundary for division between Muslims and non-Muslims
or between Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri and Nupe and other cultural groups in the
M-Belt areas.
In 1919, there were more suggestions from British political officers
in the services of the government of British administration in Nigeria for
the subdivision of the Protectorate into more units. These particularly
-135-
focused on the North, as a solution to the problems of malincorporation of
the non-Islamic groups 169 . In the period between 1920 and 1939, for
example, British officers who had served in the non-Islamic areas in the
North made several proposals for the subdivision of the North and Nigeria
in general into a dozen or more political units, largely developed from the
Ideas of Morel and Temple 170 . However, when these developments, were
gaining the attention of public policy makers, there was a sudden outburst
of tribal "nationalism" among the M-Belt groups and for the decade after
1940, interest in political separation from the Islamic society was
temporarily submerged.
The malintegration of the M-Belt groups by forceful political measures
(ie. conquest) and their subordination to the Islamic society and
leadership (ie. in certain phases of the application of indirect rule
policy), explain the subsequent resurgence of tribal movements within the
very political boundaries of the North. The tribal movements were
essentially concentrated in the M-Belt areas, which among other factors,
created the foundations and origins in the growth and development of the
M-Belt movement. The tribal movements of the 1940s were also to produce
political support for the M-Belt movement when it demanded the creation of
a M-Belt Region in the North in 1950. One of the most important
contributary force in the developments of tribal movements was the
attainment of Christian consciousness among the M-Belt groups. This
Christian consciousness started from the activities of European Missionary
Bodies, intent on wining the "Sudan" for the Christian religion. Among the
M-Belt groups in the North, Christian consciousness was developed side by
side with political consciousness in the political development of the North
in the period of British rule. The work of European Christian Missionaries,
did not only produce Christian consciousness in the M-Belt areas, it also
delibrately set about to construct a religious and socio-cultural identity
which contrasted with the dominant Islamic identity in the rest of the
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North. The concentration of the non-Islamic identity in the M-Belt areas,
was subsequently used for political purposes as it was forged into a social
movement and thus laid the foundations for the growth of the M-Belt
Movement.
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Notes to Chapter 2.
1. Frederick Lugard, 1902, cited in Margery Perham, Lugard: The Years of 
Authority 1895-1945, London, 1960 p148-p149.
2. Flora L. Shaw (Lady Lugard),A Tropical Dependency: An outline of the 
ancient History of the Western Sudan with an account of the Modern 
settlements of Northern Nigeria, London, 1905 p430-p433.
3. John Flint, Sir George Goldier and the making of Nigeria, London 1960
p166.
4. Lady Lugard 1905 p441-p450.
5. R. Heussler, The British in Northern Nigeria, London 1968 p161.
6. Margery Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, London, 1962 p149.
7. Huessler 1968 p167.
8. Lady Lugard 1905 p23.
9. Miller 1947 p44.
10. Lady Lugard 1905 p454; Perham 1962 p48; John A. Ballard, "Pagan
Administration and Political Development in Northern Nigeria", in
Savana, vol. I. No. 1, June 1972 p4.
11. For someexamples of the variation in the patterns of military
conquest of the North and in the political measures used, see J.R.V.
Prescott, "The Evolution of Nigeria's Boundaries", The Nigerian 
Geographical Journal, vol.1-3, 1957-1960 passim; E.W. Bovill, The
Niger Explored, London 1968 p128-p137; Perham 1962 p38; Lady Lugard
1905 p446; A.R. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 
1804-1906: The Sokoto Caliphate and its Enemies, London 1971
p220-p323.
12. Lady Lugard 1905 p432.
13. Huessler 1968 p168.
14. Ibid 1968 p19.
15. Perham 1960 p148-p149; Lady Lugard 1905 p427.
16. Perham 1962 p43.
17. Huessler 1968 p167.
18. Lady Lugard 1905 p83-p84; p454.
19. W.R. Miller, Have we failed in Nigeria, London 1947 p44.
20. Huessler 1968 p169.
21. Lady Lugard 1905 p454-p457.
21a Ibid 1905 p457.
22. Ibid 1905 p457.
23. Ibid 1905 p457.
24. Ibid 1905 p457.
25. Perham 1962 p118.
26. Ibid 1962 p118.
27. Ibid 1962 p118.
28. Ibid 1962 p118.
29. Northern Nigeria: Colonial Annual Reports, 1905.
30. Government policy on Christian Missionaries and the development of
the M-Belt areas is examined in detail in Chapter three of the
thesis.
31. E.D. Morel, Nigeria: Its Peoples and Problems, London, 1912 pxxiii -
pxxiv
32. Ibid 1912 pxxiii-pxxiii.
33. Ibid 1912 pxxii.
34. Perham 1962 p501-p502.
35. Morel 1912 pxxiii.
36. Huessler 1968 p30.
37. E.P.T. Crampton, Christianity in Northern Nigeria, Zaria, 1975 p103.
38. Ibid 1975 p109.
39. Sir F.D. Lugard, Nigeria: Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and 
Southern Nigeria and Administration, 1912-1919, 1919 cmdp 468 p65.
40. G.Q. Gbadamosi, "The establishment of Western Education among Muslims
-138-
in Nigeria", Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria, vol. iv No.1
December 1967 p100.
41. Perham 1962 p287.
42. Sir Hugh Clifford, Address on the Opening of the Training College at 
Katsina, Arewa House, Kaduna, 5th March 1922.
43. David Williams, "Northern Nigeria", Review Article in West Africa 
Magazine, London, 10 November 1971 p1045.
44. Ibid 1971 p1045.
45. Ibid 1971 p1045.
46. D.H. Williams, A Short Survey of Education in Northern Nigeria,
Kaduna, 1959 p7-p9.
47. Ibid 1959 p7-p9.
48. Ibid 1959 p7-p9.
49. Benue-Plateau State of Nigeria: 1968 School Statistics, Jos 1969 p41.
50. Ibid 1969 p41-p42.
50a Perham 1962 p287.
50b Ibid 1962 p287.
51. Ibid 1962 p287.
52. Boer 1979 p365.
53. Perham 1962 p257.
54. J.A. Ballard, "Pagan Administration and Political Development in
Northern Nigeria", Savana, Vol. I No. I June 1972 p4.
55. Lord Harlech, Chieftainship in Bantu and Indirect Rule in British 
African Dependencies, London June 1942 p3.
56. Ibid, June 1942 p12.
57. Lord Lugard, Annual Reports: Northern Nigeria, Arewa House, Kaduna,
1900 p26-p27.
58. Perham 1962 p140.
59. Perham 1962 p141; John N. Paden, "Language Problems of National
Integration in Nigeria: The Special Position of Hausa", in J.A.
Fishman, C.A. Ferguson and J.Das Gupta (Eds), Language Problems of 
Developing Nations, New York 1968 p199-p214; see also Armstrong 1968
p227-p236, in the same volume.
60. Ballard 1972 passim.
61. Perham 1962 p150 cf.
62. A.H.M. Kirk Greene (ed)., Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria 
Documentary Records, London, 1968 para. 16.
63. Ibid 1968 para.16
64. Lugard, Annual Reports: Northern Nigeria, 1900 National Archives
Kaduna p26-p27.
65. Lord Lugard, Special Memoranda on Fulani Rule and Pagan Tribes, 1902,
National Archives Kaduna, No.25.
66. Ibid 1902 No.25.
67. Loss of political autonomy by non-Islamic groups, in the application
of indirect rule as proposed by Lord Lugard, to Islamic leadership
and to the British.
68. Ballard 1972 p4.
69. Ibid 1972 p4.
70. Ibid 1972 p4.
71. Ibid 1972 p4-p5.
72. Mary Bull, "Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria: 1906-1911" in K.
Robinson and F. Madden (Eds), Essays in Imperial Government, London,
1963 p79.
73. Ibid 1963 p79.
74. D.C. Dorward, "The Development of British Colonial Administration
among the Tiv: 1900-1949", African Affairs, Vol. 68 1969 p316-p333.
75. Ibid 1969 p316-p333; Perham 1962 p154.
76. Perham 1962 p154; 'Tor' is the Tiv world for Chief or leader but more
as a fartherly figure rather than the political conception of a clan
Head or leader of a tribe - Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980-1984.
-139-
77. Ibid 1962 p154; Dent 1980-1984.
78. Dorward 1969 p330.
79. Annual Reports: Northern Nigeria 1907-1908, National Archives Kaduna,
1908 p646.
80. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980-1984.
81. Ballard 1972 p4.
82. Lord Lugard, Political Memorandum 1913-1918, London III Ed. 1970 No.
8 para.10; No.8 para.41.
83. J.I. Tseayo, Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration
of the Tiv, Zaria, 1975 p40-p47.
84. Davies 1947 p26; Features on Divisions in Benue-Plateau State: Jos
Division, Jos 1969 p12.
85. The development of the institutions of Chieftainship among the big
M-Belt groups are examined in more analytical detail in Chapter 3.
86. Lugard III Ed. 1970 No.9 para.13.
87. Ibid III Ed. 1970 No. 8 para. 5, No.5 para.37 and 53.
88. Ibid III Ed. 1970 No. 9 para. 23-25.
89. Perham 1962 p142.
90. Ibid 1962 p142.
91. Ballard 1972 p8.
92. Ibid 1.972 p8.
93. Ibid 1972 p8.
94. Ibid 1972 p8.
95. Hugh Clifford, Minutes, 1st June 1920, National Archives Kaduna,
k4046 Vol. I.
96. Milner 1920 Minutes, 29th May 1920, Colonial Office Record, London
583/80/214.
97. Ballard 1972 p8.
98. G. J. F. Timlinson, Pagan Administration, February 1924, National
Archives Kaduna, Kaduna Secretariat Northern Provinces, K.11 325.
99. Ibid February 1924 Kll 325.
100. Ballard 1972 p8.
101. Ibid 1972 p8.
102. Clifford 1925: Clifford to Secretary of State, 29th January 1925,
National Archives Ibadan: CSO 20/11996.
103. J. R. V. Prescott, "The Evolution of Nigeria's Boundaries", The
Nigeria Geographical Journal, Vol. 1-3, 1957 p88-100 passimsT-Tiv
Province in that period was called "Munshi" Province.
104. Ibid 1957 p88-100.
105. Ibid 1957 p99.
106. Ballard 1972 p9.
107. Ibid 1972 p9.
108. Ibid 1972 p9.
109. Palmer Minutes: 26th July 1926, National Archives Kaduna, Secretariat
Northern Provinces, K.1681.
110. Ibid 1926 k.1681.
111. Ballard 1972 p10.
112. Palmer 1926 K.1681.
113. Ballard 1972 p10.
114. Ibid 1972 p9.
115. Palmer Minutes, National Archives Kaduna, Secretariat Northern
Provinces K 3014 K.115 911.
116. Ballard 1972 p10.
117. Palmer 1926 K.1681.
118. Ibid 1926 K.1681.
119. Ibid 1926 K.1681.
120. Colonial Service Orders, National Archives Kaduna, K.26/11996.
121. Ibid 1926 K.11996.
122. Palmer Minutes, 1928 National Archives Kaduna, K.4046 Vol. I p40-41.
123. T. M. Baker, The Social Organization of the Birom, Unpublished PhD
-140-
thesis, University of London, 1954 p3; M. G. Smith, "Kagoro Political
Development", Human Organization, Vol. 19, No. 3 1960 p18.
124. Tseayo 1975 p41.
125. Ibid 1975 p41.
126. Ibid 1975 p41.
127. Ibid 1975 p41.
128. Ibid 1975 p43.
129. S. H. Wilson, Tour of a Brigadier General 1928, Colonial Office
Library Series.
130. Ballard 1972 p10.
131. Ibid 1972 p10.
132. Cameroon to Passfield, 10th December 1931, Colonial Office Papers,
London, CO 583/173/842; See also D. Cameroon, The Principles of 
Native Administration and their Application, Lagos, 1934.
133. Ballard 1972 p10.
134. Ibid 1972 p10.
135. R. A. Austen, "The Official Mind of Indirect Rule: British Policy in
Tanganyika 1916-1939", in P. Gifford and W. H. Lousi (Eds), Britain
and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, Liillaiir
1967.
136. Ballard 1972 p10.
137. Ibid 1972 p10.
138. Ballard 1972 p10-11.
139. Ballard 1972 p12.
140. Circular of Secretariat Northern Provinces, 2nd October 1937,
National Archives Kaduna, Vol. II K 13474.
141. Ballard 1972 p12.
142. Ibid 1972 p12.
143. Ibid 1972 p12.
144. Ibid 1972 p12.
145. Secretary Northern Provinces to Chief Secretary, Lagos, 28th May
1936, National Archives Ibadan, Colonial Service Orders, CSO
26/29109.
146. Ballard 1972 p12.
147. Ibid 1972 p12.
148. Ibid 1972 p12.
149. Ibid 1972 p12.
150. Ibid 1972 p12.
151. For some examples of these variations see Ballard 1972 p12.
152. S. J. Hogben and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern 
Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of their Historical Traditions, London,
1966 p258.
153. Ibid 1968 passinm.
154. C. S. Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition, Continuity and Change in 
Northern Nigeria 1946-1966, Princeton, 1970 p172.
155. Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1968 p443-446 and p551-555.
156. For details of these reforms see Whitaker 1971 p175.
157. Northern Regional Legislature, Hou§e of Assembley Debates, Kaduna
March 1956, passims. In the debate in March 1956 on the "Motion on
the Middle-Belt Region" some NPC politicians from both the Islamic
society and the M-Belt areas actually accused the British for
inventing the words and therefore causing the M-Belt problem in the
North.
158. K. H. Kumn, The Sudan: A Short Compendum of Facts and Figures about 
the Land of Darkness, London, 1907 passim.
159. Ibid 1907 passim; Religious conceptions of the Benue Region are
examined in more detail in Chapter 3.
160. E. D. Morel, Nigeria: Its Peoples and Its Problems, London, 1911
p201-210.
161. Ibid 1911 p201.
-141-
162. Ibid 1911 p201-202.
163. Ibid 1911 p201-202.
164. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria: A 
Documentary Record, London, 1968 pll.
165. Ibid 1968 pll.
166. Ibid 1968 pll.
167. Ibid 1968 pll.
168. Ibid 1968 pll.
169. Ballard 1972 p13.
170. Ibid 1972 p13; For some examples, see G. M. Clifford, Some
Suggestions for a Reorganization of Provincial Administration in 
Nigeria, Lagos, February 1941; ZARPROF, National Archives Kaduna, K.
C2/1940.
Additional Notes to Chapter 2
*1
	
There were significant differences in the speed and political
measures used to achieve conquest of the North, when the Islamic society
and the M-Belt groups are compared. The conquest of the Muslim areas was
easy and rapid, because the population cohered in a state system with a
recognised ruler over a large area, once the ruler was conquered and he or
his traditionally chosen successor accepted British rule, a stable system
of peaceful rule had been established and no more military measures were
required; whereas Middle Belt peoples had to be pacified in small units,
sometimes by persuation, but often by force and this took a long time.
Part II
Political Roots and Development of the M-Belt Movement
In Nigerian Politics
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CHAPTER 3
Foundations and Origins of the Socio-political Identity for the
M-Belt Movement in the period between 1900 and 1950
"A clean, fresh, wholesome wind passing through a dusty place
will stir up what is not pleasant. New thoughts coming into
old settled stereotyped ideas will make their owners wake up
and stir uneasily."i
I	 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether socio-political
and economic consciousness about the nature of society and political
identities among the M-Belt groups and societies in The North, developed
from impact with British influences. 2 It is proposed that British
influences among the M-Belt groups and societies conditioned the develop-
ment of social and political identities which were at variance with the
Islamic and conceptions of the Northern political identity in The North
within the developing Nigerian political state. Within the very
boundaries of The North in the period between 1900 and 1950, political
conceptions of the Northern Identity emphasized the Islamic religious
and political identity for the whole of societies enclosed in that
political unit. The social and political identities developed among
the M-Belt groups and societies resulting from the direct consequences
i
1. Dr Walter Miller, Light Bearer Magazine, SUM Headquarters, Jos,
March 1909, P. 153-154
2. British influences are taken to be activities of the government of
British administration in The North, Christian Missionaries)
Commercial and Mining activities which affected the socio-political
and economic transformations of groups and societies into Western
oriented patterns of development in The North.
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of impact with British influences were subsequently mobilized in
support of the political demands made by the M-Belt Movement in the
1950s and 1960s for the creation of a M-Belt Region. These social
and political identities which became mobilized in the 1950s and 1960s
to gain support for the political demands made by the M-Belt Movement
were a political reaction to conditions and circumstances of the M-Belt
groups and societies as internal colonies in The North.
Christian Missionary activities in particular, besides other
British influences that were effecting social change among the M-Belt
groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1950 are therefore
examined in relation to a developing Christian religious and political
identity and the assumed political meaning of Christianity for political
consciousness in the political organizations of the M-Belt Movement
and its subsequent demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the
period between 1950 and 1967. It is therefore argued that the spread
of the Christian religion through Christian educational and social-
welfare institutions, such as western oriented schools, hospitals,
dispensaries, churches and by direct 'party' proselytising by Christian
Missionaries, which became restricted and concentrated among the M-Belt
groups and societies, shaped and produced a resaurgence of ethnic iden-
tities among the different M-Belt groups and societies which became
fed into conceptions of a social and political Christian identity
that was seen to be different from the dominant Islamic patterns in
politics and society in The North.
In other words, this Chapter examines whether social and political
attributes which characterized the development of the M-Belt groups
and societies in the period between 1900 and 1950 may be taken as
causal factors that gave political meaning to existing differences in
political identities in The North and whether such were sufficient
14.4.
social and political conditions for the M-Belt groups and societies
to organize into political movements with the objective of achieving
the creation of a M-Belt Region separated from the Islamic society.
Although the foundations and origins of the M-Belt Movement took
roots and depended on the phenomenon of Western modernizing processes,
affecting the M-Belt groups and societies, historically recollected
socio-political and economic relationships in the experiences of the
M-Belt groups and societies with the Islamic society and institutional
development which were bolstered by an infused social and political
consciousness developed from Christian Missionary activities, resulted
into conceptions of a M-Belt identity. By 1950, developments from
impact with British influences created conditions from which new insti-
tutions and socio-political consciousness, with new identity patterns
within each of the M-Belt groups and societies, became accepted as
politically meaningful. Resurgent ethnic social and political identities
among the M-Belt groups and societies were the nucleus from which non-
Islamic identities became translated into an overall conception of a
M-Belt political identity. Linkages therefore existed between Christian
Missionary processes to modernize the M-Belt groups and societies and
other strands of the modernizing process. These processesproduced
ethnic nationalism from each of the M-Belt groups and societies.
Modernization among the M-Belt groups and societies meant a re-
interpretation and change in social and political attitudes on the
world views for the ethnic group, politics and society in The North
and Nigeria in general.
This is the premise from which we may understand why it was not until
after 1949 that there was begun a political organization for a M-Belt
Movement in the 1950s when infact malintergration and the political
tensions it created existed in the period between 1900 and 1950 and
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which was a constant source for concern to British administration
in The North.
The analytical focus of this chapter therefore, is on examining
socio-political and economic development in The North as they affected
the M-Belt groups and societies before a M-Belt Movement was begun in
1949. Analytical interpretations of socio-political and economic
developments as they related to the state of politics and society
and the events and political actions surrounding these developments,
constitute explanatory reasons for the foundations and origins in
the formulation of the political organizations of the M-Belt Movement
which demanded the creation of a M-Belt Region.'
Although the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement
was characterized by changes in the labels of the political organi-
zations in the period between 1949 and 1956, its political objectives
remained constant. After 1956, the M-Belt Movement became a full-
blown political force which created specific systemic political
responses from both British administration and Islamic leadership
and also the NPC political leadership in The North. It subsequently
caused the political subdivision of The North in the period between
1966 and 1967 when the Nigerian political state . became rearranged into
more and smaller political Units of the Federation.
Data and evidences produced to support propositions made in this
chapter are based on both primary and secondary sources. These were
re-inforced by oral evidences gained from interview discussions with
the 'Founding Fathers' and originators of the political organizations
and the ideas for a M-Belt Movement among the M-Belt groups and
1.	 The growth and development of the political organizations of
the M-Belt Movement based on the socio-political and economic
developments among the M-Belt groups and societies are examined
and discussed in Chapter 4.
societies like the tribal parties and politicians who were used
as clients to introduce the political parties from the Islamic society
such as the NPC and NEPU, among the M-Belt groups and societies.
The interview discussions were conducted in Nigeria as well
as in Britain in the period between November 1980 and February 1981.
In the fieldwork research, intensive interview discussions, using
carefully unstructured questions were held with 'dramatis personae'
on issues which surrounded the foundations of the ideas for a M-Belt
Movement and the tribal political organizations which preceded, such
as the role of Christian Missionary work in creating political
consciousness and why political organizations came up in the 1940s
and not earlier in the 1920s and 1930s.
Although it was an impossible task to go round and interview
leadership of all tribal organizations among the M-Belt groups and
societies, firstly because of their share numbers and also because
of the constraintsof time and research funds on travels, discussions
were held with some 'tribal' political party leadership that was
directly involved in originating the idea of a M-Belt Movement for
a M-Belt Region in the period between 1949 and 1956.
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4'dramatis personae' involved with tribal political parties which
became fed into the M-Belt political organizations for the period
between 1949 and 1956
	 included Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot,
Moses Nyam Rwang, Balla Yerima and Patrick Fom. Six political figures
from among the M-Belt groups and societies who gave the M-Belt
Movement a dynamic political thrust after 1956 in context of the
religious and socio-political identity mobilized from 1949 but with
roots in the period between 1900 and 1950 were also interviewed.
These included J.S. Tarka in London, in March 1980 before his
death, Patrick Dokotri, Isaac Kpum, Elizabeth Ivase, Azi Nyako
and Isaac Shaahu; the political positions of Bitrus Rwang Pam were
derived from D uch/ Dalyop who worked closely with him in gaining support
for the M-Belt Movement from among groups and societies in Jos Division.
Besides J.S. Tarka and Bitrus Rwang Pam, all the others were
still alive in the period of fieldwork for this research. One
advantage of conducting research into political histories when the
actual political actors that made the history are still alive is
that it gives the researcher the unique opportunity to confront
their present political positions and viewpoints with their past
political predilictions in the record of events. This gives
room for more rigorous interpretation and analysis, particularly
so for explanatory reasons on the variations in the theme of the
political identity of the M-Belt Movement after 1967 as was
characteristic of politics in Benue Plateau State and in the 1979
elections among the M-Belt groups and societies.
Documentary material from Christian Missionary records of their
activities among the M-Belt groups and societies in the SUM archives
in Jos as well as individual Missionary accounts in books were also
used to derive evidences admitted in support of propositions made
in this chapter. Published accounts of Christian Missionary
activities in The North were also important sources of data and
evidences. Statistical data, where used for this chapter, derive
from computations of 1921, 1931 and 1952 census figures as well as
the 1963 figures published by governments of The North and Nigeria.
There were other statistical sources besides the censuses as foot-
note sources will indicate.
II	 Christian Missionaries in The North 
The purpose of this section is to examine whether the objectives
in the subsequent activities of Christian Missionaries in The North
were instrumental in creating a Christian religious and political iden-
tity among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900
and 1950. Christian Missionary activities which became concentrated
among the M-Belt groups and societies after 1920 created social and
political consciousness about society in The North, a consciousness
which was subsequently used as a political resource in the 1950s
to make demands for separation from the dominant Islamic society.
British influences through Christian Missionaries in The North
and Nigeria in general is essentially the development of various Christian
Missionary denominations and individual Christian Missionary efforts,
rooted in the doctrines of Fowel Buxton about the social and political
role of Christianity in civilizing Africa with Western European
civilization. 1
 The period between 1861 and 1885 in context of the
subsequently developed Nigerian political state, was characterized
by early Christian Missionary activities, besides the main European
commercial interests in the Region. 2
 Christian Missionary interests
in The North in Nigeria are however suggested to have been started
according 0 A rin cl .a le
early in the 18th century. In 1708, for example4there were about
100,000 Christian adherents in the Kingdom of Kororafa (Jukun) and
a sixty-bed hospital built by RCM priests. 3
 In the period between
1870 and 1888, the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emirs of Ilorin, Gwandu
and Bida were presented with "Leather Bound Arabic Bibles" as
1. Ifemesia 1980 p. 99
2. Ayandele 1980 p. 133
3. Ayandele 1980 p. 133
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gifts from the Salisbury Square Bible Society of England. 1
 In the
same period, there were invitations to the CMS to start Christian
stations and work in Bida, Nassarawa, Keffi, Ilorin, Egga, Loko
and Yimaha. 2
 The Emirs were prepared to lend a helping hand to
the Missionaries as long as the "Christians" were themselves
friendly. 3
This means that Emirs and other ruling classes in the Islamic
society in the territories that subsequently became The North in
Nigeria, held pro-Christian Missionary attitudes, tolerated
Christianity and were prepared to benefit from Christian Missionary
activities. In 1826 Clapperton, for example, found that Sultan Bello
of Sokoto, Son of Usman dan Fodio, was keenly interested in Christian
theology, asked questions about it, the answers to which Clapperton
confessed he had hitherto "left to others". 4
In 1888 however, a German explorer called Standinger visited
Sokoto and thereafter reported to its religious and political leader-
ship: "... that the chief objective of the RNC was not trade but
Christianization of Moslems in The North .. (subsequently) the Emirs
began to fear the Missionaries as political spies." 5
 Even when
that happened many of the Emirs in The North in - the period between
1900 and 1906 when Lugard established political control and co-
operation between 'the British in The North' and the ruling classes
of the Islamic society were keen to have Christian Missionaries
civilize their communities with western modernizing skills. 6
1. Ayandele 1980 p. 136-137
2. Ayandele 1980 p. 136-137
3. Ibid
4. David Williams, 'A different Perspective', Book Review of
The Muslim Discovery of Europe by Bernard Lewis, West Africa
Magazine, 10 January, 1983 p. 97
5. Ayandele 1980 p. 138
6. Ayandele 1980 p. 136-137
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Although Islamic leadership in The North before the arrival
of British rule in 1900 entertained no religious fears of Christian
Missionaries, what they dreaded were the political accompaniment
of the Christian Missionary enterprise. 1
 The political policies
of British administration in The North in the application of Indirect
rule policy and subsequent political attitudes developed by British
officials toward Christian Missionaries compounded the uncertainties
on the political intentions of Christian Missionaries held among the
Islamic ruling classes. In the instance Christian Missionaries
became restricted in their work and activities among the M-Belt groups
and societies.2
It must be borne in mind however that certain Emirs were against
Christian Missionaries and their activities before British conquest
and establishment of political authority in The North. In 1893
for example, when the Emir of Yola signed a treaty of trade and
"protection of his land and people" with the RNC representative,
it is reported that he made it clear "... that we would not interfere
in any way with the religious principles of himself and subjects;
and that if any whiteman were to come and preach Christianity we
would not permit him to remain in our stations; and that he had heard
that such men were in Nupe Kingdom". 3
In the closing years of the 19th century and the early years of
the 20th century, however, behind British imperial interests in The
North, came Christian Missionaries from Europe, America and South
Africa, bringing with them Western European civilization and culture.
1. Ayandele 1980 p. 137
2. These points are discussed in more detail below.
3. Flint, 1960 p. 178
Between 1855 and the 1890s various attempts were made by Christian
Missionary Bodies to penetrate into The North, including those
by Bowen of the Southern Baptist Church in 1855, Crowther of the
CMS in 1865, Bingham in 1893 and the now celebrated "Misguided March"
of Bishop Tugwell in 1900 to keno) Bingham tried again in 1900
but failed. 2
 The result of his third journey however was the
eventual organization of the SIM whose stations became established
between 1907 and 1910.
Between 1899 and 1907 however, there were four Christian
Missionary Societies, operating in the 'Sudan' in 14 stations.3
These were the Church Missionary Society (CMS), the American United
Presbyterians (AUP), the Sudan United Mission (SUM) and the
Mennonite Brethren in Christ (MBC),
It is the impact of British influences through Christian
Missionary activities in The North that is the main concern of this
section, particularly so in the ways they transformed socio-political
and economic consciousness about society in The North among the
M-Belt groups and societies, which were to become identified with
the M-Belt Movement in the 1950s and 1960s. These transformations
were tied up to Christian Missionary objectives inThe North and
the whole religious conceptions in the confrontation with Islam in
the 'Sudan' as it was understood by Christendom. One of the
objectives of Christian Missionaries to the 'Sudan' was aimed at:
1. Ayandele 1966 p. 117-118
2. Boer 1979 p. 86
1.	 For these breakdowns see Table 3.4; the table is discussed
and analysed in more detail below.
4..	 Kumm 1907 p. 216
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"....arousing Christendom to a crusade; to arouse His Church to
send his apostles to those pagans who are drifting to Islam
because his messengers tarry so long ... English Christians
especially, though America also will listen, because on us is the
nearest responsibility for we have assumed the Government of
Northern Nigeria and it is our protectorate of the country which
is giving to the Mohammedan traders and Missionaries a security and
freedom which they did not enjoy. All the world has a claim on
Christians, but Northern Nigeria has a special claim on the
Christians of this happy land."'
Religious objectives in the Christian Missionary conceptions of
the whole of The North and the 'Sudan' in general was meant to halt
the southwardly advance of Islam. 2 Although European Christian
Missionaries arrived in The North with clear objectives, they sub-
sequently faced religious competition from Islam over the conversion
of non-Islamic groups and societies. 3 This was so because there
were also Moslem Missionaries who came from The Sudan Republic
and with the advantage of 'their dark skins', easily integrated
into the indigenous communities, quietly proselytizing contra-
distinctively to the social problems faced by European Christian
Missionaries who were physically visible because of "their white
skins." 4
In the period between 1899 and 1900, the 'Sudan Belt' of
Africa therefore became seen by European Christendom as a battle
1. Robert F. Horton, Preface to The Sudan, in Kumm 1907, p. vii-viii
2. Boer 1979 p. 141
3. Gervis 1963 p. xiv
4. Ibid
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ground between Christianity and Islam. This conception had roots
in the political interpretations of the historical experiences of
groups and societies in that region in which the Islamic religion
became tied up to politics, economics and society and the non-
Islamic groups and societies in The North were victims of all its
systems.	 The 'Sudan' in the conception of Christian Missionary
Societies in Europe did not however only refer to the British
political creation on the Lower Nile from Egypt but rather it
meant: "... that broad-belt between the Sahara and South Africa
from East to West, a huge area constantly described in the SUM's
promotional literature as 'a country larger than Europe minus Russia,
with from fifty to eighty million people that are waiting to be
evangelized. Ill
After 1850 Christian Missionary communities in Europe,
particularly those in England increasingly f ocIA S eA their religious
organization and efforts to halt the southward advance of Islam in
Africa. This was the premise from which Graham Wilmot Brooks in the
1890s, for whom "the Mission to the Sudan" became an obsession and
with the encouragement of the CMS, organized "the Sudan Party",
consisting of 11 graduates from Oxford and Cambridge Universities
with the objective of conquering The North in Nigeria, for Christ.2
Subsequently in 1900, at about the same time when British claims on
The North became known and Lugard set about conquest of groups and
societies in the territory, during the Conference of Evangelical
Missionary Societies of Great Britain, meeting in Edinburgh there
1. Kumm 1907 p. 63; but see Rodney 1972 p. 66 for a political
economy definition of the 'Sudan' differently from the
Christian Missionary conception.
2. Boer 1979 p. 85; G.W. Brooks counted on completing the task
within six months!
was an official religious plea on all the Non-Conformist Churches
to save the "animist" of The North from Islam) WhenWhen there was
increased British commercial and political penetration far into
The North and into the Islamic centres of religion and political power,
it was expected that Islam will retreat towards North Africa.2
Instead of retreating upon impact with British influences it was
observed that Islam infact was advancing more rapidly than was
previously the case before 1900.
This was the religious premise from which in 1906 Kumm, the
German pioneer Christian Missionary, who had a wide ranging travel
experience among the M-Belt groups and societies suggested that:
... tribes which were only conquered by the British last year have
been taken possession of already by Moslem Missionaries .. I stayed
for three days in a place called Kanna. This tribe was only con-
quered last year and this year is witnessing the building of a large
Mosque at Kanna and sees the King and his courtiers bow their knees
to Allah and Mohammed. The giant King of the Ankwe at Shendam was a
pagan only a short while ago, he is today followed everywhere by
his Mohammedan Mallams. In the capital of the Jukum tribe, there
is quite a Mohammedan cotony .. not one oi theze tAibez woutd have
tet a Mohammedan tudeA into theiA 	 be.ote. Bkitizh aiums
conquerted them."3 At the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh
in 1910 "the Islamic advance in Africa" was described "as the most
critical Missionary problem in Africa since it was steadily pressing
southward and westward." 4 J.H. Boer summarizes the general religious
1. Boer 1979 p. 86
2. Ibid
3. Kumm 1906; cited in Boer 1979 p. 141; emphases are mine
4. Boer 1979 p. 102
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mood developed from the 1910 World Missionary Conference toward
the Islamic challenge in Africa into something like this: "... there
is great urgency because of its (the Islamic) advance; it is low in
morality; it has left Africa in a state of degradation and does not
possess the dynamic to elevate it in future; it is a religion without
love and without hope, oppressive of women."1
The Edinburgh Conference saw the southward achievement in the
religious conversions into Islam of some groups and societies in the
M-Belt areas as a socio-political and economic threat to the progress
of Africa. Christian Missionary appeals were therefore meant to
stem the Islamic tide by presenting Christianity before further in-
roads were achieved. As late as 1916, W.J.W. Roome suggested that:
... the whole strategy of Christian Missions in Africa should be
viewed in relation to Islam." 2
 The Christian Missionary role in
Africa therefore was meant to prevent Islam from gaining any further
foothold among the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North of
Nigeria and in the 'Sudan' in general. This was so because Christian
Missionaries saw Islam as a religion opposed to the progress of
'Christian European Civilization'. The Islamic advance in Africa was
seen to be a danger to the future of the development of European
1. Boer 1979 p. 102; it is of interest for our subsequent arguments
to bear in mind that in the late 1950s Mrs Elizabeth Ivose was
to testify before the Willink Commission based on the very same
theme of Islam being "oppressive of women" in support of the
demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region where Christianity
might provide more open opportunities in the equal development
of women and men - This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4
where we analyze the Willink Commission and Politics with the
M-Belt Movement in The North and Nigeria.
2. W.J.W. Roome 'Strategies of Christian Missions in Africa',
IRM/16 p. 353-354, cited in Boer, 1979 p. 102.
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civilization in Africa. '
Christian Missionaries from Europe constantly restated
religions and political fears which suggested that in the instance
of Islam gaining an upperhand over Christianity in Africa: "... this
may mean the stagnation of European civilization and the re-intro-
duction of the horrors of slave raiding ... by means of Christian
education, Missions assist the magnificent work ... Government is doing
today in those lands and thus they help to avert the threatened
danger." 2 This means that Christian Missionaries in The North saw
themselves, as much as they were seen by Christendom in Europe, as
preparatory to British imperial interests and as aids toward its
maintenance within context of a European civilizing process. Further-
more 'Christian Civilization' from Europe was seen by Christian
Missionaries as a better alternative in the human progress of
the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North and the 'Sudan'
albeit Africa in general rather than 'Islamic civilization'.
In the period between 1900 and 1910 the religious options
surrounding these themes became considered at the EMC Conference
of 1900 and subsequently in the WMC in Edinburgh in 1910 and the
Islamic religion became strongly excluded as prerequisite for
the progress in the development of the human race in Africa. In
that instance it became argued that Christianity ought to tie-up
politics, economicsand society. For example a spokesman for the
ECM suggested that: "... The plea is sometimes heard in professed
1. Boer 1979 p. 147
2. Kumm 1910 p. 270
Christian circles that it (Islam) is better than paganism for
the African, is begging the question. Can Islam effect the
redemption of Africa? What has Islam made of Africa it has
dominated for centuries? What can it make of the future of Africa?
It is a religion without the knowledge of the Divine Fatherhood, a
religion without compassion for those outside its pale and to the
whole of womanhood of Africa; it is a religion of despair and doom.
It is a religion without love and only love will redeem Africa. We
(in Christianity) are charged with a Mission of Love and the queztion
ishatt we. taray and tAi lite in OUA mizzion white APLica i4 being
made the oey o6 14tam?"1
Although from a Christian Missionary point of view the primary
purpose of Christianity in The North and Africa in general was
based on the religious and social notions that the Christian gospel
was needed to save the souls of the non-Islamic groups and societies
in Heaven, there were other additional reasons which Christian
Missionaries considered as politically crucial to British interests.
In 1909 for example, Miller suggested that the presence of Christian
communities in Africa and The North of Nigeria in particular was
the best safeguard against the protection of British interests and
any Islamic uprising and therefore in that sense: 11 ... Christian
Missionaries may be more valuable to the government than regiments
of soldiers.	 In 1911 Kumm further suggested that "to civilize
1. ECM spokesman, New York, 1900, cited in Boer 1979 p. 102
2. W.L. Miller, Light Bearer Magazine, August 1909 p. 155-156;
this suggestion by Miller coming in 1909 is politically
significant because he was writing three years after the
Satiru revolt of 1906 in which a WAFF detachment of soldiers
was wiped out and some British military and political officers
executed.
without Christianizing" was a dangerous procedure. 1 With a theme
like that, Kumm, among others, saw the religious and political
role of Christian Missionaries as that of the vanguards of European
civilization in Africa, the powerful agents of peace and justice.
This was the premise from which Kumm earlier wrote:
Missionaries today cannot be leaders of our Government representative
they might, at least be assistants and by carrying Christian
civilization to the pagans before these Mohammedans pitevent the
unqication oi the vaitiows divertgent etementA oi the Sudan under
the Crescent and with it the possibility of S ee.111 9 raised there
at any time the green flag of the Moslem war against our representatives
of Christian Europe." 2 Boer is critical of Kumm because these
perspectives suggest preaching a Christian variety of "the Jihad
complex" with the same totality based on the assumed "Western Corpus
•ri
Christianum" as the concept was similarly based/ "Corpus Islamicum". 3
Whatever the differences Boer sees, Kumm, as well as other Christian
Missionaries in The North had reason and commitment to be explicit
about religious and political intentions of Christian Missionaries
in The North in Nigeria and the 'Sudan' in general.
1. H.K.W. Kumm, The Light Bearer Magazine, February 1911 p. 28
2. It is significant to note that Kumm wrote these arguments under
the chapter title 'The Moslem Political Danger' rather than,
let us say, 'The Moslem Religious Danger': H.K.W. Kumm,
From Hansaland to Egypt through the Sudan, London, Constable and
Co. Ltd. 1910 p. 266-267; emphases are mine.
3. Boer 1979 p. 138
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More politically significant on the Christian Missionary
objectives and the intentions of their religious activities which
became concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies however,
was a letter dated 24th June, 1908 to Crossley, who was a member of
Parliament in England and a Trustee of The Freed Slaves Home in
Lokoja in Nigeria, in which Redmayne, its author, suggested for
example, that: ".. the SUM indirectly, is a great political force
in counteracting the flood of Mohammedanism which is sweeping over
this province and recognized to be a serious danger to peace." 1
Political exigencies developed from notions like these, reinforced
the already existing bleak conceptions of Islam and the Islamic
society in The North among certain Christian Missionaries and
complimented the more heuristic options of planning western
civilization with Christianized M-Belt groups and societies
rather than with Islamic groups and societies.
Miller for example, was a strong advocate of this political
and religious opposition to the Islamic religion and the Islamic
society under Fulani rulership as it related to the diffusion
of western civilization in The North. In 1910 Miller saw nothing
good about Fulani political and religious leadership in the Islamic
society of The North. In the instance he suggested that: "... It
was the Fulani who brought evil days upon the Heausd .. the Fulani
were robbers and it was a great pity that the great ‘iausd race is in
the hands of a small powerful clique who had established the most
iniquitous government in human history." 2
 Miller linked Fulani rule
1. Redmayne, Letter to Crossley, 24th June 1908, cited in Boer
1979, p. 184
2. W.L. Miller 1910, cited in Ayandele 1980 p. 143
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in the Islamic society as similar to that by Genghis-Khan and
subsequently to that of Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy
because they were not visionary. Instead they were narrow
minded, unteachable and so oppressive that he estimated "in
his own judgement" the kusta masses might have overthrown them
in 1910 at the very latest had the British not stepped in.' It
was his conviction that the 'Habe' dynasties oughtto have been
reinstated in the early years of British rule, that it was direct
rule rather than indirect rule which ought to have been established
and therefore proposed the removal of Fulani Islamic leadership
by force: 11 ... in the interest of the salvation of these (Northern
Nigerian) people and for their ultimate good and happiness." 2 This
was so because Miller wanted Christianity to be patronized by
British administration in The North which he suggested was in the
best interest of its inhabitants. Otherwise, he argued: "... any
attempt to improve the people by any other method than first giving
them light of the gospel of Jesus Christ will be an utter failure." 3
The reasons and commitments in Miller that Christianity was
better than Islam in the processes of westernization of The North
were to make him work hard and produced a galaxy of talent and a
1. Ayandele 1980 p. 144
2. W.L. Miller 1910, cited in Ayandele 1980 p. 144
3. Ibid
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rare breed of Christian political leadership from a small Wusasa
Community for both The North and the Nigerian political state in
people like Dr R.A.B. Dikko, a Fulani Christian and the very first
medical doctor to qualify from The North. He was also a founder
member of the NPC. There was also Genera04Kulou
 Gowon, who ruled
Nigeria for about 10 years, Professor Ishaya Audu, first indigenous
Vice-Chancellor of the premier University of The North, Ahmadu Bello
C or rAer
University, and	 Foreign Minister of Nigeria, Professor Adamu
Baikie, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Benin, and also
Dr Christopher Abashiya of the Bible Translation Centre in Jos,
among others. 1
Christian Missionaries therefore arrived in The North with
the singularly specific objective of halting the southward
advance of Islam in the 'Sudan' which they invisaged carried
religious and political dangers for the diffusion of European
civilization in the development of Africa. Although the SUM,
based in England was the leading religious advocate of Christian
Missionary objectives in The North and the 'Sudan' in general,
other Christian Missionary bodies also shared its anxieties about
the rapid spread of Islam upon impact with European imperial
interests. 2
In that period Christians in Europe dreamed of "an Apostle
Street" that would be determined and established, running from
North to South of Africa, a religious route along which the King
of Glory would enter Africa. 3 It was also the religious intention
1.	 The religious and political roles of Wusasa produces in The
North and Nigeria are examined and discussed in more detail
in Chapters 4- and 5 and also their political and religious
balances they hold in the Nigerian political state
2. Boer 1979 p. 160
3. Ibid p. 101
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that a Christian Missionary Station might be established every
100 miles along the route and that the stations would be used for
the spread of the Gospel. 1 In the same period, the German CMS
Missionary, Krapf, went as far as devising a complete plan for
an east-west chain of religious stations in the 'Sudan Belt' of
Africa that was a total distance of 2700 miles, divided into
sect;ons of 300 miles, each with its own religious sub-stations
manned by four Christian Missionaries. 2 Krapf called the plan
"the Equatorial-Mission-Chain" and proposed that the project might
be completed in a dozen years. 3
This was the premise from which Kumm proposed his political and
religious strategies to halt the Islamic advance which were based
on the notion that 'Pax-Britannica' was aiding Islam in The North
of the developing Nigerian political state. In 1907, Kumm ex-
plained to British administration in The North that the objectives
of Christian Missionaries: 11 .. were to counteract the Moslem
advance among the pagan tribes in the	 region. This cannot
1. Boer 1979 p. 101
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
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be done by going to the Mohammedans and therefore our work will be
among the pagan tribes." 1
In order to achieve this objective, Christian Missionary
organizations particularly through the SUM that was based in
England, appealed to the public, at least for 150 Christian
Missionaries for the 'Sudan' to be placed in about 50 stations
along a conceived border line where "Islam and paganism" met in
The North of Nigeria and in the 'Sudan Belt' in general. 2 This
border-line was approximated to be the territorial space between
Latitude 6 and 8 North, stretching from the Niger to the Nile,
which corresponded to the route Kumm used in his trans-African
exploration tour in 1904• 3
 For each of the groups and societies
1. H.K.W. Kumm, "Principles and Constitution" in Documents,
15th January, 1907; as early as 1907 therefore there existed
within certain Christian Missionary circles (ie. the SUM),
explicit notions of 'a M-Belt Region' exclusively seen as
consisting of non-Islamic, pagan tribes, a Region Kumm des-
cribed as 'the Benue Region' where Christianity will be con-
centrated. This was three years earlier before the political
proposals made by Morel in 1911 for the 'Creation of a Central
Region' in The North, discussed in Chapter 2. The 'Benue
Region' in Kumm's conceptions is much more close to subsequent
reality than Morel's, at least in the name. The context of
Kumm's 'Region' for the M-Belt groups and societies was
religion rather than politics and administration. The
political significance in that conception however is that in
1949, the socio-political identity that leadership in some of
the M-Belt groups and societies mobilized into the initial
political organizations of the M-Belt Movement was the Christian
religious identity which subsequently sought political
separation from the Islamic society in The North.
2. Boer 1979 p. 115
3. Ibid
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formed in those areas: 11 ... at least three white Missionaries:
a medical man, an ordained educationist and a horticulturalist
could be secured." 1 To achieve the progress of this gram4 scheme,
Kumm became engaged in an international campaign to enlist the
interest of Christians, which took him to Australia, New Zealand,
Tasmania, South Africa, Denmark, Canada and the United States. 2
This explains the subsequent and numerous branches of the SUM
from different Western European Nations which operated in The
North and in the 'Sudan' territories in general.
Between 1899 and 1907 therefore Christian Missionaries from
Europe became posted to the 'Sudan' on the conceived border line
where "Islam and Paganism" faced each other both in the eastern
'Sudan' and in Northern Nigeria. In that period Christian Missionary
focus of religious attention was not as much on the M-Belt groups
and societies as it was on groups and societies on the territorial
edges of the Islamic society and the Islamic society itself in The
North.
Tables 
• 
suggests that of a total of 14 Christian Missionary
Stations in the total 'Sudan' context, 8 became situated among the
Islamic groups and societies with 2 stations located in areas
directly affecting some of the M-Belt groups and societies in the
conceived 'Benue Region'. These were in Wukari and Ibi. Four
(28.6%) of these stations were outside the conceived British
political Unit of The North and located in the Nile Valley of
Egypt and Sudan. The Nile Valley had a total Christian Missionary
force of 19 (33.9%) personnel out of a total of 56 Christian
Missionaries serving in the 'Sudan'.
1. Boer 1979 p. 115
2. Ibid
Table 3 .1	 Concentration of Christian Missionary Stations
and Numbers of Christian Missionary Personnel
in the Sudan in the period between 1899 and
1st January 1907
Territorial Area
within 'the Sudan
concept
Number of
Christian
Missionary
Stations
0,
/0
Missionary
Stations
Number of
Christian
Missionary
Personnel
0,
,0
Missionary
Personnel
The Nile Valley:
Sudan and Egypt 4 28.6 19 33.9
Niger and
Nupe 5 35.7
Districts
Hausa and
Gwari
Northern Districts
including 3 21.4 37 66.1
Nigeria Rock
Station
(Wase)
Benue
Region 2 14.3
Total 14 100% 56 100%
Source: H.K.W. Kumm, The Sudan: A short compendium of
Facts and Figures about the Land of Darkness, London,
Marshall Brothers Ltd., 1907 p. 216
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The religious emphasis in the concentration of Christian
Missionary personnel in the 'Sudan' was however on The North in
Nigeria. Out of 14 Christian Missionary Stations in the 'Sudan'
10 stations were opened up in The North in Nigeria. British imperial
interests in The North therefore complimented Christian Missionary
objectives. Within The North itself the emphasis was on the Islamic
society.Of the 10 (71.4%) Christian Missionary stations opened in
the period between 1865 and 1907, 8 (57.1%) became concentrated on
the edges of the Islamic society and also within the territorial
area which contained the established Islamic society developed
from the Fulani revolution of 1804. These were centred on the
Niger and Nupe districts, and the Hausa and Gwari districts,
including Rock Station (Wase) with only 2 (14.3%) of the 14 stations
in the Benue Region.
Furthermore, while 19 (33.9%) Christian Missionary personnel
were posted to the Nile Valley in Egypt and the Sudan, 37 (66.1%)
out of a total Christian Missionary personnel of 56, became con-
centrated in The North in Nigeria. This means that in the period
between 1865 and 1907 more Christian Missionary stations and
personnel were to be found among the Islamic society rather than
among the M-Belt groups and societies. This was so because one
initial religious strategy that was used to fulfil the objectives
of Christian Missionaries in The North, 'to halt the southward
advance of Islam': "... was to penetrate deep into the Islamic
1*-'1
religious centres and expose the evils of Islam".
1.	 Crampton 1975 passims; Boer 1979 passims
See. comme.v‘ts ctt Hive .e" d oV CA-otter
or, 1, a3e. (2(>1
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The Christian Missionary thrust to penetrate deep into the
Islamic society in The North in fulfilling this objective is even
more explicit from the break-downs in the distribution of Christian
Missionary stations in the 'Sudan' by denominations, numbers of
Christian Missionary personnel in stations and territorial areas
of concentration for the period between 1865 and 1907. This is
explicit in the figures in Table3.2.
In the period between 1865 and 1907 therefore three Christian
Missionary denominations, the CMS, SUM and MBC operated in 8 stations
with a total staff force of 30 (53.6%) Christian Missionaries
concentrated in the Islamic society in The North in Nigeria. These
were centred at Shonga, Zaria, Rock Station (Wase), Pategi, Lokoja,
Bida, Wushishi and Kuta. The eastern 'Sudan' received more Christian
Missionary focus than the M-Belt groups and societies in the same
period. In the instance for the period between 1899 and 1906, two
Christian Missionary denominations, the CMS and AUP operated in 4
stations with a total staff force of 19 (33.9%) Christian Missionaries.
These were centred in Khartum, Dolaib Hill, Bor and Ondorma.
In the instance of the M-Belt groups and societies however there
was only one Christian Missionary denomination, the SUM, operating in
two stations with a total staff force of 7 (12.5%) out of 56 Christian
Missionaries in the 'Sudan'. The two SUM stations were in Wukari
and Ibi and opened in 1906.
Table 311 Distribution of Christian Missionary Denominations
and Numbers of Personnel in stations of 'the Sudan'
in the period between 1845 and 1st January, 1907
Territorial Area in 'the Sudan'
with Christian Missionary
Stations
Missionary
Denomi-
nations
with dates
stations
opened
Numbers of
Christian
Personnel
in
stations
%
Christian
Missionary
Personnel
in
'Sudan'
Khartum CMS/AUP
1900
6 10.7
The Dolaid Hill AUP 1902
6 10.7
Eastern
Bor CMS 1906 5 8.9
Sudan Ondorma CMS/AUP1899-1900
2 3.6
Total in Eastern Sudan
4
1899-1906
2
19 33.9
The
Western
Sudan
Shanga MBC/SUM
Canadian
1905
7 12.5
Zaria CMS 1905 6 10.7
(s)
Stations
Rock Stn.
(Weise)
SUM 1904 4 7.1
in the
Islamic
Society
of
Northern
Nigeria
Patagi SUM Cana-
dian 1902
4 7.1
Lokoja CMS 1865 3 5.4
Bida CMS/SUM
Canadian
1903
2
.
3.6
Wushishi SUM Cana-
dian 1906
2 3.6
Kuta CMS 1906 2 3.6
Total (a)
	
8 1865-1906
3
30
.
53.6
(b)
Stations
centred
among
the M-
Belt
groups &
societies
in N.
Nigeria
Wukari SUM	 1906 5 8.9
Ibi SUM	 1906 2 3.6
Total (b)	 2 1906	 1 7 12.5
Total in	 10
Western Sudan
1902-1906
3
37 66.1
Total in 'Sudan Concept'
	 14 4 56 100%
Source: Computed from Figures in Kumm 1907 p. 213-216
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An even more significant lack of focus on the M-Belt groups
and societies by early Christian Missionary Societies in the early
years of the 20th Century is suggested by the time-lag in opening
the two stations in Wukari and Ibi when compared to the point in time,
stations were opened in some centres of the Islamic society in The
North. While 8 stations were opened in the Islamic Society in The
North in the period between 1865 and 1906, it was not until in 1906
itself that Christian Missionaries began to operate in Wukari and
Ibi. In Ibi itself where Maxwell, the SUM missionary lived, he
found out that the town was in its early stages of Islamizing and
most of his contacts were with Moslems rather than with "pagans".1
In the same period, while all the Christian Missionary denominations
concentrated on opening stations in the Islamic society it was only
the SUM which extended its Christian Missionary sway toward the M-
Belt groups and societies.
This may be explained by the higher numbers of Christian
Missionary personnel in the field with the SUM party when compared
to other Christian Missionary denominations as is suggested by the
figures in Table 33
. Subsequently in the period after 1920, the
SUM was to become the dominant Christian Missionary denomination
operating among the M-Belt groups and societies.2
1. Boer 1979 p. 160
2. This is discussed in more detail in Sections III and IV of
this chapter.
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Table 30 however suggests that for the period between
1865 and 1907, out of 56 Christian Missionaries in the 'Sudan'
22 (39.3%) were SUM, 18 (32.1%) were CMS, 10 (17.9%) were AUP
and 6 (10.7%) were MBC. The SUM subsequently maintained this
dominance as the Christian Missionary body which concentrated
its religious activities among most of the M-Belt groups and
societies with stations in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Plateau
and Benue in the period from 1920 to the present day, alongside
other Christian Missionary denominations who had a lesser geo-
graphical spread.'
The dominance of the SUM however took roots early in 1907
although not all of its Christian Missionary Stations were
opened up at the same time. In that year, the SUM had Christian
Missionary Stations in Bida, Pategi, Wushishi, Rock Station (Wase),
Wukari, Ibi and Shonga operating alongside with other Christian
Missionary Bodies.
2
Although Christian Missionary Societies became more active
in The North after 1907, it was in the period between 1913 and
1920 that there was a shift in religious focus from the Islamic
Society to concentrate social and religious efforts which
Christianized and developed the M-Belt groups and societies along
Western European patterns of civilization. 3 For the Christian
1. Map 3 shows Christian Missionary areas of expansion in the
period between 1900 and 1910 and the stations opened by the
various Christian Missionary denominations. These are dis-
cussed in more detail in Sections III, IV and V of this
chapter.
2. Kumm 1907 p. 213-216; see also Table 3•Z for the other
Christian Missionary Centres, which shows that the SUM had
the highest initial number of stations.
3. Explanatory reasons for this shift of emphasis are produced
and discussed in the next Section.
Table 3 . 3	 Christian Missionary Denominations and Numbers
of Missionaries in Stations of 'the Sudan' in
the period between 1899 and 1907
Christian
Missionary
Denominations
Number of Christian
Missionaries in
Stations
% of total
Number of
Missionaries
in	 'the Sudan'
Sudan United
Mission (SUM)
22 39.3
.
Church Missionary
Society (CMS)
18 32.1
American United
Presbyterian (AUP)
10 17.9
_
Mennonite Brethren
in Christ (MBC)
6 10.7
Total 56 100%
Source: Computed from figures in Kumm, 1907 p. 213-216
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Missionary Bodies already established in The North, like the SUM
and the CMS, the exploration stage of their efforts was nearly
over and the time for organization arrived. This was so because
personnel increased as did spheres of influence, with heuristic
policies formed in the light of their field experiences. Further-
more, the period between 1907 and 1913 was characterized with
debates on organization within each Christian Missionary Body and
the degree of cooperation with other Societies. In the same
period however the Christian Missionary Bodies became faced with an
unanticipated social and political policy problem which restricted
their activities. This revolved on their exclusion by the govern-
ment of British administration in The North from operating in the
core of political and religious centres of power of the Islamic
society. Christian Missionary Bodies showed considerable and
increased political resentment about this British policy which
restricted their activities in The North during the period between
1913 and 1950. When British administration began to restrict the
activities of Christian Missionaries in The North, only the CMS
had established Christian Missionary Centres in the heart of the
Islamic Society. The struggle of the Society to extend from the
towns of Zaria and Bida and its campaign to enter Kano City aroused
interest from both religious and political concerns within The North
and in England.
Generally however when there was more overt political restric-
tions of Christian Missionary religious activities in the Islamic
Society in The North in the period between 1907 and 1920, the Christian
Missionary Bodies themselves had not made any significant numbers of
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Christian converts except a few, the majority of whom were eunuchs. 1
In The North at Wusasa the early converts into Christianity by the
CMS were either slaves or political dissidents sent out of the
Islamic communities in Zaria, Kano and Bauchi. 2 This was so because
of the political and religious hostilities, some of the Christian
Missionary Bodies faced in the Islamic society which were subsequently
reinforced by the developing British political restrictions imposed
on Christian Missionary activities in the Islamic society, particularly
so after 1906 when that policy became conditioned by the events
surrounding the Satiru revolt in the same year, the specific context
of the pledge Lugard made to the Emirs in Sokoto in 1903 and the
subsequent political requirements for the application of the Indirect
rule policy in the governance of The North.
The 1903-pledge of Lugard was always reinterpreted by his
successors after 1906 and also after 1920 and became used as a policy
instrument to restrict religious activities of Christian Missionaries
in the Islamic society. 3 For example, when the SUM clashed with the
Emir of Wase over "holding of religious services and opening a
school in the town" British political authority in The North ordered
the Christian Missionaries to close the station and move to non-
Islamic areas. In that instance, Lugard wrote: It ... when you con-
sulted me on the question of the establishment of a mission in this
district, you most emphatically assured me that it was intended
solely for Pagans and you had no intention of touching Mohammedan
1. Crampton 1975 p. 131-138
2. Ibid p. 131-134
3. See more detailed discussions in Chapter l Section	 where
indirect rule policy was discussed in more detail.
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centres. When you asked permission to go to Wase, I pointed
out that it was a Mohammedan town and I was most reluctant that
you should settle there but I understood that it was only
temporary until you could select a station in the Pagan area ...
I regret I am unable to concur your remaining in Wase or in any
preaching or teaching in that Mohammedan centre which is entirely
opposed both to our original understanding and to the policy of
this Government which has consistently refused to force Christianity
upon Mohammedans." 1 Subsequently in the same year, Lugard re-
emphasized the policy of restricting Christian Missionary activities
among Islamic communities by the government of British administration
in The North when he suggested that the Resident in Bauchi ought
to tell the Emir: H ... that it has been my invariable custom to
forbid missionaries to go to any place unless the Emir and the
Resident welcome them. I promise them not to interfere with their
religion as long as I am here. I have no intention of changing
this procedure." 2
It was in the light of these developments in the period between
1906 and 1913 that Maxwell mourned the SUM station at the Rock
Station (Wase) when he wrote: "..1 We might have settled down at
once among the Burum ... and straight away hurled direct into Mission
work, instead of spending life and time and money at Wase, which
was a Muslim town." 3
1. Lugard 1906 Letter On Wase Mission, cited in Boer 1979 p. 197
2. His Excellency's Comments on Resident Horward's Report No. 27
for Quarter ending 31st March 1906 para. 106-107, cited in
Boer 1979 p. 201
3. Maxwell 1954 p. 27
The roots of Christian Missionary reversed emphasis on the
was
Ismamic society toward the M-Belt groups and societie0s a result
of government restrictions which took shape in 1900, when the
wellgureligious militant, Biohop T	 ,whose party included Dr Walter
Miller, ended up in Kano and unknown to its members, nearly met
their deaths in the hands of the Emir and at a time when Lugard
began military pacification of The North.' Lugard attached political
importance to the prestige of the "Whitemen" in Africa sufficiently
so strong that he regarded it as a guarantee of their security. 2
This was the context of his temporary anti-Missionary feelings
which developed from the 1900 incident of Bishop TuglWell and the
CMS party in Kano, an incident he came to know about from the
British press and how the "Whitemen" had been humiliated and
which he considered detrimental to the prestige he sought to
build. 3
The politically untimely missionary expedition to Kano by
Bishop lrupig i was therefore a basic reason for the restribtions
imposed on the religious activities or Christian Missionaries by
1. Boer 1979 p. 86; In the particular instance of the CMS
experience in Kano, Lugard was as much concerned about the
safety of the Christian Missionaries as he was on the
humiliation of fellow "Whitemen", a superior social myth
about the 'white-race' in Africa which he was determined
to use in ruling The North.
2. Ayandele 1980 p. 146
3. Ibid
Lugard and his predecessors in the period between 1906 and 1920. 1
This was so even when in 1901 Lugard himself stressed the importance
of Christian Missionary work, which he suggested that it ought to
be encouraged, when he wrote: " .. I have .. held out every en-
couragement to establish missions in the pagan centres, which
alone appear to me, to need the influence of civilization and
religion." 2 In that period there existed non-Islamic communities
within the very boundaries of the Islamic society as much as they
were "pagans" concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies.
Also in 1901 when Lugard established friendship with Dr Walter Miller
of the CMS Mission Station in Wusasa, Zaria,he: "... promised him
(Miller) to tell the Emirs that the Missionaries were his "brothers",
respected and valued by him and they should agree to their coming
into the country once the territory had been pacified." 3 Further-
more in 1904, Lugard suggested Wase as the pioneer camp to the SUM
party of four men with Karl Kumm as leader of their exploration
venture of The North, 4 where it was hoped that they might work
in Bauchi province. In the period between 1904 and 1907, Lugard
also suggested to the British Resident in Muri Province to assist
the Christian Missionaires "in every way he could". 5
1. Boer 1979 p. 86
2. Lugard 1901, cited in The Amalgamation Report, 1919 p. 67
3. Ade]eye 1980 p. 146
4. Boer 1979 p. 69
5. Kumm 1907 p. 77
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This means that in the initial years of British influences
in The North, particularly in the period between 1900 and 1906,
Christian Missionaries were given religious freedoms to work
among the non-Islamic groups and societies as well as in some
Islamic centres of religion and political power even when they had
explicit objectives of confronting Islam in the core of the
Islamic society.
In the same period the Emirs desired to have Christian
Missionaries in their areas of jurisdiction in order that education
for western modernization might develop among their communities)
Significantly for the period between 1900 and 1907 when Lugard
governed The North during his first tenure of political office,
there were no religious and political grumbles by Christian
Missionaries about restrictions to the Christian Missionary
enterprise.2
Upon establishment of British political and military control
over The North however Lugard felt bound by the pledge he had made
to Islamic rulers both in his original speeches and in their sub-
sequent letters of appointments, in which he emphasized non-
interference with the Islamic religion in The North. Earlier in
1902, Lugard made this policy clear when he wrote: It ... I am
myself of the opinion that it is unwise and unjust to force
missions upon the Mohammedan population for it must be remembered
that without the moral support of the government these missions
would not be tolerated. 	 And if they are established by order
of the government, the people have some cause to disbelieve the
emphatic pledges I have made that their religion shall in no way
be interfered with."3
 Subsequently this pledge became reinforced
1. Adeleye 1980 P. 146
2. Ibid
3. Lugard 1902 p. 124
by the political and religious fears entertained by Lugard
about the potentially dangerous clash of religious faiths in
The North if Christian Missionaries became religiously active in
the Islamic society. 1
This was so because at the beginning of the years of 1900,
Fulani rulers in The North saw British conquest as "Christian
Conquest". On 5th September 1901, for example, when the British
were successful in doing battle with the Emir of Adamawa,
Mallam Zubeuir, he wrote to inform the Caliph in Sokoto:	 ... about
the capture of his town by the Christians and his flight."2
Lugard, as well as other top British officials in The North
therefore did not wish that British military conquest and
subsequent political control of the Islamic society, be given a
religious interpretation as Christian victory. This became an
even more serious political objection because Christian Missionary
activities had potential of crystalizing the religious inter-
pretation, given the specific contents of their militant
objectives in The North.
Besides the pledge Lugard gave to political and religious
leadership in the Islamic society, various other explanatory
reasons have been suggested for the subsequent political and
1. Adeleye 1977 p. 235
2. Ibid
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administrative policies of the government of British administration
in The North which restricted the religious performance of Christian
Missionary activities in the Islamic society and conditioned their
concentration among the M-Belt groups and societies. Ayandele,
for example, suggests explanatory reasons which revolve on the
overzealous protection of traditional institutions and practices
existing in the Islamic society in The North, developed from
the political and social application of the policy of Indirect rule
and which conditioned British Residents as well as other admini-
strative officials to desire keeping out Christian Missionaries
from their districts. 1
According to Ayandele, Burdou, Festing, Cargill and Palmer
were autocrats in the application of Indirect rule policy with
traditional institutions of the Islamic society and dictated to
Emirs on what institutions ought to exist in society. 2
 In a
political position of power like that, a Christian Missionary was
seen as a political rival to the influential power of a Resident,
particularly so as "fellow Whiteman" who was not socially distant
to the poorer classes in society, preached doctrines for equality
and was a tribune for the oppressed. 3
 This was so because Christian.
Missionaries in The North: "... saw themselves as watch-dogs of
British interests and never hesitated to bring to the attention
of either the colonial office in London nor the public, acts of
oppression and injustice." 4
1. Ayandele 1980 p.148
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
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Although there is an acceptable logic in this explanation,
there was never a single instance in which Christian Missionaries
exposed oppression in the political practices of Residents in The
North to the British public and the world community, despite their
power connections and channels of communications with top politicians
in England, the IMC and the facts in their files. '
 W.R. Miller,
the Christian Missionary with the CMS station in Wusasa near
Zaria has however been often suggested as a concrete example of a
Christian Missionary concerned with highlighting the Tights and
plight of the non-Islamic as well as the peasantry in the Islamic
society in The North: "... in instances where British officials
were overbearing in their attitudes to the natives and condoned
many acts of oppression by the chiefs and Emirs." 2
More politically significant in the application of the policies
restricting Christian Missionaries, however, were the anticipated
political and social consequences in the interpretations of
Christian Missionary religious ideology derived from their
teachings. It was assumed among some top policy making British
officials in The North that the religious teachings of Christian
Missionaries and the political orientations in Christianity about
1. Boer 1979 p. 75
2. Boer 1979 p. 75; Ayandele 1980 p. 148-149. This is also
explicit in the two books which Miller produced: W.R.S. Miller,
Reflections of a Pioneer, London, 1936 and particularly so for
his Have We Failed in Nigeria?, London, 1947.
"the equality of all" in societies on earth, might turn non-
Islamic communities, particularly those of the M-Belt groups
and societies under rulership of Emirs and Fulani district
Heads into a politically "disobedient and rebellious lot".'
Major John Burdon for example, with a service record as Resident
in Sokoto and Kano advocated a policy which emphasized the
fear that Christian Missionary influences and their religious
teachings, might lead to a fanatical uprising of the poorer
classes in the territories of The North against their rulers. 2
The M-Belt groups and societies were historically conditioned in
relative undevelopment in socio-economic and political terms to
the Islamic society in The North.	 There were also severer
conditions of poverty, diseases and empty stomachs existing among
the M-Belt groups and societies rather than in the Islamic society
upon impact with British influences after 1900. 	 One need only
to go through some of the early British accounts in books with
photos of the so-called "pagans" in The North in the period
between 1910 and 1950 to notice malformations with short and
thin bodies to accept the conditions of undevelopment of some of the
M-Belt groups and societies the British became confronted with after
1900. 3
1. Boer 1979 p. 75
2. Ayandele 1980 p. 148
3. An example of one such early book is that by Major A.J.N.
Tremearne, The Tailed Head-Hunters of Nigeria, an account 
of an official's seven years experience in the Northern 
Nigeria Pagan Belt and a description of the manners, habits 
and customs of its native tribes, Seeley Service Ltd., London
1912.
11 1
The conditions of undevelopment were caused by slave raiding
and wars with Fulani armies rather than indigenous factors to the
M-Belt groups and societies.'
Christian Missionary teachings were seen to breed "rebellion
and revolution" in The North because there was an ultimate
Christian Missionary insistence on the equality of the Christian
religion to Islam and the better social options Christianity
provided on the status of the individual in society for the
development of western European civilization. 2 Christian
Missionary teachings with social and political emphasis on the
concept of equality of all individuals in the groups and societies
of The North were sufficiently strong for the period between 1900
and 1920 that they provoked Lugard into suggesting that: "... the
1. For examples, see more detailed discussions in Chapter 1.. . The
conditions of undevelopment which the British confronted among
the M-Belt groups and societies after 1900 are examined in
more detail in Section IV of this Chapter where we relate the
socio-economic and political conditions to Christian Missionary
efforts in developing that area in the midst of relative under-
development to the Islamic society in Western European infra-
structure generated by the government of British admini-
stration in The North.
2. Boer 1979 p. 75; Christianity as the better path in the
development of Western European civilization became the
persistent emphasis of Dr Walter Miller of the CMS, G.H. Farrant
of the SUM and also the subsequent emphasis of the RCM in the
development of its brand of Christianity in The North,
particularly so among the M-Belt groups and societies.
preaching of equality of Europeans and Natives, however, true
from a doctrinal point of view is apt to be misapplied by
people in a low stage of development and interpreted as an
abolition of class distinctions ... the premature teaching of
English ... inevitably leads to utter disrespect for British
and Native ideals alike, and a denationalized and disorganized
population."1 As early as 1905 British Residents in The North
deplored the doctrines of the equality of all peoples before God,
whether they were White or Black as they were contained in
Christian Missionary teachings. 2
Christian Missionaries like Miller however saw the
"unrest-arguments" as not something unique to the activities and
religious teaching centred on Christianity alone. Miller suggests
that all British parties intruding into the different societies
of The North created unsettling conditions by imparting specific
influences, whether these were Missionaries, the government or
commerical companies. Christian Missionaries were however different
because they represented "a wholesome positive disturbance" from
a political point of view: II ... I think it is well to acknowledge
at once that Missionaries are a disturbing influence. A clean,
fresh, wholesome wind passing through a dusty place will stir up
what is not pleasant.	 New thoughts coming into old, settled
stereotyped ideas will make their owners wake up and stir uneasily.
Influences which bring new life and reform will always come into
violent collision with the powers of death and vested interests,
1. Lugard, The Amalgamation Report, 1920, cited in Coleman
1958 p. 137
2. Ayandele 1980 p. 148
whether of bodies or souls of men. If the raising of dust is a
necessary concomitant to the ultimate cleaning of the city, should
Government seek to sprinkle water and assist the cleaning process
.1
rather than enforce the leaving of the matters in status quo?
In certain instances however Christian Missionary activities
became restricted CYomthe Islamic society in The North, because of
the attractions of society and social life in the Islamic society
for certain British officials. Charles Temple was the epitome of
an attraction like that. In the period between 1900 and 1920
the adoration for the Hausa-Fulani culture in the Islamic society
in The North led Temple to suggest that: 11 ... Christian Missionary
influences .. would result in its demise and replace the dignified
and courteous Moslems into trousered burlesque with a veneer of
European civilization, examples of which were alleged to be all
too common in the South of Nigeria." 2
There has been considerable controversy in the academic
literature about indirect rule policy and whether the government
of British administration in The North imposed political and
religious restrictions on Christian Missionary activities in the
Islamic society which subsequently turned their religious focus
toward the M-Belt groups and societies.
	 The controversy is centred
on whether Lugard as Governor of The North in the period between
1900 and 1906 and subsequently influential in political policies
over The North until 1920, made a firm religious pledge to Emirs
1. W.R. Miller, The Light Bearer Magazine, March 1909
p. 153-156
2. Charles L. Temple, cited in Boer 1979 p. 75
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in 1903 and the nature of its guarantee about religious non-inter-
ference with Islam which resulted into the objectionable
restrictions of Christian Missionary activities in the Core of the
Islamic centres of power. The critical item which has featured
prominently in the interpretations, compounding the controversies,
of the relationship between the ruling classes in the Islamic
society and the government of British administration in The North
with ramifications on restricting the activities of Christian
Missionaries, is the statement contained in the speech of Lugard
to rulers in Sokoto upon British conquest in 1903. In that .
instance, Lugard suggested to the Emirs: "Government will in no
way interfere with the Mohammedan religion. All men are free to
worship God as they please. Mosques and prayer places will be
respected by us." 1 Subsequently Lady Lugard suggested that when
Lugard made these statements: "a deep and most impressive murmur
of satisfaction broke from the crowd." 2
This means that "the Sokoto rulers and the crowd" which
Lugard addressed in 1903 understood and accepted him as suggesting
that their religion would not be interfered with by the conquering
"Christian power". Lugard himself restated this promise severally
in the period between 1903 and 1919 before he finally left Nigeria.3
1. for an extended quote of the
statements contained in the speech by Lugard to religious
and political leadership at Sokoto upon British conquest
in 1903,See Lady L4.304-4 p9o5r-vs2.- ftvca.
2. Lady Lugard 1905 p. 452-453	 •
3. Among other sources for examples,see strongly worded letters
from Lugard to the SUM pioneer camp at Wase, in Boer 1979
p. 195-202
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Boer however, curiously argues that: "... the Lugardian promise
has often been wrongly interpreted as an expression of ....
alleged hostility to Christian Missionaries." R.L. Buell has
similarly suggested that: "... on the face of it, the pledge
not to interfere with the Moslem religion did not confer a mono-
poly upon that religion or prevent other religions from competing
with it for adherents." 2 Similarly, Ayandele suggests that although:
11 .. the pledge meant Moslems would not be forced to accept
Christianity, it did not imply that Missionaries in their
capacity RS Christian teachers and British subjects would not
be allowed the liberty to operate in Moslem districts." 3
Obviously this is wrong. There is direct evidence derived
from both the reports of Residents in the government of British
administration in The North and of the different Christian
Missionary Bodies reflecting their particular experiences.
For example, Berkeley, the assistant Resident in Wase
suggested in a report to Lugard that: H ... If permission is granted
to them (the SUM Christian Missionaries in that instance) to start
a school in the town I am certain from what they told me .. they
intend to make it the thin edge of the wedge and begin a religious
crusade ... Wase is a Mohammedan town. The Mohammedan view is that
children should learn to read the Koran in the first place, and
1. Boer 1979 p. 69
2. R.L. Buell, cited in Kalu 1980 p. 77
3. Ayandele 1980 p. 72
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Mohammedan schools are semi-religious institutions, where
religious teaching is given. The establishment of a rival
Mission School in the town might I think appear to be aimed
directly at the Mohammedan religion ... any attempt either to
teach or to hold services in Wase should be expressly forbidden.
It would •, be safe for the Mission to establish a station ...
in the Yergam country which is entirely pagan and independent of
Wase." 1 Similarly the clashes and political tensions which
existed between Miller and government authorities over CMS
stations in Zari Province in the period between 1907 and 1930
suggest that there was overt restrictions of Christian Missionary
activities in The North. 2
Restrictions on Christian religious activities in the Islamic
society and other Islamic communities among the M-Belt groups and
societies became so bitterly abhorred by the Christian Missionaries
that they compared their social and political circumstances: III SG. to
the spirit which in Nazi Germany and communist Russia has destroyed
personal liberty and made the state the dictator of ideas ... a
principle that is repugnant to ideas of British rule."
3
1. Mr Berkeley, 1906 in Lugard, Letter to the SUM Pioneer Gamp
in Wase, 1906, para. 19-22, cited in Boer 1979 p. 197.
2. Boer 1979 P. 308; there is detailed evidence of CMS experience
with Palmer showing that although the government of British
administration in The North was determined to keep "the 1903
Lugardian promise", it did not keep promises made to Miller
and other Christian Missionaries, in Boer 1979 p. 309.
3. G.H. Farrant, Memo to Oldham, 27th March 1940, cited in Boer
1979 p. 308
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It was based on evidences like these that G.O. Gbadamosi
draws conclusions which suggest that "the 1903 pledge" involved
curtailing and keeping out Christian Missionaries from operating
in the Islamic society in The North and in particular in the
provision of Western education.' C.N. Ubah, in a recent re-
appraisal of 'Missionaries in the Moslem Emirates of Nigeria'
shows how the whole "1903 pledge of Lugard" became built into a
pragmatic policy which was used as a strategy to maintain political
stability in The North. While Lugard contended with 'Missionary
pressures' by offering the hope that in the future: 11 ... they
could operate in the Moslem Emirates ... political realities
dictated that he should vigorously oppose the excited, indiscreet
proselytisation of Christian Missionaries .. the limited Missionary
enterprise in Moslem areas was thus kept under tight rein."2
This suggests that in principle Lugard was not against
Christian Missionary operations in The North. The principles
Lugard held also explain his friendship with Dr Walter Miller,
the CMS missionary who was allowed "to preach openly anywhere in
the Islamic Society." 3 Furthermore it has been suggested that
Lugard was "so pro-Christian Missionaries" that his subordinate
officials in The North were unhappy and to the chagrin of such
officials, Lugard had Dr Miller as "one of his most trusted
Counsellors." 4
 Crampton further suggests that Lugard has been
1. G.O. Gbadamosi, 'The Establishment of Western Education
Among Muslims in Nigeria 1896-1926', Journal of the Historical 
Society of Nigeria, Vol. IV No. 1, December 1967 p. 94-95
2. C.N. Ubah 1979, cited in Kalu 1980 p. 77
3. Boer 1979 p. 69
4. Crampton 1975 p. 136; Boer 1979 p. 69
quoted as denying having made a promise to exclude Christian
Missionaries from the Islamic society and rather that he
promised not to interfere with the Islamic religion. 1 It was
therefore only when in the political and social opinion of
Lugard, Christian Missionaries betrayed a lack of political
precaution that there was need to restrict their religious
activities among Moslem communities. For example, this was so
in 1906 in the particular instance of the SUM camp in Wase in which
case, it was reported to him by the assistant Resident that: "...
they (the Christian Missionaries) try to induce his people (under
the jurisdiction of the Emir of Wase) to leave the town and that
their labourers behave in a very truculent manner when they came
into Wase. For some reasons, possibly because Dr Kumm is a German,
2
the Missionaries are locally known as "Germans"... and popular
rumour credits them with being the emmissaries of a rival admini-
stration trying to undermine our influence ... There is constant
friction between the King and the Mission folk. The King told me
that the Mission was only waiting till they were strong enough to
oust the Government and added that when Lt. Pearson and his
company came here (for field training in December 1905), he (the
King) was in hopes that the troops had been sent to drive the
3
Mission out of the place".
In order to assure the Emirs that the government of British
administration in The North was not interfering with the Islamic
1. Crampton 1975 p. 136
2. Dr Kumm was the SUM-party leader and the Station House was
locally known as "Gidan German" ie. "The German House" - In
the period between 1914 and 1918 when Britain went to war
with Germany, Dr Kumm subsequently was seen as a political
problem and expelled by British Administration from The North
because it was thought he could spy for Germany - Maxwell 1954.
3	 Report of Mr Berkeley, Letter to the SUM Pioneer Camp in Wase,
by Lugard 1906, para 19, cited in Boer 1979 p. 197.
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religion and to create a situation for the Christian Missionaries
to see their circumstances in which they ought not make undue
claims of the backing of the administration, Lugard chose to be
neutral to both sides by insisting that Emirs were free to invite
Christian Missionaries if they wished. He however conditioned the
process by suggesting, "subject to the approval of the Resident"'
In other words, Lugard avoided social and political identification
in Christian Missionary practices as "Ethnic Europeans" with
Christian civilization confronting Islamic civilization. Christian
Missionaries however saw "the 1903 pledge of Lugard" to the Emirs
as the basic factor and the subsequent tool used by the government
to oppose their activities among the Islamic communities in The
North and constantly criticized British administration for in-
consistency in policy delivery. 2 Christian Missionaries interpreted
government restrictions of their activities as being anti-Christian,
pro-Islamic and described the government of British administration
in The North as "a pro-Islamic Government" from a Christian Nation.3
In 1919 this opposition to Christian Missionary activities
in the Islamic society in The North were re-emphasized to Farrant
when he held interview discussions with Clifford who was Governor
of Nigeria. 4 In the instance, Clifford suggested that allowing
1. See Letters from Lugard to the SUM Camp in Wase, 1906, cited
in Boer 1979 p. 195-202
2. Boer 1979 p. 287
3. Ibid p. 276
4. J.S. Farrant, "Interview with His Excellency Sir Hugh Clifford"
Light Bearer Magazine, 20th September 1919, cited in Boer
1979 p. 287
Christian Missionaries among Moslem communities in The North
constituted a breach of promise.' In the same period, when Palmer
was Lieutenant-Governor of The North, he admitted that although
restrictions of Christian Missionaries developed from the 1903
pledge of Lugard were a government policy they were secondary
rather than basic. 2 According to Palmer, Christian Missionaries
might subsequently be encouraged in their activities in the Islamic
society: "... but for the time being .. the government wished to
maintain the three Northern most provinces (of Sokoto, Kano and
Borno) as Moslem Emirates. This was their definite policy." 3
Furthermore when Palmer held discussions with Dr Miller concerning
Christian Missionary activities in Zaria and the potential.of
converting Islamic rulership into Christianity was examined, it
has been suggested that: "... Palmer pointed out ... suppose that
the Waziri of Zaria were to become a Christian .... He could not
retain his office under a Moslem regime. If half the people in
Zaria Province were to become Christians, it would lead to a change
of Government and the policy of Government was to rule through
the existing Moslem rulers." 4
Although British administration in The North held explicit
policies on restricting Christian Missionary activities from the
Islamic society there were uncertainties on the degree of restrictions
to be imposed on Moslem communities found among the M-Belt groups
and societies as well as other non-Islamic populations under Fulani
1. Boer 1979 p. 287
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Bishop Smith, "Notes of an Interview" Light Bearer Magazine,
22nd December 1926, cited in Boer 1979 p. 287
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and Islamic rulership established in the period between 1804 and
1900 or politically claimed to be under Fulani and Islamic rulership
after 1900 when the government of British administration was con-
solidating its authority with the Indirect rule policy. In certain
instances, the government officials explained the pledge as a
policy with contradictions.1
This was the premise from which Bishop Smith suggested that
"the 1903 pledge of Lugard" as was expressed to the Emirs was meant
to cover the whole of the British created political Unit of The
North and therefore included the M-Belt groups and societies which
were essentially non-Islamic. 2 Smith however maintains that although
the government of British administration in The North: 11 ... stretched
the promise to its utmost limit by refusing Mission sites among
Moslems, the government actively encouraged Missions among Pagans". 3
Similarly, the SUM field secretary, G. Dawson suggests that "the
1903 pledge of Lugard" prevented the presentation of "the gospel to
Moslems eager to listen". 4
Although in the period between 1900 and 1920, Christian
Missionaries were anxious to work and diffuse Christianity through
1. Boer 1979 p. 287
2. Ibid
3. Bishop A. Smith, 'Government and Missions in Northern Nigeria',
Notes of an interview between the Bishop and Ormsby-Gore, Under-
Secretary of State for the colonies, The Light Bearer Magazine,
10th March 1926, cited in Boer 1979 p. 287.
4. G. Dawson, The Liaht Bearer Maaazine, July 1926 p. 76
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Western education in the Islamic centres of religion and politics
they were themselves sceptical about the prospects of converting
Moslems into Christianity. For example, Miller is quoted as suggesting
that: ".. Christianity would never convert Islam in Northern Nigeria,
although the destiny of Northern Nigeria would in future be in the
hands of Christianized, well-educated pagans of the M-Belt. 1
Lugard himself may therefore be re-interpreted as attempting
in discreet ways to advise Christian Missionaries about the fool-
hardiness of ever hoping to convert Moslems into Christianity by
having their religious activities concentrated in the Islamic
society. He therefore wished them to divert their resources in
men and money to work among the M-Belt groups and societies, where
Islam held an insignificant influence in politics and society.
That was where there was more likelihood of greater success for the
acceptance of the Christian religion.
In the period between 1900 and 1920 and well into the
1930s, all the Christian Missionary bodies held religious and
political grievances against the government of British administration
in The North over restrictions of their activities in the Islamic
society. Miller of the CMS, for example, criticized the restrictions
as reducing the principle advanced by the government itself into
its "reductio al Absurdum". 2
 According to Miller, Christian
1. W.R.S. Miller: An Autobiography, 1949, cited in Ayandele
1980 p. 151; see also Crampton 1975 p. 207
2. Boer 1979 p. 210
Missionaries were demanding equal opportunity for Moslems and
Christians rather than religious advantages for themselves. '
Miller was suggesting that if Christianity was prevented by the
government of British administration in The North from religiously
contesting with Islam in the Islamic society, then the same
government ought to instruct the Emirs that Moslems are to keep
out of the territorial spaces of the non-Islamic groups and
societies. 2 In other words, government ought to "zone" The North
into an Islamic society and the non-Islamic groups and societies
which were the territorial spaces of the bulk of the M-Belt .
groups and societies where Christianity and Western civilization
might thrive independently of Islamic influences. This according
to Miller might meet government claims of religious neutrality,
otherwise all else: 11 ... would be confusion of thought for a
Moslem is always a Missionary." 3
In rather similar circumstances of the government of British
administration in the Republic of the Sudan where there existed
religious polarities and political tensions rooted in historical
recollections of socio-political nnd economic experiences between
Islamic and non-Islamic groups and societies in that country, the
Miller prescription for The North, was an initial political
strategy used to manage political conflict in the Sudan. In that
1. Boer 1979 p. 210
2. Ibid p. 211
3. W.R.S. Miller, The Light Bearer Magazine, 1912 p. 51, cited
in Boer 1979 p. 210
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instance, there was political restriction in the movement and
settlement of Moslems among the non-Islamic groups and societies
in the territories of Southern Sudan. 1
The religious opinions of the SUM as they became expressed
by H.G. Farrant, accused the government of British administration
in The North for being anti-Christian and guilty of three basic
"evils" directed toward Christianity. According to Farrant
the Government increased the menace of Islam, antagonized the
Christian Church and perpetuated the separation of Nigeria into
two cultural regions. 2 This was the context in which Farrant
expressed the religious opinions of the SUM on the restrictions of
Christian Missionary activities in The North as: 11 ... the net result
of 29 years of rule by a government which professes to see a menace
in Islam that by their encouragement Islam is better organized and
more of a force than when Britain occupied the country in 1900 ...
Missions assert that it is the Nigerian Government and not the
Natives who oppose their entrance." 3 Furthermore, Farrant
suggested that while the South of Nigeria was turned to the West,
The North: "... was purposely directed to the Arab World and thus
the Government had supported the Moslem bid for spiritual hegemony." 4
1. Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980-1983
2. H.G. Farrant, 'Memorandum to Oldham', The Light Bearer 
BagazilE, 16th December 1929, cited in Boer 1979 p. 308
3. Farrant 1929, cited in Boer 1979 p. 308
4. Ibid
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The careful shift in Christian Missionary focus of
their religious attention from the Islamic society toward
the M-Belt groups and societies as a direct response to
Government restrictions of their activities is well sum-
marized when Miller wrote: u ... Why then does a Christian
Government enforce the Pax-Britannica and compel these pagan
peoples to permit Mohammedan traders and Malams (teachers) all
practising and teaching their religion to come and live and
trade among them, teaching their children and perverting
them against their will and as we know to their disgust and sorrow,
for at present the hatred of Islam is deep and bitter?" 1
In the instance of the SUM, R.L. Maxwell aptly summarizes
their religious feelings about government restrictions of their
activities in the Islamic society. For the period between 1920
and 1930, Maxwell described the restrictions and SUM frustrations
as: H ... a virtual denial of the rights of Christians to carry
on their religious practices freely without let or hindrance ...
If religion is free, well, let it be free. One does sympathize
with the administration in their work." 2
In the period between 1920 and 1930 Christian Missionaries
re-interpreted government restrictions of their activities in
the Islamic society, changing from attacking pro-Islamic social
and political conditions to: u ... the purpose of God to turn
the Messengers of the Cross, first to the pagan and not to the
Moslem.	 In a subsequent Field Report covering the same period
1. W.R.S. Miller, The Light Bearer Magazine, 1912 p. 50-51,
cited in Boer 1979 p. 211
2. Maxwell 1952 p. 212
3. The Light Bearer Magazine 0 1933 p. 101
and writing under the title heading f God's Provision for
Mohammedan work', Farrant brought out the shift in emphasis
by Christian Missionaries from the Islamic society toward
the M-Belt groups and societies. In the instance Farrant
suggests that: "... the original Missions in the Sudan
aimed at the Moslem communities, but they were prevented and
instead ended up building virile Christian communities among
the animist people, people akin in race to the Mohammedan
tribes... Thus the Moslems witnessed a new phenomenon of
the Christian Church, taught in the Spirit, honest in character,
growing apace in the wholesome and good things of Christian
civilization .. such a Christian community was prepared by
God... in order that the Mohammedan people should become
dissatisfied with what they have and reach out for reconciliation
with him through Christ Jesus."' This suggests that although
Christian Missionary activities became concentrated among the
M-Belt groups and societies after 1920, their objectives
still emphasized the Islamic society, meant to serve as a
'demonstrative effect' to transform Islam into Christianity
for the whole of The North.
When Christian Missionaries in The North shifted their
religious focus toward the M-Belt groups and societies after
1920, they were virtually going into a virgin religious sphere
of influence where there were insignificant Islamic influences,
no Christianity and no Churches, although it was an area
1.	 Farrant, "God's Provision for Mohammedan Work", SUM
Field Report, 1937
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characterized by disparate traditional African systems of
religious beliefs and practices which were as numerous as the
groups and societies. The religious efforts of Christian
Missionaries in The North itself had been frustrating to
themselves as much as they had been unproductive in fulfilling
their objectives in the first few years.
For example, in 1914 there were 45 Christian Churches
established among 14 groups and societies and in all about
650 pupils in the Christian Missionary schools in The North. '
In 1921 however there was some progress in the activities of
the Christian Missionaries as they began to produce churches
and Christian converts in greater numbers from among the
M-Belt groups and societies.	 This is explicit from the
figures in Table 3-Lk
Except for Zaria (Wusasa) however, it ought to be
borne in mind that Christian Churches, Christian adherents
and schools with numbers of students concentrated in the
Islamic society were to be found in the predominantly
Yoruba and Islamic provinces of Ilorin, Nupe and Kabba.
These were to be found in centres like Kantagora, Kuta,
Wushishi, Mokwa, Bidda, Jebba, Shao, Ilorin, Pategi, Lokoja,
Denkina and Rumasha. 2
1. Ayandele 1980 p. 152
2. See Map 3, which shows Christian Missionary expansion
by the distribution of their stations in The North for
the period aFeer itizo.
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Table 34thèretore suggests that by 1921 in The North there was
an already explicit shift in Christian Missionary focus of
attention in their religious and social activities toward the M-
Belt groups and societies. In 1921 therefore, out of a total of
133 Christian Churches in The North, 128 (96.2%) were developed
among the M-Belt groups and societies with 5 (3.8%) concentrated
in the Islamic society. While there were 172 (2.1%) Christian
adherents in the Islamic society in 1921, 8,232 (97.9%) out of a
total of 8,404, existed among the M-Belt groups and societies.
Similarly, in terms of the development of Western literacy in
The North, by the establishment of schools, while there existed
84 (90.3%) Christian schools concentrated among the M-Belt
groups and societies out of a total of 93, only 9 (9.7%) Christian
Missionary schools were centred in the Islamic society in 1921.
Furthermore, while the numbers of students attending Christian
Missionary schools centred among the M-Belt groups and societies
were attended by 2,110 (95.0%) students in 1921 only 112 (5.0%)
students attended Christian Missionary schools centred in the
Islamic society in The North, out of a total of 2,222 students in
16Christian Missionary schools.
In other words, as early as 1921, while each Christian
Missionary school in the Islamic society trained 12 students in
Western Liberal arts, Christian Missionary schools centred among
the M-Belt groups and societies trained an average of 25 students
in Western Liberal arts, from each of their schools. This means that
it was mainly the M-Belt groups and societies as well as other non-
Islamic societies in The North who began to become Christians and
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availed themselves of the rapid opportunities to acquire Western
education in The North developed from the activities of Christian
Missionaries. In other words, more Churches, more Christians
and more Western European skills of literacy characterized the
development of the activities of Christian Missionaries among the
M-Belt groups and societies after 1921.
This is not to suggest that skills in Western European
literacy and Western European education were not developed in
the Islamic society in The North. The introduction of Western
European education in the Islamic society in The North as early
as 1902 suggests that its development predates its introduction
by both government and Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt
groups and societies.'
Although Western education in 1921 was not a crucial advantage
in a political system whose emphasis was on preserving and diffusing
Islamic traditions and institutions in the practice and application
of Indirect rule policy, the concentration of Christian Missionary
activities and their success in producing Churches, Christians and
European oriented institutions with students disproportionately to
Islamic society meant that social and cultural differences between
the M-Belt groups and societies widened in The North. The develop-
ment of Churches, Christian adherents which produced Christian
communities subsequently increased in the period between 1930 and 1950. 2
1. For more detail examples see discussions in Chapter 2. Sections
III and IV; The development of Western European education
among the M-Belt groups and societies by both government and
Christian Missionaries is examined in more detail in Section IV
of this Chapter.
2. This is discussed in more detail in Section III of this Chapter.
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These increases took place at the same time as Christian Missionary
development of social welfare institutions among the M-Belt groups
and societies.
In the period between 1900 and 1930 however Christian Missionary
schools which were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies
were institutions where the 3Rs were taught to enable initial
Christian converts and "agents" to read the Bible and develop with a
minimal of Western modernizing skills. ' Perham termed the Christian
Missionary institution for that period as "Bush Schools". 2 This was
the premise from which there was underdevelopment of educational
and welfare institutions which were concentrated among the M-Belt
groups and societies by both Christian Missionary Bodies and by
the government of British administration in The North in the period
between 1900 and 1935. This was so because while the government of
British administration in The North emphasized the educational
development of the ruling classes in the Islamic society, Christian
Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies emphasized the
development of Christianity, Churches and Christian communities from
among both the traditional ruling houses and the ordinary classes in
society. Furthermore in the same period some of the M-Belt groups
and societies were still unconquered and therefore "unopened" to
British influences for both direct government development and the
benefits of Christian Missionary activities.3
1. Albert Ozigi and Lawrence Ocho, Education in Northern Nigeria 
London 1981, p.14-38
2. Perham 1962 p.135; These are discussed in more detail in
Section III of this Chapter.
3. See more detailed discussions of the patterns of British
conquest and the establishment of political authority and
control in Chapter 1. Sections II and IV.
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The initial emphasis of Christian Missionaries to achieve the
objective of "halting the Islamic advance" in the period between
1900 and 1920, through concentrating their institutions in the
Islamic society reinforced the already existing efforts of the
government of British administration in The North in developing
Western education in the Islamic society as early as from 1902.
By 1921, this initial advantage of achieving Western European
skills in the Islamic society became reflected in the employment
opportunities it provided to individuals from groups and societies
from that society when compared to the M-Belt groups and other
societies in The North. 	 This is explicit from the figures in
Table 5 . 5 In the period between 1940 and 1965 however the balance
of employment opportunities in government institutions, except for
top government decision-making posts shifted from the Islamic
society to the M-Belt groups and societies as a direct consequence
of the rapid development of Christian Missionary educational efforts. '
Table 5•5 therefore suggests that the majority of occupational
roles of adults in The North was dominated by groups from the
Islamic society. Out of a total work force of 450,592, for example,
there were 364,622 (80.9%) from the Islamic society, with 85,970 (19.1%)
from among some of the M-Belt groups and societies and other non-Islamic
1.	 This is discussed in more detail in Chapters ii- and 5	 the
development of Christian Missionary Western oriented
educational institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies
is however discussed in Section IV of this Chapter.
2. 0 0
communities in occupational roles which required some Western
modernizing skills in The North. Furthermore, in 1921, all the
occupational roles were dominated by Hausa Fulani, which was the
indigenous group that the government of British administration used
and emphasized in ruling The North during the period between 1900
and 1950. British emphasis on the Hausa Fulani as the ruling
classes in The North continued to be so until political power
became transferred from the British to that group in 1960.
In the instance of 1921 however, out of a total work force
of 450,592 in The North, there were 311,684 (69.2%) Hausa Fulani
in different occupational roles. Kanuri and Nupe as part of the
other groups and societies within the Islamic cohort shared
11.7% with the M-Belt groups and other non-Islamic societies occu-
pying 85,970 (19.1%) of the total work force in The North. The
occupational roles with significant M-Belt emphasis in 1921 as
suggested by the figures in Table 35 was in Administration and
Defence. While the M-Belt groups and societies had a share of
6,698 (45.4%) in that occupational role out of a total of 14,755,
the Islamic society shared 54.6% with the Fulani and Hausa alone
4k
showing a concentration of 6,764 (45.8%).
The significant concentration of persons from among the
M-Belt groups and societies in the administrative and defence
occupational roles as suggested in Table 35 in which their
numbers in the figures were mostly soldiers is explained by the
)1;-- 11/ e tbtal	 p 04:2 t4 I at t o1=3 0C -Hie H bv- ti, l'. 02.1 644s
Rsh:.... a.te al	 s 9 9 1 2 3 1 4-
	 tv I It, c4-1. 0 tA.E
2 011-2.. 335 (-ZO -4-'4,) Cvs Lii e frt- 8-ell- cR..r-eca. s ....
Cork rwt-ed Cv-' ev4 fvt-teK 192 r ZY- a .
-I
0
6"0-.
Cll 0 X
8	 r.-	 I
7 CO
i-n• w	 MCD	 /1	 I-.1-1. 	 chI... 7CD 0 U3
I C
'-'C
4.43 3
i . j
00.
VI	 1-•	 .-1
8	 '1'
I-..	 MI-.	 CDCO
	
Di
cf.	 W .
...0	 0
--1	 0)	 RI
0-	 3	 rt.CD	 0.	 7'3Z	 VI	 I-..000 II	 0
rt.	 I-.	 GICD	 01
n-0	 0
N.<	 C
I-..	
13
3	 -I
s<
-0
CD
E
'0CD
3C0)
7C
.1I.,.
=0)
C
CD
co
-,1CI-.CCI
a.
.-
...
coI-.
*43
.-
._.
.
-..1NV
•	 c
VI
.
oI-,
VI
I-.
...
.o.
0I-.
,...,
cc
.
osVIVI
z
c	 0
a	 1-, o
cr	 0W00ID	 7 Cfi 0
.1	 Cl. co CCO	 .. -170	 CO
I-,0000
INN)ON
•
VI
ON
.
V
VI
I-,
ONVI
V
I-. -I 4-1-CO
	 ID	 I...
am	 'C OO0X- 0 7
-I	 CO 7 030	 (DI-'M.
	,1LO	 coI-,
1-.
..
.../VIVI
0%
-
Os
NOco
..4
.0.CO
VI0.VI
ch
...
*V
	 •
0%
0.
0
z	 I-.5	 co In
0. co 0Cr	 a cn 0CD	 IN' . ..	 01-3	 3	 CILO	 I-“ 0 -0
CO	 CD	 al
I-,0
0WI
0.
vi
.0.
kr)
I-.
w
,J
.4s
vi
CO
IR -1., cl.
,1	 CD	 I...
be	 m p 0
rt. CO	 7
-I	 I-.. CD	 0300	 §-0
IR	3 0)CO	 7I-.
	0.
IV
VI
..
,-.
.0.CO
VI
-
v.
r.)
-4
t
0.
1/4,1NJ
I-.
JN
-05
F.I-.
I-.
co
0
...
50IVVI
Z
n5	 .-. 00-	 00CD	 g co 0
.1	 v CO CCO	 ,-1	 •• -0
•	 IDID	 -I C•
I-.0
0
be
t
NNI
VI
VI
.4
.
IV
....I
44
CO
,1	 CD	 i-..?A	 01 X00' 3
-I	 4--CD0	 I-. 1-..
cr	 CDCOI-.
I-.0
0.
NONJ
'C
U
..
••.I00
.0.
.0.1-,ON
....1N.0
r..30.
ON 
....1
..
COVINO
Z
c
I-. 0B	 00'	 CO 0CD	 CDC)
.1	 co cco
ID
I-.00it
IV
•
•A-
VI
.A.
IV
ON
••••1
ON
ON
-I rIN11	 I-..09.	 CO 0
0-I	 COO,1	 I-.IR	 COCOI-.
g
CONO1-.
co
..
IV
,J
vi
no
...
CO
r..)IV
na
1.3
--)I-.
IN)nI
VI
U
Z
S-(ID Cr	 I-. 0CO	 73. ID 7
.1	 1-1	 CO	 CCO	 rI.
 CO '0I-.. ••	 co
I-.
0000
IV
•
0
IV
ON
NO
VI
ON
CTnI
VI
co	 rt
03	 0	 I-..04	 3 r0 003 3' 7
0-I	 CD CO .1	 I-.0.
	01COI-.
.A.VI0
...
VINOIV
03
VI
..
vp
N...Io
IV
.t.
..
0Nr.
05
IVCO
.
COCOIV
VII--.1-.
..
cr.CO
.4.
ZC
a	 o
o-	 0
CD	 0
.1	 33 CCO	 0.01-, co
I-.05
I-.NO
I-.
Vi
.
VI
ON
.0.
05
513
IN)
0 MNCO	 I-..00	 0
7
-I	 co 0	 I-.
rt•CDI-.
*.V,0
..
vl
vz)
NI
I-.00
00
c0
V,
..
%CI
--1
a)
1-.
43
I-.
IN)ON
.0.
..
ch4-3IN•3
CO
0
NO
Z
S	 o
o-	 0
co	 0
.1	 c0)	 3313 -40 03 0I-. rh O-M	 1-.. c0
ay	 0 0 I-.
--I	 3W0	 I-IR
a)1-.
co
a
CO
C
01
0
Co0)
0
CD
0.
ca.
7
CD
PI
3
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British policy of a cultural division in labour affecting recruit-
ment,into the army. It is also explained by the impact of Christian
Missionary activities in producing European educated persons who
began to participate in the institutions of government in The North. '
In the instance of the period between 1900 and 1950 however,
differential patterns of recruitment into certain professions, created
a cultural division of labour. Certain cultural groups and societies
became considered good only for specific occupational roles. For
example, the Kru (encouraged to migrate to Nigeria from Liberia) were
considered to be good manual workers, the Yoruba, good clerks,. the
Tiv, Bachama as well as other non-Islamic groups and societies
in plateau, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi who successfully resisted Fulani
military conquest were considered to be good soldiers. 2
1. The concentration of persons from among the M-Belt groups and
societies in the army as an occupational role is examined in
more detail in Section IV of this chapter; in the 1950s and
1960s the Sardauna explained the non-interest of the Fulani
and Islamic ruling classes in the army as a profession
"because the British recruited slaves" in The North to form
the WAIF, subsequently the Nigerian Army.
2. Robin Cohen, Labour and Politics in Nigeria 1945-1971, Ibadan
University Press, 1974 p. 27; these occupational divisions
of labour survived into the 1950s and 1960s from the period
of British rule and became crucial factors in shaping the
political developments in Nigeria in 1966. For example, Tiv
soldiers played a prominent military role in "the Ikeja siege"
under Gowon in the July 1966 coup, provoked "a Northern
Identity" among soldiers in the 4th Battalion in Ibadan during
the January 1966 coup and alongside with other soldiers from
among the M-Belt groups and societies strongly supported
"the State Creation exercise" by General Gowan in May 1967.
Furthermore their stand on this issue influenced the attitude
of Islamic leadership in The North and halted threatened
Northern succession. This is discussed in more detail in
Chapters C , S and ki-le. E p% 1 ark
Z 0 2-
III	 Christianity, Churches and Christian Communities among 
the M-Belt groups and societies 
The purpose of this section is to examine whether the develop-
ment of Christianity among the non-Islamic M-Belt groups and
societies in the period between 1920 and 1950 transformed disparate
previously existing African systems of religious beliefs and
practices into Christian conceptions of a social and political
identity. The political consequences of these religious trans-
formations as they affected society and politics in The North
and within the developing Nigerian political state for the period
between 1940 and 1960 are also examined.
As earlier examined in the previous section, the religious
objectives of Christian Missionaries from Western European
civilization who subsequently operated in The North was meant to
occupy a broad stretch of the "Sudan-Belt" for Christianity, where
the "Islamic advance" might be halted. This objective was to be
achieved in "the Sudan-Belt" through the development of churches
with indigenous African converts.
The religious objectives held by Christian Missionaries in
The North however became reversely halted by British administration
for political reasons. The result was that there was emphasis
on separating the Christian religion from politics, a contrary
situation to the emphasis of Islam which tied up politics to the
whole processes of society in The North. When Christian Missionaries
faced these developments in the policies of British administration
in The North, they turned their religious focus toward the M-Belt
groups and societies.
20 3
In the instance, the religious objectives of Christian
Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and societies were to
establish Christian communities with churches and other related
institutions in which Christianity might expand and develop its
converts. After 1935 however Christian Missionary objectives
added its emphasis on the development of Western educational
and social welfare institutions to promote the development and
expansion of Christianity.
1
 It was inticipated among top
Christian Missionary policy and decision making bodies that although
the government of British administration in The North, imposed re-
strictions over religious activities intended to halt the expansion
of Islam within the Islamic society itself, the establishment of
Christianity, churches and Christian communities and with the
development of Christian civilization among the M-Belt groups and
societies, will be a religious launch-pad into the Islamic society
where it was hoped "the rest of The North will come to belong to
Christ. ,,2
1. The data and analytical emphasis in this section however is
on the development of churches, Christian communities and
expansion of Christianity by increased numbers of converts
in the period between 1920 and 1950 among the M-Belt groups
and societies - The development of Western educational and
social welfare institutions among the M-Belt groups and
societies is examined in Section IV of this Chapter.
2. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dush, January 1981; the
same emphasis was explicit in the writings of J.S. Farrant,
W.R.S. Miller and numerous other contributors to the
Light Bearer Magazine in the period between 1920 and 1950.
2.014r
In the early period after 1900 therefore, the government
of British administration divided The North into "Mohammedan
territories" which comprised of Islamic centres of religion and
politics under Borno, and Sokoto and "territories unhabited by
pagan tribes" formed to the South and South-eastern parts of the
Islamic society in The North. ' In the same period the government
of British administration in The North "zoned" the non-Islamic
groups and societies, concentrated mainly in the M-Belt areas, for
purposes of Christian Missionary work by the different denominations. 2
In that instance, government allocated Protestant Christian Missionaries
to particular non-Islamic groups and societies for their activities,
differently from the Roman Catholic Christian Missionaries. 3 This
was the premise, for example, from which SUM Christian religious
activities after 1907 became concentrated among M-Belt groups and
societies like the Jukun and Tiv in Benue, the Yergam, Angas, Sura,
Jerawa and Birom on the Plateau and the Bachama and Dinka in Adamawa. 415'
These non-Islamic groups and societies became militantly anti-
Islamic with a specific Christian religious identity in the late
1940s, a process which led to the formation of the political
organizations of the M-Belt Movement in the 1950s and its political
1. Maxwell 1952 p. 104
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p. 105
*4.Z See cowymextts qt	 b
CA-tarter 3 t 461.
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demands for separation from the Islamic society in The North
into a M-Belt Region. The whole political activity centred on
the M-Belt Movement and its demands for the creation of a M-Belt
Region in the 1950s and 1960s became concentrated among these groups
and societies even when the Movement also attracted political support
from S. Zaria, S. Bauchi and groups and societies like the Igala
and Idoma as well as political sympathy from the Yoruba irredentist
areas of Ilorin and Kabba. 1
Crampton suggests that before 1900, there existed political
rivalry between France and Britain which subsequently became re-
flected in the religious rivalry for "spheres of influence" between
British Protestant Christian Missionary Bodies like the CMS and the
SUM on the one hand and the French Catholic Fathers of the RCM in
The North. 2
 In other words, by "zoning" the M-Belt groups and
societies into Christian Missionary denominational "spheres of
influence" as suggested by Maxwell, the government of British
administration in The North, took into account the potential for
religious clashes among the Christian Missionary Bodies.
Although this was so in many places where the RCM came after
the Protestant Christian Missionaries, there existed serious
religious accusations of "RCM-poaching". 3
 The religious rivalries
1. The concentration of Christian Missionary Bodies among the
different areas of the M-Belt groups and societies is examined
in more detail in the next few pages below when Table
is brought into analytical focus.
2. Crampton 1975 p.153
3. Crampton 1975 p.153; Eugene Rubingh, Sons of Tiv: A study
of the rise of the Church amona the Tiv of Central Nigeria,
Michigan, 1969 p.115-116
2.0 6
between the Protestant Christian Missionaries and the RCM however
did not prevent the progress of Christian Missionary work in the
development and growth of Christianity through the establishment
of churches, Christian converts and Christian communities among
the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1920 and
1950. This was so because there were increases in Christian
Missionary Bodies and Societies with a concomitant increase in
Christian Missionary personnel who arrived in The North to work
among the M-Belt groups and societies, as well as among other non-
Islamic groups. Furthermore Christian Missionaries among the M-
Belt groups and societies began eventually and rapidly to increase
their converts, an experience that was previously characterized
by few conversions into Christianity when they concentrated their
religious stations and activities within the Islamic society in
The North in the period between 1900 and 1920.
Table 3 . 6 suggests the increases in Christian Missionary
Bodies, Christian Missionary personnel and their territorial areas
of concentration among groups and societies in The North and in
particular their distribution by denominations among the M-Belt
groups and societies compared to the period between 1865 and 1907, 1
and thereafter as well as in the period between 1920 and 1935 as is
suggested by the 1931 Census Religious Statistics. The majority
of these Christian Missionary personnel became concentrated among
the M-Belt groups and societies because according to the Report:
11 ... no missions have so far been established in provinces of Bornu,
Kanu, Sokoto or Kontagora, as it is against the Government's policy
to permit Christian propaganda within areas which are predominantly
Muslim". 2
 There were subsequent increases in Christian Missionary
1. See discussions and Tables in Section II of this Chapter.
2. 1931 Census Report p. 247
Zol
personnel in the period between 1935 and 1970 when there was also
additional objectives among the Christian Missionaries to focus
their activities on the development of Western civilization through
educational institutions with a Christian ideological emphasis
among the M-Belt groups and societies.'
Although there was a total of nine Christian Missionary
denominations operating in The North in 1931, Table 3 40 , which is
analyzed in a comparative perspective to figures displayed for 1907
in Table :3 '3 and Table 3 . 4- of this Chapter, suggests that only
seven Christian Missionary bodies were operationally active among
groups and societies in The North. These were Christian Missionaries
in Many Lands (CML), Church Missionary Society (CMS), Dutch Reformed
Church Mission (DRCM), Mennonite Brethren in Christ (MBC), Roman
4i0Catholic Mission (RCM 3 Seventh Day Adventist Mission (SDAM),
Sudan Interior Mission (SIM), Sudan United Mission (SUM) and
the Danish Missionary Society (DMS). 2
 Furthermore, although the
Danish Missionaries in The North were a separate body, they worked
together with the SUM and all their religious activities and their
statistical weight were produced as one Christian Missionary body. 3
1.	 The increases in Christian Missionary personnel to meet the
needs of their educational institutions which were con-
centrated among the M-Belt groups and societies for the
period after 1935 and between 1950 and 1970 are examined in
more detail in Section IV of this Chapter
2. Census Report, 1931 p. 247
3. Ibid
See ceftme.i.ts a H-te.
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This means that the Danish Christian Missionary breakdowns are
inclusive of the SUM statistics in the 1931 Census Religious Statistics.
This was unlike the case with the DRCM which, as much as it worked
with the SUM, it saw itself as a distinct Christian Missionary Body
and produced its own religious statistics independently of the SUM.
Furthermore, Table 3. gives only seven Christian Missionary denomi-
nations, instead of nine that were operating in The North at that
time, because the 1931 census report suggests that no returns were
rendered from MBC missionaries.'
From the breakdowns in Table 3é therefore, it is explicit
that Christian Missionary Bodies, personnel involved in Christian
Missionary work and territorial areas in the concentration of
Christian religious focus was on the M-Belt groups and societies.
The figures for 1931 were the result of the religious shift in
Christian Missionary policy in the 1920s to produce converts
from among the M-Belt groups and societies rather than in the
Islamic society in The North. Religious concentrations of
Christian Missionary influences in the core of the Islamic centres
of religion and politics, where it existed, was restricted to
townships and the peripheries of Sokoto and Borno. The figures in
Table 3b therefore suggest that the core of the Islamic society
in The North, in centres like Kano, Sokoto, Borno, Kontagora and
•
Zaria only had minimal Christian Missionary influences as latterly
as 1931. Out of a total of 105 Christian Missionaries in The North
20 (19.0%) were centred in all of the Islamic societies.
1.	 Census Report 1931 p. 251
Z 0 9
Within the very political and religious boundaries of the
Islamic society established from the Fulani Islamic revolution of
1804 therefore Christian Missionary activities after 1920 were
centred in the townships of Kano, Lokoja and Minna. In that
instance the townships had a total concentration of 9 (8.6%)
Christian Missionaries in The North. Similarly, in the political
and religious peripheries to Sokoto, Christian Missionary centres
became concentrated in Nupe, and Ilorin, although these were among
non-Islamic communities but under the political authority of Fulani
/(
Emirs. In the instance of Nupe, there were 5(3.8%) Christian
Missionaries operating among both the Islamic and non-Islamic
groups and societies in that area. Ilorin, another peripheral
centre of Islam in politics and religion in relation to Sokoto
had 7 (6.6%) of the Christian Missionary concentration in The North.
This means that British policy after 1920 became effective in
restricting Christian Missionary activities from the Islamic
society.
As earlier examined, in the instance of these developing
restrictions in the activities of European Missionaries in the
Islamic society, Christian religious focus became turned toward the
M-Belt groups and societies where in 1931 there was a total concen-
tration of 105 in the whole of The North. This is over three times
the numbers of Christian Missionaries involved in religious activities
in the Islamic society. Among the M-Belt groups and societies, there
was a high concentration of Christian Missionaries focussed on the
non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa. According to the
figures suggested by Table 3'4, Adamawa alone had a total of
7-10
38 (36.2%) Christian Missionaries. These were centred among the
non-Islamic groups and societies under the political authority of
Emirs in Muri and Yola. In the instance of Muri there were
21 (20.0%) Christian Missionaries, while in Yola there existed
17 (16.2%). Christian Missionary concentrations in religious
focus of attention were however lowest in Nasarawa Province which
had 5 (4.8%) Christian Missionaries and Zaria with 7 (6.6%), when
compared to their concentration among groups and societies in
Bauchi: S. Bauchi and Plateau with 16 (15.2%) and among the Tiv
in Benue with 19 (18.1%).
This suggests that the M-Belt groups and societies did not
receive an equal weight of Christian religious influences when
European Missionary activities became focussed on them after 1920.
This was so because the numerical sizes of the M-Belt groups and
societies conditioned their attraction to Christian Missionary
activities. Groups and societies whose population numbers were over
50,000 were considered a priority for evangelical work by the
iChristian Missionary Bodies in The North.' Like in politics,
Christian Missionary strategy for the diffusion of Christianity
took account of the potential numbers of converts to Christianity,
similar to 'vote catching strategies' in the struggle to control
political power in a popular democracy, in policies over particular
groups and societies in the M-Belt areas.
1.	 Rubingh 1969 P. 70
Interestingly and very instructive in the conduct of Nigerian
politics with the M-Belt Movement, Awolowo among others, was forced
to accept Tiv leadership and support of the M-Belt Movement because
the Tiv outsized other groups and societies in the Movement and
therefore held higher potential voters to shape the electoral
outcome of politics.1
There was however no relationship between the numbers of
Christian converts produced by the European Missionary Bodies in
their religious activities in The North and the population sizes
of a particular M-Belt group and society in the period between.
1900 and 1950 and well into the 1960s. For example in 1931, 1952
and 1963 the different Census figures in The North suggest that
there were more Christian converts among the smaller groups and
societies found on the Plateau, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Adamawa
rather than among the Tiv and Idoma in Benue who had numerically
bigger populatidn sizes in their groups and societies. 2
This means that when the M-Belt Movement was begun in 1949
and its political struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region
went on into the 1950s and 1960s and when its social and political
1. This is examined in more detail in Chapters lir e;ri-fl 5
2. This is examined in more detail below when the figures in
Table 3.14. are brought into analytical focus on the develop-
ment of Christianity in 1931 and when we produce explanatory
reasons for that state of religious development. For
examples of the figures for 1952 and 1963 see Crampton 1975
p. 220-222. Christian religious differences between the
M-Belt groups and societies are examined in more detail in
Section IV of this Chapter as well as in Chapters 41seml.S
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consciousness took the form of mobilizing Christians and the Christian
religious identity in support of its political objectives there were
more Christians to rally in support behind it among groups and
societies on the Plateau, Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria rather
than among the groups and societies in Benue like the Tiv, Idoma,
Jukun and Igala. This explains why Jonah Assadugu travelled to
mobilize Christian political support from among the former groups
and societies in the period between 1949 and 1952 rather than extend
his political travels to among the Tiv, Idoma and Igala when the
NML sought support from non-Islamic groups and Christian societies
in the M-Belt areas.	 Instructive in that respect, it was not until
in the 1950s, particularly in 1956 that the Tiv became a crucial
variable in the analytical strategy in the developing electoral
political calculations of the M-Belt Movement rather than
Christianity although they also shared anti-Islamic religious and
political sentiments and rejection.'
In the instance of the unequal distribution of Christian
Missionary influences among the M-Belt groups and societies, one
consequence of this state of affairs was that when the products
of these influences became active in society, particularly in terms
of Western educational skills there therefore existed sharp and
unequal differences between the M-Belt groups and societies. 2
1. This is examined in more detail in Chapters Li- Qr14 5
2. This is examined in more detail in Chapter 5 and its social
and political consequences are discussed in Chapters 4- <Aft.15
when we examine the politics of the M-Belt groups and societies
which caused variations in the whole theme of the M-Belt
Movement and its political identity in the period between
1967 and 1976.
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In the period between 1920 and 1930 however there was more
Christian Missionary focus of religious attention on the M-Belt
groups and societies rather than on the Islamic society,
particularly so on areas where Christian Missionaries had intimate
knowledge that there were little Islamic influences and the groups
and societies held some hostilities toward Islam rooted in their
historical recollections. ' In Adamawa, Benue, S. Bauchi and on the
Plateau for example, the population figures for the 1931 census suggest
that although there were Islamic influences among the M-Belt groups
and societies concentrated in those areas, there existed more non-
Moslems rather than adherents of the Islamic faith. This explains
the religious thrust in the concentration of Christian Missionary
activities among groups and societies in those areas rather than
in places like S. Zaria and Nasarawa where there was a substantial
migrant Islamic population and the non-Islamic population was small
and therefore a lesser Christian Missionary focus of religious
attention and concentration of effort. Furthermore political
control of S. Zaria and Nassarawa by the Emirs of Zaria was more
rigorouS and more of a politically sensitive issue to the govern-
ment of British administration in The North than elsewhere and
therefore there were tighter restrictions on the activities of
Christian Missionaries. 2
1. Boer 1979 p. 500
2. For examples of this political control and sensitivity see some
examples in Chapter 2. where the Emir of Zaria held political
influence to block 'Indirect rule reform' and subsequently
influenced the political transfer of some groups and societies
on the Plateau to Zaria Province in 1934. The sensitive
political nature of Southern Zaria in the problems of political
relationships with the Emir in Zaria after 1950 are examined
in more detail in Chapters 4-and s , where we discuss politics
within the M-Belt groups and societies, politics with the M-Belt
Movement within The North as they involved total political identi-
ties and the persistent demands of the S. Zaria groups and
societies for political merging into BP state and subsequently
with Plateau state or separation from the Emir into a separate
political unit of the Nigerian Federation.
Table 343 also suggests that there were increases in
Christian Missionary personnel in 1931 who became concentrated
among the M-Belt groups and societies, when compared to their
concentrations in the same area in the period between 1900 and 1920.
That was a period when Christian Missionary objectives emphasized
'doing battle' with the Islamic religion and doctrines in order
that Christianity might prevail in The North. In the period between
1920 and 1931 however there was also a significant decrease in the
numbers of Christian Missionary personnel who became concentrated
in the Islamic society. While in 1907 there were 30 (53.6%) .
Christian Missionary personnel in the Islamic society in The North
with only 7 (12.5%) centred among the M-Belt groups and societies,
in 1931 there were 20 (19.0%) Christian Missionaries centred in
the Islamic society and 85 (81.0%) Christian Missionaries con-
centrated among the M-Belt groups and societies.'
More significant to the development of a Christian religious
and political identity among the M-Belt Movements, started in 1949,
were the Christian Missionary Bodies and the groups and societies
the Missionaries focussed upon in concentrating their religious and
social activities. Although there was cooperation in fulfilling
the Christian religious objectives in The North among all Christian
Missionary Bodies including the rather fanatical objectives of the
SUM as preached by Kumm became complimented by the activities of
the SIM in the particular terms of what G.H. Farrant subsequently
described as the "vigour of the American character". 2 It was from
1. See figures in Table a.2 for comparison with figures in
Table 3.6.
2. SUM Reports, Volume 13, August 1942.
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among groups and societies where the SUM and the SIM operated that
there developed political organizations of the M-Belt Movement
which took off and gained social and political support with a
distinct Christian religious identity, mobilized to achieve
political objectives.
The SUM had the highest numbers of Christian Missionaries
with 47 (44.8%), out of a total of 105 Christian Missionaries in
The North in 1931. The SUM concentrated all its resources among
the M-Belt groups and societies. In this instance the SUM had
stations in Muri with 21 (44.7%) Christian Missionaries, Yola with
17 (36.2%), Bauchi: S. Bauchi and Plateau with 5 (10.6%) and
Nassarawa with 4 (8.5%). Similarly the DRCM which worked jointly
with the SUM concentrated all its resources among the Tiv, the
most numerous in population size of the M-Belt groups and societies.
In the instance the DRCM had all its 11 (10.5%) Christian Missionaries
in Tiv land. The CML also had all its 8 (7.6%) Christian Missionaries
concentrated among the Tiv in 1931. The SIM with 28 (26.7%)
Christian Missionaries which was the second strongest in Missionary
personnel to the SUM in The North, concentrated its activities in
both the Islamic society and among the M-Belt_groups and societies
with an equal distribution of personnel in its field service areas.
Similarly the CMS and RCM balanced their religious activities in
The North by operating in both the Islamic society and among the
M-Belt groups and societies, but then, 50% of their activities were
concentrated in the British developed townships in The North.
The SDAM was unique among other Christian Missionaries, by
concentrating all its activities only in Ilorin, although these
20 b
were centred among the non-Islamic groups and societies under
Fulani Islamic political authority. Subsequently in the 1950s
these areas became characterized by Yoruba political irredentist
feelings.
There were however more Christian Missionary Bodies involved
in religious activities among the M-Belt groups and societies when
compared to the Islamic society in The North. Out of a total of
nine Christian Missionary bodies, four with a total force of
20 (19.0%) Christian Missionary personnel operated in the Islamic
society in 1931. These were the SIM, CMS, RCM and SDAM. In the
instance of the M-Belt groups and societies however the figures in
Table 3. G suggest that there were five Christian Missionary Bodies
with a total personnel force of 85 (81.0%) Christian Missionaries
operating in 1931. These were the SUM, SIM, DRCM, CML, CMS and RCM.
Strictly speaking, however, there were seven Christian
Missionary Bodies among the M-Belt groups and societies when the Danish
Mission and the MBC is accounted for. It was however the SUM and the
SIM who trained the majority of the Western educated elite from among
the M-Belt groups and societies which subsequently featured in the
different phases of the M-Belt Movements. As-it is suggested by
the figures in Table 3-G, this was so, because the SUM and the SIM
concentrated the bulk of their Christian Missionary personnel and
religious activities in the M-Belt groups and societies, among other
Christian Missionary Bodies.
Although after 1920 Christian Missionaries became concentrated
among the M-Belt groups and societies, the period between 1907 and
1931 was characterized by initial religious rejection of Christianity
.1 1
from both the M-Belt groups and societies and from the Islamic
society. During that period the different Christian Missionary
Bodies also had to cope with an agonizing slow progress in making
converts into Christianity. It was not until the 1940s that
Christian Missionary Bodies began to produce Christian converts
in large numbers who subsequently constituted the churches and the
Christian communities they sought to create from among the M-Belt
groups and societies.'
This was so for two basic reasons. Traditional systems of
beliefs and practices were still strongly held before 1940. These
compounded Christian Missionary difficulties with the different
languages of the M-Belt groups and societies, none of which was
spread over a wide territorial area. Christian Missionaries had
to wait for these barriers to be shattered by modern European
practices, particularly in medical work and also to learn the
languages of their service areas. 2
Secondly, the administration itself, largely for political
reasons also restricted Christian Missionary activities among the
M-Belt groups and societies who were placed under Islamic political
leadership. 3 There were also the added problems of getting into
contact with some M-Belt groups and societies by the Christian
Missionaries because of the military slave raiding experiences
with Fulani armies in historical times and also in the period of
British conquest after 1900. For example Hepburn suggests that the
1. This is examined in more detail below and also in Section IV
of this Chapter.
2. Rubingh 1969 p. 102-105
3. Crampton 1975 p. 72-80; Boer 1969 p. 161-163
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Mada people resisted all the Christian Missionaries in the initial
days of contact because the British were "feared to be a new group
of slave raiders".' Similarly among the Birom, Suffil suggests that
there was initial resistance to Christian Missionary work because
"the Birom, were prejudiced against the whiteman, for the first
ones had come .... with guns to subdue them... that prejudice had
to be lived down and the first influence that tended to break them
was the Ministry of healing". 2
This is not to suggest that Christian Missionaries experienced
rejection in all instances of their encounters with the M-Belt groups
and societies. There were instances in which some groups and societies
showed eager interest in Christian Missionary activities rather than
in the government of British administration in The North of Nigeria
and in England. For example, Maxwell suggests that when a Jukun-
man visited him and a picture book of the British Empire was shown
to him: n ... after looking at it for a little while, he said, I
prefer the story of Jesus".3
The general pattern in the initial experiences of Christian
Missionary efforts among the majority of the M-Belt groups and
societies however was religious rejection and frustration. In April
1911 for example, when Mr Zimmerman, the first DRCM Missionary to
1. Hepburn, The Light Bearer Magazine, January 1923 p. 70
2. Suffil, The Light Bearer Magazine, January 1923 p. 70
3. J.L. Maxwell, The Light Bearer Magazine, October 1905,
cited in Boer 1979 p. 150
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settle in Tiv-land, arrived, he had difficulty in communicating with
the Tiv people and also in recruiting Tiv as employees to serve as
servants to the Missionary party. ' This was so because the majority
of Christian Missionaries were concerned to learn the Hausa language
before arriving in Nigeria, rather than any of the languages of
the M-Belt groups and societies. Miller for example went to
Tripoli in North Africa and spent some time there where he studied
the Hausa language before the CMS party set out for The North in
Nigeria. 2
This however is not to suggest that Christian Missionaries were
unaware of any of the different languages of the M-Belt groups and
societies before they went to fulfil their religious objectives in
Nigeria. Bishop S.A. Crowther for example, had come into contact
with "a rudimentary Tiv vocabulary secured from liberated Tiv-slaves
at Fourah Bay College in Freetown, Sierra Leone". 3
Rubingh however suggests that the language difficulties experienced
by the DRCM in the first few years were sufficient to condition their
recruitment of "the Hausas as Christian Missionary Workmen" until the
Tiv language was learnt. 4 Furthermore the language difficulty became
reflected in the initial Christian Missionary efforts and experiences
to make religious contact with the Tiv. For example, when the DRCM
suggested to the Tiv that they might settle on their land in order:
11 
.• to speak to them about God; the Tiv asked, what has God done?" 5
1. Rubingh 1969 p. 92
2. Miller 1936 p. 9-13
3. Rubingh 1969 p. 63 n.15
4. Rubingh 1969 p. 92; p. 95
5. Rubingh 1969 p. 94
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It was not until after a year among the Tiv that on 21st January
1912, the DRCM made its first Christian convert in Tiv land.' This
was Akiga. He was an abandoned child in the early years of life by
his runaway mother because he was blind in one eye and seen by the
family tradition to be the least promising to prosper in life and
therefore he might be associated with the Christian Missionaries. 2
Even in that instance, Akiga had to work with the Christian
Missionaries to become the first Christian in Tiv land, 3
 rather
than "a virgin-cut-convert from paganism". It was not until 1917
that four Tiv converts into Christianity were baptized including
Akiga but a year later: "... it was discovered that all four were
put under discipline". 4
 In 1922 there were six baptised Tiv converts.
After nearly 19 years of religious efforts by the DRCM when they
had 19 Christian Missionaries among the Tiv they had only succeeded
in converting six people into Christianity. 5
In S. Zaria and subsequently in Wusasa, where the CMS
Missionary Body became dominant there was similar initial rejection
of Christianity. Although CMS influences were established in Zaria
in 1907 and subsequently became developed by Dr Miller, it was not
until 1913 that there was a viable Christian Missionary community. 6
1. Rubingh 1969 p. 94
2. Rubingh 1969 p. 92; Akiga apparently became one of the most
famous of Tiv personalities and an able politician in later
years - Akiga's role is examined in more detail in Chapter,
S ect 0 ns b ia bw GILv4 cIftei-eter 1g.. Q.% a .
3. Rubingh 1969 p. 92
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.18-27
The CMS missionaries in the period before 1914 were unable to make
even twenty Hausa converts into Christianity from the entire Zaria
district. '
 In the instance of the 1913 events surrounding the
development of a Christian community in Zaria however, it was two
'Isawa-Christians' who became the conditioning boost and the
influential factor in the development of the Christian Community
under Miller: H ... because they told of many scattered families
who were awaiting the full teaching of Jesus ... it was decided
that it would be good for all these scattered Christians to come
and live together as a community. A piece of unoccupied land.
was sought from the Emir (in Zaria) .. and about 120 persons came
to live there. Baptisms took place and a school was started". 2
To compound the social status in society of some of the early Hausa
converts, the "Isawa-Christians" or their descendants were slaves
redeemed by Miller, although they also included nonslaves of Nupe
34tit
and Maguzawa social origins.
1. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.21
2. Crampton 1975 p.133; the phenomenon of the "Isawa Christians"
is discussed in some detail by Crampton who suggests that,
although there is political and religious controversy on their
"Christianity" they were a dissenting religious and political
group from Kano and with connections with the 'Ningi Rebels'
who terrorized Islamic centres of politic like Kano, Bauchi
and Zaria - see Crampton 1975 p.131-134; apart from being an
initial boost to Christian converts in Zaria in 1913 however
they were not related to the development of Christianity among
other M-Belt groups and societies like those in S. Zaria.
Furthermore subsequently in the political developments with
the M-Belt Movements the 'Isawa Christians' and the whole
Wusasa Christian population did not politically identify with
political organizations for the creation of a M-Belt Region
in the 1950s - This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Sectimas
b el °4 where we examine political identification with the M-Belt
Movements in the 1950s and 1960s.
3. Crampton 1975 p.137
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The first thirty years of Christian Missionary work among
groups and societies on the Plateau was also similarly characterized
by initial difficulties of Christian Missionaries to make converts
into Christianity and a general rejection of Christianity in the
societies. Between 1900 and 1912 there was only one Christian
Missionary station among the Birom at Ngel in the subsequent townships
of Jos and Bukuru on the Plateau. ' Early Christian Missionary efforts
in that period as suggested by their reports reveal that in the
religious progress of their work on the Plateau: II ... the natives
are to a great extent boycotting us; unless they want salt from us
they never come near". 2 This was so for example, because Birom
chiefs and their traditional religious priests among others,
rejected the Christians and Christianity. In 1922 for example
the chief of Kuru ordered "public flogging" of the first Christian
converts of his village, including the subsequent first Birom Pastor,
Toma Tok Bot. 3
Among the Birom, it was not until 1928 that a church became
formally organized at Forum: It ... with 22 members in full covenant
fellowship". 4 It was not until about 1925 when Birom traditional
authority began to religiously identify itself with Christian
Missionary activities that there was a sudden increase in the numbers
1. Maxwell 1954 p.67
2. Ibid
3. Logams 1975 p.71
4. 'SUM Reports' The Light Bearer Magazine, 1928-1930 p.14
of converts into Christianity after 1930. In that period of impasse
with Christianity, Birom chiefs who were previously hostile toward
Christian Missionary activity and Christianity, became characterized
by attendance of Sunday services in Christian Missionary camps rather
than European Chrisfian Missionaries seeking permission to hold
religious services in the compound premises of the chiefs. ' In the
instance, some of the chiefs declared "Sunday" to be kept free in
order that: "... the people go to the Mission House, rather than
going to work on their farms ". 2 Although there was religious change
of attitude toward Christianity on the Plateau, in the period between
1928 and 1938 Christian Missionaries among the Birom still reported:
".. the Natives did not really visit the Camp .. but as usual
medicine has proved an attraction". 3
In Wukari and Ibi where Maxwell initially opened up SUM stations
and worked among the Jukuns in 1907, his frustrations with British
prohibitions from preaching Christianity among Islamic communities
provoked him, but they suggest that non-Islamic groups and societies
in that area were rejecting the Christian Missionaries and Christianity.
In that instance Maxwell reports:
	 .... I am not going to be bothered
up working among the pagans only. They don't come near me, it is the
Mohammedan lot who come". 4
1. Logams 1975 p.71
2. Interview Discussions with Pastor Toma Tok Bot, 1974, cited in
Logams 1975 p.71
3. 'SUM Reports', The Light Bearer Magazines 1928-1938, p.14-34
4. The Maxwell Diaries in Rhodes House Library in Oxford, cited
in Boer 1979 p.160
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This suggests that in all areas of the M-Belt groups and
societies, although Christian Missionary religious focus of
activities shifted from the Islamic society in The North, toward
the M-Belt groups and societies the Christian Missionaries became
faced with an initial rejection of Christianity by the groups and.
societies they had come to "save from the Islamic advance" in
the period between 1907 and 1931. This however is not suggesting
that in the same period there were no converts to Christianity;
rather that there was slow progress in making converts until after
1930. Furthermore the initial Missionary converts into Christianity
in that period were of low social and political status in their
societies and in a majority of cases, they were "social rejects"
of their societies. In the rather ironical circumstances of
changing life chances when living in society "the social rejects"
who became the first Christian converts assumed political and social
prominence within their groups and societies as well as in the
developing conception of the wider society of The North and Nigeria.
This was so for the Wusasa Christian Community, individual Christian
families from among the different M-Belt groups and societies like
in the subsequent development of Akiga among the Tiv and Toma Tok Bot
among the Birom. 1
In rather similar circumstances, the SIM spent resources in
money and personnel over a period of 70 years and managed "to win
1.	 The role of Christianity in producing a prominent Western
modernized elite with roots in initial Christian converts
will become more apparent in nur discussions in Section IV
and V of this Chapter and subsequently in the particular roles
of individuals from Christian homes in the growth and develop-
ment of the M-Belt Movement, the nature of politics within the
M-Belt groups and societies and politics with the M-Belt Move-
ment examined in Chapters 4. aw‘ci 5 and wAe Eptibsue.
over only a few people as converts into Christianity in the small
Islamic communities existing between Ilorin and Nupe provinces. '
In the instance, the SIM became frustrated because the people
remained Moslems and people from the non-Islamic groups and societies
became Moslems rather than Christians. 2
 Crampton suggests that this
was so because of 'the political reasons' in the government of
British administration in The North in which Islamic leadership was
emphasized in the application of the policy of Indirect rule and
therefore Islam itself held a political attraction rather than
the tenacity of the Islamic faith among the Moslem communities
causing the rejection of Christianity. 3
However, one of the causes for the initial frustrations which
Christian Missionaries faced in regard to their difficulties
experienced in making converts from among the M-Belt groups and societies
before the period between 1930 and 1940 was that Islamic influences
rather than Christian Missionary influences became encouraged in the
political practices of the government of British administration in the
North. This was the premise from which Farrant and Dawson of the
SUM, Cash and Hooper of the CMS and Playfair of the SIM for example,
expressed strong opinions that the government-of British admini-
stration in The North was anti-Christian.4
According to Ayandele the roots of anti-Christian Missionary
attitudes took shape as early as 1906 when Percy Girouard became
1. Crampton 1975 p.157
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Boer 1979 p.499-506
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successor to Lugard and the policy of Indirect rule: II ... became
a divine revelation, a sort of natural law against which it would
be dangerous to behave". 1
 The anti-Christian Missionary stance
of Girouard after 1906 became supported by his subordinate officers
in The North. 2
 In the instance, they agreed that Christian
Missionaries were a political menace to the peace and good
government of the country and Girouard himself lashed out:
11 ... Personally I should like to see the Mission retire entirely
from the Northern states, for the best Missionary for the present
will be the high-minded, clean living British Resident. The opinion
of Residents is absolutely unanimous in considering the presence
of the Missions as a menace to the peace of the country ... It is
a very sad fact that the Missions as constituted are not of the
slightest assistance in administering the country: on the contrary
a constant source of worry. They say that their religion and
common sense bear no relation to each other". 3
 Furthermore Girouard
suggested that CMS Baptisms in Zaria were provocative to the Islamic
religion and urged that Christian Missionaries: /I ... would be far
better occupied in fighting Islam at its outposts in the pagan
states". 4
1. Ayandele, 1966 p.146
2. Ibid
3. Percy Girouard, 1908, cited in Boer 1979 p.72
4. Ayandele 1966 p.146
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Based on similar political conceptions and in the development
of the policy of Indirect rule, C.L. Temple created precedents
for anti-Christian Missionary attitudes when he developed: "..•
extra-ordinarily extreme adoration of indigenous institutions ...
regarded every European symbol and representative as a threat to
these institutions, but the Missionary was the greatest menace
of all. He sought to keep missions out of Animistic areas as well". '
In 1916 a government ordinance was passed which created
obstacles to the effective expansion of Christian Missionary activities
among the M-Belt groups and societies. 2 Furthermore in 1922 when
Hugh Clifford became Governor of Nigeria, he divided the M-Belt areas
into three religious categories for the purposes of Christian
Missionary work: "... Emirates where the chiefs and the majority of
the people were Moslems with scattered pagan communities .... the
Maguzawa pagan people lived in this type of area and the government
opposed plans to reach them ... if Christian Missionaries came to
them the government would be misinterpreted as ignoring its pledge
of non-interference in religion; secondly, independent pagan areas
where most of the people and chiefs were pagans ... the government
encouraged Christian Missionary work in such areas; thirdly, areas
where the people were pagans but the rulers Moslems ... these areas
were out of bounds for Christian Missionaries ... (for example) the
Emirs in charge of the Kona, Mumuye and Wurkum tribes refused to
allow the SUM to enter such areas .. (in order) to preserve pagan
rites and fear of disturbances among them". 3
1. Boer 1979 p.72
2. Ibid p.79
3. Crampton 1975 p.72-73
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Although Christian Missionaries were encouraged in their
religious activities among non-Islamic communities, particularly
so among the M-Belt groups and societies as a general policy of
the government of British administration in The North, they further
faced difficulties from British Residents and DOs in the Provinces,
Divisions and Districts, who frustrated their efforts toward making
converts into Christianity. This was the premise from which
H.G. Farrant suggested as latterly as 1929 that : / 1
 ... Opposition
of Government to the advance of Christian Missions has been
strongest in the Moslem Emirates, but because Missions have now
occupied so much of the pagan areas it must not be thought that
their entrance there was unopposed. Objection was made because a
tribe was under a Moslem Emir or the claim that a district was
unsettled was continued long after the danger had ceased. A
Political Officer when interviewing a chief with regard to an
application for a site by a Mission would so enlarge on the
responsibility that would fall on the chief if the Missionary
were murdered that the chief would promptly refuse the responsibility
and the application would be turned down on the grounds of the chief's
refusal ... a Political Officer would ask so many questions and
couch them in such a way that the chief would conclude that the Officer
did not wish the Mission to enter and would say therefore that he
did not... It was expressed to me by one officer in the words -
"The District Officer can help, he can hinder and he can absolutely
block" - After a Mission is established there are still interferences
varying in magnitude from the destruction of a church ... to instances
of petty but vexatious meddling.
	 Some of these latter are due to
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the personality of the official ... Interferences arise from the
apparent inability of any Political Officer to think of the
Christian Church as anything but a foreign organization. In some
districts, Islam is not ten years old but is accepted as indigenous
and left alone. In the same district Christianity may be twenty
five years old and spreading from native to native in the identical
way in which Islam spreads.Yet a native Chkiztian witt be intmogated
by a Diztkict °Week az	 he weke a dangekouz pkopagandizt liAOM
MOISCOW inztead 06 a common iakmek .... the total mass of interference
accumulated throughout the year is prodigous and every bit of it is
known and remembered by the native whethek he iz Chkiztian OA not.
The Chu/cc* thekeioke iz wwing up in the conzciouznezz that it waz
bolut againzt the coal/ o ti the Goveknment. The strongest impressions
are formed in childhood and the impkezzion made on the Chukch in
the Nokthekn Pkovincez UL pubabty nevek be eiiaced. Anyone
who studies the history and present position of the Church of
Scotland and contrasts it with the Church of England will be
assured that lasting benefits accrue to a Church which grows in
opposition."1
In the period between 1900 and 1930 there were numerous
instances in which there were vigorous interferences with the efforts
of Christian Missionaries to produce converts from the non-Islamic
communities in The North. In 1912 for example, a Resident: "... in
Kabba Province flogged an African Pastor in public because his
activity tended to denationalize the people among whom he (the
Resident) was working". 2
 In 1913 the request of the Angas
1. H.G. Farrant, "Antagonizing the Christian Church" 16th December,
1929 p.4-5, cited in Boer 1979 p.504-505
2. Ayandele 1980 p.149-150
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in Garram and Amper and the Sura in Mopun, Kerang and Kombul for
Christian Missionary teachers was refused by the government of
British administration in The North because they were termed
" unsettled areas". 1 In the general instances of the arguments
centred on "unsettled areas" Christian Missionaries confronted the
government of British administration in The North by asking:
"...When they (the groups and societies in those areas) had become
unsettled seeing that we had been invited to occupy them thirteen
years ago".
2
 In the same year of 1913, at Kataeregi in Nupe land,
B.K. Line, the Resident ordered a CMS school to be demolished with-
out any complaints against the Christian Missionaries from the
Islamic communities in the area. 3 Similarly in 1918 Captain Rowe,
a Resident in Igala Province ordered local chiefs not to grant land
permits to Christian Missionaries for the purposes of building
schools and churches. 4 Among the groups and societies on the
Plateau in 1924 the experiences of Christian Missionaries were
similarly beset with hurdles created by the government of British
administration in The North when the Missionaries made initial
religious efforts to create an atmosphere in which they might make
Christian converts from the non-Islamic communities in that area.
For example among the Sura, the pro-Christian Missionary chiefs
of Pamyam and Denkina became removed from their thrones and the
1. Ayandele 1980 p.149-150
2. G. Dawson, "Government Palaver" 1st July 1927, cited in
Boer 1979 p.499
3. Ayandele 1980 p.149-150
4. Ibid
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chief of Logwar who had anti-Christian Missionary sentiments was
put as chief of the Districts.' Furthermore in those circumstances,
Sura people who had become Christians were ordered by the chief
to go to their farms on Sundays like everyone else in that group
and society. 2 Similarly in Kabwir, when Bewarang the chief who
controlled the majority of the Angas population became Christian
he was deposed by the British Resident of Plateau: 11 ... for failing
to perform the 'pagan rituals associated with his office." 3
Christian Missionaries saw these developments and the inherent
religious manipulations in them as a grand plot of British officials
in The North who were not Christians and held no Christian religious
identity. For example in the period between 1927 and 1930, it was
from a conception like that which Bishop Smith used to suggest that
Christian Missionaries in The North: "... do not believe that these
men represent British citizenship of the Empire. We have their own
official statements that in permitting Missionaries to enter these
very territories there would be no likelihood of a breach of the
peace. For thirty years we have worked in Moslem regions and
government cannot point at a single place where Missionaries have
asked protection or where any disturbance has been created by
1. Ayandele 1980 p.147
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
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their presence .. they place in control men who are known not to
be governing with "British Fair Play" as neutral in this sphere
of Religion, but men who are pro-Moslem and anti-Christian ...
while acknowledging our debts to many friendly Residents who have
sought to aid us, we refuse to be decided by Residents or Governors,
many of whom have no interests in the religious .. we are not
supplicating for favours and if these rights cannot be assured to
us then we must take the only course left open. We are going into
the Northern Territories as ambassadors of Jesus Christ, who sitting
upon The Throne of power says "All Authority is given unto me in
heaven and on earth. Go ye therefore and make disciples of all
1
the Nations".
Ayandele suggests that these political and religious circum-
stances of Christian Missionaries were so because of the emphasis
which British officials held over the application of Indirect rule
policy with the centralizing authority pattern with the Islamic
model in The North. 2 Although that was so, emphasis on the Islamic
model further compounded the difficulties of Christian Missionary
activities in their efforts to create a religious atmosphere from
which to make Christian converts from among the M-Belt groups and
societies. Chains of authority through a local ruler were always
negativdyenclosed by the government of British administration in
The North and these were always cumbersome and involved time-con-
suming procedures before the Christian Missionaries faced a final
rejection when they sought permission to proselytize. 3 Furthermore,
1. Bishop Smith, "Historic Memorandum Presented to the Missionary
Conference at Miango when the subject of Relationship of
Missions to Government was under consideration" in the 1930s,
cited in Boer 1979 p.504
2. Ayandele 1980 p.147
3. Boer 1979 p.291
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although the traditional rulers had the judicious authority to
decide on the issue, Christian Missionary reports suggest that:
11 ... in almost every case the Native authority will follow what he
knows or believes to be the wish for the white official". ' For
example, among the non-Islamic groups and societies centred on Randa
in S. Zaria, before SUM Christian Missionaries built a church for
their converts, they had to get permission from the village chiefs
and with them went to the District Head who was a Fulani Moslem and
when they got his permission, thereafter took the matter to the Emir
in Jema'a and Zaria and then to the Resident who "cleared the matter
from the Northern Secretariat in Kaduna". 2 In the socio-economic
and political circumstances of the 1920s and 1930s in The North,
this was not a problem that took only days but months of considerable
hardships and frustrations. 3 As latterly as in the early years of
the 1940s W.H. Tett suggests that Islamic chiefs in the villages and
Districts centred on Lafia Division of the Plateau were so anti-
Christian that they refused the children of non-Islamic parents
permission to attend Christian religious instruction classes until
either the Emir or the DO were consulted. 4 Prior to the 1940s
1. Boer 1979 p.291
2. Maxwell 1952 p.211
3. Ibid
4. W.H. Tett, SUM Annual Report for Lafiya, 1942, cited in
Boer 1979 p.281-282
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Maxwell made extensive Diary entries in which he described the
hostile ways officials of the government of British administration
in The North intimidated Christians from among some of the M-Belt
groups and societies. Although some of the hostilities were not
personally witnessed by Maxwell, they were reported as early as in
1913 during the Northern Nigerian Christian Missionary Conference
at Lokoja. 1
 
 In that instance it was suggested that: "... a
Christian asked a colonial officer a question about the Bible,
whereupon the officer responded by grabbing the man's Bible, throwing
it on the ground and stamping on it ... another Christian called to
witness in court, refused to swear as Moslems and Pagans were
accustomed to doing and he was subsequently brow-beaten and insulted
... a third Christian was instructed by an official to live 400
yards outside his own town (and) government officials warned the
people not to listen to (Christians and Christian) Missionaries."2
As latterly as in the period between 1938 and 1945 Christian
Missionaries saw these inhibitions as protecting Islam and the
creation of conditions for Islamic influences and the Islamic
religion to get a hold on the M-Belt groups and societies for
The North to be Islamized. This was the premise from which Maxwell
lashed-out regret that 'Christians' in the government of British
administration in The North: n ... so protected Islam that it had
found an entry into hundreds of communities where it never had a
1. Boer 1979 p.164
2. Ibid
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footing before the Union Jack lent it its protection. Why should
the proclamation of Christianity be blocked and forbidden and that
too by the representatives of a normally Christian Nation? This
is not religious liberty though it was perpetrated under the
pretext of religious liberty .. why could the Gospel not be
preached in Kano and Sokoto when it could be preached in scores of
places in Algeria and Morocco and Egypt and Persia and India?"'
This however is not to suggest that the government of British
administration in The North was in all instances creating ideal
conditions for the diffusion of Islam. There were however isolated
incidents where British officials discouraged chiefs among some of
the M-Belt groups and societies from becoming Moslems. For example,
when the traditional chief of the Ankwe in Shendam associated him-
self with Islamic teachers and was losing political control over
his people, the Resident "advised" the King to return to his
former ways and he accepted. 2
However, in the period between 1900 and 1910 when there was
increased spread of Islamic influences caused by the social and
political conditions created from impact with British influences,
among the M-Belt groups and societies, concern began to be expressed
about its political consequences. In 1912 Tremearne argued against
the political protection of Islam inherent in the application of
Indirect rule policy by the government of British administration in
1. Maxwell 1952 p.253
2. J.L. Maxwell, Diaries, cited in Boer 1979 p.75
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The North. In that instance, Tremearne suggested that it was
well: ".... to remember that any encouragement given to
Mohammedanism will recoil on our heads, for the gAeat 6actoA in
the zecuAity o6 ouA pAment Au& is the knowledge that we are
disinterested arbitrators between peoples varying in every possible
way. Once tet theze tAibm be united by a common Aetigion, once
tet them be 6i/red with the 6anaticat zeat o6 14tam and well I think
there will be trouble ahead .. it is possible to maintain the old
beliefs though they may be purged of any particular objectionable
features by a sympathetic study of them, thu4 keeping the tAibez
zepartate and avoiding the dangeA o6 theiA combining to expet u4
and also conserving to the savage what he most values instead of
teaching him to despise his ancestors; for strange as it may seem
to us, there is a great deal of good in his laws and customs and
even his religion." 1 The fear of Islam as it relates to the
causes for political action was not unique to The North of Nigeria
in the experiences of the British as well as other European Nations
in ruling over Islamic communities in other parts of the world.
Besides the Satiru revolt in The North in 1906, there were also the
French experiences in Northern Togo, Samoa, the British political
experiences in Northern India and the tragic political experiences
of General Gordon in the Sudan. If there was anything to guide
policy toward Islamic communities, these were political lessons to
gain from. This was so because these were not simply the tragic
consequences in the short-comings of European imperial techniques.
1.	 Tremearne 1912 p.73—r
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They were also an ideological and religious expression in the
objections to European political rule which were rooted in the
teachings of Islam. Kraemer suggests that European Imperial regimes,
not only in Africa, recognized that Islam held an inherent theo-
logical revulsion to non-Islamic domination and Islam itself:
•••• was a consistant form of imperialism and strongly resents when
it itself is subjected to an imperialism by peoples of a foreign
religion: it is regarded religiously speaking as "monstrous", a
feeling that may be subdued temporarily but is always latently pre-
sent".
1
Although this political feature of Islam was used as 'the
political reason' in restricting the activities of Christian
Missionaries in The North even among the M-Belt groups and societies
it also became used as a plausible political argument to advance
the causes of Christian Missionary politics with the government
of British administration in The North. Miller for example, used
similar lines of arguments advanced by Tremearne to suggest that
Christians in The North: ".. were always splendidly loyal to
governments ... because they see that the only hope for their
country is Christian rule .. government sentiments against
Christianity was a suicidal course: the greatest safeguard against
a Moslem uprising was a Christian nucleus". 2 This was the premise
from which there was developed some sympathy toward Christian
Missionary activities among the M-Belt groups and societies from
some British officials in the government of British administration
n
1. Kraemer p.334, cited in Boer 1979 p.74
2. W.R. Miller, Light Bearer Magazine, August, 1909 p.153-156
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in the North. For example, as early as 1907, Kumm suggests that
when he visited Lugard at the government headquarters in Zungeru:
II ... He (Lugard) was exceedingly friendly and granted us the
introduction of certain goods free of customs house duty and
expressed his desire to do all he could for the work. As the price
for transport had been placed already so low that the government
was making nothing out of it, he at first felt that he could not
conscientiously agree to a reduction of fares for Missionaries.
A few weeks afterwards however I received a communication from him
stating that after further thought he felt that the Government
should assist the Missionaries in their good work as far as .
possible and would be very good to grant the Missionaries a
reduction of one third of the fares on Government steamers.
This practically means that the Government pays one third and
the Missionaries two thirds of their passage by government boats." 1
The Christian Missionaries also had miscellaneous forms of coopera-
tion from the Government, like cashing cheques, the use of RNC
facilities like Barges, Rest House and the government made 'social
visits' to the Missionaries and invited some of them to Government
celebrations. 2
 This suggests that despite political restrictions
on the activities of Christian Missionaries there were numerous
premises in which there was identification with the government of
British administration in The North. In the period between 1900
and 1930 there was also initial cooperation between Christian
1. Kumm 1907 p.77
2. Boer 1979 p.156
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Missionaries and the government of British administration in The
North, particularly in education and medical work, although in
that period "medical work was leprosy work". ' Subsequently in
the early 1930s a government enactment which produced "great
pleasure" in political identification to the Christian Missions
with the government was the introduction of Sunday as an official
day of rest in certain parts of The North. 2 Christian Missionaries
through the CMNP conference sought to exploit this development by
associating themselves with what they regarded as "their govern-
ment" in The North and hoped that Sunday as a day of rest might
be extended throughout The North, including in other words, the
Moslem areas. 3 The political effects of these developments on
many of the M-Belt groups and societies was that there was developed
the impression that there exists a unity of purpose and effort
between the Christian Missionaries and the government of British
administration in The North. 4
These impressions became strengthened by the frequency of social
intercourse between Christian Missionaries and government officials.
For example, in the period between 30th May and 30th November 1921
government officials paid 11 visits to the Wukari Station run by
Christian Missionaries. 5 In 1936 there were about 20 visits to
the Christian Missionary station at Ibi. 6 In the process of the
1. Boer 1979 p.156
2. Ibid p.278
3. Ibid p.276
4. Ibid p.190
5. Ibid p.276
6. Ibid p.277
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Military Conquest of some M-Belt groups and societies, Christian
Missionaries played social and political roles that were acknowledged
by both sides. For example in the conquest of the Bachama the
government of British administration in The North acknowledged its
success "largely to the work of the Christian Missionaries") . In
another instance when a group and society in the M-Belt areas had
proved particularly resistant and executed 50 members of a con-
tingent of WAFF troops and also the British political officer in
the District who were stationed in their midst, the government of
British administration in The North called upon Christian
Missionaries to open-up the area by beginning Christian Missionary
activities. 2 In that instance, Maxwell commented: n ... What was
begun by the administration is being peacefully and successfully
carried out by the Messengers of the Gospel". 3
In the period between 1900 and 1930 although there was an
explicit policy of restricting Christian Missionary activities in
The North, the period was also characterized by a developing
cooperation between Christian Missionaries and the government of
British administration. In the period between 1909 and 1929 for
example, Maxwell was not only an Evangelist but was also a prolific
Hausa language teacher: ".. Not only did he teach in Nigeria but
also in London; and not only did he teach other Christian
Missionaries but also government officials were frequently assigned
to study under him ... at one time he was teaching six of them for
which they paid a fee to the Christian Missionary body (the SUM)
and to him."4 Similarly in the period between 1900 and 1925 there
1. Boer 1979 p.314
2. Boer 1979 p.314
3. J.L. Maxwell, cited in Boer 1979 p.314
4. Boer 1979 p.144
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was cooperation between government and the Christian Missionaries
focussed on the Freed Slaves Home in Lokoja. In 1920 for example,
the Primary School educating inmates of The Home became a govern-
ment assisted institution and received grants. ' In the period
when Girouard ruled The North, the SUM was permitted to open
another Home for the Freed Slaves and inmates in a government
equivalent became transferred to the Mission Centre and subsidized
it with annual grants. 2
In the 1920s and 1930s, it was from these developments that
the relationship between the government of British administration
in The North and the Christian Missionary bodies became acknowledged
as one of team work in which each member had his own task. This
was the premise from which the early suggestion of Reverend Horton
became developed. In 1907 Horton argued that there was a need in
The North: ".. for men who are good great Christians but also
politicians ... else the team would not be adjusted. He attributed
to the government the task of safeguarding the country politically,
while the Christian people must be committed to the country's
evangelization."3 Latterly in 1933, Farrant in a speech given at
dieswick in England further suggested that: -".. the government may
have the chair, but the Church should not sit upon his knee ... the
Church is not to be courted by or nursed by a government .. she has
her own sphere. The respective tasks of government and of Church
are complementary." 4
 Subsequently in the period of the 1940s and
1. SUM Report, The Light Bearer Magazine, 1920 p.60
2. Boer 1979 p.76
3. Horton, The Light Bearer Magazine, cited in Boer 1979 p.184
4. Farrant 1933, cited in Boer 1979 p.302
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and 1950s and well into the 1960s the government of British
administration in The North in certain instances cooperated and
invited Christian Missionaries to harness "their abilities and
interests" in the development of education, welfare and medical
work, not only among the non-Islamic communities in the M-Belt
areas but also in the core of Islamic centres of political power
and religion like Kano)
Despite initial difficulties which Christian Missionaries
faced in their religious activities among the M-Belt groups
and societies, in the period between 1920 and 1940, they success-
fully achieved the development of Christianity through the establish-
ment of churches, medical work and European oriented educational
school systems and related institutions. This was the premise
from which there was developed religious and social identification
with Christian Missionaries serving among the M-Belt groups and
societies. The Christian Missionaries complimented this developing
identification by mediating over social issues and the problems of
their service areas with the government of British administration
in The North way back from the mid-1920s as the issues affected the
evolving Christian communities. The problems and issues raised by
Christian Missionaries with the government of British administration
in The North as they affected the Christian communities mostly con-
centrated among the M-Belt groups and societies ranged from the
1.	 These developments and their subsequent impact on the developing
Christian identity among the M-Belt groups and societies are
examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter and also
in Chapter 1k..
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1922 concerns over the marriage of inmates in the Freed Slaves
Home, child murder and rituals, protection of Christian girls about
to be forced into "Moslem or Pagan Marriages" against their will,
tax exemption for leprosy patients in recognized Christian leprosy
camps; to the demands for the exclusion of farmers on the Plateau
tin-fields who were forced into 'political labour' on the mines
and into the camps in the period between 1938 and 1945 when there
was increased demands for tin-ores during the second world war. 1
In the particular instance of the problems of farmers forced to leave
their homes to work on the tin-mines, the SUM for example, while
acknowledging high remuneration on the tin-fields, suggested to the
government of British administration in The North that the farmers
be relieved of inclusion in 'political labour' during the farming
seasons and the request was granted. 2
In certain instances however Christian Missionary methods and
the nature of the problem affecting the group and society in their
service areas brought them into instant identification with each
other without a mediating need with the government of British
administration in The North. In 1909 for example the Miango people
on the Plateau rounded up and slaughtered about 60 cattle-heads
belonging to a Fulani nomad and the government met violence with
violence in an attempt to force the community to compensate their
owners.
3
In the instance a section of the town was attacked and
the troops left behind them casualties. 4 Subsequently the chief
1. Boer 1979 p.277
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.214
4. Ibid
of Miango called upon the SUM doctor to provide medical aid to
"the wounded innocent". '
 The Miango incident produced an
opportunity for Christian Missionaries to imprint in that group
and society the idea that the Christian Missionaries held a
distinct identity different from other "whitemen" in the government
of British administration in The North, the tin mining companies
and other commercial companies. For example a SUM Reporter of the
incident wrote: "... it is encouraging to know that they (the
Miango people) know enough of the Missionary to distinguish him
from other whitemen...they have learnt ... that he has come to
their midst to save life and not to destroy it". 2 Latterly in
the 1940s Miango town developed to become an important Christian
Missionary Centre where conferences and conventions of indigenous
Church and Christian Elders with Missionary Committees met. 3
It was from experiences like these that there was developed
a focus, on Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and
societies to solve social and political problems, particularly
so for the Plateau groups and societies, rather than any direct
involvement with the government of British administration in The
North. 4
1. Boer 1979 p.214
2. Ibid
3. This is examined in more detail below.
4. For example, this Author remembers, when as a small boy, his
father as Evangelist/Headmaster of the Mission Primary School
at Fan, became very ill in the middle of the night; other
Christians rode bicycles a distance of some ten miles to go
call Mr Barrow, the Christian Missionary at Forum in the late
1950s and early 1960s, to take the sick person to Vom Christian
hospital 30 miles away, rather than call at the ATMN officials
4 miles away at Dorowa Camp or 'Sabon Gidan' Forum 6 miles on
the way to the Mission House to attend the Government Hospital
at Barakin Ladi 8 miles away from Fan! Mr Barrow always came
down to take my father to Vom on several occasions in that
period.
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In the period between 1930 and 1950, when there was
developed identification between Christian Missionaries and the
M-Belt groups and societies Christian Missionaries sought less
social and political identification with the government of British
administration as well as with other "whitemen" in The North.
Walter Miller for example, made strong pleas against close social
and political identification between the Christian Missionaries
and "whitemen" in the government of British administration in
The North as well as with other British officials with commercial
companies and the Tin Mines on the Plateau. 1 In the instance
Miller suggested to his colleagues: "... not to claim the privileges
that often accrue to a ruling caste .. for it may be taken as an
axiom that any apparent social gain, any political advantage gained,
any legal victory scored by the Missionary will have disastrous
effects on his work and after influence .... Decorations from
Government, Government favour and even too much association with
Government officials are not among the things which conduce to the
increase of Christ's Kingdom .. To be too much in the lime light of
Government favour is not a thing which the true Missionary seeks." 2
Boer suggests that Miller was not beingagainst British colonialism
in The North, rather he was using arguments previously advanced by
Balmer another Missionary contributor in which there were two
suggested reasons against the dangers of social and political
identification by Christian Missionaries with the officials in the
government of British administration in The North. 3 Firstly,
Christian Missionaries associating with government meant dependence,
1. W.L. Miller, The SUM Magazine Vol. 6 p.223-224, cited in
Boer 1979 p.214
2. Miller, cited in Boer 1979 p.214
3. Boer 1979 p.214
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help and protection and these attributes weakened "their spirit of
selfreliance upon their resources in God and entire devotion to
their work". 1 According to Miller, in a situation like that there
existed concrete instances in which social and political pressures
with criticism became applied by the government on the Christian
Missionaries in The North. 2 Secondly, Miller suggested that social
and political association with British administration in The North
was identification with Islam since government favoured Moslems. 3
In a situation like that where Christianity sought the eradication
of "paganism", the M-Belt groups and societies (where "paganism"
was formidable) might become resentful toward the Christian
Missionaries if they noticed a close identification with government
and there did not exist better thinking conditions to show that
there was no favour for Islam. 4 These religious and political
identity positions by Christian Missionaries in the 1930s were
meant to protect the developing Christian communities among the
M-Belt groups and societies as a result of increased Christian
converts after that period.
As a direct result of the increases in the numbers of Christian
converts after 1930 there developed visible -Christian communities
which became noticeable among the M-Belt groups and societies.
This was so because Christian converts moved their settlements from
the traditional set-ups to become centred around the Christian
Missionary compounds and stations, the Churches and where Christian
Pastors and Teacher-Evangelists lived. These Christian settlements
1. Boer 1979 p.214
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
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also attracted non-believers in the "new faith" to move from their
traditional places of residence, previously in hill-tops, mountains,
cave-like places and thickly forested areas to the open plains.'
In the 1950s and 1960s when electioneering became a vigorous
characteristic of politics in The North, these settlements became
the centres of political campaigns, outside the urban centres
developed from British commercial companies which were concentrated
among the M-Belt groups and societies. The religious activities
of Christian Missionaries became directed from these Christian
Missionary and 'Christian Community' settlements. These activities
included classes for religious instructions, the organization of
gospel preaching parties, preaching the gospel in specific religious
centres (quasi-churches), medical work in Dispensaries and attached
maternities for treatment and the deliveries of babies and also the
baptisms ofnewmembers of the Church. 2
Other Christian Missionary Bodies however operated in The
North with different objectives, policies and strategies creating
a concomitant variation in the rate and growth of the numbers of
Christian converts, besides the conditioning factors of indigenous
resistance to Christianity and Christian Missionary activities and
the degree of Islamic influences in a particular area among the
M-Belt groups and societies. 3	For example, although the SIM and
1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu
and Barnabas Dusu, December 1980 and January 1981; also for
examples see Miller 1947 p.14-15.
2. Maxwell 1952 p.249
3. Crampton 1975 p.157
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the CMS were the most territorially spread Christian Missionary
Body in The North with stations in very different areas their most
successful achievements in building up Christian communities with
churches became concentrated in Yagba areas of Kabba Province and
in S. Zaria. 1 Crampton suggests that this was so because there
was little Islamic influences and chiefs as well as government
officials in the areas were not Moslems.
2
However in terms of religious methods and strategy, the SIM
and the RCM produced churches and Christian communities by focusing
and emphasizing a rigorous policy of European educational training.3
In the instance of Protestant Christian Missionaries who emphasized
the policies advocated in the ideas of Brookes that Christianity
be transplanted independently of European education and the
Christian Missionaries concern themselves with evangelical work
only and therefore neglected the development of European education,
their developing Christian communities shrank and weakened because
their converts shifted to other denominations. 4 This was so for
the Danish EUB (Evangelical United Brethren: now United Methodist
of Nigeria) branches of the SUM who concentrated their activities
in Adamawa.
For example Christian churches and communities among the Kilba
and Chamba in Adamawa are more tightly knotted with European
educational development resulting from the activities of the
1. Crampton 1975 p.157
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.159
4. Crampton 1975 p.159; for Tiv examples see also Rubingh 1969
p.115-121
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Lutheran Missionaries when compared to the EUB Christian communities
among the non-Islamic groups and societies centred on Muri. 1
 In
other words, the EUB was not seriously interested in establishing
a relationship between the Christian communities and Christian
produced European education in the centres from where Christianity
diffused to the rest of a particular group and society.
	 This
was so because it was from these centres that Christianity diffused
outwardly to the rest of a particular group and society where there
was a Christian Missionary station. For example , the SIM Christian
communities among the Tangale-Waja expanded in this way and a strong
Christian church grew and became established. 2
 Similarly this was
the pattern in the pioneering work of the DRCM among the Tiv in
Benue.
3
The patterns in the expansion and diffusion of Christianity
among the Yoruba in Ilorin and Kabba under the CMS, SIN and SDAM
however was mainly done through Yoruba Evangelists brought in from
the western provinces of Nigeria. 4
 In that instance many 'Northern'
Yorubas in Ilorin and Kabba attained post-primary educational
qualifications in the western provinces, largely due to and through
Christian Missionary efforts before educational facilities became
developed in their own areas. 5
 Crampton suggests that this is in
1. Crampton 1975 p.159
2. Ibid p.157
3. Ibid p.145
4. Ibid p.123
5. Ibid p.124
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apparent contradiction to the ideas produced by Trimingham which
assert that "the Yoruba churches in the West have shown no desire
to evangelize among their fellows in the Ilorin Region". 1
However the Christian religious and European educational
linkages between the Yorubas in Ilorin and Kabba with those from
the West in the Nigerian Federation explain the subsequent
irredentist feelings in the political movements centred on Ilorin
in the 1950s which were led by Christian European educated persons
who school in the West. 2
The Anglican, Baptist and Catholic Christian Missionaries
were to use Nigerian Christians from among groups and societies in
Southern Nigeria to promote the diffusion of Christianity in The
North. 3 Crampton further suggests that the majority of Christians
as Anglicans, Catholics and Baptists in The North before 1945 were
from Southern Nigerian groups and societies who were the employees
of government institutions, companies and the Christian Missionaries.4
Except for the RCM, among the few other Christian Missionary Bodies,
it has been suggested that Southern Nigerian Christians played only
a little positive role in the evangelization of groups and societies
in The North. 5 In the instance of the RCM, it was able to call on
the services of teachers trained in its colleges in the South to
work in the Christian educational institutions in The North in the
early days of developing its work. 6
1. Crampton 1975 p.123
2. This is examined in more detail in Section VI of this Chapter
and in Chapters If and 5
3. Crampton 1975 p.141
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid p.123
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This means that apart from the impact of 'Southern Nigerian
Christians' in Ilorin and Kabba Christians and Christianity among
the M-Belt groups and societies were the products of European
Christian Missionary Bodies. These expatriate Christian Missionary
Bodies produced Christians from among the M-Belt groups and
societies using external sources of funding to build institutions
like the European school system, hospitals and other social welfare
services in The North. 1 This is the premise from which indigenous
Christian Churches among the M-Belt groups and societies became his-
torically linked to Missionary minded churches in overseas countries
and before 1970 there was an almost total non-existence of Nigerian
Separatist Church Movements indigenous among the M-Belt groups and
societies. 2
 In many respects this also explains the differences
in the Christianity of the M-Belt groups and societies which
has remained "pure" on the principles of its pioneers and path
makers when it is compared to Christianity in Southern Nigeria and
with Ibo or Yoruba Churches in The North which became ethnic in
languages, attendances as well as in their total religious
identification.
The political consequences of a situation like that has been
that Christians in The North have shared insignificant and volatile
political identification crystallized by the Christian religious
identity with Southern Nigerian Christians in politics. 3
Table 3 .1 suggests the achievements of the SUM, as an example
in the period between 1938 and 1945. The analytical concern with
1. Crampton 1975 p.163; This is examined in more detail in
Section IV of this Chapter.
2. Crampton 1975 p.163
3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 14 0--a 5
Table 3-1
	
Christian Missionary Influences developed in
The North from SUM Religious Activities in
the period between 1938 and 1945
Type of Religious
Activity 1938 1945
Increases
over 1938
in 1945
% increases
over 1938
in 1945
Christian Religious
Instruction classes 121 298 177 146.3
Christian Preaching
Centres
(semi Churches)
23 43 20 87.0
African Voluntary
(Evangelical)
Workers
143 312 169 118.2
Church Members on
Roll 1,442 3,126 1,694 116.8
Average Attendances
at Sunday Services 6,881 13,048 6,167 89.6
Baptisms 211 432 221 104.7
Africans as
Dispensary
Attendants and
Midwives
24 45 -	 21 87.5
Patients Treated
in Christian
Dispensaries
29,403 46,075 16,672 56.7
Total Persons under
known Christian
Missionary
Influences
38,248 63,379 25,131 65.7
Source: Computed from figures in Maxwell 1952 p.249 ; 'Itte 195Z
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F,eop ie
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figures in the Table, more than anything else, is with the progress
of SUM Christian religious activities. The figures in the Table
suggest that there was religious progress toward Christianizing
The North, although the process was concentrated among the M-Belt
groups and societies. The significant increases over the 1938
year in 1945 was the focus on Christian Religious Instruction classes
where there was an increase of 146.3%. These religious classes
produced Christians as well as African voluntary (Evangelical)
workers with a concomitant increase in Church membership on roll
and Baptisms. These increased in 1945 by 87.0%, 118.2% and 116.8%
respectively over the 1938 figures. Average attendances at Sunday
Services also increased by 89.6%. Christian Medical work also
produced Christian Missionary influences over persons who attended
Christian Missionary Dispensaries to be trained as Dispensary Atten-
dants and Midwives, in 1945 these trainings produced 45 of these
personnel. This represents an increase of 87.5% in 1945 over the
1938 figures. One of the ways in which Medical work produced
Christians was in the intensive religious sermons before European
Medicines became served; the emphasis became placed on God rather
than European human medicine to compliment the cure of diseases. 1
While in 1938 there were 29,403 patients treated in Christian
dispensaries, the figure went up to 46,075 in 1945. This represents
an increase of 56.7% in 1945 over 1938. Christian Missionary
activities produced by the SUM however increased the total numbers
of persons under the direct religious influences of Christianity
by 65.7% in 1945 over the figures suggested for 1938.
1.	 Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu January, 1981; for
some Tiv examples of this path to Christianity, see discussions
in Rubingh 1969 p.140.
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This was the premise from which in the 1940s, Miller, for
example, while arguing 'British Failure' in The North suggests
that in that decade:	 ... Missions have been started in nearly
all parts of the country. Thousands of men and women once naked
pagans and some even cannibals, are now "clothed and in their right
mind". Schools are rapidly springing up in town and village.
Thousands of children are learning to read and being taught crafts,
trades and useful methods of earning a living. The whole Bible
has been translated into two chief languages of the country and
parts of it into various smaller languages and dialects. Churches
of various kinds and denominations, big and small in the country
and towns are being built by those who have become converts and
partly as a consequence many of the worst forms of savagery and
cruelty have disappeared. Hospitals have been built and many hundreds
of African male nurses have been trained. Patients of all sorts and
with every kind of disease are free to attend these and be treated
by able physicians and surgeons .. Pagans and Moslems who in pre-
British days were always fighting are now before the law equal
and thousands of Pagans who before the occupation had their houses
in the rocky fastnesses and only came down armed with the spear
and poisoned arrows are now free to farm in the plains without fear
and are doing so everywhere, while markets, open to all, are
increasingly the scene of lively inter-tribal friendship and commerce.
One language, the Lingua Puma of Western Equatorial Africa, the
Hausa Language, is being rapidly learnt and used as "market"
language by most of the tribes; and Wm the whoots, mainty mizzion,
eme4ging a geneution no tongex oppituised and down-tAodden, to take
its iutt ishaxe in eve/Ey way that they may become abte in the iunationis
2,5
oi the Body Paitice. 1 This suggests that behind the Christian
Missionary enterprise, particularly for the British SUM there was
an implicit socio-political and economic 'liberating Movement'
directed at the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North to ful-
fil the religious objectives that were tied up with the 'Sudan concept'
and politics and society with Islamic leadership. The roots of
Christian Missionary theme of Liberation in their religious
activities in The North were shaped from the ideas of Karl Kumm.
In June 1910 at the World Missionary Conference (WMC) Kumm emphasized
a list of "tribes" not yet evangelized by Protestant Missions. In
the instance he suggested that: "... Fulani, Hausa, Yoruba (some),
Guari, Bassama, Mutchi, Rago, Afo, Kibyen, Panyam, Dimmock, Miriam,
Kwolla, Ankwoi, Angass, Pirpum, Montoil, Yergam, Gurkawa, Burmawa,
Jukun, Djem, Dengele, Mbula, BeriBeri ... numbering from five
thousand to two million each along the borderline of Central Africa,
Paganism, driven out by the crescent faith from the fruitful plains
of the northern half of the Sudan took refuge in the mountains
of the Murchison range, the Bautchi Hill country, in Adamawa,
the Mandara Mountains, the Sudd region and the more inaccessible
parts of the Shari Valley. The barrier which nature has built
against the advance of the religion of Mohammed in the Central
Africa was made the best use of by the warlike pagan tribes of those
lands and successfully they maintained their independence and their
fetish worship. Now through the conquest of the European powers...
the better education of the Moslem and the prestige connected with
1.	 Miller 1947 p.14-15
2. 5 5
his creed are enabling him to spread the faith of Mohammed in an
almost unprecedented way amongst the independent pagan tribes ...
Eurtopean. adminiztAatwus aite dixectty advancing and azAiisting
MohammedaniAm. Theze tabu Living in the mountain4 oi the centitat
Sudan au the mozt waAtike in Aptica. They oute woAth the winning
and it will be an eternal shame on our generation if we let those
tribes go over to Islam")
Although colonialism was never defined by Christian
Missionaries, their different bodies subsequently operated with
the objective of civilizing and halting the advance of Islam under
the political view of colonialism may be summarized like this:
... colonialism is a form of imperialism based on a divine mandate
and designed to bring liberation-spiritual, cultural, economic and
political by sharing the blessings of the Christ-inspired civilization
of the West with a people suffering under Satanic forces of oppression,
ignorance and disease effected by a combination of political, economic
and religious forces that cooperate under a regime seeking the benefits
of both ruler and ruled". 2 This suggests that the basic attitudes
toward British colonial ventures in The North were appreciated even
when this attitude did not preclude criticisms of its various prac-
tices. The means by which Christian Missionaries sought to compli-
ment British colonialism was by establishing preaching centres which
became Churches and the centres of Christian communities from where
there was diffusion of "the blessing of the Christ-inspired civili-
zation of the West" might benefit the suffering people of the 'Sudan'.
1. Dr H. Karl Kumm (Sudan United Mission, London), Presentation
and discussion of the Report at the Meeting of the Conference
on Wednesday, 15th June 1910, World Missionary Conference,
Volume I p.406, cited in Boer 1979 p.495
2. Boer 1979 p.218
In the period between 1900 and 1940, although there was
growth of the Church with concomitant increases in the numbers of
Christian converts which expanded the Christian communities, it was
in no way comparable to the rapid growth in both Churches and
Christian numbers in the shorter period of 20 years, between 1940
and 1960. 1 This was so because Christian Missionary work among
the M-Belt groups and societies became linked with indigenous
Christian converts who were trained as Pastors, Evangelists and
Teachers and upon the completion of their courses returned to serve
among their different groups and societies.2
In the period between 1940 and 1960 Christian Missionary Policy
was that the indigenous Pastors, Evangelists-Teachers and well
established Christian converts proselytise under European Christian
Missionary guidance and supervision, who might subsequently be
forced to go back to Europe depending on the nature of political
relations that develop with the governments in The North of Nigeria.3
1. This is examined with more concrete data and examples in
Chapter 5ection6 10.6:44.,
2. Crampton 1975 p.156
3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters ii..0A4 5 signifi-
cant as a result of this initial strategy, while in the period
between 1900 and 1950 European Christian Missionaries 'did
battle' with government of British administration in The North
over issues of religion and social welfare deprivations affec-
ting the M-Belt groups and societies, in the period between
1950 and 1967 the Christian leadership produced by Christian
Missionaries, supported by Christian converts as well as other
non-Islamic persons in the M-Belt areas who organized the
'Tribal' parties subsequently fed into the M-Belt Movement,
took over the same struggle with governments in The North to
demand not only 'equal rights and the basic freedoms of society'
but political separation from the Islamic society into a M-
Belt Region within the political framework of the Nigerian
Federation. These political demands intensified at a period
when institutions of government and political leadership in
the causes of political development in The North became syste-
matically transferred by the British to Islamic leadership.
These issues are examined in more detail in Chapters 4.and 5
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In the period between 1920 and 1931 however, as suggested
by the figures as they stood in 1931, in Table 34 , there was
emphasis in the establishment and development of Christian insti-
tutions among the M-Belt groups and societies which produced
dedicated Christians who consolidated and expanded the Christian com-
munities in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1931 for example, there were 93
indigenous Christian Teachers (Evangelists) in The North. 49.5% of
these Teachers were among the M-Belt groups and societies, 25.8%
among groups and societies in the Yoruba areas of Ilorin. In the
1950s and 1960s, these Yoruba areas of Ilorin became characterized
by political irredentist feelings in the causes to join a pan-Yoruba
Region in the West of the Nigerian Federation. 24.7% of the
Christian Teachers were concentrated in the core of the Islamic centres
*5
of political and religious power in The North. There were also 150
Churches established by Christian Missionaries in The North in 1931.
50 (33.3%) of these churches were established by the CMS and
were all concentrated in Ilorin Province with 3 other churches inside
Ilorin township itself. 1 However, of the total of 150 churches
established in The North by 1931, Ilorin Province alone had 82.
This represents a 54.7% concentration of churches in Ilorin in the
overall distribution of churches in The North. This suggests that
the religious divide between Christianity and Islam was brought out
into sharper focus at an earlier period in Ilorin Province more than
elsewhere in The North.
1.	 Talbot 1969 p.252
5 See c ovnme4...ts gt L-ke ev,ol or
c19‘ 643ter 3.
2.5S
Other Provinces in The North, containing the M-Belt groups and
societies had a total of 44 churches in 1931. This represents 29.3%
of the churches established in The North from Christian Missionary
activities. There were also 24 (16.0%) Christian churches in the
core Islamic centres of political and religious power in places like
Nupe and in the townships of Kano, Zaria and Minna. 	 Similarly in
1931 there were about 19,191 Christian converts in The North, out of
a total population of 9, 998,314. 1 Christian converts in The North
in 1931 represented about 0.2% of the total population in that year.
An institution that was developed by Christian Missionaries and
which became collateral to Christianity among the M-Belt groups and
societies was the European school system. In the instance of their
development among the M-Belt groups and societies Christianity became
equated with literacy. 2 In 1931 there were 103 Christian Missionary
schools in The North producing educated persons literate in Roman
scripts and adapting European patterns of civilization. 43.7% of the
Christian schools with 38.4% of the students on the Missionary roll
in The North were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies.
The Yoruba areas in the Islamic society centred on Ilorin and
subsequently irredentist in the 1950s had 30.1% of the Christian
Missionary schools in The North with 37.2% of the students on roll
in the institutions. The core Islamic centres of politics and religion
in The North had 26.2% of the Christian Missionary schools with a
24.4% share of student numbers in 1931. 	 This suggests that Christian
schools and student numbers under the religious influence of Christianity
became the monopoly of the M-Belt groups and societies as well as of
the groups and societies centred on IJorin.
1. Talbot 1969 p.248
2. Rubingh 1979 p.137
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Although the figures in Table 3 . 9 suggest that European
Missionaries consolidated their progress in Christianizing The North,
there was still little Christian religious impact on the majority
population in both the Islamic society and the very M-Belt groups
and societies that had become the focus Christianity. Many people
remained non-Islamic as well as non-Christian in 1931.
Table 3 .9 suggests that a large proportion of the population
in The North was still non-Christian as much as it was non-Moslem in
both the Islamic society and among the M-Belt groups and societies
after over 30 years of Christian Missionary religious efforts. While
there were many Moslems among the M-Belt groups and societies, the
majority of the population was non-Islamic and practised African
traditional systems of religious beliefs. This is implicit in the
high proportional scores under African traditional systems of beliefs
concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies in 1931 as suggested
by the figures in Table.
However, the significant patterns in the Christian religious
developments in 1931 suggested by the figures in the Table is that
where there were numerically more Christians in The North there were
less Moslems. For example, this was particularly so in the sharp
contrasts between Kano and Benue. While there was a proportion of
0.03 Christians and 965.0 Moslems to a thousand persons in Kano, in
Benue there was a proportion of 0.4 Christians and 14.4 Moslems.
Similarly where there were more Moslems there was also a lesser number
of Christians and persons practising African traditional systems of
beliefs. The sharp contrasts between groups and societies found in
Kano and Benue are again explicit of these suggested patterns in
Table 2 . 9 . The crucial difference for the development of Christianity
Table 1 . 9	 Proportions in Thousands of Religious adherents to
Populations of groups and societies in The North in 1931
Territorial Area in
The North Christians Moslems
African Traditional
Systems of Beliefs
Core of
the
Islamic
Society
Kano 0.03 965.0 34.9
Sokoto 0.04 869.6 110.4
Borno 0.08 687.9 312.0
Kontagora 0.22 205.1 794.7
Nupe 1.50 503.7 494.8
Yoruba
Irredentist
groups and
societies
Ilorin 18.7 324.1 657.2
Others with
M-Belt
groups and
Societies
Yola 0.1 426.7 573.2
Benue
(Munshi) 0.4 14.4 985.2
Nasarawa 0.7 160.2 839.1
Bauchi 0.9 448.8 550.3
Zaria 0.9 697.5 301.6
Muri 1.2 186.4 812.4
Proportion for The North
as a whole 1.9 670.1 328.0
Source: Talbot 1969 p.249
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among the M-Belt groups and societies in the 1940s and 1950s as
suggested by the figures in Table 31 however is that where there
were Christians there was also a high concentration of persons
practising traditional African systems of beliefs at a higher proportion
than Moslems. The general pattern among the M-Belt groups and societies
however, except for the instance of Zaria Province was that Moslems
were outnumbered by persons identified with traditional African
systems of beliefs. In the instance of Zaria Province the small
population sizes of the non-Islamic groups and societies concentrated
in S. Zaria explains the smaller proportions of persons with traditional
African belief systems rather than an Islamic predominance in the
whole of that territory. In other instances however, particularly so
.for the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies like the Tiv1 in
Benue who were almost all non-Islamic, and eclipsed Christianity by
the practice of traditional African systems of beliefs and worship,
there was a consistent concentration of persons who were non-Christian
and non-Moslem in religious identification.
The initial increases in Christian Missionary converts who sub-
sequently built the churches and the Christian communities were
attracted by medical work in Christian Missionary centres. Using the
Tiv experience as an example, Rubingh suggests that traditional world
views about religion and society were given "a mortal blow and became
eroded" by a variety of forces upon impact with British influences
after 1900. 2 The most significant of these forces which were most
dramatic in influencing the Tiv Society were Christian Missionary
European school systems, Western European medicine with its concomitant'
consequences on eroding traditional religious beliefs and practices
as cures and Christianity itself within the institution of the church
1. Scored as "Munshi" in the 1931 Census Reports
2. Rubingh 1969 p.130
2,I
and its converts. '
 These influences affected the general patterns in
the development of Christianity after 1930 among the other M-Belt
groups and societies albeit the non-Islamic groups and societies
in The North where Christian Missionary activities became concentrated.
Although the Christian Missionary school system was an instrument in
creating socio-political and economic consciousness about the nature
of unequal relationships in society in The North and as it related
to the development of a Christian religious identity among the M-Belt
groups and societies, before 1930, the educational emphasis was on
Reading, Writing and Simple Arithmetic, the basic 3Rs in European
literacy with the Roman script and numerals.
This process of educating the initial Christians from among the
majority of the M-Belt groups and societies found on the Plateau,
Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria was with the Hausa Language, which
was the dominant language of society and government in The North.
As latterly as in 1937 however Perham still termed the Christian
Missionary institutions of European type of learning as "Bush Schools",
because their educational standards were lower when they were compared
with similar institutions developed in The North by the government of
British administration. 2
 For example, the English language was not
taught in the Bible Training Schools in the period between 1900 and
1930. Rather the linguistic emphasis was on the Hausa language as well
as each vernacular language of the different groups and societies in
the M-Belt areas.
1. Rubingh 1969 p.130-170
2. For more detailed examples, see discussions in Chapter
Sections III and IV.
2.
However in instances where the groups and societies were numerous
and concentrated over a small territorial area, the dominant languages
of the groups and societies that were numerically big became emphasized.
This was particularly so for the development and translations as well
as selections of the Bible to be translated into indigenous languages
by the Christian Missionaries. This was so for the Birom in Jos
Division, the Sura and Angas in Pankshin, the Yergam in Shendam
Divisions on the Plateau and the Bachama in Adamawa, the Tangale
Waja in S. Bauchi, the Jaba and Chawai in S. Zaria and the Jukun and
Tiv in Benue. '
4E-6
The Surd were the first of the M-Belt groups and societies to
have "selections of the Scriptures" translated into their indigenous
Mahavul language as early as 1913. 2
 In the instance of the religious
developments affecting the groups and societies in Jos Division, the
Birom language was learnt by SUM Christian Missionaries before 1916
and in that year the Gospel according to St. Mark became translated
into the indigenous language. 3
 Similar religious emphasis on
dominant groups and societies characterized the development of the
Bible and indigenous languages in Pankshin and Shendam Divisions
on the Plateau. The Gospel according to St. Mark became translated
into Sura and Angas languages in 1913 and 1916 respectively and into
the Yergam language in 1917. 4 When compared to the smaller Plateau
1. This is implicit in the chronology of the development of
'Translations of the Scriptures into Languages of The North'
produced by Crampton 1975 p.218
2. Crampton 1975 p.218
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
*6 see c avAme...es GA-
&talker 3
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groups and societies it took decades before the Irigwe had the Gospel
of St. Mark translated into their indigenous language in 1923, the
Rukuba in 1924 and the Jarawa and Gamawuri in 1940. 1
Christian Missionary emphasis on indigenous local languages
was	 strong, sufficiently that they wished to integrate themselves
socially into "the tribes" with their Christianity rather than integrate
"the tribes" into Christianity. 2
 This was so because in the period
before 1930 Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and
societies were concerned to create total ethnic Christian communities
that practised Christianity without the influences of an external
culture rather than that which was indigenous to their group and
society.
Similarly among the Tiv in Benue, Rubingh suggests that Christian
Missionary methodology aimed at the conversion of the soul with "strong
aversions" to the teachings of English and the Hausa languages. 3
 The
Tiv therefore received the Gospel in Tiv and became initially educated
in the Tiv vernacular. 4
 This was so because Christian Missionaries,
particularly the DRCM wished that the Tiv be sheltered from the
1. Crampton 1975 p.218
	
-
2. In my interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu in January 1981, it
was suggested to me that Dah Jang Chollom, an early Birom convert
into Christianity, is crippled in one leg because of "frustration
kicks" caused by Mr Suffil, the SUM Missionary at Forum Station,
when Dah Jang Chollom dared to greet Mr Suffil in the English
language with a "good morning" instead of using the Birom
language. Dah Jang Chollom was the Christian Missionary Gardener and
cook until about 1970.
3. Rubingh 1969 p.100
4. Ibid
insidious influences of secularism and materialism and therefore
sought to isolate the Tiv from the corruptive forces outside their
own group and society. 1
 This wRs the premise from which, accorHing to
Rubingh: "... The DRCM insisted that the Tiv remain Tiv and school
children who affected foreign ways were soon brought to heel. CoApoitat
punizhment, given by the Miz4ionaitie4 themzetvez wa4 common OA thoise
who eimayed to 4peak Engti)sh, to wear shoes or to ride a bicycle.
When in 1930 the Government went in the direction of introducing Hausa
into the schools .. the Mission refused to accede and continued its
instruction solely in Tiv. The DRCM had no desire to see Hausa become
the medium of instruction and in time, the language of the Church.
This never happened in Tiv".2
Furthermore, on the Jos Plateau, where the SUM was the dominant
Christian Missionary Body, its educational policy in the period between
1907 and 1930 de-emphasized Western education and European modernizing
skills. Instead the focus was on the Gospel, Christianity and the
Hoe. This was meant to make the "tribes" self-sufficient and to
remain to work on their indigenous lands, the lands of their ancestors. 3
This was also the case with the Tiv when the American branch of the
SUM offered the Tiv-field to the South African-DRCM. In that instance
1. Rubingh 1969 p.100
2. Ibid p.101
3. Maxwell 1954 p.152
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the suggested reason was that the Tiv: 11 ... were an agricultural
people. This would give your branch special favour with them as you
favour industrial work. As far as I know the country, there is some
excellent farmland near Salatu. I think that horses, cattle and
other livestock could be kept there". '
Furthermore, in the period between 1920 and 1930, Christian
Missionary efforts focussed their energies and attention on each of
the M-Belt groups and societies as a distinct cultural entity rather
than create socially integrated communities built on a Christian
conception of an identity. One consequence of this was that there
developed notions of "tribes" with a Christian identity rather than
Christians with "tribal" identities among both European Missionaries
and Christians in the different M-Belt groups and societies. 2
 In
other words, the "tribal" identities persisted before they were
partially eclipsed by the Christian religious identity.
In the 1940s however Christianity began to transcend the
identities of ethnic social and political boundaries. This was a
consequence of the social consciousness achieved by indigenous
Christians about religious polarities existing in society in The North
1. E. Casaleggio, cited in Rubingh 1969 p.100
2. As latterly as 1981 for example in the course of my field work
research interviews in Numan, although the cultural lifestyle
is typically Hausa and Islamic which restrained my entry into
houses for fear of interferring with women in Purdah, I was
bluntly told that "the Bachama are Christians" rather than
'the Christians here are Bachama'.
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rather than as a process induced by European Christian Missionaries
among the M-Belt groups and societies.' Christianity among the M-
Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1940 there-
fore initially generated and maintained disparate ethnic identities
which became reinforced, despite an existing collective social and
political identity externally imposed on the M-Belt groups and
societies. This being that the M-Belt groups and societies were
"pagan" and "non-Islamic" in identity in The North.
Although the initial religious emphasis in Christian Missionary
activities on the Bible, the vernaculars and the 'tribal land' of
each of the groups and societies in the M-Belt areas conditioned and
reinforced previously existing social and political identities, in
the 1940s and 1950s there was increased development in the conscious-
ness of the Christian religious identity that became conceived of by
each of the groups as belonging to part of the family of the "children
of Jesus". 2 Hausa was 'the language of the Church' among the majority
of the ethnic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas after 1920.
1. It is however acknowledged that achieving social consciousness
about the religious polarities in society in The North was a
function of Christian Missionary activities which shaped and
conditioned its form.
2. This is a direct translation from the Hausa language conception:
"Yayan Yesu", which became explicit in interivew discussions
with Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, Dah
Chunun as well as highly European educated persons like
Barnabas Dudu and Patrick Dokotri in January 1981.
z(1
This was so, even when there were changes of emphasis from
doing battle with Islam to produce a Christian society in
The North to creating "tribal Christian communities" which might
be used to evangelize other "pagan" communities.
In the period between 1930 and 1950 social conceptions
of the "Children of Jesus" as an identity remained within each
of the M-Belt groups and societies. The really significant
social difference to earlier patterns of identifications in the
period before 1940 is that non-Moslems as well as people who
practised various forms of African traditional systems of beliefs
and worship identified with the Christian concept before they
became Christians. ' It was from these social and political
identity patterns that the M-Belt groups and societies began to
see threads of unity among themselves which enabled their
transcendance from ethnic Christian communities to a community
of Christian people from the different ethnic groups. Sub-
sequently this consciousness produced political support for
the M-Belt Movement when it was begun in 1949. In the period
between 1950 and 1960 and well into the 1970s, many Christians,
albeit others in The North saw M-Belt territories as "the
Bible Belt" centred on the Plateau. 2
1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, December 1980;
in his own experience, this was particularly so when he
travelled in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria.
Jonah Assadugu did not travel to Tiv, Isoma and Igala
Christian communities in 1949 when they built up social
and political support from Christian communities for the
M-Belt Movement.
2. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu and Patrick Dokotri,
January 1981.
2. (g. g
In the instance of the Plateau groups and societies however
unlike the situation of the DRCM among the Tiv, the SUM used Hausa
to become the language of the Church while it maintained 'tribal'
languages to evangelize, make converts into Christianity and diffuse
Christian ideas. When individuals from the different groups and
societies experienced Christianity, they also became "Hausa speaking
Christians". Except for the Tiv, Idoma and Igala, Christianity
among the M-Belt groups and societies united disparate social and
political identities with the Hausa language.
Unlike what TaCiEus, the Roman historian suggests, the language
of the conqueror became the language of Christian unity among the
M-Belt groups and societies and was subsequently used in the
political rhetoric of the M-Belt Movement.'
In the instance of the development of Christianity among some
M-Belt groups and societies, this suggests the premise from which
Maxwell, among other Christian Missionaries became involved in
translating Anglican religious hymns into Hausa. 2 For example:
li ... 25 have been published in the most recent edition of "The
Littafain Wakoki", an ecumenical Hausa Hymn Book for the Protestant
Missionaries and Churches in Nigeria". 3 Yet-among the Jukun, where
1. TaciEus suggested that: "The language of the conqueror in the
mouth of the conquered is forever the language of the slave",
cited in Hechter 1975 p.150.
2. Boer 1979 p.144
3. Boer 1979 p.144
2. ‘q
he spent a substantial amount of his life-time in doing Christian
Missionary work, he attained only "a measure of competence" in that
language, which enabled him to translate portions of the Scripture. 1
Furthermore it was not until 1927 that the Kona Jukun had the Gospel
translated into their own indigenous language. 2
This was so because in the period between 1853 and 1932 the
Christian religious emphasis of European Missionaries in their
efforts to diffuse Christianity was on the languages of the Islamic
groups and societies in The North. In 1853 for example selections
of the Book of Genesis in the Bible became translated into Hausa and
Kanuri languages. 3
 In 1860 there were similar selections of the Book
of Genesis which became translated into the Nupe language, a pre-
dominantly Islamic group and society which is fanatically loyal to
Sokoto in politics and religion. 4 In 1880 the whole of the New
Testament of the Bible became translated into the Hausa language. 5
In 1881 the Igbirra who had substantial Islamic communities had the
Gospel according to St. Matthew translated into their language by
the Christian Missionaries. 6 In 1915 Wipe, like the Hausa had the
1. Boer 1979 p.144
2. Crampton 1979 p.218
3. Crampton 1975 p.218
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
_
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New Testament translated into their language. 1 In 1919 the Gospel
according to St. John was translated into Fulani and the whole of
the New Testament in 1964. 2 The whole Bible became translated into
Hausa by Walter Miller in 1932 and into Nupe by other Christian
Missionaries in 1953. 3
The Hausa Language Bible as was translated by Miller from the
English version has become the effective element of the religious forms
of the M-Belt Christian identity and to the present day generation
of Christians in that area it ought to persist unchanged. Ayandele
suggests that it has become a religious legacy for the "Hausa
speaking Christians" in The North, particularly for those in
Adamawa, Benue as well as other groups and societies in the
territories of the political M-Belt, whose "Book in Hausa" is just
the Bible produced by Miller. 4 Ayandele further suggests that
despite: ".. the discovery of grammatical and literacy shortcomings
of the Miller Bible, the Christian Churches have not succeeded in
having another translation .. they have refused to cooperate, saying
that the Miller Bible is the only version they will have and that
to attempt to alter it is tantamount to undermining its sacredness" 47. t
In the instance of translations of the Bible into the indigenous
languages of The North, the Tiv being the most populous of the non-
Islamic groups in The North and among the M-Belt groups and societies
1. Crampton 1975 p.218
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.128, p.218; Ayandele 1980 p.153
4. Ayandele 1980 p.153
5. Ayandele 1980 p.153; although thisis a contested opinion,
Ayandele does not give any crisp sources of the rejection.
*7 See comme.tt aA ep.d oP cA,Nafker:S.
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had selections of the Book of Genesis translated into their language
as early as 1914, the New Testament in 1936 and the whole Bible in
1964.
1
In context of the indigenous languages to the M-Belt groups
and societies and the development of translations of the Bible,
there was therefore emphasis on the Hausa language. It was only
the Tiv language that compared with Hausa in the early development
of the Bible into indigenous languages followed by the Tangale Waja
who had St. Luke translated as early as 1920 and subsequently the
New Testament in 1932. 2
 The Burra also were characterized by the
early development of the Bible in which selections of Genesis became
translated in 1924 and all of the New Testament in 1939. 3
The translations of the Scriptures into languages of The North,
suggested by 'the Crampton Chronology' show that only selections
of the Book of Genesis and the Gospel of St. Mark, Luke, John and
Matthew were completed before 1950. 4 It was not until in the period
between 1950 and 1970 that there was the development of translations
of the New Testament and subsequently all of the Bible into languages
of the numerically dominant groups and societies in the M-Belt areas
like the Igala and Tiv in Benue, Tangale in S. Bauchi and Adamawa,
and the Burra also in Adamawa. 5 The Tiv and Igala for example had
all of the Bible translated into their languages in 1964 and 1970
respectively . 6
1. Crampton 1975 p.218
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
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The use of Hausa as the language of the churches among groups
and societies found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Plateau and
Benue
1
, except for the DRCM and RCM churches among the Tiv, Idoma
and Igala which were in their own indigenous languages, was later on
regretted as a proselytizing strategy in the process of establishing
the Christian churches among the non-Islamic and non-Hausa communities
in those areas and in The North generally. This was the premise from
which in the 1950s Maxwell suggests that Christian Missionaries,
particularly the SUM: ".. made one somewhat grave mistake, for we
did our preaching and teaching mainly in the Hausa language,-instead
of the mother tongue of the people... (for example) The Gospel
should have reached the Jukun in their own home speech, not in the
tongue of the Mohammedan Strangers ". 2
This was so for example because SUM policy in the period
between 1900 and 1930 focussed on Christian evangelical work rather
than on creating Western European civilization. Maxwell suggests
that for SUM Christian Missionaries it was: it ... sternly necessary
for the Mission worker to remember that he is there to evangelise,
not to civilise much less to Europeanise. He must never forget
that the soul of the culture is the culture of the soul. All true
life and progress must come from within".3
1. Before 1940 Benue Province included the six Divisions of Lafiya,
Nasarawa, Keffi, Idoma, Gboko and Wukari.
2. Maxwell 1952 p.61
3. Ibid p.152
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At the Gindiri Training schools therefore, the religious
focus of activities was on producing Pastors from the different
groups and societies in the M-Belt areas. In the period between 1925
and 1930 the Gindiri schools produced Pastors like Toma Tok Bot
(Birom), Bali (Yergam) and David Lot (Sura) with Toma Tok Bot
becoming the first Pastor of the SUM churches indigenous to 'the
Sudan concept'. 1
 In the period between 1925 and 1927 for example the
Gindiri schools trained over 380 Christian Pastors and Evangelists. 2
These came from among groups and societies where by 1920 Christian
Missionary religious activities had created a community of Christians.
For example, in that period there were 200 Yergam, 80 Jukun, 70 Birom
and 30 Ninzam studying in the Gindiri Training schools. 3
 According
to Maxwell, the SUM among other Christian Missionary Bodies in The
North saw the policy and process of "Evangelizing without civilizing
and Europeanizing" as fruitful in the period between 1920 and 1940:
m ... because it avoided the rush to become clerks which is evident
in some places in Nigeria (ie. Southern Nigeria) .. as young folk
aspire to the collar and tie jobs, easy and big money and a position
for themselves, regardless of what happens to home, village and tribe". 4
After 1930 however the SUM for example-regretted their initial
policy on education as it related to the needs of its converts in
the Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies to
participate in politics and society when nationalist political demands
1. Maxwell 1952 p.217
2. SUM Report, The Light Bearer Magazines, 1925-1927, p.66
3. SUM Report, The Light Bearer Magazines, 1925-1927 p.66
4. Maxwell 1952 p.152
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increased political participation in society.
	 This was the premise
from which in the period between 1930 and 1950, Christian Missionary
Bodies in The North made frantic efforts to improve the quality of
Western European education in their schools concentrated among the
M-Belt groups and societies. Maxwell suggests that this was so
because Christian Missionary Bodies like the SUM felt there was a
religious need: "... to grasp the remaining chances of making good
this matter wherein we have failed. We must turn out men and women
eompetently trained to teach the members of their own tribe uo to
a standard which will enable them to think for themselves and wisely
to play and work for the future of the country ... It
	 U/S no
tongut meitety the queztion oi winning a gxoup oi individuats
ChAi4t .. it £4 now the quution oi zettting the dutiny o6 a nation
which demands
	 it4 cauying out the Ammation oi a powexiut
ChAiAtian community, intelligent, progressive and far-seeing. The
days of easy conclusions are gone for ever ... mere holding of
services will not suffice. They must be thoroughly equipped with
and taught to use the Sword of the Spirit, for they will have to
fight for faith against deceptive doctrines and diabolical propaganda.
To this end, it is imperative that we do our-best to give them
competently trained Pastors, able not merely "to break the bread of
life" as we say to them, but also to perceive and expose the false-
hood of much of the talk of today which leads men to look for heaven
upon earth and find satisfaction upon things and not in God." 1
1.	 Maxwell 1952 p.300
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In 1930 all the Christian Missionary Bodies in The North had
a total of 152 schools with 3,446 pupils enrolled. '
 Subsequently
in the period between 1930 and 1960 Christian Missionary schools with
concomitant student enrolments dramatically increased among the M-Belt
groups and societies. 2
 In the same period there were also enormous
increases in the numbers of Christian churches and converts, with
the Christian converts being from a younger age group than was
previously the case. This constituted a second generation of
Christians whose children in the 1940s and 1950s became born into
Christian families. 3
 It was this group of Christians who consolidated
the emergent Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies.
Crampton suggests that Christian numbers have consistently in-
creased since 1921. 4
 For example in the period between 1921 and 1963,
while the percentage of Moslems rose from 67.01 to 71.8 that of
Christians rose from 0.13 to 19.6. 5
 This means that more people in
The North became Christians rather than Moslems. This was particularly
so for M-Belt groups and societies found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi,
1. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.33
2. This is examined and discussed with more analytical detail in
Section IV of this Chapter and also in-Chapters 4.c4 5 .
3. For example my father and mother among others became Christians
when they were 18 years old before they were married in the
church and subsequently sent to Gindiri for Christian religious
training. This was so even when my father came from a Moslem
family and my mother from a non-Moslem and non-Christian family.
They both produced their nine children in Christian communities
that ranged from Fan village itself, the Gindiri schools to Jos
Township.
4. Crampton 1981 p.4
5. Crampton 1981 p.4
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S. Zaria, Plateau and Benue, where by 1963 Christian numbers in the
local communities either equalled or overtook the numbers of Moslems. '
In the period between 1930 and 1950 therefore Christian
Missionary evangelical and education policy changed and became
characterized by a combination of religious teachings with knowledge
and skills required for Western European modernization. This was a
departure from the pure emphasis of only Christian religious teaching
to produce exclusively "Christian tribes" doing agriculture on the
traditional lands of their ancestors. These developments in the
changed educational policy, produced the establishments of SUM post-
primary institutions in Gindiri in 1934, SIM institutions in Kagoro
in S. Zaria in 1935, RCM in Zonkwa and Kafancham in S. Zaria in 1939,
CMS in Zaria in 1942, DRCM centred at MKar among the Tiv in Benue
in 1948. 2
Previously academically "promising Christian converts" from
the different M-Belt groups and societies were sent mainly by the
RCM to seminaries and post-primary Christian institutions in Ibadan,
Lagos and Enugu in Southern Nigeria.3
The Christian Missionary post-primary institutions developed
in The North after 1930 were based on the ideas contained in the
proposals made by the SUM as early as in 1911. 4
 In that instance,
1. Crampton 1981 p.4
2. Crampton 1975 p.101-118; Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.33; Perham 1962
p.278-279.
3. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri and Alexander Fom,
January 1981.
4. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.33
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it was suggested that seminaries be built for the training of
Christian Teachers and Evangelists from among the different M-Belt
groups and societies.'
In the instance of the SUM however the proposals were not
implemented until 1932 when the Gindiri schools were started with
15 of the 18 men admitted being trained by W.M. Bristow, while the
remaining 3 were trained as School Teachers by Miss Elsie Rimmer. 2
This suggests that even when the schools began with an explicit
policy objective the educational emphasis still remained firmly
rooted in the training of Christian Pastors and Evangelists.
The majority of the students admitted into these post-primary
institutions were recruited from among the groups and societies
in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Plateau and Benue areas with the
bulk of the students coming from groups and societies in its
surrounding territorial location. For example, Gindiri became the
Christian Missionary educational institution, training the majority
of the Plateau groups and societies.
Table 3 . 10 suggests that 56.5% of the students in Gindiri
schools came from among the Plateau groups and societies. 19.3%
of the students were Fyem which is the group andsociety indigenous
to the territorial location of the schools. The Gindiri schools
also trained and educated mainly people from the indigenous groups
and societies in the M-Belt areas. These constituted 89.2% of the
total number of students in the institutions.
1. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.33
2. Ibid; Crampton 1975 p.107
Table 3 . 10	 Ethnic Origins of Students in Gindiri Schools in
the period between 1934 and 1952
Territorial Area Ethnic Origins Number of Students
% total number
of students
Plateau
Fyam 162 19.3
Birom 99 11.8
Sura 77 9.2
Yergam 49 5.8
Angas 41 4.9
Others:
Kulere 46 5.5
Total (474) (56.5
Behue
Tiv 52 6.2
Igala 29 3.5
Jukun 18 2.1
Idornd. 9 1.1
Others 14 1.6
Total (122) (14.5)
Adamawa
Bura 26 3.1
Bachama 9 1.1
Longuda 8 0.9
Others: Marghi,
Kilba Wurkum 19 2.3
Total (62) (7.4)
S. Zaria
Ninzam 22" 2.6
Kaje 11 1.3
Jaba 7 0.8
Others 16 1.9
Total (56) (6.6)
S. Bauchi Jarawa, Lere,Mbula (34) (4.1)
The Islamic
Society in
The North and
Other Nigerian
Regions
Ibo 30 3.6
Ilorin Yoruba 26 3.1
Hausa/Fulani/
Nupe 17 2.0
Southern
Yoruba 8 0.9
Other
S. Nigerians 10 1.2
Total (91) (10.8)
Total	 839	 100%
Source: The Gindiri Jubilee Magazine 1934-1959, Jos, 1960 p.22;
In 1152 1 144e p er-tatasvb Wttl e	 ctreas wcts
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It is expected that other similar Christian Missionary Insti-
tutions like those of the DRCM at MKar among the Tiv in Benue, the
SP1 at Waka in Adamawa and Kagoro in S. Zaria, the RCM in Zonkwa
and Kafanchan in S.Zaria and subsequentiyin OturKpo among the Idoma
in Benue similarly focussed attention in the patterns of admitting
students from the local groups and societies while at the same time
admitting others from distant places from the M-Belt areas. It was
not until in the 1940s and 1950s therefore that when there were
more European educated Christian young men in the midst of increased
Christian converts among the M-Belt groups and societies, developed
from the activities of Christian Missionaries that ethnic socio-
political consciousness and political identity patterns developed.
At about the same point in time this consciousness in political
identity patterns began to transcend ethnic confines into conceptions
of the "Children of Jesus" as a religious cum political identity to
produce initial social and political support for the M-Belt Movement
in the 1950s which attracted European educated young men from these
societies.
While Christian Missionary policy on educating the M-Belt
groups and societies faltered in the period between 1900 and 1930
government policy in the same period and in many respects thereafter
was clear-cut and headed toward the development of political leader-
ship from the Islamic society as leadership for The North. In that
instance literacy in the Roman script which conditioned European
modernizing skills developed among the Islamic groups and societies
rather than among the M-Belt groups and societies. Since Christian
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Missionary focus was concentrated on the Islamic society in the
same period, the M-Belt groups and societies lagged behind in
literacy with the Roman scripts. However when Christian Missionary
attention became focussed on the M-Belt groups and societies, there
was rapid development in the increases of the % population, literate
in Roman scripts.
The figures in Table :311 ought to be understood in context of
the smaller population proportion relative to the Islamic society
which was concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies.
Table 311. therefore suggests that literacy rates in Roman scripts
in the period between 1900 and 1920 was concentrated among the
Islamic groups and societies, with the M-Belt groups and societies
showing a 0.6% of the population literate. This means that while
more people read and wrote in Roman scripts in the Islamic society
only a few had those skills from among the M-Belt groups and societies.
This initial advantage complimented the dominance of the Islamic
society already literate in the Arabic script.
One of the ways in which social and political prejudices
directed against the M-Belt groups and societies became built in
The North was rooted in the civilizing notions of a non-reading,
non-writing civilization, a civilization that was based on human
memory.
1
Table 111 further suggests that in the period between 1920
and 1950 there was increased literacy rate in Roman script in
The North. While literacy in the Roman script in the Islamic society
increased from 15.6% in 1921 to 22.1% in 1951, there was a similar
1.	 For more detailed examples see discussions in Chapter 1 and 2...
Table 3 . 11	 Literacy in Roman and Arabic Scripts in The North
for the period between 1921 and 1951.
% Literacy Figures in The North
Territorial Area
in 1921
% 1921 Literacy
in Population
with
Roman Script
Territorial
Area in 1951
% Literacy
1951
Population
Roman
in
Arabic
Kanuri 5.3 Ilorin Yoruba
and Kabba
10.3 -
Islamic	 Fulani 5.0 Zaria 5.6 10.8
Society
Hausa
in
2.6 Kano 0.9 8.0
NupeThe 1.6 Katsina 1.6 4.8
North	 Ilorin 1.1 Niger 2.8 4.0
Yoruba
Borno 0.9 2.1
Others in The
North including
the M-Belt
groups and
societies in
0.6
Plateau 5.1 2.2
Adamawa, S.Bauchi
Plateau, S.Zaria
and Benue
Benue 1.9 1.0
Sources: 1921 figures are derived from C.K. Meek, 'Northern
Tribes' 1925 Vol.2 p.258; the average literacy rate in Roman
Scripts for The North in 1921 was 1.94%; the 1951 figures are
derived from NHA Debates, 15th January 1953 p.29; the average
literacy rate in Roman Script for 1951 was scored as 2.1% -
John Smith (1972 p.66-68) further suggests that the figures for
literacy in Roman scripts for 1951 in Zaria Province may be
safely assumed to be a concentrated literacy rate of S.Zaria
because of the numbers of schools and the smaller population
proportion of the province in that area when compared to
Northern Zaria where there is the interesting converse literacy
rate in Arabic script to the RomansTie tborkko,tto% tp 144.e,
14 °IP iii 11'1 % cral was .es6a,AtAze4 Pift....% ....e r-e Le-v- 01s 0.5
0199S %I li- 1411-1 „	 0460 01A-V 2. 04 2- '135 (o44) oh Kie
ri4-gell- aseas . In 19S2L, Kt ibbriAktiiiti b(2 tue. 0.01. 1t, wAs
ii boo ooc,	 Ctn. o1/4	 °Jo oi,..1-	 2. q, 9 6 L7 	 itv-ed IAA	 -TW;
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increase among the non-Islamic groups and societies from 0.6% in
1921 to 7.0% in 1951 for groups and societies concentrated in
Plateau and Benue Provinces alone. Furthermore, while in 1921
Yoruba in Ilorin were the least literate in Roman scripts among
other groups and societies in the Islamic society in The North,
in 1951 the highest level of literacy in Roman script was from the
population concentrated among the Yoruba in Ilorin and other groups
and societies in Kabba. In 1951 the Plateau groups and societies
were the most literate of the M-Belt groups and societies. While
5.1% of the population on the Plateau was literate only 1.9% was
literate in Benue. In the late 1940s and in the early 1950s, the
M-Belt Movement assumed organizational form from among the groups
and societies on the Plateau just as irredentist separatist political
demands for merging with a pan-Yoruba Region became characteristic
of Ilorin and Kabba areas at about the same period. This suggests
that Christianity and literacy were instruments directly related to
consciousness about patterns of political identity and the circumstances
of social and economic relations existing among groups and societies
in The North.
As expected, Table 3 . 1I further suggests that literacy in
Arabic script was concentrated in the Islamic society in The North.
In the instance of groups and societies in the Plateau and Benue
Provinces, 2.2% and 1.0% of the population was respectively, literate
in Arabic script. Ames suggests that upon impact with British
influences in the period between 1900 and 1937 some groups and
societies on the Plateau: n ... adopted some of the outward culture
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of Mohammedans owing to a certain social status which they imagined
is acquired by so doing .... and send their children to Koranic
schools". ' Although that was so, it is suggested here that the
significant percentage literacy in Arabic script on the Plateau
and that in Benue is explained by the presence of a migrant population
after 1900 rather than groups and societies indigenous to both areas.
Literacy in Roman script in both the instances of Ilorin and
Kabba and in the political core of the M-Belt areas being Plateau
and Benue was a direct consequence of Christian Missionary activities,
in particular on educational development rather than from the
educational efforts by the government of British administration in
The North. 2
 This is the premise from which Ozigi and Ocho suggest
that the Tiv, Lioma, Sura, Jukun, Birom, Angas, Igala, Gwari and
numerous other groups and societies in the M-Belt areas of Adamawa,
S. Bauchi and S. Zaria: ".. have a life debt to pay to Christian
Missionaries for transforming their socio-political and economic
outlook into that of the twentieth century". 3
In the period between 1950 and 1965 the government of the
NPC party in The North depended on European educated Northerners,
the majority of whom were Christian Missionary products, to manage
the Western European institutions of governing society. 4
 The Christian
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p.307
2. This is examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter
3. Ozigi and Ocho, 1981 p.38
4. Ibid
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Missionary products filled up the administrative, and in some
instances, political vacancies created by the departing British
officers, even when there were increased political tensions developed
from demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region or over irredentist
feelings directed toward joining a pan-Yoruba Western Region of
Nigeria from Ilorin and Kabba areas in The North. ' The majority of
Christian Missionary products recruited into government jobs in The
North in that period however came from groups and societies in the
M-Belt areas and from Ilorin and Kabba areas.
Although responsibility became shifted to Christian Missionaries
to educate the M-Belt groups and societies with European modernizing
skills as a partial policy of the government of British administration
in The North, the political and religious problems Christian Missionaries
faced became compounded by meagre financial assistance from public funds. 2
In the period between 1900 and 1940 Christian Missionary educational
institutions which were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies
operated with little financial assistance from the government of
British administration in The North. Christian Missionary social and
welfare institutions similarly suffered from a lack of financial
assistance during the same period. For example, as lately as 1944,
Dr Barnaden, the SUM Christian Missionary Medical Officer suggests
1. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4- 0-.9,4 5 where in
the instance of the period in question, it is argued that the
recruitment of administrative officers into the Bureaucracy of
The North was tied up to the very nature of the politics among
the different M-Belt groups and societies.
2. For example	 initial financial assistance to Christian
Missionaries from the governmentuwe sma .	 Government
and NA schools were directly funded while only a few Christian
Missionary schools received little funding despite the higher
proportions of student attendance were recorded in the Christian
Missionary schools in the period between 1900 and 1940. Govern-
ment assistance to Christian Missionary schools and social
welfare institutions in the period between 1940 and 1965 when there
was the M-Belt Movement is examined in Section IV of this Chapter
and in Chapters 1+ av,c1 5'
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that the Vom Christian Hospital, as it was then called, received no
government financial assistance. ' Dr Barnden further suggested
another example of a voluntary Medical Agency which according to
him had "no Christian personnel" and got various forms of government
financial assistance including rail travel and free leprosy clothing
that were imported duty free. 2 From that situation, Barden suggested
that: "... no such aid applied to the Mission because of Christianity.
The attitude of Government toward Christian leprosy institutions in
Moslem areas is a warning thatno help will be given to any Christian
work unless secularized". 3
The religious reason for the government policy was suggested
as:.... the Christian Missionaries try through Christian services
to win confidence and friendship of the Moslem communities (and also
proselytise) .. and by proselytising, it was meant the unwelcome
visitation from house to house and pressure brought to bear on a person
to accept another faith". 4
 The problems faced by Christian Missionaries
however did not prevent their progress of Christianizing the M-Belt
groups and societies. When in the 1940s Christian Missionaries became
successful in making more converts, establishing churches and with a
concomitant growth in the numbers and sizes of the Christian communities
among the M-Belt groups and societies, they sought to organize Christian
unity from the disparate socio-cultural and political identities into
a solid bloc directed against Islam. This was in terms of both the
dangers Islam poised on the contest for converts with Christianity and
1. Boer 1979 p.284
2. Boer 1979 p.284; Government financial assistance to Christian
Missionary Bodies in The North is examined in more detail in
Section IV of this Chapter and also in Chapters 2 0--4
where we also examine the religious tensions it created.
3. Dr Barnden 1944, cited in Boer 1979 p.284
4. Boer 1979 p.284
and over the contest of issues in government, governing and politics
in The North and Nigeria. This was so because in that period Christian
Missionaries were anxious to establish "a collective element" in
the social identity of Christianity to enable the M-Belt groups and
societies to become Christian oriented over issues that are of concern
to the nature of politics in society in the same of the political per-
formance of Islam in The North.
The religious method which the Christian Missionaries used to
achieve this objective was by organizing Christian conferences and
conventions, which brought together Christians as well as Church
leaders and elders from the different M-Belt groups and societies.
For example, Protestant Christian Missionaries, through the organi-
zational channels of the SUM held several annual Christian conventions
and conferences in the period between 1940 and 1950. 1
 The Christian
conventions and conferences were held in rotation from year to year
at the different Christian Missionary centres as well as in the
district stations. 2
 They were functionally specific because they did
not only bring together Christians of different denominations and
from the different groups and societies of the M-Belt areas but also
created a sense of Christian solidarity. 3 _
For the purposes of creating this sense of "Christian Solidarity"
the SUM for example appropriately named one of their settlements as
FORUM where church leaders and elders on the Plateau and particularly
among the Birom Districts met from time to time. 4
 Besides creating
1. Crampton 1975 p.135
2. Ibid
3. Maxwell 1952 p.261
4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot and Barnabas Dusu,
December 1980 and January 1981 respectively.
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"Christian Solidarity" among the Christian communities, the
conventions and conferences also shared and discussed the religious
and social needs of the different M-Belt groups and societies for
educational development with the development of Christianity. Crampton
suggests that requests for teachers with higher qualifications became
a persistent theme at these meetings. 1
Although the religious and social objectives in the organization
of the Christian communities were numerous, Maxwell suggests that one
of the most important was that they were meant to be forums where the
Christian community learnt to be: 11 ... a vigorous element in the life
of the country, speaking with a voice that must be heard in advocacy
of the things that are just and seemly and of good report". 2 Further-
more Maxwell suggests that although the process of Christian religious
training taught the Yergam, Angas, Birom, Sura, Jukun, Jan, Montol
and Kulere etc. that they were "brothers and sisters in Christ",
Christian conferences and conventions produced opportunities for
those Christians who had not the privilege of studying and living
at either Training schools or Boarding schools "to develop the same
sense of oneness and solidarity". 3
 In the period between 1940 and
1950 the emphasis in Christian training, whether this was in the
Bible schools, the Training Colleges, the secondary schools and the
women schools became focussed on the development of a Christian
feeling of brother-hood among ihe M-Belt groups and societies, although
1. Crampton 1975 p.135
2. Maxwell 1952 p.261
3. Ibid p.293-294
7,i16
it also transcended to accepting other Christians as brothers. 1
Maxwell suggests that by 1950 the Gindiri Training Schools already
achieved that objective and implicit in that suggestion the process
became consolidated in the 1950s and 1960s. For example in the
Gindiri Bible school in 1950: ".. there were 50 students from 20
different tribes represented, each with its own tongue ... but in
close daily association with members of the other tribes in study and
work and worship which brought about a real experience of oneness
of the Christian Church". 2 According to Maxwell this was important
in more than the spiritual life of the country: ".• for it is
precisely in this matter of a sense of solidarity and mutual loyalty
that one great danger lies for OWE non-Moztem peopte. I they do
not istiek togetheA in theze day4 oi a new goveknmentat ()Ada, when
the executive and tegiztative woAk oi Nigekia £4 being trtanziekked
to A6kican hand4 they may iind themzetvez being exptoited by the
Moztem peopte4 06 The NoAth. The onty unitiying ioAce ioA the non-
Moztem	 the ChkiAtian Chultch.3
Implicit in these political anxieties expressed by Maxwell
is a suggested strong relationship between the emphasis on nom
non-Moztem peopte" and the initial political-organization of the
M-Belt Movement in the non-Moistem League of Northern Nigeria which
was begun in 1949. Although the political intensity of Christian
Missionary involvement is not very precise, it is apparent that they
were deeply engrossed in the M-Belt Movement before the government
of British administration alerted them on its political consequences.
This was particularly so for the SUM and the SIM Christian Missionaries.4
1. Maxwell 1952 p.293-294
2. Ibid
3. Ibid; emphases are mine
4. This is examined in Chapter 4- where the growth and development
of the M-Belt Movement is discussed.
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The first step toward organizing the Christian communities among
the M-Belt groups and societies for "a vigorous life in the country"
and for "a sense of solidarity and mutual loyalty", was begun in
1943 when the first Christian convention was held as "The Taron
Zumunta" (a fellowship meeting)) ThisThis was a gathering of African
Pastors and Church Elders with members of the European Christian
Missionary staff. 2 In that instance Maxwell suggests that the
religious objective of the gathering: "... was just a fellowship
meeting, a sort of first step in the formation of a ruling-body
for the Church in the Mission's area composed of both African leading
Christians and Missionaries; it looked forward to the day when the
whole Christian Church would be taking counsel for its affairs as
a zotidaA.i.ty, zpeaking tath one autholtitative voice az AepAezenting
the judgement oi thoze uhoze aim it As to zeAve the Kingdom oi God
eztabtizhed among men and eistabti4h a avitization Lazed on Utah and
tove". 3 In 1947 the first Birom Christian convention was held at
the SUM centre of Forum: "... arranged entirely by the indigenous
members of the Church". 4 In that instance there were about 2000
people from the different M-Belt groups and societies who attended
with an explicit Christian religious identity. 5 In a subsequent
convention held at Takum, the special guest speaker was Bulus Gbajor,
an Evangelist with the DRCM among the Tiv, Maxwell wrote: 	 "Tiv differ
greatly from the local Jukun and Kutev in speech and custom but in
ChitiAt they afte bAotheu".6
1. Maxwell 1952 p.261
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.261-262; emphases are mine
4. Crampton 1975 p.135
5. Maxwell 1952 p.294-295
6. Ibid p.268
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In the period between 1940 and 1950 when there were increased
political activities over constitutional developments in Nigeria,
Christian Missionaries in The North also became faced with an even
more urgently self-created task over the need to organize the
Christian communities as Christian Unity in a social movement to
enhance political participation. This was the social and political
premise from which Maxwell suggested that: 	 "The Moslem element was
much more vocal and united than the pagans, for the latter tribes
were... not yet aware of how important it is for them to abandon their
haughty independence of each other and get together realizing that
only in union with each other can they hope to realize their dreams
of survival and progress". 1
 Implicit in this observation is that
the Christian converts as well as the non-Islamic communities in
The North were outside the main stream of affairs in the evolving
participatory politics in both instances of effects on The North
and Nigeria in the particular period of the years between 1940
and 1950. In the period between 1949 and 1951 the Christian con-
ventions and conferences became the most noticeable inclusion into
Christian Missionary activities among the M-Belt groups and societies. 2
This was so because in addition to the Christian Missionary political
anxieties about the future of their Christian communities and
Christianity in The North, there was also the more specific political
and constitutional developments of Nigeria that were shaping the nature
and control of political power.
1. Maxwell 1952 p.270
2. Ibid p.279; in a very significant way this was the psychological
stage from which the Non-Moslem League (NML) launched itself
as a political organization - this will be examined in more
detail in Chapter Li..
In that period political steps were taken by the government of
British administration in Nigeria to revise previously existing
constitutions with the objective of giving the indigenous people of
the country more share in government and governing.' In that instance,
the government asked the people at all cultural levels right down to
villages in society for suggestions and were encouraged to say how
the country ought to be governed. 2 Maxwell suggests that constitutional
changes and political developments in Nigeria in the period between
1945 and 1952, raised a three-fold problem for Christian Missionary
work in The North and the political future of the Christian communities
concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies: "Firstly, there
was a great possibility that Moslem members of the Government would
greatly outmumbek the non-Moztem, zo that the Chniztian minoAity
woutd be hopetezzty outvoted. That woutd appty to the NoAthekn pakt
oi the countAy onty.	 When the House of Representatives, which
combined all the regions of the country in one body would be constituted
it was likely that the non-Moslem would have a small minority. The
outlook Lutz not too braght	 thoze to whom OWL zociety haz been
miniztening. It would have been much better if we had not been so
unwilling in the past to venture on a more thorough educational program.
AA thingz wene the Chniztianz wee Lan too backwartd educationatty to
be abte to take an active pant in potiticat teadenzhip. The paganz
um too unentightened to zee the dangen to which neienence haz atAeady
been made oi being zwamped and exptoited by the Moztem. Secondly,
it brings us a very urgent call to do all that is in our power to
grasp the remaining chances of making good this matter wherein we have
failed. We must turn out men and women competently trained to teach
1. Coleman 1963 p.271-279; Maxwell 1952 p.229-230
2. Ibid
the members of their own tribes up to a standard which will enable
them to think for themselves and wisely to plan for the future of
their country. As the teachers of the community are, so will the
• thinking of the community be. It is for us no longer merely the
question of winning a group of individuals for Christ, tremendous
though that is, it is now the question of settling the destiny of
a Nation which demands .. the formation of a powerful Christian
community, intelligent, progressive and farseeing. Thirdly we must
have ever before us the possibility that unfriendly developments
may in Nigeria, as in China, expell all foreign workers. Our districts
must be so staffed that our people will be adequately taught in the
things that belong unto their peace. There must be planned, persistent
instruction in the actual Scripture itself. They must be thoroughly
equipped with and taught to use the Sword of the Spirit, for they will
have to fight for their faith against deceptive doctrines and diabolical
propaganda". '
This means that the "Melting Pot" theory within the Christianity
that was affecting the socio-cultural and political identities of the
M-Belt groups and societies, held by Christian Missionaries in The
North, emphasized the religious needs to become unified with the
Christian religions rather than remain "Christian tribes". However,
this did not mean rejecting existing cultural patterns of identification
as it meant respecting their origins as secondary to the primary of the
Christian religious identity among the M-Belt groups and societies. In
other words, according to Maxwell, the basic infrastructure which might
reinforce the already existing Christian superstructure in the Christian
communities among the M-Belt groups and societies was training in
Christian ideology with European education as it was practised in England
in the period after 1950.
1. Maxwell 1952 p.229-230
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Significantly the standards of Western European Education in
Christian Missionary institutions concentrated and with students
from among the M-Belt groups and societies after 1950, increased
rapidly and became equal with those of students in Government owned
institutions. In the mid-1950s and in the 1960s Christian Missionary
institutions produced better educated students with European skills
of modernization from their Primary, Secondary, Teacher Training
Colleges and the High Schools, who found their way into Universities
and other institutions of higher learning in the 1970s, rather than
students from Government institutions in the M-Belt areas and in
The North in general. 1
It ought to be borne in mind however that Maxwell wrote his
experiences and anxieties of the 1930s and 1940s in the closing years
of the 1940s which became produced into a book in 1952 and revised
in 1954. The ideas contained in his books reflected the general
Christian Missionary socio-political anxieties for the subsequent
period between 1950 and 1960.
The path toward political participation anticipated by Christian
Missionaries from among the M-Belt groups and societies was meant to
come not only from European educated persons trained in Christian
institutions but also from dedicated Church Members. 2 In the sub-
sequent socio-educational origins of political leadership in the
M-Belt Movement, while the initial leadership before 1956 like in
David Lot, Jonah Assadugu, Patrick Davou Fom, Bala Yerima were
dedicated Christians and had attended Christian institutions in the
1. The political and social consequence of these developments are
examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter and in
Chapters 1.1- and 5
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu
in November 1980.
period between 193 6 and 1941 1	political leadership in the
Fter 56
M-Belt Movement/in men like J.S. Tarka, Bitrus g wang Pam,
Patrick Dokotri, Moses Nyamkwang was mixed in educational origins,
having attended both Christian Missionary institutions as well as
Government Institutions both outside the territorial areas of the
political M-Belt. Furthermore some of them were only "Christians"
on Sundays and when they answered questions on religious affiliations,
rather than actual dedication and Church attendance. 1
It was however Maxwell who in his suggestions pounded on the
social and political importance of the Christian conventions and
conferences assertingthe political protection of the Christian
communities in the period between 1949 and 1952. He did this by
presenting very lengthy arguments of their necessity as a "Christian
social Movement" and how they brought about and demonstrated a sense
of "Christian oneness and solidarity" even when it is the case th41
different ethnic socio-cultural identities from the M-Belt groups
and societies were fed into the Christian religious identity. In
one instance for example, Maxwell argued: "One can easily appreciate
how that may happen (the Christian social Movement, Christian oneness
and solidarity with ramification on a Christian religious identity).
Here let us say is a small handful of converts from some semi-
Moslem area. They have been well used to being taunted with following
a vain teaching. They have seen the local Moslem parading on their
horse, dressed in their flowing robes and turbans on the days of the
big festivals. They have been despised and reviled in local judicial
1.	 The political predelictions in the Christian religious identi-
fications of the political leadership in the M-Belt Movement
are examined in Chapters L1.. c4 5	 their concomitant causes
in the political variations of the theme of the M-Belt Move-
ment and identity are examined in Chapters ti.o.,,c,5
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courts when they had a matter there. They have felt themselves small
and poor and of no account. And then they attend some conference
like that already referred to ... at Forum: they suddenly find
themselves among a great throng of folks who obviously are of their
own way of thinking. Here is no petty little group of unimportant
people engaged in their "vain-religion". Here are a multitude of
well dressed, intelligent people, eveky one with hiA book in hand,
joining in ordered worship. "Why" says the newcomer, as he looks
over the vast crowd of men and women: "We Chki4tian4 aken i t Pat
a iew oi the negtigibte peopte, we'ke 4omebodie4 and theke ake a big
tot oi ue and as they join in the singing and share in the hospitality
and meet time after time, the hearty welcome of friendship, their
hearts burn within them and the messages in the addresses given,
gain an added earnestness and reality, and then on the Sunday, when
they meet for worship and the whole great gathering rises to its feet
and begins to repeat its avowal of faith: "I believe in God the Father
Almighty" .. can't you feel the thrills of emotion that shoot through
the visitor's soul and body as for the first time he realises what
the Communion of Saints really can be. So he goes back to his village
but his head is in the air now, and the Moslem mockery has lost its
sting, for he knows that he is on the conquering side, one of a great
multitOde which no man can number, who glory in acknowledging Jesus
Son of Mary as Jesus Son of God, their Lord and Master who has redeemed
them by his blood. He is in the tight; it is the Moslems who are
in the darkness, poor souls". 1
In the 1950s and 1960s when the Christian conventions increased
in the numbers of. attendances and always culminated in Christmas
gatherings in the thousands at the many different Christian Missionary
1.	 Maxwell 1952 p.294-295
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centres among the M-Belt groups and societies, Moslem traders in
their midst exploited the economic demand situation for cooked foods
and light refreshments in the sales of bean-cakes, groundnuts, and
non-alcoholic drinks like Krola, Coca-Cola, Fanta at inflated prices. '
There were instances when Christians openly accused Moslem traders
of price inflation at the gatherings during Christmas, particularly
so because Christian traders were discouraged from trading on Sundays
and during Easter and Christmas gatherings or when there was a
Christian convention. 2 The Christian Churches reacted to this
situation by producing cooked food and 'Kunu' for the convention
attendants, which became the social responsibility of the local church
where the convention was held. 3
 Moslem traders however were generally
encouraged to bring cooked food items to sell at the Christian Con-
ventions, although in the late 1950s and 1960s Christians attending
the Conventions were encouraged to bring along their meals. 4 In the
19708 however opinions became expressed that "inflated prices be
paid for from Christian buyers to Christian sellers". 5 At the Jarawa
Christmas Festival in December 1980 at the Shere Hills ground,
Christian women sold fried meat, cooked food, Coca-cola, sugar cane
sticks, alcoholic beverages at very exhorbitant prices alongside
Moslem traders. 6
1. Interview discussions with Baba Sanda and Pastor David Lot,
November 1980 and January 1981 respectively.
2. Interview discussions with Baba Sanda, December 1980 and with
Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981
4. Interview discussions with Baba Sanda, December 1o80 and with
Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
5. Ibid
6. This is a personal observation at the Christmas Festival which
I attended during my fieldwork in December 1980.
According to Maxwell however the Christian conventions were
the religious premise from which the spirit of Christian fellowship
developed and expressed itself as early as in the 1950s to an extent
that they: "... overflowed the limits of our society". 1 Also in the
period between 1950 and 1960 there were more frequent Christian
conferences in the Miango-Five-Day Inter-Missionary African conference,
where Christian leaders gathered to discuss religious affairs and the
need: ".. for better schools for their children, where they could
be taught in a Christian atmosphere as the few secular schools in the
Northern Provinces of Nigeria were in most cases pro-Moslem in their
outlook". 2 In one instance of the Christian Missionary Conference
at Miango, Maxwell suggests that there were: II .... one hundred and
seventeen African delegates representing over 50 tribes present, some
elected by their Churches and some from Moslem districts where local
churches had not yet been formed owing to the fewness of the converts.
Some of them were from tribes which not so long ago had been hostile
to each other, but now they were sitting in God's House in peaceful
fellowship with each other. 3
In the period between 1960 and 1965 and before the Military
coups of 1966 the religious efforts of Protestant Christian Evangeli-
zation in The North changed from the annual conventions of Christians
and the conferences of Church leaders and elders to "mass hysteria,
channelled through: 'The New Life For All' Movement and Campaigns". 4
1. Maxwell 1952 p.268
2. Ibid p.269
3. Ibid p.268
4. Crampton 1975 p.174
1This involved intensive evangelization on a large scale and the
participation of indigenous Christians from among the M-Belt groups
and societies or of M-Belt origins, where the Campaigns were outside
the M-Belt areas. 1 The New Life for All Movement and the Campaigns
were begun in Plateau and S. Zaria and became most successful in
appealing to youths and women who had finished Primary Schools,
were unemployed and redundant in the urban centres of Jos, Bukuru,
Zaria and Kaduna. 2
Furthermore, when Christian Missionaries sought to organize
the Christian Communities into a Movement with "an affectionate love
of Christianity" through the Christian conferences and conventions
the religious energies and the sense of Christianity that became
developed in the communities did not become channelled into a purely
pietistic Movement. Rather it soon became translated into the
nature of socio-economic and political relationships among groups
and societies in The North and finally burst out to find political
expression in the NML in 1949. This was when M-Belt Christian
consciousness through the organizational channels of church leaders
and elders showed discontent over inequalities in The North. In
other words Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies did
not remain as a heavenly haven.
These "reactive Christian religious strategies" were so because
of the general religious developments in the Islamic society,
particularly in the government of the NPC in The North, which began to
give a vigorous thrust of Islamic expansion that obviously affected
the Christian communities in the M-Belt areas. 3 The Sardauna for
1. Crampton 1975 p.174
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
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example sought to coerce some chiefs, army officers and politicians from
among the M-Belt groups and societies, into Islam by using political
and professional means in the period between 1961 and 1965. 1
 For
example, in that period, the Sardauna began to make "Tours of The
North, including all of the major towns and districts among the M-
Belt groups and societies, which were meant for conversions into the
Islamic religion." 2 Furthermore, in certain M-Belt areas where
Islamic influences were strong, the cultures of the Islamic society
in The North, in the Hausa-Fulani patterns I gained more influences
rather than Christian influences and Western European cultural
patterns. 3 For example, persons from the Marghi group and society
who became Moslems, socially identified with the Fulani and Hausa
as well as other Moslems rather than the Christian and "pagan"
Marghi. 4 This was also the case with Birom, Tiv, Idoma among other
M-Belt groups and societies who became Moslems.
Implicit in the developments of the Christian religious con-
ventions and conferences however is that by 1950, a Christian religious
identity crystallized among the Christian communities which were con-
centrated within the M-Belt groups and societies. This is the premise
from which Maxwell, for example, suggests that by the end of the 1940s:
H
... in district after district, our people had, in their conferences,
been given a sense of the power of Christianity as a social movement...
the uniting spirit of fellowship between the tribes was at work". 5
In the period between 1949 and 1952 when there was an established
relationship between a visible and highly mobilized Christian and
1. These issues are examined in more detail in Chapters 4-eb-LA 5
2. Interview discussions with Barnabas DusU, January 1981
3. Crampton 1975 p.76
4. Ibid
5. Maxwell 1952 p.268
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Church leadership, developed from the conventions and conferences,
with the Christian communities in mass support, Christian
Missionaries found that the churches and their councils had been
taken straight into politics in The North. That was at a time when
the M-Belt Movement in the Non-Moslem League of Northern Nigeria (NML)
was begun. This was so because the state of the Nigerian political
environment in that period showed signs of becoming mature and
favourable to participatory and electoral political activity, as a
result of the Richardson constitutional reforms in the Macpherson
proposals after 1947. 1
In the instance of the late 1940s, as it is suggested by
Maxwell, there was "increased temptation" to use Church channels and
the Church Machinery to achieve political objectives. 2 This was so
because the Church was already organized and well accustomed to
leadership, organization and control of Africans: ".. simply by
virtue of its being to such an extent developed along indigenous
church lines before constitutional reforms."3
 In the instance of
the period between 1949 and 1952, although Maxwell does not give a
detailed account of what happened when Church channels and the Church
Machinery became used to achieve political objectives, he suggests
that: ".... on one or two occasions ... politically ambitious leaders ...
made havoc on an unwise church council". 4 It ought to be borne in
mind that in the period between 1949 and 1952 there was the initial
organization of the M-Belt Movementwhich developed from the NML to the
MZL under political leadership that was Church leadership in persons
1. This is examined in more analytical detail in Section IV of this
Chapter and in Chapter ii- where the Growth and Development of the
M-Belt Movement is discussed.
2. Maxwell 1952 p.324
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.268
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like Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu. It is however not clear
whether Maxwell made reference to Mr S.O. James "the Yoruba Christian"
based in Jos and who became one of the political representatives of
Christians in 1949 in the NHA and who in that year met the Christian
Missionaries, indigenous Church leaders and Elders from among some
of the M-Belt groups and societies at a meeting in Jos to suggest
that "Christians ought to organize to seek political representation
in the NHA" or Maxwell is making reference to Pastor David Lot,
the first President of the NML and the MZL.1
Although Christian Missionaries were anxious that the Christian
communities among the M-Belt groups and societies participate in
politics and the political process in The North and Nigeria and
that Christianity itself be seen as a social Movement that ought
to shape society, Christian Missionary policy was against European
Missionary involvement with any form of participation in the political
process in The North, Nigeria and in other parts of the world.
Apparently there were severe ambivalences in maintaining
a policy position like that. The Christian Missionary policy on overt
political participation which influenced Christian Missionary attitudes
to political organizations in The North had its roots in the period
between 1900 and 1910 during the Madras Christian Missionary Conferences.
The Christian Missionary Conferences at Madras asserted that: " 	
Political action by Churches may be as Christian as any other type of
Christian social action .. in the past, Christians organized for
political action for such causes as temperance, Sunday observance..
1.	 This is examined with more analytical detail in Chapter 4- where
we discuss the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement
and the Christian religious identity it mobilized for its
political objectives.
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this did not imply that the Church should identify itself with a
particular party.. but it did mean that the ChuAch ishoutd Astimeate
its membeu to make a Aight toe oi a potiticat machineAy 04 the
wet6aAe oi thoze who &L ige& 6/WM oppAuzion OA exptoitation
the Church could, for example, encourage and promote small groups
within the fellowship, organize for specific types of social action,
even when those groups work through ligislatures and political
machinery". 1 This was so because in the Madras Christian conferences,
the overriding point of agreement was that behind the imperial
expansion of the West and behind all the developments of the century:
"There was the providential hand of God at work which the Missionaries
must take advantage of and establish His Kingdom on earth". 2 This
was the political premise from which Christian Missionaries openly
advocated their roles as "reinforcers of the Colonial Enterprise"
and in particular teaching their adherents political obedience and
loyalty to whatever European Colonial regime was in power. 3 Although
this was so, there was unanimous rejection of overt political action
as a legitimate constituent of the Christian Missionary program to
establish 'His Kingdom on Earth'. While Christian Missionaries saw
themselves as instruments that inculcated loyalty, sought the protection
of Western interests and opposed the negative aspects of colonialism,
there was also a policy which was directed on emphasizing disassociation
from politics because: "Everywhere a Missionary is under a moral
obligation to abstain entirely from Politics". 4
1. Boer 1979 p.259; emphases are mine
2. Ibid p.103-105
3. Ibid p.106
4. Ibid
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Although Christian Missionary policy on overt political
involvement in politics remained vague it was taken to mean keeping
clear of associating with any type of political movement. ' In the
instance of Christian Missionaries in The North, SUM policy on political
involvement in the political process suggested that it ought to be
channelled through its central offices and thereafter it was at the
discretion of a Superintendent in that office who might act
politically rather than the individual political actions of a
Missionary. 2 In the instance, SUM staff in The North became forbidden
to interfere in matters concerning the administration of Justice by
Native Courts, the Collection and payment of tributes and other taxes,
the inter-relations of Native Chiefs as adjusted by the Government. 3
In the period between 1950 and 1960 when the M-Belt Movements were
vigorous in politics in The North, these were:some of the social and
political issues which became used to demand for separation from the
Islamic society and in 1957/58 were brought as explanatory reasons
before the Willink Commission. 4
 CMS policy on the other hand about
the overt political involvement of Christian Missionaries in The North
and Nigeria in general were contained in the ideas put forward by its
secretary, M.D. Hooper to the government of British administration.5
The ideas of Hooper were also made explicit to all CMS Christian
Missionaries in The North about the degree of their involvement in
1. Boer 1979 p.106
2. Ibid p.275
3. Ibid
4. The Willink Commission is examined and analyzed in more detail
in Chapters 1i-and5 where we discuss Politics with the M-Belt
Movement.
5. Boer 1979 p.275
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politics as early as in 1931. 1
 In that year Hooper explained to
the government of British administration in The North that CMS
regulations: H .... expressly warns its Missionaries against
engaging in political intrigue and would expect Government to
require the removal of any of its agents when adequate proof of
such activities could be adduced; and the Society would be prompt in
exerting its own authority in such an event. If any Missionary trans-
gressed the limits of political liberty it is the duty of the Society
to obey instructions of Government and to remove their agent without
delay; in the belief that Government will not withhold the substantial
charges on which their instructions were based." 2 Whatever these
policy positions were meant to achieve, in the period between 1940
and 1952, Christian Missionaries became engrossed in politics, some-
times overtly, among the M-Belt groups and societies. That was a
period when the Christian Missionaries organized the Christian
communities and Christianity into 'a Social Movement' through bringing
together Christians to conventions and conferences. Furthermore in
1944 Farrant suggested that one of the objectives of Christian
Missionaries: II ... was to make the Church to be heard in the State,
advocating the things that are true, honest,-just, pure, lovely and
of good report". 3
In the period between 1940 and 1960 Christian Missionaries in
The North became inclined to appreciate any evidence that their
converts from among the M-Belt groups and societies participated in
1. Boer 1979 p.275
2. Ibid
3. G.H. Farrant, SUM Field Report 1944, cited in Boer 1979 p.302
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some different roles of governing and government institutions. This
was seen to be a recognition of the "potential importance of non-
Moslem people as well as giving them an opportunity of expression ...
and the Church by Christian living wins its way to acceptance".1
This means that when Christian Missionaries sought to involve
their converts into Government and politics it was an issue that
became based on the political ethnics of Christianity itself.
Maxwell suggests that justice according to "Christian ethics required
the elimination of domination of one people by another". 2 The M-Belt
groups and societies were seen to be dominated and exploited by the
Islamic society in The North, and idea that was rooted right from
the period before 1900 based on their historical experiences which
became compounded by the nature of problems in The North, because
of the Christian Missionary objectives that were shaped by Karl Kumm.
In that instance Kumm preached an ideological doctrine of Christianity
which emphasized the political dangers of Islam over the non-Islamic
and the M-Belt groups and societies in socio-economic and political
terms with very critical denigrations to the Islamic religion as a
premise for the development of the society in The North. 3 Under-
lining the ideas of Karl Kumm was a liberating intrusion by Christian
Missionaries and British imperial interest since both processes had
caused the cessation of slave raiding, arbitrary powers of traditional
rulers, the dangers that used to inhibit travel and trade, and a
Liberation whereby the whole country-side was now open to residence:
tt ... and there was no need to live in large communities for purposes
of defence". 4 Furthermore, when the SUM pioneers travelled from Lokoja
to Ibi in the RNC steam-boat named "Liberty" they became thrilled that
1. Farrant 1944, cited in Boer 1979 p.302
2. Maxwell 1952 p.39
3. For examples of Kumm's religious and political positions, see
more detailed discussions in Section II of this Chapter.
4. Maxwell 1952 p.39
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the name of the boat was "appropriate enough" for Christian Missionary
objectives in The North. '
This "Liberating theme" was to dominate Christian Missionary
conceptions of their religious objectives among the M-Belt groups
and societies. In the period between 1950 and 1965, the same theme
found its way into the political rhetoric of Christian politicians
in the M-Belt Movement. Furthermore, it is politically significant
that there was inclusion of the same "Liberating theme" for the
conduct of government and governing in the essentially non-Islamic
state of BP, upon its creation by General Yakubu Gowon in the
'state creation exercise' in 1967. 2 However, in states created in
1967 in The North, it is politically significant that where there
was a M-Belt political and religious problem and where there also
existed an electoral vote in support of the M-Belt Movement for the
creation of a M-Belt Region in 1959, as an alternative vote for
the dominant Northern political party of the NPC, in votes for the
UMBC and NEPU, the state motto on its 'Code of Arms' contained the
words: Liberty and Justice or both, among others.
This was particularly so for BP state, NE state and NC state
which existed until the political reorganization of the Nigerian
Federation in 1976. 3
 It is politically significant that of the
six states created in The North, it was in territorial areas where
political tensions existed before 1967 that the name of the state became
developed from previously existing Provinces with established provincial
identities among the groups and societies in The North. For example,
1. Maxwell 1952 p.39
2. This point is examined with more analytical detail in Chapters
4- ay.'
 a s
3. For examples, see The Armorial Bearings of the Northern States,
Kaduna, 1968, posters: this point is further examined in more
detail in Chapters 4. 0,,,,A5
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except for Kwara state, which was an entirely new name coined up from
the indigenous 'Northern Concept' of the River Niger (Rafin Kwara)
in order to neutralize Yoruba political irredentism of the 1950s and
1960s implicit in the initial name of the state: Central-West,
Provincial identities became contained in BP state and Kano state.
In the period between 1950 and 1965 the Northern Provinces of Kano
and of Plateau/Benue were the core centres of political movements
showing discontent over inequalities in The North with collateral
demands for adjusting them as suggested by the political struggles
of NEPU and the M-Belt Movement in the UMBC respectively. ' • The other
states created in The North in 1967, which were the predominantly
Islamic areas besides Kano and which in the period between 1950 and
1966 showed consistent political support to the government and party
of the NPC, were North-West, North-Central except for the S. Zaria
parts, North-East also except for the Numan parts in Adamawa and
the Lere-Jarawa areas in S. Bauchi became geographically descriptive
in their names until 1976. 2
In the instance of the concepts of 'Liberty and Justice' on
the code of Arms for BP state, it was a demonstrative and deliberate
political choice by J.D. Gomwalk, suggested-by some of his political
commissioners. The motto on the Code of Arms was meant to suggest
that the M-Belt political struggle for the creation of a M-Belt
Region triumphed and had achieved Libelation from Islamic hegemony
in The North, into a state where justice will be the practice of
Government, governing and politics, evenwhen the political product
of the 1967 exercise was 'a quasi-M-Belt Region' given the territorial
political enclosures of BP state. 3
 The BP state political commissioners
1. Nigeria: The Creation of States, Kaduna 1968 p.13-15
2. Nigeria 1968 p.13-15; these points are examined with more analy-
tical detail in Chapters 4,56,61 5
3. Interview discussions with Isaac Shaahu, January 1981; this point
is examined with more details in Chapters 4- ar.el 5
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who made these suggestions were the old war horses from the UMBC
struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the period between
1950 and 1965. 1
The 'Liberating theme' persisted and became a political
strategy in the actions and political rhetorics of politicians in
the NPP government of Plateau state. This has been so in the
political justification of local Government reforms in that state
in which instance new Local Government Areas became created, non-
Islamic traditional chiefs became elevated in status as they were
politically removed from the traditional judicial authority, of Emirs.2
The recurrent word which became used collaterally with "Liberation"
among the Plateau Christian'NPP politicians was the "Emancipation"
of the non-Islamic groups and societies who were still under the
political authority of Emirs in Keffi, Lafia,Nassarawa and Wase.3
The creations of the LG Units on the Plateau state in the period of
the NPP civilian Government and the accompanying political reforms in
which non-Islamic groups and societies became removed from the political
authority of Emirs was characteristic of the M-Belt sentiments in the
period between 1950 and 1967. In the political circumstances of
Plateau state, the Islamic communities of Lafia, Nassarawa, Keffi and
Wamba reacted to the political meaning in the reforms by demanding
separation and constitution into a curiously defined state called
It a M-Belt State". 4
1. Interview discussions with Isaac Shaahu, January 1981.
2. This point is examined in more detail in Chapter 11.0...,415
3. Interview discussions with George and Catherine Hoomkwap,
January 1981; for examples of the nature of issues in these
political rhetorics with the recurrent use of the word
"Emancipation", see Plateau State House of Assembly Debates,
Local Government Bill, Jos, Hansards 1979-1982.
4. These issues are examined in more detail in Chapters 5 eu,A 1-kg.
Tzfactve
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The "Liberating theme' is also characteristic of the political
mood in the state movements of the 1970s that are centred on Numan for the
creation of a 'Taraba State' separated from the dominant political con-
centration of the Fulani in Gongola State. 1 Similarly, it is also the
case with non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Bauchi and S. Zaria
where there are political demands for merging with Plateau State because
some of the Local Chiefs among other reasons are still under Emirs
with predominantly Islamic personnel in the NA bureaucracies despite
the Local Government reforms in 1976. 2
The consequences of the development of Christianity among the
M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1950
was that in 1950 Christian communities were well established and
identifying themselves more with European Christian Missionaries in
the search for solutions to their socio-economic and political problems
rather than with officials in the government of British administration
in The North. This became more socially and politically pronounced
among the Plateau groups and societies rather than for those in
Benue. Furthermore, although the Christian communities were still
essentially rooted in each of the "tribes" in 1950, the Churches,
the Christian Missionaries with indigenous church leaders and elders
1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, December 1980.
2. Interview discussions with George and Catherine Hoomkwap,
January 1981; the 1976 Local Government Reforms were meant
to bring in elected councillors to run the NA bureaucracies.
These issues are discussed in more analytical details in
Chapters ij. ci 5	 These political demands of the groups
and societies in S. Zaria and S. Bauchi are also very explicit
from the submissions from these areas to the Irikefe Commission
on the creation of more states within the Nigerian Federation
in 1975.
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achieved social and religious mobilization of Christians among some
of the M-Belt groups and socie 	 with the consequence that
Christianity became a visible force as a social movement criss-
crossing "tribal" identities with the Christian religious identity
through regular conventions and conferences of Christian leaders.
It was some of this Christian leadership from churches in Adamawa,
Plateau, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi who began to organize the NML in
1949, the first political organization in the M-Belt Movement. 1
IV Undevelopment, Underdevelopment and the Development of the M-Belt
groups and societies 
The purpose of this Section is to examine whether the undeveloped
. socio-political and economic nature of the M-Belt groups and societies,
conditioned Christian Missionary activities to establish Western
European patterns of society in those areas after impact with British
influences in the period between 1900 and 1950. When Christianity,
through the development of churches, Christian religious leadership
and Christian communities became established and consolidated among
the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1900 and 1935,
and thereafter Christianity itself rapidly expanded, Christian
Missionary Bodies in The North changed policy from their previous
emphasis on Christianizing, to the development of the M-Belt groups
and societies with Christianity and Western European skills, rooted
in the English civilization .
It is therefore suggested that the shape of society among the
M-Belt groups and societies, increasingly developed toward Western
European patterns of modernization, a situation that was a function
1.	 The political development of the NML to become the UMBC is
examined in detail in Chapter4
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of Christian Missionary social and welfare activities. These develop-
ments had ramifications on the forms of social and political identi-
fication, within an overall framework of Christian social conscious-
ness which became established in European educated persons among the
M-Belt groups and societies. The Christian Missionary activities
became centred on Christian schools and medical work through social
welfare institutions like hospitals, dispensaries, maternity and
leprosy clinics.
In the period between 1900 and 1950 and in particular the 10
years before 1950, the Christian Missionary schools produced a core
of European educated persons from among the M-Belt groups and
societies, some of which in the 1950s and 1960s became the political
leadership of the M-Belt Movement as well as participated in political
leadership of The North and Nigeria. In the period between 1960
and 1970 Christian Missionary institutions with government financial
grants increased the development of European patterns of modernization
among the M-Belt groups and societies.'
Undevelopment, underdevelopment and the development of the
M-Belt groups and societies was a cumulative process of the effects
of events and activities in two historical epochs, before and after
establishment of British rule in the territories that became politically
created as The North in 1900 by the British. Undevelopment is taken
to be the general lack of universally accepted specifics in the
functioning of a society which can be immitated. For example, there
might be no writing, no organized system of education beyond that
1.	 These developments are examined in more detail in Chapters Li-
AAA 5	 in the specific context of politics and society in
The North in that period.
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which is based on memory, no large scale organizations in politics,
trade and commerce, no large scale social intercourse beyond the
village or ethnic unit and there is no accummulated wealth either
collectively or wealth by individuals that transforms society.
In the instance society is therefore characterized by poverty, disease
and primitive living conditions in which the human beings may survive
only on basic necessities to which they have access. Underdevelopment
is taken to be an absence of the basic specifics, such as a road, a
bridge, electricity or a school which might condition social and
economic changes in society, an absence that might be caused by a
government as a policy or as a deliberate political act based on the
nature and colouring of its politics and its envisaged political
alliances in the cause of the society it wants to achieve. In the
instance of the M-Belt groups and societies, it is also taken to
mean a general absence of exploitable raw materials as well as
their expropriation. An exception as such was the presence of tin
and columbite on the Plateau which in some way conditioned the
development of physical infrastructure that transformed society on
European patterns of development as it did in the urban centres of
the Islamic society and on the Jos Plateau upon impact with British
influences and as directed by the government of British administration
in The North. Development is taken to mean processes which produced
enlightened human beings with universally accepted social, economic
10,01..Lk n co4
anronsciousness with specifically achieved attitudes about the
nature, shape and patterns of societies that have a Western European
infrastructure. It also means creating the basic infrastructure for
the development of the human being and the resources of society for
political and socio-economic development.'
1.	 These definitions derive from the contents of Appendix rin
the thesis; but also see among others: Walter Rodney,
How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London, 1972
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Educational development among the M-Belt groups and societies
is however differentiated from other patterns of development in
The North, particularly those to do with economic aspects. This
is so because, although it is suggested that Christian Missionaries
'developed' the M-Belt groups and societies the process took the
emphasis of establishing educational and social welfare institutions.
Obviously the development of education and social welfare institutions
has ramifications on economic development, 1
 but then, it is meant
that the development of industries and related economic institutions
in society were not a prerogative of the Christian Missionary Bodies
in The North. This means that economically, the M-Belt groups and
societies were relatively underdeveloped when compared to the con-
centration of economic development in the Islamic Society in The
North in the period between 1900 and 1950.
The undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies, as it
became seen by the British in the period between 1900 and 1950,
particularly so on the socio-economic and political concerns in
Christian religious intentions, held by Christian Missionaries, was
rooted in the expansion of the Islamic society in the period between
1804 and 1900. In that period, there were intensive Fulani wars on
the M-Belt groups and societies with concomitant consequences of
slave raiding and the slave trade which depopulated the area and
conditioned undevelopment. 2
 In the instance of the events and
activities surrounding the underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups
1. Rimmer 1981 p.109-119
2. For examples, see earlier discussions in Chapter A.
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and societies in the period between 1900 and 1950 when there was
a government of British administration in The North, there was
developed socio-economic neglect and discrimination in economic
aspects of European patterns of modernization. However, in the
same period, the activities of European Christian Missionaries in
The North, became directed toward the development of the M-Belt
groups and societies, focussing on the establishment of modernization
skills. In other words, there might not have been rapid European
infrastructural development to the benefit of the indigenous groups
and societies in the M-Belt areas, were it not that Christian
Missionaries produced the basic infrastructure to serve the dual
objective of creating European civilization with Christianity, as
an alternative path to Islam in the development of societies in
The North. This is the analytical base of data and arguments produced
in this section.
Although there exists gaps in the data and evidences produced
about the years between 1900 and 1950, which ought to suggest concrete
facts about underdevelopment and the subsequent levels of development
achieved in the Islamic society when it is compared with the M-Belt
groups and societies what is available is sufficiently explicit to
show that there was unequal European infrastructural development for
modernization as lately as 1950 when the government of British
administration was in political control of The North. Subsequently
in the period between 1950 and 1965 the M-Belt groups and societies
were accustomed to political allegience by the political distribution
of infrastructure because of the nature and colouring of politics
by the governments of the NPC in The North. This was so because
A
infrastructural development became dependent on anticipated political
support for the Northern government and for the NPC party, received
from particular groups and societies.' This ought to be expected
because of the very nature of politics in The North, albeit in
the Nigerian Federation, given the political strength of patron-
client relationships and the degree of dependent patronage politics
in that period. 2
The first 50 years in the underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups
and societies generated by the activities of the government of
British administration and the development of the M-Belt groups and
societies by the objectives in Christian Missionary activities are
given analytical justification for the purposes of this section
because after those years of impact with British influences in The
North, the M-Belt groups and societies became characterized by a
rapid organization of "tribal" political associations which sub-
sequently converged with a specific Christian religious identity to
form the NML, the nucleus of the M-Belt Movement. This is so because
1. These points are examined with more analytical detail in Chapter IF
2. This will be examined in more detail in Chapters +Ana 5 where
in the particular instance of Benue Province for example
the Idoma benefitted from the NPC government in The North,
disproportionately to the Tiv, even when the Tiv were a
numerically bigger group and society in that Province. This
was so because the Tiv, unlike the Idoma, consistently voted
against the NPC party and were anti- its government at the
local NA and Regional levels as well as at the National Level
when politics was taken to the electorate and to the legislatures,
particularly so in the period between 1956 and 1965.
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of the importance of the relationship, which is sought to be
established, between the underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups and
societies relative to the Islamic society as was generated by the
government of British administration in The North and the develop-
ment of Christian consciousness from Christian Missionary activities
causing the resurgence of "tribal" identities, subsequently fed into
the M-Belt political struggle. The political objective in the
convergence of the "tribal" identities on to the Christian religious
identity was meant for a struggle to readjust for the socio- political
and economic inequalities 1 in the existing state of underdevelopment
in their territorial areas, relative to the Islamic society as a
direct consequence of the activities of governments in The North.
Furthermore the first 50 years are given analytical justification
because in that period Christian Missionaries provided the mechanisms
among the M-Belt groups and societies whereby the fact of popular
consciousness about the nature of inequalities and domination in
The North became developed and productive at both individual and
the collective levels of the "tribes". This is so because after 1940,
it became mobilized as a political force, firstly among each of the
"tribes" to contest over the state of local politics and issues
1.	 Inequality is taken to be the perception of difference between
groups and societies over conceptions of political and social
status, the distribution of economic institutions and infra-
structure which may create wealth in society. In the instance
of existing inequalities in a society they cause sharp
difference in living conditions between the benefiting groups
and those who are outside its main stream with concomitant
frustrations for the latter - see Appendix I for more detailed
discussions of definitions of some of the terms used in the
study.
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affecting the concerns of the M-Belt groups and societies. In the
period between 1949 and 1967, the contest over the state of local
politics and socio-economic issues that affected each of the ft-Belt
groups and societies generated a collective sense of discontent
which increasingly developed and there was political demand for
separation from the Islamic society in The North.
There was "culture shock" in the period between 1900 and 1950
which was evident in the social and political as well as in the
economic experiences of both Christian Missionaries and British
officials in the government of British administration in The North,
when they became faced with the nature of undevelopment of the
M-Belt groups and societies.	 In the instance the government of
British administration and Christian Missionaries pursued different
paths in the strategies to transform the situation of undevelopment
and underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies into a new
type of society. 1 The alternative path to remedy - the situation of
socio-political and economic undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and
societies in the policies of the government of British administration
in The North was cultural and political integration into the Islamic
society, upon the successful establishment of the new political
unit. In the instance, the Islamic culture in Hausa-Fulani patterns
became imported into the M-Belt areas and the destruction of cultural
patterns indigenous to the M-Belt groups and societies through legal
and institutional means that were bolstered by military force, was
1.	 For detailed examples and discussions of the social, economic
and political examples of the reactions to the state of un-
development in the experiences of the officials in the govern-
ment of British administration and the socio-political efforts
to remedy the situation, see Chapter 2 Sections II and III; this
section is concerned to examine the reactions of Christian
Missionaries and their religious and educational efforts to
remedy the situation.
accomplished, partially for civilizing reasons.
It ought to be borne in mind however that there was never a
'total cultural eclipse' of the indigenous cultures of the M-Belt
groups and societies by either Hausa-Fulani culture in the way it
affected the Yoruba in Ilorin, the Nupe and the Igbirra or European
cultural patterns in the way it has affected Black American citizens
in the U.S. The significant fact however is that both Hausa-Fulani
culture and the European cultural patterns on the M-Belt groups and
societies have fundamental force of determining socio-political and
economic relationships rather than any of the indigenous cultural
patterns of the M-Belt groups and societies in the European modernizing
processes on the shape of society in Nigeria.
Contradistinctively to the path taken by the government of British
administration in The North however, because Christian Missionaries
held Islamic aggression responsible for the undeveloped state of the
M-Belt groups and societies, they emphasized that the only alternative
path to change was by generating the Christian civilization of
European nations. Implicit in the processes that produced 'a culture
change' among the M-Belt groups and societies is that Hausa-Fulani
culture was as much alien to the M-Belt groUps and societies as was
the civilizing cultures of European nations in the emphasis of the
Missionaries. The impact of Hausa-Fulani culture was however trans-
posed over the cultures of the M-Belt groups and societies, affecting
a larger population, rather than the Christian culture of European
nations. This was a process that Christian Missionaries themselves
complimented the policies of the government of British administration
in The North since Hausa Language was the language of Christianity
among the majority of the population of the M-Belt groups and societies.
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As early as in 1900, the undevelopment of the M-Belt groups
and societies and the whole Christian Missionary strategy directed
toward its solution was conceived of on "the Light versus Darkness
theme" affecting Africa. 1 This was also tied up to European
ethnocentricism about African cultures outside the influences of
the Islamic religion. Kumm for example in the period between 1900
and 1910 consistently suggested the "darkness of African civilizations"
and the contrasts it produced when compared with the "Light of
European culture". For example, in his book which was produced in
1907, he suggested that while European culture was a divine gift of
God: "Africa was burdened under the power of demons and the curse
of them". 2 Similarly Farrant suggested that while African civilizations
were "dark and desolate" the civilization of European Nations was
equiped to be the guardian of African people. 3 This was so because
of the primitive nature of the living conditions of the people on
the Plateau. In 1923 for example he made a typology in which he classi-
fied the degrees of civilizations in Africa ranging from: "the Birom...
who wear no clothes at all and are only two generations removed from
the use of stone weapons to the highest i- consiting of the Hausa and
Fulani who had a civilization akin to that cif the Arabs". 4
 As latterly
1. Boer 1979 p.168
2. Karl W.H. Kumm 1907, cited in Boer 1979 p.146
3. Boer 1979 p.298
4. G.H. Farrant 1923, cited in Boer 1979 p.298
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as in 1934, in his report of SUM medical work among the Plateau
groups and societies, Farrant suggests that it is clear some of the
M.-Belt groups and societies:	 .. were a crowd of sufferers and the
naked pagan .. shows in his bare unwashed and uncared-for body all
the horridness of disease". 1
 At about the same period, the inhabitants
of Kabwir and Panyam, where the Angas and the Sura were respectively
concentrated among other groups and societies in that area, were
described by Christian Missionaries as : "wild, naked savages ...
given over to cannibalism ... without God or hope .. in village after
village, a condition of sin stained darkened souls ... existing in a
reign of unmixed darkness and unmitigated depravity .. they wander
about in a moral midnight ... they know not what they do." 2
 Further-
more, when a Christian Missionary observed a traditional religious
festival at Donga among the Yergam, and Jukun he described their
town as: ".. sunken in sin and degradation where women were
engaged in a "bori" dance .. an awful sight ... their facial expressions
were terrible and they appeared demon possessed". 3
Compounding the social and religious 'culture shock' in the
experiences of Christian Missionaries on the undevelopment of the
M-Belt groups and societies were the primitive methods of organization
and the degree of civilizations which had no large scale socio-economic
and political systems of organization of society.
	 Foremost was that
there was no formal system of education except that which was based
1. Farrant 1934, cited in Boer 1979 p.298
2. Boer 1979 p.169
3. Ibid
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on the socialization of age-grades rooted in the separate practices
of each group and society. This was not based on reading and
writing, rather it was a process transmitted from the memory of elders
to specific developing age grade structures.
In the instance of economic undevelopment of the M-Belt groups
and societies, this was conditioned by an absence of commerdial
organization which inhibited substantial surplus production of exchange
goods before impact with British influences in 1900. 1
 In the subsequent
period between 1900 and 1950 the undevelopment as well as the under-
development of the M-Belt groups and societies was modified by the
introduction of cash crops like cotton and groundnuts in The North
although the more successful cash crops among the M-Belt groups and
societies after 1930 were: Beniseeds and Soya beans among the Tiv
in the Benue valley, the potato on the Plateau, ginger in S. Zaria
and sugar cane in Adamawa. 2
 This was so because the economies of
the M-Belt groups and societies were mainly for subsistence, based
on their agricultural products. For example, agricultural practices
among the Tiv group and society preceeding British control was based
on a custom of planting yams, their major food crop, together with
other subsidiary food crops like grain crops and cowpeas on freshly
cleared land, shifting every second year which after 1930 also included
the growth of cotton, soya beans and Beniseeds (sesamen indicum). 3
This agricultural practice was centred on a single household and was
meant for subsistence rather than for exchange value outside the Tiv
"tribe" except after the 1930s and 1940s when cotton, soya beans and
Beniseeds as well as yams began to produce cash to farmers. As latterly
as 1945 Forde and Scott suggest that Tiv economy itself required
1. Daryll Forde and Richenda Scott, The Native Economies of Nigeria,
London 1945 p.180
2. Forde and Scott 1945 p.180; the consequences of the introduction
of these cash crops are examined in more detail below.
3. Forde and Scott 1945 p.190
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"exceptional needs of remedial measures designed to restore a
balanced system of land use and productivity". 1 This was so because
the Tiv practised "an extravagant farming system and a particularist
land tenure surviving from more spacious days".2
Furthermore Tiv land itself was Tse-Tse fly-infested and there
were no 'economic animals' in the same way that there were goats,
cattle, donkeys and sheep in the Islamic society, except for a small
number of "dwarf-cattle", allowed to roam free, being valued only
for gift exchanges and ritual purposes. 3 Although the "fly" saved
the Tiv as well as other groups and societies in the Benue Valley
from the political and social tensions developed on the Plateau,
Adamawa, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi because of the economic problems of
land over-grazing by Fulani cattle and crop-trampling, it did not
help their condition of undevelopment economically.
It was not until in 1929 when Beniseed became introduced as
a cash crop, when the East Railway Line from Port Harcourt to Jos,
passed through Tiv-land that economic cultivation for exports was
stimulated. 4 Although cash began to find its way into the pockets
of some Tiv farmers, the development of Beniseed as a cash crop
produced maldistribution of the population and congestion in many areas
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.190
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
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of Tiv-land with serious consequences on soil degradation. 1
 For
example Forde and Scott suggest that: "So rapidly has the population
increased in many parts of the country that the region to the West
of Katsina Ala is said to have densities as high as 300 to the square
mile. On the other hand, there are also large areas that are very
thinly settled, but the particularism of the clans and lineages has
until recently frustrated attempts by the people of conquested areas
to secure access to the vacant land in the hands of other groups.
Over half the population of half a million in the Tiv Division is, in
consequence, compressed into the small Kpareu section between the
Katsina Ala river and the Ogoja border". 2
 This was the premise from
which Forde and Scott suggested in 1945 that in the instance of
producing solutions to the state of undevelopment of Tiv economy:
"It is only too clear that an assured cash crop alone cannot be
expected to remedy a situation which both demographic conditions and
ill-suited agricultural methods have produced". 3
Unlike the Tiv economy, which was centred on a single household
practising subsistence agriculture, the M-Belt groups and societies
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.190
2. Forde and Scott 1945 p.189; for more detailed examples, see a
valuable study of Household production and consumption patterns
among the 'Southern Tiv' by G.W.G. Briggs, 'Crop Yields and
Food Requirements in Tiv Division', Farm and Forest, Vol. 5
No. 2 1944 p.17-23; G.W. Briggs, 'Soil Deterioration in Southern
Tiv Division', Farm and Forest, Vol. 2 1941 p.8-12; R. Downes,
The Tiv Tribe, Kaduna, 1933.
3. Forde and Scott 1945 p.190
2. Z.
found in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria, although similar
in the practice of subsistence agricultural economies, these were
based on "collective cultivation by multiple households". ' In the
instance of the groups and societies indigenous to the Plateau,
for example, farming was organized and directed by the Head of each
compound which contained the households of several kinsmen, involving
the use of several large plots. 2 The farmlands were under the control
of the compound Head and the other members of the group shared only
small patches which were reserved to them personally. 3 Labour on
the farmland of the compound Head was a priority with the crop yields
stored in the main granary under his control. 4 Besides the collective
cultivation, there was also 'a collective storage system'. 5 This was
economically directed at purely meeting the subsistence needs of the
'collective community of households' rather than for external exchange
either to the benefit of the household or the other community of house-
holds in the "tribes". Forde and Scott suggest that from the granary
of the Head of the households:	 ... supplies for beer are taken and
household rations are drawn when members' own harvests are exhausted.
The main harvest is also regarded as the reserve against famine and
for the next year's planting. Both men and women have their own
smaller granaries in which their personal harvests are stored. These...
provide for their own household needs for most of the year. Despite
this collective storage system, it has been claimed that Plateau
farming groups often show little foresight in reserving adequate
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.192
2. Ibid p.193
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
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supplies of seed for the next harvest ... a recent feature associated
with the introduction of money incomes from mine labour and the
increased opportunities for purchasing grain". 1 Forde and Scott further
suggest that this was so because besides the fact that farmed grain
yields were used for consumption, a considerable further quantity
was needed to meet the production and demands for beer consumption.2
This was so even when the economy was 'self-contained', the crops
grown being mainly several small varieties of grains and root crops
which were "much inferior in yield and food value", to, for example,
the guinea-corn, grown in the Islamic society in The North. 3 The
most staple of the grain crops characteristic of the groups and
societies on the Plateau, in Adamawa, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi was
"Acha" ('Digitaria exilis') and these existed in several varieties.4
This was so because it grew and ripened early and was well suited for
the thin and frequently leached soils in those areas. 5
In the period between 1900 and 1950 it was an acknowledged fact
that foodstuffs among the M-Belt groups and societies were generally
thought to be of inferior food value when they were compared to the
quality of food in the Islamic society in The North, particularly
so for the absence of the consumption of milk-products. As latterly
as 1951 for example, when there was an outbreak of "a peculiar
epidemic" which in many ways resembled the disease of Yellow Fever
in Jos Division and causing the death of as many as 700 Birom people
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.193-194
2. Ibid p.194
3. Ibid p.192-193
4. Ibid p.193
5. Ibid
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there was medical focus in the explanation that: "..• the disease may
in fact be due to some fungoid condition of the 'Acha".1
The other root crops grown, generally among the M-Belt groups
and societies for subsistence were yams and coco-yams ('Gwaza'). 2
This suggests that among other things the majority of the non-Islamic
groups and societies ate basically the same type of foodstuff for
subsistence in yams, coco-yams, acha, peas etc., unlike the concen-
tration of guinea-corn, millet and milk in the Islamic society in
The North. 3 When the root crop, cassava was introduced on the Plateau
after 1930, to produce more for the mines workers, it became socially
and religiously rejected and was not grown on any considerable scale
as latterly as 1945. 4 This was so because there was rooted objection
to agricultural reforms: ".. in the ritual prohibitions associated
with the groves spirits ('tsafi') of the village which often serve
1. C.R. Niven, Plateau Province 1951  - Northern Region of Nigeria:
Provincial Annual Reports, 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.63; this is examined
in more detail below and also in Chapter Li- where we relate the
underdeveloped nature of the M-Belt groups and societies to
political support of the M-Belt Movement. It ought to be borne
in mind however that 'Acha' has continued to be eaten by many
of the M-Belt groups and societies even when the Sarda 	 for
example, among others, in the 1950s became insultingly specific
when he told leaders of the M-Belt Movement in the NHA that there
was no pride in the food crops they grew because he only once
"ate Acha and yams", the predominant food crops among the M-Belt
groups and societies.
2. Forde and Scott 1945 p.193
3. In the general course of my field work interview discussions with
Jonah Assadugu, among others, it became an explicit point of emphasis
that the M-Belt groups and societies "were the samebecause of the
similarities in food, housing (huts) and life style (social and political
independence) besides other externally imposed identities - this point
is discussed in more analytical detail in Chapters 1. 0,-."4 2
4. Forde and Scott 1945 p.193
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both to restrict and petrify the agricultural system, since they may
include taboos on the cultivation of various plants and the rearing
of particular stock". ' This was the premise from which agricultural
productivity remained economically poor among the Plateau groups and
societies since there was no variety in the growth of even subsistence
crops.
In the period between 1900 and 1950 there was increased attention
on the production of 'Pennisetum Millet , exceeding the growth of 'Acha'
by the majority of the groups and societies concentrated in Adamawa,
Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria. 2 This was caused by the demands
for beer consumption, 3 because the 'Pennisetum Millet' was the best
grain for that purpose even if it had to be made unavailable for
daily meals since "considerable amounts were required to produce
beer". 4 Forde and Scott suggest that: "Beer drinking, in which
the pagans differ conspicuously from the Moslem peoples of The North,
although it can be abused, is by no means to be regarded as an entirely
unfortunate diversion of good grain from its proper use (ie. grain
for cooked meals). The pagan beer has the consistency of porridge
and considerable food value, while the process of fermentation provides
a supply of protective elements which would otherwisebe lacking in a
diet which includes no dairy products". 5
 In other words, beer drinking
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.193
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.194
4. Ibid p.197
5. Ibid p.194
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was to some extent 'a dietetic counterpart of milk which was generally
available elsewhere in The North, particularly in the Islarilic societies.1
Although this might have been so, alcoholism was a social problem among
the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1940 and 1967
and is very much still a characteristic of the area. 	 It was also
as much a consequence of frustrations to the state of underdevelopment
since it was not only a fact among farmers but also with Christian
trained European educated persons. 2
However, similar to groups and societies in the Benue valley,
like the Tiv, Idoma and Jukun, only a few livestock were kept on the
Plateau. This was so despite the ideal climatic conditions and
Tse-Tse fly-free grassland plains. In some communities on the Plateau
there were only a few horses and "dwarf-cattle" which were not milked
but used for funeral feasts, horse display and only eaten when they
die 3.	 In Vom for example, the most populous of the Birom villages,
Forde and Scott suggest that in 1945 there were 2000 goats, 1 per
able bodied man, 402 horses and 16 mares and no cattle at all. There
also existed a few chickens and dogs found in most compounds receiving
little care but eaten. 4
The economic absence of cash products among the M-Belt groups
and societies suggests that the basic exports of The North being in
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.197
2. This point is examined with more analytical detail in Chapters
L.
	
and subsequently discussed in Chapter S where
the failure of the 	 military coup of 1976 is cl.ccussed
3. Forde and Scott 1945 p.194-195
4. Ibid
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the production of groundnuts, cotton, hides and goatskins, which
produced money for a wealthy new middle-men-class as well as money
into the pockets of the ordinary man was a monopoly of the population
in the Islamic society. For example in 1937 from only one district
in Kano there was enumerated about 441 horses, 335 mares, 6516 donkeys,
33,133 goats and 8554 sheep with a total value of £9,599 95 10d.1
The animal wealth in the Islamic society gave rise to a thriving economic
export trade between The North and Southern Nigeria. For example,
Forde and Scott suggest that: "The cattle trade between north and south
is in the hands of big dealers, mostly Hausa, who act as the middle-
men between the Fulani and the southern purchasers ... it is not
uncommon for a Hausa trader to spend £200 at a time in the purchase
,
of livestock. In 1939, the price of slaughter cattle varied from lOs
to £8 according to size, weight and condition ... it takes at least
three months for the animals to complete the journey from the pastures
of Sokoto, say, to Abeokuta, a trader may have several hundred pounds
locked up in the cattle on the road on which he cannot look for any
return for several months ... the record animals passed on hoof across
1.	 Forde and Scott 1945 p.147
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the Jebba Bridge which is one of the main points of crossing over
the Niger. Others would come into the Southern provinces on foot
by different routes, for instance, in 1936 an additional 14,000
cattle passed through Adomawa province on the eastern road, and in
1939, 23,380 cattle and 29,771 sheep and goats came via Ago Are".'
In the period between 1900 and 1940, 1936 was the "Cattle Boom Year"
when 100,847 cattle crossed the Niger bridge at Jebba to the slaughter
houses of Southern Nigeria. 2 Although there was a decline in the
cattle export after that year, it subsequently increased from 73,500
cattle in 1938 to 96,538 in 1940. 3 Similarly, while 79,198 sheep were
" exported" in 1936, there was a record total of 100,116 sheep exported
in 1940. 4 423 goat exports in 1936 increased to 1751 in 1940. 5 In
addition to "hoof-crossing" in 1936, 23,590 cattle were carried by
rail to markets in The South of Nigeria, increasing to 37,523 in 1939.6
There were similar increases in the sheep and goat exports, from
12,796 in 1936 to 17,200 in 1939 carried from Kano by rail to markets
in Southern Nigeria. 7
 In other words besides the economic poverty in
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.277
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
7. Ibid
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the production of subsistence crops, the majority of the M-Belt
groups and societies were characterized by a total absence of
animal wealth comparable to the Islamic society from which 'cash
flows' permeates all the spectrums of society to establish improved
living conditions on the basis of the new monetarized economy of
The North, developed from impact with British influences.
This was the economic premise from which after 1930, there was
effort by the government of British administration in The North to
introduce the cultivation of the potato (solanum) as a cash crop
among the groups and societies on the Plateau to be sold to the
population in the township of Jos, although initially it was meant
for the consumption of Europeans concentrated on the tin mines. '
In the instance however the indigenous groups and societies faced
competition with the Hausa and settled Fulani who were used to better
farming methods.	 The production of the potatoes as a cash crop
became so successful that the seeds were issued on a considerable
scale with the hope that the production competed in quality, quantity
and price with those imported, to enable the establishment of a
permanent cash crop for the Plateau groups and societies, particularly
so when the Europeanized urban population in the South of Nigeria
showed increased inclusion of the potato in their meals. 2 Similarly
during the same period in S. Zaria the government of British administ-
ration in The North introduced the cultivation of ginger as a cash
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.199
2. Ibid
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crop to benefit the non-Islamic groups and societies in the area.
In the instance Forde and Scott suggest that: "The success of the
development of ginger cultivation among groups in Southern Zaria is
not without significance for the future development of the Plateau.
Production of this largely alien crop, which requires very careful
preparation for the market has been achieved in a very short time,
an advance which indicates both aptitude and responsiveness to
opportunities for cash crop production on the part of pagan groups,
whose conservatism has on occasion been over emphasized on the side
of the administration". ' It ought to be borne in mind however that
in both instances of the Plateau and S. Zaria there was competition
with Hausa and Fulani migrant farmers in the growth of the "new cash
crops", just as there was competition in the M-Belt areas for cotton
growers in S. Bauchi, Adamawa, Keffi, Lafia and Nassarawa. However,
the introduced cash crops in the period between 1930 and 1940 among
the M-Belt groups and societies: Tiv with Soya Beans and Beniseeds,
Plateau with the potato, S. Zaria with ginger, Adamawa, subsequently
with sugar cane suggests that the government of British administration
in The North was concerned to establish an economic premise from which
cash flows might find their way to benefit indigenous farmers among
the M-Belt groups and societies for improved conditions of living
and participation in the monetarized economy.
As early as in 1930 however the economies of the M-Belt groups
and societies no longer remained 'self-contained' and in an undeveloped
state, particularly so for those communities that were in close contact
with "alien groups which penetrated the areas". 2
 This however did not
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.199 n.1
2. Ibid p.145
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mean that it developed to become equal as the economic patterns
existing in the Islamic society in which indigenous historical advantages
complimented the economic activities introduced from impact with
British influences. The changes in the new economic patterns became
the conditioning factors in the underdevelopment and exploitation of
local economic circumstances among some M-Belt groups and societies.
For example, on the Jos Plateau, where there was a large concentration
of tin-mines with many communities of mine workers there grew high
market prices for food, firewood and other farm products for home con-
sumption in the 1930s and 1940s. 1 In the instance, although the price
of ten bundles of firewood cost as low as ten shillings per person per
year, the total value in the exchanges were estimated to be at a value
of £513 per year in the period between 1920 and 1930. 2
 Firewood became
the largest economic item of income value in the new exchange economy
for raw cash, after the sales of subsistence crops from farms, sold
to the tin mine workers by the local population.3
The price of foodstuffs and firewood in the exchange process
subsequently conditioned socio-economic tensions between the indigenous
population to the Jos Plateau and the migrant population on the tin
mines, particularly so with the Hausa in the Mining communities. The
tensions were centred on commerical participation in the new economic
system. For example, in the one instance of the money worth of food-
stuffs and their demands in the market place, where Hausa and other alien
communities already established themselves chiefly to labour on the tin-
workings, they began to employ both men and young women to work on
farm plots they claimed to be theirs. 4
 The farm work was carried out
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.195
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
3 32
under an agreement, whereby two shillings was paid for a given farm
job . 1 Among the Birom in Vom, it was estimated that 75 0' of the
labour on the farm plots owned by the Hausa communities as well as by
other mine-working aliens, was done by the indigenous groups and
societies. 2 The land was not rented, neither were the subsequent
crop yields produced which found their way into the market places and
fetched substantial cash incomes shared with the land-owners or the
farmers. 3 In the other instance of the high demands with comcomitant
costs for firewood for urban centres like Jos as well as other markets
serving the mining camps, Hausa middle-men as traders developed, began
to buy firewood from the indigenous 'traders' outside the market places
which led to the townships, which became subsequently sold at higher
prices in the markets. 4
To compound these socio-economic problems with the alien migrant
labour force on the tin-mines, there also developed severe economic
problems with their concomitant socio-economic tensions between the
indigenous groups and societies and Fulani Pastoralists. These tensions
subsequently shaped hostilities toward the Fulani because of historically
recollected experiences in the period between 1804 and 1900. 5
 Although
this was so, Forde and Scott further suggest that the problem was
fundamentally economic in that: "...the hostility and suspicion of
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.195
2. Ibid
3. Interview discussions with Dudu Dalyop, January 1981; this is
examined with more analytical detail in Chapters t4	 where
we discuss the consequences of these economic tensions on
electoral politics. In December 1964 foraxiwle Vom became
characterized by severe political tensionsithe migrant Hausa
population which supported the NPC political party and the
indigenous population which was UMBC and these tensions culminated
in setting fire on the Mercedes belonging to one of the UMBC
leaders, Bitrus Rwang Pam on the night of December 25th, 1964,
an act that was widely interpreted as conceived and executed by
NPC thugs.
4. Interview discussions with Dudu Dalyop, January 19810
5. Forde and Scott 1945 p.198
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the pagans towards the Fulani, who have been coming into the area for
both seasonal and all year occupation in greatly increasing numbers
with the establishment of settled administration and the growth of a
market for dairy products among the alien population have further
complicated the problem of economic advance on the Plateau". '
 The
Fulani with their cattle, were attracted in large numbers to the
Plateau because of the wide and open Tse-Tse fly-free grasslands. 2
In the period between 1940 and 1945 Forde and Scott estimated
that there were about 100,000 cattle on the Plateau in the wet season
and of this total about 30,000 remained in the dry season and grazed
at will. 3
 In the instance, all of the farming population on the
Plateau at one time or another suffered loss of crops from the
trampling of straying cattle. 4
 Furthermore, Fulani cattle-overgrazing
caused increased soil erosion which was already a problem due to
deforestation by heavy cutting to meet the urban firewood needs and
demands. 5
This economic problem existed side by side with the already accute
problem caused on farm land from the mining activities of Tin companies,
particularly so in the period after 1926. For example, when the Drag-
lines became introduced in the tin mining process one drag-line
excavator in its life time removed about 3 million cubic yards of
alluvial soil, creating huge artificial mounts on farmland or on places
	
-1.	 Forde and Scott 1945 p.198
2. Ibid p.197
3. Ibid p.198
4. Ibid p.192-198
5. Ibid p.198
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where it was placed to process for tin.' In the late 1920s the drag-
lines were the latest innovations in tin mining machinery, combining
the operations of excavating and elevating with automation. 2 It
floated on a pontoon over a flooded area of tin-bearing ground which
it raises by means of a chain of buckets and washes the alluvial earth
for tin on board. 3 The trailings are dumped behind it in the
previously worked-out area of the tin deposits. 4
 The use of this
machinery was characteristic of the period between 1926 and 1938, 5
with increases in the annual imports of mining machinery from £41,475
in 1926 to £123,562 in 1938. 6As expected there was a decline in the
numbers of companies from 72 in 1926 to 31 in 1938. 7
 This was so
because the cost of importing machinery forced the tin companies to
amalgamate, the biggest merger being The Amalgamated Tin Mines of
Nigeria Ltd., a company controlled by the London Tin Corporation and
by 31st March 1940 had produced 7050 ton of concentrates or 47% of
the estimated total output in that period. 8 This suggests that there
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.23 n.2
2. Ibid p.17
3. Ibid p.17
4. See Section V of this chapter for examples of the intensity of
tin mining activities on the Jos Plateau.
5. Forde and Scott 1945 p.18
6. Ibid p.20-21
7. Ibid
8. Margery Perham (ed), Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria: 
Being the second part of a study of The Economics of a Tropical 
Dependency, London, 1947 p.23
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were very many drag-lines on the Plateau. The fundamental point
to be made as it relates to maintaining undevelopment and conditioning
the patterns of underdevelopment on the Plateau is that it destroyed
farm land and forced people to work at very low wages. ' This was so
because there was a monopoly of freedom of the tin industry from
competition in the labour market, the absence of trade union
organization and a complete absence of a minimum wage legislation.2
Trade union organizations on the tin mines on the Plateau were not
begun until after 1945 and itwas not until in the period between 1950
and 1960 that they became politically vigorous.
3
In 1926 when the industry expanded, there was a severe labour
shortage and that conditioned the payment of high wages. 4 For example,
wages for labourers increased from five shillings and six pence in
1926 to six shillings and six pence per week in 1928. 5 In 1931 however
there was evidently a sufficiently large core of labour which was
thoroughly broken into mining, willing to continue work at a very low
wage and there was nothing to prevent the mining companies from imposing
drastic wage cuts. 6 In the instance the average wages for a labourer
fell from six shillings and six pence per week to about two shillings
and seven pence.
7
 Although after 1931 there was an increased demand
1. Perham 1947 p.24
2. Ibid
3. Trade Union Movements on the Plateau Tin Fields are examined
with more analytical details in Chapters 	 4-	 where we relate
their activities and influences in the politics of the M-Belt
Movement.
4. Perham 1947 p.24
5. Ibid p.23 n.3
6. Ibid p.23
7. Ibid p.24
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for labour there was only a slight increase in wages, averaging three
shillings and six pence in 1937 and fluctuating to between two shillings
and three pence per week in 1938. 1 Penelope Bower suggests that in
the period between 1930 and 1940 and thereafter there were fluctuations
in wages: H ... because another decade of civilization had increased
the desire to earn wages and the former difficulty in recruiting
labour was not experienced to the same extent". 2 That was a period
when socio-economic consciousness of the Plateau groups and societies
became no longer 'self-contained' and apart from selling farm products
and firewood, also began to take an interest in wage earnings from the
tin mines. Implicit in these developments is that when the indigenous
groups and societies began to take an interest in the mining industry
the wages became low and when they were earned they did not assist in
the transformation of living conditions of the groups and societies
immediate to the tin mining fields. Even when this was so, the
majority of the indigenous population was fed into the unskilled
labour categories of the tin mining companies because they were
undeveloped in Western European educational skills before 1940. 3 This
was also the case with unskilled labour which was recruited from the
adjacent regions to the Plateau, from Benue,"Adamawa, S. Bauchi and
S. Zaria.4
The unskilled and skilled labour on the tin mines fields were
distinct types. The unskilled labour force which was employed on the
1. Perham 1947 p.23 n.3
2. Ibid p.24	 .
3. For more detailed examples of the social and religious conditions
which produced this undevelopment, see discussions in Section II
and II of this Chapter.
4. Perham 1947 p.25
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'pick and shovel and head pan' work in the period after 1940 was
composed of recruited 'political labour' from among the M-Belt groups
and societies, particularly from Plateau and Benue) ItIt also included
Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and Nupe who previously migrated and were
permanently settled on the Plateau. 2
 The emphasis on 'political
labour' was however in the period of the second world war particularly
so for the years between 1941 and 1944 and thereafter was subsequently
abandoned. The majority of the labourer work force on the tin-fields
in the period between 1940 and 1967 however remained largely persons
who migrated from the Islamic society in The North as was the pattern
since 1903. 3
 Both the indigenous unskilled and the migrant labour
force on the tin mines on the Plateau was illiterate and was unable
to speak English. 4 In the instance of the indigenous population
to the Plateau, their occupational roles in societywere essentially
hunting and agriculture for their small scale subsistence and only
appeared on the mines to earn money to pay taxes and buy some European
imported goods, when the short period of harvest was completed. 5
 Contra-
distinctively, the supervisory work over the 'pick and shovel and head
pan'labourers, the semi-skilled drag-line work and the skilled jobs in
the offices and technicians were filled for -the companies by Hausa,
Yoruba and Ibo. 6
 Headmen in charge of "sluice boxes ,,
	the indigenous
1. Perham 1947 p.24
2. Ibid
3. For examples, see more detailed discussions and tables in Section
V of this Chapter where the migrant population increases on the
Plateau are examined from the period between 1903 and 1940.
4. Perham 1947 p.24
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
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M-Belt groups and societies and Hausa unskilled labour worked, were
usually Hausa, while Southern Nigerian immigrants worked as fitters,
electricians and clerks. '
When the Japanese seized by military force the British colony
of 'Malaya' in 1942 and there was the consequent necessity to increase
the output of tin, the tin mining companies were impelled to seek the
assistance of the government of British administration in The North
to create extra labour. 2 In the instance however, local labour was
already depleted by recruitment into the army from among the essentially
non-Islamic groups and societies centred on the Plateau. 3 There was
also the additional problem created by a diverse need in labour demands
to grow food for the increased need for local foodstuff for additional
men to work on the tin mines. 4 The situation conditioned attempts
in February 1942 to "import" 10,000 men conscripted under the Nigeria
Defence (compulsory National Service) (Essential Mines Northern Provinces)
Regulations No.23 of 1942 from the Islamic society as well as from among
the M-Belt groups and societies. 5 The scheme however resulted in main-
taining only 515 conscripted men who still worked on the tin fields
by July 1942 because of frequent desertions and the absence of proper
organization for their welfare. 6 Subsequently in the same year, because
1. Perham 1947 p.24
2. Ibid p.25
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
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of the failure of 'The February 1942 scheme', another became devised
in which there was provision of a special machinery and the appointment
of an Administrative Director of Mineral Production: n ... with wide
powers to recruit the necessary labour, to fix wage rates and to
provide for the welfare of the "selected labourers" during the period
of 4 months for which their services were required at the mines". 1 To
give the scheme a boost, two Administrative Officers were posted to
the mines fields to act as Labour Welfare Officers and two others
became assigned and detailed: "... for constant touring and propagation
work in the Plateau Province to stimulate the flow of voluntary labour
from the tribes which are accustomed to meet the requirements of the
mining industry". 2
 The consequences of reorganizing 'The February
1942 Scheme' was that by December 1942, the total labour force on the
tin-mine fields reached 70,800 men, in which 14,000 were compulsorily
recruited from other provinces, 15,000 voluntarily recruited within
the Plateau Province, and the balance of 42,000 were made up of
permanent employees of the Mining Companies and voluntary labour from
the various regions adjacent to the Plateau. 3 The policy of compulsory
recruitment of 'political labour' meant for the mines however became
changed and ended in April, 1944.4
Although Penelope Bower suggests that this was so because of
further installations of machinery which reduced the need for extra
labour with concomitant financial costs, 5 the findings of Tseayo and
Unongo on Tiv recruitment as political labour for the tin mines suggest
that there was a critical level of death rate. For example it is
1. Perham 1947 p.25
2. Ibid
3. Report on the Department of Labour 1942 p.2, cited in Perham 1947
p.25
4. Perham 1947 p.25
5. Ibid
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suggested that: "Thousands of able bodied young Tiv were removed
forcefully ... to the temperate cold of the Jos Plateau ... most died
even before they arrived at their shacks ... many more died from the
unfamiliar (climatic) conditions". 1 This suggests that while the
M-Belt areas and people were undeveloped, there were new socio-
economic and political conditions which underdeveloped their groups
and societies. Furthermore this also suggests that in the period
between 1900 and 1950, besides the outstanding feature in the absence
of the major cash crops of either the Islamic society or The North
and those characteristic of Southern Nigeria, there were internal
economic problems within the area itself which made the M-Belt groups
and societies persist in an undeveloped situation which established
a premise for the underdevelopment of socio-economic institutions.
It is very little wonder that a M-Belt Movement was begun from Jos,
given the multivariant nature of shared socio-economic and political
problems in the experiences of people brought up from among the M-Belt
groups and societies to work on the Plateau tin minefields.
By 1950 therefore there existed a number of striking and sharp
contrasts between the economies of the M-Belt groupsand societies and
the economy of the Islamic society in The North. This was most
apparent in the total absence of cash crops, particularly in Adamawa,
S. Bauchi, Plateau and S. Zaria had "no real cash crops" in the period
between 1900 and 1945.
2
 In the instance of the Tiv in Benue Province,
1. Paul Iyorpuu Unongo, "Where Do We Co From Here", An Open Letter 
to the Tiv People, 1969, unpublished, cited in Tseayo 1975 p.151
2. Forde and Scott 1945 p.196
among other groups and societies in that area, it was not until in
1929 that the Beniseed crop commercialized the Tiv economy on an
export basis.' In that year 8,889 tons became exported and the export
tonnage of the Beniseed crop increased to 19,000 in 1955. 2
 Soya beans
became an additional cash crop from Tiv land after its introduction
in the period of the second world war. 3 Although ten tons of the
product became exported in 1947, its popularity grew and in 1955,
19,700 tons were exported, the highest recorded production before the
dramatic political changes of Nigeria in 1967 conditioned BP state to
score production differently from the rest of The North. 4 Furthermore,
unlike the grain economy in the Islamic society, production of food-
crops among the M-Belt groups and societies was purely within the
community and meant for home consumption. Where there were financial
exchanges, they became tied-up to the new economic activities
developed from impact with British influences and also connected to
the development of alien communities among the M-Belt groups and societies.
This means that economic activity among the M-Belt groups and societies
contributed to internal rather than external financial exchange. Forde
and Scott suggestthat this condition of undevelopment with its con-
comitant consequences on the underdevelopment of some of the M-Belt
1. Tseayo 1975 p.126
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
groups and societies on the Plateau contributed to the sizes of
families which were smaller than those in the Islamic society. A
family on the Plateau consisted of only a man and a wife with one or
two children or three adult units) AlthoughAlthough family fertility was
"fair" infant mortality was high among the Plateau groups and
societies. 2 For example, the gynaecological histories of 82 Birom
women of various ages showed that while the number of pregnancies
were high, infant mortality, taken to be the age before walking, was
over 50% in 1945. 3 Although there was growing interest in the money
economy, particularly so to meet the needs of buying new products,
the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies in the 1940s remained
relatively undeveloped socially as both men and women went about naked
and in decorative attire with the bulk of their economic instruments
and utensils being produced within the villages or districts.
4
 Further-
more, the economies of the M-Belt groups and societies were less
developed than that of the Islamic society because they simply lacked
an integrative economic base with the new British economic forces
after 1900 and therefore remained undeveloped as much as they became
underdeveloped. This was more particularly so for the groups and societies
on the Plateau where there were intensive extractive economic industries
in the Tin and Columbite Mines. 5
 In other words, while a developed
1. Forde and Scott 1947 p.197
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.197 n.1
4. Ibid p.197
5. For more detailed discussion and examples see Section V (c) of
this Chapter.
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economic system in the Islamic society became easily tied to the
British extractive economy in The North, there was no previously
existing trans-local economic system among the M-Belt groups and
societies.
This was so because historically, the trans-local economic
centres developed from the Hausa markets and which became integrated
into the religious and political state of the Fulani Islamic
revolution, were both relatively larger and generated more wealth
than any market centre among the M-Belt groups and societies taken
singularly or in aggregate economic terms. ' While the markets among
the M-Belt groups and societies were essentially local, albeit mainly
centred in the villages of the different communities, the economic
markets in the. Islamic societies were trans-local, cutting across with
merchandise beyond the political boundaries of the Islamic state of
the Fulani revolution and the Kingdom of Borno to North Africa and
received merchants and goods from the Middle and Far East as well as
from Europe through the trans-Saharan trade routes. The trade with
the commerical links did not only generate wealth but also shaped
the socio-political skills of reading and writing in the Arabic scripts.
These were some of the historical bases in the roots of inequalities
which developed in The North, when the Islamic society is compared to
the M-Belt groups and societies. These initial historical economic
patterns in the Islamic societies became consolidated and magnified
1.	 For detailed discussions and examination of the trans-local
economies of the Islamic societies of Sokoto and Borno, see
Chapter .1,044 2.
34-4-
advantages upon the establishment of The North by the British. In
the instance, when the socio-economically disadvantaged M-Belt groups
and societies became territorially incorporated into the new political
unit of The North, they were in subordinate and socio-political and
economic status. Furthermore, the economic growth of the old and new
centres of trade and commerce which were concentrated in the Islamic
society intensified urbanization on both, but with a decline and economic
stagnation of the old, when trade became redirected toward the coast
rather than based on the traditional trans-Saharan routes.
The new centres of trade and politics however became built-up
on the old. This is explicit from the figures in Table S.M. While
there were 16 major centres of trade and politics before impact with
British influences, they only increased witha single addition of one
to 17 after the establishment of The North. Of the 16 centres of trade
and politics in the territories that became enclosed as a political
unit of The North, only one trade centre rather than a political centre
existed in Jos (Naraguta) which might be taken to be centred among
the M-Belt groups and societies, before impact with British influences
in 1900. Table 3,m, also suggests that the centres of trade and politics
in the Islamic society were maintained upon impact with British influences,
increasing from 15 to only 16 when there was the growth and development
of Kaduna as the major centre for administration by the government of
British administration in The North. 	 In the instance however, when
trade and politics shifted from Naraguta to Jos, it developed as a major
centre after 1900 largely due to the tin and columbite mines. This means
that economic patterns were not altered in the Islamic society in the
same sense of the experiences of the M-Belt groups and societies. This
Table 5,12	 The
in
Territorial Area
in The North
main Commercial, Trade and Political
The North in the period between
Centres before impa# with
British influences in 1900
Centres
1885 and 1960
Centres after impact with
British influences in 1900
Commerce
and
Trade
Politics Total
Commerce
and
Trade
Politics Total
The Islamic
Society
8 7 15 8 8 16
The M-Belt
groups and
societies
1 1 0 0
Total 9 7 16
Source: Breakdowns are from Okpu 1977 p.46.
A commercial and trade centre is taken to be a
market where there existed trans-local merchants
and merchandise for exchange purpose; a political
centre is taken to be where an important Emir or
a British senior administrative officer existed
with political decision-making powers, bu.',Ak ulo
-Prowl ce rLZJI orLAI1 base.
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was so because the British while consolidating the existing economic
patterns in the Islamic society also introduced new administrative
(political) and commercial centres and influenced the redirection of
the trans-Saharan trade routes by the introduction of the cash
crops, notably groundnuts and cotton with their concomitant new
cash exchange value to the ordinary farmer and trader. In the
instance the political and religious centres of trade centred in Kano,
Katsina and Zaria became the 'groundnut triangle' of The North,
generating wealth and revenue to local farmers and the government
while cotton was widely grown but concentrated in the Islamic
society.
The introduction of groundnuts for export purposes dates from
1912 when the Lagos to Kano rail link was opened to give the crop
production a boost and the subsequent production of cotton led to
differentiation in the material development of society with sharp con-
trasts between the Islamic society and the M-Belt groups and societies
in the amount of cash flows to both middle-men traders, the farmers
and the housewives. ' For example, in 1934 Forde and Scott suggest
that a farming household in Kano Province with groundnut got seventeen
pounds gross value by its marketing, 2 while -a housewife in the same
household earned a gross income of about ten pounds a year from
weaving goods in Kazaure because of the availability of cotton. 3
Furthermore in 1933 it was estimated that farmers in Kano produced an
t.0 vi 5
average of 37416tof groundnuts from h acre plot of land giving a
basic cash return of over eight shillings. 4 There were about between
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.245
2. Ibid p.140
3. Ibid p.138
4. Ibid p.144
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15000 and 80000 acres of land in Kazaure Division alone which produced
16000 tons of groundnuts with an approximate cash value of £34,000
in a year. 1 Cooking oil is also extracted from the groundnuts and
marketed by women for cash. The residue paste from the process is
mixed with salt and baked as "Kulli-Kulli" and becomes sold as a
popular item of food in the market place. 2 The two processes of
producing cooking oil and "Kulli-Kulli" from groundnuts is exclusively
carried out by women who are the professional extractors. 3 It ought
to be borne in mind however that groundnuts were a widely grown cash
crop in The North. For example in 1935 there was a record production
of 13000 tons of groundnuts in Benue Province. 4 This was only 4.9%
of the total production of groundnuts in The North for that year which
was 267,000 metric tons. 5 The process of producing oil and "Kulli-Kulli"
however remained a monopoly of Hausa women.
Cotton production in The North was centred on a belt 'South of
the groundnut belt', the most productive areas being in Misau, north
of Bauchi Province. 6 The 'Cotton Belt' in The North was essentially
concentrated in the Islamic society, although like groundnuts it was
a widely grown cash crop with variations in production levels among
the M-Belt groups and societies. Wealth generated by cotton and ground-
nut production in the Islamic society was supplemented by the growth
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.144
2. Ibid p.224
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid p.144
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of tobacco, vegetables and sugar cane in areas where there were
damp soil conditions like in Hadejia. 1 These were also cash fetching
agricultural products for industries and urban populations, although
they were not comparable to the cash output from groundnuts and cotton.
For example in 1937, typical cash returns were estimated for groundnuts
at twenty two shillings and twelve shillings for cotton per pound per
year. 2
The economic importance of groundnuts and cotton and their
impact in shaping the economy of the Islamic society albeit The North
is suggested by their rapidly increasing levels of production and
the financial revenues they accrued to the government. For example
the groundnut trade expanded from a few hundred tons in the first five
years of the century to over 300,000 tons in 1937 while its value
increased from less than 1% of the total export value of Nigeria to
as much as 24% in the trough year of 1933. 3 Similarly the exports
of cotton lint increased by 100% in the period between 1913 and 1931
and the export value of cotton comprised 5% of the total export of
Nigeria in 1921. 4 After some production fluctuations in the period
between 1903 and 1930, it reached its highest level of production
before 1950 of 192,000 cwt. in 1937. 5
A product which the M-Belt groups and societies completely
lacked in export and value and which contributed enormously to the
economy of The North was untanned hides and skins. This was so
because they simply did not have the "animal wealth" when it is
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.144 n.1
2. Forde and Scott 1945 p.145; it is suggested by Fords and Scott
that there were no comparative statistical prices beyond their
personal observations.
3. Forde and Scott 1945 p.7
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
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compared to the Islamic society sufficiently to be an export product.
The figures in Table •%3 suggest that only 14.9% of the animal wealth
in The North existed among the M-Belt groups and societies. Pigs
were widely kept among the M-Belt groups and societies, consisting
of 73.5% of their numbers in The North. The Tiv alone kept about
27,773 pigs, which was 58.5% of the total numbers of pigs in The North
in 1931. 1 The rather high number of pigs in the Islamic society is
explained by their concentration among the non-Islamic groups and
societies centred around Ilorin and Nupe. This ought to be under-
stood because Moslems have a religious and social revulsion toward
keeping dogs and pigs, animals that were widely eaten as a source of
protein among the M-Belt groups and societies. 2
 One of the ways in
which mobilization was achieved for electoral political support for
the UMBC party in the late 1950s and 1960s in the demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region among the Tiv was in a political song
which suggested differences in the types of food eaten between
the Islamic society in The North and the M-Belt groups and societies,
particularly the pig. For example, this was so when the Tiv sang
"Semba Uke ga Semba Yan Igo", (We are not 'Uke' (Hausa) we eat pig).3
1. Talbot 1969 p.237
2. This point will be revisited and examined in more detail in
Chapters L.	 : where we analyze the nature of social issues
that were fed into the political demands for the creation of
a M-Belt Region separated from the Islamic society in the
Nigerian Federation.
3. Discussions with M. J. Dent, 1979-1983
Table 5 . 13	 Livestock wealth in The North in 1931
Livestock
Type
Livestock
Total
Islamic
Areas
% Total M-Belt
Areas
% Total
Swine
(pigs) 47,445 12,584 26.5 34,861 73.5
Sheep 1,731,609 1,353,170 78.1 378,439 21.9
Stallions
(Horses) 62,153 50,180 80.7 11,973 19.3
Goats 4,281,131 3,475,330 81.2 805,801 18.3
Mares 96,526 84,942 88.0 11,584 12.0
Donkeys 436,757 408,392 93.5 28,365 6.5
Cattle 2,248,913 2,196,460 97.7 52,453 2.3
Ostriches 369 365 98.9 4 1.1
Camels 4,802 4,788 99.7 14 0.3
Total 8,909,705 7,586,211 85.1
	 - 1,323,494 14.9
Source: Computed from Talbot 1969, Table 43 p.237
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It ought to be borne in mind however that the respectable con-
centration of sheep, horses, goats, mares, donkeys and cattle among
the M-Belt groups and societies is explained by the provincial scores
in the 1931 census. This means that the animal wealth in the M-Belt
areas as suggested by the figures in Table 3 . v3 was concentrated with
Hausa Fulani in the Islamic centres of religion and politics like
Yola, Bauchi and Zaria, rather than among the M-Belt groups and
societies. It was from the concentration of this animal wealth in
the Islamic society in The North that as early as in 1908, 10,000
untanned hides and skins reached the Nigerian ports for export
purposes.
1
 The following years witnessed steady increases in the
extraction of the products until in 1937 when 6,000,000 hides and
skins were exported from The North with a total revenue value of
£853,000 for the government.
2
It was in these economic advantages that the territorial
incorporation of the M-Belt groups and societies into the political
Unit of The North with a dominant and wealthier Islamic society
reinforced political inequalities upon impact with British influences.
This affected the causes of the developing dependence of the M-Belt
groups and societies on the cultural, economic and socio-political
patterns of the Hausa-Fulani Islamic society in the period between
1900 and 1950. Except for Tin and Columbite products, which were
gained from the territorial areas of the M-Belt groups and societies
and which subsequently created an enclave industry and infrastructural
development on the Jos Plateau, there was nothing comparable to the
development of 'cash crops' in the Islamic society. This was one of
the economic premises from which as early as in 1933, Cameron became
1. Forde and Scott 1945 p.10
2. Ibid
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concerned over the undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies.
In that year he pointed out that the non-Islamic groups and societies
in The North had made less political progress in 30 years when
compared to similar socio-economic and political units in the South
of Nigeria, who achieved rapid development in three or four years. '
In the period between 1900 and 1930 the economic and socio-
political undevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies was
also characterized by depravity and moral degradation which was
constantly compared to European and Islamic civilizations. This
became fitted to be the general patterns existing in the non-Islamic
parts of Africa. In particular, this was so for Christian Missionary
choice selection of observ
	 socio-economic and political
patterns in the societies of the M-Belt areas. According to
Christian Missionaries from European nations who went to The North
in Nigeria, the socio-economic conditions of the undevelopment and
the underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies were caused
by the consequences of Islamic slave raids and the persistence of
the slave trade in the period between 1804 and 1900. These ideas
were however previously and rigorously propounded with their
remedies suggested by T.F. Buxton in about-1840 in England. 2
At the beginning of the 20th Century however, Christian
Missionaries still maintained that it was Islamic raids for slaves
and the slave trade which reduced the West African Nations: II .,. into
fragments of nations ... disintegrated nations .. broken nations ...
that are the spent waves of a stream of harrassed humanity, testi-
fying to terrific tempests of strife that for ages have swept over
the seething millions of the vast interior ... a calamity that left
1. Kirk Greene 1965 p.195
2. For examples, see discussions in Section II of this Chapter.
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the crushed African mass a mere heap of particles."1
 In one instance
for example, Maxwell used a report from the government of British
administration on existing political and economic conditions before
impact with British influences in 1900, which suggested that in
The North: "The country was controlled and ruled under conditions
giving no guarantee of liberty or even strife ... slave raiding was
being carried on by the Mohammedans upon the pagans and the pagans
in general were engaged in inter-tribal warfare .. further realities
were those of exorbitant taxation, extermination of populations,
cannibalism, trial by ordeal, highway robbery, ignorance, illiteracy
and disease." 2
This was the political and social premise from which conceptions
of religious cum political paternalism for the development of the
M-Belt groups and societies in Christian Missionaries became
established to support the government of British administration in
The North. 3
 Kumm for one, suggested that like people, the nations
of the world can be divided into adults and children, with "The Negro"
being the "Hobbledehoi" of the Human Family. 4
 According to Kumm,
with a typology like that: ".. The heathen clans amongst whom we
are today administering justice in Central Africa, are in our hands
as little children whose fate and future we may make or mar... older
than the whiteman in years, but in mind and soul, a child; and as
children they must be treated .. They are our brothers and sisters
1. Boer 1979 p.169
2. Maxwell 1952 p.131
3. Boer 1979 p.131
4. Ibid
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in common humanity. They are one of us in sin and ruin .. eventually
they will occupy a responsible and respected position in the Council
of the Nations, the Parliament of Mankind ... characterized by peace,
justice, increased health and wealth, modern education and technology -
all stamped with Christian morality." 1 It was this paternalistic
path geared toward creating a specific type of society, among the
M-Belt groups and societies albeit the 'Sudan' which Christian
Missionaries followed and sought to create, a type of society that
might be different from patterns in the Islamic society and therefore
hold an attraction to the adherents of the Islamic religion,
sufficiently for Christianity to thrive in fulfilling the objectives
of Christendom in civilizing Africa with European civilization.2
However contrary to the general ideas of Karl Kumm which were based
on his wide travels in the 'Sudan', in the social and political
experiences of Lowry Maxwell centred on the Jukum towns of Ibi and
Wukari as well as among other M-Belt groups and societies:	 "The
Native was an ignorant lot that needed the protection of the govern-
ment than paternalism."3 In other words, Maxwell saw the relation-
ship to the government of British administration in The North as 'Loco
parentis to the Natives' rather than the isolated paternalism of
Christian Missionaries advocated by Kumm with no complimentary
patterns.
4
Although there were differences in the emphasis among Christian
Missionaries on who was "protector of the pagan" in The North, for
example, whether it was the government of British administration or
1. Extracts from the writings of Karl W.H. Kumm in the period
between 1900 and 1910, cited in Boer 1979 p.131-132
2. For more detailed discussions and examples of Christian
Missionary objectives in the 'Sudan' see Section II of this
Chapter.
3. Boer 1979 p.151
4. Ibid
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the Christian Missionaries, government became supported because it
represented the government of England, a country where there
existed the highest attributes and virtues of the West, especially
those of Liberty and Justice for the cause of humanity.
1
 For example,
Kumm, a German Christian Missionary in The North, suggested that
within the Western Nations of Europe: "Britain outshone all other
nations in justice where truthfulness, honesty and liberty are valued
more highly than in any other on earth."
2
The Christian Missionary path to transform the undeveloped
nature of the M-Belt groups and societies with the development of
European educational school systems and social welfare institutions
became shaped by these socio-political notions. Unlike the progress
of Christianity through the establishment of Christian churches which
made converts and produced the Christian communities, Christian
Missionary development of education among the M-Belt groups and
societies was characterized by neglect in the pre-1940 period with
almost relegation to the backwaters of achieving European modernization.
This was so because of the religious preference in the emphasis of
the development of Christianity. Both processes however shared a
characteristic initial slow growth in the period between 1900 and
1930 when it is compared with the subsequent Christian conversions
into Christianity and Christian educational development in the
period between 1930 and 1950 and in the period between 1950 and 1970.3
1. Boer 1979 p.130
2. Kumm 1910, cited in Boer 1979 p.130
3. The concern of the next few pages will be to show how Christian
Missionaries made efforts to transform societies in the M-Belt
areas by the development of European type of educational and
welfare institutions in the period between 1900 and 1950.
Educational developments as a direct consequence of Christian
Missionary activities in the period between 1950 and 1970 are
examined in Chapters 4.Q.,413.
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In the instance of the initial slow growth of education among
the M-Belt groups and societies before 1930, this was caused by a
deliberate Christian Missionary religious policy. 	 For example,
Maxwell suggests that Christian Missionaries did not advance the
frontiers of educating the M-Belt groups and societies before 1940
because according to "indigenous Church principles it would seem
well to wait until the people were prepared to advance". ' However,
when it was in the experience of Christian Missionaries that
Christianity developed more rapidly with learning European modernizing
skills in the school system, the two began to develop collaterally
after 1940. The period between 1930 and 1940 was characterized by
Christian Missionary refinement of its educational policy for the
development of the M-Belt groups and societies. 2 Although there
were numerous socio-economic and religious factors with political
ramifications, which conditioned the development of European
educational institutions by Christian Missionaries after 1940 among
the M-Belt groups and societies, one of the most significant was
the social feedback they experienced from Nigerian soldiers whose
ethnic origins were from among the M-Belt groups and societies who
were Christian converts and had been recruited into the Army to
fight the second world war in Abbyssinia (Ethiopia), India, Burma and
North Africa. For example, Maxwell suggests that although in the
1. Maxwell 1952 p.252
2. For more detailed discussions with examples, see Sections II
and II of this Chapter.
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experiences of Christian Missionaries the "African mind" was not yet
"woken up" to the real needs and facts of the circumstances: "We
found that we had been far too slow in our schools .. the world and
life will not wait upon our tastes and prejudices. Our young people
joined the forces. Their services took them to Abbyssinia, India,
Burma and North Africa. Letters came back home from these lads,
sometimes to parents who could not read them. 	 So there arises a
demand for schools and schools need teachers and teachers nowadays
may be greatly attracted by the possibilities of other professions
with less (religious) ties and more pay: Mines, commerce,-transport,
army, police, medical services, public hygiene, local administration,
engineering, railway, forestry - all beckon the clever boy who knows
enough to be able to take or give written instructions or to keep
an account or a register or to rise out of the rut of native hand!-
craftsmanship 11 . 1 Maxwell further suggests that in the 1940s,
Christian Missionaries realized that they might not be able to build
up longer lasting churches and Christian communities in socio-economic
and political ignorance since: "There ought to be someone in the
Christian community who knows something about the historical and
geographical setting of the Bible Story, something about the history
of the Christian Church, of the civilization of today and its urges
and perils, something of the errors of Roman:Ism, Millenial Dawnism
and other "isms" that are seeking to seduce Africa today. Then when
1.	 Maxwell 1952 p.252
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the new Hausa Bible is in their hands and the more thorough
exposition of it, may not be either shirked or postponed .. and
lastly our people need much help, properly competent help too, in
bridging the gap between the primitive way of life into which they
have been born and the terrific rush of modern civilization that is
pouring in like a flood over poor Africa, withits harsh calls for
nationalism and self-government and its glittering line of money
and more money, pleasure and more pleasure, power and more power."
1
Although Christian Missionary work in The North which sub-
sequently became concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies
was begun as Evangelical work, it became more and more involved with
establishing the European school system for modernization. In the
instance, it rapidly opened and organized Christian institutions
among the M-Belt groups and societies after 1940. The Christian
institutions were established with an explicit Christian religious
ideology, cutting through the whole spectrum of the curriculum. In
these institutions there was a rigorous programme of Christian
religious indoctrination, firstly into the Christian faith and also
directed toward building up anti-Islamic sentiments. 2 Furthermore,
although in the period between 1900 and 1930- there was political
and religious restriction of the activities of Christian Missionaries
in The North contained in explicit anti-Christian Missionary policies,3
there was no comparable venture in which the government of British
administration in The North and the different Christian Missionary
Bodies, together cooperated as closely as they did in the educational
1. Maxwell 1952 p.181
2. This will become apparent in the details of the next few pages.
3. For examples, see more detailed discussion of these policies in
Section V and III of this Chapter.
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sphere.
1
 In contrast to the Medical Departments which were run by
the government it was not until 1945 that the Educational Depart-
ments "cordially invited" the cooperation of Christian Missionaries
and the churches for the progress of educational development among
the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North. 2
It was Lugard in the period between 1900 and 1920 who set the
precedent for the developing correlation in the relationship between
Christianity and the establishment of European type of educational
institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies. In the instance,
Lugard suggested that Christian Missionary interests might "take
off the burden" from the government in the education of the "pagan
tribes". 3 Subsequently as early as in 1910, Rower, a top British
Resident stationed in Yola, suggested to Maxwell that "the Education
of pagans was the Mission's task". 4 Furthermore, unique in the
political and religious policies of the ruling caste he belonged to,
Governor Bell suggested in 1911 that Christian Missionary work and
the education of the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North
was crucially important "in order to forestall the advance of Islam".
5
In 1918 when the provincial government in Benue appointed a clergyman,
Reverend G.P. Bargery as Director of Education "for the pagan areas,
Missions were asked to cooperate in education". 6 In 1924 Farrant
1. Boer 1979 p.303
2. Ibid
3. Maxwell 1952 p.253
4. Boer 1979 p.163
5. Ibid p.192
6. 'bid p.194
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suggests that there existed a principle in the government of British
administration in The North: "..• more or less accepted that
Mohammedan education is in the hands of the government but the
education of pagans was to be left in the hands of the Missions...
and in any case Government schools offer no hope at all (to
Christianity) for the satisfactory education of Christian children". '
In the period between 1900 and 1926, government effort in the
education of the M-Belt groups and societies was however practically
non-existent. 2
 For example as latterly as in 1926 while there were
68 government and NA schools in The North, which were mainly con-
centrated in the Islamic society with a total average attendance of
22.,207 pupils, there were 56 Christian Missionary schools concentrated
among the M-Belt groups and societies which had 3,003 pupils in
average attendance with only one of their schools receiving govern-
ment financial assistance. 3
 In that year however the Australian-
New Sealand Branch of the SUM expressed happiness with an educational
grant of £50,103 from the government of British administration in
The North. 4
 Furthermore in 1927 the provincial government on the
Plateau proposed that Christian Missionaries undertake all elementary
school development in the province. 5
1. G.H. Farrant,SUM Circular, 22nd February 1924
2. Boer 1979 p.194
3. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.32
4. Boer 1979 p.279; The socio-political and religious controversies
over government financial assistance is examined in more detail
below.
5. The Light Bearer Magazine, 6th March 1937
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Although the goveinment of British administration on the Plateau
never implemented this formulated policy, the development of European-
type educational institutions in the school system became the
exclusive concern of Christian Missionaries. As early as in 1908,
the first European-type schools to be operational on the Plateau were
those opened by the CMS at Kabwir among the Angas and at Panyam among
the Sura. 1 In the period between 1908 and 1940 educational development
on the Plateau was almost entirely derived from the work of various
Christian Missionary societies. 2 In 1937 for example when there was
a total number of 61 schools of all grades on the Plateau, - 55 were
Christian Missionary schools with only one government school in Jos
township and five Native Administration schools. 3 Ames suggests that
even when this was the case, the government and Christian Missionary
schools in Jos township in 1926, were specifically meant to meet:
II ... the demands for schools for the children of educated and semi-
educated natives of Southern Provinces of Nigeria and other African
colonies... There are also at Jos four other schools maintained by
Missions. The total pupils'number was 456 of whom not more than
five per cent are natives of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria.
Teaching in these schools is entirely in English and the work reaches
a more advanced academic standard than in the village Mission schools." 4
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p.312
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.314
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This suggests that although there were lower academic standards
in Christian Missionary schools, the majority of which were directly
influential in the diffusion of Christianity, while the Christian
institutions were begun as early as in 1908, it was not until in
the 1930s that government educational development began to take
shape among the Plateau groups and societies. For example, in 1930
an NA Elementary Day School became opened at Jema'a but for Moslem
boys only. '
 In 1933 similar NA schools were opened at/4gel, Haifan
and Bokkos, followed by another at Rim in 1934• 2 These schools served
the Birom and the Challa as well as the migrant labour force on the
tin mines. Ames suggests that it was intended: "Further Elementary
Schools for non-Moslem pupils will be opened from time to time as
the students from the Province at the Toro Training Centre complete
their training."3
The Toro Training Centre Institution was opened by the govern-
ment of British administration in 1929, exclusively for the training
of teachers for NA Elementary schools in the non-Moslem parts of Bauchi
and Plateau. 4
 In 1933 seven students indigenous to the Plateau
groups and societies passed out from the Centre and became posted
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p.314; it ought to be
borne in mind that Jema'a Federation was a Division in Plateau
Province until it became politically transferred into S. Zaria
as part of Zaria Province in 1934. For examples and discussions
see Section V (c) of this Chapter.
2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p.314
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
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to work in schools in Jos and Pankshin Divisions. '
 Two of these
students, Rwang Pam and Gwamna Kagoro subsequently became Headmasters
of NA schools and in the 1950s were first-class-chiefs of the Birom
and Kagoro respectively in the NHC. In the same year 11 students,
indigenous to the Plateau groups and societies were still studying
at Toro, 4 having passed through Elementary Christian Missionary
schools.
2
 While the government of British administration in The North
trained non-Islamic teachers, not necessarily Christians, at Toro
for service among the M-Belt groups and societies, the Missionaries
trained Christian teachers at the RCM institutions in Shendam, opened
in 1933 and the SUM colleges at Gindiri opened in 1934 which also had
an Elementary practising school attached to it. 3
 Ames suggests that
training sortie of the Christian teachers in Gindiri reached an advanced
academic standard. 4
 This means that although government was concerned
to develop education among the non-Itlamic groups and societies on
the Plateau, the efforts of Christian Missionaries, similar to other
areas of the M-Belt groups and societies were more characteristic of
the process.
Table 3.14 suggests that 90% of European-type educational insti-
tutions on the Plateau were Christian schools with 90.3% of student
attendances rather than in government schools. In these institutions,
it is significant that while there were 496 girls in Christian schools
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p.313
2. Ibid p.314
3. Ibid p.313
4. Ibid p.314
Table 3.14.	 Concentration of European-type Educational
Institutions on the Plateau in 1933
Origins of
Institution
,
Number of
Schools
% Schools Number of
Pupils
% Pupils
SUM 28 46.7 790 35.9
RCM 16 26.7 629 28.6
Lagos Diocesan
Synod 5 8.3 271 12.3
SIM 4 6.7 237 10.8
Native
Administration 5 8.3 129 5.9
Government 1 1.7 85 3.9
Baptist Mission 1 1.7 58 2.6
Total 60 100% 2,119 100%
Source: computed from Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,
1972 p.315
36Z
on the Plateau, the six government schools were educating, 214 boys
only, in 1933. 1
 This suggests that even when educational development
began to take shape as a direct consequence of government involvement, it
became conditioned by the practices of modernization as it existed in
the Islamic society in The North in which women were excluded from the
process. There were however 1,489 boys in the Christian Missionary
schools in 1933. 2
 This is about three times the number of girls in
the Christian schools. Although this suggests that there were more
boys rather than girls in the Christian Missionary schools, the
significant fact however is that the education of girls was com-
pletely excluded from government and NA schools on the Plateau in
1933.
Ames suggests that these figures were only the numbers of pupils
shown as enrolled in regular attendance but that in the Christian
Missionary schools in the villages: "The number in attendance is con-
siderably in excess of those on the roll so that these figures should not
be regarded as an accurate index of the number of persons influenced by
the Missions from an educational point of view."3
 In other words, un-
like Christian Missionary circumstances in the urban centres, there
was more Christian influence in the villages, where the Christian schools
took in pupils of any age provided they were willing to attend regularly.
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p.315
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.313; My father suggests that when he was the Evangelist-
Headmaster at Fan village in the 1950s the ages of pupils in
the SUM Elementary Primary school ranged from 10 year-olds
to married adults of about 25 years old who sat in the same
classes.
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However in addition to the 54 Christian Missionary schools on the
Plateau in 1933, there were also 32 classes of Christian Religious
Instructions which were maintained by different Missionary Bodies.'
In these classes, only a little reading and writing was taught based
on the need to understand the Bible. 2 In other words these were
not formal schools.
The socio-religious emphasis in the objectives of the government
of British administration in The North when it encouraged Christian
Missionaries to develop educational institutions among the M-Belt groups
and societies was to achieve "character building and with a universal
religion". 3 This was so because society and social control among the
M-Belt groups and societies was not understood but assumed to be non-
existant and therefore the appropriate entities to civilize with
European modernizing influences. 4 In the instance it was suggested
that although the Christian religion was to be taught and not Islam,
its instruction being compulsory in the Christian schools, objectors
were to be excused. 5 In 1930 the Christian Missionaries acknolwedged
the policy, placed some of their schools under government control in
acceptance of their functional role of "character building and
religion". 6 The government of British administration in The North
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p.315
2. Ibid
3. Boer 1979 p.194
4. For more detailed discussions and examples, see Chapter 2,
Sectionl"ndE where British social and political attitudes
toward the Islamic society in The North contrasted sharply
with those held toward the M-Belt groups and societies.
5. Boer 1979 p.194
6. Ibid
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complimented this by recognizing Christian Missionary graduates as
"proper graduates, eligible to compete for positions on the same
/
basis as graduates from government schools") FromFrom this development
there was increased cooperation after 1930 between Christian Missionary
Bodies and the government of British administration in The North in
the development of educational institutions among the M-Belt groups
and societies.
Although this was so, Coleman suggests that educational cooperation
between the government of British administration in The North and the
Christian Missionaries was "a marriage of convenience" and like all
marriages there were socio-economic and political tensions. 2 The
tensions were three-fold. Firstly, financial assistance to Christian
Missionaries with its concomitant consequences on social and political
control by the government of British administration in The North.
Secondly, on a policy, although it was never implemented, of deploying
trained teachers from the Islamic society to all educational institutions
in The North inclusive of Christian Missionary schools.	 Thirdly, -
Christian Missionary religious teaching for conversion into Christianity
in all schools in the M-Belt areas after 1940 in order to produce virile
Christian communities with knowledge about "the civilizations of today".
3
Before 1940 there was a suggested policy in the government of
British administration in The North that Moslem teachers among the
1. Boer 1979 p.194
2. Coleman 1974 p.4
3. Maxwell 1952 p.181
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M-Belt groups and societies might be more prestigious in social
status. '
 When this developed to be policy of government of and
fact to Christian Missionaries, Maxwell counter-acted the assumed
prestige of Moslem teachers by suggesting that properly trained
teachers from among the M-Belt groups and societies were more
prestigiously acceptable, especially where there was "anti-Hausa
and anti-Islamic sentiments". 2
 This was the religious premise
from which there was developed the urgent Christian Missionary need
to produce educationally qualified Christian teachers by training
indigenes from among the M-Belt groups and societies in order to
reduce the need for Moslem teachers in Christian educational insti-
tutions. In that instance although it was not until in the 1940s
when Christian Missionaries began to implement a counter-active policy
of educational development of teachers, as early as in 1910 Maxwell
vigorously suggested to Christian Missionaries in The North: "That
they are now even training at Kano a number of teachers in the
rudiments, linking book and handwork. These will be utilised up
and down the country. They will all be either Moslem or Islam-
invested Missions, it's up to you to provide teachers that
Government will recognize as qualified for the pagan districts so
that the schools in them need not be taught by Moslems .. before
the Government comes with its Kano-taught 'Mallcims' to set up an
Islamic-tainted Government school ... It is coming ... and we must
get up to meet it". 3
 In the developing relationship between the
1. Boer 1979 p.162-163
2. Ibid p.162
3. Maxwell Diaries 1910, cited in Boer 1979 p.162
3‘..(..
the Christian Missionaries and government of British administration
in The North, however, it has been suggested that Vischer subsequently
intended a programme of cooperation whereby the government establish
schools among the M-Belt groups and societies and Christian Missionaries
supply only teachers: "for distinctly Christian religious instructions". '
This was the premise from which the development of schools among the
M-Belt groups and societies became shaped by Christian Missionary
Teachers who trained indigenous Teacher-Evangelists from each of the
"tribal areas". In the period between 1900 and 1940 the concern of the
Christian Missionaries was therefore with the Training of Teachers who
will also be church leaders and do evangelical work. This was the
premise from which Dawson the SUM Field Secretary emphasized that "it
is the government's business to promote education while the Mission
is interested only in evangelism and training of church leaders". 2
This suggests that Christian Missionaries were interested in the develop-
ment of Education among the M-Belt groups and societies only as long
as the process aided the cause for Christianity. Although this was
so, after 1940 the Christian Missionaries had many reasons which
caused regret for an insistance like that. 3
When the educational process was begun however, similar to the
developing patterns in the Islamic society, both Christian Missionaries
and the government of British administration in The North before 1950
initially tried to focus their attention on providing education only
1. Boer 1979 p.193
2. Ibid
3. These reasons will become apparent in the more detailed
discussions below.
3'-'
to the M-Belt groups and societies. In 1913 for example, the
government planned an Elementary School at Ibi at the site of the
Christian Missionary Headquarters for the sons of chiefs. '
 In the
1930s, Bristow sought the political cooperation of the government
in having chiefs and other prominent persons in society send their
sons to Christian Missionary schools. 2
However, in the instance of the socio-religious tensions over
the deployment of government teachers who might be Moslems to
teach in schools among the M-Belt groups and societies, Christian
Missionaries counter-acted the plans by directly involving themselves
in teaching programmes in their schools as well as with a rapid
programme of developing indigenous Christian teachers. For example
in 1931 while there were 14 European teachers with 180 "Native" teachers
in 30 Government schools, mainly in the Islamic society, there were
48 European teachers with 108 "Native" teachers in 102 unassisted
Christian Missionary schools which were concentrated among the M-Belt
groups and societies. 3
 In that year however there was one Christian
Missionary school with two European teachers and six "Native" teachers
which received grants and financial assistance from the government. 4
This suggests that there was more direct European influence in the
development and training of the M-Belt groups and societies through
1. Boer 1979 p.193
2. The Light Bearer Magazine, 6th March 1937
3. Talbot 1969, Table 57 p.260
4. Ibid
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the school system rather than in the Islamic society. The social
consequences in these direct European influences with Christianity
in the transformation of the M-Belt groups and societies to
European patterns and views are obvious. '
In the instance of the tensions between the government and Christ-
ian Missionaries over religious teachings in the period between 1900
and 1950 in the developing schools, these were centred on the pro-
hibition of 'teaching Christianity' outside Christian Missionary
schools among the M-Belt groups and societies. For example, although
it was the politics of Lugard that determined that education among
the M-Belt groups and societies was to have Christian religious bias
for the pragmatic reason of obtaining a higher level of morality,
when government established schools in the area, they prevented the
teaching of Christianity. 2
 Since Government schools had Moslems as
teachers, Farrant suggests that the government of British administration
in The North was "a proselytising force for Islam" among the M-Belt
groups and societies. 3
 Bishop Smith further suggests that there
were instances in which boys from among the M-Belt groups and societies
were forcibly enrolled in government schools rather than those of
Christian Missionaries and in the instance they were taught by Moslem
teachers with Moslem textbooks and therefore "were morally bound
to become Moslems". 4
 There were also instances where Christian boys
1. This is examined in more detail in Chapter 4-where the growth
and development of the M-Belt Movement with a distinct
Christian religious identity is discussed.
2. Boer 1979 p.303
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.281
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attending government industrial schools became compelled to work on
Sundays. 1
 Furthermore in 1942 Doris Spencer also suggests that the
series of The Government Readers for schools "Magana Jan i Ce" were
unsuitable for use in schools where there were Christian boys in the
M-Belt areas because the books contained an Islamic ideology about
society with denigratory social attitudes toward European civilization.
Spencer listed a number of bad qualities raised in the books on
European civilization which included "saying bad things about Europeans,
cruelty, invective, lying, perversion of justice, nepotism, loose
living, immorality, gambling, drinking, smoking, harlots and concubines".
2
Spencer therefore suggested that the books were Moslem inspired,
contained Islamic doctrines and concluded: ".. were children in schools
for Moslems only given reading books upholding Christian doctrines
there would quickly be strong objections made. Instead of this we
get approved school books made almost into a handbook on Mohammedanism".3
There were also suggestions that Moslems exerted strong pressures
against having Christian teaching of Moslem children in government
schools, Moslem chiefs preventing children from attending Christian
schools and Spencer felt Christians ought to display a similar zeal
"to prevent their children from exposure to Moslem influence". 4 In the
1. Boer 1979 p.281
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
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one instance of Moslem chiefs preventing non-Islamic children from
attending Christian schools Tett for example suggests that "Moslem
overlords use threats to prevent the pagan peoples from allowing their
children to attend our Christian Religious Instructions in Lafiya". 1
Complaints of this nature continued throught the pages of the Light
Bearer Magazines in the period between 1903 and 1950 from different
Christian Missionary Bodies in The North. 2
However the greatest issue that became a problem in the period
between 1900 and 1950 in educational cooperation between Christian
Missionaries and government for the development of the M-Belt groups
and societies was government financial assistance and grants to
Christian Missionaries for educational purposes. Although the
Christian Missionaries subsequently accepted grants from the govern-
ment of British administration in The North, particularly so after
1945, the initial strong suspicions about the political and social
intentions of the grants and financial assistance remained and
sometimes meant outright opposition. This was so because Christian
Missionaries were always alerting themselves that government sought
to use them for its own aims rather than those of Christianity. 3
 It
was after 'The 1910 Lokoja Conference' that Christian Missionaries
1. W.H. Tett, Annual Report for Lafiya, 1942
2. Boer 1971 p.282
3. Boer 1979 p.280
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adopted a policy on accepting grants and financial assistance from
the Government.
1
 The policy suggests that government grants and
financial assistance were to be accepted:	 "... only when given
unconditionally to make sure no limits would result on the Mission's
spiritual work". 2 This suggests that Christian Missionaries were
prepared to receive grants and financial assistance from the govern-
ment of British administration in The North provided that social and
religious control of their institutions remained in Christian
Missionary hands. Furthermore Christian Missionaries desired that
government grants supplement the income of the Christian schools.
3
In 1916 however there developed political indicators which began
to suggest that the government's grants and financial assistance were
not without strings. In that year, the government presented an
Educational Ordinance which prohibited grants to Christian Missionary
schools established after the law took effect. 4 When this development
occured, Christian Missionaries in The North interpreted The Ordinance
as meant to control the expansion of Christian Missionary education
among the M-Belt groups and societies since the Missionary financial
resources were too thin to continue with expansion without the
government grants and financial assistance.
5
 In that instance the
SUM in conjunction with the CMS vigorously contested the Ordinance
1. Boer 1979 p.192
2. Ibid p.280
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
and objected to the measures and its provisions. SUM and CMS
Christian Missionaries suggested to the Governor-General of Nigeria
in Lagos that the 1916 Ordinance: II ... was discriminatory ... its
definition of 'school' was too wide to include even ecclesiastical
gatherings as choirs, Sunday Schools, catechumate classes and even
sewing classes ... it was in effect a withdrawal of the earlier
promises of cooperation in Pagan Education."' This was one of the
premises from which when in 1924 the government gave grants for the
Gindiri schools, and prior to their acceptance, Bristrow was instructed
by the Missionaries: ".. to enquire as to the implication of the
grant". 2
 Later in 1936, Farrant received a formal communication from
the government of British administration in The North, attempting to
allay the fears of the Christian Missionaries by suggesting that:
"I hope that you are not under the impression that by taking a grant
you are terribly bound (to government policies) .. There is a more
broad-minded view now. It is the spirit and not the letter that
we go by".
3
 This however did not stop the political fears in policies
of Christian Missionaries over receiving financial assistance and
grants from the Government. In 1941 for example, Farrant was forced
on the issue to send circulars to SUM Christian Missionaries to solicit
1. Boer 1979 p.194
2. Ibid p.280
3. Bieneman 1 February 1936, cited in Boer 1979 p.280
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opinions on grants from the government for educational development. '
The responses ranged from wholehearted acceptance to outright rejection.2
The main religious and political reasons produced for the rejection
were twofold: "... it would create a class distinction among servants
of the church, since teachers would get much higher salary than the
church could ever pay Pastors and Evangelists and secondly these
grants would give power to the government in Mission schools with the
result of increasing secularization".
3
 In other words educational
development was maintained at an underdeveloped level before 1945
because Christian Missionaries did not concede secularization of their
religious objectives in the Christian schools for accelerated develop-
ment of modernization on European patterns.
When in 1942 the government of British administration in The
North and Nigeria adopted a new educational scheme and policy in
relation to the "Colonial Development and Welfare Fund" that provided
for wholescale government support of increased education in The North,
including the Christian Missionary Schools, grants and financial
assistance became accepted: ".... on condition that no strings be
attached prejudicial to freedom of religious teaching". 4 This suggests
that the underdevelopment and the slow progress in the Christian
Missionary educational development of the M-Belt groups and societies
1. Boer 1979 p.280
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
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relative to the activities of the government of British administration
concentrated in the Islamic society in the period between 1900 and
1940, besides the essential focus on the diffusion of Christianity
through the development of Churches and Church leaders, is also
explained by the political caution which Christian Missionary Bodies
exercised over receiving grants and financial assistance from the
government of British administration in The North.
There were however other additional religious and political
problems in the experiences of Christian Missionaries which inhibited
the rapid development of educational institutions with Christianity
among the M-Belt groups and societies. For example, although it
was government policy that Christian Missionaries "actively cooperate"
in educational development among the M-Belt groups and societies there
were instances where the government discriminated against Christianity
in favour of Islam. This was so because of certain specific education
policies and the religious preferences of certain British officials
which were always tied up to the policy of Indirect rule and Islam in
The North. 1
 There was the perenial problem of restricting the activities
of Christian Missionaries among assumed Islamic communities among
the M-Belt groups and societies which subsequently extended to medical
work.
2
For example, it was not until 1936 that the policy of
1. For examples, see Chapter 2.. where the political consequences
of Indirect Rule over the M-Belt groups and societies were
examined. Also see Crampton 1975 p.51-55
2. Boer 1979 p.303; Christian Missionary Medical work is examined
below where we discuss their efforts in developing the M-Belt
groups and societies by creating social and welfare institutions
like hospitals, dispensaries and clinics.
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restricting Christian medical work among Islamic communities in The
North became relaxed and Christian Missionaries were invited to begin
medical work in the Islamic areas. '
 This however was mainly leprosy
work among the Moslem communities in the Islamic society. 2
 Leprosy
and lepers were more characteristic of the Islamic society in The North
rather than among the M-Belt groups and societies. The lepers were
uncontrolled and walked about as beggars and mingled with unaffected
people.
Table 345 suggests that 61.8% of lepers in The North in 1931
were in the Islamic society with the highest concentrations in Kano
and Sokoto, while 38.2% were to be found among the M-Belt groups and
societies. The highest concentration of lepers among the M-Belt groups
and societies was in Bauchi Province where there was 14.0% of the
total in The North.
	 This suggests that although Christian Missionary
work was restricted from the Islamic society, it was an area of greater
need rather than the M-Belt areas. However while there was wealth in
the Islamic society, poverty and disease was characteristic of the
lower classes of society.
	 This was unlike in the M-Belt areas where
undevelopment and underdevelopment existed side by side with disease
and poverty and was more visible at all levels of society. For
example, the most prevalent of the diseases of the M-Belt groups and
societies was sleeping-sickness. 3
 In the instance of the Plateau
1. Boer 1979 p.303
2. Ibid
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.317
Table 3.15	 Lepers in The North in 1931
Territorial Area in
The North
Number of
Lepers
% Numbers Total
Lepers
% Total
Kano 10,653 32.5
Sokoto 5,068 15.5
The Nupe
1,604 4.9
Islamic Ilorin 1,189 3.6 20,237 61.8
Society Kantagora 886 2.7
Borno 837 2.6
Bauchi 4,605 14.0
Areas
with
Zaria 2,321 7.1
M-Belt Tiv (Munchi) 1,970 6.0 12,535 38.2
groups
and
societies
Nasarawa 1,708 5.2
Yola 1,034 3.2
Muri 897 2.7
Total 32,772 100% 32,772 100%
-
Source: computed from Talbot 1969 Table 44 p.238
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groups and societies, Ames suggests a list of about 15 other
diseases that were characteristic of the area which included
Small-pox, Amoebic Dysentery, Tropical Ulcer, Tapeworm, Hookworm,
Bilharziasis, Schistosamiasis, Guinea worm, Leprosy, veneral
disease, Chigoes, Malaria, Pneumonia and fevers l . Leprosy on the
Plateau was on an average of 5 per 1000 people2 . Veneral disease
however were "imported" diseases from the Islamic society and were
prevalent among the non-indigenous population, particularly the
Hausas although incidences also became common among the indigenous
groups and societies 3 . Although there was government effort to cope
with these diseases, it was Christian Missionary Medical work that
cared for a wider area and a greater number of people. For example,
of the 22 Dispensaries on the Plateau, 13 were maintained by the
various Christian Missionary Bodies while 9 belonged to the NA4.
Furthermore in 1933 the SUM hospital at Vom had about 55 402
treatments given to 4339 patients5.
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p317-p318.
2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p318.
3.. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p318.
4. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p316.
5. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p316; Christian
Missionary Medical work in the development of the M-Belt
groups and societies is examined in more detail below.
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In the period between 1900 and 1945, although the political and
religious restrictions by the government of British administration in
The North on Christian Missionaries caused tensions and inhibited the
rapid development of the M-Belt groups and societies with Christian
schools and social welfare institutions, there was progress. For
example, Table S.16 suggests that as early as in 1912, SUM schools were
territorially and widely spread among some of the M-Belt groups and
societies. In that year there were as many as 989 school sessions in
SUM schools with a total of 12,459 students in attendance. In 1912
however there was a total of 29 Christian Missionary schools in The
North with 5 government schools which had an average attendance of
350 pupils. 1
 It ought to be borne in mind however that the Christian
schools in the period between 1900 and 1940 were more of Christian
Religious Instructional classes rather than the formal school systems.
It was only in the government schools that there was a standard quality
educational system. 2
 This is significant because, while the Christian
Missionary schools were concentrated among the M-Belt groups and
societies, government schools were the prerogative of the Islamic
society in The North before 1940. As earlier examined, this suggests
that the educational standards were lower in academic standards in
Christian Missionary schools in the period between 1900 and 1940
while higher standards were attained in the government schools con-
centrated in the Islamic society. In the years before 1940 therefore,
even when there was progress in the development of Christian educational
establishments, the academic break-through in the quality and quantity
1. Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.32 Also see the breakdowns in Tables .
below.
2. For more detailed discussions see Chapterl and also Section III
of this Chapter.
Table 2.16	 Sudan United Mission Educational Statistics for 1912
Station Sessions ofSchools
Total
Attendance
Donga
(Yergam and Jukun) 119 3,446
Wukari (Jukun) 220 3.012
Salatu (Tiv) 229 2,459
Langtang (Yergam) 176 2,058'
Ibi (Jukun) 151 1,127
Du (Birom) 94 541
Total 989 12,459
Source: S.F Graham, Government and Mission Education in 
Northern Nigeria 1900-1919, Ibadan University
Press, Ibadan 1966 p.127; cited in Albert Ozigi
and Lawrence Ocho, Education in Northern Nigeria,
Allen and Unwin, London 1981 p.25.
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of the standards of educational achievements only came after 1936
and its impact began to imprint itself on society in The North in the
mid-1950s and 19606. 1
A subsequently recognized problem among Christian Missionary
Bodies in The North that developed from the lower quality of educational
academic standards was that the majority of the M-Belt groups and
societies were oblivious over the political developments in Nigeria
in the period before 1950. This was so because when political nation-
alism became a factor in the considerations of Christian Missionary
objectives in The North, the Missionaries were concerned that their
converts were outside its main stream. This was the premise from
which in one instance for example Bristow of the SUM suggested that
the M-Belt groups and societies: "...would have been in a better
position if the Missions had not been so reluctant in the past to
venture upon an educational programme... All the Christians are
still too backward educationally to take active part in political
leadership ... true, Missions are at long last beginning to take up
educational work in a small way, but it is probably too late to have
any effect on the present situation." 2 This suggests that it was
not until after 1950 that Christian Missionary Bodies in The North
recognized the political importance of education as it related to
the whole strategy of halting "the Islamic advance" centred on the
M-Belt groups and societies within the territorial concept of the
'Sudan'. This means that the M-Belt groups and societies were under-
developed as latterly as in 1950 in their socio-political and
educational levels of development for participation in trans-local
1. This will become apparent in our discussions in Chapters 4. 0w...id
.5
2. W.M. Bristow, The Light Bearer Magazine, July 1950 p.71-72
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activities, particularly so in political leadership. This was the
premise from which in the same year Bristow also expressed the recurrent
Christian Missionary concern suggesting that the M-Belt groups and
societies as well as other non-Islamic groups and societies in The
North might end up with little or no political representation in an
independent government) AccordingAccor  to Bristow, it was a situation
like that which "gave added importance and urgency to our educational
work."2
Although that was so, in the period between 1949 and 1951
Christian Missionaries were satisfied that the Christian converts
had organized the NML as a political organization. It was from
impact of the organizational thrust of the NML that Bristow, although
disappointed with standards of education among the M-Belt groups and
societies suggests: "..Nevertheless, few Christians were already
leading in the Movement to safeguard non-Moslem interests and their
leadership so far had been wise and a credit to the quality of their
Christianity"
In the period between 1900 and 1950, although all the Christian
Missionary Bodies in The North became involved in the development
of the M-Belt groups and societies by the establishmentof Christian
schools and social welfare institutions, the religious and political
pace of the process was championed by the SUM, particularly its
British Branch. This was so because the SUM-British Branch was seen
to be in a unique position of political advantage in relation to the
government of British administration in The North. This was the
1. Bristow 1950 p.46
2. Ibid
3. W.M. Bristow, The Light Bearer Magazine, October 1951 p.68
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premise from which it developed to be the coordinator of "The
International Inter-denominational and non-denominational Alliance"
of Christian Missionary Bodies in the 'Sudan' . 1 The SUM-British
Branch was accepted in that capacity by other Christian Missionary
Bodies in The North for two reasons: it originated the entire
Christian religious concept and effort to the 'Sudan' in order to
develop a Christian society to halt the southward advance of Islam,
a religious premise from which most of its branches served under
British Imperial regimes, particularly so in Africa. 2 Secondly,
with its religious headquarters in London as well as that of the
government of British administration in The North, the SUM-British
Branch was expected to be more influential, not only with the colonial
office in England but with Christendom as well rather than any other
Christian Missionary Body in taking up issues concerning the problems
of developing Christianity. 3
 Boer suggests that this was not simply
because of national affinity since the British as well as the non-
Britisn Christian Missionaries in The North were aware of the peculiar
advantages in the potential of the SUM to be influential in London. 4
Thus in the practical experiences of Christian Missionaries in The
_
North in the period between 1900 and 1950, where other Christian
Missionaries hesitated to take up issues with the government of
British administration, the British Missionaries were expected to
lead the struggle. 5 It was from this premise that Farrant suggests:
1. Boer 1979 p.117
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.116
4. Ibid p.117
5. Ibid
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“ ... the non-British Missionaries feel embarrassed in taking up a
matter with the Nigerian Government ... it might make it easier if a
British Missionary were in charge ... my feeling is that it may be
expected of British folk to defend the liberties of all". 1
However, although the SUM was like a collosus in the amount of
social and political influence it wielded on the government of British
administration in The North, because of its British origins, Farrant
suggests that SUM-British Christian Missionaries were looked upon,
because of certain difficulties Christian Missionary Bodies like the
SIM experienced in their relationships with the government of British
administration. 2 The difficulties conditioned social and political
reliance on British Christian Missionaries. Farrant explained these
difficulties of the SIM as caused by "the vigour of the American
character", a premise from which it was assumed that the SUM being
essentially British "could better understand the mind of the
administration". 3 This suggests that in the development of
Christianity, educational and social welfare institutions among the
M-Belt groups and societies the process was shaped by the compromises
produced by the SUM-British Branch with the government of British
administration in The North. In other words, "the Christian society"
in The North among the M-Belt groups and societies was based on the
model of society which existed in England rather than in Germany,
Canada, S. Africa, the US even when it was the case that the Christian
Missionaries were from different variants of Western European
civilizations.
1. G.H. Farrant, SUM Magazine, Vol.21, 30th August 1954, cited in
Boer 1979 p.117
2. Boer 1979 p.117
3. Ibid
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The 'national characters' of the different western European
nations were however to influence the different attitudes towards
government and the Islamic religion on socio-political and religious
issues among the M-Belt groups and societies where the different
nationality Christian Missionary Bodies concentrated their activities.
For example where the SIM focussed its Christianity among other
Christian Missionaries, in areas like S. Zaria, Lere in S. Bauchi and
Wurkum in the Numan Division of Adamawa, there was more violent
political reaction with an explicit Christian religious identity,
demanding for freedom from Islamic domination of political rulership.
The phenomenon was in political support for the ideas of the M-Belt
Movement in the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region. These
were contradistinctively to political reaction toward Islam produced
by the brand of Christianity from the SUM where there was emphasis
on political loyalty toward government and the struggle for religious
freedoms and liberties through political dialogue by talking to
government. The 'national characters' of the different Christian
Missionary Bodies explains the religious emotions which accompanied
the political reactions in the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement, the
bloodshed which greeted the activities of the Wurkum Tribal Union and
the demands for a "Kilba State" led by the Kilba Tribal Union in the
1950s)
After 1945 however Christian Missionaries in The North maintained
their efforts to achieve their religious objectives by the traditional
1.	 These political issues at the start of the M-BELT Movement in
the demands of the creation of a M-Belt Region are examined in
Chapter L1.. where the growth and development of the Movement
and its built-up political support interplayed the variation in
the degrees of political support created by the 'national
characters' of Christian Missionaries which operated among the
different M-Belt groups and societies.
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"three-pronged-approach" to diffuse Christianity by Evangelism, Medicine
and Education. 1 After that period however there was distinction between
Christian educational development among the M-Belt groups and societies
when Christian Evangelism became combined with the practice of
producing Christians from Medical work in Christian hospitals,
maternities and leprosy clinics. In the instance of the diffusion
of Christianity through Evangelism by medicine, the Christian
Missionary strategy used the friendly contacts developed from people
in need of pain relief as well as other humanly distressing conditions
of bodily health: "... to make Christ known by definite evangelistic
instructions and appeals." 2
The development of the social and political cooperation between
the government of British administration in The North and Christian
Missionary Bodies was similar to that in the development of Christian
educational institutions. Christian Missionary work in the development
of medical institutions in The North in general was however less ex-
tensive than the educational efforts and also less charged with political
tensions. There however developed more religious tensions from medical
work than the educational from Christian Missionary activities.3
It was not until in 1930 that the government of British admini-
stration in The North invited Christian Missionaries to have its
dispensaries join the government system in order to upgrade services. 4
1. Maxwell 1952 p.200
2. Ibid
3. This point is revisited when we analyze the motion of Bello
Dandogo in which he suggested the expulsion of all Christian
Missionaries from The North.
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This suggests that the development of welfare institutions by
Christian Missionaries in the period between 1900 and 1930 among
the M-Belt groups and societies was a neglected theme of government
policy. Even when this was so, some Christian Missionary Bodies did
not accept the government proposals. This was particularly so for the
SUM. ' This was so because Christian Missionaries wanted to continue
with Christian religious introductions to patients before medical
attention and treatments were given and also similar to instances
of grants for educational development, the Christian Missionaries
suspected government aid unless given unconditionally. 2 Subsequently
however government gave grants and financial assistance to Christian
Missionaries for the development of medical institutions under the
conditions that new Christian dispensaries were opened where there
was no government dispensary to serve the people. 3
Since Christian Missionary work was concentrated among the M-
Belt groups and societies, this means that in the period between 1900
and 1950 they suffered a major disadvantage in the share of the
distribution of government medical facilities. 4 For example, while
everything was provided freely in government hospitals essentially
1. Boer 1979 p.283
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
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derives from tax payers funds, there was less chance of the government
building a hospital where there existed a Christian hospital or dis-
pensary: "... because there were many other places without a govern-
ment or a Mission hospital at all". ' In the period between 1950 and
1965 this became a political issue in the demands of the M-Belt Move-
ment for separation of the M-Belt groups and societies into a M-Belt
Region. This was so because while they paid taxes, government did
not develop medical institutions. Furthermore where government
developed medical institutions through Christian Missionaries,
where Christian Missionary hospitals and dispensaries existed, people
paid for medical attention while in the government hospitals treatment
and medical attention was free of charges.
Besides the financial costs of medical attention in Christian
Missionary hospitals and dispensaries there was also a preference
for government hospitals which were few among the M-Belt groups and
societies, because of the use of European medicine as an Evangelical
Strategy in Christian medical institutions. In the period between
1940 and 1960 this Evangelical Strategy became a political issue,
firstly in the NHC and later in the NHA where Islamic chiefs and NPC
politicians who were Moslems argued that while Christian Missionary
work was appreciated, government ought to intervene to stop "coercion
into another faith" in reference to Christianity. 2 In the period between
1. Crampton 1975 p.161
2. Although this point has been examined in some detail in Chapter 2..
it will be revisited in greater detail in Chapters 4, A-g S where
the motion in the NHA suggested by Bello Dandogo in 1949 that
'European Christian Missionaries be asked to leave The North'
because they were involved in politics, a political rhetoric that
helped to trigger off the organization of already mobilized
Christian communities with the Christian religion as a social
movement into a political movement.
3g6
1928 and 1930, Maxwell suggests that in one of those years alone
Christian Missionary hospitals and dispensaries treated between 30,000
and 40,000 patients. 1 In the period between 1927 and 1929 about 77,205
people came under the influence of Christianity from Christian medical
work centred on the Vom Christian hospital and dispensaries alone. 2
According to Maxwell, in circumstances like that, the process enabled
"a thoughtful mind to appreciate the enormous amount of opportunity
for friendliness which was made available." 3
Christian Missionaries also used leprosy clinics to consolidate
and diffuse the Christian religion as much as the process wasmeant to
create a healthy society for the development of the M-Belt groups and
societies with Christianity. Maxwell suggests that: "In those
earlier days the treatment required a long stay at the settlement.
This gave the patient a chance of learning "the story of redemption"
and also learning to read so that when discharged "symptom-free" he
might well become in turn winner of others for Christ."4 For example,
at the leprosy clinic at Vom, Nyam became Christian, learnt how to
read and write, thereafter he took "the story of the Saviour" to
his Jarawa group and society, whereby the process "laid the foundation
_
among them for the acceptance of the Mission overtures later on". 5 It
ought to be borne in mind however that when the Dapsone tablets for
1. Maxwell 1952 p.200
2. The figure was arrived at from totaling the numbers of patients
who received treatment at Vom as provided in The Light Bearer 
Magazine and SUM: Go and Tell Magazine, 1929-1930 p.71
3. Maxwell 1952 p.200
4. Ibid p.217
5. Ibid
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leprosy patients were developed in the 1950s the Christian
Missionary strategy of diffusing Christianity through the leprosy
clinics became less effective. This was so because the lepers simply
only had to visit the clinics to collect monthly doses of Dapsone
and stayed in their homes for treatment. This development however
provided the Christian Missionaries with a larger audience to preach
Christianity to. For example when Christian Missionary doctors
visited patients in their homes to make sure the correct doses were
being taken regularly and that there was curative progress they
preached Christ to the families.' In that way the majority of families
with leprosy patients became tied to Christianity.
This was the premise from which Christian social welfare
institutions became developed among the M-Belt groups and societies
and trained midwives, nurses and dispensary attendants who had govern-
ment recognition and with financial assistance. 2 For example, in the
late 1930s it was suggested to the Vom Christian Hospital and Dis-
pensaries to institute a system of dispensaries to be staffed by
trained Africans from different districts and the Medical Officers
periodically visit the outstations to help in their work.
3
Implicit in these developments is that Christianity did not
remain at the level of educational institutions established by
Christian Missionaries after 1945, although that became the emphasis
1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981
2. Maxwell 1952 p.200
3. Ibid
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in the Christian Missionary objectives. This means that after 1945
while Christian Missionary objectives sought to develop an advanced
educated Christian leadership for political purposes they were also
concerned to create a followership with an explicit Christian religious
identity among the M-Belt groups and societies.
In the instance of the development of the Christian religious
institutions with advanced educational standards they became developed
side by side with the needs for modern agricultural education and
practices. For example, the Christian Missionary post-primary
institutions centred in Kagoro (SIM) and Zonkwa (RCM) in S. Zaria,
MKar (SUM-DRCM Branch) in Benue and Gindiri (SUM-British) combined
agricultural educational and practice with rigorous religious and
academic work, an educational system that declined only after 1970. 1
The development of educational and social welfare institutions among
the M-Belt groups and societies by Christian Missionaries was an
independent Missionary policy with little government financial
assistance. Before 1945 the greater numbers of Christian Missionary
1.	 An examination of the curriculum in these schools suggests that
besides the higher academic standards than was previously the
case, there was also taught agricultural science/rural science
with practical lessons in which each student owned a plot of
land on which crops and vegetables were grown and subsequently
sold to the institution either to pay for school fees or to
earn pocket money - interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu,
January 1981.
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institutions received no government financial assistance and grants.
In 1936 when Christian Missionary schools overtook the numbers of
schools owned by the government and the NAs, there were only 22
Christian schools that received government grants and financial
assistance, out of a total of 344 Christian Missionary schools. 1
This means that government development of education in The North was
in the Islamic society. The increases in government schools in 1936
is suggested by the establishment of 'Provincial Schools' in all
the provinces in The North which provided opportunity for the M-Belt
groups and societies to benefit from government educational facilities.
As latterly as in 1947 only 167 Christian Missionary schools in
The North received government financial assistance out of an increased
total of 610 Christian schools with 64.6% enrolment of the total pupils
in The North. 2 This suggests that while there was government neglect
in the development of the M-Belt groups and societies with education,
there was also discriminatory practices in funding the Christian
Missionary efforts, the only agencies that determinately developed
educational facilities among the non-Islamic groups and societies in
The North.
Table 31i suggests the rapid development of education in The
North by Christian Missionaries concentrated among the less populous
1. Ogunsola 1975 p.27; Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.32
2. Ogunsola 1975 p.27; Ozigi and Ocho 1981 p.32
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groups and societies in the M-Belt areas. While as early as in 1912
there were more Christian Missionary schools in the M-Belt areas with
consistently higher numbers of school - enrolment over the years
rather than in the government schools which were concentrated in the
Islamic society, there was generally fewer numbers of government
schools with lesser school-enrolments. Christian schools and their
total school-enrolment in the M-Belt areas outnumbered the government
schools in the Islamic society by at least 4 to Leven when it was the
case that the M-Belt groups and societies consisted of about one third
of the population in The North.
This is crucially significant in more than just the sense of
developing the M-Belt groups and societies with Christianity and
European education because it had ramifications on the developing
social consciousness over political power relationship about the nature
of society in The North. For example in the period between 1950 and
1965 the potential for "reverse colonialism" developing in the relation-
ship between the M-Belt groups and societies on the Islamic society
became real. This was so because of achieved literacy and skills,
requisites for the control of a modern state which became concentrated
among ithe M-Belt groups and societies, a cbnsequenceofChristian
Missionary activities. This became an alarming potent political weapon
because of the religious polarities in The North and the fact of
historical recollections in the experiences of the M-Belt groups and
societies to the Islamic society. This was the premise for bureaucratic
discrimination and political control of the M-Belt groups and societies
in The North. For example, while social and political consciousness
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about the nature of the modern state system based on European patterns
became an accelerated developing process among the M-Belt groups and
societies at all levels of society, government catered for only a few
in The North, mainly the ruling classes of the Islamic society before
1950. 1 After 1950 the problem of "reverse colonialism" on the Islamic
society in The North became compounded when the academic standards of
education in both primary and secondary schools improved because of
the changes in Christian Missionary policies to develop the M-Belt
groups and societies to higher educational levels than was previously
the case. 2 One of the socio-economic problems that had direct bearing
on politics caused by increased education in the period between 1950
and 1965 was that more persons from among the M-Belt groups and societies
became unemployed and flooded the industrial centres of The North. This
was particularly so for groups and societies from S. Zaria who found
their way to Kaduna. 3 It was these differences in socio-economic patterns
of development that maintained the roots of malintegration of the M-Belt
groups and societies into the Islamic society in The North. These
differences also had concomitant consequences on the failure of the
political incorporation processes of the majority of the groups who
saw themselves as outside the mainstream of society in The North.
Subsequently in the period between 1950 and 1965 when there was more
education among the M-Belt groups and societies, achieved social con-
S.
1. For examples of the process see more detailed discussions in
Chapter
2. The political problem of the potential of reverse colonialism
as a consequence increased standards of education among the
M-Belt groups and societies is examined in Chapters 4- qnd 5.
The fall in the standard quality of education in schools in the
Islamic society in the period between 1955 and 1965 was more
of an educational problem rather than a political_problem.
3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters LI- oci.tok 5
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sciousness conditioned awareness about religious differences and the
advantages of controlling political power for socio-economic develop-
ment. This became compounded by the existing inequalities relative
to the Islamic society in The North and the discriminatory distribu-
tion of social welfare, economic and educational amenities from an
Islamic dominated government in The North, a premise from which one
political solution was seen to be in the creation of a M-Belt Region.1
However besides the development of education and social welfare
institutions, Christian Missionaries made efforts to develop the
M-Belt groups and societies by building basic economic infrastructure
like roads and bridges. For example, as early as in 1907, the idea
of the road from the Benue to Wase, was suggested to the government
of British administration in The North by Karl Kumm. 2
 In the instance,
although Kumm suggests that it was agreed that Christian Missionaries
build half the road and the government the remaining half, Lugard sub-
sequently: "... replied that the Government would be glad to build
the whole roacP". 3 Except for Jos Division on the Plateau where the
road network system is one of the most dense in Nigeria, largely
developed for the needs of the Tin Mining Industry, 4 Christian and
non-Christian Communities among the M-Belt groups and societies became
1. The discriminatory patterns in the distribution of government
amenities like schools, hospitals, dispensaries and economic
institutions like agricultural establishments, electricity, roads
and bridges, water supply, industries and housing as a cause of
the persisting underdevelopment of the M-Belt groups and societies
in the period between 1950 and 1965 as they affected the political
demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region are examined in
Chapters 4. a,\A 5
2. Kumm 1907 p.77
3. Ibid
4. Dudley 1966 p.236-262
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socially and economically linked by roads and bridges built by
Christian Missionaries. For example, the Bristow Bridge in Gindiri
built before 1950 still stands and it was not until after 1970 that
government built a motorable bridge to link the Gindiri village market,
the Christian Missionary compound and the feeder road to Mongu.
In the period between 1950 and 1970 the Christian Missionary
effort to develop the M-Belt groups and societies with basic social
and economic infrastructure however created problems in "the Unity
of the tribes" with Christianity and to some extent inhibited the rapid
growth of the churches and Christian converts. For example while
Christian Missionaries preached that the churches and the Christian
religious identity ought to transcend "tribal" socio-cultural and
political boundaries, historical recollections of the experiences
between the different M-Belt groups and societies conditioned the
contest over citing Christian Missionary social and welfare as well
as educational institutions. The contest always split Christian Unity
and the church councils. ' The Fyem group and society for example,
who were predominantly Islamic in religion became unpopular among
the Sura, Angas, Birom and Challa because of their historically
recollected slave raids on non-Islamic groups and societies and this
inhibited the growth of the Christian churches and Christians even
when it was the case that the Gindiri schools were in their midst. 2
Furthermore the rivalry over the distribution of Christian Missionary
facilities, independently of historically recollected experiences was
1. Crampton 1975 p.158
2. Ibid
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characteristic of the relationship between the Bachama and the Kilba
group and society where the Luthetan Christian Missionary Body con-
centrated its activities in the development of the non-Islamic groups
and societies in Adamawa. 1 This suggests that there were also factors
internal to the M-Belt groups and societies which conditioned the
persistence of underdevelopment despite Christian Missionary efforts.
Although there were internal problems to the M-Belt groups and
societies as much as there was discriminatory practices by the govern-
ment of British administration on the socio-economic development of
the M-Belt areas, by 1950 Christian Missionaries achieved infusing
a Christian religious dimension to M-Belt consciousness by educational
and social welfare development of institutions. In that respect,
Church, school and medical institutions organized by Christian
Missionaries became catalyst for both "tribal" and "Christian" conscious-
ness among the M-Belt groups and societies. It was from these achieve-
ments that Christian Missionary converts from among the M-Belt groups
and societies began to participate in the activities of government
both within their territories and in the wider society of The North,
Nigeria and in other parts of the world. This was particularly so
for the Army Services. In the instance of this development particularly
for the predominance of soldiers from among the M-Belt groups and
sqcieties in the contingents from The North recruited to fight the
second world war and quite significant for political developments in
1966 and 1967, Maxwell suggested that: ".. it could be of the greatest
1.	 Crampton 1975 p.158; this point is discussed in more detail in
Chapter LI- where we examine the politics of the M-Belt groups
and societies as it affected political support for the demands
for the creation of a M-Belt Region by the M-Belt Movement.
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service to the 'Sudan' that among its leaders and in its most progressive
communities men should be in control whose faces were not turned toward
Mecca and whose minds were not fettered with the philosophy of Islam.
Government had become aware of this alteration in the status of the
non-Moslem communities". 1 Although the majority of these soldiers
were initial Christian Missionary converts and therefore upheld for
their services in government, the Christian Missionaries had cause
for contempt upon the return of the soldiers as ex-servicemen of the
Nigerian Army in the period between 1941 and 1947. This was so because
the ex-servicemen created problems to Christian Missionareis in the
practices of the Christian Faith and by their "unusual" state of in-
dependence in social relations with both church and government. For
example a Danish Christian Missionary Report suggests that: "...the
Christian ex-soldiers have done and are still doing much harm. Many
of them have become heavy beer-drinkers and now try to persuade the
others to stand by them against what they call the absurdity of the
prohibition of beer-drinking and tell them that all the white-men whom
they met during the war drank beer. Many of them have taken a second
wife after returning from India." 2
In the period between 1938 and 1956; the ex-servicemen were one
of the decisive forces in the organization and political mobilization
of people into "tribal" unions, clubs, associations and political
organizations and subsequently in the organized development of the
M-Belt Movement from the NML to the MZL until they became eclipsed in
1. Maxwell 1952 p.253
2. Ibid p.266
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its political leadership by European educated Christians from among
the M-Belt groups and societies. 1 This was so because by their military
training and battle experiences, they came back to their groups and
societies with strength and courage to travel great distances through
lonely countryside and had seen how organization and mobilization achieved
results. 2 The ex-servicemen from among the M-Belt groups and societies
set a tradition of military service, particularly in the infantry of
the Nigerian Army in the period between 1940 and 1*, a pattern of
military tradition that was crucial in shaping political developments
in The North and Nigeria after 1966. 3
A major consequence of the development of the M-Belt groups and
societies by Christian Missionaries through the establishment of
European educationaland social welfare institutions that emphasized
Christianity is that there emerged a class of persons with Christian
consciousness as it related to the dominance of Islam in society and
politics in The North. These European educated persons with an explicit
Christian social and subsequently political identity found their ways
into government services and other modernizing sectors of society in
the period between 1950 and 1967. The concentration of European
educated persons in government services from among the M-Belt groups
and societies subsequently gave rise to anticipated fears of "reverse
colonialism" on the Islamic society, particularly so with increases in
both education and the standards of qualifications attained in the
same period. This was one premise from which there was developed
discriminatory practices in the employment of the 'European educated'
from among the M-Belt groups and societies into top government jobs.
1. This is examined in more detail in Section VI of this Chapter
and also in Chapter 4-
2. This fact is derived from my interview discussions with Baba Sanda
in Neman, Moses Nyam Rwang at Bukuru, among others, both who were
ex-servicemen after World War II.
3. This point will be examined in more detail in Chapters aci.,Y-dc5
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Furthermore the activities of Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt
groups and societies produced in 1950 a convergence of European
patterns of civilization and modernization with Christianity in the
transformations of society. This was the alternative society to the
Islamic type that was envisaged when Christian Missionaries set out
to do battle with the Islamic religion in the 'Sudan'. It was also
from the convergence of Christianity and modernization that a M-Belt
Region became demanded when the political organization developed from
the NML seeking political participation in The North, to MZL demanding
the creation of a Region where like in the Islamic society, the
Christian religion might be the baseofa social and political identity.
In the period between 1900 and 1950 the social and political consequences
of Christian Missionary activities among the M-Belt groups and societies
was the development of an externally conceived M-Belt identity from
"uncivilized pagan" groups and societies to "non-Moslems" and subse-
quently from "non-Moslems" to "Christian tribes" with "animists" con-
ceptions of the "Christian tribes" developed and became internalized
when the M-Belt groups and societies began to see themselves as "the
children of Jesus" in social identity. It was at the terminal height
of this internalized conception of the Christian religious identity
between 1940 and 1950 among the M-Belt groups and societies that a M-Belt
Movement was begun as a political organization in 1949, known as the
MIL. The very nature of politics in The North and Nigeria however
in the period between 1950 and 1967 conditioned the development of
the M-Belt identity from conceptions of the "children of Jesus" and
Christian Minorities in religion and politics in The North to concep-
tions of "Northern Christians" with an accompanying resurgence of ethnic
identities.'
1.	 This point will be examined in more detail in Chapters k bAci 5
The common characteristic that cut through the whole shifts and
subsequently fragmented conceptions of the M-Belt identity however
was the deprivation in social welfare facilities and the distribution
of economic amenities by government in The North which became increas-
ingly demanded by the different groups and societies. 1 This was so even
when it was the case that political leadership in the period between
1938 and 1967 from among the M-Belt groups and societies were
Christian Missionary products. Unlike political leadership from the Islamic
society in the same period, which was deliberately developed and shaped
by the government of British administration in The North for political
purposes, Christian Missionaries in their religious activities only
provided bases for the development of leadership. 2 Political leadership
from among the M-Belt groups and societies which dominated the arena
of politics in the M-Belt Movement cannot be said to have been shaped
by the Christian Missionaries for purposes other than for the protection
of the Christian society and Christian interests in The North. This
explains the premise from which in the period between 1949 and 1956,
until upon the political entry of J.S. Tarka in the M-Belt Movement
1. The shifts in the identity from "the children of Jesus" to ethnic
types, conditioned by the contest for the distribution of
amenities is examined in more detail in Chapter sett-tv
2. The development of leadership for political purposes rrom the
Islamic society is explicitly presented in the writings of
Morel as early as in 1911 as suggested by the purposes of the
central schools. It was not until 1936 that the models of the
central schools became extended to provinces in The North which
contained the M-Belt groups and societies. For detailed
discussion of the contrasts see Chapter 2_
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political leadership from the M-Belt groups and societies focussed
its attention on the local political arena and on Islamic dominance
in The North rather than national. In those years there was a more
vigorous tie between the Christian religion and politics as it affec-
ted the M-Belt groups and societies. 1 Socio-economic and political
grievances over discrimination beyond the Christian religion however
became political issues in the M-Belt Movement after 1956 even when
it was the case that they existed before that time.
By 1950 therefore the significant political aspect in the educa-
tional development of the M-Belt groups and societies with Christianity
by Christian Missionaries was that conscious social relationships were
achieved. These conditioned the organization of "tribal" as well
as religious alliances. In the instance education and Christianity
created a resurgence of the older "tribal" identities in each of the
M-Belt groups and societies which existed side by side with the newer
Christian social identity that increasingly developed. Both these
patterns of identities became used as political resources in the M-Belt
with the older ethnic identities increasing taking precedence over
the newer Christian religious identity.While education and Christianity
developed conceptions of "Tiv Christians", "Birom Christians", "Bachama
Christians" and subsequently "Northern Christians" 4lecontext of "M-Belt
Christians" never gained currency in political rhetoric of the Christian
politicians in The North. This was so because 50 years of Christianity
1.	 This is examined in more detail in Chapter +where the rapid
growth and development of the M-Belt ideas on participation in
politics led to the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region
based on a Christian religious identity with strong anti-
Islamic sentiments rather than socio-economic and welfare
deprivation.
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among the M-Belt groups and societies was not long enough to break
by socialization processes "tribal" identities in the same social-
ization process that "tribal" identities in the Islamic society became
eroded by Islam religion where it existed since the 11th century. This
was the premise from which the Christian religious identity among the
M-Belt groups and societies remained volatile and never became a per-
manent political identity in the same way as Islam in The North. '
V Institutional Development and Socio-political Identities and
Consciousness achieved among the M-Belt groups and societies
before 1950.
The purpose of this Section is to examine whether variations in
impact with British influences in the period between 1900 and 1950
conditioned the progress in the development of institutions and socio-
political consciousness which came into existence among the M-Belt
groups and societies during the 1930s and 1940s. It is proposed that
differences in the development of social and political institutions, 2
which became operational among the M-Belt groups and societies were
caused by the point in time British influences became receptive among
the M-Belt groups and societies, a process that was set into motion by
1. The volatile nature of the Christian identity as a political
resource rooted in the M-Belt Movement is constantly revisited
and cuts through the discussions of the thesis in the remaining
chapters.
2. Institution, as used in this study refers to standardized routines
of solving the fundamental problems and needs of a society. Once
institutions become formalized they develop personnel with vested
interests in the survival of the institution - G. Duncan Mitchel
(ed), A new Dictionary of Sociology, London 1979 p.106
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the government of British administration in The North and European
Christian Missionary activities.
Government and Christian Missionary institutions among the M-Belt
groups and societies developed in the period between 1900 and 1950,
created socio-political consciousness about society, politics and govern-
ment in the wider society of The North and of the developing Nigerian
political state. This consciousness which was developed from the new
institutions among the M-Belt groups and societies as a direct conse-
quence of the impact with British influences was instrumental in
bringing into sharper focus the differences in political identity
patterns existing in the North. Consciousness about the differences
in political identity patterns in The North were politically mobilized
in the 1940s for ethnic political organizations in many of the M-Belt
groups and societies and subsequently became fed into the political
organizations of the M-Belt Movements with the objectives of struggling
for the creation of a M-Belt Region which might become politically
separated from the Islamic society. Institutional and socio-political
identities with subsequent, political meaning for the M-Belt groups
and societies found in Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria
are therefore examined in context of the differences in social, political
and economic characteristics of the M-Belt territories as they had
experienced transformations in the period between 1900 and 1950.
This was a period before the political organizations in the
M-Belt Movements began to challenge and create impact on the conceptions
of political unity previously existing in The North. This is meant
to illustrate that there was enormous variation in social and political
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institutions and new identity patterns as well as differences in
economic levels of development within the M-Belt areas. Differences
in economic levels of development among the M-Belt groups and societies
were in many respects conditioned by their exclusion from political
power and powerlessness in political decision-making. This is analy-
tically crucial in understanding the shifts and strength of political
identification with the subsequent M-Belt Movement in the 1950s and
1960s by each of the different M-Belt groups and societies and the
variations in the theme of the identity in the Movement.
The territories of the M-Belt groups and societies contained
enormous variations in the patterns of social, cultural and political
identity. For example, out of about 416 different ethnic groups and
societies in Nigeria, identified in the period between 1921 and 1931,
while 75 were concentrated in the South of Nigeria, 341 existed in
The North. Within the very political boundaries of The North itself,
while there were 44 different ethnic groups and societies in the
rsictati3ed.rnb,e
Islamic society in 1931, and who since 1804 were increasingly/politi-
cally defined M-Belt territories of Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria
Lhere wepe cAlso °vex- 300 bAlers
and Benue,each quite distinct in its own culture although partial
assimilation into the dominant Islamic culture took place. '
The 299 (300) ethnic groups and societies identified among the
M-Belt territories were indigenous to the area rather than 'a colonizing
group', characteristic of the period between 1804 and 1900 when there
was Fulani expansion of the Islamic society established by clan Fodio.
Furthermore, these groups and societies were also indigenously distinct
1.	 Blitz 1965 p.17
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from other migrant groups from the Islamic societies in The North,
other parts of Nigeria and West Africa after 1900 upon the successful
establishment of The North as a political unit and when British influences
created increased social mobility alongside the social and political
changes that took place.
The figures in Table 3.1e and 3.11 are therefore discussed and
examined as their breakdowns relate to the different concentrations
of the M-Belt groups and societies in the specific context of the
political institutions which became developed and socio-political
consciousness achieved from impact with British influences and as it
might subsequenity be related to the development of political organi-
zations among the M-Belt groups and societies.
(a) Adamawa
Table 3 . 12 suggests that Adamawa with about 180 ethnic groups
out of a total of about 300 ethnic groups concentrated in the M-Belt
areas had the highest concentration of different non-Islamic groups and
societies in The North within the political and social concept of the
M-Belt. Adamawa was also politically distinct in the nature of the
socio-political problems characteristic of the M-Belt groups and
societies because it had one of the highest concentrations of a
colonizing Fulani ruling class and with a substantial Hausa-Fulani
Islamic population.
In 1931 for example Fulani and Hausa alone consisted of 82,317
•out of a total population of 270,971. 1 This is 30.4% of the total
1.	 1931 Census Report, Table 8 p.182
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population of Adamawa province. Subsequently in 1952 when British
political authorityin the period between 1900 and 1950 in The North
conditioned new social and political relationships with increased
horizontal social mobility, Hausa-Fulani alone, among other migrant
Nigerian groups in Adamawa consisted of 217,649 out of a total pop-
ulation of 1181,024. 1
 This was 18.4% of the total population of
Adamawa province.
A majority of the groups and societies in Adamawa were
either militarily conquered or harrassed with military raids sufficien-
tly to pay political tribute in acknowledgement of Fulani authority
during the period between 1804 and 1900. 2
 Only a few of the Adamawa
groups and societies centred around the Mandara Kingdom and in Bachama
territory around Numan successfully resisted Fulani conquest, payment
of tributes and Fulani political authority before impact with British
influences from about 1900.
Establishment of British influences by both the government
of British administration in The North and from the activities of
Christian Missionaries from Europe in Adamawa were not completed until
after 1950 even when the Fulani and Islamic rulers in Yola were con-
quered before 1910. The Mumuye and Pire for example were outside the
considerations of British Administration in Adamawa as late as in the
period between 1950 and 1951. 3
1. Secret Report of the Government of the NPC in The North to
the Willink Commission in 1957: Northern Region of Nigeria, 
Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government 
of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna 1958 p.147.
2. For more details see discussions in Chapter i Sections III
and IV.
3. W.H. Paul, Acting Resident, Adamawa Province, Northern 
Nigeria Provincial Annual Reports, Kaduna, 1951 p.3
Table 3.18
	
Territorial Concentrations, Numbers and Population
sizes of some of the M-Belt groups and societies
for the period between 1921 and 1952.
Territorial Area
of the M-Belt
Population
Numbers in
1952
% M-Belt
Population
Numbers of
Ethnic groups
identified in
1921-1931
% Ethnic
groups,
M-Belt in
1921-1931
Bachama 121,438 3.1
Adomawa
Chambct 19,571 0.5
About 180 60.0
Others
M-Belt 775,717 20.1
Birom 116,200 3.0
Angas 55,242 1.4
Plateau Sura 51,300 1.3 50 16.7
Others
M-Belt 594,407 15.3
Jeba 41,082 1.1
S.Zaria Kaje 35,782 0.9 35 11.7
Others
M-Belt 224,882 5.8
Jarawa 17,007 0.4
S.Bauchi
Others
M-Belt 245,082 6.3
30 10.0
Tiv 800,000 20.7
Benue
Idoma 203,479 5.3 5 1.6
Others
M-Belt 568,056 14.7
Total 3,868,245 100% Over 300 100%
Sources: Meek 1925 Volume I-IV; Meel 1931 in Talbot 1969
Volume I-IV; Blitz 1965 p.17; A.H.M. Kirk Greene,
1972 p.347-348; Northern Nigeria Statistical 
Year Book, 1964 p.16-17.
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Table 3 . 18 further suggests that although Adamawa had about
180 (60.0%) different ethnic groups, out of a total concentration of
300 groups and societies indigenous to the M-Belt territories, it had
23.7% of the total M-Belt population for 1952. The most populous of the
non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa were the Bachama and Chamba.
While the Bachama were 121,438 (3.1%) out of a total M-Belt population
of 3,868,245 the Chamba were 19,571 (0.5%). Both groups and societies
were instrumental in providing initial political leadership which was
vigorous in the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement within
Adamawa and also in Plateau, S. Zaria, and S. Bauchi.' Other non-Islamic
groups and societies in Adamawa consisted of 775,717 of the total M-Belt
population. This was about 20.1% of the total M-Belt population in 1952.
Although this is a substantial population concentration when compared
to Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Lana relative to the Tiv in Benue, it
ought to be borne in mind that there were about 180 groups and societies
in Adamawa with enormous variations in their population sizes.
In the period between 1900 and 1930 most of the non-Islamic groups
and societies came under the political authority of the Fulani Emirs in
Yola and were also ruled by Fulani District Heads when there was
political application nf the Indirect rule policy based on the centrali-
zing model of political authority as it existed in the core of the
Islamic society in The North. 2 This was so because besides the Mandara
Kingdom which was a centralized political system in the authoritative
control of society, most of the other groups and societies in Adamawa
1. This is examined in more detail in Chapter 1-
2. For more detailed discussion of the application of the Indirect
rule policy see Chapter 2_ Section IV.
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like Bachama, Chamba, Tangale, Marghi, Kilba, Batta, Bura were decent-
ralized small scale political organizations under a collective leader-
ship of different chiefs, African traditional religious priests ruling
jointly with a council of elders for each group.
Although in the period between 1804 and 1900 political resistance
to Fulani authority was centred around the Mandara group and society,
it shifted to the Bachama, Kilba, Chamba and Bura in the period between
1900 and 1950. In that instance these non-Islamic groups and societies
organized other non-Islamic groups and societies in the Numan areas to
seek separation from the political authority and control of the Emirs
who were based in Yola. This was the political premise from which the
Numan Federations in the development of NA systems as 'the government
in the Divisions' became created and developed.
The desire for political separation from Fulani political authority
by the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa were however not
started until 1950. 1 It was a political phenomenon started by the
Kilba and directed at objections to continued Fulani political leader-
ship. The Kilba were found north of the Benue river in The North. 2
Political demands for separation from Fulani political authority and
control became subsequently followed by similar ethnic movements among
the Batta who were also found along the banks of the upper Benue river
and also by the Chamba who were concentrated on the southern banks of
the Upper Benue river.
1. NPAR 1951 p.2
2. Tribal Map of The North 1931
Historical sources suggest that most of the non-Islamic groups
and societies centred around Yola, Muri and Numan have a common origin.
According to Ballard, their migration patterns from somewhere to the
East of their present territorial location is suggested by their cultural
and linguistic unities in the languages. '
 Cultural and linguistic unities
is not however narrowed to the non-Islamic groups and societies in
Adamawa. Some archaeological evidence suggests that a certain measure
of "cultural unity" exists among the majority of the M-Belt groups and
societies rooted in the Nok culture which extended over a large area of
the M-Belt.
2
 Furthermore recent research evidences produced by the Benue-
Congo working group of the West African Linguistic Society based at
Ibadan and Tervueren suggest that there is internal unity of the Benue-
Congo sub-family and its clear distinction from the neighbouring Chadic
languages to the north and east and the Adamawa Eastern languages, the
Kwa and the more heavily disputed sub-families of the Niger-Congo to
the south and west.
3
In the instance of Adamawa however the direction of migration has
been inferred from the distribution of ethnic languages based on the
hypothesis that: "where homogeneous groups are geographically contiguous
on only one side with groups speaking languages most closely related to
their own, migration took place in the direction away from the area of
contiguity". 4 This is the premise from which it has been suggested that
neighbours of the Plateau-speaking peoples on the east and south-east
1. Ballard 1979 p.14
2. B.E.B. Fagg, "The Nok Culture in prehistory" Journal of the Histori-
cal Society of Nigeria, Vol.I 1959; G.P. Murdoch, Africa: Its 
Peoples and their culture history, New York 1959; cited in John
Ballard "Historical Inferences from the Linguistic Geography of The
Middle Belt" Private Seminar Paper 1979 p.1
3. Ballard 1979 p.2
4. Ibid p.2-5
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those speaking Chadic, Adamawa or other Benue-Congo languages show a
similar high degree of internal linguistic differentiation, implying
that they are very long-term residents within the general area which
they occupy. ' This means that many of the groups and societies in Adamawa
were for a long time indigenous to their territorial areas rather than
having experienced any recent migration whatever was that historical
period in the time of migration patterns of the Adamawa groups and socie-
ties, Ballard suggests that they came from somewhere to the east of
their present locations and have subsequently only migrated within
territorial areas of the M-Belt, such as toward S. Bauchi, Ningi,
Borberi and out towards the Plateau to Angas land and some as far
inwards as the Mama Hills. 2
Local political movements about political separation from Islamic
and Fulani rulership centred among the non-Islamic groups and societies
in Adamawa began to possess vocal political powers in the 1950s, although
they were started with the general political organization of the 'tribal'
Unions. This is explicit from the political report of the Resident
for Adamawa in 1951 which suggests that although there were no immediate
"obvious remedy" to the growing political situation: 11 ... the T.easons
for objection to the Fulani or complaints against the Fulani are for the
most part demonstrably untrue... and the covements do not seem to be
supported by a majority of the people". 3 This was so because political
representation and initial participation was based on Fulani district
headmen with selected elders from each of the non-Islamic groups and
1. Ballard 1979 p.9
2. Ibid p.14
3. NPAR 1951 p.2
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societies rather than in a developed traditional chieftancy institution.
The village Headmen and Elders from the non-Islamic groups and societies
were held in subordinate political status positions relative to the
Emirs and Fulani district Heads by the government of British admini-
stration. This group participated in "the Annual Adamawa Emirate
Conferences" held twice each year in which: "Genuinely useful and
interesting debates result although members tend to grumble, justi-
fiably up to a point that little attention is paid to their resolutions." 1
This therefore suggests that political agitation for separation from
Fulani Islamic rule by the non-Islamic groups and societies came
from the excluded European educated teachers and catechists who had
been trained by Christian Missionaries, even when selected village
Headmen and Elders by the government of British administration in
The North, also had "grumbles" and did not pay attention to "resolu-
tions".
2
 In that instance however, the government of British admini-
stration suggested that the political problems be solved: u •.• by
steady touring by Administrative Officers charged particularly with
developing District Councils and expenditure by them on the funds at
their disposal; but it cannot be denied that there is an established
dislike of the Fulani in some quarters which are now finding they
possess vocal powers and that this can be dispersed only by the
.3
Fulani."
1. NPAR 1951 p.2
2. The political role of European educated teachers and catechists
is examined in more detail in the development of 'tribal'
political consciousness which found expression through Tribal
Unions, Clubs, Associations and Political Parties in Section VI
of this Chapter.
3. NPAR 1951 p.2
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Although District Councils in Adamawa were created and developed
as from 1946, they did not meet regularly until 1951. 1 Although they
were created and developed for the purpose of diffusing overt political
tensions between the Fulani and the indigenous non-Islamic groups and
societies, British administration found that their increases over the
years became shaped: "... by the numerous petty territorial Fulani
District Headships which the Native Authority has always had the
natural desire to maintain unimpaired in status". 2 Before 1950 for
example, there were about 31 District Heads in Adamawa under the
political authority of the Lamido in Yola, a figure that was described
as "far higher than that of any other Emirate except Sokoto". 3 The
institution of the District and village councils were subsequently
described as "imperfect in structure" as a political institution and
attention became focussed on the development of Federations to
politically enclose the nnn-Islamic groups and societies centred on
Numan.
4
 It was however not until April 1951 that the Federated
Numan Division became constituted as single Native Authority politically
independent of control by the Lamido in Yola. 5
The Numan Federated NA developed from a council of chiefs from
the non-Islamic groups and societies around Numan and consisted of the
1. NPAR 1951 p.2
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
four non-Islamic chiefs of Batta, Bachama, Mbula and Shelleng and also
the President of the Longuda 'tribal' council, six other elderly
members from the same five districts, the Alkali of Numan and the NA
treasurer who maintained a subtle Islamic presence. 1 With the Alkali
of Numan and the NA treasurer as non-political members, the presidency
of the Federated NA Council was rotated among the four non-Islamic
chiefs and the president of the Longuda 'tribal' council. 2 The council
therefore had about 13 political constituents which reflected the
social cleavages within the Numan area alone. 3 Unlike Adamawa and
Muri Divisions which were 'chiefs-in-council NAs' with the Emirs
controlling political authority from 'a throne' and ruling over
numerous other non-Islamic groups and societies, the Numan Federation
NA was a council with collective policy and decision-making powers. 4
The political authority of the Numan Federation however controlled
about 18 other non-Islamic District Councils, village group councils
as well as village councils. 5 In other words, the Numan NA Federation
was not organized on a similar structure of political power based on
a chief as a traditional leader ruling with a specific political identity
over a single ethnic group and society. Rather different chiefs with
different political identities at different points in time controlled
political power jointly with other chiefs from a different cultural
background in the Numan NA Federation. This was so for the period
before 1950.
1. NPAR 1951 p.2
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Northern Nigeria Local Government Yearbook, Kaduna 1963 p.17
5. Ibid
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The development of chieftaincy institutions in the Numan
Federation and among the non-Islamic groups and societies in Muri
was from British appointed individuals as chiefs who became sub-
sequently approved by the District and village Councils dating from
1941. 1 In the period between 1940 and 1950 for example Ngbale became
appointed as third class chief of the Bachama in September 1941, while
in January 1944, Biyapo also became appointed as a third class chief
of the Mbula all in the Numan Federation NA. 2 Similarly before 1950,
Ibrahim became appointed as the chief of Zinna in Muri Division in
December 1947. 3
.*E-aAlthough third class chiefs became appointed from among the non-
Islamic groups and societies in the Numan Federation and subsequently
given the political status of belonging to the Northern House of
Chiefs it was not until after 1950 that they assumed political roles
in that Assembly.During the period between 1929 and 1947
the names of chiefs from among the non-Islamic groups and societies
in Adamawa do not feature until after 1950. Even then, chiefs from
among the M-Belt groups and societies were not politically significant
in shaping policy and politics at both the local and regional levels.
For example, in the period between 1931 and 1950 it was only the Aku
Uka of Wukari who raised socio-political and economic issues affecting
the M-Belt groups and societies in terms of policy and politics in
The North. 4
 In the period between 1940 and 1950 however the chieftaincy
1. Northern Nigeria Local Government Year Book, 'Facts on Chiefs',
Kaduna 1963 p.90-99.
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. For more detailed examples, see discussions in Chapter 1 QACI
Section IV.
s*g .See cerwwinents	 k-Le -ey‘a bC
ciAct. e	 .
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institutions developed by the government of British administration
in The North from among the M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa
were instruments which created a 'tribal' focus in the development
of a political identity for each ethnic group. Subsequently in the
1950s Enoch Swade became appointed as the chief of Batta in August
1955, Isa as the chief of Shelleng in January 1956 and Yoila as the
chief of Longuda in May 1957.1
(b) Benue
The figures in Table 2•8. suggest that Benue with only 5 (1.6%)
different ethnic groups and societies out of a total M-Belt con-
centration of over 300 groups and societies was the most socially and
politically homogeneous of all the M-Belt territories. The figures in
the Table also suggest that Benue had about 40.7% of the total 1952
population concentrated among the M-Belt groups and societies with the
Tiv alone comprising 20.7%.
Territorially, the Tiv and the other Benue groups and societies
were the most distant of all the M-Belt groups and societies from the
Islamic society and Islamic influences in The North. They therefore
were the most minimally affected by Fulani wars and their concomitant
Islamic influences in the cause of expanding the Islamic society in
the period between 1804 and 1900. This means that the Benue groups
and societies were also the most minimally affected by subsequent
Fulani slave raids and payment of political tributes to Islamic centres
of power like Lafia, Nasarawa, Jema'a and Keffi, a socio-economic and
1.	 Northern Nigeria Local Government Yearbook, Kaduna, 1953 p.90;
The political status conception of the non-Islamic chiefs in
the NHC as a grievance factor in the political demands of the
M-Belt Movement for separation from the Islamic society in
The North is examined in Chapters 4. a.n4 5.
political experience that was historically recollected with strong
resentments among other M-Belt groups and societies in Plateau,
Adamawa, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi.' Much more than the Tiv people
however the Idoma group and society also in Benue experienced Fulani
wars and their concomitant slave raids on a protracted scale. Old
men in Idoma land today still recollect Fulani slave raiding parties
on their land from Nasarawa and the wars that accompanied the raids
before impact with British influences in 1900. 2
 Furthermore, upon
the establishment of British influences and the political control of
The North after 1900, the Tiv and Idoma, who are the dominant ethnic
groups and societies in Benue did not experience socio-cultural
influences from a migrant population coming from the Islamic society
on the same scale of intensity as the M-Belt groups and societies found
in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria. In 1931 for example
while there were about 768,525 (99.0%) people indigenous to the Benue
groups and societies, there were only 7,841 (1.0%) people, the majority
belonging to Islamic groups and societies in The North, like Fulani,
Hausa and BeriBeri who were identified as settlers in the total popu-
lation of Benue Province.
	 Similarly, as latterly as 1952 even when
previous British political authority in the period between 1900 and
1950 conditioned new social and political relationship with a concomi-
tant increase in horizontal social mobility, the population of groups
from the Islamic society in The North which became concentrated in
territories that were equivocally Tiv, Idoma and Jukun in Benue Province
comprised a total of only 19,550.3 This was 1.3% of the total population
of Benue Province.
1. For more detailed discussions and examples see Chapter 2_
Sections III and IV.
2. Interview discussions with Prof. A.R. Armstrong, January 1981
-
1952 Census Report, Lagos 1952 p.18-19
4- I s
Tiv have always been the numerically dominant group and society
in the Benue area even before a Benue Province became organized by
the government of British administration in The North. This has been
so, both in terms of their population size and the territorial area
of land on which they were concentrated. Historically, the Tiv people
have been characterized by migration, largely due to pressure on
their farm land caused by their population increases. This is so
because the Tiv are prolific. For example, although they numbered
about 800,000 in 1952, population estimates based on the 1963 census
suggest that the Tiv YluvAber-ed well over 1,000,000. 1
 In other words
within a time period of 10 years the Tiv increased their numbers by over
200,000, producing 20,000 Tiv each year by an average birth rate of over
2,000 Tiv babies each month l k. m poru-lo.t.Con m C mv -e-ke 1,,,AuWort.
Tradition of social origins suggest that the Tiv people migrated
from "somewhere in the South" during the 19th century to their present
territorial location. 2 In the instance of their initial migration
from the South after some sojourn in "the hills of the Cameroon's
border" they moved northwardly until they arrived to their present
territorial area. 3 It has been suggested that because of their con-
stant migration, Tiv people have been in existance on their present
territorial location for not more than 200 years 6%riCe. about nooetp.
4
In the process of their migration, they met other groups and societies
and interacted with them, in particular the Chamba and the Jukun. 5
1. D.C. Dorward, "Ethnography and Colonial Administration: A
study of Working Misunderstandings", Draft Paper presented at 
The Institute of African Studies, Fourah Bay College, Sierra
Leone, February 1972 p.1
2. Perham 1962 p.153
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.152 n.2
5. Ibid p.153
Tiv-Jukun socio-economic and political relationships when the
Tiv were in the process of migration to their present territorial area,
were volatile. Before 1860 for example, the Jukun raided the Tiv for
slaves to enable the payment of political tributes to the Fulani.'
Subsequently in the period between 1860 and 1900 both groups and
societies combined to do battle against socio-economic and political
intrusions into their society by the Fulani. 2
 Furthermore in 1906
even when there had been impact with British influences, the Tiv
came to the aid of the Jukun when there was a quarrel with local
Hausa traders. 3
In the instance of the period between 1860 and 1900 however
the original culture of the Tiv became influenced by the "powerful
Jukun culture". 4
 Perham further suggests that an earlier "dual
authority among the Tiv gave way among those nearest to the Jukun
capital, to single leaders known as Tors who went to obtain recognition
from the AK1A of Wukari and were subsequently accompanied home by
Jukun Drummers." 5 These were called by the Tiv, 'Tor U Gbande and
subsequently in the 1930s and 1940s were not of any political sig-
nificance when the British set out to develop the chieftaincies
institutions among the Tiv.6
Although this means that Tiv were at one time or the other under
a Jukun oligarchy, they did not depart from their decentralized and
1. Perham 1962 p.153
2. Ibid
3. Crowther 1966 p.229
4. Perham 1962 p.153
5. Ibid
6. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980-1983
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. 1"democratic system of politics. 	 The Tiv people still maintained about
36 clans as a polity system only distinct to themselves. Gordon has
produced, perhaps the most singularly specific features of the Tiv
polity as a segmentary lineage structure in which there is the limi-
tation of political consensus of leadership and the bases upon which
leaders might build a modicum of power. This is so when he wrote:
"There is little doubt that all the clans are descended from a common
stock, each clan representing a separate family. As these families
got bigger they split up into sections and these sections again
subdivided into clusters of villages. The sections have in every
case a name and it is by this name in a clan any particular man is
located... The division by clans is explained by the growth of the
numerous family of a common ancestor. What organization exists is
therefore that of the family but it has been broken up ... There is
no permanent chief of the Munshis, nor has one ever been found,
although there are without doubt certain men in each clan who are
recognized as being stronger than others either from prowess or
riches.... The clans are divided into sections in which there is one
man who is spoken of (as) the headman but his position is to a great
extent honorary and unless popular or feared has little authority in
the sections outside his own cluster of villages. These clusters of
villages represent the immediate family of the man whose name it bears
and if each member was examined it would be found that he was one of
the immediate descendants or co-relatives of the headman. The rest
of the clan is spoken of as "a kin". From the foregoing it would
appear as if in theory there was a chain of responsibility but in
1.	 Perham 1962 p.153
*-1 See Cov,Avv%eytt	 szvn 	 oR cInckt‘ter3
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practice this is not so. In their relations however with the Govern-
ment the recognized headman of the section has generally been pushed
forward but, it is seen apparent that he is only there as a figure-
head, and that each individual (the only unit) may hear what is going
on but not bind himself in spite of their representation having seemingly
done so."
1
Although Tiv political leaders were recognized by the govern-
ment of British administration in The North, the system within which
they worked did not meet the political requirements of a centralized
model of political authority for the application of indirect rule.
This was the premise from which Divisions became developed among the
Tiv by the government of British administration through the institu-
tion of clan chieftaincies for native administration. Dorward des-
cribes the development of Native administration among the Tiv as a
" working misunderstanding". 2
This was so because for the first 30 years, the British did not
understand patterns of authority among the Tiv and also because it
took a long time before conquest over the Tiv was established. Perham
suggests that it was not until 1923 that the Tiv were brought under
British political control,
3
 although they were one of the first of
the M-Belt groups and societies to do battle with WAFF troops on
8th January 1900, one week after territories of The North became
claimed by the British. 4 The period between 1900 and 1923 was
characterized by "inflicting punishment on the enemy" rather than a
1. Gordon, cited in Dorward 1972 p.5
2. Dorward 1972 p.4
3. Perham 1962 p.154
4. Dorward 1972 p.2
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British military victory from conquest.
1
It was however not until in the period between 1914 and 1915
that there was an attempt to develop an administration among the Tiv.2
The political establishment of Tiv Division was conditioned by the
continual expansion of the Tiv into the neighbouring territories of
the Jukun. In 1914 it was the experience of Ruxton that the Tiv had
migrated and engulfed nearly the whole of Wukari in search of farm-
land.
3
 In 1917, Freemantle ordered the expulsion of all Tiv people
from Wukari districts and subsequently a boundary was demarcated
representing the 'tribal' boundary as it supposedly existed in 1906
and the Tiv were forbidden to occupy Jukun territory. 4 In the same
year "the Munshi boundary wall" became built as the southern boundary
of Tiv land to separate the Tiv and halt their expansion southwardly
toward the groups and societies of the Ogoja areas in the south-
eastern corner of Nigeria. 5 The "Munshi boundary wall" was a rampart
about three feet high with a ditch from which the material was ex-
cavated on one side with 'a boundary forest reserve' measuring about
15 miles long and half a mile wide. 6 Although this was meant to re-
present "a no-man's-land" between the Tiv and their southern neigh-
bours it has been suggested that: ".... the Tiv merely climbs over...
and believe it is their right to migrate and expand their territory
at will". 7
To enhance political control of the Tiv, the government of
British administration in The North created district headships for
what was considered convenient areas and fitted these posts with
1. Dorward 1972 p.4
2. Perham 1962 p.154
3. David Craig Dorward, 'The Development of British colonial Admini-
stration among the Tiv': 1900-1949 African Affairs Vol 68 p.169
cited in Tseayo 1975 p.21.
4. Dorward 1969, cited in Tseayo 1975 p.21
5. Prescott 1960 p.99
6. Ibid
7. Ibid
"generally thrusting youngish men who were not 'tors' but drew upon
British authority to behave in a high-handed way to the people much
to the dislike of Tiv elders". 1 Political dislike to British
chieftaincies existed because Tiv were traditionally attracted to
"strong personalities or big men" of society, a pattern of political
power which the British ignored and did not understand its existence
among the Tiv and which the 'British created chiefs did not have. 2
Dorward gives two examples of Tiv attraction toward strong
personalities and its relationship to political loyalty. In the
19th century, the Tiv were willing followers of the Fulani freebooter,
Dan Karo and the renegade Chamba War-Chiefs, Masar and Kachella. 3
Within the Tiv group and society itself, tradition abounded with tales
of indigenous "big men" of society like Kogi of Turan who acquired
wealth and influence by providing "protection" to Hausa traders. 4
Furthermore G.J. Podevin suggests that Tiv were ruled by big-men of
society and strong personalities. In that instance, he wrote: "The
Munchis cannot be bracketed in the same category as other pagan tribes
in the Eastern Province; they are superior intellectually, physically
and socially and represent what would seem to be a medium between
the Mohammedans, their neighbours to the North and the pagan tribes
in the South. To describe the Munshi as a tribe would be almost a
misnomer; they are undoubtedly a nation and a very powerful one, and
form the predominant race in Southern Nigeria, in the same way as the
Zulus, Basutos and Swazis form the predominant race in South Africa.
1. Perham 1962 p.154
2. Dorward 1972 p.6
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
Many of the chie .64 au men q much inguence and poweit and appear to
have theiA pup undeA thnough contnot".1
In the evolution of the chieftaincy political institutions
among the Tiv, the government of British administration in The North
therefore attempted to develop a system of district Heads modelled
directly on that which existed in the Islamic society. 2 Dorward
ex0:-empt&8 t6
suggests that the systemabsorb	 the Tiv into 'the Northern system'
as second grade "pseudo-Hausa" rather than as a distinct ethnic group
and society with viable indigenous political institutions even when
they were cultural in a cross-cultural political unit of The North. 3
This was so because it was assumed that imposition of Hausa-Fulani
type of political institutions in the district Headmen system might
lead to changes in Tiv social and political views of the world. 4
In other words the government of British administration in The North
sought to produce Hausas out of the Tiv and began to emphasize the
Hausa-Riga as a fitting gift for a Tiv Tor. 5 The process however
was a political expediency as well as administrative, because Hausa
was the language of official communication for the whole of The North,
particularly at the levels of the institutions of government in the
Divisions. In the instance of the Tiv, it was not until 1931 that the
only British officials to sit for Tiv Languages examinations were
Education Officers. 6 16"'
1. G.J. Podevin, District Commissioner of Obudu, 1911, cited in
Dorward 1972 p.6; emphases are mine.
2. Dorward 1972 p.8
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid p.9
6. Ibid
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In the 1950s however administrative officers like D.F.H. MacBride
sought to preserve the Tiv as they originally existed by the discourage-
ment of "Hausa and Ibo-like habits" in favour of a Tiv model. ' Dent
further suggests that MacBride was so obsessed with protecting the
original Tiv culture that he always imagined a scenery of round huts
of Tiv compounds neatly cleaned with elders sitting in them and peace-
fully smoking their pipes.
In the instance of the developing chieftaincy institution among
the Tiv the social and political consequences was that Tiv District
Heads before 1930 began affecting Hausa mannerisms, language, and dress
and this fitted British stereotype on the social and political identity
of The North.
2
 This however became rejected by the mass of society
and the new system therefore broke down in the period between 1912
and 1916, among other reasons, because of the imposition of direct
taxation and also because Tiv elders as District Heads refused to
perform the role of tax collectors.
3
In the period before 1930, the Tiv people were administered as
if they were two groups and societies. In the instance two groups of
districts became organized which split the concept of unity of the
"tribe" concentrated over a specific territorial area. 4 There was a
district which grouped together some Tiv to the east of Katsina Ala
1. Discussions wit h M.J. Dent 1980-1983
2. Dorward 1972 p.9
3. Ibid p.8
4. G.L. Monk, Annual Report for Benue Province, cited in Tseoyo
1975 p.39.
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river including Katsina Ala town, Utur and Mbagen which became centred
on Ibi, a Division that was removed from the political control of
the Emir in Muri Province. 1 The second group of districts which
enclosed the remaining Tiv became centred on Abinsi with their head-
quarters in Abinsi town itself, although the centre of the Division
was later transferred to Makurdi.2
This was at a time when Palmer sought to reorganize the provinces
in context of new anthropological findings to meet the political
reinterpretations of Indirect rule policy of the 1930s. 3 In 1926
therefore when Palmer was Lieutenant Governor of The North he used
his political power to place some of the Tiv people who were concen-
trated east of the Katsina Ala river under the political authority
of the Aku Uka of Wukari, the Jukun 'paramount chief', whom he
expected might be groomed as the eventual overlord of all Tiv land
or "a quasi-Emir" in political authority to some of the non-Islamic
groups and societies found in adjourning territories to Wukari.4
In Abinsi Division where there was the majority concentration
of Tiv people, Audu clan Afoda, a Yoruba Moslem from Bida, became
'chief of the Tiv' and the dominant political figure in the Division.
Audu dan Afoda had been chief of the developing Makurdi town since
1914 and had previous political experience as 'political agent' for
British District Officers. 5 In 1917 Tiv clans in Maser and Harev
whose territorial claims also covered Makurdi town became placed under
1. Tseayo 1975 p.39
2. Ibid
3. For more detailed discussions on these shifts in the Indirect
rule policy see Chapter 2. Section DI
4. Dorward 1972 p.9
5. Tseayo 1975 p.40
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dan Afoda who presided over a superior B-graded Native Court of Law. '
It was anticipated by the government of British administration in
The North that this political arrangement might be a temporary measure:
II ... until such a time as the clans could produce their own rulers." 2
Although a district Head became appointed from the Masev clan
of the Tiv as early as in 1922 he was placed in a subordinate political
status to dan Afoda the Moslem Yoruba chief of Makurdi. 3
 It was not
until 1934 that Masev District Head became politically independent of
the Chief of Makurdi. 4
 In 1927, although the Iyonov and Njiriv clans
of the Tiv people became amalgamated into one district by the govern-
ment of British administration in The North the new district remained
under the political control of Audu dan Afoda and all the district
Heads were agents of 'the Chief of the Tiv'. 5 In the Taraku settle-
ment founded in 1924 with a mixed population of some 200 people Audu
dan Afoda appointed his own messenger Mallam Garuba who subsequently
lived there as the village Head of Taraku settlement and became re-
cognized by the government of British administration. 6 The district
Heads of Iyonov and Njiriv however became politically independent of
dan Afoda in 1932. 7
1. Tseayo 1972 p.40
2. Tseayo 1975 p.40
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
7. Ibid
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This suggests that by 1930 a system of 'political district
Heads' had emerged and became accepted by both the majority of Tiv
people and by the government of British administration in The North,
although they remained in subordinate political status to British
appointees in the chieftaincy institution developed at the Tiv
Divisional level.
It was from this political acceptance that when in 1927 the
District Heads of Abinsi Division met over the non-political issue
of "the abolition of exchange marriage and its substitution in all
cases for the Bride Price form of marriage" the occasion became used
for the formation of a Tiv council for Abinsi Division. E.S. Pembleton,
who was Resident for Benue Province justified the elevated political
power position of dan Afoda as: n .. still useful, believing an
educational influence is being fulfilled". ' By "educational influence"
it is suggested that it was meant the diffusion in the practices of
the centralized patterns of political authority based on the Islamic
model existing in The North. In 1929 a similar council became
developed for the Tiv districts in Katsina Ala Division which was under
the political authority of the Aku Uka of Wukari with a Tiv man,
Jato Aka as President of the Council. 2
1. E.S. Pembleton, Annual Report for Benue Province 1929, cited
in Tseayo 1975 p.41
2. Tseayo 1975 p.41
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Tseayo suggests that the political status of Jato Aka was in-
comparable to the President of the Abinsi Divisional Council where
dan Afoda was chief ruling over the majority of the Tiv population.
In the instance of Katsina Ala Division however the District Officer
was the political link between the Tiv, the Aku Uka of Wukari and
subsequently with the government of British administration in The North. '
In other words, where there was Islamic political authority, the
government of British administration established direct political
links while in the instance of the non-Islamic President of Katsina
Ala Division, the Tiv became managed by a three tier structure of autho-
rity.
In the period between 1927 and 1933 Tiv districts which were
politically centred at Katsina Ala became administratively united with
those centred at Makurdi to constitute Tiv Division, 2 and its head-
quarters became built in Gboko. These developments took place within
the general political and administrative reorganization that took place
in the whole of The North in which Plateau Province was created in
1926 with some non-Islamic groups and societies under the Emirs of
Bauchi, Muri, Yola, Zaria and Jemaa becoming politically separated
from the Islamic society. 3
1. Tseayo 1975 p.41
2. Ibid p.43
3. This is examined in more detail in Section V (c) of this Chapter
where there is discussion of the non-Islamic groups and societies
concentrated on the Plateau.
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Ethnic political consciousness through the development of the
political institution of chieftaincies among the Tiv however became
conditioned by the trip of some Tiv district Heads to Kaduna in May 1926.
In that instance a party of 260 Tiv district Heads and Elders accom-
panied Captain G.G. Feasey, a District Officer and Audu dan Afoda,
the Chief of Makurdi to visit Kaduna, the political capital of The
North. ' Although the visit to Kaduna was meant to encourage the
migration of Tiv farmers so that they might become "a farming colony"
in order to produce food to meet the needs of the developing urban
population of that town 2 , there was an unintended political con-
sequence on Tiv leaders when they came into contact with patterns of
Western modernization already achieved in the capital territory,
the prestige, wealth and political status of the Emirs which became
the conditioning factors in the subsequent political and social demands
for "a Tiv Chief like an Emir".
In 1940 there was further Tiv and Idoma presence in Kaduna which
compounded the demand. In that instance, the Resident for Benue,
D.M.H. Beck suggests in his 1940 report that: "... The Chiefs' Con-
ference at Kaduna was attended by the Emir of Nasarawa. Interested
visitors on the last day of the conference were representatives of the
Tiv and Idoma councils. The Tiv party consisted of five clan Heads
1. G.L. Monk, Annual Reports for Benue Province, cited in Tseayo
1975 p.41
2. Tseayo 1975 p.41
with wives and attendants; they were much impressed with what they
saw.
1
This was also the same experience for the Idoma. This means
that M-Belt groups and societies like the Tiv and Idoma were not only
seen as subordinate and in an inferior political status position
relative to the Emirs but also that Western European infrastructure
in the processes of modernization and the gravitation toward conceptions
of political status based on the centralizing model of authority seen
in the Emirs as 'one man' of authority had become an attraction power
to relate to the political circumstances of their groups and societies.
In other words by 1940 M-Belt groups and societies began to accept
the prestigious norms attached to a central political figure acclaimed
to be the focus of leadership and unity for their group and society.
This also means that before 1950 western European infrastructural
development was lacking among the Tiv and Idoma, a situation of
development along those patterns, that was the general circumstance
in the territories of the M-Belt groups and societies in The North.$ 
II
Before 1930 when there was political search for "natural ruling
classes" among the M-Belt groups and societies by Palmer at the time
he was Lieutenant Governor of The North, 3 the Aku Uka of Wukari and
1. D.M.H. Berk, Annual Report for Benue Province 1940, cited in
Tseayo 1975 p.42
2. This is examined with concrete data as examples in Section IV
of this Chapter.
3. For examples see discussions in Chapter 2.. Section IV.
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the district head of Takum attended the NPAC in Kaduna as representa-
tives of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Benue and also other
areas of the M-Belt. In the period between 1900 and 1926, although
the Emir of Nasarawa was considered as the 'natural ruler' of that
province as conceived by Lugard which enclosed the Tiv, Idoma and
Igala, in the period after 1930, political emphasis shifted toward
the AKu Uka and he became the political representative of the non-
Islamic groups and societies in that Assembly. Government watched
the personality of the Aku Uka of Wukari, to develop as chief of the
M-Belt groups and societies. This was the premise from which W. Morgam
suggested that: "... the mere attendance of these chiefs' attendance
on equal terms with the important Emirs is of the greatest mutual
benefit. Ths two chiefs comported themselves well". 1
 It was in that
connection that Tiv Division became placed under the political authority
of the Aku Uka of Wukari in the period between 1927 and 1933. 2)01
It was however not until after 1947 that the Tiv may be said to
have achieved political autonomy when 'a paramount chief' of their
group and society became appointed. Political consciousness about
the Tiv political identity which became mobilized in support for the
demands of the creation of 'a Tiv chief like an Emir' in the 1940s,
found mass expression through European educated Tiv who attended the
government schools at Annune and Katsina Ala and had worked with the
NA establishment in Gboko.
3
 In the period when European educated Tiv
1. E. Morgan Annual Report for Benue Province 1930, cited in
Tseayo 1975 p.43
2. Tseayo 1975 p.43
3. Tseayo 1975 p.39; p44-49
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sought the creation of a Tiv chief Audu dan Afoda had "become a sort
14°5
of de facto paramount chief of Tiv".	 Furthermore Tseayo suggests
that initial political expression ()fa Tiv political identity in the
period between 1937 and 1947, from "the young Tiv intelligentsia"
was caused by a set of interrelated factors centred on the political
meaning of the dominant prominance of dan Afoda as the head of Tiv
Native Administration. 2 In the instance, Tseayo suggests that:
".. The young educated Tiv rejected him on grounds that he was a
foreigner imposed on the Tiv people by the British. Audu dan Afoda
usurped a position which legitimately belonged to any one of them.
Audu dan Afoda constituted a threat to the ambitions of young educated
Tiv .. his presence represented or reflected the Hausa Fulani...
which the British favoured (although) not all British officials favoured..
Those who would have argued the preservation of the democratic system
.	 3
of the Tiv influenced the young educated Tiv."
	 The political con-
sequences of a situation like that was a movement with an explicit
Tiv political identity. This was the TPU. 4
 Tseayo further suggests
that this political movement expressed: "The zenith of the level
of Tiv consciousness and particularism." 5
Although "Tiv consciousness of being Tiv" was achieved before
1937 and therefore they began to act politically with that identity,
1. Tseayo 1975 p.48
2. Ibid p.45
3. Ibid
4. The Tiv Progressive Union is examined in more analytical detail
in Section VI of this Chapter.
5. Tseayo 1975 p.45
'tk,c1 .3 see co+-NA..e.v..k. cLv
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the "Tiv intelligentsia" did not channel their political actions
through Tiv traditional institutions; nelwner did the Tiv intelligentsia
confront British administration with the political demands for a Tiv
chief. The demands for a Tiv chief by the "Tiv intelligentsia" had
to be channelled through the British created 'Tiv Central Council'.
It was political ambivalence within the Council that caused a more
forceful political movement under leadership of the 'Tiv intelligentsia'
when their sponsored candidate lost the contest to be Chief of Tiv.
The first political request from the Tiv which became directed
to the government of British administration in The North, for the
creation of the post of a chief for all Tiv was suggested at a meeting
of the already existing 'Tiv central council' held in Gboko in 1937.1
Gboko town itself was founded in the period between 1907 and 1933
when the headquarters of the developing Tiv Division shifted from
Abinsi to Makurdi and settled in the 'new' town. 2
The political request in 1937 for the creation of a Tiv chief
took the government of British administration in The North by surprise.
This suggestion is explicit in the 1937 Annual reports of Captain
H.H. Wilkinson who was the acting Resident for Benue in that year.
In the instance Wilkinson wrote: ".. the suggestion that there should
be a chief of Tiv came as a bombshell but on close inquiry in individual
clan areas it was clear that there was not the slightest desire or
intention that an outside pmson should have any control over clan
1. Tseayo 1975 p.45
2. Ibid p.43
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affairs... the suggestion possibly originated with a few of the more
ambitious as a means of self aggrandisement .. gradually as higher
education marches with growing feelings of nationality (Tiv nationality)
a real central administration may be evolved." 1 Implicit in this
perspective of the Tiv political demand is that British administration
sought to create a political institution in which one of the clan District
Heads might develop to control "over clan affairs" as well as affairs
that were equivocally Tiv, rather than "an arbitrary Tiv man" chosen
from the intelligentsia class.
Tseayo however suggests that Wilkinson was necessarily against
a Tiv-man being chief of the Tiv because of the faulty interpretation
of the words "outside person". 2 'Outside person' in whatever inter-
pretive sense from what Wilkinson reported did not mean someone from
outside Tiv land as is implicit in the interpretations of Tseayo.
Furthermore, in 1938, British political intentions for the development
of the Tiv chieftaincy institution was from the clan district heads
rather than from the European educated Tiv men. This became even more
explicit when D.M.H. Beck visited Tiv land to reiterate political views
from the clan heads concerning the issue of a Tiv chief. In the instance
the clan heads rejected the very concept of "an outside person" from
their own class being chief of Tiv. This is explicit in the 1938 report
of Beck when he wrote: "... the last annual meeting gave rise to a hat4
hearted demand (of the Tiv central council) 4o11L the appointment o4 a
paltamount chie4 to AepAuent the Tiv tAibe at the con4mence o4 chie44
at Kaduna. Thi.z demand ftaz quickty dAopped by the clan counci24 them-
zetvez, but the agifation was fostered sporadically by literate members
1. H.H. Wilkinson, Annual Report for Benue Province 1937, cited
in Tseayo 1975 p.46.
2. Tseayo 1975 p.46
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of the tribe, more with a view to their own personal aggrandisement
than to the interest of the people .. the proposal (for a Paramount
Chief of the Tiv) in so far as it was prompted by the literate
employees of the Native Administration woAking behind the 4mokewteen
o theiA tAibat councit with theiA own intekezt4 in view arose from a
vague realization that the Council itself is far too unwieldy to achieve
practical results."1 Contrary therefore to what Tseayo suggests in
his interpretation that "British officials were not aware of the fact
that the demands by the literate leaders of Tiv society for a paramount
chief could be related to their general position in The Northern
Provinces" they were infact very aware (!) since Beck himself suggests
that the Tiv Central Council "itself is far too unwieldy to achieve
practical results." 2 Thus when the Tiv Central Council was addressed
in the period between 1946 and 1947 by the political representatives
of the TPU, J.B. Ukpada and Iguse Adoki they lashed out that there was
political need for the Council ".. allowing the voices of the literate
young Tiv to be heard".3
Although there was political communication between the European
educated men of Tiv and the British-created traditional political
authority in the institution of the Tiv Central Council for the purposes
of creating a Tiv chief they both lost in the political manoeuvres for
the post. The sponsored TPU candidate Condo Aluor for example, lost the
contest for the job and Makere Dzakpe became appointed as the first chief
of the Tiv in 1947 by the government of British administration in The
North. 4
 Makere Dzakpe was a less European educated person than
1. D.M.H. Beck, Annual Reports for Benue 1938, cited in Tseayo, 1975 p.L
2. Tseayo 1975 p.47
3. 'Pagan Administration' Nak Gbodiv 246 Vol.I and TPU letter 1946,
cited in Tseayo 1975 p.49.
4. Tseayo 1975 p.49
Condor Aluor, the NA chief scribe. Although this was so, it ought to be
borne in mind that while Dzakpe came from the larger and better educated
parts of Tiv, the Ipusu, Condor Aluor came from the Chango. 1
Makere Dzakpe was a former Sergeant Major in the WAFF and subsequently
became the chief of NA police.2
Dorward suggests that the victory of Makere Dzakpe for the Tiv
chieftaincy job in 1947 undermined initial Tiv traditional political
solidarity with the Tiv European educated young men. While the
European educated Tiv, sponsored and supported Condor Aluor who was
chief scribe of the Tiv Native Administration, British administration
favoured Makere Dzakpe: ".. because of his loyal military background
and more conservative outlook". 3 This was what caused political
polarities to develop between European educated young men in Tiv land and
the created traditional institutions of the government of British admini-
stration in The North which split political support for the M-Belt Movement
along those lines among the Tiv in the period between 1956 and 1966.
While some European educated became supported in the M-BELT Movement
by the majority of the Tiv in the rural areas, others with the sympathies
of the 'traditional' institutions were outside the M-Belt Movement and
gave their support to the government of the NPC in The North until
after 1965. 4
The analytical significance of these political developments for
this Chapter as well as for the subsequent chapters in the thesis on the
1. Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980-83; for discussion of the political
differences between the Ipusu and Chango, see Tseayo 1975 p.87.
2. Dorward 1972 p.18
3. Ibid
4. This is examined in more detail in Chapters Li_ a...0(5
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creation of Tiv Division and the evolution of the institution of Chief
of Tiv (Tor Tiv) and his subordinate Chieftaincies is that there were
marked contrasts with similar political developments when compared to the
experiences in the establishment of administrative divisions and the
political institutions of chieftaincies among the other M-Belt groups
and societies concentrated in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Zaria and S. Bauchi
in the period between 1900 and 1950. For example, while the initial
political struggle of the Tiv was over the imposition of British
authority with a centralized Islamic model, which resulted in the
political institution of the chief of Tiv, other M-Belt groups and
societies sought political separation from the political rulership of
Emirs or Fulani Islamic distinct Heads and the development of a chief for
their groups and societies. In the instance of the Tiv, this was so
because of the little social and political impact, expansion of the
Islamic society in the period between 1804 and 1900, had on conquest
and political control of their society. Unlike the Tiv however in many
of the M-Belt groups and societies found in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Bauchi,
S. Zaria, there existed village chieftaincies rather than clan heads found
among the Tiv who were built around the "personality of a bigman" in
society and whose decisions did not commit the rest of the group and
society.
Idoma who were found toward the west of the Tiv territorial areas,
shared many of the Tiv political characteristics in the development of a
'Native' Authority, the Idoma Division and the political institution of
an Idoma chief for the political requirements of both the government of
British administration in The North and for the Idoma group and society.
However, while the Tiv wanted 'a Tiv chief like an Emir' the Idoma acceptec
the development of the chieftaincies institutions as a direct result of
the political need for a powerfully centralized authority caused by
an externally induced competition for 'land use' from the Ibo and Tiv
who were their neighbours to the south and east. ' There was also
the political concern to unite the different sub-ethnic groups and
societies among the Idoma. 2 The need for Idoma unity was an important
consideration because they were politically and culturally fragmented
and existed in a congeries of small sub-ethnic groups and societies
with language and customs the only basis of developing unity. 3
It has been suggested that about 23 sub-ethnic groups exist within
the Idoma with the Eggede being the most politically prominent. 4
Although they have always spoken related dialects of their language they
differ about the origins of their migration patterns and social origins.5
The majority of Idoma who became concentrated in the British created
Idoma Division trace their social origins to the Jukun or "Apa"
from where they suggest that they migrated to their present territorial
location because of the "horse war". 6
 This might be suggesting migration
caused by the Fulani cavalry raids, but then, the Jukum also used horses
when they became marauding Empire builders of the 16th century. 7
1. Dudley 1966 p.61
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.60
4. Ford, Brown and Armstrong 1955 p.91
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
7. For detailed examples see discussions in Chapter 1 Section I and II.
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In the period between 1804 and 1900 the Idoma found in Doma
and Keana, came under direct military impact and Islamic influences
developed from raids by Fulani armies for political conquest and
for slaves from Nasarawa and Keffi. The Fulani armies also crossed
the Benue river southwardly on several occasions to undertake slave
raids from among the majority of the Idoma groups and societies.'
Fulani authority and political control of the Idoma was however
not established because the Idoma succeeded in resisting total
military conquest. 2 Upon impact with British influences after 1900
some Idoma in Doma and the Keana areas became placed under the
political authority of the British "created Emir and Emirate"
centred on the Kanuri town of Lafia as early as 1905. 3
Idoma Division might be said to have been conceived as early
as 1917 when "the North-South" boundaries of Nigeria were redrawn
on ethnic lines. 4 In that instance the administrative and political
subdivisions affecting the non-Islamic groups and societies in the
Benue areas became organized as "independent pagans" of Igala, Idoma,
Tiv and Jukun. 5 After 1926 Palmer placed the political subdivision
of Igala under the Attah of Igala and those of the Tiv and Idoma
under the political authority of the Aku Uka of the Jukun based in
1. Forde et al 1955 p.97
2. Ibid
3. Ballard 1972 p.4
4. Ibid p.8
5. Ibid
1430
Wukari Division. 1 Subsequently when Idoma Division became organized,
it was bordered by the Benue River in The North, Tiv Division in
the east, Igala Division in the west, a concentration of Ibos in the
south and on the southeastern edges of the Division was to be found
numerous other groups and societies of the Ogoja Province. 2
Table 3.18 suggests that in 1952 there were about 203,479
Idoma people in Benue Province, which makes them the second largest
group and society within the political conception of both Benue Province
and in relation to other groups and societies in the M-Belt territories.
Magid suggests that the majority of the Idoma numbers were concentrated
in 16 of the 22 districts of Idoma Division.3
As early as 1927 the government of British administration in
The North considered the establishment of a Divisional Chief for the
accephelous Idoma groups and societies. 4 After 1928 the Idoma 'Ojira'
became developed as a political institution: ty ... and fond hopes were
expressed that from the 'Ojira' will eventually be found a paramount
chief who will rule the whole of Idoma". 5 The 'Ojira' was a traditional
Idoma political institution in which all adult men of the group take
part in its mass meetings. 6 Before 1940 however, the political
emphasis of the government of British administration in The North in
regard to political organization of the Idoma into a single entity,
1. Ballard 1972 p.9
2. Magid 1971 p.360
3. Ibid p.360 n.5
4. Ibid p.362 n.19
5. The Tour of Brigadier-General, Sir S.H. Wilson, Permanent Under-
Secretary, in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, 27th August -
10th September 1928, Colonial Office Library Pamphlet Series,
cited in Ballard 1972 p.10
6. Magid 1971 p.347
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was on the development of a 'Native Authority system' by strengthening
the sub-institutions of the District Chiefs. In that instance district
headship posts became created and were filled up with both traditional
clan heads and political persons without any roots in the legitimacy
of the office or title. 1
It was from this class of persons created by the government of
British administration in The North that Idoma representatives to the
1940 Conference of Emirs and Chiefs in Kaduna became chosen. Beck,
the Resident in Benue Province suggests that upon their home-coming
from Kaduna the Idoma representatives: 11 ... returned somewhat awed
and with a modified opinion of their relative importance: not unex-
pectedly they were particularly impressed with aeroplanes, the lighting
and water supplies in Kaduna and the wealth and dignity of the Emirs". 2
A rather interesting but very understandable correlation to this
experience is that in the period between 1951 and 1965 Idoma politicians
in the NHA and their representatives in the NHC became concerned to
raise issues about electrification, pipe borne water, postal services
and dispensaries in the town of Oturkpo. 3
Very much like in the instance of the Tiv, the visit to Kaduna
served the political value in attracting the non-centralized Idoma
groups and societies into appreciating the prestigious political status
of the Emirs. In the period between 1940 and 1947 the previously
decentralized Native Authority system in Idoma Division became a
centralized administration designed with emphasis on developing Idoma
Unity. 4
 Also in that period when the government of British administration
1. Magid 1971 p.347
2. D.M.H. Beck, Annual Report for Benue Province 1940, cited in
Tseayo 1975 p.42.
3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4.. 0,,,ct 5
4. Magid 1971 p.347
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was effecting reorganization of the Native authority system, Idoma
consciousness found expression among a growing body of primary school
graduates in the Division, who formed the Idoma Hope Rising Union
as early as 1942.1
The IHRU, attracted employees of the Idoma Native Authority,
particularly those who had lost their employment with the NA and
also among those who were still in NA employment but faced frustrations. 2
As early as 1942 one of their political objectives was to support
British intentions to centralize the NA under an Idoma chief. This
was so because they wanted to break the political hold of members of
the British created District Head Council on the NA, stimulate the
NA to make more progressive development in the Division and influence
policy in the local administrative apparatus. 3 Unlike similar develop-
ments in Tiv Division in the same period the Idoma European educated,
were on the same side with British administration, although they did
not make use of any existing created political institutions as the
Tiv did. In 1947 however a chief for all of the Idoma groups and
societies became created from the Idoma district and clan council.
4
He was Ogiri Oko who had combined leadership as the clan district
headship of Adoka and the British chieftainship of the Idoma under
the designated title of the 'Ochi Idoma'. 5 In 1948 an Advisory Council
became established by British administration to assist the 'Ochi Idoma'
1. Magid 1971 p.344-345
2. Ibid p.345
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.348
5. Ibid
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in the administration of Idoma Division. 1 In the same year, the Council
became the 'Idoma Central Court'. Both the processes which led to the
appointment of 'Ochi Idoma' and members of the Advisory Council,
subsequently the Idoma central court excluded suggestions by the IHRU
that literate European educated Idomas ought to hold the posts. 2
By 1949 when Ogiri Oko became inaugurated as 'Ochi Idoma', and a
district head with three other illiterate clan heads became elected
into the Advisory Council, political exclusion of European educated
Idomas was sealed off from political participation in British created
institutions. 3 When after 1950 electoral processes of politics
developed in The North, 'traditional' authority, created by the
government of British administration in Idoma Division was in effective
control of influences to shape electoral choices and completely over-
shadowed the ambitious political objectives of the IHRU. 4
Other groups and societies significantly related to the political
concept of the M-Belt in The North, who were sociologically concen-
trated alongside the Tiv and the Idoma were the Jukuns and the Igalas.
Both the Jukun and the 'gala had centralized social and political
institutions in the systems of their societies before impact with
British influences in 1900. In the instance of the Jukuns, it has
been suggested that in the 16th century, they built a political Empire
over the whole territories which became politically defined by the
British as The North in the period after 1900. 5 Archaeological
1. Magid 1971 p.348
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. The political roles of the European educated young men in the
formation and development of Tribal Unions among the M-Belt
groups and societies is examined in more detail in Section VI
of this Chapter.
5. Perham 1962 p.144
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evidence and the massive anthropological researches produced in the
period of British administration in The North suggest that the Jukun
expansion created a cultural diffusion among the majority of the
M-Belt groups and societies.'
In the period between 1804 and 1900 however Jukun territory
north of Wukari was over-run and conquered by Fulani armies and the
Jukun chiefs made to pay political tribute to Emirs in Yola and Muri.2
After impact with British influences in 1900 and in the period between
1914 and 1940 the government of British administration in The North
sought to ressurect the Jukun Empire over some M-Belt groups and
societies so that "they might exercise their imperial techniques". 3
This was at a time when the government of British administration in
The North searched for a centralizing model, indigenous to the non-
Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas so that they might
meet the political requirements in the application of the Indirect
rule policy.
Ressurecting the military and political Empire of the Jukun however
became mainly directed at groups and societies like Tiv, Idoma and Igala
in the Benue Province. For example, as earlier noted in this section,
some of the Tiv population concentrated on the Eastern banks of the
Katsina Ala river were ruled for about 10 years by the Jukun chief of
Wukari until the 1940s when the Tiv gained their independence under a
British created chief. In the instance of the Jukuns, this means that
1. Ballard 1979 p.1
2. For more detailed discussions and examples see discussions in
Chapter I Sections II and III.
3. Perham 1962 p.145
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although the British reinforced an already existing chieftaincy
political institution they sought to transpose that institution onto
other groups and societies where centralized political authority was
not the political experience. A Jukun Division called 'Wukari' Division
was however created after 1930 and became centred in the Native
Administrative headquarters of the town of Wukari. 1 Political con-
ceptions of Jukun political dominance on some M-Belt groups and societies
centred on the AKu Uka of Wukari became narrowed to Wukari Division
upon the creation of Tiv and Idoma Divisions, the creation of chief-
taincy political institutions among these groups and societies and
the administrative transfer of the Igala to Kabbd province in the period
between 1934 and 1938. 2
The Igala who numbered about 150,000 in 1931 3 and about 294,400
in 19524 trace their social origins to the Jukun dynasty of Wukari.5
It has been suggested that a Jukun prince founded their ruling chiefs
and that of nine other Igala sub-chiefs. 6
 The Igala were however about
the first of the political M-Belt groups and societies to come into
contact with British influences with Christianity based on the Buxton
principle of Christianity civilizing Africa rather than Islam. 7
1. Perham 1962 p.145
2. Ballard 1972 p.11
3. Perham 1962 p.145
4. Okpu 1977 p.24
5. Perham 1962 p.145
6. Perham 1962 p.145
7. M.J. Dent, Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, One of a series on the
Saints, preached at St John's Parish Church, Keele, Summer 1982.
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Before 1918 the Igala group and society were politically split
between the governments of British administration in The North and
South of Nigeria, divided in The North between two provinces and
existing in three Divisions with different political authorities.'
The traditional chief of the Igala, the Attah himself was politically
cut off at Idah under the southern Nigerian administration while
his subordinates ruled the majority of the 'gala population concen-
tration in The North. 2 It was by political and administrative policy
decisions in 1918, 1921 and 1926 that the government of British
administration brought all the Igalas into one administrative Division
under the authority of the Attah with a Native Court under his
jurisdiction. 3 In the instance, Igala social and political identity
emerged and looked up to the Attah for unity.
This was the premise from which politics in Igala similar to
the circumstances of the Jukun, became tied up to traditional politica
institutions unlike in other parts of the M-Belt groups and societies.
In both instances of the Jukun and the Igala, European educated young
men and their subsequent political formations were not instrumental
in shaping the development of political institutions. In the instance
of the Tiv and Idoma however both with different political paths,
'British created traditional political institutions' were developed in
the specific context of an emergent traditional ruling group of "Elders
and a politically interested European educated group that was more
conscious of political processes in society because of the impact with
1. Perham 1962 p.146
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.147
European influences. Among all of the Benue non-Islamic groups and
societies variation in the development of political institutions
was centred on the political interests within factions in the groups
and societies rather than against an overbearing "outside" political
group. This means that the M-Belt groups and societies who were
concentrated in Benue did not face Islamic groups to contest the
development of political institutions which were created by the
government of British administration in The North in the same politica
sense that groups and societies in Adamawa, Plateau, S. Zaria and
S. Bauchi did after 1940.
(C) Plateau
Table 3-18 suggests that by 1950, Plateau Province with about
50 (16.7%) of the different ethnic groups and societies and with over
100 different linguistic groupings l so far identified, was a territoriE
area with the second largest concentration in ethnic group numbers of
the different non-Islamic groups and societies indigenous to the areas
which were within the territorial political conception of the M-Belt
in The North, even when upon closer perusal, many of them were
numerically quite small. The total population of the Plateau groups
and societies constituted about 18.0% of the population concentration
within the political conception of the M-Belt areas in the territories
of The North. The numerically dominant of the disparate Plateau
groups and societies were the Birom, Sura, Yergam and Angas. 2
1. Ballard 1972 p.2
2. Northern Nigeria Statistical Year Book, Table 19, Population of
Northern Nigeria by Tribe and Province, 1952 Census; Table 20 (a)
some smaller tribes in Northern Nigeria by Province 1952 Census,
Kaduna, 1964 p.16-17.
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Although these four groups and societies were numerically dominar
relative to other groups and societies on the Plateau, they jointly
constituted only about one third of the indigenous population in
the area. Thus for example, Birom, Angas and Sura constituted only
about 27.3% of the total indigenous population of Plateau Province.
Although the Ankwe people who were concentrated in Shendam
Division of the Plateau were a numerically small group and society in
1952 they were prominent in the 1950s and 1960s at two levels of
government and politics opposed to each other. For example, while
some of their European educated young men under the leadership of
Michael Audu Buba identified with the government of the NPC in The
North, the churches and the electorate identified and voted in 1959
for the M-Belt Movement which sought political separation into a M-Belt
Region from the NPC government and the Islamic conception in the
political identity of The North. This suggests that although the
numerical size of a group and society was crucial in the politics
that affected the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement,
there were other determinate intervening factors that shaped the
political performance of a group in the strength of its political
activity in support of M-Belt demands. '
The choice of the Birom, Angas and Sure as representative
of the focus in the development of political institutions and achieved
consciousness in political identity before 1950 is therefore analytical
1.	 These factors and their explanatory reasons are examined in more
detail in Chapters yanct5 where politics within the M-Belt
groups and societies and with the M-Belt Movement in The North
is discussed.
justified by the political roles, leadership from these groups per-
formed in the development and growth of the M-Belt Movement. This
was particularly the case with political and religious leadership that
emerged and developed from European educated young men among the Birom
and Sura in the period between 1949 and 1956.1
Apart from the Angas, examined below, most other Plateau groups
and societies shared similarities about their migration patterns and
traditions of social origins before they arrived at their present
territorial locations. 2 There has however been much more cultural
fusion among all the Plateau groups and societies, when compared to
Idoma, Tiv, 'gala and Jukun in Benue Province. This cultural fusion
makes the distinctive social origins of the Plateau groups and
societies difficult to unravel for each to stand out on its own accoun
This also is traceable in the instance of the different groups and
societies found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria, where cultural
similarities exist similar to those groups and societies found on
the Plateau. Plateau groups and societies share linguistic similariti
It has been suggested that implicit in these linguistic similari
ties there might be inferred migration patterns. 4 A Plateau language
1. Political leadership from among some of the different groups and
societies on the Plateau and its political performance in the
growth and development of the M-Belt Movement is examined in
detail in Section VI of this Chapter and also in Chapters 1400‘61:
2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972.
3. Ballard 1979 p.8
4. Ibid
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which is spread over a large territorial area is the Birom language.
Birom belongs to the Benue-Congo group of languages. 1 The language
extends from its territorial frontiers with the Sura of the central
Chadic group, Ron and Monguna of an "older" Chadic group, to fill
the entire level northern salient of the Plateau. 2 The languages
closely related to the Birom on the Plateau are those of the Aten or
Ganawuri and the Chara. 3
Patterns of migration within the territories of the subsequent
Jos Division however suggest that the Birom language is related to
that of Jarawa, particularly the Afusare or "Hill Jarawa". 4 Afusare
oral tradition in turn indicates a close relationship with Chawai
and Ingwe (Miango) on the western escarpment of the Plateau. 5 Other
M-Belt groups and societies including the Kagoro in S. Zaria have a
tradition of having come from the Plateau. 6 In addition the Rukuba
in Jos Division bear close linguistic affinities with the Nimtan of
S. Zaria. 7 Their territorial location provides the strongest linguis
evidence that the Birom have migrated from south to north, pushing
various related people like the Chara and the Aten off the Plateau t
the east, north and west. 8
1. Ballard 1979 p.8
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. H.D. Gunn, Peoples of the Plateau area of Northern Nigeria,
London 1953, cited in Ballard 1979 p.8
6. Tremearne 1912, cited in Ballard 1979 p.8
7. Ballard 1979 p.8
B.	 Ibid
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Gunn suggests that the majority of the Birom villages on the
Plateau trace their origins to the village of Riyom. 1 Riyom in
turn claims to come from an area off the Plateau to the south-west,
an area now occupied by Gwandara. In the process of their migration
the Birom incorporated and assimilated various groups on their
frontiers. 2 Most of these processes of migration took place before
the beginning of the 20th century. Tiv are the only M-Belt group and
society to have migrated to their present territorial location within
3the last 200 years 5 nYNCE a.e,A.A.t1100 AD •
Traditions of origins on the migration patterns of the Birom
suggest that they previously lived further to the south and south-
west of their present territorial location centred on Jos in the
Plateau. For some unknown reasons they moved as a group and society
from a "forest country" in those southern territories to Riyom where
their clan heads dispersed to become the nucleus of the Birom village
of: Bachit, Du, Fan, Forum, Gashish, Gyel, Kuru, Heifan, Riyom,
Ropp and Vwang (Vom).4
The Birom became the dominant group and society in the subseque
Jos Division which was created in the period between 1926 and 1927,
centred on the developing metropolitan town of Jos earlier in 1910. 5
This was so because the Birom occupied the greater parts of the terni
land of Jos Division in terms of their population size, number of Dis
1. Gunn 1953 p.78-79
2. Ballard 1979 p.9
3. Perham 1962 p.153
4. Harold Gunn, "The Peoples of The Plateau Area of Northern Niger.
in Darl Forde (ed), Ethnographic Studies of Africa, Part VII,
International African Institute, London 1953 p.24
5. Jos Division, Ministry of Information and Internal Affairs,
Jos, 1970 p.3
and territorial area of land. For example, while the Birom were
concentrated on 948 (66.2%) sq. miles out of a Divisional total
of 1431 sq. miles, other groups and societies in Jos Division shared
483 (33.8%) sq. miles. 1 The Birom were concentrated in about 80
villages before they were Federated with other groups and societies
to constitute Jos Division as a single administrative unit in 1935
by the government of British administration in The North. 2
Previously however in the period before impact with British
influences, although there was social unity within the Birom through
language, customs and other cultural forms, there was no traditional
political integration in an existing 'Birom Polity'.
3
 In other words
the basic unit of political organization among the Birom was the
village where chiefs and a council of Elders governed politics,
economy and society. Although the village chieftaincy system among
the Birom was historically hereditary, there were no political
institutions which served or united all the dispersed villages, even
when warriors from a neighbouring village might assist another to do
battle with another village or another outside group, to drive away
the enemy. In other words, Birom had no standing army which might
be called upon to fight a war. 4 This means that "political units
among the Birom were smaller than the tribe" and each unit was
autonomous, independent and owning no political loyalty to the others. 5
1. Jos Division 1970 p.3
2. Dudley 1968 p.61
3. Ibid
4. Logams 1975 p.26
5. R. Apthorpe, 'Political Change, Centralization and Role Differen-
tiations', Civilizations, Vol.10, No.2 1960 p.221.
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This was the general pattern of political organization of
society among the other groups and societies in Jos Division, like
the Jerawa, Jarawa, Anaguta, Ingwe, Rukuba and miscellaneous others. 1
Like other M-Belt groups and societies therefore the Birom did not
have any formal state system and a hierarchical political organizatioi
in control of the whole group and society. 2
Subsequently upon impact with British influences none of the
groups and societies on the Plateau achieved the creation of a politil
and an administrative Division in the same political and cultural
sense as the Tiv in Tiv Division, Idoma in Idoma Division and the
concentration of the Jukuns in Wukari Division. Like most of the
groups and societies found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, and S. Zaria they
became either politically organized into "Federated Native Authority
Divisions" or under the direct rulership of Fulani Emirs and some
variant of Islamic political leadership. This was so, because the
Plateau groups and societies were numerically small and dispersed
with each of the village chiefs politically independent of the other
villages within the same ethnic groups. Dudley has aptly summarized
and described the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies as the
"non-centralized, dispersed societies of The North".
3
Jos Division which became politically functional in 1927 had thE
highest concentration of different indigenous non-Islamic groups and
societies on the Plateau. There were 25 different groups and societiE
in Jos Division in the Plateau Province. 4 Ethnic group concentration
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.53-121
2. T.M. Baker, The Social Organization of the Birom, unpublished
PhD thesis, University of London, 1954 p.274.
3. Dudley 1968 p.57-65
4. 1931 Census Report p.184; Jos Division 1970 p.3
which became concomitant with cultural fusion, unique to the Plateau
in general and in particular to Jos Division was so because many other
groups and societies, previously existing in S. Bauchi and S. Zaria
migrated to take refuge on the Plateau hills and caves in the period
between 1804 and 1900 as a direct consequence of the impact with the
expanding Islamic society from political centres of religion and
politics like Zaria, Bauchi, Muri, Jemaa, Wase, Nasarawa, Keffi and
.	 1
Lafia.
Ames suggests that in the creation of administrative Divisions
on the Plateau particularly in Jos Division, political problems existed:
n .... because in one or two instances, where segments of a tribe have
left their main body and eventually settled in between tribes of a
different genus, the ethnological basis of administration has had to
give way to that of geography". 2 This means that there were migrations
of other groups and societies onto the Plateau, and in particular to
the territories which subsequently became the administrative Divisions
centred on Jos. Furthermore, Ames suggests that although the three
Irigwe (Miango) towns of Kwal, Mango and Kimakwe with a total
population of 6693, located on the edge of the Plateau escarpment
were a part of the "Irigwe Tribe" they were never conquered and were
not under Fulani domination. Their "much smaller part" was however
in Zaria Province (mainly concentrated in Southern Lana), ruled firstly
by the Chawai and afterwards came under Fulani political authority
based on the Emir of Zaria.3
1. See more detailed discussions of the expansion of the Islamic
society in Chapter l and its effect on the non-Islamic groups
and societies in Chapter 1 Section III.
2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, p.47
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.57
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Similarly, on the eastern side of the Plateau escarpment
where the Anaguta were concentrated there were: ".. Jarawa villages
of Jos with a population of nearly 1000. The main part of the Jarawa
tribe is in Bauchi Emirate, the Jos section originally coming from
Lamingo to avoid conquest by the Emirs of Bauchi. They still have
association with their main body and return to Lamingo in Bauchi for
circumcision and other Tsafi purposes. In fact Jos (Jarawa) and
Lamingo form a dual village and alternately provide a chief for
certain Tsafi purposes. The Anaguta tribe have assimilated much
Jarawa customs and have always been allies of the Jarawa of Jos.
Naraguta and Jos (Jarawa) fought side by side against the Fulani, who
camped on the outskirts of Jos but were eventually driven out and
also against the Rukuba tribe". 1 Similar traditions of origins and
cultural fusion were characteristic of Birom-Ganawari, Kaje-Birom-
Rukuba-Herawa, Jarawa-Kaje-Jaba, Irigwe-Moroa-Kagoro-Kaje, Kaje-Chawai
and Kagoma in S. Zaria and the Gamawuri on the Plateau, 2 even when
it has been suggested that the "Ganawuri were runaway slaves of
Fulani from Adamawa". 3
In the instance of the Plateau groups and societies found in
Pankshin and Shendam Divisions traditions of origins suggest that they
belonged to an original Angas group which was part of the main Chadic-
group that migrated from Borno with subsequent factions branching off
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.57
2. Ibid p.83
3. Ibid p.76-77
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in the course of migration to form the different tribes. '
Before migrating to their present territorial location on the
Plateau, the Angas lived in Borno and their traditions of origins
suggest that they belonged to the same stock as the Beriberi and the
Jukun. 2 They set off from Borno "a long time ago under a single chief"
and first settled in Yam in the district of Kanam. 3 Thereafter, they
moved to Sur, Zwal, Jekka and eventually settled at Amper District
when "hostilities" had caused: "the chief and the tribe to move from
Yam".
4
 When factions within the Angas group and society became more
severe, some of their members broke off to found Kabwir, Gyangyan
.
and Dawakl. 5 Also in that instance some of the Angas from Kabwir
branched off and went to Fier where they founded "the Pyem tribe", 6
while other factions went to become a variant of the Angas in the town
of Garram, the celebrated last victims of the brutal slave raiding
expedition by the Emir of Bauchi even when impact with British
influences had begun to take shape.
Similarly Ames suggests that the Chip, Tal, Pai, Ron-Kulere,
Kaleri among numerous others as well as the Sura, originated from Angas
factions who left their main body in Garram during "ancient times" and
migrated to their present territorial location on the Plateau. 7
 Their
languages, culture, tribal law and land tenure system as well as the
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.122-217.
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.132
4. Ibid
5. Ibid p.134
6. Ibid p.135
7. Ibid p.146-152
method of selecting chiefs were similar. ' In the instance of the
Yergam, Burumawa, Ames suggests that they came from Wukari and
might have belonged to the Jukun in "ancient times". 2 Meek classified
these groups and societies as belonging to the "semi-Bantu section
of the Sudanic group of languages". 3
Similarly in instances of the different groups and societies
who became concentrated in Shendan Division, Ames suggests that:
"They were closely related to each other and also to the Angas-Chip-
Tal group of tribes.., from whom they trace their descent". 4 The
majority of the Shendam groups and societies also came under Jukum
influence. The Ankwe for example were at one time a tributary within
the Jukun Empire: 11 ... and they absorbed much Jukun culture,,. 5
Although these groups and societies subsequently maintained and
stood differently in their social and political identities, they shared
common socio-political and economic patterns. This means that groups
and societies in Pankshin and Shendam Divisions, although differently
from groups in Jos Division, shared a lot of cultural fusion before
impact with British influences from 1900
Impact with British influences among the groups and societies
on the Plateau were begun in July 1899. 6 In that instance troops of
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.166-167
2. Ibid p.169
3. Meek, cited in Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.169
4. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.177
5. Ibid p.179
6. Ibid p.36
the RNC did a two day battle with the Montols which subsequently
resulted in the capture of Wase. 1 The company however did not remain
there but rather, it returned to its Depot at Ibi. This military
clash was meant to open up trade routes into the interior of The North
from Ibi.2
Military conquest of the Plateau for political purposes in the
processes that established the government of British Administration
in The North were however first experienced in 1904 and were to continue
until 1934 when a stable administration was consolidated. 3 This means
that the establishment of political control was a protracted military
struggle.
Conquest of the Plateau groups and societies was developed
from "the urgent requests of the RNC" centred on advancing its economic
interests of Tin prospecting and whose representative, Colonel Laws,
had been on the Plateau since 1903. 4
 Ames suggests that in the period
between 1903 and 1904 when WAFF Platoons marched through the Plateau
groups and societies to Bauchi, Gombe, Muri, Yola and Borno, the very
presence of these stranger elements on those territories: ".. temporarily
caused unity among the tribes than could have been the case for many a
generation... the government's forces met with opposition in several
places, particularly Ganawuri, Hos and Rukuba. When the issue was
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.37
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.117
4. Ibid
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decided, this unity among the tribes fell away as quickly as it
had arisen". 1 In other words, unlike other M-Belt areas, the
Plateau groups and societies initially united, militarily to resist
British intrusion and only as conquest progressed and became success-
ful by superior British arms did they recoil into their ethnic
political identities which were used to resist the British. This
was however similar to the instances in the battles resisting Fulani
armies and conquest of the same groups and societies on the Plateau
2
and in Adamawa.
Upon the successful conquest of the Plateau groups and societies
however, and in particular the groups and societies who became centred
around Jos when the government of British administration in The North
sought to establish political control with the centralizing Islamic
model of political authority, it found: ".. a plethora of petty chiefs,
many having sentimental ties with another, and a few being under the
nominal suzerainty of another, but none being under the effective
control of any one. Even Government's own control was nominal...
The principal obstacle to obtaining effective control was the large
numbers of units with which Government had to deal... The result was
that some villages (who became firstly conquered by the Platoons of
the Government of British administration in The North) acquired a
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.117
2. For more detailed discussions see Chapter 1, where battles in
resisting Fulani conquest caused the formations of three
quasi-political Federations but essentially military alliances:
one in Adamawa and two on the Plateau. Firstly under the
Mandara Kingdom in Adamawa and also among the groups and
societies centred on the Birom and Sura on the Plateau in Jos
and Pavhshim Divisions respectively.
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political importance for geographical reasons which history or
tradition would not have given them")
In the political organization of society that followed the con-
quest of some of the groups and societies on the Plateau for the
purposes of British administration after 1930 the Administration
dealt with the political problems described as "untractable and
unintelligent conditions" by creating artificial NA Divisions. 2 In
other words they were politically artificial because they were not
based on a single traditional ruler with control over political
decision-making affecting a singularly specific ethnic group.
Similar to British political experiences among other M-Belt groups
and societies with no clear-cut patterns in the structure of their
political authority, like the Tiv and the Idoma in Benue as well as
the Bachama and Chamba in Adamawa, among other groups and societies
in the instance of the Plateau groups and societies, although the
British created a District Head system and was acknowledged as
"not at all appropriate" for the Plateau, it became used as a
measure of political control for all of the groups and societies.3
Subsequently these district heads became legal heads of the British
created Native Courts even when they had no relation to past indigenous
judicial institutions.4
Before 1940 when no centralized political institutions were
developed among the Plateau non-Islamic groups and societies, the
government of British administration in The North made use of
"Hausas as political Agents" as late as 1934. 5
 This is the premise
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.117-118
2. Perham 1962 p.150
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
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from which Ames suggests that: "when this system of administration
was organized for the indigenous population, the District Heads were
not sufficiently advanced or experienced to cope with the administration
of the large number of extraneous towns and villages which had come
into being since the British occupation. These were therefore grouped
to form four areas called Hausa Village Areas ... Each village area
is under the control of a Headman appointed by Government and includes
a multitude of extraneous villages, the boundaries of each area being
coincident with the external boundaries of three or four adjacent
Pagan Districts. This facilitates cooperation between the headmen
of these Hausa village areas and the District Heads and will also
enabte them to be zubdivided without dii i icutty when the pagan
diztAict head's aite abte to take oveit the adminatAation os6 evekyone
and eveAgthing in theiA diztAict4. Thiz event, howeveA, i not
yet in zight ....The Administrative staff of Jos Division supervise
the coordination of the activities of the Hausa Areas and the Pagan
Districts and also those of the integral parts of each." 1
 Within
this general framework in the development of Divisions among the
Plateau groups and societies therefore, there was direct political
control of the "Hausa Agents" by British DOs. 2 Subsequently in the
period between 1940 and 1950 political effort was made within the
general framework of the Divisions in order: ".. to sort the people
out into the group which they themselves desire and to bring the
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.120; emphases are mine.
2. Perham 1962 p.150
Administration in detail nearer to the customs and wishes of the
people".
1
 According to Perham the process of political re-
organizations after 1934 produced slow results. This was so because
traditional leadership refused to identify itself with the government
even when attempts were made: tf ... to coax the real heads to come
out of their obscurity and assume the leadership of their groups.
Their religious character still presents difficulty. A priest has
great powers of obstruction ... a dual headship which did in fact
often exist has been accepted". 2
It was these socio-political problems existing among the
Plateau groups and societies that caused constant political reorgani-
zation of the Divisions in the period between 1930 and 1950. The
political and administrative Divisions of the Plateau only became
politically stable after 1940 when knowledge about the Plateau
groups and societies was achieved by British administration and also
when Christian Missionary activities and the government school at
Toro produced European educated teachers indigenous to the Plateau,
enabling some Federations of NAS to develop as Divisions, particularly
those centred around what Perham described as "the small and parochial
groups", although the political adjustments did not square with
regulations in the application of Indirect rule policy among the
Plateau groups and societies. 3
1. Perham 1962 p.150
2. Ibid p.150-151
3. Ibid p.150
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Plateau Province itself was formed in 1926 when there was the
general provincial reorganization of The North for the application
of Indirect rule policy to use indigenous political institutions and
personnel. 1 In the instance, the creation of Plateau Province was
a deliberate political act of the government of British administration
in The North to separate political control of the non-Islamic groups
and societies from rulership by Fulani Emirs and other variants of
Islamic leadership. 2 This was the political premise from which Plateau
Province became created from the provinces of Bauchi, Muri and Nasarawa,
where previously Emirs and Islamic district heads ruled over a greater
number of non-Islamic groups and societies.
3
 As a direct consequence
of the political creation of Plateau Province, Muri and Nasarawa
Provinces were no longer bigger political units with the political
status of provinces. In that instance, although Emirs and Islamic
political leadership still ruled over non-Islamic groups and societies,
it was in the smaller political confines of the Divisions of Nasarawa
and Muri. In the instance of Plateau Province however, its creation
politically incorporated the following areas into a new political unit:
"From the Bauchi Province: Jos Division without alteration, The Pankshin
Division intact plus the Gindiri village Area, the plains of Angas
District, and the Kamm District, without Duguri, which remained a
district under the political control of the Emir of Bauchi;
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.7
2. For more detailed discussions and examples see Chapter 2.
Section nE. where the application of Indirect rule policy on
the M-Belt groups and societies in general was examined.
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.7
From the Former Muri Province: The Shendam Division, less Awe District
and the Wase District proper le. the plains Yergam District of the former
Wase Emirate remained as part of the Shendam Division; From the Former 
Nasarawa Province: The Temaa Division without alteration, but since
reduced by the transfer of the three independent tribal units of Moroa,
Kagoro and Jaba to Zaria Province; The Lafia Division (exclusive of
the Lafia Emirate) which is now called the Southern Division". 1
The new political unit for the majority of the Plateau non-Islamic groups
and societies therefore became separated from Islamic rule, that was
centred on its north-western parts on Zaria, on its northern parts
centred on Bauchi and on its south-eastern parts centred on Muri and
Yola. 2 On its southern parts however there was Benue Province where
the majority of the other non-Islamic groups and societies like the
Tiv, Idoma, Jukun and Igala were concentrated.
In the long run however the creation of Plateau Province albeit
other provinces in The North developed a sense of political identity
among the groups and societies which the territorial area enclosed.
Although very perversive in political identity the territorial units
of administration continued to grow with specific political identities
even after the provincial boundaries were no longer the political
boundaries of the units of government in Nigeria. Thus for example,
besides the State Creation Movements that characterized the political
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.7-8
2. Ibid p.8
separation of the M-Belt groups and societies enclosed in Benue-
Plateau state, political tensions within that state were also under-
lined by explicit notions of a Plateau and Benue political identity,
which were developed and became consolidated from the provincial
boundary creations of 1926. 1
 It ought to be borne in mind however
that the migrant population on the Plateau and Benue as well as the
colonizing Islamic population in Adamawa on a fairly equal level with
the indigenous groups and societies assumed political identification
with the provinces created in 1926. For example, during the 1979
elections campaigns Hausas in Jos, Bokkos, Pankshin and Barakin Ladi:
"saw NPP as the party for their Plateau state and discouraged PRP
and NPN for Plateau".2
However, while there were Emirs and Islamic village heads with
political and religious thrones, supported by a substantial Islamic
population who became politically enclosed in the administrative unit
of Plateau Province, as was apparent in places like the Gindiri
Village Area, the Kanam District, Wase Emirate, Jemaa Division and Lafia,
the political unit of Benue Province, politically enclosed the more
prominent Emirs of Nassarawa, Lafia and Keffi who were tied up to the
1. These political tensions in the identity patterns in BP state
are examined in more detail in Chapter 5cand 61ke 61,,LossAe
2. Interivew discussions with Samuel Mafuyai, Lagos January 1981;
This is examined in more detail in Chapter Tcewhere the 1979
elections are discussed in the specific context of the
variations in the theme and political identity of the M-Belt
groups and societies.
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prestigious throne of Zaria and also supported by a substantial
Islamic population in their territories of jurisdiction.
Plateau Province as a political unit in 1926 was divided
into five divisions: Jos, Pankshin, Jemaa, Southern and Shendam. 1
These political developments on the Plateau, although similar to the
circumstances of groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria,
they contrasted sharply with the creation of divisions in Benue
Province among the Tiv, Idoma and Igala, where ethnic categories were
emphasized rather than territoriality. In many respects this explains
the development of stronger ethnic identities tied up to territoriality
of a specific ethnic group in Benue rather than on the Plateau,
Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria. Thus for example, in the 1950s and
1960s as much as in the 1979 elections when politics was taken to the
electorate, as an ethnic bloc for the party of their choice, Plateau
groups and societies, like the Birom, Jarawa, Sura, Yergam and Angas
were characterized by split votes within each of the ethnic groups
and societies for the different parties and factions of the group chosen.
2
The political processes for the development of the groups and
societies into political divisions within the politics and admini-
stration of the Plateau were begun in 1906. 3 In that year the groups
and societies concentrated in the subsequent Jos Division were
administered as part of Bauchi Division. 4 The remaining Plateau groups
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937 p.7
2. This is discussed and analyzed in more detail in Chapters 6-6t.'Nd
the E r.147su.a.
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, 1972 p.42
4. Ibid
and societies were, until 1926, a sub-division under the Emir of
Bauchi with headquarters at Bukuru. I Subsequently, groups and
societies centred on "Kanam Emirate and the Angas Tribe" formed another
sub-division with headquarters at Pankshin. 2 Since there was no chief
but a council of district heads among the Angas, the Islamic chief of
Kanam was politically prominent. Also in 1906 the Ankwe people were
nominally under the political authority of an Emir centred on Wase,
although under a political division with headquarters at Ibi.3
Although the non-Islamic groups and societies south of the
Plateau were not organized into any political division in 1906,
they were theoretically assumed to be under the Islamic chief who
was based at 'Lafia-Beriberi' where a British Administrative Officer
exercised some political control as early as in 1905. 4
 It was however
not until in 1911, when the Administrative Station in Lafia became
moved to Wamba that Wamba Division came into existence as a political
unit in Plateau, with an Islamic chief ruling over the non-Islamic
groups and societies who were centred around Akwanga and Mada Hills. 5
In 1907 however there was political reorganization of the sub-
divisions, with headquarters in Bukuru and Pankshin. In the instance
of the developing Pankshin Division when a WAFF detachment from Bauchi
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.42
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid p.43
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became stationed in Pankshin town, the Sura and the Ron-Kulere were
removed from the political and military control of the British sub-
division with headquarters centred at Bukuru. 1 The political
organization of Pankshin Division was therefore begun in 1907.
In 1911 however the Bukuru and Pankshin sub-divisions were
again reorganized as one political sub-unit with headquarters at
Naraguta under Bauchi Division and the territories of the Anaguta
Jerawa and Jarawa districts which were concentrated between Toro
and Jos township added to it. 2 Following these developments, in
1913 the Angas Districts of Gyangyan, Kabwir and Amper were also
removed from the non-Islamic political control in the previous
Pankshin sub-division, constituted into an Angas District and placed
under the political control of the Emir of Bauchi. 3 This political
arrangement remained so until 1926 when Plateau Province was created
and the Angas District became removed again from Bauchi to constitute
Pankshin Division.
It is difficult to see how ethnic identities might reinforce
territorially conceived political identities in the divisions on the
Plateau since in the processes of political reorganizations 'tribal'
Districts often got split up under different political authorities.
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.42-43
2. Ibid p.43
3. Ibid p.44
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In 1914 however the political sub-divisions centred on Bukuru
and Pankshin were again politically separated into two distinct
divisions with headquarters at Pankshin and Naraguta. 1 Subsequently
in that year when there was rapid urban growth of Jos, the Naraguta
headquarters became moved into the township. 2 This political act was
to compound the problems of politics in the administration of a political
division with a rapidly developing cosmopolitan metropolitan centre
in the period between 1940 and 1970. 3
It was from these political arrangements that there was the
subsequent development of chieftaincy political institutions which
were centred on the Angas in Pankshin and on the Birom in Jos Divisions
during the period between 1940 and 1950.
The political processes which led to the creation of Shendam
Division which became centred on the Ankwe were begun in 1909. 4
Previously before 1909, the Ankwe, Yergam, Montol and Gerkawa were
under the Fulani Emir in Wase. Ames suggests that in the long period
of Fulani political domination of these groups and societies,
particularly so for the Ankwe, there was: ".. disintegration of the
tribal authority for executive purposes". 5 In the instance of the
1909 political reorganization for the development of Shendam Division
however, the Yergam, Montol, GerKawa became organized into the same
political unit with the Ankwe, as an Ankwe District and the process
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Ga7etteers 1937,1972 p.43
2. Ibid
3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters Li.. awNd 5 c.
4. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.43
5. Ibid
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separated them from the political control of the Emir in Wase. 1
 In
the same year, a British administrative cum military officer became
posted to rule over the Ankwe District from Gerkawa.
In 1910 however the headquarters of the Ankwe District became
moved from Gerkawa to Kwolla in order to enhance the military conquest:
n ... of the lawless tribes in the north and north-east of Shendam
Division". 2 In 1912 the conquered groups and societies to the north
and north-east of Shendam, including the Ankwe became territorially
enclosed into the political unit of Ibi Division and Kwolla ceased
to exist as an administrative political unit. 3 In 1913 however they
were removed from Ibi Division, reorganized again into a political
district with the ethnic title of the District changing from Ankwe
District to Shendam District.4
In 1919 however the plains Yergam District' was removed from
the Shendam District and became placed again under the political control
of the Emir in Wase. 5 This political act split the Yergam group and
society into two: those centred on the hilly terrains of Gazum,
independent of Islamic rulership and those with a Fulani district
head as a leader, under political control from Wase. This political
arrangement remained without further changes until 1926 when Plateau
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.43
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid p.44
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Province was created and the Yergam, Ankwe, Montol, Gerkawa became
organized as Shendam Division.I
These constant political reorganizations resulted into six
political units on the Plateau which were theoretically administered
as five divisions. These six administrative and political units were
organized like this: "A group of tribes sharing common central
departments at Jos. This group by itself forms the Jos Division
and is under the supervision of an administrative staff whose head-
quarters are at Jos; A group of tribes sharing common central
departments at Pankshin; The Kanam District; These two units (Pankshin
and Kanam) together comprise the Pankshin Division, the headquarters
of which are at Pankshin; The Shendam Native Administration and two
Independent Districts which share its Treasury. This group forms the
Administrative Division of Shendam; The Jemaa Emirate with headquarters
at Kafanchan; Another group of tribes sharing a Treasury at Wamba.
This group forms an administrative Division called the "Southern
Division" and having its headquarters at Wambe". 2
 The headquarters
of Plateau Province became developed and centred on the Jos
metropolis which strictly speaking was another administrative
political entity standing on its own, although geographically it
became a political enclave within Jos Division.3
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.44
2. Ibid p.47-48
3. Ibid p.48
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This was the premise from which Perham suggests that in 1935
socio-political and economic problems between the groups and societies
in the township of Jos developed and faced the government of British
administration in The North were between "classes" rather than
" regarded as a pagan problem".
1
 According to Perham, four classes
existed among the groups and societies which built up Jos Township
and which were the basis of the sharp divisions between people:
"Firstly European traders, miners and bankers; secondly Southern 
Christians or at least Europeanized natives who work for the Europeans
as clerks, chauffeurs and so on; thirdly the Hausa Fulani Moslem 
community centred round their mosque and their Alkali; and fourthly,
the local pagans who come and go with their foodstuffs and firewood.
The Europeans in the township proper present the least difficulty.
In the native town the pagans hardly count as yet. The other two 
classes by no means easy neighbours ... (Then) The Southern educated
group suddenly began to take interest in Municipal affairs. Instead 
of being ignored or discouraged (by the government of British 
administration in The North) they were invited to form part of an 
unofficial Advisory Council. In 1934 its members were asked to assist
in the assessment of the town revenue. They also sit as honorary
members on the court of the Alkali when he deals with cases in which
Southerners are parties". 2
In the 1940s and 1950s when there were more European educated
people, indigenous to the Plateau groups and societies, particularly
1. Perham 1962 p.151
2. Northern Nigeria Annual Reports, Kaduna, 1933 p.53-54; 1934
p.43-45, cited in Perham 1962 p.151. Emphases are mine.
the Birom, who had achieved socio-political consciousness about a Euro-
pean modernizing society from Christian Missionary activities, the
social and political grievances on the Plateau became lashed out on
Nigerian "southern Christians" in Jos as well as the "Hausa Fulani
communities" rather than on "European classes" or other ethnic groups
and societies within the Plateau and from among the M-Belt groups
"
and societies.
In the instance of political developments on the Plateau which
led to the creation of administrative Divisions, territorial political
identities were not reinforced by ethnic social and political
identities. This was so for all the five divisions which became
politically functional on the Plateau.
Even when District Administrations became organized on the Plateau
they were not based on specific ethnic social and political identities,
rather they were 'Federated tribal Districts'. For example, the Ankwe
District consisted of the Yergam, Kwolla and Montol, all previously
under Fulani domination in political authority.
The political significance about the creation of Plateau Province
and the political reorganizations within the political unit itself,
was that demonstrative efforts were made to separate non-Islamic groups
and societies from Fulani rule and other variants of Islamic ruler-
ship. In the process however not all the political goal of separating
Islamic rulership from ruling over non-Islamic groups and societies
was achieved, since some groups and societies like those centred
around Jemaa Federation, subsequently in S. Lana under the Emir of
Zaria, Wamba, Kanam, Wase, remained under Islamic chiefs.
1.	 This is examined in more details in Chapters il-a-vxd 5
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While the political reorganization solved the problems of
political separation from Islamic rulership for some non-Islamic
groups and societies on the Plateau, it however compounded the
political problems in developing chieftaincy institutions on the
political territories of the different ethnic groups and societies
in the British created Divisions. This was so because of the numerical
share of the different ethnic groups and societies in the units the
divisions contained.
The government of British administration in The North coped with
these problems in two ways: it created a Council of Chiefs from
the different groups and societies who constituted the "total traditional
authority" for the Division and thereafter imposed a chosen individual
completely outside traditional patterns of legitimacy in political
authority over the Council of Chiefs. In the instance it was hoped
that a charismatic personality might submerge other chiefs as the
traditional Head of the Division.
These political solutions worked in the particular instances
of divisions where the majority numerical numbers of a group among
the minorities underlined the political development of a chief for a
division. Thus for example it was the Chief of Birom in Jos Division
who dominated the development of the chieftaincy institution in the
1940s and 1950s and subsequently that was only remotely contested by
other smaller groups and societies in the same division. Similarly
in Pankshin Division the Chief of the Angas politically overshadowed
the Chief of Sura in the cause of developing a paramount chief for
that division, although the Sura contested the issue. This was the
political premise from which Ames observediilat: "Prior to 1934 the
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village areas (of Angas, Chip, Tipap, Ron, Pai, Kumbul, Vodai, Tal
etc.) were all subordinate to Panyam, whose village head was Chief
of Sura. As a result of investigations carried out in that year it
was found that Panyam had no claims to being the paramount village
for any other reason than that it was so made by our administration...
the Sura District has therefore been divided up in accordance with the
traditional associations of the people". 1
In the Divisions where Islamic leadership and non-Islamic chiefs
existed among the different Plateau groups and societies, as was the
political situation in places like Jemaa Federation, Lafia, Wase,
Wamba, Mada and Kanam and Akwanga, existing patterns in the practices
of centralized leadership of the Fulani, took precedence over the
development of chieftaincy political institutions. As suggested
by the incumbents of the posts in 1963, the development of chieftaincies
as traditional political institutions on the Plateau was begun in 1919
based on Islamic chiefs among the territories of the groups and
societies which subsequently became enclosed as that political province.
2
In that instance, the very first chief to be appointed by the
government of British administration in The North on the territories
that became Plateau Province was Mallam Mohammadu Kwore who was the
Chief of the Islamic, but non-Fulani town in 'Lafiya-Beriberi' and
subsequently the Chief of 'Akwanga Federation' with the title of
"Oriye Rindiri" of Wamba when the administrative headquarters shifted
from Lafia to Wamba. 3 His early appointment as chief in 1919 is
explained by the British establishment of an administration in
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.127
2. Local Government Year Book, prepared by the Department of Local
Government, Institute of Administration, Northern Nigeria,
7aria 1963 p.98
3. Local Government Year Book, 'Facts on Chiefs' 1963 p.98
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'Lafiya-Beriberi' as early as in 1905 which was directed at the
conquest of groups and societies on the Plateau. '
The earliest non-Islamic chief who became appointed for his
ethnic group from among the groups and societies on the Plateau was
the Chief of Ankwe. This however was not until in 1931, when
Nyelong became the 'Long Kemai' of Shendam Division, subsequently
of Lowland Federation NA. 2 The early appointment of Nyelong as
Chief is explained by the British search to establish an early
"safe and peaceful trade route" from Ibi into the interior of the
non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas. 3 This means
that the development of the chieftaincy institution among the groups
and societies on the Plateau was less to do with the development of
unity in a specific context of a cultural identity. Rather it
emphasized economic, political and administrative necessities of the
government of British administration in The North.
Table 2,t9 suggests that before 1950 there were six "British
created" chieftaincies for the Plateau from both Islamic and non-
Islamic patterns of centralized political authority. In that in-
stance, while there were four Islamic chiefs, there were only two
chiefs from the non-Islamic groups and societies on the Plateau.
The four Islamic chiefs on the Plateau were the 'Oriye Rindiri',
Mohammed Kwore in Wambe, appointed in 1919, Mallam Ibrahim in Kanam
in 1938, Mallam Musa in Mada in 1943 and the Emir of Wase, Abdullahi
Maikano in 1948. The two non-Islamic chiefs on the Plateau before
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.40-43
2. Local Government Year Book, 'Facts on Chiefs', 1963 p.98
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.177-221
Table -..) . 1 c1
	
The Development of non-Islamic Chieftaincy
Institutions among the M-Belt groups and
societies.
Territorial Area
of the M-Belt
British created
Chiefs before
Numbers
1950
WA
British created
Chiefs after
Numbers
1950
wA,
Plateau 6 37.5 6 30.0
Benue 3 18.7 5 25.0
Adamawa 3 18.7 5 25.0
S. Zaria 3 18.7 2 10.0
S. Bauchi 1 6.3 2 10.0
Totals 16 100% 20 100%
Source: Northern Nigeria Local Government Year Book,
Kaduna, 1963 p.90-99. The Yearbook indicates
the names and dates the chiefs became
appointed way back from 1919 as the incumbents
stood in 1963.
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1950 were the 'Long Kemal', Mallam Nyelong, the Chief of the Birom
in Jos, Mallam Rwang Pam who was appointed in 1947. 1
Subsequently in 1951 when there was increased representation
of the Plateau groups and societies in the NHC, the Islamic chiefs
of Wase, Kanam and Wamba were an addition to the Emir of Jamaa, with
only the Birom chief chosen into that Assembly from among the non-
Islamic chiefs. 2 This suggests that before the political impact of
the M-Belt Movement was felt in The North, the path in the develop-
ment of chieftaincies institutions on the Plateau emphasized Islamic
patterns and personnel.
As it is further suggested by the breakdowns in the figures in
Table 3 •‘9, after 1950 of the six created chieftaincy institutions on
the Plateau, five were non-Islamic and only one was an Islamic chief.
The Islamic chief was the Chief of Eggon, while the four other non-
Islamic chiefs appointed after 1950 were the chiefs of Angas (1954),
Ron-Kulere (1955), 4ergam (1955), Sura (1957) and MontoL (1962)
and all of these chiefs became members of the NHC although with sub-
ordinate political status as third and fourth class chiefs. 3
When the British set out to develop chieftaincy political
institutions on the Plateau, none of the non-Islamic groups and
societies had a centralized chieftaincy, controlling the whole group.
Rather, they were characterized by autonomous village chiefs within
each of the different ethnic groups and societies. Unique however
among all of the Plateau groups, albeit, the majority of the other
1. Local Government Year Book, 'Facts on Chiefs' 1963 p.98.
2. C.R. Niven, Senior Resident Plateau Province 1951, Northern 
Region of Nigeria Provincial Annual Reports 1951, 1953 p.60
3. Local Government Year Book  l 'Facts on Chiefs' 1963 p.98
M-Belt groups and societies, the Angas in "ancient times" had a
tradition of a chief controlling the whole of their group and society. '
In the majority of instances in the processes of these British
chieftaincy creations, there was direct British involvement in
producing a chief over the whole ethnic group and society as well as
over other different numerically smaller groups and socieites which
became politically subordinate to the authority of the 'paramount
chief' in a Division. This was so in the instance of the Chief of
Jos, 'the Bwong Gwom' of the Birom, whose subordinate chiefs were
not only Birom District Heads but also previously autonomous village
and District Heads of other ethnic groups and societies such as the
Jerawa, Ganawuri, Buji, Rukuba and Irigwe. 2
The development of the chieftaincy institution among the Birom
in the 1940s however, became complimented by increased political and
social consciousness about their ethnic identity in the politics of
the chieftaincy. This ethnic political identity found expression
through the political demands of the 'tribal' party which began
demanding for the creation of a chief for all Birom, at about the same
time that the British were reorganizing the groups and societies into
NA Federations after the creation of Plateau Province in 1926.
Although the process was begun in 1926, as late as 1951 Niven, the
Resident on the Plateau still maintained that in that year: 	 ... There
has been a noticeable movement towards the Federation of the various
tribes. The progress has notbeen spectacular but it is visible. We
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.131
2. Post 1963 p.78 n.2
have not yet reached a position, without which true progress is
impossible, where definite executive committees have been evolved from
the mass of Native Authorities". ' This was so because, according to
Niven, Plateau Province was a political province of contrasts: "There
is probably no such small area in Nigeria where contrasts are so
striking except in some of the larger towns. Here we have the cust-
omary progress in civilization as represented by motor vehicles,
elaborate mining machinery, tarred roads and fine buildings. The
reverse of the picture is the naked pagan living in a small village
on the well nigh inaccessible crags, still isolated and still sus-
picious of his neighbours. Between these, lie innumerable shades of
contrast and colour. The natural beauty of the high Plateau is often
marred by the frenzied efforts of man to wrest Nature's precious min-
erals from below ground. In the same way, the natural beauties and
graces of the people are being marred by the sordid and dirty clothes,
the wearing of which makes them think they are becoming civilized...
Further contrasts with the Missions and their many schools, the
dispensaries, the six hospitals and the wild dances of the masked men
at the Juju festivals, the superstitions and prejudices of the remoter
people. Through all the contrasts run two threads, the first is an
ancient threat, that is, the life of the people, the ti4e o4 divmse
communitim, jea1ou4 and zuzpiciouz o4 each otheA, the inability to
awtee on a common policy, the inchoate chao4 o4 a human nebuta. TAibat
jeatocusius wte 4titt ye/Ey acute; the paAochial owttook iz 4tit2 ova-
whetming; the tack o4 wtopeA keting o4 Ampon,sibilx:ty amonvt o44iciatz
and chie4is iz notabte. The work of the administration here is in
1.	 Niven 1951 p.59
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general an up-hill struggle. The second thread is the modern one of
the tin mines, the threat which runs through the entire life of the
Plateau. Far away in the plains, away from the sight of the dumps,
the life of the people is affected by the rise and fall of the price
of tin; the corn they grow and the wood they cut, the cattle they
rear are all affected by the demand for them on the minesfield. The
two threads are so separate and yet cannot be separated and between
them they control the life of this involved Province". 1
In the instance of the administrative developments on the Plateau
however, in 1927 Jos Division became reorganized into 15 village
Districts. 2 The districts became named after the towns of the Head
Chiefs in each instance. These were Amo, Buji, Achakka, Gonawuri,
Jere, Kwal, Naraguta, Machi, Forum, Gashish, Heipang, Kuru, Rim,
Ropp and Vom (Vwang). 3 Eight of these districts were from among the
Birom group and society. With the single exception of Jere District
Area, all the other District Areas were intensive tin-mining areas:
II 
... and consequently have a large population of alien natives from
other parts, a fact which added to administrative problems", 4 and
this compounded the problems of developing a chieftaincy institution
in the politics of Jos Division with severe political ramifications
on issues like the Registration of voters for the 1959 Elections. 5
1. Niven 1951 p.59-60
2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.53
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.53
4. Ibid
5. Post 1963 p.201
4-19
Complexities in the administrative and political problems in Jos
Division was so because, besides the indigenous groups and societies
the government of British administration on the Plateau also had to
deal with three other categories of people under their political control.
The rush of the "alien population" into Jos Division was conditioned
by tin mining activities and increased with the years as the mining
industry was developed. "Tin Mining Camps" were provided for the alien
population on land leased through the NA to the Tin-Mining Companies
which became dotted all over Jos Division.' Mining companies provided
this population with modern European infrastructural facilities and
social welfare services exclusive to the residents of the 'Tin Camps'. 2
This means that members of the indigenous groups and societies who were
not on the 'Tin Mining Camps' became excluded from benefitting from
these facilities and services that were exclusive to an "alien
population". The "alien population" also consisted of people who came
to trade and this population settled in villages where trade might
be most conveniently developed. 3
 Ames suggests that a third category
of the "alien population" were the nomad Fulani: "who came later,
wandered everywhere and settled nowhere". 4
According to Ames, all the immigrant population except for those
on the "Mining camps on Mining leases" were theoretically within juris-
diction of an indiscernible Jos Native Administration. 5In the instance
of the indigenous population found among the groups and societies in
Jos Division, District Heads were in political control and each possessed
a court and its own "small police forces". 6 The members of the District
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.118
2. Logams 1975 p42-44
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.118
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid p.119
LC)
Courts consisted of chiefs of the subordinate towns and villages
within the districts and the district heads were the Presidents of
the Courts. 1 The personnel that formed the courts were also 'a
social and political council' which the district head used to discuss
district issues and to take decisions on all affairs of concern to the
district. 2 This was the political and legal premise from which the
wandering Fulani settlers in the districts came under the political
control of indigenous district heads. Although the Fulani had one or
more of their own rulers in "the Hardos" who were the head-men of the
'Fulani in the Districts', in 1930 indigenous District Heads supervised
and collected cattle taxes from the Fulani for the government of
British administration on Jos Division.3
This was unlike the political circumstances of groups and societies
found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and some of the Divisions within
Plateau Province itself, where Fulani and Islamic leadership controlled
society from the top right down to the grassroots levels. 4 This
however suggests that in the instance of the Birom and other groups
and societies in Jos Division, the political consequences of
developing institutions of the District Head with a court and a police
force under their control at such grassroots levels, maintained and
generated already existing sub-ethnic political identity patterns at
village and district levels before an institution, assumed to be
politically 'traditional' to the Birom, became developed to be the
focus of unity of the whole group and society.
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.119
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. For more detailed examples see discussions in Chapter I Sections
III (a), (b) and (c) and also Chapter 2- Section 714.
The processes of uniting the Birom under a single 'traditional'
institution of a chief, were begun in 1935. This was about 10 years
earlier to political conceptions of the institution of the 'Tor Tiv'
in 1938, the 'Ochi Idoma' in 1945 and the subsequent institution of
the 'Bwong Gwom' in 1947 which became created among the Birom them-
selves. In 1935, for example, Da Chung Gyang became chief of Riyom
and the chief representing all other Birom village chiefs in the
"Great Judgement Court" at Riyom which was a council consisting of
.	 1
other non-Birom chiefs in Jos Division.	 Da Chung Gyang as "chief"
over all other Birom village chiefs became President, in the first
instance of the Divisional Council of 15 village chiefs from the
different districts of the 'Birom Tribal Area' to judge over social
and legal traditional problems affecting groups and societies in
Jos Division.
The British emphasis on the chief of Riyom as chief of Birom
was rooted in the traditions of origins of the Birom which suggest
that the Birom in their migration path first settled at Rioym, from
where the different clan-heads dispersed to form the Birom villages
and districts. Emphasis on the chief of Riyom as chief of Birom
however became contested by other Birom village chiefs which resulted
into the removal of Da Chung Gyang in 1943 as chief of Birom and
as President of the 'Birom Tribal Area'. 2 In 1944 the chief of Vwang
1. Jos Division 1970 p.12
2. Interivew discussions with Moses Nyam Rwant, January 1981.
was again wrongly appointed to be 'Chief of Birom' based on similar
traditions of origins and initial settlement patterns which were
also contested by other village chiefs in the 'Birom Tribal Area'.
The British upon further investigations removed him immediately in
the same year of his appointment because there was no basis to bolster
his legitimate rule over the whole of the other Birom villages and the
'Tribal Area'. 1
When in 1945 Birom village chiefs disagreed over who ought to
be chief of the Birom, other chiefs in the Divisional Council from
the different ethnic groups and societies alongside with the Birom
village chiefs and based on the advice of the government of British
administration in Jos Division, decided to adopt a system whereby:
"The 15 of them rotated the chairmanship of their monthly meetings,
with each District Chief taking turns as Chairman". 2
In the instance of thPt development different chiefs from the
Birom, Irigwe (Miango), Buji, Rukuba, Anaguta held the rotative post
in each of their monthly meetings for a while, with interpreters in
Hausa in their midst to enhance communicativeness between the chiefs.
In the closing years of 1945 however the government of British
administration in The North attempted to turn the chairmanship of the
Council into a more permanent institution by suggesting that the 15
1. George Hoomkwap, The Evolution of the Institution of 'Bwong
Gwom', BSc dissertation, Department of Government, Abu, Zaria
1971.
2. Interview discussions with some Birom chiefs at Fan, Vwang, Du,
Elders at Cwelnyap, Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri, in 1974,
cited in Logams 1975 p.57.
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chiefs elect one of their members as "Chairman-Chief" until he
"died" and thereafter another chief in their ranks might take over
the post.1
When this proposal was placed before the Council of Chiefs in
the Division, the British faced a problem of political reluctance,
because the District Heads will not give up their traditional chief-
taincies to that of "Chairman-Chief-until-death" of Jos Division. 2
Subsequently this initial political rejection of a rotating chief of
the Birom, split support for the chieftaincy institution and for the
Jos NA from both the Birom European educated and chiefs in the villages
in 1953. 3 The chieftaincy of Jos and the Birom as it exists today is
a prerogative of any indigene of the Birom who might be "tied up in
some way to the NA Councillors" in Jos and not based on a dynasty as
was sought to be centred on Rwang Pam and the Birom village of Du
iin the 1950s and 1960s. 4 This is the premise from which Fom Bot,
the present incumbent from Ropp village, having been the longest
serving councillor in the NA Council became elected by the Jos NA
1. 'Death' did not necessarily mean exit from earthly society, it
also meant failure to perform responsibly. This is, I think,
a gimmick from - Patrick Dokotri in an interview discussion
in January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri January 1981
3. Post 1963 p.82; this is examined in more detail in Chapter It
where we examine the factions in the political development
of the M-Belt Movement and the politics of the M-Belt Movement
within the M-Belt groups and societies.
4. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981;
Logams 1975 p.61
and the Council of Chiefs in Jos Division with the approval of the
military government of BP State under Joseph Gomwalk in 1970.
1
In 1945 however the British became faced by political demands
from European educated Birom who organized themselves into a Birom
Progressive Union. In that instance, among other issues that con-
ditioned the Birom political Union, it was suggested that an
"educated Birom Man" ought to be appointed not only as Chief of Birom
but also as Chief of Jos, rather than a village District Head re-
presenting the Birom in the "Bwong Gwom Duk Shot ,,
	In 1945 however
two related but quite distinct issues caused the semblance of
European educated Birom to organize themselves with political focus
on the issue of chieftaincy. Firstly there was perception of
political disunity, envy, jealousies between the villages and that had
cost the Birom, the removals of Da Chung Gyang and the Chief of Vwang
or H,e clevelope
	 oetke. clet0aPt-o.aksinCe e• 1/4- ToS ca ..% a
as chiefs/of Jos Division in the period between 1935 and 1946, even
when the government of British administration on the Plateau insisted
on focussing the development of that institution on the Birom. 3 Intere-
stingly, all these developments took place right under the nose of
Rwang Pam, subsequently chief of Birom and Jos, when he was Head-
master of the Government school in Riyom and an executive member of
BPU with the post of Treasurer of the political organization in 1946. 4
1. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981
2. Interivew discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981
3. Ibid
4. Dudley 1968 p.92
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Secondly from 1910 until 1954, Hausa chiefs vigorously increased
their claims to rule in Jos and Bukuru besides other Hausa and Islamic
chiefs in places like the tin mining camps of Bisichi, B/Ladi and
Dorowa Babuje who were independent of Birom village heads in those
areas. '
 This situation was perceived as political dominance and existed
since 1910 when Jos grew as an urban centre and the tin mining camps
increased with Hausa migrant populations disproportionately to that
of the Birom and other M-Belt groups and societies indigenous to the
Plateau. 2
At about the same time in the instance of the 1945 political
formations among the Birom, when European educated individuals began
to demand the creation of a Birom Chief, British administration on the
Plateau changed policy in regard to developing a chieftaincy institu-
tion from among the Council of Chiefs for Jos Division. The change
in policy emphasized that "some suitable person be selected " to
give the required leadership to the small groups and societies in
the Division. 3
 The policy also emphasized "literacy in European
education" in the choice of the "suitable person" as chief of the
Birom. The political meaning of this new policy position was that
it met the requirements of both the Government of British admini-
stration on the Plateau to have a "European educated literate"
person as chief and also the political intensity in the agitated
demands and petitions of the European educated Birom who organized
the BPU. 4
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri,
January and February 1981.
2. Dudley 1968 p.235
3. Jos Division, 1970 p.12
4. Dudley 1968 p.92
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In 1947 therefore Rwang Pam who was already under the scrutiny
of British officers having been trained in Toro and was Headmaster
of the government school in Riyom, became appointed as the Chief of
Birom.
1
 In the same year of his appointment, Rwang Pam as Chief
of Birom was moved from Riyom to Jos, although his political authority
remained restricted only to the Birom. 2 Subsequent political develop-
ments in The North in the 1950s, consolidated the position of Rwang Pam
as the paramount chief of Jos NA, with political authority over other
non-Birom villages and District Chiefs in Jos Division.3
In contrast to the development of chieftaincy institutions among
the Tiv and Idoma in Benue province political interests of all three
'parties' clashed: those of British administration, British created
traditional councils and those of European educated young men in
those groups and societies. In the instance of developing the
institution of the 'Bwong Gwom' among the Birom for example, the
process became characterized by complimentary interests of European
educated Birom to British administrative expediencies, resulting
in the choice of a member of the BPU as Chief of Birom. This is
explained by the political difficulties the British experienced in
trying to create a chief in Jos Division from a similar council to
the Tiv 'Jir t'armen' and the Idoma 'Ojira'. Another sharp contrast
in the development of the institution of the 'Tor Tiv' and 'Ochi
Idoma' is the complete lack of factions within their traditional
councils from the clan heads in the processes of their evolution
1. Dudley 1968 p.92
2. Ibid
3. Post 1963 p.82; the political tensions in these developments
were tied up to NPC party politics on the Plateau and are
examined in Chapter LI.
when compared to the village, district and ethnic factions which
developed in Jos Division. In the instance of developing the
institution of the 'Bwong Gwom' however although factions were
inevitable between the numerical strong Birom and other ethnic
groups and societies, there were also considerable political dis-
agreements on who ought to be "the big chief" from among Birom
Districts and villages.
Besides the small population sizes I
 , which compounded the
problems of politics in the development of chieftaincy institutions,
as was characteristic of political developments in Jos Division,
and which make Plateau unique among other M-Belt groups and societies,
Plateau also stood out differently in social characteristics among
other M-Belt groups and societies as these relate to socio-political
and economic experiences and developments during the period between
1804 and 1900 and also in the period between 1900 and 1950,
characteristics which consolidated conceptions of inequality and
political prejudice among groups and societies in The North.
In the period between 1804 and 1900 some of the Plateau groups
and societies in its northern, western and southern escarpments
became conquered by Fulani armies and were forced to pay political
tributes in slaves and material goods in acknowledgement of Fulani
rule. Similar to other non-Islamic groups and societies in the
territories that came to be politically enclosed in The North which
were found in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria, Fulani conquest of
1.	 The smallest ethnic group and society among the M-Belt groups
and societies, albeit The North and Nigeria, existed on the
Plateau. This was the Pakara 'tribe' who numbered just about
937 people in 1931 and became assimilated into the Birom,
Rukaba and Buji by the time the 1952 census was conducted.
Earlier in 1937 Ames suggested that the "tribe will die out"!
Ames 1937 p.108
some groups and societies on the Plateau was conquest without civili-
zing by the government of the Islamic society in the Fulani Empire.
Rather it was conquest that became increasingly characterized by
1
exploitative relationships of both human and material resources.
	 In
the instance of the Plateau, this was so for groups and societies
centred around the Jarawa, the Anaguta, the Jerawa, groups and
societies around Wase, the numerous groups around the Mada Hills, the
Angas, and in Shendam, the Ankwe. 2 Groups and societies on the Central
Plateau highlands militarily resisted Fulani conquest and therefore
were not made to pay political tributes, although Fulani armies from
Bauchi, Zaria, Muri and Wase raided the Birom, Irigwe, Anaguta, Yergam,
Montol and Sura and took away some of their members as slaves. 3
In the period between 1900 and 1950 more severe, brutal and
protracted military methods were used to establish British political
control and influences among the Plateau groups and societies than
elsewhere in the M-Belt areas, albeit the whole of The North. In
1937 Ames acknowledged that: ".. Government could not immediately
create responsible Native Administrations such as are to be found in
the so-called Hausa states, nor could the principle of Indirect Rule
be adopted throughout the whole Province (because) .. Apart from the
fact that contact with the majoAity o the tAibez had only been
established in the first place by the Luse o6 aimed lioAce and, in
many instances, has onty been maintained by a 'show o6 armed 6oAce and...
by it4 Luse, the vast number of separate and distinct units would have
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.33; Also see more
detailed discussions in Chapter 1, Sections III (a), (b) and (c).
2. See more detailed discussions in Chapter 1 III and also A.H.M.
Kirk Greene, C.G. Ames Gazetteers of the Plateau Province 
(Nigeria) 1937, London 1972 passing
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers: 1937,1972 passion
precluded the possibility of organizing a self-contained central
Government in each, while differences in language, origin and
customs rendered amalgamations under head chiefs or even under
Federal Council impracticable." 1
Among other British military experiences of the Plateau groups
and societies Ames suggests that "numerous punitive expeditions" were
made against the Montols in July 1899, June 1901, September 1902,
June 1904, August 1905 and February 1909 with "severe measures taken
against them by government" before they were quiescent. 2 In August
1916 however the Montol revolted against the government of British
administration in The North and showed this by executing 60 persons
associated with the social and political intrusion of British in-
fluences into their society in the town of Lalui. 3 This was about
0.4% of the whole Montol population. The victims of the Montol revolt
included F.E. Maltby, the Assistant District Officer of Shendam
Division, Rapman, the 'Long Kemai' and his two brothers and also
56 other persons who were associated with and accompanied the British
DO and the British appointed chief of the Montol. 4
 Ames suggests
that the reaction to this "bloodbath" by the government of British
administration in The North was that: "... a punitive patrol severely
punished the Montols, the ringleader being eventually arrested and
hanged. The Tal section of Montol (who) were chiefly responsible
for the outbreak ... were expelled from their land, the majority being
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.46; Also see more
detailed discussions in Chapter.
 Section I (b).
2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.194
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
exiled in Ankwe territory .. on the Jos-Ibi road". ' It was not until
after 1920 that the Montols acknowledged the political authority and
control of their society by the government of British administration
in The North. 2
In the specific context of the military experiences of other
M-Belt groups and societies upon impact with British influences, the
Montols might be described as "the Tiv of the Plateau" for their
protracted resistance which earned them administrative characterization
as "uncivilized adversaries", "lawless", "treacherous", "intractable
people", unresponsive to anything except severe chastise-
ment.
3
Furthermore the Plateau groups and societies stood out
differently from the majority of the M-Belt groups and societies on
two other critical social and economic factors developed from impact
with British influences. Firstly there was a massive and sudden
increase of a non-indigenous population from the Islamic society
in The North as well as from other parts of Nigeria and 'British West
Africa' who were encouraged to migrate to earn wages in the new
economic activities developed by the government of British administra-
tion and the Tin and Colombite Mines on the Plateau in the period between
1900 and 1950. This created social and economic pressures on their
land and society.
The population increases on the Plateau were unlike the population
increases by a 'colonizing population' from the Islamic society in The
North characteristic of places like Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.194
2. Ibid
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 passims; Dorward 1972
p.2
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before impact with British influences in 1900. After 1900, while
groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria were familiar
with "strangers" and "outsiders" intruding into their social and
political systems, and while the Benue groups and societies experienced
'stranger intrusion' on a gradual scale, the Plateau groups and
societies became faced by a sudden and massively huge number of
'stranger populations' which increased rapidly over the years into the
1950s. This explains why social and political tensions developed
against other southern Nigerian groups which subsequently compounded
the problems of peaceful relationships between Islamic groups of
The North on the Plateau with the indigenous groups and societies in
that period.
In the instance of the Plateau, the Birom and other groups and
societies indigenous to Pankshin and Jos Divisions became the most
affected; for example as early as 1903 Colonel Laws introduced 625
"strangers" to some of the Plateau groups and societies who were con-
centrated in Jos Division.' These initial 'strangers' came from
distant places. The majority were from the southern provinces of
Nigeria and were employed as carriers of mining equipment, tin diggers
as well as 25 soldiers from the 2nd Battalion of the WAFF Regiment
stationed in Lokoja as protectors against "the Natives" on the
Plateau.
2
Subsequently, with soldiers as their guards, Colonel Laws
and his men used large steam shovels, bucket dredges and very huge
hydraulic monitors and dug up Buji, Anaguta, Jarawa and Birom lands
in search of tin cassiterites. Colonel Laws and his men did not have
1. J.G. Davies. The Birom, Type Manuscript, Jos Museum Library,
1947 p.50, cited in Logams 1975 p.61.
2. Davies 1947, p.50, cited in Logams 1975 p.61
permission from local chiefs in the area, in the form of treaties;
they were simply fulfilling an assigned economic and military task by
the government of British administration in The North in the service
of the interests of the RNC. 1
 There was never an earlier economic
intrusion of British interest which became complimented by military
force anywhere else in the M-Belt areas albeit in other parts of
The North such as the Plateau experience. This was before the
Plateau groups and societies became conquered by British arms which
opened up trade and peaceful social relations which became established
by the government of British administration in The North.
Although the accounts by Ames admit that social and economic
reaction of "the Natives" in that instance and over the subsequent tin
mining activities clashed, European and African because farms and crops
were destroyed in the process he contradicts himself when he further
suggests that: ".. In the early days of mining there were no clashes
between natives and miners and (only) one European miner was killed
as the result of one such conflict". 2 According to Ames, rather
that the clashes were explained by Europeans digging up land for tin
and therefore destroying farm land and in certain instances crops,
they "... were not clashes of native inteAutz and mining inteAutz
but were caused by the Amentment o one Aace at the intAwsion
anotheA Aace and would have occurred whether these early pioneers had
been miners, (BBC) Cameramen (or) of filming companies, tourists or
anything else. Since the time when European intrusion became an
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 passims.
2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.306
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accepted fact, conflicts between mining and native interests have
been remarkably few and relations between the pagan inhabitans and
the companies are entirely amicable". '
'Resentment of one race at the intrusion of another race' does
not explain the political and military ruthlessness of Colonel Laws
in 1903 and thereafter. For example Colonel Laws captured many
chiefs from groups and societies such as the Buji, Jarawa and Birom
who refused to surrender their land for mining purposes. In an
encounter with a Birom chief at Ngel, for example, Colonel Laws
suggests this pattern of resistance and control when he wrote:
".. I captured an old chap well inside the cactus and after the fighting
was over, took him to Naraguta (the base camp) .. not knowing what on
earth to do with the truculent old devil, a problem he solved for me
and himself by dying during the night. As far as I could see he had
done nothing but eat gravel sand". 2 This suggests that some chiefs
who were captured by Colonel Laws preferred to commit suicide by
eating gravel sand rather than surrender their lands for tin mining
activities.3
In the 1940s, one of the political grievances which resulted
into indigenous political organizations among the Birom was the issue
centred on farmlands destroyed by the mining activities of the tin
companies, their lack of adequate compensation and land reclamation
and the total laxity of the governments to enforce land reclamation
programmes where tin mining activities had been completed on previously
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.306; emphases are mine
2. Colonel Laws, cited in Norman Perchonock, "Jos and Its Hinter-
land" A paper delivered at an Historical Seminar in Jos, April
1974 p.3 in Logams 1975 p.55.
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arable land. For example, in 1944, when there was the Gyel Farm
survey, 10.3% of the original arable land was already destroyed
through the operations of the mining companies, 2.2% was taken over
for occupation by the miners, 86% was under mining leases of some
sort or other, though not all necessarily taken up and 4% was settled
and farmed by strangers employed in the tin mines. 1 The land
situation on Jos Division became compounded by the fact that the best
tin bearing areas were also the most fertile farm lands. 2
Although there was initial resistance to mining activities on
the Plateau by indigenous groups and societies to the area, military
force became used which eventually overthrew the resistance and drove
off the indigenous population from initial participation in the tin
mining industry. 3 In the period between 1909 and 1912 however it
was anticipated by the government of British administration in The
North that with the enforced introduction of direct taxation by cash
payments the indigenous population of the Plateau were obliged to
work as permanent employees of the tin mining companies. For example
one tin company spokesman, J. Astley Cooper: "... spoke almost lust-
fully in 1912 of the 200,000 'native Pagans' of the Bauchi Plateau
as the complete solution of the labour question" .4 Birom however
resisted and preferred to earn tax money by selling foodstuffs and
firewood to the labour force on the tin mining camps rather than
from selling their labour on the minesfields. 5
1. J. Davies, Gyel Farm Survey, 1944, p.196-212, cited in Dudley
1968 p.112 n.77
2. Dudley 1968 p.112
3. Interview discussions with Birom tin miners in 1974, cited in
Logams 1975
4. J. Astley Cooper, Mining World, 1 February 1913, cited in
Freund 1981 p.55
5. Freund 1981 p.55
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The concomitant consequences of a situation like that was
that a migrant labour force became encouraged and the process in-
creased the concentration of a non-indigenous population on the
Plateau. In the period between 1903 and 1930 and right through to 1945,
labour force on the tin mines came from the Islamic centres of Sokoto,
Katsina, Kano, Zaria, Bauchi and Borno. 1
Table 3.zo suggests increases in the concentration of the migrant
labour force for the tin mines on the Plateau for some years in the
period between 1903 and 1930. This suggests that although there were
substantial increases in the labour force on the Plateau after 1903,
in the period between 1926 and 1930 however, when there was the pre-
second-world-war "Tin-Boom", there were over 30,000 people employed
on the tin mines on the Plateau, the highest numbers being reached in
1928 with 363 Europeans and 40,000 Africans.
2
The majority of the labour force which developed on the tin
mines on the Plateau was from freed slaves from the Islamic society
in The North. The institution of slavery itself in The North became
smashed following political measures that were taken by the government
of British administration based on the slavery Proclamation Act of
1900.
3
 In that instance all children born after 1 April 1901 were
declared free and the legal status of the slave " was abolished. 4
Perham suggests that upon impact with British influences many slaves
achieved freedom although: ".... as an immediate measure it was
neither possible, nor desirable (for slaves to be completely freed)
1. This is explicit in the Map in Freund 1981 p.83
2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.303.
3. Perham 1962 p.50.
4. Ibid
Table 3 . 20	 Increases in the Labour Force on the Plateau Tin
Mines in some years in the period between 1903
and 1930.
Years
Labour Force on
the Tin Mines
% Total Labour
Force*-14
1903 625 0.6
1912 12,000 11.5
1917 22,000 21.0
1926 30,000 28.7
1928 40,000 38.2
Totals 104,625 100%
Source: Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937, p.301-306
44".See cov.tmen,	 ab ttie evn ck a (2 CVN aller 3.
as the bottom would have completely dropped out of society and the
country would have been flooded with masterless and homeless people.
Slave raiding, the curse of the country disappeared with the advance
of our power. Slave trading was prohibited as soon as the northern
Emirates with their large markets, were brought under control ...
the slaves were (however) given "a permissive freedom" the initiative
lying with the slave and not with the Law". 1 In the period before
1910, Colonel Laws in his initial operations at Tilden Fulani, near
Naraguta, secured labour by hiring slaves from local masters who sub-
sequently used their wages to pay for their manumission. 2 In the same
period however most of the labour for the tin mines also came from
great distances. In 1906 for example, Colonel Laws brought up
labour from Lokoja which included Yorubas, Hausas and Nupes who sub-
sequently became trained in "pick and shovel work". 3 After 1910
however, the bulk of the labour on the Plateau tin mines came from
the Islamic society in The North: mainly Hausa from Kano, Zaria,
Bauchi and subsequently Kanuri from Borno. 4 The majority of this
labour force consisted of slaves and fugitives escaping from justice
or both. 5 In 1917 for example slaves belonging to Shuwa Arabs in
Borno left their masters in search of new opportunities in parts of
the M-Belt areas. In the instance: 11 .. when the slaves go, they go
1. Perham, 1962 p.50; for more detailed examples and discussions
see also M.G. Smith, "Slavery and Emancipation in Two Societies",
Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 10 3954 p.239-289; Michael
Mason, "Population Density and 'Slave Raiding' - The case of
The M-Belt of Nigeria", Journal of African History, Vol. 10
No.4 1969 p.551-564.
2. Laws, cited in Bill Freund, Capital and Labour in the Nigerian 
Tin Mines, Longman Ltd. Ibadan 1981 p.47.
3. Freund, 1981 p.50
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
they go right away; formerly they took to highway robbery, but now
they go to big towns - become woodcutters or casual labourers or go
in for trade. Many have gone to the Tin Mine4, and there are villages
of runaway Shuwa in the Pagan Division of Marghi". 1
In the period before 1900 most slaves were captured from among
the M-Belt groups and societies and taken to the Islamic society in
centres of trade and politics like Sokoto, Kano, Zaria, Bauchi and
Borno.
2
 This piece of evidence suggests that it was the bulk of M-
Belt labour which became used to extract the mineral wealth of some
of the M-Belt groups and societies. Most of the labour force for
tin mining activities became concentrated among the Birom,
Ganawuri, Anaguta, Jerawa and Jarawa in Jos Division and also among
the Sura in Mongu as well as the Challa in Bokkos and Gama Ropp in
Pankshin Division, where the bulk of the tin mining activities on
the Plateau were centred. 3
Plateau also was unique because it was initially an economically
exploited territory, one of the first, among other M-Belt groups and
societies albeit other parts of The North, as a direct consequence of
tin mining activities developed from 1903. This is suggested by the
figures in Table
	 of the amount of tin tonnage extracted from the
land and the value in British currency in the period between 1903
and 1930. The bulk of this extraction in tin tonnage and financial
1. NAK: SNP 15, 215/1917, cited in Freund 1981 p.52; emphases
are mine and as in Freund.
2. See more detailed discussions of this point in Chapter_; also
in Smith 1954 p.239-289 and Mason 1969 p.551-564. It is however
significant to note that of the slaves who left Borno as
suggested in the 1917 report, some settled in Marghi, probably
recollecting the society to which they belonged.
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.347-348
Table 3 . ,21	 Tin Mining Activities on the Plateau in the
Period between 1903 and 1930
Year Tin Tonnage % Tonnage
Tin Value VO5
in British £ % Value
1903 59 0.06 - -
1910 774 0.7 - -
1911 1,809 1.7 294,481 1.7
1912 2,000 1.9 325,573 1.9
1913 4,000 3.7 651,147 3.8
1914 6,000 5.6 976,720 5.7
1916 8,000 7.5 1,022,975 6.0
1917-1922 7,000 6.5 895,103 5.2
1923-1924 8,937 8.3 1,626,700 9.5
1925 over 10,000 9.3 1,626,700 9.5
1926 over 10,000 9.3 3,180,000 18.5
1927 11,509 10.7 2,365,324 13.8
1928 over 10,000 9.3 1,000,000 5.8
1929 15,129 14.1 2,000,000 11.6
1930 11,902 11.1 1,206,816 7.0
Total 107,119 100% 17,171,539 100%
Source: Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.301-306
*-1 5see covAmevtt	 Az.KA	 c t .e_r 3.
4-2
profits went away as profits to British Companies based in the
Metropolitan country rather than reinvested for social and economic
transformations on the territories of the Plateau groups and societies.
A total of about 107,119 tons of tin cassiterites were extracted
from the Plateau with a value worth of about £17,117,539 in the first
30 years of impact with British influences. Furthermore European
salaries in the early days of tin mining activities ran into several
hundreds of pounds per annum, roughly about fifty times the wage
earnings of a Nigerian labourer and those Europeans who settled on
the Plateau lived well from the profits made on the minefields. 1 This
was so because Europeans with the tin mining companies: 	 ... expected
a high standard of amenities to compensate them for living in Nigeria".2
This was the premise from which Plateau, and in particular Jos
Division became a developed area with modern European amenities relative
to other areas of the M-Belt groups and societies rather than by the
direct benefits from the governments of British administration and the
subsequent government of the NPC in The North. The highly critical
factor however was that the indigenous population on the Plateau, and
in particular the groups and societies in Jos Division did not benefit
from the development of European modern infrastructural amenities con-
centrated on the Plateau, rather, it was the monopoly of European tin
mining company camps and the non-indigenous African population centred
in urban centres like Bukuru, Jos, Rayfield, Barkin Ladi, Kurra Falls,
Bisichi, and Forum among others. 3
1. Freund 1981 p.52
2. Ibid
3. These "cells of European modern infrastructural development"
on the Plateau are examined in more detail as social and
political issues in Section IV and VI of this Chapter as well
as in Chapters 14-and 5 where the politics of the M-Belt groups
and societies are examined.
W- 16 see	 cy.mei.a	 4--ke e...".c.1	 C ,.10.f, tee S
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In the 1950s for example, the Birom population in the developing
metropolitan township of Jos was about 1-2% of the total town population.1
The economic consequences of tin mining activities on the Plateau were
that many of the groups and societies concentrated in Jos and Pankshin
Divisions like the Birom, Challa, Sura and Ganawuri continued to
exist in poverty in the midst of socio-economic and welfare trans-
formations taking place on their land. This was the premise from
which in the 1950s and 1960s Sharwood Smith observed and suggested
for example that the Birom: n ... spent and still do, their lives in
unimaginable squalor, in tumble-down villages, hedged with cacti ...
and within sight and sound of these villages, large motor cars journey
to and fro between the mining camps ... and the well painted,
electrically lit bungalows of the tin mines managers and their European
staff contrasted sharply with Birom settlements and style of life.
2
Between 1926 and 1927 about 32.2% of a total tin value of
£17,171,539 and its profits were extracted from the Plateau. This
was in a period before the majority of the Plateau groups and societies
became conquered and before the establishment of political control
with peaceful social relationships by the government of British
administration in The North. 3
It is rather curious that the initial political reaction in the
1940s by the groups and societies on the Plateau was not directed against
the European tin miners and the government of British administration in
The North, but rather it became lashed out on the migrant labour force
1. Perchonock 1974 p.10
2. Sharwood-Smith 1969 p.138
3. A stable political administration became established over all
of the Plateau groups and societies only after 1934 - Ames
Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.46-48
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on the Jos Plateau, a reaction that was mainly spearheaded by the
Birom. Three explanatory reasons suggest themselves. The military
experiences of the Plateau groups and societies when they were
conquered for the British to establish political control and their
lands taken away from their control: in the 1930s and 1940s the
Plateau groups and societies focussed their attention on British
development of political institutions of chieftaincies which
diverted attention from economic issues.	 The politically conscious
European educated therefore focussed on political issues rather than
on economic issues. Economic issues therefore became taken out of
the political, while infact they were complimenting and reinforcing
each other in the particular case of politics and society on the
Plateau in that period. In other words the Plateau groups and
societies were falsely conscious of their own circumstances of
existence as they related to other Nigerian groups on their
territories and as the total situation related to the pillage of
their land by European tin mining companies who had the military and
political support of the government of British administration in The
North. '
The value of tin and tin tonnage for the years between 1903 and
1930 is as generally provided in Ames Gazetteers for the Plateau.
However, when tin values for certain years were not provided in the
Gazetteers, estimates were made of the tin tonnage values from those
of a previous year on the value of tin per ton. This was particularly
1.	 This is examined in more detail in Sections IV and VI of
this Chapter and also in Chapters Y eand 5'
so for the years between 1912 and 1914, between 1917 and 1922 and
for the 1928 year as suggested by the figures in Table 3 . 2.1 Other-
wise, the figures in Table 3 . ',7_1 were computed from the secondary
evidence as produced in the Ames Gazetteers of 1937. The price
of tin reached an overall pre-second world war peak of £318 per
ton in 1926. 1 This explains the high value of tin for that year
as suggested by the figures in Table 3. 2.0 even when the same amount
of tin tonnage was produced in 1925 and 1928. A high grade-con-
centrate of tin oxides have an assay value of at least 70%
metalic tin. 2 However, in the period between 1930 and January 1931
the average tin profits per ton dropped from £30 in 1930 to £1 in
1931. 3
The period between 1926 and 1930 was the "boom" period for the
tin mining industry on the Plateau. In that period it brought to
the Plateau many "strangers and outsiders" mainly Hausas from the
Islamic society in The North as labour force on the minefields as
well as people from other parts of Nigeria and West Africa as traders
and Commercial agents to European companies. With its already
disparate ethnic groups and societies and the added heterogeneity
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.303
2. Ibid p.302
3. Ibid p.303; the tin mining industry on the Plateau, particularly
in Jos Division in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s as it affected
the political developments and the political grievances to
condition the growth and development of political organizations
in the M-Belt Movement is examined in Section VI of this
Chapter and subsequently in Chapter LI- where the politics of
the M-Belt groups and societies is discussed.
from the migrant population, Plateau and Jos Division became unique
in The North and Nigeria, with its developing socio-political and
economic problems being the microcosm of those in the developing
Nigerian political state in the period after 1940. The "Tin Boom"
period also resulted into intensive and extensive mining activities
which destroyed farmland without adequate compensation while it took
away huge financial profits to England rather than reinvest on the
Plateau for socio-economic transformations of society. 1
However in the period between 1945 and 1960, The North became
conceived of as developing largely on the financial revenues derived
from the tin companies which partly went into the Treasury of the
government.
2
 This was so because the tin mines were a major source
of revenue to both the governments of British administration in The
North and the subsequent government of the NPC as well as to the
Federal Government. This was the premise from which the Plateau
groups and societies, particularly those in Jos Division became
unique among the other M-Belt groups and societies because the nature
of their socio-economic problems which became fed into the M-Belt
struggle, were centred on the tin mining industry. 3
1. The political and social grievances raised by intensive and
extensive mining activities which became compounded by
inadequate compensation to farmers on the Plateau and in
particular those in Jos Division is examined in Section VI
of this Chapter and also in Chapter it.
2. Freund 1981 p.58
3. This will become more apparent in our analysis of the socio-
economic and political problems which produced local
political organizations that became the focus of the M-Belt
Movement in Sections IV of this Chapter as well as in
Chapters L. av,4 5
(a)	 Southern Bauchi
Table3 . 1g suggests that there were about 30 different non-
Islamic groups and societies indigenous to S. Bauchi. This however
was 10.0% of the different ethnic groups and societies found among the
territorial areas of the M-Belt in The North.
Although this suggests that there were numerous different groups
and societies in S. Bauchi their numerical sizes, like some of the
groups and societies in Adamawa, Plateau and S. Zaria, were quite small.
For example, the most politically significant group and society in
S. Bauchi were the Jarawa with a total population size of 17,007 people
in 1952, which is 0.4% of the total population of the M-Belt groups
and societies. Other non-Islamic groups and societies were about
245,082 people, which is about 6.3% of the total population of all
the other M-Belt groups and societies. In terms of the population
sizes of the groups and societies in S. Bauchi when the whole political
concept of the M-Belt is accounted for, S. Bauchi with a 6.7% share,
was the least populous of the M-Belt territories in The North when
comparisons are made with Adamawa, Benue, Plateau and S. Zaria.
The majority of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Bauchi
were centred around the Tangale Waja, the Longuda villages on the
territorial edges of Numan, Biliri, Dunguri in Kanam District which
included numerous Angas, Jarawa and Pyem Districts, numerous other
groups found between the towns of Bauchi, Toro and Tilde Fulani as well
1*IE
as the Lere Districts aryA 	 Dass.
1.	 Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports 1951,
Kaduna 1953 p.7-12; Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972
passims.
l'I. See ce-mme...t. ca kike- -e--Aci D C C.Laft-er 3.
In the period between 1804 and 1900, the majority of these
different groups and societies concentrated within the territorial
political concept of the M-Belt in S. Bauchi, there was direct impact
with the expanding Islamic society centred in Bauchi town. While
some of these groups and societies were over-run by Fulani armies in
the battles for conquest, and subsequently came under direct Fulani
and Islamic political rulership others like those found around the
Dass Districts militarily resisted Fulani conquest although political
tribute was paid in acknowledgement of the conqueror. This was so in
the instance of the majority of the Jarawa who were concentrated in
S. Bauchi, the LerecoN a Dass Districts and the Angas in the Kamm
District of Duguri.1
In the instance of those groups and societies who paid political
tribute to Bauchi, they were allowed to maintain their political
independence through a brand of 'Indirect Rule system' uniquely
practised in the exercise of political authority by the Emirs of
Bauchi. 2 After 1900 when there was impact with British influences,
groups and societies who paid political tributes developed from the
practice of 'Indirect rule' by the Emirs of Bauchi, while they main-
tained their political independence, were the first to agitate for
political separation from Fulani and Islamic leadership. For example,
this was so, for the Dass, who were the epitome of political resistance
to Fulani and Islamic rulership in S. Bauchi as early as the 1920s and
1930s. 3
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.169-176; also see
Chapter 1 Section III.
2. For more detailed discussions and examples see discussions in
Chapter 4.Section III; also Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,
1972 passims on 'Pankshin Division'.
3. For examples of these instances of appeals to British officials
see more detailed discussions in Chapter 1 Section III, Chapter 2-
Section IV.
Military resistance by the non-Islamic groups and societies
in S. Bauchi to British conquest was not on the same scale to that
on the Plateau, Adamawa, S. Zaria and Benue. In fact it was almost
non-existent except for sporadic instances like those in the Lere
Districts. This was so because the British did not expect any either,
except, according to Temple for the Jarawa people around the Highest
Mountain Ranges in Nigeria at the Shere Hills: "... who fought and
defeated an army sent from Bauchi to conquer some two years ago, may
choose to fight, but I hope to talk them into a reasonable frame of
.	 I
mind.	 Furthermore, anticipated military welcome from the groups and
societies in S. Bauchi, was so because British conquest of Bauchi
was seen to be liberation of the non-Islamic groups from Bauchi. This
political perception was from both the British and the S. Bauchi groups
and societies. For example, in the instance of the Jarawa experience,
which was unique from other political and military experiences of the
M-Belt groups and societies, their chiefs from Fobor went to the British
and surrendered political authority, expressing willingness to cooperate
with the new conquerors without doing battle. As early as 1902, Temple
suggests that in his path to conquer the M-Belt groups and societies:
it ... the chief of Fobor met me on the road to Tilde and expressed his
willingness to serve the whiteman .. I do not expect to have any trouble
with the Jarawa tribes after this". 2 This instant need to cooperate
with the British is explained by the military and political experiences
of the Jarawa from Fulani armies in the period between 1804 and 1900
which caused their migration to different parts of the Plateau, splitting
the 'tribe' with the majority remaining under the political control of
the Emirs in Bauchi.3
1. C.L. Temple, Letter Reports From Costing and Fobor: Bauchi Reports,
April-June 1902, SNP 15, ACC. 40 para.17
2. Temple 1902 para.17
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.27
However when British conquest was accomplished and an
administration became consolidated through the practice of British
indirect rule policy, the non-Islamic groups and societies in
S. Bauchi became placed under the Emir and in some instances under
Fulani District Heads appointed from Bauchi. This was so for the
Lere Districts culA	 around Dass. Although there was strong
resistance to Fulani political rulership in S. Bauchi, particularly
by the Lere and the Longuda, the Jarawa in S. Bauchi and in parts
P t oP the Tarcooa trao e_
of Plateaucentred on their chief in Fobur became the politically
prominent group and society who gave support in the 1950s and
1960s to the political ideas of the M-Belt Movement and the demands
for the creation of a M-Belt Region. S. Bauchi, like S. Zaria
has been unfortunate in the political rearrangements of the Nigerian
Federation into more political units. This is so because the groups
and societies in those areas have never had their traditional patterns
of power relationships with the Emirs in Bauchi politically altered
except for the Jarawa who became removed from Bauchi and put into
Plateau State in 1976 by General Murtala Mohammed. '
 The very nature
of the political problems which caused a M-Belt Movement have persisted
among the groups and societies centred around the Lere and the Districts
of Dass. Their political struggle has remained as vigorous as it was
in the period between 1940 and 1960 right through into the 1970s. For
example the recurrent theme in the political agitation that has been
well articulated by their spokesman, S.T. Bitkon, since 1967 has been
1.	 This is examined in more detail in Chapters li-cabnol5"
501
for political separation from the Bauchi NA and for the merging of
"Lere (Tafawa Balewa) Districts with the Plateau" State.1
However, the Jarawa whose history and tradition of origins are
rooted with the majority of the 'tribe' in the territories of S. Bauchi,2
were a widely dispersed linguistic group and society, although they
are numerically small. 3 It was in the period between 1925 and 1927
that the Jarawa became identified as a distinct group and society by
the anthropoligist, Thomas, who expounded "their very great linguistic
uniformity despite their scattered location". 4 Ames suggests that the
"migrant section" of the Jarawa "tribe" on to the Plateau proved them-
selves to be: ” ... such born explorers and pioneers that they are
now to be found in places as widely separated as the Kanam District
of Pankshin Division, Inshar of Shendam Division, Jos, part of Ftqn.8.1,
Gnar and Kwakwi of Jos Division. They also provide a portion of the
fusion which became the Irigwe Tribe and account for much of the
formation of the Anaguta Tribe.., classes as Bantu and distinguished
from others ... who are semi-Bantu". 5 There also existed isolated
.
Jarawa groups among the Mbula, Bare and Bille, in S. Bauch'. 6 This
1. Submission of Lere Students Association to the Irikefe Commission 
on the Creation of More States in Nigeria, 3rd April 1975,
29th September 1975; This is examined in more detail in Chapters
4. anrA 5
2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.27
3. Ballard 1979 p.6
4. Ibid
5. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.27
6. Ballard 1979 p.6
wide "dispersion of the tribe" was caused by their migration to
"avoid conquest of the Emirs of Bauchi")
According to Ballard however the inference in migration patterns
in the origins of the Jarawa, that might be derived from this is that
their western branch in S. Bauchi have migrated to the north-west
from the Wurkum hills on the Benue river. 2 This according to Ballard
explains their location over a very wide swath from the Wurkum Hills
to Dass Hills, south of Bauchi and up to the base of the Plateau
escarpment north of Pankshin. 3 It has been suggested that the 'Jarawan
Kogi' in Bauchi belonged to an "original stock" of the Ankwe and
therefore that their origins are tied up to the Jukun. 4 This was
particularly so for the Jarawa who were concentrated around the town
of Yelwa and whose first chief was appointed from Shenaamby the
14th 'Long Kemal' of the Ankwe.5
Although there has been little historical and anthropoligical
studies of the Jarawa that are conclusive about their traditions of
origins and migration patterns to the present territorial location of
the majority of the group and society there is "one morsel of oral
tradition", which suggests that they came from a place called Kantana. 6
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers, 1937,1972 p.57
2. Ballard 1979 p.6
3. Ibid
4. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.179
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
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This town however is the name of a clan village located in Kanam
District, east of the Plateau and it has been suggested that this was
the main starting point from which the main western branch of the
Jarawa journeyed along the base of southern escarpment of the Plateau
to the present territorial location of the Mama group and society. 1
In the period between 1900 and 1950 the non-Islamic groups and
societies in southern Bauchi were under the political authority of the
Emirs of Bauchi and controlled by the administrative apparatus of the
NA in Bauchi Division. It remained so for the Dass, Tangale Waja,
the Longuda and for the Jarawa until 1976 when the latter group and
society became part of Plateau State.
Unlike other non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas
of S. Zaria and Adamawa where similar political circumstances developed
from Fulani conquest and political control before 1900, the S. Bauchi
groups and societies never attained the political status of a self-
governing federation of different ethnic groups devoid of political
control by Emirs and Fulani District Heads. For example, while the
Dass and Jarawa remained under Bauchi Division, other non-Islamic
groups and societies in Bauchi Province, were under the political con-
trol of Emirs centred in the NA Divisions of Gombe, Katagum, Jamaare
and Misau. This was so for groups and societies centred on Tangale
Waja, Biliri and the Longuda.
1.	 Ballard 1979 p.7
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The political arrangements in Bauchi produced demands for
separation from Islamic rulership in two different directions. The
Dass and Jarawa for example initially sought the creation of a separate
Division to constitute all the non-Islamic groups and societies in
S. Bauchi. This has been the persistent political demand even when
the Dass chieftaincy was Islamic. When this was not forthcoming they
demanded political separation and a merging with Plateau Province. In
the instance of the Longuda, the Tangale Waja and the Districts centred
around Biliri, there was persistent political demands "to secede and
join their fellow tribesmen over the border".'
Although the non-Islamic groups and societies in S. Bauchi made
these political demands before 1930, it was not until in the 1940s
that there were attempts to reorganise them into units that might be
politically autonomous in local affairs even when they remained under
the authority of the Emir of Bauchi. 2
 In that instance the majority
of the non-Islamic groups and societies became organized into "a
multiplicity of small village units without traditional sanctions". 3
These however were not Divisions, rather they were political units of
traditional authority in the non-Islamic areas within the NA Divisions
of Bauchi Province. It was however the small non-Islamic Kingdom of
Dass which remained politically autonomous of Bauchi but its ruling
classes became Moslems in the 1950s.
1. H.C. Gill, Resident Bauchi Province 1951, Northern Region of
Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.8
2. Ballard 1972 p.12
3. Ibid
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Although there was desire by the government of British admini-
stration in The North to merge the non-Islamic groups and societies
with others outside the territorial context of S. Bauchi in Bauchi
Province, the political process was inhibited by scepticisms on whether
"Federation NAs" with non-Islamic and non-centralized political
authority were functional. This was the premise from which as late
as 1951 when there was increased Longuda and Tangale Waja demands
"to secede" from Bauchi Province, H.C. Gill suggested that: "... the
question has been deferred until the new Longuda Native authority in
Numan Division proved itself". '
In the instance of S. Bauchi therefore there was no political
focus on a particular group and society to develop a 'paramount
chief' for non-Islamic groups and societies in the same political sense
as there was for the chiefs of the Bachame, the Longuda in the Numan
Federation and the chief of the Kagoro in S. Zaria or the singularly
prominent chiefs of the Birom, Angas and Ankwe on the Plateau or the
Tor Tiv and the Ochi Idoma in Benue Province.
In the instance of S. Bauchi, chieftaincy political institutions
were developed from Fulani and Islamic personnel ruling over the non-
Islamic groups and societies largely from the appointments by the Emirs
of Bauchi. There were eleven chieftaincy institutions in Bauchi
Province, with the Emir of Bauchi as the tradition of political legiti-
macy rooted in the history of the expansion of the Islamic society
by military conquest. Of the eleven chiefs in Bauchi Province only two
were non-Islamic and subsequently became Moslems in the 1950s. These
were the chiefs of Dass, Menem Maleka and the chief of Tangale Waja,
Mallam Iliyasu who were both members of the NHC in the 1950s with the
political status of third class chiefs.2
1. Gill Annual Reports 1951, 1953, p.8
2. Local Government Year Book 1963 p.91
Table 3 . 19 suggests that before 1950 it was the chief of Dass
who was the only non-Islamic chief acknowledged by the Government of
British administration in The North. After 1950 however two other
chiefs became appointed from among the non-Islamic groups and societies.
These were the chief for the Tangale Waja and the other for groups and
.	 1
societies in West Tangale Waja in Gombe Division.	 The incumbent of
the Dass chieftaincy in 1963 was appointed as early as 1928. 2
The only chieftaincy institution that was directly created by
the British with no roots in traditional legitimacy, to rule over
non-Islamic groups and societies was a Moslem as the chief of Biliri,3
an appointment that went through as late as 1951 even when it was
vigorously opposed by Christian converts in the area. This was at a
time when Christian Missionary activities had created new consciousness
about politics and society among the non-Islamic groups and societies
in some parts of S. Bauchi. Socio-political and economic consciousness
about European modernizing patterns among the groups and societies in
S. Bauchi was largely a function of Christian Missionary activities.
These were concentrated among the Tangale Waja, Lere Districts in
Fobor and also among the groups and societies around Biliii.
Although the influences of Christianity compounded the historic
problems of political opposition to Islamic rule from the Emirs and
Fulani District Heads in Bauchi, Islamic and Christian communities
1. Local Government Year Book 1963 p.91
2. Ibid
3. Gill, Annual Reports 1951, 1953 p.8
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in places like the Lere Districts and Dass existed without local
political tensions upon the advent of electoral politics in 1951.
In that instance for example, although there were only two Christians
as 'the chief representatives' of the non-Islamic groups and societies
of the area, within the 'District Council' one became elected into the
'Provincial Electoral College' despite an Islamic majority. '
Generally in S. Bauchi however as was the similar circumstances
of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, Plateau, and S. Zaria,
British created chieftaincy institutions did not produce ethnic identities
in the same political sense that the development of chieftaincies
produced Tiv and Idoma 'nationalism', which subsequently became fed
into the M-Belt Movement. In the instance of S. Bauchi, non-Islamic
groups and societies who came under the influence of Christianity saw
themselves more as Christians rather than as ethnic categories. It
was this Christian social and political identity which caused their
support for the ideas and political demands of the M-Belt Movement in
the 1950s and 1960s, rather than specific political institutions
developed for each of their groups and societies by the government of
British administration in The North.
(€)	 Southern Zaria
Table 3 . 18 suggests that there were about 35 different groups
and societies which were indigenous to the territories of S. Zaria.
This is about 11.7% of the total different non-Islamic groups and
societies concentrated within the territorial political concept of the
1.	 Gill, Annual Reports 1951,1953 p.8
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M-Belt areas in The North. Although this suggests that there were
numerous different groups and societies in S. Zaria their population
sizes, like those of groups on the P1	 , S. Bauchi and Adamawa,
were numerically small.
The Jeba were about the numerically dominant group and society
in S. Zaria with about 41,082 people. This population size was about
1.1% of the total of all the M-Belt groups and societies. The other
substantially populous group and society in S. Zaria after the Jeba
were the Kaje with about 35,782 people which is about 0.9% of the
total population of the M-Belt groups and societies. Other non-
Islamic groups and societies in S. Zaria constituted about 224,882
people, which is 5.8% of the total population found among the M-Belt
groups and societies. In terms of the population concentration of the
non-Islamic groups and societies indigenous to S. Zaria, they only
shared about 7.8% of the total population of the M-Belt groups and
societies.
This means that besides being numerically small in population
size, there was also great variation in the numbers of people con-
stituting each group and society in S. Zaria. This however was not
unique to S. Zaria because there were enormous variations in the
population sizes of groups and societies in other areas of the M-Belt,
albeit other parts of The North and Nigeria.
The majority of the S. Zaria groups and societies are centred
around the railway town of Kafauchan, although as early as 1903 it
developed as a Division from the subordinate Emir to Zaria based in
Jemaa. 1
 Jemaa was established and developed in the period between
1.	 Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.221-156
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1810 and 1897 when there was expansion of the Islamic society through
military conquest.
1
Although many of the groups and societies in S. Zaria were con-
quered and paid political tribute in acknowledgement of Fulani
authority in Zaria and Jemaa, they remained non-Islamic. The Emir
of Jemaa for example ruled many of the S. Zaria groups and societies
through Fulani and local agents who were resident in Jemaa: ".. and
only visited the tribes when tribute had to be collected". 2 After
impact with British influences in 1900, this system of political con-
trol became used in the application of Indirect rule policy on the
groups and societies in S. Zaria until about the 1940s. Jemaa however
only maintained a weak form of political control on the majority of
the groups and societies and subsequently reduced its relationship
"to periodical expedition against them to collect slaves or other
forms of tribute". 3
 Some of the groups and societies in the
territories of S. Zaria who became placed from 1903 under the political
control of the Emir in Jemaa included: the Ayu, Kagoma, Numana,
Kaninkwom, Ninzam, Gwandara, Yeskwa, Birom, Kagoro, Attaka and also
a few Mada and the Kajuru. 4
Unlike many of the M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa,
S. Bauchi, Plateau and Benue, the traditions of origins of the majority
of the groups in S. Zaria is still obscure because there have been few
anthropoligical studies into their histories. It has however been
suggested that the 'Jeba-Kaje-Kagoma-Katab group of tribes' trace their
migration, pre-Fulani conquest of 1804 to places as distant as Katsina,
Kano and to Panda and Sanga in Southern Bauchi. 5 There has however
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.225-226
2. Ibid p.250
3. Ibid p.222
4. Ibid
5. Ibid p.235
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been intensive local migration, particularly in the period between
1804 and 1900 which were caused by Fulani wars, to the Plateau where
it has been suggested that the Irigwe in Jos Division are an "oft-
shoot of the Kaje". 1 Furthermore, the Kagoro have a tradition of
origin of having come down from the Plateau to occupy their present
territorial location in S. Zaria. 2 In addition there is close
linguistic affinity between many of the Plateau groups and those
of S. Zaria. For example, this is so for the Rukuba in Jos Division
and the Ninzam in S. Zaria. 3 Similar to the M-Belt groups and societies
in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and Plateau, in the instance of S. Zaria local
migration patterns resulted into enormous cultural fusion although
many of the groups and societies were characterized by cultural
similarities.4
Cultural similarities among the S. Zaria groups and societies
became reinforced by the considerable inter-marriage that has taken
place between the different groups, particularly among the "Katab-
Kaje-Jabe-Kagoma group of tribes". 5 Customs in the performance of the
marriage act among the Kaje-Jaba and Katab for example were similar.
Apart from similarities in social patterns of existence, the S. Zaria
groups and societies were also characterized by the same patterns of
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.247
2. Ballard 1979 p.8
3. Ibid
4. Tremearne 1912
5. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.234
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political organization. Except for the Ayu who had a tradition of a
chieftaincy institution for the whole group but now virtually assimi-
lated into other groups and societies, 1 the majority of the other
groups and societies in S. Zaria had no centralized patterns of
authority beyond the clan and village heads. 2
 Each of their groups
and societies were organized as "village confederacies" of the ethnic
type with no chief having a commanding loyalty of the others. 3
This makes the S. Zaria groups and societies similar in social
and political organization to groups and societies in other parts of
the M-Belt areas like Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and Benue.
Historically however, quite differently in the socio-economic and
political experiences of the other M-Belt groups and societies,
S. Zaria has had more persistent hostilities with the Islamic society
centred on Zaria, well before the Fulani Islamic revolution of 1804.
For example, the Kajuru, among others, were subject to the Hausa
dynasty of Zaria in pre-Fulani days. 4
Impact with British influences were begun in 1903 and focused
on the conquest of the Emir of Jemaa who was assumed to be the politi-
cally dominant authority over the groups and societies in the territories
of S. Zaria. 5
 In that instance although the Emir made a formal sub-
mission to WAFF forces in that year the conquest of the non-Islamic
groups and societies of S. Zaria was as protracted and militarily
thorough as was characteristic of the other M-Belt areas. 6 As early as
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.238
2. Ibid p.228
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.249
5. Ibid
6. For examples, see Tremearne 1912, examined and discussed in
Chapters Section I.
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October 1904, a British administrative officer became stationed in
Jemaa together with a detachment of WAFF troops. I Subsequently upon
this political focus, S. Lana developed until 1934 as a distinct
Division within the territorial concept of Plateau Province, and was
centred on the authority and the administrative set-up of the Emir of
Jemaa. In that instance, the groups and societies in S. Zaria became
politically organized for administrative purposes into four districts
under Districts-Head-System who were all subordinated and responsible
to the Emir in Jemaa. 2 The developing metropolitan centre of the
railway junction at Kafanchan which was centrally located to the
majority of the non-Islamic groups and societies and the town of Jemaa
itself were under the direct political control of the Emir.3
Before 1926, the four organized administrative districts in
S. Zaria containing disparate groups and societies were Kaje-
Kagoma-Yeskwa, Ayu, Ninzam and Jemaa, 4 which subsequently in the 1930s
and 1940s became reorganized as the 'independent districts' of Kagoro,
Zangon Katab, Jaba (including Moroa) and Birnun Gwari. Of these four
ei<pe r teytt e	 ty, p 1 us...in cD...s
District areas, the 'Kaje-Kagoma-Yeskwa i kof a colonizing Islamic
population outside Jemaa before impact with British influences in 1900. 5
The 'Kaje-Kagoma-Yeskwa' District was ruled by a Fulani District Head
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.249
2. Ibid p.250
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid p.251
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who was one of the sons of the Emir of Jemaa. 1 In the instance of the
Ayu and the Ninzam however there were indigenous traditional rulership
by a chief who controlled their group. 2
Although these chiefs were indigenous to their groups and
societies, they were appointed by the Emir of Jemaa and owed political
loyalty to him. 3 In the instance of the Jemaa District, there was
also a Fulani District Head who ruled over non-Islamic groups and
societies like, the Kaninkwom, Ningwon and the Gwandara. 4 Besides
Fulani District Heads ruling over the majority of the non-Islamic
groups and societies in S. Zaria, there were also 'Hardos' as Fulani
chiefs who were responsible for the rulership of the 'nomadic cattle
.
Fulani' in S. Zarla. 5 The 'Hardos' were responsible to the District
Heads. The Emir of Jemaa however filled both executive and judicial
roles in the governance of all the groups and societies in S. 2aria.6
This was so because the 'Central Council' of the Division was
dominated by Islamic personnel under his authority. For example in
that instance, the Emir was the President of the Council with six
other members who were the 'Liman' of Jemaa, the Confidential Envoy
of the Emir and other four ward-heads of Jemaa town who were all Fulani
and Moslems. 7 In the instance of the administrative arrangements of
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.251
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.253
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid p.250
7. Ibid p.255
5. Zaria before 1929 however, the District Heads spent most of their
time in Jemaa town. This was particularly so for the son of the Emir
who ruled as District Head over the 'Kaje-Kagoma-Yeskwa District'
until forced in 1929 into permanent residence at Fadan Kagoro, the
most central town of the District. 1 In 1933 however the headquarters
of the Division were moved from Jemaa to Kafanchan. 2
Further to the patterns of Islamic domination established in
S. Lana in the period of British application of the Indirect rule
policy, in each of the four Districts where Fulani and indigenous
appointees of the Emir	 ruled, there were 'Hausas as scribes' appoin-
ted from Keffi or Jemaa. 3 According to Ames, this was so because of
"the lack of any sufficiently educated people in the indigenous tribes". 4
As late as 1930, Ames further suggests that the government elementary
school opened that year in Jemaa-na-Sarari was the "only one in the
Province (Plateau)" .5 It was however, not until the 1940s when
Christian Missionary influences gained grounds on the essentially non-
Islamic groups and societies in S. Zaria that there were social and
political tensions between Fulani Moslems and the non-Islamic groups
and societies in S. Lana which conditioned demands for political
separation into an autonomous Division from the Emir of Zaria within
Zaria Province. Subsequently after 1967 there was political demand
1. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.251
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.255
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
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from the S. Zaria groups and societies for merging with BP State and
in 1976 with the present day Plateau State. '
 Christian Missionary
activities in S. Zaria besides the CMS station on the outskirts of the
Islamic town of Zaria itself, were concentrated among the Ninzam,
Kagoro and the towns of Kwoi and Zonkwa. In that instance, the SUM,
SIM, and RCM developed stations and expanded their work within the
groups and societies in S. Zaria from Randa, Kwoi and Zonkwa respecti-
vely. 2
In 1934 however the 'independent' Districts of Jemaa Division
centred on Jaba, Kagoro, Kaje and Moroa became transferred from the
political control of the Emir in Jemaa and placed in Zaria Division
under the Emir of Zaria. 3 Ames suggests that this was so because:
"of the fact that a large number of their kindred tribes had been
settled for generations on the Zaria side of the boundary". 4
This suggests that unlike the political reorganization in the
same period which took place in Numan, S. Bauchi and Plateau, in the
instance of the groups and societies in S. Lana became removed from
the political authority of one subordinate Emir only to find themselves
under a more dominant authority of the Emir of Zaria. In that instance,
although there was already developed political consciousness, mainly
from the activities of Christian Missionary institutions among the
different groups and societies in S. Zaria, this consciousness became
1. These are discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 0.45
2. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.255; C.V. Williams,
Resident Zaria Province 1951, Northern Region of Nigeria: 
Provincial Annual Report 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.74
3. Kirk Greene, Ames Gazetteers 1937,1972 p.256, p.345
4. Ibid p.256
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jointly and outwardly directed against Fulani and Islamic domination
rather than inwardly toward the development of ethnic identities.
Political hostilities toward Fulani rule in S. Zaria therefore became
superimposed by consolidated conceptions of a Christian social and
political identity among the S. Zaria groups and societies.
Individual ethnic political identities in S. Zaria became
insignificant political resources because the groups and societies were
numerically small. This was explicit in the development of non-Islamic
chieftaincy institutions in S. Zaria which was a policy process
delivered to meet direct British administrative expediencies rather
than the demands of a particular group and society in S. Zaria to
consolidate an ethnic political identity. Thus in 1934, although it
was suggested that the S. Zaria Districts ought to be reorganized
"on tribal lines" and their representative District Heads deal directly
with the Emirs of Zaria, rather than through District Heads appointed
by the Emirs, the proposals were rejected: ".. because the Residents
were concerned to maintain the authority and the goodwill of the Emirs
and there was no great willingness to upset stable arrangements in the
cause of speculative benefits to pagans". 1
 That there was no 'tribal'
consciousness among the S. Zaria non-Islamic groups and societies,
developed from the creation of administrative units in the village
and district is explicit in the political regret of the Resident of
Zaria in 1934 who suggests that: "... Had these Districts been
arranged otherwise from the start 'tribal' consciousness and the tribal
1.	 Ballard 1972 p.11
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machinery might have been preserved to an extent which would have
made it possible to utilize them as an effective part of the
administrative organization". 1
As late as 1951 for example, the Moroa District were so politically
demoralized from the non-emphasis of any political institution centred
on a particular group and society in the District that they were dis-
missed as "a backwater so placid that it may be said to stagnate". 2
It was from political circumstances like these that there was
developed non-Islamic chieftaincy institutions which focused on the
more politically dominant groups and societies in S. Zaria like the
Kagoro, Jaba, Moroa and Birnin Gwari. Although the Gwari were
essentially non-Islamic before the 1950s, as early as 1945 a Moslem
chief, Mallam Jibirilu as the chief of Birnin Gwari became appointed
by the government of British administration in The North. 3 Furthermore,
although there were five chiefs ruling over the non-Islamic groups
and societies in S. Zaria, besides the Emir of Zaria who was in an
overall position of political authority, the Emir of Jemaa and the
Chief of Birnim Gwari were Moslems.
In the period between 1935 and 1955 there was developed three
non-Islamic chieftaincy institutions from among the essentially non-
Islamic groups and societies in S. Zaria. These were the chiefs of
Kagoro, Mallam Gwamna (1945), the chief of Jaba, Mallam Ishaya Andrew
(1955) and the chief of Moroa, Mallam Kaza (1935) who from the 1940s
became members of the NHC with third class political status, except
for the chief of Kagoro who was second class in political status. 4
1. Ballard 1972 p.11
2. C.V. Williams, Resident Zaria Province 1951, Northern Region of
Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports, 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.75
3. Local Government Year Book, 1963 p.99
4. Ibid
In the instance of the three non-Islamic chiefs who became
prominent in S. Zaria, by the appointment of the government of
British administration in The North, they were not only seen as non-
Moslem chiefs but also became the focus of a Christian social and
political identity which they also sought to represent.'
Table 2,.pli. however suggests that although there was a decrease
in the trends of the appointments of non-Islamic chiefs from 18.7% to
10.0% in the development of non-Islamic chiefs in S. Zaria there was
increased political focus as a Christian representative on the Chief
of Kagoro which became bolstered by the "special appointment" of
Mallam Haruna Dauda Kwoi, the Headmaster of the SIM school in the
'Independent District' of Jaba in S. Zaria, as member of the NHC in
1951.
2
In S. Zaria therefore, similar to the political circumstances
of the groups and societies in S. Bauchi and many other parts of
Adamawa and Plateau, patterns of economic and political dominance
established in the period between 1804 and 1900 continued well into
the 1950s and 1960s and remained unaltered in the 1970s. For example,
in S. Zaria District council funds derived from the general community
taxes became used for religious purposes of the ruling Islamic classes
to build mosques in the midst of non-Islamic communities and a highly
mobilized Christian community.3
	Furthermore, when
in 1951 politics became taken to the electorate, the four Provincial
1. Interview discussions with Mallam Gwamna, January 1981
2. Williams, Provincial Annual Reports, 1953 p.74
3. Ibid
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members of the NHA elected from Zaria Province were all Moslems. '
 In
that instance, according to Williams: 11 ... this result caused con-
siderable disappointment among the predominantly non-Moslem population
of Southern Zaria whose numbers though considerable were not sufficient
to outvote the Moslem representatives of Northern Zaria".2
This was the premise from which in the instance of S. Zaria,
political organizations became developed among the non-Islamic groups
and societies based on Christian religious affiliations rather than on
indigenous socio-cultural categories. Similar to the political and
religious experiences of groups and societies found on the Plateau,
Adamawa, and S. Bauchi, ethnic political identities were less con-
solidated by the political institutions created by the government of
British administration in The North. Rather, they were a function of
Christian Missionary religious institutions which developed conceptions
of a Christian religious and political identity. Even when there was
the development of an ethnic identity among the S. Zaria groups and
societies in the 1940s and 1950s from Christian institutions, they
were activated within an overall religious conception of "the children
of Jesus"
This conclusion suggests that unlike the Tiv, Jukun, Idoma and
Igalla in Benue Province, the groups and societies on the Plateau, Adamawa,
S. Zaria and S. Bauchi saw themselves more in Christian religious categories
responding to the affairs of government, politics and society rather than
the precepts of ethnic categories. This further suggests that political
identification was more with the Christian Missionaries and the churches
1. Williams, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, 1953 p.74
2. Ibid
3. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 14-a,ci 5
and less with the political institutions created by the government
of British administration in The North. It was from this premise
that in the period between 1950 and 1965 there were covert efforts
to encourage Rwang Pam, the chief of Jos and Mallam Gwamna, the
chief of Kagoro in S.Zaria politically to stand out as personalities
and institutions representing Christians from both the Churches and
c_6.4u.....zties
Christian Land in very subtle ways by the government of British
administration in The North. This was when the M-Belt movement began
to grow and develop its demands for a M-Belt Region that might
consist of the majority of non-Islamic groups and societies in the
North, separated from the Islamic society, within the Nigerian
Federation.
VI Ex-Servicemen and the European educated in Tribal Unions,
Associations and Political Organizations among the M-Belt groups
and societies.
The development of "tribal" unions and Associations as
political organizations in Nigeria in the period between 1 q 30 and
1950 were phenomenal to achiev ed social and political consciousness
on the socio-economic and political transformations taking place
among the different groups and societies.
It was a consciousness that was established from European patterns
of education, a process in which Christian Missionaries from European
nations played a very significant role. ' An important indicator of
the socio-economic and political consciousness developed from European
patterns of education was the ability to perceive and relate the
circumstances of a particular group within itself to developments
among other groups and societies in Nigeria. Thereafter the European
educated from the group and society organized their political identity
which often had roots in traditional culture and became mobilized to
uplift the status of the "tribal" unit. This was so for Ibo and
Yoruba nationalism, the numerically dominant groups and societies in
Southern Nigeria and which developed their cultural identities into
political parties like the NCNC and the AG respectively. 2 However
in instances where there was a culture fusion among different
"tribal" units which were numerically small and concentrated in a
specific territory, a collective social and political identity became
organized as well as activated by mobilization as was the case with
Christian religious influences in the conceptions of the M-Belt
identity among the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North. 3
1. For detailed examples see Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political 
Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton 1963;
James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, London
1958; Richard N. Henderson (1971), "Generalized Cultures and
Evolutionary Adaptability: A comparison of Urban Efik and Ibo
in Nigeria" in Robert Melson and Horward Wolpe (Eds), Nigeria: 
Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan 1971
p.215-253; Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu
1978 p.140-168.
2. Sklar 1963 p.41-86
3. For more detailed discussions of this point see Sections III
and IV of this Chapter.
Unlike other parts of Nigeria however the development of
"tribal" Unions as political organizations among the majority of the
M-Belt groups and societies was caused by the state of local politics
which subordinated non-Islamic groups and societies and the nature
of modernization as well as by British economic expropriation
activities which were effecting changes on M-Belt territories, a
process that became bolstered by achieved socio-economic and political
consciousness through Christian Missionary activities. The activities
of Christian Missionaries produced a European educated elite from among
the M-Belt groups and societies.
In contrast to the development of political activities among
the M-Belt groups and societies, in the Islamic society in The North,
although a European educated elite was developed from the ruling classes
by the government of British administration there was never developed
a 'Hausa Tribal Union', a 'Fulani Tribal Union', ' Nupe Tribal Union'
nor a 'Kanuri Tribal Union' even when it was the case that there was
a Kanuri Improvement Union and a 'Habe Tribal Union'. The two latter
Unions were an expression of political discontent in the peripheral
centres of the Islamic society that was based on Sokoto in places
like Maiduguri and Bauchi. The 'Habe Tribal Union' in Bauchi made
political attempts to invoke images of the lost glory of the Hausawa
as a 'ruling race' before their overthrow in 1804 by clan Fodio.1
Similarly in the period between 1955 and 1960, there was organized the
Borno Youth Movement (BYM) which was territorially defined with political
1.	 Sklar 1963 p.371; For detailed discussions of the overthrow of
the Hausa Kingdoms by Usman clan Fodio in 1804, see Chapter
where the expansion of the established Islamic society in the
period between 1804 and 1900 was also examined.
and cultural roots in the ancient Empire of the Islamic Kingdom of
Borno rather than an equivocally "tribal" Union.' In the period
between 1956 and 1965 the BYM was concerned to organize political
protest over the domination of political roles in The North by the
established Fulani ruling classes centred on the political and
religious authority of Sokoto. In the instance, it demanded the
creation of a North Eastern Region separated from the Islamic society
centred on Sokoto, to consist of Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi and Plateau
Provinces. 2 In the period before impact with British influences in
1900 some non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, Bauchi and Plateau
were functional economic peripheries of the Borno Kingdom from where
slaves were extracted for the trans-Saharan trade, a commodity
that was vital to the economy of the Kingdom. 3 This suggests that in
the period between 1956 and 1965, Borno with the Kanuri group and
society was equally anxious to establish itself in the politics of
The North with a specific sphere of influence that was based on
an equal political footing to the dominant patterns of political roles
and decision making that were based on the Fulani Empire centred on
Sokoto. Political protest by the BYM also found expression in the
rejection of NEPU because it became seen as a Hausa-Fulani political
party even when it was the case that its programme contained reforms
that were directed at uprooting the established bases of political
support for the Fulani ruling classes in The North. 4 In the period
1. Sklar 1963 p.340
2. Ibid
3. For detailed discussions with examples see Chapter 1 where
the slave raiding activities of the Kingdom of Borno on the
non-Islamic groups and societies found toward its southern
territories were examined.
4. Sklar 1963 p.340
before 1956 however, one of the factors that squeezed-in "tribal"
identities in the Islamic society in The North into the Islamic
religious identity to become the dominant political identity was
the Islamic religion. This was so because the majority of the
population in The North was Moslem for a longish period of time before
impact with British influences and upon the establishment of British
political authority the diffusion of Hausa-Fulani Islamic culture
over other groups and societies was encouraged by political means. '
The purpose of this Section is to examine how far ex-servicemen
and the European educated were the causal instruments in the develop-
ment and organization of "tribal" Unions and Associations among
the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1938 and 1966.
It is also examined whether the "tribal" Unions and organizations
which became political in nature were shaped by the state of socio-
economic and political consciousness about the increases in European
patterns of modernization that were rapidly transforming society in
The North and in particular the M-Belt groups and societies. It is
proposed that the vigorous ressurgence of "tribal" identities among
the M-Belt groups and societies was a political reaction to the
exploitative and dominant socio-economic relationships developed
from the new influences on their territories upon impact with
colonialism as directed from England. In the short period between
1938 and 1950 there developed in different years as many "tribal"
political organizations as the numbers of the different groups and
1.	 For detailed discussions with examples on the development of
the Islamic religious identity as the political identity of
The North in the period between 1900 and 1960 see Chapters 2.
53 1
societies in the M-Belt areas. 1
 Many of the "tribal" Unions had
explicit cultural and political identities and were concerned to
struggle for the socio-economic and political improvement of their
groups and societies as they related their circumstances of existence
to the provincial and regional governments on the transformation
of society in The North rather than to the national society of Nigeria
and the national government. Although the "tribal" organizations
were explicitly cultural in social and political identity, the
identities became subsequently fed into the Christian religious
identity of the M-Belt Movement as political support in the demands
for the creation of a M-Belt Region when it was began in 1949. In
the instance, "tribal" political identities were mobilized as the
political identity of the M-Belt Movement. The "tribal" identities
became bolstered by the Christian religious identity in the period
between 1950 and 1965. This was so because in the period between
1930 and 1950 European Christian Missionaries were successful in
organizing the different groups and societies as "Christian tribes"
through Christian conventions and conferences of Church Elders with
representation from the different M-Belt groups and societies. 2
It ought to be borne in mind however that the M-Belt Movement was not
begun on the crucible of "tribal" identities. It was begun with an
1. The Section however only examines a few of the "tribal" Unions
that were crucial in shaping developing patterns in the different
areas defined as the 'Political M-Belt' like the Tiv and Idoma
in Benue, the Kagoro in S. Zaria, the Birom on the Plateau, the
Kilba and Wurkum Unions in Adamawa and the Sayawa and Jarawa
leagues in S. Bauchi. This is so because the numbers of tribal
unions among the M-Belt groups and societies were simply legion
for all to be considered and examined.
2. Although the development of the Christian religious identity
among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1930
and 1950 has been examined in detail as a social movement in
Section III of this Chapter, the interplay of the religious and
tribal identities in the M-Beit Movement are given analytical
emphasis in Chapters 4-and 5 where the growth and development of
the M-Belt Movement and the politics of the M-Belt groups and
societies with the M-Belt Movement are examined.
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explicit Christian religious identity vigorously directed at reducing
Islamic hegemony of political roles and decision making in government
in The North. In order to achieve its objectives it directed its
appeals to Christian "tribes" in The North to gain political support.
For example, although "tribal" Unions were characteristic of the
M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1938 and 1950, each
stood on its own until in 1949 when the Christian identity became
activated by exclusively Christian interests to produce a common
political front for articulating the problems and interests of
the different non-Islamic tribes. Mobilization of the Christian
religious identity took political shape before 1950 from Plateau,
Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria where there were more European
educated persons as Christian adherents than elsewhere among other
M-Belt groups and societies. The development of "tribal" Unions among
the M-Belt groups and societies was however more shaped by the
numerical sizes of the groups and the degree of in-group cultural
cohesion rather than by achieved social consciousness on society
developed from European patterns of education. Where a group was
numerically bigger and had some European educated persons, it organized
its unity earlier than a group with more European educated but fewer
in-group members. Table 3 . 2,2 suggests that the numerically bigger
of the M-Belt groups and societies like the Tiv, Idoma and Birom
organized into "Tribal" Movements with political interests earlier
than the numerically smaller tribal Units. For example, while there
existed "tribal" organizations influencing about 1441,041 people
which is about 55.5% of the total M-Belt population over seven years
of age in eight Divisions in 1945, it was not until after 1949 that
Table 3 . 22..	 The development of 'Tribal' Unions among some M-Belt
groups and societies in the period between 1938 and 1952
M-Belt Areas with
Tribal Organization
Population
size in
1952: 7 years
of age and
over
Numbers of
European
Educated
with Ele-
mentary IV
and Higher
in 1952
% Population
with Euro-
pean Edu-
cation
Year of
Organization
Tiv Division (Tiv
Progressive Union) 533,267 4,905 0.9 1938
Idoma Division
(Idoma Hope
Rising Union)
226,339 1,764 0.8 1942
Zaria (Southern
Zaria Freedom
Movement)
562,850 14,961 2.7 1944
Jos Division
(Birom Progres-
sive Union)
118,585 7,308 6.2 1945
Bauchi Division:
1) Pan Jarawa
League
2) Pan Sayawa
League
3) Habe Tribal
Union
378,047 3,284 0.9 1949
Muri Division
(Kilba State
Union)
555,706 3,956 0.7 1950
Numan Division
(Wurkum Tribal
Union)
86,797 994 1.1 1951
Shendam Division
(Yergam Tribal
Union)
134,834 1,354 1.0 1952
Total in eight
Divisions 2,596,425 38,526 1.5
Sources: Dudley 1966 p.90-95; Post 1963 p.80; Sklar 1963 p.344-350;
Smith, 1960 p.137-149; C.S. Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition,
Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966, Princeton
1970 p.204-205; Population Census of Northern Region of Nigeria 
1952, Zaria 1952 p.30-31.
the remaining 45.5% of the M-Belt population began to be influenced
by similar movements. The level of educational achievement which
conditioned socio-economic and political consciousness on the state
of society in The North seemed to have had only minimal intervening
effects on the development of tribal movements in the period between
1938 and 1952. For example, if educational achievement was the
causal factor rather than the numerical size that bolstered group
cohesion, earlier tribal organizations might have been characteristic
of the groups and societies in Jos Division where there was the
highest percentage of the population with European education rather
than in Tiv, Idoma and S. Zaria. As will become apparent in the
discussions below the concentration of ex-servicemen and their
apprehension of the state of local socio-economic and political problems
conditioned initial political reaction to organize their 'tribes'
rather that achieved consciousness from education held by the European
educated. The high concentration of ex-servicemen explains the
earlier development of tribal unions among the Tiv and Idoma where as
early as in the period before 1940 many soldiers from these Benue
groups and societies served in the Nigerian Army. In the period
between 1930 and 1950 the patterns of recruitment into the Nigerian
Army changed from non-Islamic Hausa Fulani to focus on persons from
among the M-Belt groups and societies. ' This was so because: "To the
chiefs and to the (Fulani) ruling classes of the North ... the Nigerian
Regiment had always been an essentially British creation .. had been
1.	 Sir Bryan Sharwood Smith, But Always As Friends: Northern 
Nigeria and the Cameroons, London, 1969 p.139-140
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the instrument by means of which they and their own armies had been
subdued.. Apart from this, the soldiers in the eyes of the ruling caste,
were excessively addicted to strong drink and loose living and to
practices that were displeasing to orthodox Muslims. The army was for
pagans and for the rootless labouring classes of the big cities. It
would be unthinkable for any young man of decent family to risk cor-
ruption by enlisting .. by 1939 a high proportion of these superb
fighting troops came from the pagan tribes of the Niger and Benue
valleys and the hill country beyond, but there was still a good
sprinkling of the solid Hausa peasantry that had once formed the back-
bone of the regiment ... the Northerners formed 90% of the army in
pre-war years (although) they lacked the education needed to take them
beyond the rank of warrant officer") ThisThis suggests that while
political reaction to the state of local socio-economic and political
problems was of particular concern to the ex-servicemen, the subsequent
protest within the "tribal" unions among the M-Belt groups and societies
directed at Islamic hegemony in local affairs and in the wider society
of The North and Nigeria, was conditioned by higher educational standards
that became complimented by Christian consciousness. It was Christian
consciousness among the European educated Christian persons that led
to the organization of the non-Moslem league even when it was the case
that the ex-servicemen raised local problems as a basis for "tribal"
unity.
The political roles of ex-servicemen in the development of tribal
unions as a focus of unity for their groups and societies is suggested
1. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.139-140; The concentration of recruitment
into the Nigerian Army of both officers and infantry ranks from
among the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1940
and 1970 and its political consequences in 1966, 1967 and 1976
are examined in analytical detail as they related to the political
goals of the M-Belt Movement in Chapters 9-ctild 5
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by the fact that the very first British created chieftaincies among
the Birom who generated the political ideas for the creation of a
M-Belt Region and the Tiv who maintained the ideas until the political
objective was achieved were ex-servicemen. For example, this was so
for the appointment of Dah Chung Gyang the first paramount chief of
the Birom in Jos Division and for Makere Dzakpe for the Tiv in Tiv
Division of Renue Province. 1 In the period between 1940 and 1970 the
development of Christianity became collateral with the development
of European type of education among a majority of the M-Belt groups
and societies. 2 Christian Missionary Bodies like the SUM with schools
centred on Gindiri pursued policies which ensured that "the children
of Christians" from their districts benefitted from European education
in their institutions because "only bright young men and women throbbing
with spiritual life, trained and equipped for their job will be able
to win and hold this rising generation for God and his work". 3
 How-
ever while education and Christianity do not wholely explain the
formation of "tribal" unions among the M-Belt groups and societies.
they are the critical variables that explain the initial organizations
of the M-Belt Movement, the Non-Moslem League and the Middle Zone
League, which took off from among groups and societies where there
were more European educated persons as Christians in 1952. For example,
when "tribal" organizations and the cultural political identities they
1. For a detailed examination of the development of the chieftaincy
institution among some M-Belt groups and societies in the period
between 1940 and 1950, as a focus of "tribal" unity for the
application of the policy of Indirect Rule see Chapter 2and
also Section V of this Chapter.
2. Rubingh 1969 p.137
3. The Light Bearer Magazine, London 1938 p.47-48
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mobilized ) developed and became fed-in as political support for the
Non-Moslem League and the Middle Zone League which were begun in Jos
Division. The 1952 population census report suggests that 6.2% of the
people were European educated, the highest among the M-Belt groups
and societies. Subsequently the M-Belt Movement gained rapid political
and social support from S. Zaria Division which had 2.7% of its
population with European education, Numan Division with 1.1% of the
population with European education and Shendam Division with 1.0% of
the population literate with European education.' In the period between
1950 and 1965 when there was increased development of education with
Christian consciousness among the Tiv which became bolstered by their
cultural numerical weight in strengthening their "tribal" identity
the struggle for the political demands of the M-Belt Movement shifted
from among the groups and societies on the Plateau, Adamawa, S. Bauchi
and S. Zaria where previous to 1956 there existed more Christians and
non-Moslems, to find political leadership among the Tiv in Benue
Province where there was an insignificant concentration of Islamic
influences. Islamic influences and the concentration of Moslems among
the Tiv was least visible, constituting just about 1.0% in 1952.2
1. The relationship between the causal variables, Christianity
and European education as factors in creating social and political
consciousness in the growth and development of the M-Belt
Movement is examined in more detail in Chapter it when the trans-
formation of the Non-Moslem League to the United Middle Belt
Congress is analyzed.
2. For more detailed analysis and discussion of the social and
political experiences of the M-Belt groups and societies and
their different degrees with Islamic influences see Chapter 2_
and Section V of this Chapter.
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Plateau, Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria were the areas where
the M-Belt Movement was begun and gained initial political support
before it was maintained by the Tiv in Benue Province until in 1967
when its political objectives were achieved in the creation of more
units of the Nigerian Federation with BP State as the epitome of the
political struggle. When the Nigerian Federation was restructured in
1967 by General Yakubu Gowon the success of the M-Belt struggle was
from the military control of political power rather than one which
was based on the political skills of the leadership in meeting the needs
of the people. This was so because of the "tribal" concentration of
the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North, particularly those
from the M-Belt areas in the Nigerian Army like the Tiv. The Tiv were
the most highly represented group and society from the M-Belt areas,
albeit other Nigerian groups and societies, as rifle-men in the infantry
ranks of the Nigerian Army. 1 For example, as early as in the period of
the Second World War in the years between 1938 and 1945, there were
6,000 Tiv as against 2,000 Idoma people from Benue Province in the
contingents that were recruited from The North. 2 As earlier suggested
these figures increased with the changes in the recruitment policies
into the Army of The North and the Nigerian governments. Changes in
the recruitment policies of the Nigerian Army focussed on the non-
Islamic groups and societies, the majorities being from the M-Belt areas.
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This was caused by Northernization Policy and the Military performance
of persons from the non-Islamic groups and societies as soldiers in the
1. Tseayo 1975 p.122
2. Ibid
3. Interview discussions with General Yakubu Gowon, May 1980.
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battles of the Second World War.
1
These political policies increased
conceptions of the M-Belt groups and societies as functional to the
political leadership of the Hausa-Fulani in The North and Nigeria.
While persons from the M-Belt groups and societies were recruited into
the Army and Civil Service of The North as "Northerners" because of
their achieved skills in European education, they were excluded and
maintained in subordinate positions in political leadership and
decision making in top government posts. 2
The first cultural political organization among the M-Belt
groups and societies was begun by the Tiv who were a numerically
dominant group and society among the other non-Islamic groups and
societies in the M-Belt areas as early as in 1938. 3 This was a social
and political movement founded by Tiv ex-servicemen upon their return
to Nigeria from East Africa, Burma and other areas of the Far East. 4
The ex-servicemen with the support of the Tiv European educated on
Tiv land called the "tribal" political movement the Tiv Progressive
Union (TPU). 5 The ex-servicemen that were active in the TPU had
fought in both the First World War in the period between 1914 and
1918 and in the Second World War in the period between 1938 and 1945. 6
These included John Aemberga Samu, Guse Doki, Makele Dzakpe and some
European educated like Makondo Igbon, Tsedzugh Tyungu and H.O. Abaagu,
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Gbile Gundu, Wuam Gambe, Yough Agera, Pagher Mue, Chia Aka, Akiga Sal.
1. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.139-140
2. Northernization policy, the political consequences of the con-
centration of non-Islamic groups and societies in the Nigerian
Army from the M-Belt areas and their exclusion from political
roles and decision making in The North are examined in more
detail in Chapters 4_ ar+A 5
3. Benue Provincial Annual Report, NAK 1953, cited in Tseayo 1975 p.179
4. Tseayo 1975 p.179
5. Dudley 1966 p.91
6. Paul K. Loko, "Political Activity and Unity in Tiv Land" Text of
An Address to the 23rd Convention of the Community of Tiv Students,
Gboko, 31st December 1982 p.2
7. Loko 1982 p.2
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The last eight persons became elected representatives from Benue
Province in the NHA in the 1951 indirect elections. Loko suggests
that the ex-servicemen rather than the European educated were influenced
to organize "tribal" unity when in the period between 1938 and 1945,
Emirs from The North, Obas from the West and Warrant Chiefs from the
East visited the Nigerian Contingents at different times in India,
Burma as well as those stationed in Britian. 1 The Tiv, obviously being
the dominant soldiers in the Nigerian Contingents "felt a conspicuous
absence of a Tiv chief during the visits" and were determined that upon
their return after the war they will demand the creation of "a Tiv
Chief like an Emir for Tiv land". 2
 It was with these interests in
their minds that organized political activities in Tiv land was begun
by the ex-servicemen in 1945 even when it was the case that the
"tribal" movement was formed in 1938. When the Tiv European educated
subsequently dominated the TPU they were concerned with a subsequently
similar recurrent theme that caused the emergence of "tribal" unions
among other M-Belt groups and societies to struggle for "the general
improvement of the Tiv people". 3 The method envisaged for improving
the Tiv people was to use the TPU as a pressure group that might push
the Tiv Native Authority to award overseas scholarships to Tiv sons
for study in Britain. 4 Although the TPU pushed hard the issue of
scholarship awards by the Native Authority, one of its members, Bala
Usman was unsuccessful.
1. Loko 1982 p.2
2. Ibid
3. Dudley 1966 p.92
4. Tseayo 1975 p.187
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The educational interests centred on the award of scholarships
for studies in Britain was developed in the TPU after 1946 as a direct
consequence of the NCNC political ruralization tour of Nigeria.' In
the instance the NCNC delegation which included Herbert Macanley and
Nnamdi Azikiwe "promised to help in the training of the sons of Tiv
in higher institutions of learning". 2 Tseayo suggests that although
James Ityowua Adzakpe was selected for the NCNC educational training
3\A(-2-1
the scholarship never materialized for a study in Britain.	 This
suggests that although the state of local socio-economic and political
issues and problems conditioned the development of "tribal" unions
among some M-Belt groups and societies, social and political develop-
ments among other groups and societies in the overall political arena
of Nigeria were also crucial factors in shaping their accelerated
cultural patterns. TPU for example was organized as a vehicle for
achieving progress among the Tiv: ".. because many Tiv had watched
with interest how their bigger trading neighbours, the Ibo, had organi-
zed various Ibo Unions especially for the award of scholarships for
their people to institutions of higher learning". 4 This was the
premise from which when the TPU was organized, its members pressed
for the award of a scholarship in the period between 1940 and 1945
for Bala Usman, the son of a Tiv train driver and the first Northerner
to be a qualified train driver with the Nigerian Railways. 5 Further-
more, when Bala Usman became stranded in Britain in the course of his
studies the TPU pressurized the Tiv Native Authority to finance the
scholarship for his stay. 6
1. Tseayo 1975 p.188
2. Ibid p.187
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
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The demonstrative effects of external political influences
were crucial social factors in shaping the development of "tribal"
unions and the generation of political ideas among some M-Belt groups
and societies. BPU, the Non Moslem League and the Middle-Zone-League
were influenced by Ibos and Yorubas who were in Jos Division as
skilled labour on the tin-mine fields. It was for example S.O. James,
a Yoruba who suggested to Christians on the Plateau that their under-
representation in the NHC in Kaduna required political organization.1
In Gboko the headquarters of Tiv Division that was established in
1932, the NCNC tour of The North in 1946 left behind a political impact
on a seven-year-old girl that subsequently shaped and conditioned her
participation in the M-Belt struggle for the creation of more units
of the Nigerian Federation as well as total involvement in politics.
The little seven-year-old in 1946 is now Elizabeth Ivase, a Minister
in the NPN Government in Nigeria. Political impact of the NCNC tour
of The North in 1946 on Elizabeth Ivase was caused by the inclusion of
the only female in the delegation, Mrs Ransome Kuti who was active
in the political orations of the Nationalist rally in Gboko. 2 Ivase
suggests that Mrs Ransome Kuti: "...being the only woman in the
delegation, there was something about her dynamism when she spoke ...
my father had taken me to the rally and had encouraged me to donate
money he had given me for the nationalist cause and the NCNC party.
I remember Zik was with the party. The delegation taught us a song at
the rally which we all sang. The words that were repeated were re-
membered "... we want our Freedom.. freedom... freedom. Freedom from
the whiteman..." At the end of the rally my father told me to work
1. This point is examined in more analytical detail in Chapter 4
where the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement is
examined.
2. Interview discussions with Elizabeth 'vase, January 1981.
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and study hard so that some day I will be like that woman... Later
when I went to study at Sacred Heart College in Kaduna I still re-
membered the Nationalist Song which I constantly hummed and sang...
In the 1950s when there was a M-Belt Movement for political struggle
from Hausa-Fulani rule in The North the NCNC song and the M-Belt
struggle became related to the Nationalist struggle from British
rule. It also became particularly reJated to the Freedom of women
in The North. If Northern women could not be liberated because of the
Islamic religion then in a M-Belt Region that goal could be achieved
because of the Christian religion and the different cultural environ-
ment of the M-Belt groups and societies!'
However, the Tiv European educated in TPU were also concerned
that the institutions of governance by the Tiv NA in the Division
ought to be cnntrolled and managed by persons indigenous to the
Tiv tribe rather than Hausa-Fulani or a variant of Islamic leader-
ship, a premise of political subordination in the rulership of the
non-Islamic groups and societies in The North which was shaped by the
needs of the government of British administration for the application
of the Indirect Rule policy which affected all of the M-Belt groups
and societies until indigenous "tribal" institutions were developed
in the period between 1930 and 1940. 2
 The political status of the
British developed chieftaincy institutions among the M-Belt groups
and societies as they related to the powers of the Emirs in the
Islamic society was a major political issue to the demands of the
1. Interview discussions with Mrs Elizabeth Ivase, Commissionarfor
Education in Benue State, January 1981.
2. For more detailed discussions with examples of the application
of Indirect Rule policy which subordinated the indigenous
patterns of political authority among the M-Belt groups and
societies, see Chapter/ Section III. The development of
indigenous chieftaincy institutions among some of the M-Belt
groups and societies has also been discussed in Section V of
this Chapter.
election of Condo Aluor: ... hushed-up the matter and a second nomi-II
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nation was called, in which Makere Dzakpe was declared the winner".
"tribal" unions and the M-Belt Movement in the period between 1940
and 1960. However this was the premise from which in the period
between 1938 and 1945 European educated Tiv became involved in the
political demands for the creation of a Paramount Chief of the Tiv
land to rule the Division. In 1946 Makere Dzakpe was elected from
'The Tiv Majalisa Council' by the Jirtamen (the Tiv Central Council)
and became the first Chief of the Tiv. 1
 There were political and
social influences of both the European educated and the ex-servicemen
in the TPU as distinct pressures in the Tiv Central Council which
selected Makere Dzakpe as Chief of the Tiv. While J.B. Ukpada repre-
sented the ex-servicemen for example, Iguse Adoki was the representa-
tive of the European educated in TPU in the Tiv Central Council.
2
Makere Dzakpe himself was an ex-serviceman whose popularity as
"Seargent-Major Makere Munchi" among both the Tiv and the government
of British administration in The North conditioned his preference for
the appointment as the Tor Tiv. 3
 There was however political effort
to influence the choice of the TPU, Condo Aluor to be chief of Tiv
although he subsequently lost the contest to Makere Dzakpe. Tseayo
suggests that the British Resident who conducted the elections fiddled
the votes of the Council in favour of Dzakpe because the administration
distrusted the politics of Tiv intelligentsia. 4 This opinion is given
credibility because in the instance of the elections in the Council,
the Resident rejected the first round of votes which favoured the
1. Tseayo 1975 p.184-189; this has been examined in detail in
Section V of this Chapter.
2. Tseayo 1975 p.184
3. Interview discussions with Professor David Muffet, 25 September 1980
4. Tseayo 1975 p.185
5. Ibid
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This conditioned the European educated in the TPU represented by
Iguse Adoki who opposed the pressures of the British administration
on the Tiv Central Council to suggest that rather than listen to the
British: ti ... there was need of allowing the voice of the literate
young Tiv to be heard". 1 This suggests that the TPU wanted politics
in a changing Tiv society to be influenced and controlled by the European
educated even when it was the case that they were outside the political
institutions of society on Tiv land. This was so because the European
educated were a class of persons who had a consciousness on the
patterns and paths of European modernization having achieved a certain
measure of skills required for running a European type of society.
The political consequences of this initial emphasis on educational
achievement compounded the grievances developed from the political
distrust of the European educated Tiv by the government of British
administration in The North. This subsequently caused TPU to accept
the call by Patrick Dokotri that the M-Belt Movement be led by a
Tiv European educated, rather than the rich but illiterate Tiv
contractor, Abuul, even when it was the case that he gained the
nominations based on the Tiv constituency and won the Presidency by
a large Tiv vote in 1956. Abuul won massive popular support in
Lafia in 1956 during a leadership conference of "tribal" unions that
supported the M-Belt Movement because as a contractor he was able to
transport his supporters to Lafia from different parts of Tiv land by
a hired fleet of lorries, a feat that none of the other leadership
1.	 Gbodiv, Nak Vol. 2/1: 329, cited in Tseayo 1975 p.184
contestants had imagined and financially had been unable to do on
the same scale. 1 Ab 1 was replaced by the election of J.S. Tarka
as President of the UMBC party, which marked his political entry
into the national political arena and the direction of commitment in
the whole vigour of the M-Belt Movement changed. 2
However, although TPU was concerned to influence the Tiv Central
Council over decision making in local affairs, their influence was
also felt in the Gboko Central Court. This was represented by the
TPU membership who were mainly European educated in persons like
.	 3
J. Bendega Ukpada, Tarka Nachi, Lila Lisa and Amyamnyian. 	 When TPU
established its political influences within the institutions of local
government that controlled society in Tiv Division, it became more
active in changing the shape of political and economic dominance by
the Hausa-Fulani who enjoyed the support of the government of British
administration in The North. In 1946 the European educated and the
ex-servicemen in TPU effectively opposed and prevented the son of
Audu dan Afoda from becoming a separate chief of Makurdi Town and the
adjacent hinterland areas. 4 In 1947, largely from TPU pressures, it
was suggested to the government of British administration in The North
that rather than have an Islamic chief, Makurdi Town ought to be
administered by a council consisting of each section of the Tiv clans
and that the Makurdi Town Council be subordinated to the Tor Tiv
(the chief of the Tiv) and his Council: "... because Makurdi Town
had been founded originally on Tiv land". 5
 Although political interests
1. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor
David Lot, Isaac Shaahu and Isaac Kpum in the period between
November 1980 and February 1981.
2. The political entry of Joseph S. Tarka as Presdient of the UMBC is
examined in more analytical detail in Chapter
3. Tseayo 1975 p.185
4. Ibid p.188
5. Tiv Central Council Minute Meetings, 3rd April 1947, cited in
Tseayo 1975 p.188.
which revolved around the status of the Tor Tiv were the major
issues surrounding the politics of controlling Makurdi Town, there
were also economic and commercial interests which were in the hands
of non-indigenes particularly dominated by Hausa-Fulani and Ibo traders.
Tseayo suggests that the economic and commercial interests centred on
non-indigenous control of Makurdi Town clashed with Hausa-Fulani
traders as well as other Moslem traders with the Tiv in 1947. 1 In the
instance: "... the Hausa-Fulani fought the Tiv and many lives and
much property were destroyed". 2
In general, although the European educated and the ex-servicemen
in the "tribal" unions among the M-Belt groups and societies sometimes
operated as separate social and political pressure groups, they
were never strange bed-fellows. Although the European educated dominated
the executive posts of the "tribal" unions among each of the M-Belt
groups and societies, where there existed ex-servicemen, they always
were elected to some of the posts and those outside the executive
positions always gave their political support to the organizations. 3
This was so because the major "tribal" unions were begun by the ex-
servicemen, particularly the TPU and the BPU. For example, this was
so in the initial organization and expansion of the TPU from urban
centres like Lagos. Tseayo suggests that it was Peter Dodo,an ex-
serviceman, who started and organized the Tiv "tribal" political
4	 .	 .
organization from Lagos in 1945. 	 Within the Lagos Branch of the
TPU itself, while there were 5 European educated persons in the
executive who had achieved a measure of European modernizing skills
in the control and management of society, the only ex-serviceman however
1. Tseayo 1975 p.188
2. Ibid p.188-189
3. Interivew discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Choji Bot, Jonah
Assadugu and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
4. Tseayo 1975 p.186
was Peter Dodo himself. ' These were Ityeku Yough who was President
of the TPU and an employee of the Nigerian Railway, Ayila Yough,
Secretary of TPU and an associate of the NCNC, serving as NCNC
party reporter with 'The Pilot', Peter Dodo a member of the executive
and the only ex-serviceman in the Committee, Atim Atedze, a member of
the executive committee and Yakubu Adam, Patron of TPU in Lagos, all
of whom had achieved a measure of European education. 2 It was however
a European educated person from among the Tiv, Ayila Yough, who upon
his return from Lagos to Gboko after 1945 that was asked by the other
European educated in the Divisonal headquarters of Tiv land to organize
the TRU with District branches from the town of Gboko.
3
 Thereafter,
with headquartersin Gboko, TPU became organized among otter urban
centres of The North and Nigeria wherever there was a concentration
of European educated Tiv. 4 In Gboko town, where there was the highest
concentration of European educated Tiv persons, almost all the adult
members joined the TPU, the most politically influential members being
Native Authority employees and rich traders like Ugor Iwoo and Sekpe
Abaagu. 5
Implicit in the organizational development of the TPU before 1956
was that it directed its "tribal" appeal to the European educated as
well as to people who were already participating in the modernization
order
sectors of the new economic/introduced by the government of British
administration in The North. It was not geared toward political mobili-
zation of the remaining mass of the ordinary Tiv people in the rural
1. Tseayo 1975 p.187
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.188
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
areas. As latterly as in 1952, MacBride, the Resident for Benue
Province suggests that : "Party organization does not mean much in
Benue, even to the educated minority; tribal and local loyalties are
still paramount and in this field popular interest still belongs to
the mainly illiterate heads of large and successful families who
as elders, chiefs or councillors are the customary community repre-
sentatives and the accepted arbiters in matters of common concern..
the advice of literate juniors may be heard and considered if it is
offered with deference, but the fact that a man has been elected to
the legislature does not make him a prophet in his own country". '
Before 1956 therefore the TPU was basically a political phenomenon
of the European educated and did very little to mobilize the rest of
the Tiv population as a socio-cultural movement. In many respects
the whole processes of "tribal" unions influencing the patterns
of politics in a particular group and society was initially restricted
to the developing metropolitan centres of The North similar to the
experiences of other groups and societies in Southern Nigeria. 2
	In
Tiv land before 1956 political mobilization by TPU hardly went beyond
the confines of urban and district centres of social and economic
1. D.F.H. MacBride, Annual Report for Benue Province, 1952, cited
in Tseayo 1958 p.184.
2. For detailed examples and discussions of situational ethnicity
(tribalism), of the urban centres in Nigeria, see Ulf Himmelstrand,
"Rank Equilibration, Tribalism and Nationalism in Nigeria" 1971
p.254-291, Andrey C. Smock, "The Political Role of Ibo Ethnic
Unions" 1971 p.320-341; Leonard Plotricov, "Situational Ethnicity
in Jos, Nigeria", 1971 p.606-628, in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe
(Eds), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism,
Michigan 1971; Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power 
in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton 1963 p.64-71.
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development and did not influence villagers in the rural areas.
Earlier in the 1951 Indirect Elections into the NHA, MacBride suggests
that in Tivland: "... despite the efforts of administrative officers
and others to publicise the objects and reasons of the primary
elections, only a very small proportion of the country people had more
than a dim idea as to what it was all about. In the District colleges
however interest began to awake, but because of apathy at the lower
level they contained few men of distinction and most of those were
servants of the Central Native Administrations, who had had the enter-
prise to go and stand in the primary areas in which they were born")
This was unlike in the Islamic centres of religion and power where
people were easily mobilized for elections by a hierarchy of authority
based on accepted traditional legitimacy from the Emir, District Heads
and flowed down to the Ward-Heads in the urban centres. For example
in the 1951 elections in Borno Province while the predominantly Islamic
population had a turn-out of about 60%, Gwoza areas that share the same
non-Islamic characteristics with the Tiv had an average poll turn-out
of 40%. 2
In contrast to the limited state of political consciousness
achieved by the Tiv in 1951, among the Idoma group and society the
IHRU
3
 created a mobilized electorate from both the ranks of the Euro-
pean educated as well as from the traditional system sufficiently to
sponsor fifteen of its members out of the thirty members from the
Divisional College including two men of considerable talent that were
outside the services of the Idoma Native Authority. 4 In the instance,
1. MacBride 1953 p.14
2. F Humphreys, Bornu Province 1951, Northern Region of Nigeria:
Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.20
3. Examined in more analytical detail below.
4. MacBride, 1953 p.14
only comparable to the political circumstances in Jos Division on the
Plateau, it was in Lafia and Idoma Divisions that party labels were
evident in the 1951 elections in Benue Province) WhileW  in Lafia
Division the Hausa Fulani as well as other Islamic communities identified
with the NPC and the Idoma affiliated to NEPU, 2
 the majority of the
"tribal" Unions in Jos Division on the Plateau, particularly the BPU
leadership in centres of commercial and economic life like Jos and
Bukuru and in Kafanchan where the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement was
active, they became affiliated to the NCNC. 3 This was so because of
the political influences developed from the concentration of non-
indigenes from Southern Nigeria who worked as Tin Miners on the Plateau
and in Kafanchan being an important railway junction, developed a large
Ibo community with commercial interests. 4 Subsequently in the period
between 1951 and 1956 some of the Tiv European educated were affiliated
to the NCNC political party. 5
In Benue Province however despite a highly more measurable degree
of political consciousness among the Idoma group and society when it is
compared with the Tiv, it was the numerical sizes of the group and society
that determined the outcome of the 1951 indirect elections. This is not
suggesting that political consciousness was directly related to political
solidarity of a particular group and society. In the instance of the
Idoma group and society higher consciousness from achieved European
1. MacBride 1953 p.14
2. Ibid
3. Niven, 1953 p.60
4. Ibid
5. The shifting patterns of alliances among the M-Belt groups and
societies in the period between 1950 and 1965 in the cause of
politics and political support for the objectives of the M-Belt
Movement are examined in more analytical details in Chapters Li-
and 5 where we discuss the growth and development of the Movement
and the politics within the M-Belt groups and societies with the
M-Belt Movement.
patterns of education produced severe political schisms within the
IHRU. This became compounded by their smaller numbers of representation
relative to the Tiv in the Provincial Electoral College for Benue. In
the Final Electoral College for example, out of 140 members, 68 were
Tiv including two Tiv members that were elected from Wukari where
there was a high concentration of migrant Tiv people as farmers,
against 30 members who were indigenes of Idoma Division with 15 as
committed members of the IHRU. 1
 There were also three Ibos in the
Final Electoral College for Benue Province while the Turst-Territory
District of Ndoro produced one member. 2
 This was the premise from
which there was shown a rather unusual demonstration of Tiv political
solidarity in the outcome of the final elections of members from
Benue Province into the NHA which underscored the politically mobilized
Idoma unity. In the instance, by their numerical weight, the Tiv
elected members filled all the eight seats assigned to Benue Province
with Tiv indigenes. 3 Of the Tiv elected members for Benue Province,
three were Native Treasury officials, two were schoolmasters and of
the remaining three, one was a Government clerical service pensioner,
one the Eidtor of the Tiv newspaper "Mwange-U-Tiv" based in Enugu
and the third person, a contractor and member of the Makurdi Town
Council. 4 These were Gbile Gundu, Wuam Gambe, Yough Agera, Pagher Mue,
Chia Aka, Akiga Sal (the first Christian Convert among the Tiv group
and society), Makondo Igbon and T. Ayilla. 5 Some of the Tiv European
1. MacBride 1953 p.14
2. Ibid p.15
3. Ibid p.14
4. Ibid
5. Nigeria Year Book 1952, A Daily Times Publication, Lagos 1952 p.8
educated however felt regret over their established dominance in the
electoral process developed from the 1951 indirect elections.
Paul Loko for example, described the representation as selfish that
"these people represented the whole of Benue Province in the Northern
House of Assembly ... I was present and witnessed the conduct of the
election myself. It was funny the way people voted. The method of
voting was primitive and undemocratic .. because the two contestants
stood up and those who supported them lined up behind them". 1 The
non-Tiv members in the Benue electoral College who gained nominations
and lost the election votes were J.C. Obande, an Idoma from Idoma
Division and Ibrahim Shangai, a Jukun from Wukari Division.2
Previous to these political developments in Benue Province in
1951 the Tiv group and society caused social and economic anxiety
among other neighbouring groups and societies, like the Idoma, the Jukun
as well as other smaller non-Islamic groups and societies in Lafia,
Nasarawa and Shendam Divisions, by their overland expansion in search
of farmland, where they settled as indigenes. 3 The 1951 election
results into the NHA caused further political resentment of the Tiv
by the neighbouring groups and societies and increased tensions in the
area, particularly so because two Tiv were elected as Jukun repre-
sentatives from Wukari in the Final Benue Electoral College and there
was a total non-representation of the Jukun and the Idoma. This was
so because in the 1951 Elections a culturally heterogeneous Benue
1. Paul K. Loko, "Political Activity and Unity in Tiv Land". Text
of an address to the 23rd Convention of the Community of Tiv
Students, Gboko 31st December 1982 p.3-4
2. Loko 1982 p.3
3. This has been examined in Chapter . with some detailed examples
of the tensions that resulted and caused the expulsions of the
Tiv as "aliens" from Wukari Division.
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constituency for political representation in the NHA became a Tiv
constituency. MacBride infact ridicules what he describes as "the
working of democratic institutions in a heterogeneous constituency"
because "In selecting the candidates whose return they wished to
ensure the Tiv members of the Final College paid regard to clan
affinities and personal repute; political parties had nothing to do
with their choice and the only influence that these had on the final
election was to split the Idoma vote and complicate the lobbying that
might otherwise have given one or more of the eight seats to non-Tiv
members".
1
 This suggests that before the political ideas of a M-Belt
Movement filtered to the Tiv group and society, "Tiv nationalism" in
shaping political patterns of dominance in a democratic electoral system
was already established. The electoral political weight of the Tiv
rooted in their numerical size in relation to other M-Belt groups and
societies subsequently gave recalcitrant leadership in the M-Belt
Movement demanding the creation of a M-Belt Region opportunity to
produce political arguments in favour of co-existence in The North
as political minorities rather than in a separate region from the
Islamic society in which the Tiv might dominate and shape electoral
patterns.
2
 Subsequently in the period between 1968 and 1976 the
assumed dominance of the Tiv in government institutions of BP state
was a major issue in the developing political tensions that tore
apart the equivalence of a M-Belt Region when Plateau and Benue states
became created in 1976. While the European educated among the Plateau
groups and societies were concerned that the Tiv dominated decision
making in the institutions of government in BP state, political under-
1. MacBride 1953 p.15
2. The political issues surrounding the numerical size of the Tiv
electorate is examined in more analytical detail in Chapters
14-anc1 5 where the social and political grievances of the M-Belt
groups and societies brought before the Willink Commission in
1957 are discussed.
representation surfaced as a grievance from among the Tiv European
educated because of the numbers they represented of their group and
society. '
 As early as in 1967 when there was political anticipation
that The North will be subdivided into more Federal Units of the Nigerian
Federation there was Plateau representation to General Yakubu Gowon
that political opposition existed to the merging of Benue and Plateau
provinces to become a political unit because of the'political fears'
centred on the Tiv potential electorate in the instance of a return
to civilian rule. 2 Subsequently in 1975 the Plateau Students Asso-
ciation in ABU Zaria produced similar arguments that re-echoed the
'political fears' of the Tiv numerical weight which might be used in
electoral processes to demand the split of BP State into Plateau and
Benue states when it was evident that electoral processes will be
resumed in 1979. 3 In the instance, the Plateau European educated
became instrumental in shaping the demands for the separation of
Plateau from BP State and for the two previously distinct provinces
to constitute separate political units of the Nigerian Federation.4
This was done by mobilizing one of the political fears that was
centred on the potential of the size of the Tiv electorate upon
anticipated return to civilian control of political power even when
it was the case that the political interest was complimented by
1. The political problems in BP State which caused increased
variations in the conceptions of the social and political
identity over the creation of that State as a M-Belt Region
for 'Political Minorities' in The North are examined in more
analytical detail in Chapters 5cC
2. Interview discussions with George Hoomkwap, January 1981
3. Interview discussions with George Hoomkwap, January 1976; The
'break-up' of BP State into Plateau and Benue states are
examined in detail in Chapters 5 q'
4. Interview discussions with George Hoomkwap January 1981
economic interests that were centred on access to top government jobs
a new state administration will create. '
Although in 1952 the Tiv group and society were more numerous
in population size than any others among the M-Belt groups and societies
they only had 0.9% of their total population of 533,267 people that
was European educated and over seven years old. 2
 This suggests that
the TPU was based on the ideas of a few European educated Tiv and the
ex-servicemen who mobilized themselves for protest and participation
over local socio-political and economic problems rather than involving
the rural population in the process.It was however the ex-servicemen
and the developing commercial class among the Tiv who brought in the
ideas of a M-Belt Movement to the European educated in Tiv land
largely from the social and economic interactions of persons like
Sekpe Abaagu, Peter Dodo and J.B. Ukpada who had travelled to centres
of commercial and economic activities like Jos, Kafanchan, Zaria and
Kaduna. 3
 Unlike the social and political experiences of ex-servicemen
and the European educated in the "tribal" unions among the groups and
societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and S. Lana, the Tiv did
not develop political separation from Hausa Fulani and Islamic
domination in The North before 1956. Political separatism was however
characteristic of the other "tribal" unions among the groups and societies
in the M-Belt areas in the period between 1940 and 1956 before the political
entry of the Tiv leadership in the M-Belt Movement. The TPU, similar to
1. A.D. Yahaya, "The struggle for power in Nigeria 1966-1979" in
Oyeleye Oyediran (Ed), Nigerian Government and Politics under 
Military Rule 1966-1979, London, 1979 p.259-275
2. This is explicit from the figures suggested by Table :) . 2.1 which
are discussed in more detail below.
3. Tseayo, 1975 p.184-187; Interview discussions with Ajiva Aji
and Isaac Kpum, January 1981
the subsequent IHRU, directed its mobilized cultural identity into a
political organization to benefit a European educated class of the
group and society. In the period between 1950 and 1965 however when
there developed more persons with European education as Christians and
there was increased social and political consciousness on the shape
and pattern of dominance over society in The North, the Tiv became a
significant force in the separatist demands of the M-Belt Movement,
a process they bolstered by their numbers, the political vigour of
their leadership that was encouraged in the tradition of their ex-
servicemen. 1
The organizational skills and political courage of the ex-
servicemen from among the M-Belt groups and societies in the development
of "tribal" unions were gained from socio-economic experiences on two
political arenas. Firstly there was experience gained from military
sencice oUside Nigeria. Secondly upon their return from both the First
and Second World Wars they shared frustrating social and economic
experiences in Kaduna, the capital of British administration in The
North when they frequently travelled from different areas to converge
and make claims and demands for their gratuities from the government. 2
The circumstances of the experiences in Kaduna, conditioned the
organization of confrontation and protest with the Regional authorities.
In the instance of experiences gained from military services in the
Second World War which took them to Burma, North Africa, East Africa
and India, "the outside world" to the societies of the M-Belt areas,
1. Interview discussions with Professor David Muffet, 25th September
1980.
2. Interview discussions with Baba Sanda and Moses Nyam Rwang, in
the period between December 1980 and February 1981.
with European patterns of development became opened and served as the
attraction model of society in which they wanted to live. 1 This was
the premise from which upon the return of ex-servicemen from 'foreign
lands' to their groups and societies in Nigeria, they began to look
more closely at the patterns of development and the institutions of
government in their areas and demanded political control as a means
to change in society. In the instance of the experiences of the ex-
servicemen upon their return to The North and in Kaduna the social and
economic frustrations derived from government policy on claims by
demobilized soldiers for gratuity and pensions. The frustrations
caused the soldiers to develop a shared sense of anxiety as Christian
ex-servicemen dependent on an Islamic dominated government. 2 The
experienzes of persistent travels to Kaduna became compounded by the
social and political problems of underdevelopment existing among
their different societies which were explained as caused by their lack
of control of the apparatus of a government that discriminated against
Christians and the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North. This
was the crucial political perception of government activities and its
policies in the period between 1945 and 1950 as they related to the
non-Islamic groups and societies in The North which caused the
Christian ex-servicemen to translate personal experiences into collective
1. In both instances of my discussions with Baba Sanda and Moses
Nyam Rwang the recurrent theme that was emphasized in their
experiences gained from Burma was that: "da mun je wuje mun ga
duniya sal idon kowa ya budu. Mun dawo mun ga gida da barn ...
Kuma dole a gaya wa Gwamnati ta gyara Kase (meaning): upon our
travels outside of our societies, we "saw the World" and everybody
became wiser (everybody's eyes opened). Upon our return to Nigeria,
home was a different place and it became obligatory to tell the
government to produce development.
2. Interview discussions with Baba Sanda, Moses Nyam Rwang and
Choji Bot, January 1981.
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forms of political grievances in shaping the patterns of protest in
the "tribal" unions and the political purposes of the M-Belt Movement.
It was from the Kaduna experiences however that ex-servicemen
like Baba Sanda, a Bachama from Numan in Adamawa, Moses Nyam Rwang,
a Birom from Jos Division on the Plateau and Peter Dodo, a Tiv from
Tiv Division in Benue, among others, established social contacts based
on their aggrieved experiences. These became politically crucial after
1949 in the development and spread of the ideas for political partici-
pation in government institutions in The North and subsequently
demanding for political separation from the Islamic society and con-
stitution into a M-Belt Region. 1 However it was from the organizational
efforts of the ex-servicemen with the literate support of the European
educated in the "tribal" unions that the socio-political and economic
problems of the M-Belt groups and societies became taken into the
maturing political arena firstly of The North and subsequently became
a national political issue in the period between 1950 and 1965 when
the European educated dominated both the political leadership of the
"tribal" unions and the developing M-Belt Movement. In other words
in that period there was a political shift in the control of both the
leadership and the political organization of the "tribal" unions from
the ex-servicemen to the European educated among the M-Belt groups and
1E2.5
societies. This was particularly so for the Igalla, Idoma and Tiv
whose ex-servicemen dominated the formations of "tribal" unions until
the European educated took to reinvigorate the unions with expanded
local socio-political and economic interests. 2 Although the ex-servicemen
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Baba Sanda,
January 1981
2. Interview discussions with Professor Armstrong, Professor David
Muffet and Isaac Kpum in the period between November 1980 and
February 1981.
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featured in almost all the "tribal" organizations among the M-Belt
groups and societies, their political roles were more pronounced among
the Tiv, Igalla and Idoma in Benue Province and among the Birom on
the Plateau. In the instance of societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and
S. Zaria church leadership with Christian European educated persons
were the main social forces in the political organization of the "tribal"
unions. 1 In the period between 1940 and 1950 the successful political
roles of the ex-servicemen in organizing tribal unions among groups
and societies in Plateau, S. Zaria, S. Bauchi and Adamawa is explained
by educational achievement and the concentration of Christians which
produced consciousness and a sympathetic understanding to the few
ex-servicemen, rather than the actual numbers of demobilized soldiers
involved in the support of the movements as was the case with the Tiv,
Idoma and Igalla. However, unlike the social and political circum-
stances of the European educated among the groups and societies on the
edges of the Islamic society in The North, in Benue Province, there
was little previous experience of Islamic dominance of political leader-
ship and decision making as well as confrontation with the Islamic
religion. For example the social and political dominance by the Hausa
Fulani and Islamic leadership in general was experienced by the Tiv only
after 1900. When the European educated therefore joined the "tribal"
unions, their interests became centred on jobs and political control of
the apparatus of government at the local levels rather than developing
separatist tendencies that were directed at the Islamic society in The
North. The distribution of the concentration of the European educated
1.	 This will become apparent in the next few pages below where we
examine the development of "tribal" unions among other groups
and societies in other areas of the M-Belt.
as Christians among the M-Belt groups and societies seems to explain
the early development of separatist political tendencies in the period
between 1945 and 1950 and subsequently joined by others in the period
between 1950 and 1965 within the political demands of the M-Belt
Movement rather than the concentration of demobilized soldiers. For
example while statistical evidence suggests that there were more
European educated as Christians on the Plateau,Adamawa, S. Zaria and
S. Bauchi, 1
 where separatist tendencies were overtly articulated
before 1950, intelligent statistical estimates suggest that there
were more ex-servicemen among the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla who gave
vigorous support to the separatist tendencies only after 1950
In all the instances of the three main groups and societies in Benue
Province the Idoma, Igalla and Tiv, the Jukun being considered as fused
into Tiv interests in the period between 1938 and 1954 socio-cultural
identities and its concomitant political consciousness conditioned
political reactions to the state of socio-economic and political
problems which were championed by the ex-servicemen.
One of the initial economic problems that concerned TPU was Ibo
domination of commercial enterprise and their social consciousness
developed from European educational literacy that was advantageous in
manipulating financial profits in Tiv market places. This was as much
on Tiv land as it was in areas where there were Tiv migrant farmers
like Nasarawa, Lafia and Wukari. MacBride infact described the
migration of Ibos to Tiv land and their concentration in the market
places as an "invasion of Tiv trade centres by Easterners". 2 Although
1. For example see Table 3.21 in this Chapter
2. MacBride 1953 p.13; Tseayo 1975 p.178
Ibo commercial enterprise that existed among the Tiv raised the
material standards of living in Tiv Division, the exploitative
exchange rates annoyed local people. 1 While the Ibos introduced the
sales of clothing and fancy articles, which the Tiv paid for in cash
from the sales of their farm plots in the town layouts of Tiv and
Wakari Divisions and also with beans, yams, and rice which were produce
included from Adamawa trans-shipment by canoe to Ibi, there was also
an evolving pattern of dominating the resale of soya beans and beniseed
beans by Ibos who became agents and sub-purchasing agents of the Marketing
and Export Board, an economic pattern that increased political tensions
directed against non-indigenes in the Division. 2 Ibos and Idomas
however dominated private industries in Makurdi, the most modern town
with European infrastructure in Benue Province. Two power driven mills
for example in Makurdi were owned by an Ibo and an Idoma who were also
successful in different businesses in Enugu, even when it was the case
that the mills served the needs of domestic neighbours. 3 Economic ten-
sions between the Idoma group and society and Ibo commercial enterprise
were as equally bitter as was the case with the Tiv. For example
besides Ibo domination of market stalls in Oturkpu town, the head-
.	 4 .
quarters of Idoma Division, in 1951 two rice mills which were started
t..) ere
with the aid of loans from the Production Development BoardAby non-
indigenes to Idoma Division 1 5
 While one of these rice mills was owned
by an Ibo and built at Utonkon in Idoma Division the other was the
property of a Cameroon man, naturalized in Donga. 6 This means that
1. MacBride 1953 p.13
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.14
4. Interview discussions with Professor Armstrong,January 1981
5. MacBride 1953 p.13
6. Ibid
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both Tiv and the Idoma were concerned with the "tribal" unions to
adjust for the dominance of economic control of local enterprise by
non-indigenes among their groups and societies. In the period between
1950 and 1960 however while the Tiv saw the solutions to their local
socio-economic and political problems in the creation of a M-Belt
Region, the Idoma group and society saw non-indigenous domination of
economic life in Oturkpo town, particularly by the Ibos a sufficient
threat that required the political support of a powerful Northern
Region Government of the NPC with its vigorous policy of "Northernization"
to deal with the situation. This was so even when it was the case that
the Idoma European educated supported the ideas in the M-Belt Movement
for the creation of a M-Belt Region as against its traditional leader-
ship who controlled the apparatus of government of the Native Authority.
The circumstances created a strategically balanced risk taking in politics
in which the Idoma kept themselves politically active in two camps to
protect their interests. While the Idoma European educated were politically
rhetorical about support for the ideas of the M-Belt Movement, the tradi-
tional leadership wielded the NA apparatus to mobilize political support
and fetched electoral votes for the NPC consistently demonstrating an
anti-M-Belt Movement vote. '
However, similar to the development of the TPU early in the 1940s,
the IHRU became organized in 1942, 2 with an explicit political objective
of raising the social and economic status of the Idoma people by con-
trolling the powers and authority of the Native Authority in Idoma
Division. 3 Dudley however suggests that the IHRU was organized at the
later date of 1944, rather than in 1942. 4 Like the Tiv in 1938 and
1. The Idoma support for the M-Belt Movement, while consistently voting
for the NPC party is examined in more detail in Chapters If a.ci 5
where Politics with the M-Belt Movement is examined.
2. Magid 1971 p.344
3. Dudley 1966 p.91
4. Ibid
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and subsequently the Birom in 1945, the IHRU was concerned to attain
"greater tribal autonomy or form their own region". ' In 1942 however
the phenomenon of the Idoma "tribal" Movement was begun as "a group
of youths meeting" at Oturkpo Town. 2 It is not clear from the available
sources whether "the group of youths meetings" suggested by Magid which
began the IHRU consisted of ex-servicemen, European educated or both.
It is however clear that while as latterly as in 1952 the European
educated in Idoma Division constituted only 0.8% of the Idoma population
aged over 7 years (Table 3.21 in this Chapter), similar to the Tiv, there
was a large concentrationof Idoma as ex-servicemen as demobilized soldiers
of the Nigerian Army when the "tribal" movement was begun. 3 It is there-
fore suggested that given this concentration of demobilized soldiers
from the Nigerian Army from among the Idoma group and society, the IHRU
was also an initial "tribal" movement that was started by the ex-service-
men, particularly so since the organization existed before it began to
recruit members and supporters: ".. from the growing body of primary
school leavers in the Division ... (and attracted) both employees and
former employees of government or the Idoma Native Authority ... who
had been dismissed from positions in government or the NA and those who
had been led by feelings of frustration and disillusionment to resign
their positions". 4
The political strategy followed by the IHRU to achieve a higher
status for the Idoma people included pressing the government of British
administration in The North to make democratic reforms in the running
1. Coleman 1963 p.365
2. Magid 1971 p.347; Although Magid does not give a definition of "Youth"
a youth in Nigeria may be defined as a person who is less than 50
years in chronological age from his day of birth and is outside the
mainstream in the control and shape of socio-economic and political
power influences - this definition is derived from Tutorial Dis-
cussions with James O'Connell who taught me in an undergraduate class
in ABU Zaria in 1974.
3. Tseayo 1975 p.122
4. Magid 1971 p.345
of the Idoma Native Authority and for members of IHRU to participate
in policy formulation over local affairs. 1 The IHRU was also concerned
to accelerate the rate of social and economic development in Idoma
Division by lobbying governments in Nigeria for the provision of better
roads, pipe-borne water systems, postal facilities in rural districts,
provision of agricultural cooperatives, more NA schools, scholarship
awards to indigenes of Idoma and seeking government assistance to
sponsor traditional art and music. 2 The IHRU also petitioned various
Native Authorities throughout Nigeria to repatriate Idoma prostitutes
who were alleged to be damaging the reputation of Idoma people.
3
Although this was so, the IHRU was mainly concerned to struggle for
the infrastructural transformation of Idoma land with modern European
amenities which were either lacking or underdeveloped in Idoma Division.
Furthermore there was the problem of the alienation of Idoma land to
non-indigenes, particularly the Ibos and IHRU lobbied both the govern-
ment of British administration in The North "to restrict stranger
migration into the Division". 4
 Economic issues were therefore also
central to the organization of "tribal" political movements directed
at non-indigenous domination of these activities rather than exclusively
cultural expressions of the identity of a group and society.
1. Alvin Magid, "Minority Politics in Northern Nigeria: The case
of the Idoma Hope Rising Union", in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe
(Eds), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism,
Michigan, 1971 p.343.
2. Magid 1971 p.346
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
One of the political strategies of IHRU in organizing to transform
Idoma land into a modern group and society within the wider Nigerian
Society was to generate support and influence on an Idoma Paramount
Chief. This was so even when it is the case that the institution of
the "Ochi Idoma" was not created from the direct political demands of
the IHRU. 1
 As early as in 1942 when the "tribal" organization was
formed, it supported the government of British administration in its
efforts to centralize authority and power under a single chief for all
Idoma clans in the Division. 2 The political interest of this support
however was centred on the destruction of 'the political strangle-hold'
of traditional District Heads and Clan Heads over local affairs in
order to stimulate "Progressive development in the Division and
secure for it a major policy role in the local administrative apparatus". 3
This objective and the pattern of political support for reforms of tradi-
tional institutions from the IHRU however created for it, political
stress with the NA and with the government of British administration.
The stress led to the demise of the "tribal" Union because it became
increasingly dominated by demands for radical reforms that were arti-
culated mainly by literate Idoma youths. 4 For example although it
supported the political existence of traditional institutions, the
Idoma "tribd1" Union wanted personnel in it to be literate. 5 In 1948
IHRU was outraged that a District Head and three elderly Clan Heads
were elected into the First Idoma Advisory Council because all four
1. Magid 1971 p.348
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
5 6 6
were illiterate) FurthermoreFurthermor  even when the IHRU supported the insti-
tution of the "Ochi Idoma", in 1949 many of its members were opposed
to the formal inauguration of Ogiri Oko because he was seen to be a
corrupt conservative. 2
However, although the IHRU did not resolve its contested issues
over the chieftainship of the Idoma, it was successful in creating
sufficient political impact in the Division to be invited to attend
the Provincial Conferences in 1950 to discuss matters concerning local
government reforms and electoral procedures under the Macpherson
Constitution in anticipation of the 1951 elections. 3 In 1951 it
gained control of the electoral colleges at both the district and
village levels in Idoma Division. 4 In the same year the government
of British administration in The North responded to its political
pressures by appointing two literates to combine the Clan and District
Head posts of Boju and Orokram. 5 In 1952 the political activities of
the WRU produced more concessions from the government of British
administration in The North as well as from the Native Authority.
The Idoma Advisory Council became enlarged to include a scribe and
two members elected for a three year term of office with nine new
members of whom six were literates and three of the six were members
of the IHRU. 6 Furthermore, it was from the direct activities in the
political pressures of the IHRU that District Councils became empowered
1. Magid 1971 p.348
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.349
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
5 C.1
to appoint one person each, to sit with District Heads on the Inter-
mediate Area Council as well as effecting the reorganization of the
District Court system to include court members with an elected status
from officially recognized kindred based on the different Idoma clan
constituencies.' In the light of these political achievements, the
IHRU was about the most radically committed political organization
among the M-Belt groups and societies that produced a programme for
change and delivered rather than politically walked into the existing
structures of the government of British administration. In the period
between 1950 and 1965 however, the social and economic problems on the
distribution of modern infrastuctural facilities from the NPC govern-
ment in The North remained as issues of concern to the IHRU even when
it was the case that the Division benefitted more than other Benue
groups and societies largely so, because of political identification
with the NPC and the concept of "One North" in the Nigerian Federation.2
The political significance in the development of the concessions
that were given to the "tribal" Movement in Idoma Division was that
moderate members of the IHRU and the Idoma NA found government re-
sponsive to the needs of their group and society. In the period between
1950 and 1965 the moderate members of the IHRU and the Idoma NA became
tied to the NPC and the regional government policies in The North.
This was an experience that very little of it was received in the socio-
economic and political circumstances of the Tiv, Birom, Bachama, Tangale-
Waje and Jaba, among others of the M-Belt groups and societies where
"tribal" Unions made little political impact and the issues and problems
1. Magid 1971 p.349
2. This point is revisited and examined in more detail when we discuss
Politics with the M-Belt Movement in The North in Chapters z+
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remained contested with no concessions given. However, it was from
these experiences of the Idoma that there was developed split images
on the performance of government in The North and the political
problem of whether to give support for the ideas of the M-Belt
Movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region in the period between 1950
and 1965. In the instance the Idoma group and society was concerned
whether a M-Belt Region might be politically powerful enough to protect
their interests, particularly those that related to Ibo domination of
economic activities as well as Ibo and Tiv migration to farmland in
the Division, in the same political sense that the NPC government in
The North was responsive to their demands and needs with a policy of
"Northernization" which they stood to benefit from. The alliance
with the NPC furthermore meant an open route to development with
modern European infrastructure and a counter-point to the Tiv dominated
UMBC.
1
In the same period however besides the contested political support
for the creation of a M-Belt Region, which caused political schisms
among the Idoma group and society, there existed local political issues
that were a persistent source of friction between the European educated
and traditional Idoma leadership in the NA. The European educated for
example persistently held the Idoma NA as politically responsible for
the state of socio-economic and cultural underdevelopment existing in
the Division. This was so because IHRU officials suggested the NA
personnel and the "Ochi Idoma" were inefficient, corrupt and undemocratic
in the practice of local governance. 2
 In the instance the IHRU increased
1. Discussions with M.J. Dent, October 1979-1983; The patterns of
"tribal" Union alliances with the political parties in The North
are examined in more detail in Chapters if.
2. Magid 1971 p.347
its anti-corruption campaigns against the "Ochi Idoma" and the NA
officials through newspapers. 1
 Since the government of British
administration in The North generally treated the anti-corruption
campaigns as political trivialities, the issues raised brought the
IHRU into direct controversies with the NA in Idoma Division. 2 The
Native Authority responded by encouraging its employees to resign
membership of the "tribal" Union. 3 Subsequently in 1955, the NA
persuaded a group of recalcitrant European educated who were members
of the IHRU to organize a rival "tribal" Union which became known as
the Idoma State Union. 4 The political objectives of the new "tribal"
'Onion among the idoma group and society were no different from those of
the IHRU because both movements were committed to supporting demands
for greater tribal autonomy in dealing with local affairs in the
Division. 5 Local political differences therefore came to the fore of
"tribal" Unity to split its organizational leadership. This was so
because of the "virulent newspaper" attacks on the Idoma NA apparatus
as an instrument for the development of the Division and also because
of the political weight the European educated in IHRU gave to supporting
the developing demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region separate
from the Islamic Society which was opposed to the NPC conception of
"One North". 6 The European educated who led both "tribal" movements
however merged in 1957 to try to resurrect the IHRU although its credible
1. Magid 1971 p.350
2. Ibid p.351
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Coleman 1958 p.365
6. Magid 1971 p.351
influence was in decline retrospectively to the more permanent insti-
tution of the Native Authority, the NA personnel and the "Ochi Idoma"
on people in the Division.' This was the premise from which in the
same year, the President-General admitted the political failure of the
IHRU to achieve the aims of the "tribal" Movement in Idoma land. In
the instance, the President suggested that the IHRU collectively: "...
had little or no say in planning policies and in the affairs which affect
the mass of the people in the Division for whom we fight to release...
from political and economic prisons.., we have struggled in vain to
make our cries heard through one of the legislature of the country ...
By standards which mortal beings assess success and failures, we have
seen no convincing signs of our achievement". 2 This suggests that
before 1959 the IHRU virtually ceased to exist as a "tribal" force
in shaping politics and electoral outcomes in Idoma Division. This
was critical to electoral political support for the M-Belt Movement
because the 1959 elections provided a political opportunity to show
grassroot support for the demands of the creation of a M-Belt Region.
In that year however, the IHRU was a spent wave of political mobili-
zation among the forces that shaped electoral outcomes on the political
arena of Idoma Division. In the instance the NA personnel and factions
of the IHRU who were in step with the conservatism of traditional
leadership shaped the electorate for political support to the NPC even
when it was the case that some of the European educated Idoma main-
tained support for the creation of a M-Belt Region as was championed
1. Magid 1971 p.351
2. "Address of The President-General" Idoma Hope Rising Union Annual
Conference at Oturkpo, 1957, cited in Magid 1971 p.351.
by the UMBC in alliance with the Action Group Party.
1
Before 1959 however the IHRU had succeeded in bringing to the
fore of politics in Idoma land as it related to the NPC party and
government in The North, the resources of bargaining for amenities
with political support through the institution of the Native Authority. 2
While it is clear that Idoma land was underdeveloped by a lack of modern
amenities relative to patterns of development that existed in the
Islamic society in The North, the political reaction to a situation
like that which was led by the ex-servicemen and the European educated
was conditioned by the need to accelerate development. There was little
political concern in the rhetoric of the IHRU leadership to show that
domination at local levels by non-indigenes was responsible for the
state of underdevelopment in the Division. The concerns remained hidden
political and economic fears that were tolerated in the name of peaceful-
co-existence among Nigerian groups and societies until their gates were
burst open in 1966 when the events surrounding the January coup were
given political interpretation as Ibo domination not only at local levels
but also at the national level. In the instance the Idoma took over
Ibo commercial positions in Oturkpo market as if the process itself
was planned while many observers and the NA suggest that it was
1. Electoral political support from the different "tribal" Unions
among the M-Belt groups and societies for the ideas and demands
for the creation of a M-Belt Region, articulated by the M-Belt
Movement in the 1959 elections are examined in analytical detail
in Chapters 4- and 5
2. As will become apparent in Chapters 4-cul 4 5 Idoma Division bene-
fitted more than the Tiv and Igala, the other groups and societies
in Benue Province in the distribution of modern infrastructural
facilities because of their electoral political support for the
NPC and the government in The North, a political lesson the Tiv
and Igalla also learnt when politics was returned to the electoral
market place in 1979 - The Tiv vote in the 1979 elections is
examined in Chapter5cC where explanations are produced to suggest
why they voted NPN rather than NPP and UPN.
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spontaneous.
1
 The domination of political roles and decision making
by Hausa Fulani and Islamic leadership was however absent as a causal
factor in the organization of the IHRU. This was unlike the existing
political factors that caused the organization of the TPU, BPU as well
as "tribal" Unions among the other M-Belt groups and societies, where
the structure of political domination by non-indigenes in the apparatus
of local government in the period between 1900 and 1940 compounded
existing social and economic problems to create political reactions in
the organization of "tribal" Unions. 2 The political domination of the
apparatus of local government by Hausa Fulani as well as by a variant
of Islamic leadership in political roles and decision making was one
of the severest problems that conditioned the development of the Birom
Progressive Union in Jos Division on the Plateau. There were similar
political reactions to this pattern of domination which conditioned
the organization of "tribal" Unions among other non-Islamic groups and
societies in Pankshin, Shendam and Jemaa Divisions of the Plateau in
the period between 1940 and 1952. 3
The Birom Progressive Union was organized in 1945 by ex-service-
men and Christian trained evangelists and teachers and later joined by
1. Interview discussions with Professor Armstrong, January 1981.
2. M.J. Dent, "A Minority Party - The United Middle Belt Congress"
1966 p.461-507 in John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and 
Politics, London 1966.
3. The political development of the BPU and the issues it contested
is examined in detail in the following pages as it related to
the political reactions on the state of socio-economic problems
in l os Division because the initial organizational thrust of a
M-Belt Movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region was begun by
the BPU. In the period between 1940 and 1965 Jos Division was
characterized by all the socio-economic and political tensions
existing among other M-Belt groups and societies.
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a very young first generation of advanced European educated from
both Christian Missionary and Native Authority schools. 1
 Sklar
suggests that the original founders of the BPU were PatrickFom,
Patrick Dokotri, Stephen Ajani, John Fom, Lawrence Fom and
Frank Adu. 2 Evidence from research interviews for this study con-
ducted in the period between 1980 and 1981 with some of the poli-
ticians Sklar mentions over the initial organization however suggests
that although these persons were active members in the BPU and sub-
sequently dominated its political roles in the executive, they were
not the founding fathers of the Birom "tribal" political movement. 3
When the Birom "tribal" movement was organized in 1945 the initial
political support came from indigenes of Jos Division who were mainly
Birom. 4 They were mainly employees of the Native Authority in Jos
Division who also enjoyed the social and political support of
Headmasters and Evangelist-Teachers in Christian Missionary schools
in the villages of Jos Division. 5
 Moses Nyam Rwang suggests that
BPU directed its political appeal to this class of Birom because they
1. Dudley 1966 p.92; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang
Choji Bot, Patrick Dokotri and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
2. Sklar 1963 p.345; These were in chronological order, President
50 years old in 1945, an ex-serviceman later a forester and an
RCM Teacher-Evangelist; 25 years old, a Teacher and member of
the RCM Church; 30 years old, a driver with RCM Missionaries
in Jos and member of the RCM Church; 30 years old, an Agricul-
tural Overseer and member of the RCM Church; 26 years old and
a nurse with the RCM hospital in Jos.
3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pam Tee gu i< and
Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
4. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981
5. Dudley 1966 p.92; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang,
January 1981
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afforded payment of membership subscriptions and donated money at
meetings for the political activities of BPU.1
It ought to be borne in mind however that the BPU was not an
exclusively Birom political organization in the same sense as was
TPU for the Tiv and the IHRU for the Idoma in Benue Province. Two
members of the BPU executive that are closely associated with the
formation and initial political activities of the "tribal" political
movement for example were non-Birom and non-indigenes to Jos Division.
These were Stephen Ajani, an Igbirra who was a Christian Missionary
Teacher with the RCM in Jos and Frank Adu, a Ghanian who was a nurse
with the RCM hospital also in Jos. 2 Both persons however had lived
in Jos Division and other parts of the Plateau for a long period
of time. Although they were not Birom and did not speak any of the
languages of the groups and societies in Jos Division, they closely
associated with the ex-servicemen upon their return from the Second
World War as well as with the European educated Birom before BPU was
formed. 3 It further ought to be borne in mind that BPU was also
not exclusively Birom because of the "tribal" heterogeneity in Jos
Division which conditioned extra-tribal political support for BPU
from the different groups and societies rather than from as numerous
unions as the tribes themselves. This was so because some of the groups
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981
2. Sklar 1963 p.345; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang
and Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
3. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981
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and societies were exceedingly small, ' and also because the nature
of the socio-economic and political problems which BPU subsequently
raisedin the period between 1945 and 1960 affected all of the indigenous
groups and societies in the Division who saw themselves as sharing a
common dilemma and this conditioned support. This does not mean that
there were no other "tribal" unions in Jos Division. Among others,
in the period between 1950 and 1970 there was developed a strongly
organized 'Rukuba Tribal Union'. It was BPU however that dominated
and mobilized political activities in the period 1945 and 1960.
This did not only attract indigenous groups and societies to Jos
Division but also the political sympathies of non-indigenes who were
not Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and Nupe as active members of the organization. 2
The political leadership and followers of PBU, both indigenous and non-
indegenes to Jos Division were all identified with Christianity. 3
This suggests that there was a Christian identity that organized-in
the formation of the Birom "tribal" movement and the name of the
movement was a political tag rather than reflecting a cultural
identity. Furthermore the non-indigenous members to Jos Division in
the executive of BPU were Christians even when it was the case that
BPU itself was almost a family affair of three brothers, Patrick Fom,
John Fom, Lawrence Fom, in the executive committee from the Birom
1. The Pakara group and society for example numbered less than
500 in 1937 and the tribe was experiencing increasing dis-
integration because of assimilation into other cultures. In
the 1952 census it was not scored as a distinct group and
society. For more detailed examples of some of the very small
groups and societies on the Plateau see Section V of this
Chapter.
2. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
3. Sklar 1963 p.345
village of Kuru. 1
Richard Sklar however does not account for the initial beginning
of the political ideas of a "tribal" organization among the Birom which
were generated by the ex-servicemen to contest and protest over the
state of local socio-economic and political problems and issues in
Jos Division upon their return after the Second World War in 1945. 2
Although the political personalities suggested by Sklar as founding
fathers of BPU were later active in the movement after its inception,
it was ex-servicemen like Moses Nyam Rwang, Choji Bot, Pam Tee Buk
who organized and urged Birom European educated persons like
Patrick Dokotri, Moses Rwang Pam (subsequently Chief of Jos in 1947
after being Treasurer of BPU for two years) and his son Bitrus Rwang
Pam, of the social and political necessity to organize Birom unity
in order to struggle for the readjustment of the unjust state of the
welfare of the groups and societies in Jos Division.
3
 Patrick Dokotri
himself, one of the most politically active members of BPU and subse-
quently in all the different phases of the M-Belt Movement admits
that he joined the Birom Movement rather than that he was a founding
father. 4
1. Sklar 1963 p.345; Interview discussions with Dr Alexander Fom,
the son of Patrick Fom, one of the founding fathers of the BPU
Movement.
2. For examples of this missing link in the story of the PBU see
Sklar 1963 p.345
3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
4. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
Similar to the formations of the Tiv, the Igalla, 1
 and Idoma
Unions, organized in the period between 1938 and 1945, Birom ex-
servicemen featured in developing ideas of "tribal" unity to contest
and protest over the state of local political issues in order to solve
social and economic problems on their land. In the short period
between 1945 and 1950 there was organized three distinct "tribal"
political organizations among the Birom which subsequently gave
political support to the M-Belt Movement when it was begun in 1949.
These were the Birom Progressive Union, the Birom Tribal Union (BTP)
and the Birom Educational and Cultural Organization (BECO). 2 How-
ever the main political movement among the Birom, albeit affecting
the shape of politics in Jos Division after 1950 was the BPU which
directed the activities of the other Birom organizations. 3
The Birom Progressive Union was a mass movement of all adults,
indigenous4 to Jos Division. The Birom Progressive organization also
1. Not examined in this Section because in the period between 1950
and 1965 the Igalla politically identified their total "tribal"
unity with the NPC rather than with a M-Belt Movement. However
it was only when the Igalla formed themselves as political and
religious minorities in Kwara State where there was a predomi-
nantly Islamic population of the Nigerian Federation with a
powerful Emir whose traditions were established in the Islamic
revolution of dan Fodio, that in 1967 upon the creation of
states in Nigeria they sought political inclusion into BP State
as a M-Belt Region - This is examined in more detail in Chapters
4 c4 a5cF. where variation of political identities in the theme
of the M-Belt Movement are examined.
2. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, Alexander Fom and
Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
3. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981
4. An indigene meant persons who belonged to groups and societies
with residential existence in the area before 1900 and whose
traditions of origins suggest that they occupied a territorial
space within Jos Division for at least 200 years before 1900.
This narrows indigenes to Jos Division to groups and societies
like the Birom, the Rukuba, the Irigwe, the Jerawa, the Anaguta
and the Ganawuri (Jal), among others rather than including a
migrant group and society - This was the unwritten "legal" con-
ception of an indigene among the leadership of BPU - Interview
discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
admitted politically sympathetic non-indigenous persons living in
.1
Jos Division in the period between 1945 and 1965 for membership.
This explains the presence of Bala Yerima from the Kilba group and
society in Adamawa and Frank Adu, a Ghanian, who were active members
of BPU and belonged to its executive committee. With a manifesto
that suggests commitment for a political struggle to establish Truth
in Jos Division,
2
 BPU suggested in the Hausa language to its members
that it was a "Jam'iyyar Yan Kasar Jos" (a congress of the sons of
the soil of Jos) seeking the political support of indigenes and non-
indigenes. 3 The first aim of BPU as suggested by its manifesto,
an aim that was subsequently and obsessively emphasized in the period
between 1951 and 1960 among others in a list of twenty objectives
set out to be fulfilled, was "the establishment of truth" in Jos
Division. 4
 The more politically practical objectives of BPU that
concerned the state of politics in Jos Division however was that there
ought to be an established relationship between control of political
authority and the indigenous groups and societies as it exists else-
1. Dudley 1966 p.90; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang
and Patrick Dokotri, January 1971; see also BPU Manifesto 1951 
p.3
2. The BPU motto was "Gaskiya za ta ci Nasara" meaning "Trust will
triumph"
3. In the Hausa written manifesto this was: "BPU tana son dukan
yan kabilu na asalin Kasar Jos, maza da mata su hada kai a
Cikin BPU, ko ma ba acikinta su ke ba" - BPU Manifesto 1951 p.3
4. "BPU tana goyon bayan Gaskiya, Saan nan ta aikata Gaskiya, ta
kuma facia Gaskiya, tana son Gaskiya" - BPU Mainfesto 1951 p.3,
meaning "BPU is a supporter of Truth, a messenger and deliverer
of Tru61 , a spokesman of Truth and likes Truth".
Gil
where in other parts of The North and Nigeria, recognition and
respect for all religions in the Division, concern that legal judge-
ment in the courts of law be based on truth, the controversies over
the issue of certificates of occupancy for residential buildings in
the expanding metropolis of Jos, the planting of overhead electrical
routes over farmland without the permission of farmers by the Native
Authority and the Electricity Company, NESCO (Nigeria Ltd.) from
Kurra Falls. ' Social and welfare issues were also of concern in
the political protest of BPU. 2 These included the concern over
lobbying the governments in The North and the Native Authority in
Jos to establish hospitals, dispensaries, clinics for infants and
children, maternity clinics, trade and agricultural cooperatives
as well as concern over demarcation and financial compensation for
land that government and mining interests took over from farmers. 3
The purely political issues that were subsequently raised by BPU
were centred on mobilization of support to elect indigenes of Jos
Division in the 1951 elections for the NHA and the 1954 elections into
the Federal House of Representatives as well as the question of an
indigene to Jos as the confirmed Paramount Chief with political
authority over the whole Division. 4 It was however not until 1955
1. BPU Manifesto 1951 p.2-3
2. "Shaanin raya Kasa" meaning: "Concerning the development of the
land with socio-economic and welfare infrastructure" - BPU
Manifesto 1951 p.2-3
3. BPU Manifesto 1951 p.2-3
4. Ibid
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that a Birom, Rwang Pam, was confirmed as Chief of Jos and the
Paramount Chief of the Division with a second class chieftaincy status. 1
In its attempts to emphasize the issues it was contesting in Jos
Division, the Manifesto of the BPU concluded that it will "forcefully
arbitrate" in matters that affected the groups and societies who were
its'children' in the instance of hostilities between two personalities
as well as non-indigenous communities in the Division.2
While the BPU was non-tribal, the Birom Tribal Party was an
exclusively cultural movement, meant to contest local elections into
the NA councils in the period between 1950 and 1965. The Birom Tribal
Party (BTP) was also meant to serve as a political body representing
the Birom to screen and nominate Birom members into the executive
bodies of the BPU and the M-Belt Movements like the	 , the MZL,
MBPP and the UMBC as well as other political parties which the leader-
ship chose to identify with the Birom group and society. 3 Although
BPT was an organization within the political unity of BPU in Jos Division,
its main socio-economic and political interests were focussed on the
culture and interests of Birom unity. This was so even when it was the
case that the political protests it articulated over the state of socio-
economic problems affecting the Birom were similar to those that were
1. Northern Nigeria Local Government Year Book 1965, Zaria 1965
p.16; Dudley 1966 p.112
2. BPU Manifesto 1951, article six p.3
3. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981
of concern to BPU. The BPT however provided a political vent to occupy
executive positions that were contested by both the ex-servicemen and
the European educated in BPU and prevented the organization of a
rival union in the instance of an excluded developing leadership.
BECO also fulfilled this political function of keeping all potentially
rival leadership in executive positions of organizations under BPU.
In the period between 1950 and 1965 BECO was another exclusively
Birom organization that was meant to bring together a younger
generation of European educated Birom "who were outside the mainstream
of political stress and competition". ' The organization was concerned
to encourage Birom Youth to attain higher European based educational
qualifications and to create conditions for the preservation and
persistence of Birom culture. 2 Both the initially composed and sub-
sequently reviewed copies of the BECO Constitution were produced by
Dr Alexander L.M. Fom, John Wash Pam, Lt. Pam Mwadkwon, Inspector Toma
Gambo, Sgt. Chiroma Dangyang, Sgt. Gyang Pam Kuru, who became the first
members of the executive committee of the organization.
3
 It is interesting
that similar to the formulation of BPU there was still a military personnel
concentration in the formation and organization of BECO. Four out of the
1. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri and Barnabas Dusu,
January 1981
2. The Constitution of the Birom Educational and Cultural 
Organization, 1951, Review copy 1966 p.1; Since 1978 BECO has
been resurrected as a focus of Birom unity for socio-economic
development and the mobilization of all the Birom in support
of a political party its leadership thinks will best serve and
protect Birom interests - This is examined in more detail in
Chapters 4--4 5
3. BECO Constitution 1966 p.15; interview discussions with Barnabas
Dusu, January 1981
six members in the executive committee of BECO were in the armed
services of Nigeria and only two, Alexander L.M. Fom and John Wash Pam
were the purely European educated. The political involvement of
armed services personnel in the organization of "tribal" movements
generally among the M-Belt groups and societies is explained by the
influences outside their areas of the observations made of other
Nigerian groups and societies who agitated for socio-economic improve-
ments of their groups and societies, since work in the armed services
took them away from the home areas.
However, while BPU and BTP used Hausa and English as the
languages of their political meetings, BECO was concerned to use only
the Birom language even when it was the case that minutes of their
meetings were taken in the English language. 1 Furthermore the con-
stitutions of BPU and BECO were both written in English and Hausa
and none of the published documents sponsored by both organizations
in the period between 1950 and 1965 were in the Birom language.
Although BECO was theoretically concerned with culture its major
emphasis in the list of projects it set out to achieve was focussed
on "cash-programs" for the development of Birom unity and culture.
Essentially these were money making projects rather than creating
conditions for the persistence of Birom unity and culture. The
projects included the establishment of economic and commercial enter-
prises for BECO: "to own houses.. establish 'The Birom House' and Birom
commercial enterprises in all parts of the country, starting first at
home... establish Birom bakeries, a Birom 'club', a Birom transport
company to provide easy means of transportation of our local foodstuff
1.	 Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981
and crops to the bigger markets in the townships.. This transport
company shall be composed of taxis, omnibuses and lorries and shall
bear the inscription of "Birom Taxi Service" or "Birom Transport
Company" on the sides of the vehicles ... the commercial projects
shall include all forms of commercial activities with special emphasis
on retail trading; establishment of the 'Birom Super Markets' for the
provisions of local foodstuffs and (the establishment of BECO owned)
petrol stations") ThisThis suggests that while BPU was essentially a social
and political organization, BECO, an organization within the political
directives of BPU was concerned with organization for the economic
and commercial advancement of the Birom within the unity of the
Nigerian political state. This is to be expected because political
and economic interests themselves are not independent of each other
since they tend to compliment and reinforce each other. 2 The "tribal"
identity of the Birom was therefore meant to be organized into Birom
economic interests by BECO as they stood in relation to other groups
and societies in Jos Division albeit The North and Nigeria.
There were some social objectives of BECO however which empha-
sized Birom unity in cultural terms. Firstly BECO itself was a Birom
Educational and Cultural Organization. The organization emphasized
culture in its desire for Birom unity when it suggests that: "The
key word in the name of the organization is "Birom" .. with the aim
to deepen love and mutual understanding among Biroms all over the world..
to inculcate the spirit of oneness in order to render the Birom fit
and well informed as capable leaders and helpers of the Birom... to
1. The Constitution of BECO, Reviewed Copy 1966 p.3
2. Lavers 1980 p.18
preserve the Birom culture and traditions that have been inherited
from our forefathers and to uphold the glory of the Birom-man and his
fare.' Furthermore although the BECO constitution emphasized that
the organization was not political and not religiously Christian, it
suggested that "the Birom man must be God fearing (in Christian
religious ethics)... and membership is strictly BiAOM ... God hap
the BiAom that we may be one. For divided we fall, but united we
ishatt 4tand".2
The socio-economic and political problems and issues contested
by BPU were three-fold. In the period between 1945 and 1950, when
there was increased political activity in Nigeria because of the
changes in the constitution of the country, BPU was concerned to
organize political representation for the groups and societies in Jos
Division by elected indigenes. 3 It was from this premise that political
representation became an issue sufficiently to be included in all of
its manifestos in the period between 1950 and 1960. In the period
1955 and 1958 for example two of its major objectives were exclusively
concerned with political mobilization for the 1956 elections of re-
presentatives into the NHA and planning for the Federal House of
Representative Elections in 1959 from among indigenes of the groups
and societies in Jos Division. 4
 The BPU Manifesto also suggested that
one of its political objectives in the struggle was that the indigenes
of the groups and societies in Jos Division ought to be "left alone"
1. BECO Constitution 1956 p.1
2. BECO Constitution 1966 p.1; p.15 Emphases are as in the Constitution
3. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981
4. Birom Progressive Union ("Jamiyyar Yan Kasar Jos), Manifestos,
Serial No. 861, 1954-1958 p.4: "Zaben Wakilai zuwa Majalisar
Jihar Arewa da Majalisar Nigeria daga yankin Kasar Jos" meaning
"the elections of representatives to the NHA and the Nigerian
FHA from Jos Division".
to choose whom they wanted as a political representative into the
legislative assemblies of Nigeria.' This suggests that within the
very social and geographical boundaries of Jos township as well as
Jos Division, there was political interference by some outside and non-
indigenous authority that dictated the choice of political representation
for the indigenous groups and societies in the Division. In the instance
of the period between 1954 and 1965 political representation from among
the groups and societies indigenous to Jos Division was subjected to
the dictates of the choices of the NPC leadership in Kaduna based on
the political recommendations and manipulations of the Hausa Fulani
communities and migrant Islamic leadership in Jos Division. 2 The purely
local political problems that were of concern to BPU were centred on
the domination of political roles and decision making in the NA
institutions by Hausa Fulani, particularly so in the NA of the Division
and the townships of Jos and Bukuru. The Native Authority was seen
to be responsible for unjust laws, unfair issues of certificates of
occupancy for buildings in the townships, activities which were seen
to favour the non-indigenous richer population. This problem became
compounded by the fact that the NA processed and approved the applica-
tions without the permission of the indigenous owners of the land plots
in the urban areas. 3 The NA in Jos Division was also held responsible
for laxity in the rapid development of plots by non-indigenes with
commercial buildings, which in most instances were also erected without
1. Manifesto No.861 1954 p.4: "... A bar Jamaar gari, Ko Kasa su
zabi wanda suke so" meaning: "Let the people of the town (Jos)
and land (Jos Division) be free to elect the person of their
choice".
2. Political manipulation in the choice of indigenous leadership
to Jos Division is examined with more analytical detail in
Chapter 4. where Politics with the M-Belt Movement in The North
and Nigeria is brought into focus.
3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981
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the permission of the farmers who owned the land and the overall town-
ship lay-out of building sites. ' The particular political and economic
tensions in Jos Division over the domination of the NA apparatus were
compounded by persistent claims of the Hausa Fulani and Islamic commu-
nities in the Division for Hausamen to be the 'Paramount Chiefs' in
the townships of Jos and Bukuru. The political problems centred on
the chieftaincy of Jos however were rooted in the political practices
and application of the Indirect Rule Policy. The policy and its
application in the period between 1900 and 1932 meant the centring
of political authority on the Hausa Fulani which the British initially
used as political interpreters as well as a variant of Islamic leader-
ship that was based on the patterns of authority which existed in the
Islamic society in The North. 2
In 1910 when the government of British administration in The
North established Jos as a developing metropolis and became the most
important political and economic centre of the Plateau, it appointed
a Hausa, as Chief of the township.
3
 It was however not until in the
period between 1940 and 1950 that the Birom who were the numerically
dominant group and society in the hinterland of Jos and Bukuru town-
1. Manifesto of the BPU No.861 1954 p.4: "Shaanin gine-gine da
wadansu suna yi da babu izinin mai gona, wuri, Ko mai Kasar" -
meaning: "The issue of buildings and constructions which some
people do without the permission of the farmer, place or land".
2. For detailed discussions with examples on the policy of Indirect
rule and the changes in the political meaning of its inter-
pretation in the period between 1900 and 1932, see Chapter 2...
where its application over the M-Belt groups and societies was
examined.
3. Dudley 1966 p.92
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ships as well as in Jos Division in 1952 and who were in the midst of
an economically and socially developed enclave of the M-Belt groups
and societies with a literacy rate of about 6.0% of the Divisional
population total and with well established functioning modern
European infrastructural facilities, began to voice objections to a
Hausa continuing as chief over land and people where the Hausa
communities were non-indigenes. Although Rwang Pam, a Birom, was
appointed as chief in 1947 after being a Treasurer of BPU in 1946
and even when he was moved to Jos township in 1947 his political
authority was restricted to taking decisions over the Birom group
and society as "Chief of Birom". 1 The BPU however produced political
pressures for him to be titled as the Chief of Jos, in the same political
sense to the Emirs (Chiefs) of Kano, Zaria and Katsina, a political
demand that was contested by the Hausa communities in the township.
This was so because as Chief of Jos there was potential for him to be
chairman of the NA council and this will condition his meeting the
incessant representation to the NA and to the government of British
administration in The North by the BPU over compensation for lands
acquired for tin mining. 2 BPU also anticipated that Rwang Pam as
chief of Jos might also have influence over plot allocation for private
and commercial building of houses in the lay-outs of the developing
metropolitan townships of Jos,2 situation that will reverse discrimi-
nation on the non-indigenous population. 3 In the period between 1947
and 1954 there was increased pressure from BPU members of the executive
1. Dudley 1966 p.92
2. Ibid
3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
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to make Rwang Pam, the "Chief of the Birom", Chief of Jos. When the
leaders of the Islamic Hausa Fulani communities protested against
this demand in 1953, BPU delegated Moses Nyam Rwang, one of the
executive members of BPU, to write a strongly worded petition to the
Sardauna of Sokoto, the Premier and Minister for Local Government in
The North discounting the claims of the Hausa communities to the
chieftaincy of Jos. In that year Moses Nyam Rwang wrote arguing that:
II 
... If any Hausaman wants to ascend to a throne, the people of Birom
land have no objection to his going back to his town to become either
a chief, a district head or a village head.. he can become anything
he wants to in his native land... Have the Hausas, Ibos and Yorubas
come in search for food in Birom land or for chieftaincy? If the
three of them have come to look for chieftaincy, each should go back
to his native land and ascend to the throne he wants. But if they
have come in search of food they should concern themselves with that
alone and stop causing trouble among the peoples of this land". '
 As
a direct consequence in response to the political pressures of BPU
the chief of the Birom, Rwang Pam became the chief of Jos in 1955. 2
In 1956 however the political pressures generated by BPU which
shaped the ascendency of the Birom in the political affairs of the NA
in Jos became checked when there was organized a Hausa Tribal Party
(Jammiyyar Hausawan Jos) with the objective of protecting "the interests
Logs es-r5 evet t 3E44
of the Hausa elements in Jos area".	 When the Hausa Political PartyX
1. Extracts from A letter of Petition, by Moses Nyam Rwang,
addressed to the Premier and Minister for Local Government in
The North, Ahmadu Bello the Sardauna of Sokoto, 18th July 1953.
The English translation above from the original Hausa language
version is mine.
2. Dudley 1966 p.112
3. The Nigerian Citizen, 5th May 1956 and 28th August 1956, cited
in Dudley 1966 p.112.
to contest the political issues raised by BPU, local politics in the
Division became taken into the Regional House of Assembly in the
interests of the non-indigenous Islamic communities by the Hausa
Fulani members that were elected from the constituencies on the Plateau
as well as by Islamic members of Parliament who were outside the
electoral districts of the Jos area. In 1958 for example, Ibrahim Imam
who was politically affiliated to the AG and the M-Belt organization.)
the UMBC suggested to members in the NHA that the Chief of Jos,
Rwang Pam was a rascal, and derided as "a corrupt Emir" who ought
to be removed from the Chairmanship of the Jos town council because
11 ... of the unusual position in Jos where the chief is not only chief
and chairman of the Local Town Council ... The unprecedented situation
was well within rights to be changed (by the Assembly). 	 Similarly
Alhaji Isyaku Gwamna who was NEPU in party political identity and the
elected member in the NHA from Jos Township constituency argued that
"the Chief of Jos should be removed from the chairmanship of the
town council because ... when the town council of Jos was established
the Native Authority was to choose the chairman. The leader of the
Native Authority appointed himself to be the chairman .. how many
second class chief are chairmen of town councils! ... it means the
Chief of Jos has promoted himself instead of demoting himself and I
hope that before long he will be removed from the council". 2
Although BPU became deeply involved and subsequently divided
over the political issue of the chieftaincy in Jos Division this was
1. Northern House of Assembly Debates, Ilorin NA Council, 5th August
1958 p.444-445
2. Ibid p.445
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not of central concern on the necessity for unity of the Birom as
a cultural group and society in the same political sense that the
institution of chieftaincy was considered as crucial in the expression
of tribal "unity" and identity among the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla in
Benue Province. While socio-political and economic problems were
paramount issues which raised the need for the organization for the
"unity of the tribe(s)" in Jos Division, purely political problems
with peripheral economic issues conditioned the development of
"tribal" identities among the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla. When "tribal"
cohesion was achieved among each of the groups and societies in
Benue Province it became used as a joint political resource to urge
for the solutions to the social and economic problems existing in
their societies. While "tribal" identities were first and foremost
consolidated among the Tiv, Igalla and Idoma before their mobilization
was activated as political support which was fed into the M-Belt
Movement, non Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi,
Plateau, S. Zaria experienced a "non-tribal" identity before regression
into "tribal" types. In the instance of the latter this was in the
Christian religious identity before increased modernization caused
the development of their "tribal" organizations within the M-Belt
MovEment. Among other factors, the variation in the development of
"tribal" identities and socio-political consciousness on the nature
of society among the M-Belt groups and societies within the developing
M-Belt Movement in the period between 1949 and 1960 explains the
volatile nature of political support for the demands for the creation
of a M-Belt Region. In other words when the M-Belt Movement was
begun in 1949, while "tribes" in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and
Plateau gave their political and social support because they were
Christians in a non-Islamic religious movement, the Tiv for example
joined in the Movement as that of "non-Islamic tribes" rather than
"Christian tribes".
However BPU was also concerned to organize political and social
protest to stop the evacuation of Birom as well as other groups and
societies indigenous to Jos Division who were being encouraged to
migrate to a resettlement scheme at Sabon-Zawan, a territory along
Old Jemaa road to Kafanchan. Although the policy in the scheme was
developed as early as in 1939 when there was increased demand for
tin ores to meet the needs of the Second World War, it was not until
in 1945 that the ideas in it began to be implemented. 2 The Sabon-
Zawan resettlement scheme for the groups and societies in Jos Division
was meant to create an undisturbing environment for tin mining activities, 3
and was also intended for the development of "a European Colony" because
the climatic conditions were uniquely temperate for European settlement. 4
It is further suggested by Dokotri that conceptions of developing "a
European Colony" in Jos Division to serve as a holiday resort as well
as a place where British retiring Officers might settle is explained
by the unusually high development and concentration of functionally
stable modern European facilities in the Division as early as in
1950. There was for example a very stable supply of electricity by
NESCO Ltd. from Kurra Falls, stable pipe-borne water supplies from
Lamingo and an ultra-modern hotel in the GRA in Jos - the Hill
Station Hotel. 5 The critical point however was that most of the
1. These differences in the social and political conceptions of
the political identity of the M-Belt Movement will become
apparent in Chapter tk- when we examine the growth and develop-
ment of the M-Belt Movement from the Non-Moslem League (NML)
in 1949 to the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) in 1956.
2. C.R.Niven, Plateau Province 1951, Northern Region of Nigeria: 
Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna 1953 p.61
3. Freund 1981 p.156-169
4. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981
5. Ibid; although Dokotri further suggests that one of the political
motives in the development of the scheme was that Jos Division was
meant to be developed as a military base where units of the WAFF
might be stationed for use to crack down on nationalists in British
West African Colonial countries, there is no evidence to support this.
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modern infrastructure developed in Jos was for the benefit of the
mining industry and British administrative institutions of Government,
Commerce and industry rather than for the indigenous population.
The economic problems caused by tin mining activities among the Birom
however conditioned the justification of the scheme. These were
based on the arguments that: "The Birom does not depend upon farming
for his living as he can always get money from mining and the
shortage of firewood is such that manure tends to be used as fuel
rather than on land; further, in some cases the land is scattered
into small units which makes true mixed farming very difficult". 1
The government of British administration in The North used different
incentives which were mainly directed on the Birom group and society,
the numerically dominant in the DivisionI to induce farmers to move
their families to the resettlement scheme at Sabon Zawan. In 1945
for example, the fifteen chiefs in the Birom Districts were promised
that any of them who successfully persuaded his people to move and
first completed the process will ascend to political power to be the
"Bwong Gwom Birom" (Big Chief of Birom). - Furthermore, financial
inducements of two shillings per week with "two measures" of free
grains of corn and millet per day were given to each family for one
year when they moved to Sabon-Zawan. 3 This was meant to enable the
farming families to settle down on the new land before they started
farming on the government allocated plots while they built their own
houses without government assistance. Moses Nyam Rwang further suggests
1. Niven 1953 p.61
2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pam Tee Buk and
Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
3. As (2)
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that it was only the Chief of Zawan village who responded positively
to the inducements of the government before they, the ex-servicemen
in particular, stepped in with the BPU Movement. There was however
never any political pressures from the government of British admini-
stration in The North to coerce Birom chiefs to move their populations
to Sabon-Zawan.
Zawan, Du and Gyel are the three Birom villages where farmland
was most affected by tin mining activities. They are close to each
other and were centred on the township of Bukuru where there were
the headquarters of the ATMN Ltd, the biggest of the tin mining
companies in Nigeria.' It is the concentration and the causal effects
of the problems developed from tin mining activities ,-)n the Birom
village of Zawan and the efforts of the government to move the
majority of the population centred on the village that explains the
name of the new resettlement scheme as "Sabon Zawan" meaning New
Zawan. Of the fourty families that Niven suggests had moved to
'Sabon Zawan' in 1951, all were from the original Birom village of
Zawan.
2
 In the period between 1950 and 1965 the Chief of Zawan
village fell out permanently with the other Birom chiefs as well as
with political leadership of the BPU over the issue of moving Birom
people to 'Sabon Zawan'. This was so because in the period between
1950 and 1965 the Sardauna of Sokoto who was also the Premier of
The North exploited the social and political divisions among the
Birom created by the 'Sabon Zawan' issue, converted the Chief of Zawan
1. For more detailed discussions of the social and economic problems
developed from the activities of tin mining companies in The
North and in particular on the Plateau as it related to the
exploitation of land and labour, bringing an influx of non-
indigenous population to Jos Division, see Sections IV and V
of this Chapter.
2. Niven 1953 p.61; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang,
January 1981.
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to Islam and promised him the chieftaincy of Jos Division to replace
Rwang Pam if only himself and the Zawan people (with very strong
Catholic communities) towed the lines of government policies and dis-
associated themselves from the political demands of BPU and subse-
quently those made in the different phases of the M-Belt Movement
which BPU leadership supported. 1 The chief of Zawan village has
remained the only Birom chief who is Moslem. All other Birom chiefs
are Christians.
However, in the period between 1940 and 1950, while the
government of British administration in The North was concerned to
successfully implement the 'Sabon-Zawan Scheme' it increasingly
required Birom 1Pbour on the tin mines fields. For example, while
the impact of the Second World War on tin ore requirements increased
land alienation in Jos Division (an economic premise from which
the 'Sabon Zawan' scheme became justified) there existed political
and administrative pressures to recruit people as 'political labour'
to work on the mines. 2 In Gyel, one of the fifteen Birom villages,
an average of 463 persons out of a total adult population of 3093,
worked on the mines in the period between 1942 and 1943 with wives
carrying tin ores besides their husbands. 3
In the period between 1945 and 1950 when ex-servicemen like
Patrick Fom, Moses Nyam Rwang, Pam Tee Buk and Choji Bot returned
from Burma, India and East Africa to find the 'Sabon Zawan' scheme
under implementation in the midst of increased destruction of farmland
as a result of tin mining activities without adequate compensation,
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri,
January 1981; the political pressures on non-Islamic chiefs from
among the M-Belt groups and societies to convert and accept the
Islamic religion which were produced by the Sardauna of Sokoto
are examined in more detail in Chapters LlraAd S
2. Freund 1981 p.160
3. Ibid
besides the political tensions existing in Jos Division over the
domination of political roles and decision making in the Native
Authority by HausaFulani and a variant of non-indigenous Islamic
leadership, they organized the BPU as a political movement to contest
the solutions of the issues. Firstly however, the main objective
of the ex-servicemen with BPU, was to mobilize chiefs in the
Division and their people in the different Birom villages "to refuse
moving out from their fatherland to Sabon Zawan". 1 The political
success in the efforts of BPU that discouraged chiefs and their
people not to move is suggested by the fact that in the period
between 1945 and 1951, fourty families from a single village had
moved to 'Sabon Zawan'. 2
 This was the premise from which in 1951,
Niven himself suggests that: "The resistance offered by the Biroms
to mining has still remained serious and irreducible. One can of
course understand and sympathise with the individual farmer whose
land is destroyed by mining. It is not so easy to understand the
attitude of people who refuse to improve their farms, who will not
endeavour to stop erosion by simple methods, who will not go in for
simple irrigation schemes at no expense to themselves ... obviously
there is a natural reluctance to leave one's home and go to distant
places to farm, but this natural reluctance has stopped many Birom
families from going of their own free will to farm down in the Plains.
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang. There were
similar views expressed by Choji Bot and Patrick Dokotri during
interview discussions, January 1981.
2. Niven 1951 p.60
The more surprising it is therefore when one considers that the Jemaa
Resettlement Scheme last year, which was created especially to assist
these Birom on the Plateau and which considerable Government money
has been spent on, was only strengthened by the arrival of two settlers
so that the whole settlement still only comprises fourty families". '
Although the scheme was eventually abandoned by the government of
British administration in The North after 1956 because of its un-
healthy location, the BPU in particular led the fight to kill the
scheme for its underlying political and economic motives as serious
remedies to the problems of the groups and societies in Jos Division. 2
In the period between 1950 and 1956 the 'Sabon Zawan' Resettlement
Scheme was a contested political issue in both the NHA in Kaduna as
well as in the Federal House of Representatives in Lagos.
3
BPU was also concerned to organize resistance to tin mining
activities and alternatively struggle for indigenous participation
in the mining industry, as well as make demands for compensation
on land leased to the mining companies and reclamation by re-
afforestation upon completion of mining activities on the land.
This was so even when it was the case that British colonial legis-
lation made all land in The North the property of The British Crown. 4
The farmers were entitled to compensation from the mining companies
for mining activities on his land under the Mineral Ordinance of 1916. 5
1. Niven 1953 p.60
2. Freund 1981 p.164
3. For examples, see Debates in the House of Representatives,
The 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955, Lagos, 28th March 1955 
p.646-649
4. Freund 1981 p.159
5. Ibid
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In most instances before 1945 when BPU became organized the financial
compensations were simply handed over to the chief of a village where
the mining companies operated as a form of bribe rather than com-
pensation to the farmer. 1
 The tin companies paid low compensations
and always made their own dubious arrangements with the farmers whereby
the farmer continued to work his land on a mining lease that was
actually not being mined. 2 Although the chiefs were dissatisfied with
the patterns of company arrangements and operations their positions
depended on the government and that cost them political influence to
protest. 3 In the situation direct expropriation of land for mining
purposes was only one of the systemic forces pressing down on the
groups and societies in Jos Division and on their agricultural land.
This problem became compounded by the fact that after tin was mined
on agricultural land, the land was left unreclaimed by reafforestation.
This does not mean that the government of British administration in
The North made no efforts to reclaim destroyed farmland. Re-
afforestation was the only programme which surfaced in 1947 that
appeared economically viable to the government in the options of
solutions to the mining problems on farmland in Jos Division. The
reafforestation efforts however turned out to be mainly eucalyptus
plantations. 4 While the eucalyptus plantations had potential for
stemming soil erosion, it did little or nothing directly to the Birom
farmer and the process became less enthusiastically accepted with
gratitude. This was so because the eucalyptus plantations became
government forest reserves and it was illegal practice to hunt wild
1. Freund 1981 p.159
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.164
life as well as to cut the grown trees for use as fuel or sell to
earn cash.
1
 In 1949 the government rejected the efforts in reaffore-
station: II ... because there was no economic sense in a reclamation
policy which was carried out solely for the sake of political
propaganda". 2 Subsequently in 1951 it was estimated that it required
£440,000 to restore between 4000 to 5000 acres of land for agricultural
use.
3
 This gave the government a further reason to drop efforts of
land reclamation by reafforestation. As early as in 1946 the tin
mining companies were held liable by the government for primary
reclamation work on mines dumps as well as on other land damaged by
mining activities. 4 The government however established a Forestry
Department in the NA and recruited indigenes of Jos Division, mainly
Birom as workers and inspectors. In the instance the founding
fathers of BPU in ex-servicemen like Patrick Fom, Moses Nyam Rwang
and Pam Tee Buk who were very active in mobilizing protest over
issues affecting Jos Division and who were not sufficiently educated
for the attention of top government jobs, all became appointed as
Forest Inspectors with the Forest Department of the NA in Jos, wage
earning jobs that they held until their retirements. This suggests
that there were subtle strategies to reduce the impact of political
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981;
Moses Nyam Rwang was one of the NA employed BPU leaders as
Forest Officer in the period between 1960 and 1970.
2. Mining Policy Compensation, Comments on the Memorandum,
D. de M. Robin 1949, cited in Freund 1981 p.164
3. NAK: JOSPROF III 8248, Annual Report of Plateau Province 1951,
cited in Freund 1981 p.164
4. Nigeria: Legislative Council Debates, 5th March 1945; NAK: 
JOSPROF III Mining Policy Compensation 1947; Report on Farm
Survey of Area Occupied by the Zawan Community of the Birom Tribe,
Jos Division by J.G. Davies, cited in Freund 1981 p.162
activities generated by BPU as some of its leadership became engaged
and integrated into government activities as alternative roles related
to their protests and demands.
The socio-economic and political problems of Jos Division how-
ever remained unsolved and there was increased discontent over their
contested solutions in the period between 1950 and 1965 and the protests
echoed well into the years after 1970. One that was of major concern
to BPU and preoccupied its energies on an equal scale to protest over
the 'Sabon Zawan Scheme' and land reclamation by reafforestation was
compensation direct to farmers for mining activities on agricultural
pieces of land. In 1944 the Gyel Farm Survey suggested that in Jos
Division 10.3% of the original arable land was already destroyed through
the operation of the mining companies, 2.2% was taken over for occu-
pation by the miners, 86% was under mining leases of some sort or
another although not all was necessarily taken up, 4% was settled and
farmed by non-indigenes employed as labour on the mining camps. 1
 In
Gyel village itself, which was at the heart of tin mining activities
in Jos Division there remained only 4.4 acres of farmable land left
per adult factor with a 6.4 average acreage for the entire Birom country
in 1944. 2 Where arable land existed it was farmed on alternate fallow
years and about 6.4 acres produced food for a 'sufficient diet' and
1. J. Davies, Gyel Farm Survey, 1944 p.196-212, cited in Dudley
1966 p.112
2. J. Davies, The Gyel Farm Survey, 1944 p.8, cited in Freund
1981 p.161
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4.4 acres produced food for 'sufficient energy'. ' In Birom country
as a whole there was hardly any unused agricultural land left and
the people existed below diet sufficiency. 2 In practice food suffi-
ciency was achieved by a gross over-use of agricultural land. 3 In
1947 the Birom as a whole were obliged to purchase an average of 20%
of their food requirements because of the destructive state of
agricultural land created by mining activities. 4 To Baker suggests
that in Bachint village an area of Jos Division least affected by
mining activities and less crowded in population than Gyel village,
the people had to buy grain before a new harvest. 5 In the period
between 1947 and 1952 the majority of the Birom population depended
on wage earning rather than farming their crops in order to eat, 6
because the farmland areas were considerably reduced.
It was from the deteriorating relationship between agricultural
production and the destruction of farmland that a new mineral ordinance
altered the compensation for arable land from £.2 per acre in 1939 to
7£27 in 1946.	 This was one year after the formation of BPU. The tin
mining companies strongly objected to the new aspects of the 1946
regulations because they increased costs and lowered tin company
1. Freund 1981 p.161
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Tanya M. Baker, The social organization of the Birom, London
1954 p.22
6. Freund 1981 p.161
7. Ibid p.162
profits since the compensation payments were higher. 1 By 1950 for
example, the ATMN Ltd, the biggest of the tin mining companies operating
in Nigeria, paid £10,000 per year in land compensation, an increasingly
important cost factor in their operations especially for the small
companies operating in the congested areas of Du, Zawan and Gyel. 2
Political pressures from BPU mobilization in resistance to tin
mining activities pushed the government to extend legislation even
further inspite of objections by the tin companies. 3 In the period
between 1940 and 1955 the government of British administration in
The North was extremely nervous about the rising tide of mobilized
Birom resistance by BPU to tin mining activities. 4 For example,
in 1946 Gyel villagers were successfully mobilized to force the
ATMN Ltd. to wait until crops were harvested before mining was
begun. 5 In 1950 the first organized violence against mining
prospecting on the high plateau in half a century took place. 6 In
1951 Moses Nyam Rwang, a BPU executive member led a crowd in ob-
structing mining operations on site which proved to be an invalid
claim to contain tin deposits, to the delight of the Birom. 7
1. Freund 1981 p.164
2. Ibid
3. For a detailed account of the patterns and nature of this
mobilized resistance, see Chapter 6 of Bill Freund 1981
p.156-173 where he examines "Peasant Resistance: Tin Mining
and the Birom"
4. NAK: JOSPROF III Annual Report, Plateau Province 1952, 8379:
Resident to H.R.E. Brown, Secretariat Kaduna 9th January 1953.
5. NAK: JOSPROF III Annual Reports, Jos Division 6450 Jos Division
Annual Report 1946
6. NAK: JOSPROF 1/2 Annual Report, Plateau Province 1950
7. NAK: JOSPROF III Annual Reports, Jos Division 6450 Jos Division
Annual Report 1951
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Following these developments organized by BPU as early as 1946
the government of British administration in The North was prepared
to press cases against the tin mining companies who operated without
the consent of farmers in Jos Division.' In 1951 the government
introduced new exclusive prospecting licences which limited tin-
mining prospecting operations to one square mile. 2 In 1954 an
amendment to the Mines Regulations permitted objections to be heard
over land given for new mining leases before farmland was excavated
for tin ores. 3 It was from these concessions that BPU further
organized Birom communities to proclaim land as 'stafi' (sacred)
areas in order to exclude mining as well as to increase bargaining
for compensation prices. 4
In the period between 1955 and 1970 the character of Birom
resistance to tin mining activities changed and its force weakened.
This was not because of an improvement in the socio-economic standard
of living of the groups and societies in Jos Division. The mining
companies continued to nibble land in Jos Division with mining
activities and the problem of land relcamation remained with increased
deterioration on the environment. 5 The changed character and weakened
force of resistance to tin mining activities on Jos Division is
explained by the rechannelling of political energies rather than an
1. Freund 1981 p.165
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Logams 1975 p.100
improvement in the socio-economic and political situation of the
groups and societies. Firstly in the period between 1949 and 1956,
BPU leadership became the initial political leadership in the NML
and the MZL which championed the struggle for the creation of a M-
Belt Region. 1
 Secondly when there was decline in agricultural
production, as a direct consequence of the destruction of arable
land caused by tin mining activities many Birom individually turned
to other ways of making money to make a living outside selling fire-
wood and farmed food crops. One of the new ways of making money was
through what became "illegally" defined in legal terms as "tin-
stealing" by both the government of British administration in The
North and the tin mining companies. 2 Furthermore in the period between
1950 and 1965, the political policy of 'Northernization' which sought
to indigenize the civil service in The North, opened up a bevy of
well paid jobs and took away some of the European educated in the
leadership of the BPU who were politically acceptable to the NPC
party,
3
 a situation that was accelerated in 1968 when the BP state
government apparatus began to function.4
1. This is examined in more detail in Chapter	 where the growth
and development of the M-Belt Movement and its ideas for a
M-Belt Region are discussed.
2. Logams 1975 p.104-105
3. Freund 1981 p.115
4. This is examined in more detail in Chapters 4-RNA5 where jobs
in the civil service of The North are discussed as important
resources for buying political support as well as the political
tensions that resulted from elite competition upon the creation
of BP state in 1968.
Before 1945 Hausa and other immigrants to Jos Division were
the sole participants in "tin-stealing". '
 The earliest instance of
Birom participation in "tin-stealing" was in 1937. 2
 In that instance
it was suggested that "Birom villagers near Ropp put on Hausa clothes
in order to sell contraband tin" .3 In the period between 1940 and
1950 when many European tin mining employees privatized and operated
as 'Private Miners' who had mining licences, "tin-stealing" increased
among the Biromas a quick moneymaking activity. 4
 Oumar-Shittien
suggests that in the period between 1950 and 1970 earnings from "tin-
stealing" sold to private miners were in excess to cash values from
Birom farm crops like "Acha" and the potato and concludes that "..
in Birom villages wealth is unequally distributed according to ones
access to the tin and how one can control its acquisition". 5 In a
survey of the Birom villages of Du and Shen at the end of 1972 it
was estimated that 80% of the adult male population was engaged in
"tin-stealing". 6 Tin stealing became an acceptable as well as an
essential part of Birom village economy. 6 This was so because it
was a means of capital accumulation for a few and a way of expressing
defiance to a system that destroyed agricultural land and the older
ways of life among the groups and societies in Jos Division. 7
In the period between 1950 and 1970 there were increases in
the numbers of Birom as 'private miners' and who were also the ring-
1. Freund 1981 p.167
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Aishatu Abigail Oumar-Shittien, The New Economic Factor: Social 
Impact of Mining on the Birom 1973 p.82
6. Freund 1981 p.168
7. Ibid
in the tin-poaching operations and some acquired private mining
rights which enabled them to legally sell tin ores. 1 This is
suggested by the value of privately bought tin from incidences of
"tin-theft". For example Freund suggests that while in 1950
£250,000 was spent on contraband tin, it rose to £1,000,000 in 1971. 2
Between the private miners and the ordinary villagers who were the
real poachers, there existed a network of middlemen who were Birom. 3
Birom who served as fences and as middlemen in the 'tin stealing'
business were viewed by the community as 'brothers'. 4 In the period
between 1950 and 1965, the Birom political elite with connections to
government personalities in Kaduna acted to protect the communities
that were economically dependent on "tin-stealing". This was
particularly so for the Birom villages of Du, Shen and Gyel. For
example when Danboyi Zang from the Birom village of Gyel who developed
to become the wealthiest of the Birom private miners was accused of
running a network of "tin theft" the ATMN Ltd suggested that he used
political connections with the NPC government in Kaduna to prevent
legal procedures that might prove the allegations to be true.
5
 This
was so because in the period between 1960 and 1965, Danboyi Zang
became appointed as one of the mining members in the NHA from Jos
Division, 6
 and enjoyed the political patronage of the Sardauna of
Sokoto. 7
1. Freund 1981 p.167
2. Freund 1981 Table 6-I p.167
3. Freund 1981 p.167
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
7. For examples of the apparent ties between Zang and the Sardauna
see the farmer's first speech in the NHA in NHA Governor's Speech: 
Debate on the Address, 26 February 1965 p.61-62
It was in the midst of these socio-economic and political
problems that there developed split images in the envisaged support
and patterns of solutions that might be created in a M-Belt Region
over the contested issues in Jos Division. While severe economic
problems remained at the bottom of society frustrating the ordinary
people, personal economic gains took precedence over organization
for their solutions in an anticipated M-Belt Region. In the period
between 1956 and 1965 within Jos Division itself where a 'M-Belt
Movement' was begun and where socio-economic and political problems
were severest, there was volatile political support for the ideas
of a M-Belt Region. This was so because both political and economic
leadership in the membership of BPU became clients to the government
of the NPC in The North. The political clientele of some of the
leaders and supporters of the BPU as well as in the subsequent M-Belt
organizations weakened the vigour of the demands for a M-Belt Region
to solve socio-economic and political problems in Jos Division. This
is explained by dependence on patronage to NPC leadership. For
example, in 1965 it was patron-client political sentiments that
conditioned the very first speech on the floors of the House of the
Northern Assembly by Danboyi Zang to retort: "I, Danboyi Gyel always
dreamt that I was in the midst of the members of this House, but for
the good leadership of the Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of
Sokoto, who said that every person whoever he may be, should ask for
his rights and it will be given to him, has thought it necessary for
my dream to be fulfilled ... We have good government under the leader-
ship of the Hon. Premier Alhaji, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of
Sokoto which is unique in the whole of Nigeria. In the first place,
he likes everyone to enjoy without caring what tribe you belong to...
I am appealing to our ministers to emulate the good character of the
Hon. Premier to help everybody who comes to them for help". 1 Although
this suggests patron-client relationship between political leadership
in the NPC and some top economic elite in BPU albeit among some of
the M-Belt groups and societies the patterns in maintaining the
relationship were meant to bargain for the solutions of the socio-
economic problems and issues in the constituencies. For example,
Zang in the same "first time speech" since 1962, went on to suggest
that although the people of Jos Division have sufficient wealth of
tin and columbite: "We are at times treated like slaves and our
farms are taken away... in Jos Division people suffer a lot. So
many lands belonging to farmers have been seized and this has brought
a lot of stealing. If someone's farm has been excavated and he has
not got any other piece of land upon which to farm, he will obviously
tend to steal ". 2
Although 'tribal' unity was also of concern to the Birom political
organizations, it was the land question that was central as a political
issue conditioning the unity for confrontation between the government
of British administration and subsequently with the NPC in The North
as well as with non-indigenous groups and societies on Jos Division.
Although it was not until 1945 that the state of the land became a
political issue in the organization of "tribal unity" in Jos Division,
the problem existed as early as 1940, when individual farmers took
complaints to Residents and Dos over the effects of mining activities
1. NHA, Governor's Speech: Debate on Address, 26 February 1965
p.61-62
2. Ibid; Patron-client relationships which weakened "tribal" unions
and their political alliances in the M-Belt Movements are
examined in more detail in Chapters 4.c16-14 .5
on agricultural productivity. 1
 The economic issues between the
mining companies and the groups and societies centred on land
became compounded and complicated contested solutions to the problems
caused by mining activities because the tin-bearing areas were also
the most fertile farming land in Jos Division since the Plateau areas
itself were rocky with granite terrain. 2 This was the premise from
which E. Bathurst, the special member in [HR representing Tin Mining
Interests, suggested as latterly as in 1955, that the wrong impressions
were being created on the land problems of Jos Division. 3 According
to Bathurst there was sufficient monetary compensation and the groups
and societies in Jos Division were not losing their land. 4 Further-
more it was suggested that: II ... the question of farmers losing
their land is a question which is not quite accurate .. money is being
spent on reclamation and a lot is being done on reclamation. The
question is that this mineral is useful to Nigeria's revenue and
economy and the farmer's land is being restored to him. 	 It is
only a question of an interval of time. It is not a question of
his having lost his land for ever. It is just a small interval of
time whilst the mineral which is useful for Nigeria's economy is
being brought out of the ground ... that you can see vast areas of
dumps in Bukuru, I am afraid is true, but that was done in the past,
before one thought of restoration. Let us not think of the past but
the future. Restoration and Reclamation is now being done and will
continue to be done. That is why money has been voted for - to
1. Logams 1975 p.87
2. Dudley 1966 p.112 n.77
3. Debates of the House of Representatives, The 1955-56 
Appropriation Ordinance 1955, Lagos 28 March 1955 p.648
4. Debates 28 March 1955 p.648
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recover these areas... All the land is not good arable land; much
of the land was useless before mining took place. It is not that
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the mining companies have destroyed over much... in 1948 38059/miles
of the congested areas in Jos Division have only been used ... it
is a very small percentage of the total arable land... Little of
the land has actually been used by the mining companies") ThisThis
suggests that as latterly as in 1956 the government of British
administration in The North and Nigeria as well as the tin mining
companies themselves	 realize the gravity of the land problem
as it affected the economy of the groups and societies in Jos
Division. This was so because solutions to the problems caused
by mining activities were differently seen by the parties involved
in economic activities in Jos Division.
In the period between 1955 and 1956 10,000 tons of tin were
extracted from Jos Division alone with tin prices per ton valuing
£700 and columbite varying from between £2000 to £3000 per ton in
1954. 2 In that year, tin and columbite brought in for the Nigerian
government a total cash value of £13 million, which was "very nearly
the total revenue of the Government of Northern Region".
3
 In the
period between 1950 and 1956 and thereafter until 1965 royalties
(as opposed to rights) from mineral products in Nigeria were
Regional revenue sources and the Federal Government only acted as
a collecting agent. 4
 Although the government of British administration
in The North got at least about £2,000,000 every year for about 50 years
1. Mr E. Bathurst (special member) Debates in The House of
Representatives: The 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955,
Lagos 28 March 1955 p.648
2. Patrick Dokotri (Jos Township), Debates in the House of Re-
presentatives, the 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955,
28 March 1955 p.646; These figures were not disputed by the
Minister for Land, Mines and Power in the House.
3. Dokotri 1955 p.646
4. The Minister of Land, Mines and Power, Debates in the House of
Representatives, the 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955,
28 March 1955 p.649
*214. see Cez,t40,44.-e pti- a -anc4 t5C C:inCttpler
the Tin Mining Industry in Jos Division never gained local support
and sympathy because it destroyed local interests. These centred
on the destruction of land by mining activities without adequate
compensation. In the period between 1940 and 1950 when the govern-
ment of British administration in Nigeria was very keen on tin and
columbite in Jos Division it was at the same time unduly touchy over
the question of compensation to farmers. This was the premise from
which Patrick Dokotri suggested that while the government got
"lucrative revenue from the Industry (about £2,000,000 a year)...
government has voted only £500,000 which is half a million pounds
to reclaim land which has been destroyed by mining. This amount
is really very small... If this Industry is to be expanded local
interest should be adequately protected ... to the Birom, particularly,
government has adopted an attitude of "laissez faire" towards their
educational, cultural and economic set-back in order to give full
prominence to this industry. It was thought that by educating the
people they would be in a position to voice out thier legitimate
aspirations .. the Birom is in dire need of assistance to survive
the economic pressure imposed upon him by circumstances beyond his
control. Whatever may be the cause, it is government's moral duty
to help them ... the economic position of the Birom is far worse than
what is occurring in South Africa and I would very seriously and
sincerely warn government that if proper action is not taken to
rehabilitate the Biroms properly something worse than what is
happening in East Africa might occur in Nigeria... It makes little
sense to criticize the system in South Africa if here in Nigeria,
Nigerians are suffering the same fate. We should first of all think
about the welfare of the people here") . In the instance of the
1.	 Dokotri 1955 p.646
particular problem of land relcamation by 1955 about 207 acres of
land had been reclaimed at a cost of £250 per acre giving about
£51,750 spent by direct government disbursement. ' The political
issue that was more severely contested however was the rehabili-
tation of the Birom from their home area in Jemaa Division some
fifty miles away. Although the government of British administration
voted £100,000 in 1955 for the scheme, many people simply were not
sufficiently attracted. 2 Even when that was so the government of
British administration was reluctant to rehabilitate the Birom
within Jos Division and preferred to push through with the scheme.
It was this particular position on the Sabon Zawan scheme that there
developed early considerable political sympathy between the BPU and
the NCNC as well as the AG, an early situation that conditioned sub-
sequent patterns of alliances for the 1959 elections. Most of the
Southern Nigerian politicians used socio-economic and political
problems in Jos Division, particularly those that centred on the
activities of the tin mining companies to raise issues with other
parties as well as with the government of British administration.
For example in one instance R.C. Agwuna argued that the government
cannot "expect the average Birom to live on anything else if you
remove his land from him and it does not pay to vote sums of money
to transport somebody from his place of birth where his ancestors
have lived for years, to a strange place, no matter whether it is
in the same Region or in another Region. You cannot expect a man
1. Debates in the House of Representatives, The 1955-56 
Appropriation Ordinance 1955, 28 March 1955 p.647
2. Ibid
so transported to be happy and to continue to be a loyal member of
the governing machinery of that area. It is the duty of this Federal
Government to look into the conduct of the mining companies over
the native Biroms. In places where the miners have exploited so many
acres of Birom territory you only find big ravines and wide pits in
very many places ... talking of the proposed settlement in Jemaa,
how many Biroms will that place contain? If you put them there
where will you give them the land to farm... We all know that the
average Nigerian is fundamentally a peasant farmer and this is even
truer in The North „ . 1
 As early as in 1955 it was suggested to the
government in The North "... to see that the Birom people are given
a special consideration in the proceeds of mining royalties and to
take into consideration and make a grant, however small, from the
royalties being received to Jos JA for the sole benefit of the Birom
people who are directly affected by the mining operations. 2 Although
this was so, it was maintained that it ought to be regarded as "an
act of grace rather than as a right because mineral deposits are a
national asset... and government in The North determined how the money
will be spent”.
3
 In the period between 1955 and 1965 politicians in
BPU and in the political organizations of the M-Belt Movement within
both the NHA and in the FHR persistently re-echoed this grievance
centred on the failure of the NPC government in The North to disburse
funds from mining royalites rather than the tax on tin profits to go
to the Jos Native Authority. 4
1. R.C. Agwuna (Awka Division) Debates in the House of Representa-
tives, the 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955, Lagos 28 March
1955 p.648
2. The Minister of Land, Mines and Power, Debates in the House of
Representatives, the 1955-56 Appropriation Ordinance 1955,
Lagos 28 March 1955 p.649
3. Ibid
4. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981
It was from the political perceptions that being outside the
mainstream in controlling decision making in government in order to
solve local social and economic problems that there was anticipation
that a government in a M-Belt Region might perform better than the
NPC government in The North whose politicians had roots in the
Islamic society. It is however significant that the social and
economic problems in Jos Division which were instrumental as factors
for the initial organization of a M-Belt Movement and the demands
for the creation of a M-Belt Region were never raised as issues by
politicians in the [HR from the Islamic society in The North on the
same scale of political contest as became the concern of both Southern
Nigerian politicians in the NCNC and AG parties which were dominant
in the Eastern and Western Regions respectively. 1 In the period
between 1950 and 1960 when there was increased political demand for
the solutions of social and economic problems existing among the
M-Belt groups and societies, particularly those existing in Jos
Division that were often easily quoted as exploitation, domination,
expropriation and oppression and discrimination of the non-Islamic
groups and societies in The North and centred on the state of land
destroyed by tin mining activities there was a concomitant increase
in the vigour of political mobilization to gain support for the ideas
of a new political unit of the Nigerian Federation in The North. 2
1. For examples of very elaborate political rhetoric on the
socio-economic and political problems in Jos Division by the
politicians of both parties see Debates in the Federal House
of Representatives for the period between 1950 and 1960.
2. This is examined with more analytical detail in Chapter LI-
It was (also the microcosm of the socio-economic and political problems in
Jos Division in the period between 1950 and 1965 that the Birom became the
centre of political activity and controversy on the demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region by politicians in the M-Belt Movement in both
the NHA and FHR. In other words, political differences with roots in
socio-religious identities existing in The North, between the Islamic and
the M-Belt people became seen as factors that caused the problems of
society in the M-Belt areas. This was so because control of political power
also conditioned choice and selection of social and economic problems in
the organization of policies for the solution of the problems of society.
This became critical for the non-Islamic people in The North, because after
1947 politicians with an Islamic religious identity began to control
political power as a dominant group.
The available evidence on the socio-economic and political problems
affecting the M-Belt people in the period between 1950 and 1965 suggest
that when local issues were taken into the grievances in the conditions for
the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, the "tribal" unions ceased
to be the political machinery for pushing through options for the solutions
of local problems on the political arenas they had access to in Nigeria.
This is not suggesting that the severity of local socio-economic and
political problems ceased to be a premise for "tribal" unity. When there
was ressurgence of "tribal" unity in certain instances it was channelled
into a M-Belt movement, meant for the solution of local problems in the
political demands for the creation of the M-Belt Region. This means that
the political demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region was related to
the "tribal" intentions of solving their socio-economic and political
problems rather than an explicit need to maintain a non-Islamic religious
identity, based on the Christian religion, the driving force in the
organization of the demand. In the period between 1956 and 1965, for
example, when the political fires of the UMBC as the M-Belt Movement flared
most glaringly, Christianity did not feature as an issue in the political
rhetoric of the leadership in the same political sense that Christianity
was used and seen to be a social movement in the period between 1940 and
1955 when social, economic and political issues conditioned Christian
solidarity among the M-Belt people. In other words, the causal factors in
the M-Belt movement and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region
were mult-variant in nature and these were differently emphasized among the
M-Belt people, to gain political support from the non-Islamic people in The
North. Non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S.Bauchi and S.Zaria,
where there had been more direct Fulani Islamic colonization, for example,
saw their political demands and support for the ideas of the M-Belt
movement in terms of social and political liberation from Islamic
domination of political decision making in local affairs. The Plateau
groups and societies were concerned with social and economic problems on
their land and mobilized the Christian religion as a political identity
with anti-Islamic sentiments. In general terms these issues became directed
at Hausa-Fulani and Islamic domination of political roles in The North to
gain support for the ideas of the demands of the M-Belt movement. In Jos
Division, there was a completely different socio-economic and political
situation to what existed, for example, in S.Zaria, S.Bauchi, Adamawa and
among the Idoma, Igalla and the Tiv, where by their culturally and
numerically bigger groups, spread over a wider geographical area they
successfully assertted "tribal" political identities to press for
socio-economic and political changes in their areas l . Furthermore, the
non-Islamic people in Jos Division for example, were in more contact with
social and economic influences from outside their areas, on a more
intensive scale than any others of the M-Belt groups and societies, which
created pressures for political organization. This was so because of the
Tin-mining activities which brought in an influx of stranger elements in
their midst from distant areas, beyond the Nigerian borders. This was the
premise from which Jos Division became officially defined as "a congested
area" and most sensitive on political issues indigenous to the area2.
Dudley suggests that the alien migrants to Jos Division produced a
situation: "whereby Jos district has the peculiarity of being the only area
in the North, where the indigenous inhabitants are more than outnumbered by
the non-indigenes, and in the division as a whole, it is the only area
where non-indigenes constitute more than half the total population" 3 . Jos
Division therefore produced examples of profound fears and frustrations
over the socio-economic and political problems characteristic of all the
other M-Belt groups and societies on indigenous loss of control in the
conduct of their local affairs. The situation in Jos Divison therefore
explains why the BPU was less of a singularly specific "tribal" political
organization as it stood for socio-economic and political grievances
affecting all the groups and societies in the area. It was from this all
embrassing concern for issues and problems, that were not necessarily
"tribal", that BPU was to develop into a M-Belt movement in the political
struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region to enclose a majority of
non-Islamic groups and societies, where there existed similar problems to
those in Jos Division.
Although initial political leadership in the BPU was rooted in persons
with military experience as Ex-Servicemen, there were additional factors
that served as boosters to their political roles. Some of the
Ex-Servicemen, for example, achieved social consciousness from European
education, had wide travel experiences within different Nigerian groups and
societies and had been influenced by the patterns of political
organizations which struggled and resisted domination and discrimination.
They were also familiar with the types of socio-economic demands made on
the activities of government for the transformation of deprived societies,
which influenced their own shape of organization of issues into demands.
This was so for example, for Patrick Fom who was an Ex-Serviceman and one
of the six original founders of the BPU, who at fifty years became the
first President of the tribal union in 1945.4  When he returned from India,
he served as Evangelist Teacher with the RCM school in Kuru. Previous to
his military and religious career however, Patrick Fom stayed and schooled
at Ibadan, worked in Lagos, where he married a Ghanian Yoruba. Before 1950,
he was about the most European educated among the Ex-Servicemen that were
involved after 1945 with the political organizattion of the BPU. While at
Ibadan and Lagos he was influenced by the local political organization of
Yoruba and Ibo which subsequently found expression in facing the government
of British administration in Nigeria with political demands of freedom and
the rights to make demands on the government for the allocation of modern
infrastructure for the transformation of traditional African societies, in
the benefit of the local tribal population. It was however, not the state
of local problems and policies in Jos Division which caused him to leave
Lagos and return to the homeland where he became politically involved.
Rather, it was the social stress caused by the experience of a divorce with
the Ghanian wife that made him leave Lagos to seek solitude in his
indigenous homeland at Kuru 5 . It was from Kuru that in 1945, he began to
redirect his energies to contest for the solutions to land problems in Jos
Division which had become political issues between the Birom and the Tin
mining companies and the government of British administration in The
North6.
Although the economic issues raised by the destruction of land from
tin mining activities were the central causes of the political activities
in the formation of the BPU under the leadership of the Ex-Servicemen and
the European educated in Jos Division, other social problems intervened to
compound relationships with government institutions in the area. When there
was Hausa domination of decision making in the NA institution in Jos
Division, for example, social and religious attitudes of Hausa Fulani and
Islamic communities in the urban centres as well as in the tin mining
camps, toward the indigenous people was characterized by prejudice on what
was termed as non-Islamic practices. There was overt insult and covert
ridicule of the indigenous people and this centred on the types of food
that was eaten such as dogs, pigs, rats, lizards and alcoholic beverages.
In reaction to the social Islamic prejudices, some of the indigenous groups
and societies sang songs which suggested: "May those who disapprove of
drinkers of alcoholic beverages be cursed by our people" 7 . The Hausa-Fulani
Islamic population also had numerous songs that sought to ridicule and
discourage the decorated nudity of indigenous people in Jos Division. In
Jos Division, albeit on the Plateau, there was also the problem and concern
to organize protests on overgrazing of the land as a result of the Fulani
presence with their cattle, which had created severe soil erosion which was
encroaching on Farm land. The problem with Fulani cattle grazing constantly
developed into hostilities in which lives were lost, particularly so when
the Fulani cows ate food crops. These economic problems on land and food
crops with the Fulani, were however not confined to Jos Division and the
Plateau, but also affected almost all the M-Belt areas, wherever the Fulani
went with their cattle. As recently as in April, 1983, Godwin Terhemba
suggests Fulani herdsmen still destroyed food crops by driving their cattle
over Tiv farms:
"As the Fulani herdsmen are always invading, so
they are always ready to fight when smelling
trouble. So they strike and kill innocent Tiv
farmers ... seven Tiv farmers were killed in a
violent clash with the Fulani on 31st March,
1983"8.
It was from the nature of these over-bearing socio-economic and political
problems in Jos Division the non-Islamic people de-emphasized "tribal"
identities and used the Christian religious identity to contest the 1951
elections. This christian religious identity that became used for political
purposes was bolstered by administrative changes in Jos Division, which
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caused the Federation of other smaller non-Islamic people into a bigger Jos
NA9 . The 1951 elections, therefore, provided an opportunity to test the
already mobilized and developed solidarity of Christian unity with the
non-Islamic communities for political purposes, against Moslems among the
groups in the Jos NA, albeit groups on the Plateau. This solidarity
subsequently found expression in a temporary alliance with the NCNC party
which was seen at that time to share the Christian religious identity
rather than an Ibo dominated party. Christian mobilized solidarity became
apparent in the 1951 elections and this was acknowledged in the Annual
Report for Plateau by C.R. Niven, the Resident:
"the elections held during the year have done a
great deal towards bringing the people
together. It can be safely said that they acted
as a reagent in this fluid mass ... in the
primaries, which involved the choosing of over
7,000 members to the next colleges, the remote
villages had a good idea of what it was all
about ... although some were more politically
minded than others, which caused active
feelings over the elections"10.
The tribal unions however controlled political mobilization in the rural
areas among the different groups on the Plateau and this effectively
neutralized party decisions, unlike the urban areas where there were
divisions along party political lines among the tribal unions in electoral
centres like Jos, Bukuru and Kafanchan. This variation is explained by the
concentration of a socially mobilized population in these urban areas. In
the Jos area, for example, there were many educated Southern Nigerians and
Jos Division itself had one of the highest percentage of an indigenous
literate population, when compared to other M-Belt areas (6.2% of the
population over seven years old was literate and some had certificates of
Elementary Primary Standard Four). Dudley suggests that about 17.3% of the
population in the Jos area was Ibo and Yoruba alone, besides other Southern
Nigerian tribes il . Although tribal jealousies were reported to be "still
very acute" among the Plateau groups in 1951, the elections were contested
with a Christian political party identity, rather than tribal, a situation
that was caused by the development of the NML to the MZL which maintained
the Christian religious identity for political purposes, despite a change
in political labe1 12 . The political situation on the Plateau with a
mobilized Christian religious identity as a political party identity,
contrasted with the circumstances of the groups in Benue Province, where,
by the strength of their numerical sizes, cultural identities persisted in
the tribal unions and these were used to determine representation into the
final electoral college in the 1951 elections. The consequence was that the
Tiv, who were the biggest group in Benue, dominated in the Provincial
College and elected their tribal members. Some of the numerically stronger
cultural groups on the Plateau, like the Birom, Angas and Sura, for
example, did not use their strength to sweep the board by electing only
their members as representatives of the Province in the final electoral
college. Thus in the electoral outcome from the final stage of the indirect
election into the NHA from Plateau, was that representation came from four
Divisions out of the five Divisions of the Province 13 . Four of these five
representatives from the Plateau were all Christians on the party label of
the MZL, unlike it was the case in Benue Province, for example, where all
the representatives were Tiv from Tiv Divi sion and members of a particular
tribal union, the TPU, having outvoted the Jukun and the Idoma in the final
Provincial electoral college. The variation in the pattern of political
representation between Plateau and Benue: One based on a Christian
religious identity and the other on a purely tribal identity, is explained
by achieved political organization and mobilization of the MZL which in
1951 had not penetrated into Benue Province and Tiv land as much as it is
explained by Tiv tribal solidarity on its own. However, reinforcing the
Christian religious identity, Plateau representation in Kaduna, was further
increased by the special appointments of Major H.E. Wilson, as
representative of mining interests, S.O. James a Yoruba, as representative
of non-indigenous Christian communities in Jos Division into the NHA and by
the appointments to the NHC, Rwang Pam, the Chief of Birom (later the Chief
of Jos), while to balance the Christian dominance in the representation of
the Province, Moslems like the chiefs of Kanam, Wamba and the Emir of Wase
were appointed into the NHC 14 . The nominated representation of
non-indigenes of the Plateau to both the NHA and the NHC was caused by
Christian domination of the electoral process in 1951 and this was meant by
the government in Kaduna to balance social and political diversity that
existed on the Plateau. In the instance, there was one indigenous Christian
chief, five elected Christian politicians, two non-indigenous nominated
Christians and four Moslem chiefs. This gave a total of about eight
Christians as representatives of the Plateau in Kaduna as against four
Moslems. The electoral patterns of political protest, directed against
Islamic domination on the Plateau, therefore, crystalized and remained as a
political resource after 1951. However in the period between 1952 and 1965,
Plateau political leadership which came from the different tribal unions
and which shaped support in the Divisions was not consistent in the use of
the Christian religious identity as a political resource. The leadership
shuffled between support for "One North" (seen to be Islamic) and
separation into a M-Belt Region (seen to be Christian). On many occasions
the political behaviour of the leadership contradicted the trans-tribal
political unity achieved with the Christian religion and which was
presented in their political organization as a political identity.
Political behaviour on the Plateau, however, was essentially shaped by
Christianity and the state of local socio-economic and political problems
affecting particular tribes. The Christian religion as a political identity
was consistently used because the tribes are small and the appeal to a
trans-tribal political identity with Christianity had greater political
impact, rather than the cultural tribal identities standing on their own.
The issues and problems that conditioned the organization of tribal
unions in Adamawa, S.Bauchi and S.Zaria were centred on political rulership
and control of decision making by the Hausa-Fulani as well as some other
variant of Islamic political leadership over the local affairs of the
non-Islamic people in those areas. Futhermore, historically, many of the
non-Islamic and Christian people in Adamawa, S.Bauchi and S.Zaria were
perforce subject to the Moslem judicial and legal system which embodied
standards of justice often uncongenial to their own indigenous traditional
systems as well as to those that were sought to be established by the
government of British administration in The North 15 . Some non-Islamic
people on the Plateau, conquered in the period of the Fulani Jihad, like
those that were found in Wase, Kanam, Jemaa, Shendam, Keffi, Lafia and
Gindiri, were similarly subjected to the alien application of the Islamic
legal system. The political problems on the legal application of Islamic
laws over non-Islamic people in the M-Belt areas, in general, were
compounded by the social and religious resentment of being derided "as
'Kafiri' (unbelievers) for adherence to Christianity or animistic
worshi p" 16 . Similar to the social and political experiences of non-Islamic
groups and societies on the Plateau, where there were many "tribal" unions
who fed in their cultural identities into those of the bigger tribes like
th Birom, Yergam, Angas, Sura and Ankwei, in Adamawa, S.Bauchi and S.Zaria,
although there existed other "tribal" unions, the majority also fed in
their cultural identity into the political leadership of the Kilba State
Union movement and the Wurkum Tribal union in Adamawa. The Pansayawa League
in S.Bauchi also incorporated the cultural support of the Lere and Jarawa
tribal unions. The Pan-Jarawa League, apparently was politically active in
S.Bauchi as well as giving its political support to the protests and
problems that were articulated by BPU on the socio-economic and political
issues in Jos Division on the Plateau. This was so because there was a
respectable concentration of Jarawa people in S.Bauchi, while the majority
of the group and society was found to the north and north-eastern
escarpment of Jos Division with their chief centred at Fobur town, a
premise that conditioned their separation from the Emir of Bauchi and
political inclusion in Plateau State in 1976. This was unlike the
Pan-Sayawa League which to the present day still struggles for a merger
with Plateau state as a protest against their political control by the
Emirs and Islamic District Heads appointed by the royalty of Bauchi. This
may be the case, because the Sayawa were part of the Lere group in S.Rauchi
and they had their own District Head. However, the political struggle of
the Pan-Sayawa League which most vocally articulated the grievances of the
non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Bauchi is still maintained through
its elite and the Lere Students Association at Ahmadu Bello University,
Zaria.
Similar to the situation in the development of "tribal" unions on the
Plateau, particularly in Jos Division, because the cultural groups and
societies in S.Zaria, were numerically small in the size of their
membership, the numerous "tribal" unions which developed, fed in their
political unity and support into what became known as the Southern Zaria
Freedom Movement, which was led by political leadership of the Kagoro
tribe17 . This suggests that the "tribal" political identity was even weaker
among all the groups and societies in S.Zaria when compared to the peoples
of Jos Division albeit on the Plateau and with those in Benue where
powerful tribal unions shaped political development, although political
leadership in the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement was dominated by educated
persons from the Kagoro tribe. In the instance, rather than assume the
tribal identity of a Kagoro group and society that was dominant in the
political leadership of the movement, as was the case in Jos Division with
the Birom in BPU, a territorial category became used as a political tag to
meet the political objectives of Christians and non-Islamic people in
S.Zaria. This was so because the political tensions in S.Zaria were
developed from the domination of political roles by Hausa and Fulani
imposition of Islamic laws in British established courts, discrimination
and harassment on christians and Christian Missionaries, expropriation of
land, as well as, exploitation of the material possessions of the
non-Islamic people and the systemic destruction of tribal culture and
government which characterized the processes of the development of society
in the area, in the particular period between 1900 and 1945.
The epitome of the processes in the subordination of the non-Islamic
groups and societies in S.Zaria was characteristic of the reign of a Hausa
Chief, who was strangely and appropriately named from birth as "Mugunta" (a
Hausa word meaning "wickedness") whom the British appointed to rule the
Kagoro from 1930 until 1933 when he was deposed because he failed to
produce tax rather than the nature of terror he produced in ruling over
alien societies 18 . Smith suggests that political control by Mugunta was so
repressive that he ordered everyone who brewed beer to send him two large
potfuls before drinking it themselves, smoked a pipe cut from a mahogany
tree, ten feet long, which became obligatory to be borne ahead of him on
the shoulders of two men, so that he might smoke as he walked and
forcefully remodelled the relation between chief and people on Hausa-Fulani
lines in which there was a hierachial pattern of authority 19 . Furthermore
Mugunta introduced a series of exactions, levies, judicial miscarriages,
corvee turnouts, whippings, jailings and fines: " ... until the population
fled from sight and earshot, whenever Magunta appeared. Some Kagoro at this
time emigrated to Jemaa"20.
The first Christian missionaries from Western Europe to be found among
the groups and societies in S.Zaria were Mr. and Mrs Archibald of Glasgow,
Scotland who were members of the SIM and succeeded in establishing a
station in Kagoro in 1926 despite the opposition of the government of
British administration in The North that: "the tribe was scarcely under
control, and that the risk was on their own heads" 21 . Until 1945 the SIM
with the Archibalds had the 'Southern Zaria Field' almost entirely to
themselves22 . Smith suggests that the Archibalds wrought remarkable changes
by peaceful persuation, won a permanent place in the hearts of the Kagoro
and made many converts before 194023 . However in the period between 1930
and 1940 Christian youngmen in S.Zaria were forbidden by Mugunta to sell
food to European Missionaries as well as forbidden to work for them when
Mugunta ruled; and subsequently by another notorious "alien" chief from
Ankwei called Imbwheh who established political control over some of the
S.Zaria groups and societies by traditional magico-religious techniques,
when people suffered a famine from a locust invasion 24 . Smith suggests that
the Ankwei who manipulated the 'Inbwheh cult' for political control, copied
Hansa Chieftainship in having I dogarai l (Native Policemen) and an
intermediary as a spokesman 25 . With that structure, it ruled effectively
and exploited the people by introducing cult titles for women and youths
and:
"Everyone, old and young was required to attend
nightly dances at the Imbwheh shrine, to bring
beer, goats, chickens and dogs as tribute ...
when required, women married or not were
ordered to sleep with Imbwheh's nominees and
this license was enforced by whipping, fines or
other means if necessary"20.
This was particularly directed at and meant to punish Christian convents
who were constantly obliged to have sexual relations as Imbwheh ordered
against their wishes27.
Hostilities toward the Christian Missionaries existed because Mugunta
in particular regarded them as possible informers on his activities to the
government of British administration in The North and sought "to cow them
by frequent whippings" 28 . It was not until after 1933 that Christians in
S.Zaria became free to peruse their religion in peace and thereafter
conversions into Christianity increased rapidly 29 . Smith further suggests
that many of the groups and societies in S.Zaria, particularly the "pagan
Kagoro attribute the tribe's rescue to the mission"30.
The social and political problems in S.Zaria however became compounded
in 1933 when there was administrative reorganization affecting Hausa claims
to rulership and decision making in exclusively indigenous affairs to the
groups and societies in the area. In that year the government of British
administration in The North sent down trained Hausa staff from Zaria
emirate to guide and assist a new "pagan chief" to the Kagoro group and
society in the performance of his duties 31 . Furthermore, in 1934 the groups
and societies in S.Zaria became transferred from the predominantly
non-Islamic Province of Plateau to Zaria, a Province dominated by Islamic
leadership that was based on the emirate of Zaria with religious and
political loyalty to Sokoto in identity32 . In the instance of the newly
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developed i( circumstances, the Hausa staff in the reorganized Kagoro
administration manipulated the political situation to suit the diffusion of
Hausa culture and the Islamic religion. This was so because the chief
became dependent on them for advice and on the execution of policy
decision, while for their security they enjoyed the confidence of the
government of British administration in The North. This became bolstered by
a superior knowledge of administrative procedures which were conducted in
the Hausa Language 33 . In the period between 1934 and 1945 Hausa cultural
and Islamic influences that were represented by the Hausa staff in the
Kagoro administration and its dependence on Zaria Emirate for departmental
and treasury services, increased and permeated the "tribal" affairs of the
non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria 34 . In the circumstances
"tribal" chieftainships became more orderly copies of the Hausa and Islamic
hierachical mode135.
Although these political developments pleased the government of
British administration in The North, increased numbers of Christian
converts in the period between 1930 and 1945, caused social and political
consciousness on the alarming prospects of losing independence and being
totally incorporated into Islam, the Hausa culture and into the Zaria
Emirate under an Emir 36 . In 1950 between one third and one quarter of the
Kagoro were Christian Missionary adherents while about half of the children
attended Christian missionary schools even when it was the case that
previously the teaching was in Hausa until in 1950 when English became used
as the language for knowledge in the Christian schools among the
non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria 37 . Religious tensions therefore
compounded the cultural and political problems of incorporation into The
North among the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria. This was the
premise from which British Provincial Officers in the period between 1940
and 1950 began to keep a close watch on the local affairs of the Kagoro
group and society as a microcosm of the social and political problems of
the non-Islamic groups and societies, largely due to political changes in
the reinterpretation of the meaning of the policy of indirect rule as it
affected the administration of the M-Belt groups and societies. The
'political monitoring' of Hausa Fulani and Islamic influences in the
'tribal' affairs of the groups and societies in S.Zaria however did not
prevent increased attempts at the destruction of non-Islamic cultures. In
1934 there were efforts to enforce Islamic practices on the marriage
institution of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria 88 . For
example in that year, a Provincial Order forbade the practice of "secondary
marriage" unless the runaway wife previously observed "idda", a moslem rule
that required a three month continence before a divorce became final39.
It was pressures from these social and political problems that people
in Kagoro began to request their ablest local men, who were teachers in the
Christian Missionary schools in the area to take on Native Administrative
appointments as Assistant District Scribes 40 . It was from local pressures
affecting the majority of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria
that there was developed "The Southern Zaria Freedom Movement" with the
objective of organizing a political struggle for independence from Hausa
Fulani and halting the increases of Islamic influences "because indigenes
to Southern Zaria were essentially Christian and more non-Moslems and
non-Christians were becoming Christians 41 . Smith suggests that in 1959
about 60% of the Kagoro group and society were Christians and over 80% of
the school-age children went to government schools with a majority
attending the schools established by Christian Missionaries 42 . In S.Zaria
therefore, similar only to the political developments in Jos Division, an
all embracing social and political movement which cut across "tribal"
identities was began before exclusively "tribal" unions became organized.
For example while the southern Zaria Freedom Movement was organized in 1944
it was not until after the 1951 elections into the NHA that the Nzit Tribal
union was organized43 . The trans-tribal identities in the political
organizations on the Plateau and S.Zaria is explained by Christianity which
united the numerically small cultural groups and societies directed against
Islamic and Hausa domination as well as its influences which were
visible 44 . Even when different "tribal" unions were organized in S.Zaria,
they became politically associated and identified with the ideas of the
Southern Zaria Freedom Movement, which supported the M-Belt Movement,
particularly so, when it developed from the non-Moslem League (NML) to
become the Middle Zone League (MZL). This was so, for example, in the
experience of the Nzit Tribal Union, which joined the Southern Zaria
Freedom Movement45.
One of the earliest of the Christian teachers from the Kagoro tribe
who featured in the organization of social and political movements in
S.Zaria was Mallam Haruna Gwamna. Although he was trained in the government
college at Toro rather than the local post-primary Christian Missionary
institution, he was initially educated at the SIM Christian Primary school
at Kagoro. He eventually shifted from his teaching career to become an
Assistant Scribe with the NA, subsequently becoming the Chief Scribe
because of the political pressures brought to bear on him by the local
people in area to represent them 46 . When he became the Chief of Kagoro, he
was regarded by the government of British administration in The North as a
most respected Chief. While as Assistant Scribe and member of the S.Zaria
Freedom Movement he stopped the manipulations of his Hausa Superior, the
Chief Scribe47 . It was "pagan" priests and the majority of the
non-Christians and non-Moslem population in S.Zaria however who urged for
political protest which subsequently found expression and articulation in
the Christian educated elements in the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement as
well as other "tribal" unions. For example, Smith suggests that when the
reigning non-indigenous chief to the Kagoro group and society died in 1944,
it was the "pagan" priests and the "pagan" majority of the population which
refused on four occassions to accept anyone but Gwamna as the new Chief of
Kagoro 48 . This suggests that similar to the experiences of other
non-Christian and non-Moslem adherents among other M-Belt groups and
societies in Benue, Plateau and Adamawa there was social and political
identification with Christian educated persons rather than with Moslems in
S.Zaria. It ought to be pointed out however that unlike the perceptions of
socio-economic and political problems coming from the European educated and
the Ex-Servicemen among other M-Belt groups and societies in S.Zaria
discontent and political protest took shape from the bottom of society and
got pushed upwards to find expression from among the European educated. It
was from a political situation like this, that in 1945 Mallam Gwanna became
appointed as a third class chief of the Kagoro group and society as
representative of the non-Islamic groups and societies in S.Zaria in the
NHA49 . This was in the midst of Hausa and Moslem intrigues. The intrigues
produced political pressures on the government of British administration in
The North to appoint a rival Christian candidate to the Kagoro
Chieftainship who was sympathetic toward non-separatist tendencies from the
Islamic society 50 . The rival to Mallam Gwamna in the midst of the political
intrigues was Mallam Gwoni whose claims to legitimate rulership of the
Kagoro group and society was based on the Mugunta Legend51.
Although the political manipulations in the rivalries between Mallam
Gwamna and Mallam Gwoni in the period between 1940 and 1945 temporarily
split Christians unity among the Kagoro as well as among other groups and
societies in S.Zaria, in the period between 1950 and 1965 the whole of
S.Zaria looked up to Mallam Gwamna as their paramount chief 52 . This was the
political premise from which S.Zaria came to support the ideas of the
creation of a M-Belt Region because Mallam Gwamna supported the M-Belt
Movement 53 . However in the instance of the political cleavages within
Christian solidarity in S.Zaria during the period between 1945 and 1950,
Mallam Gwoni seceded from the SIM which he hitherto been a member and
together with a number of other converts, transferred their Christian
allegiance to the RCM and moved to establish a rival Chieftaincy at
Kafanchan 54 . In Kafanchan, Gwoni and his political loyalists had the
support of British administrative officers and was prestigiously supported
by the Hausa communities over his claims to the Chieftainship of the Kagoro
group and society in both Kagoro town and within Zaria Emirate55.
Subsequently when there was electoral politics in 1959 and as latterly as
in 1979, patterns of political support for the ideas of the M-Belt Movement
and the social and political identity it stood for reflected the splits
from the local tensions which developed from the rivalries, among other
causes, between Mallam Awan Haruna Gwamna and Mallam Gwoni in the period
between 1940 and 1950, the latter being bolstered morally to shape
political support by the large concentration of the Hausa and Moslem
elements in the population of S.Zaria56.
It has however not until 1951 that the Christian as well as other
non-Islamic people of Southern Zaria became socially and politically united
with a christian identity after the political split in the period between
1945 and 1950. Two factors caused the need for Christian unity to resurge
after 1951. Firstly, there was rapid development of the ideas of the
non-Moslem League in a crusade for Christian representation in government
decision making bodies in The North in which Christians as well as persons
participating traditional African systems of belief, supported 57 . Secondly,
there were the 1951 indirect elections in The North, developed when the
Macpherson constitution came into effect and a series of elections from
village to provincial electoral colleges became held throughout Nigeria, a
process which the S.Zaria districts participated 58 . In the instance, the
four Provincial members for Zaria elected into the House of Assembly in The
North elected by the Provincial Electoral College included two Heads of NA
Departments, One District Head and an Editor of a newspaper 59 . All the four
members representing Zaria Province in the NHA were Moslems and this
outcome of the elections caused considerable discontent and politcal
disappointment among the predominantly non-Islamic population in S.Zaria".
This was so because, although there was a considerable number of
non-Moslems in S.Zaria, they were not sufficient to outvote the Moslem
representatives of Northern Zaria Province, nor to push through their
representation in the midst of very little political effort to give
electoral representation by the government of British administration in the
non-Islamic people from the area 51 . The political tensions which developed
in S.Zaria because of the total eclipse of non-Moslem representation to the
NHA in 1951, only became allayed when the Headmaster of a SIM school at
Kwoi, Mallam Dauda Kwoi, was appointed by the Lieutenant Governor of The
North as 'a special member' in the House of Assembly to represent the
groups and societies in Southern Zaria 62 . This means that as early as in
1951, S.Zaria was dependant for the appointment of its political leadership
into some institutions of government in The North, rather than on its
rational electoral choices. Smith suggests that the 1951 electoral
experiences revealled the numerical political weakness of not only the
non-Islamic groups and societies of S.Zaria but also among other M-Belt
groups and societies in S.Bauchi and Adamawa 63 . Significantly it was from
these political circumstances that the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement as
well as the developed "tribal" unions after 1951 aligned themselves with
Christians among other groups and societies in the M-Belt areas in places
like Adamawa, S.Bauchi, Plateau and Benue in the Middle Zone League to
demand for the creation of 'a Central Region' in The North. It was the
political vigour and enthusiasm to demonstrate the protest over the Moslem
domination because of their superiority of numbers in the representation of
Zaria Province in the NHA, which excluded any electoral form of
representation from S.Zaria Christians and non-Moslem indigenes that misled
M.G. Smith to erreneously suggest that the MZL was organized under Kagoro
initiative in 1950 rather than support for the organization, a political
development that followed the publicity in the growth of the MZL, the
parent organization in the M-Belt movement which was formed in 1949 on the
Plateau by Christians.
The social and political problems in Adamawa and S.Bauchi were similar
to those that the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement as well as the "tribal"
unions contested. The social and political problems in Adamawa were
therefore typical of those parts of the M-Belt areas, where there was drawn
administrative calibre on non-Moslems by a Moslem Emirate, remained in The
North until in the 1940s and the 1950s. Unlike the problems on the Plateau,
which were economic and centred on land issues destroyed by tin-mining
activities and the benefits of jobs going to Hausa and "alien" communities
in the tin industry, rather than to the indigenes and in sharp contrast to
the "tribal" nationalism of the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla in Benue that centred
on modernization and its effect on the drive for political control on local
affairs by the European educated in Tiv land, the problems in Adamawa and
S.Bauchi were purely social and political and centred on the liberation of
the non-Islamic people in the area from Fulani and Islamic rulership. There
were numerous "tribal" unions in both Adamawa and Bauchi Provinces,
although in the latter instance these were concentrated in S.Bauchi. The
most politically active were the Kilba State Union in Adamawa Division, the
Wurkum Tribal Union in Numan Division. Within Numan Division itself, there
was also the Bachama Tribal Union. The most politically active "tribal"
unions in Bauchi Province before 1950 were the Pan-Jarawa and the
Pan-Sayawa Leagues. In the mid-1950s the Habe Tribal Union and the Katagum
Peoples Union also became organized and were politically active. Although
the Habe and Katagum Unions held political sympathy for the M-Belt
movements and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, they were
not part of a M-Belt conception of cultural unity.
The Kilba State Union and the Wurkum Tribal Union were the most
militant political movements of protest and demands for separation at the
local level from Fulani and Islamic domination of political roles and
rulership over the non-Islamic peoples in Adamawa. Furthermore, unlike
other "tribal" unions, the Kilba State Union was the only movement among
the M-Belt people which was organized to demand the creation of 'a Kilba
State' exclusively for members of its group and society and which supported
the M-Belt Movement. Although there was an Idoma State Union, it did not
show support for the M-Belt Movement. Similar in militancy, and politically
unique in the experiences of other "tribal" unions among the M-Belt people,
the Wurkum Tribal Union was the first to produce mytars from a
confrontation of separation from Fulani and Islamic political leadership.
Another contrast that existed with the "tribal" unions in Adamawa and
S.Bauchi is that although there were many Ex-Servicemen among the
non-Islamci people in Adamawa, the political task of organizing particular
tribes to resist Fulani and Islamic domination in political decision making
was in the hands of European educated teachers and Christian trained
evangelists. The Ex-Servicemen however supported the unions and were
involved in political mobilization of their particular groups and
societies.
The Kilba State Union or "the Kilba State Congress" was a local
political party organized in 1950 with the exclusive objective of
struggling for political separation from the Fulani in Adamawa and to be
constituted into a Division of its own". The political organization of the
Kilba and their political demands set into motion similar movements among
the Batta, along the northern banks of the Benue. and among the Chamba,
South of the river Benue 65 . The first President of the Kilba State Union
was Balla Yerima, a Christian trained Teacher/Evangelist, who had also
served as member of the BPU executive when he worked at Bukuru66 . The
central political issue which underlined the demands of the Kilba State
Union was objection to Fulani rule as well as grievances over total control
of decision making in the affairs of Adamawa Division which were based on
the Emir in Yo1a 67 . Although the Emir was a dominant political figure in
authority the political grievances of the non-Islamic groups and societies
in the Division were on the Fulani District Heads and their surrogate
Village Heads. In Adamawa Division, there were thirty one District Heads
alone, who were all Fulani and Moslem and were the direct appointment of
the Emir in Yo1a 68 . Although the government of British administration
sought to reduce their numbers to 18, the Native Authority under the
chairmanship of the Emir: "had a natural desire to maintain the petty
territorial Fulani District Headships unimpaired in status" 69 . In the
instance of the Kilba District, the local chief was appointed by the
'Hedime from Yola and because he was a Fulani, he was known throughout the
Province as "Santuraki", the traditional Fulani title 70 . Besides objecting
to the Fulani title being used by the Kilba District Head in which instance
the Kilba people preferred him to remain as "Til Kilba" (King of Tilba),
there was also political resentment that the Fulani 'Hedima' traditionally
installed the Chief of the Kilba, within the framework of the local
government system that was based on the hierarchial system of the Emirate
in Adamawa 71 . There was political resentment also that Kilba Chiefs only
looked forward in the future to becoming members of the Adamawa Division NA
council rather than expressed concern for tribal unity or tribal affairs72,
since they were depended on the approval of their appointments to the
council. After 1950, for example, when there was a new successor who was
barely out of his teens, it was suggested by the Council that: "his
inexperience and his need for a sound grounding in District Administration
makes it unwise that his appointment to the Council should be unduly
hurried" 73 . Resentment over this pattern of political control was
compounded by the historically recollected fact that the Kilba did not lose
political autonomy in their local affairs when there was the expansion and
establishment of the Islamic society of dan Fodio in the period between
1804 and 1900. In that period the Kilba were never subdued, although they
owed a loose political allegiance, with very little tribute paid to the
Lamido of Adamawa, the Fulani Emir74 . In the period between 1900 and 1933,
before there was political re-interpretation of the policy of Indirect
Rule, the government of British administration in The North, sought to
introduce and to use a uniform structure of power and authority derived
from the Fulani Islamic model, on the non-Islamic people. This was so,
despite at that time, incessant political complaints on the arbitrary uses
and abuses of power by the Fulani on non-Moslem populations and which
subordinated non-Islamic culture and when there was no tribal union or a
M-Belt movement to articulate these types of grievances. Although this was
so, in the period when there was increased political activity that had
developed from the protests of tribal unions and their grievances, the
government of British administration interpreted the issued as reflective:
"of the fears or inferiority complexes which
the smaller tribes who make up the non-Moslem
minority hold for the solid homogeneous ranks
of the Fulani-Hausa-Kanuri-Nupe, Moslem
majority ... It must be admitted that the fears
and anxieties still lurk in the background of
many undeveloped minds. Without doubt the main
cause of aprehension is simply a matter of
numbers ... In population, they vary from
hundreds of thousands down to a few hundreds.
Their average numbers are and in comparison
with the millions in the
Fulani-Hausa-Kanuri-Nupe Moslem bloc, merely
fractional. After centuries of strife and
turmoil in a hostile world, it is not
surprising that these tribes have been unable,
in little more than a generation, to shed their
atavistic fears, These lived on; and are likely
to do so for some time yet, in the form of
irrational suspicions'.
In the instance of the development of political grievances among the
non-Islamic people in Adamawa Division, although religious differences
underlined the cleavages between Christians and non-Moslems against Islamic
dominance, these were compounded by the numerical weaknesses to create
political influence in decision making processes in NA policies. The
non-Islamic peoples in Adamawa Division were therefore both religious and
politicaical minorities in access to control of political power, which was
dominated by a Fulani Moslem minority. In 1952, for example, while there
33753 (34.3%) Moslems in Adamawa Division out of a total population of
110030, there were 2587 (3.2%) Christians with 69690 (63.3%) people who
were non-Moslem and non-Christian 76 . The Christian minority in relation to
the Islamic majority in the patterns of dominance in Adamawa Division is
significant because in most instances, persons practising African systems
of traditional beliefs and worship (the so called pagans), identified with
Christians rather than with Moslems in their social and political support
and attitudes to the tribal movements under the leadership of the Christian
educated. The political and social circumstances of the non-Islamic people
in Adamawa Division therefore are very similar to the situation in S.Zaria,
where an "alien" minority population controlled political decision making
over local affairs of the majority population. Although the Fulani tribe,
for example, numbered less than 33% of the toal population of the Province,
they were about 50% of the total population in Adamawa Division 77 . In the
circumstances, although the Kilba State Union made the most far reaching
demands of any of the "tribal" political organizations among the M-Belt
people in the sense that it wanted the creation of "a Kilba State" to
constitute its own indigenes, it lacked political consistency in
organizational vigour to pursue its objectives. It was suggested for
example, that the leader of the "Kibal State Congress" emerges from:
"long periods of hibernation only when its
leaders become aware of an impending event of
political importance and feels compelled to add
his voice to that of other interested
parties"1°.
The numerical size of the Fulani and the inconsistent pattern of
resistance, by the Kilba State Union, made the Fulani in Adamawa Division
develop to become dominant in the diffusion of Islamic and Fulani culture
itself as well as the domination of decision making over public affairs
affecting the non-Islamic groups and societies in the area. Furthermore,
this was the premise from which Adamawa became unique in the whole of The
North in the useage of "Ful-Fulde", the Fulani language as the official
language in the Council Chambers in Yola, rather than the usual Hausa
language 79 . Fulani colonization and colonialism was therefore, most
vigorous in Adamawa, only comparable to S.Zaria in the experiences of the
M-Belt areas. Many persons among the non-Islamic groups and societies in
Adamawa therefore came to accept "Ful-fulde" as a language besides the
Hausa language, as the language of Administration while coping with their
own indigenous language. Although the non-Islamic groups and societies in
Adamawa Province outnumber the "alien" Moslem population in their midst the
established patterns of Fulani dominance in the period between 1804 and
1900 which were subsequently reinforced upon contact with British
influences in the period between 1900 and 1940, made the non-Islamic
majority politically ineffective. Although the numerous "tribal" unions,
for example, as well as the officials in the government of British
administration were able to mobilize their constituencies by "efficient
whipping" for the 1951 indirect elections:
"In the primaries, the farmers and primitive
people showed little interest (even when) their
attendences were good ... (and) the elections
were of intense interest to the educated, who
needed no tuition on what they were all
about"8°.
Furthermore, some of the remoter groups and societies in the Mumuje Hills
and in the highlands of Mandara, did not understand what "representation"
in Kaduna meant: "and the question was nervously asked as to what and where
Kaduna was"81 . In the political control of local affairs and representation
of the Province on the Regional political arena, therefore, Fulani
dominance crystallized into permance in Adamawa. This was the premise from
which in the period between 1951 and 1957 the Kilba State Union, as well as
other "tribal" unions in both Muri and Numan Divisions of the Province
supported the M-Belt movement in its phase as the NML and the MZL. In the
1956 elections, however, the Kilba State Union was affiliated to NEPU,
whose support gained the party a seat in Adamawa Northwest, which was an
electoral victory for Balla Yerima, the President of the Kilba State Union,
mainly as an anti-establishment vote rather than a rejection of the
political ideas in the creation of a M-Belt Region82.
While political discontent over Fulani and Islamic domination of
decision making in local affairs in Adamawa Division found the most
vigorous expressions in the Kilba State Union, in Muri Division it was the
Wurkum Tribal Union that was concerned to organize and attract political
resistance to similar problems. Wurkum was one of the physically
inaccessible districts in Muri Division of Adamawa Province, inhabited by
many small "tribal" groups and societies, who were previously ruled with a
firm paternal hand of the Emir in Muri in the period between 1875 and
190083 . In the period between 1900 and 1950, the government of British
administration in The North consolidated the rule of the Emirs over the
non-Islamic groups and societies that were centred on the Wurkum Districts
of Muri Division. Although a new Emir was appointed in 1926 84 , in 1953 he
was succeeded by his son in the Emirate Counci1 85 . The son, who was a
previous District Scribe for many years in the Wurkum areas was given the
Emirship: "At the specific request of the vast majority of the Village
Heads and elected members of the District Council" 86 . This appointment
coming from the top of society, activated political resistance and set into
motion anti-Fulani, anti-Islamic campaigns over the continued domination of
decision making on local affairs, spearheaded by a previously domant Wurkum
Tribal Union that had been organized in 195187 . Although the campaign of
the Union was initially directed at the Fulani and Moslems as a distinct
group in the Division, it crystallized into opposition to the whole NA
apparatus, where the Fulani and some of their appointed non-Islamic
District Heads and councillors dominated88 . This issue explains the
subsequent political affiliation of the Wurkum Tribal Union to the NEPU, a
party that had avowed aims and objectives of reforming the NA system in The
North because it perpetuated the existence of an autocratic and privileged
class of family compact rulers". In 1951 when the Wurkum Tribal Union was
an affiliate of the MZL it was mainly concerned to mobilize non-Islamic and
non-Fulani groups and societies on anti-Fulani religious sentiments".
Subsequently in the short period between 1952 and 1954, the Wurkum Tribal
Union expressed its resistance to only Fulani domination of political roles
by refusing to obey traditional Village Heads who had become instruments of
the Fulani District Heads and the Emir. When the son of the Emir of Muri
became appointed as District Head over the non-Islamic groups and societies
centred on Wurkum the "tribal" union saw the appointment as a political
issue that might win popular support from the "acquiescent-pagan masses
which had hitherto remained indifferent to their activities" 91 . The Wurkum
Tribal Union pushed further the matter to the District Officer in Muri
Division and subsequently to the Resident and only got the political reply:
"the Native Authority had given careful thought to the appointment and that
in future, real political power could lie with the District Council and the
Outer-Council" 92 . One of the four Outer-Council members for the Wurkum
District was a Christian and a high executive member of the Wurkum Tribal
Union93 . Early in June, 1954 the reaction by the government of British
administration in The North to the political demands of the non-Islamic
groups and societies in the Wurkum District, caused the members of the
Wurkum Tribal Union to intimidate Tax Scribes and subsequently their papers
and ink used for recording paid and unpaid taxes were seized. On 30th June
1954, when the Emir, the District Officer and another British Official,
W.D. Wilson went to Karim-Lamido, the District Headquarters, to seek a
reduction of tensions developed from the protests of the WTU by meeting
representatives from members of the different groups and societies: "they
met some 300 sullen-men, armed with cudgels, knives and matchets"94.
Although the District Officer was successful in persuading them to
surrender the bulk of their arms, "before they realized what was
happening", as well as to allow the return of the tax records to the Emir
with apologies, the 300 men warned that there might be violence if the
District Head returned to rule their area and also submitted that they did
not wish to see the newly appointed District Head visit the Wurkum
Districts 95 . Furthermore, the members of the WTU intimidated the Village
Heads and some elders who wanted to attend the District Court at Karim
Lamido96 . As a result of these developments, the DO revisited Karim Lamido
on the 13th July, 1954 to meet the leaders of the Wurkum Tribal Union to
hear the nature of their political grievances and subsequently toured the
villages in the company of the Waziri and the newly appointed District
Head97 . Implicit in the tour was that the problem and grievances of the WTU
should continue to be "heard" rather than solved. To meet the party of the
government, the WTU organized some 500 members from the non-Islamic groups
and societies in Muri Division. Although the DO suggested as a
conciliation, that there were to be no persecutions for the previous tax
offences, when the issue of the new District Head came up and the
authorities suggested that "he be given a trail in the office", the crowd
became out of hand and openly hostile 98 . The small but carefully organized
Police Force was ordered to disperse the crowd and a riot resulted. It was
from these riots that a native of Wurkum, a former Junior Primary School
Headmaster came to be appointed as the chief scribe of the NA, upon his
completion of the 'District Scribe Course' at the Institute of
Administration in Zaria, while the Fulani District Head left in the same
year to attend the same course in the same place 99 . Thereafter until 1960
British DOs and Fulani District Heads, jointly ruled the Wurkum District,
with more guidance from the former than the latter, a political pattern of
authority that was established by G.R. Gardner, an ADO in the Division in
1954100. Although this "joint" authority pattern on the non-Islamic groups
and societies and the clamp down on the leadership of the WTU temporarily
silenced its political activities, sufficiently for the Resident to suggest
that: "behind and around the tiny Fulani group there remained the great
mass of pagans still politically asleep but already beginning to show the
first stirrings of consciousness 1,101 , significant reforms came to be
implemented within the NAs of Adamawa and Muri Divisions as a direct
consequence of the political activities of the Kilba State Union and the
Wurkum Tribal Union, who were both in alliance with the MZL in that period.
In Numan Division, for example, where there remained a Sole Native
Authority there was reorganization of the District Council for the 1954
elections which incorporated 13 district members and 13 elected members
into the Final Electoral College who were "all young, all Europan educated
and all keen members of the Middle Zone League" 102.
 Furthermore, a
representative of the educated Christian elements became appointed as a
full time councillor in the NA 103 . This means that when there was increased
political manipulations by the establishment to keep the Fulani as the
ruling class over the non-Islamic groups and societies the "tribal" unions
in the Province became increasingly united by the Christian religious
identity which also stood and served as a political identity. It was from
the observations on these aspects of social and political identification
that the Resident of Adamawa, for example, stated:
"when in December Numan elected a Divisional
Member for the first time in history, everyone
tipped a modern progressive federal councillor
standing for Northern Peoples Congress.
Instead, Jonah Assadugu on a straight local
Middle Zone League ticket, which has little
connection with the regional party policy, got
in with no difficulty inspite of serious
obstacles. He is an intelligent man who has
shown political acumen and organizing ability;
under his leadership, the local Middle Zone
league coulq either run the Ferderation or
break it'.
Although separate Divisional constituencies of electoral colleges for
the 1954 elections into the Federal House of Representatives were set up
for Muri and Numan with four constituency electoral colleges in Adamawa
Division, there was increased political unity with the Christian religious
identity which cut across these territorial divisions, among the
non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa Province. The political
mobilization that conditioned this unity was under the educated Christian
leadership which existed in the tribal unions, organizations which served
as the local branches of the Middle Zone League. Christian political unity
which gained the support of other non-Islamic groups and societies in
Adamawa, was given a boost before 1954 in terms of what came to be
described as "the insult of 1951", when the Provincial electoral college
produced five Fulani as representatives of the Province in the NHA in
Kaduna, without a single representative from Numan Division. However, there
was no strong "tribal" organization among the non-Islamic groups and
societies beyond the Chamba Tribal Union, which was affiliated to the Kilba
State Union. Only the splits between two NPC Fulani candidates in the final
electoral college caused a Chamba candidate to win 105 . The political
"independence" of the Chamba candidate, however, did not last long after
'9.3
his election victory because he was promptly dragged into the NPC party
fold 106 . The 1954 results in the Adamawa electoral co ll ege, however, were
75% "tribal" representation and 25% Fulani and Islamic, an exact reflection
of the composition of the heteregenuity of the Province 107 •
 In Muri,
however, the Mumuye declined to give their "tribal" political allegiance to
other non-Islamic groups, because they wanted "to let things ride till the
next House of Assembly elections", a tribal political decision which caused
the election victory of the son of the Emir of Muri on the NPC party
identity 108 . In contrast to the Mumuye, the Bachama collectively with an
anti-Fulani, anti-Islamic and anti-establishment vote rejected a Moslem
Bachama NPC candidate, who was soundly defeated by a tightly organized
local MZL wing under the leadership of Jonah Assadugu, who won in the 1954
as an indigene of the non-Islamic tribes 109 . As lately as in 1954, however,
the Fulani themselves were not prepared to give electoral representation to
the non-Islamic tribes in the area. In Adamawa electoral area, for example,
while two electoral constituency colleges lay entirely in the Trust
Territory, three were predominantly "tribal" in composition 11 °. This
arrangement was a grave political shock to the local N PC-Caucus, who
thought they might have a single Divisional electoral college from which
they planned to elect three Fulani and one "tribal" representativelll•
Curiously, although the Fulani political leadership was quite shrewd in its
electoral strategy it was not blinded by complete self-interest. In the
circumstances, a quick survey of the constituencies convinced them that the
only hope of winning outside Yola, was to sponsor "tribal" NPC candidates
and the strategy worked perfectly in the constituencies north of Yola;
while in Yola town areas itself, they won convincingly by electing
Muhammadu Ribadu 112 . In the Southern Trust Territory, where the NPC failed
to find a "tribal" candidate, the political strategy broke down 113 . The
Middle Zone League-Northern Elements Progressive Union, however only got
three out of the thousand odd seats in the final electoral colleges of the
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Province114.
One of the ways the government of British administration in The North
sought to reduce the political influences from the activities of the
"tribal" unions as well as the developed Christian Social unity of the
non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa which became apparent in the
local organization and political support for the MZL was to restrict the
operations of all expatriate Christian Missionaries. The new policy was
particularly directed at the SUM. This was so because of the high
proportion of SUM employers among the membership of the WTU who were
convicted of leading the Wurkum riots as well as the evidence which showed
that some Christian Religious Instruction (CRI) classes had also been used
as political meeting places other than purposes of religious
instructions 115
. The local government administration therefore introduced
conditions which made it obligatory for all expatriate Christian
Missionaries to get "Permits to Operate" and the NA also insisted that CRIs
ought to be regularly visited by the European Christian Missionaries in
charge of them to ensure that religious classes did not become political
classes and meeting places 116 . This restrictive policy was made in the
specific context of the political attitudes of British administrative
officers in the period between 1950 and 1965 which held European Christian
Missionaries in Adamawa as increasingly characterized: "by taking sides
with the apparent underdogs without bothering to find out the (official)
point of view" 117 . This was a conception that was developed even before
Christian consciousness became a political force with anti-Islamic
sentiments that were directed against control of policy and the
administration of society by Fulani Moslems. It was from the political
pressures brought to bear on the social and political unity in the
relationship between European Christian Missionaries, Christian adherants
and the Christian Missionary educated leadership in the tribal unions that
the Kilba State Union, for example, on its own accord elected "A Committee
for Better Relations". This committee was entrusted with a social and
political task: to investigate and if possible settle matters that appeared
likely to create discord between the three rivals, Christian, Moslem and
animist sections of the Community 118, while discussions were held with the
European Christian Missionaries: "to show appreciation that there could be
no real progress unless all bodies (Native Authorities, Missions and
Government) that influence the minds of local men work in the closest and
most sympathetic cooperation" 119 . The critical political issues which
developed with bitterness in the grievances of the non-Islamic groups and
societies in Adamawa were that while Islam shaped political behaviour and
the selection of political roles, Christianity became restricted in its
attempt to take a religious identity into the political arena. It was this
political frustration that made the non-Islamic groups and societies in
Adamawa, to feed in their political support to the ideas of the M-Belt
movement and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, where social
and religious identities might be freely allowed to be collateral in
complimenting political identities, particularly, the Christian identity in
the minority politics of The North.
Similar to the social , and political problems which caused tensions in
Adamawa and S.Zaria, the non-Islamic groups and societies in Southern
Bauchi were faced with a struggle against the domination of political roles
in decision making processes over their local affairs by Hausa-Fulani
Moslems and variants of Islamic leadership; an issue that was central to
the organization of their politics with the tribal union movements.
AlthougH the earliest "tribal" unions and the most politically active
organizations in S.Bauchi were the Pan-Sayawa, Pan-Jarawa and the
Habe-Fulani Tribal Party which were organized in the period between 1949
and 1952, it was in the Longuda tribal areas in the east of Tangale Waja
District that on more than one occassion made representation to the
government of British Administration in The North expressing political
desire over the central theme of the M-Belt movement: "to sucede and join
their (non-Islamic) fellow tribesmen over the provincial borders in Numan
Division" 12°. Furthermore, similar to the political tensions in Adamawa,
political protest generated by discontent centred on Islamic political
rulership over non-Islamic groups and societies. The protests were
organized by the Pan-Sayawa League (PSL) and the Pan-Jarawa League (PJL)
and the tensions, most often degerated into frequent revolts, sometimes
violent 121 . Both leadership of the PSL and the PJL came from Christian
Missionary trained teachers and evangelists, particularly Missionary Bodies
like the SUM and the SIM. While the President of the Pan-Jarawa League
until 1959 for example, was Dogon Yaro Fusare, a SIM Parishoner, the
Secretary was Mallam Anyam a SUM school teacher 122 . Similarly, while the
President of the Pan-Sayawa League was Gwonto Mwaru, a SUM Lay-preacher,
the Secretary and chief organizers were employed as school teachers under
the same Mission 123 . Although Christians dominated the executive posts of
the Pan-Jarawa and Pan-Sayawa Leagues, both groups also included
non-Christians and non-Moslems in their executives and the bulk of their
support came from Christians and persons practising African traditional
systems of belief and worshi p124. There is no evidence that suggests that
Moslems supported or participated in the social and political organization
of the "tribal" unions, the local political movements that were the very
basic foundations from which popular consciousness about the political
grievances of the M-Belt groups and societies penetrated to the individual
level to become mobilized as a political force in the M-Belt Movement. In
fact Crampton suggests that in some instances of culture change as a result
of Islamization, there was total rejection of political and social
identification with the original "tribal" group before Islamization, like
the experiences of some Marghi in Adamawa, albeit Islamized groups and
societies in the M-Belt areas:
"On the whole pagans in the emirates who
embraced Islam also adopted the culture of the
Hausa-Fulani as well, just as the early
Christian Converts in Sierra Leone took
European names and started to wear European
clothes and the like. The Nupe terminology for
conversions to Islam is 'A ze poizi l (They
became Fulani) ... the Islamized Marghi tend to
regard themselves as Fulani and identified with
the Fulani rather than with pagan or Christian
Marghis"125.
In the period between 1949 and 1950, the Hill-Jarawa people who were
concentrated on the rocky terrain on the fringe of the Jos Plateau and who
were the main support of the Pan-Jarawa League, chafed under the autocracy
of a District Head, appointed from the Royal Family of the Emir of
Bauchi 126 . Although the Bauchi Royal Family was established by the Gerawa
tribe, a non-Fulani but Islamic people indigenous to the area, the Fulani
tribe dominated in the ranks of the Bauchi nobility 127 . When the Pan-Jarawa
League was organized in 1949, it mounted a campaign to have an indigenous
Jarawa man to substitute the appointed District Head from the Fulani in
Bauchi 138 . The political campaigns of the PJL included the mobilization of
Christians and non-Moslems to refuse to pay tax directly to the agent of
the Emir as a demonstration of rejection to the appointment of aliens to
perform political roles in the local affairs of the Jarawa, from the Emir
in Bauchi 129 . Whitaker suggests that it was widely believed by government
in The North and the Local Authority in Bauchi that the Pan-Sayawa and the
Pan-Jarawa Leagues received overt moral, organizational and financial
support from different Christian Missionary Bodies which operated in
S.Bauchi (SUM and SIM) 130 . The more covert Christian Missionary influences
on the organization of political protest on the Leagues in S.Bauchi were
through the Missionary training in the methods of evangelicalism: "going
out to witness among the people, meet the people and make converts". Both
leagues exploited the method and combined religious activity with political
campaigns against Islam in general, and particularly directed their appeals
against the Islamic presence and influence on local affairs. Furthermore,
with the method, both Leagues were therefore able to penetrate to the
grassroots of society where they articulated local political grievances
which created unity on anti-Islamic and anti-Fulani sentiments 131 . The
campaign of the Bauchi Hill Jarawa, organized and led by the Pan-Jarawa
League with leadership that had graduated from Christian Missionary
institutions, succeeded in obtaining an indigene as Chief in 1959, after
ten years of political protest and struggle, which included an alliance
with the M-Belt movement in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt
Region 132 . After 1959, the indigenous Chief to the Jarawa group was in firm
political control of the village Chiefs in Jarawa land 133 , a political
advantage which the European educated in the Pan-Jarawa League,
subsequently under the influence of Azi Nyako, were able to use to rally
total support for the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region, most
particularly articulated in political campaigns of the 1959 elections.
Furthermore, because of the political impact developed from the political
protest, organized by the PJL, Toro District was dissolved and most of the
Jarawa were constitued into "a Jarawa District unto themselves" 134 .
Although the Pan-Jarawa League was mainly concerned with social and
political issues which were on the diffusion of the Islamic religion and
the Hausa Islamic culture from Bauchi by the instrumental use of
institutional channels to convert Jarawa still practising African
traditional religions, there existed economic pressures on Jarawa land that
were caused by tin mining activities. By 1955 the tin mining activities
caused destruction to farmland, sufficiently to cause agitation from the
Jarawa, Anaguta, and the Jerawa, similar to the circumstances of the Birom
in Jos Division. These problems however affected most of the groups that
were found on the West and South-Western parts of S.Bauchi 135 . In 1955
certain areas of Jarawa and Lame Districts of S.Bauchi were defined as
congested areas and it became necessary to employ an Administrative Officer
as Land Officer, solely to work with the tin mining companies to reduce
tensions from the affected local communities, a development that was
largely resolved using the experiences of Jos Division 136 . The problem
however caused some migration of the Jarawa eastwardly from the west of
S.Bauchi in search of farm land. The question of land destruction as a
result of Tin mining activities however was not increased by a migrant
population in S. Bauchi as was the case in Jos Division. Indeed the PJL did
not raise the land issue in the economic sense as was the experience of BPU
in Jos Divison. Although the Pan-Sayawa League was an aggregated
agglomeration of the Sayawa, Longuda, Tangale-Waje, Lere and Mbula tribes
etc and therefore rather differently organized and in its patterns of
protest from the PJL, it more emotionally contested similar issues in S.
Bauchi to the Jarawa movement which centred on political protest and a
struggle against political influence of the Emir of Bauchi and his local
representatives who were appointed as District Heads on decision making
over local affairs 137 . Some of the non-Islamic groups in the PSL being on
the edges of the Emirate System - with the Emirs of Bauchi, Gombe and Muri
- were more directly affected by the autocratic rule of the Emirs and in
many ways were a buffer to the Jarawa people, from influences of Bauchi.
The political protest of the Pan-Sagawa League (PSL) however were
successful in effecting patterns of representation and reform in the
district council although they did not stop the domination of political
roles and decision making on the local affairs of the non-Islamic people by
Hausa-Fulani and Islamic leadership. As a result of the protests, for
example, in Lere District, there was instituted a system of
"District-Head-in-Council" along the lines of "Emir-in-Council" which
maintained effective political control of the District Head still appointed
from Bauchi rather than from the counci1 138 . Although a council was
established with elected and nominated members to moderate the excesses of
the District Head, the non-Islamic people remained political and religious
minorities in the District Head Council, particularly the elected members
with an average ration of six to ten for the whole of Bauchi Province139.
However, this was not unique to S. Bauchi. The political problems developed
from elected under-representation of the non-Islamic groups and societies
into the Central District Councils were also characteristic of Adamawa with
a ratio of six to nineteen, Keffi with Fourteen to Eighteen, Muri with Five
to Ten, Nassarawa Ten to Twenty, Wase seven to Nine and Zaria had Six to
Ten 140 . The political protests however over these circumstances, obliged
the Fulani nobility and the Emirs who ruled them to introduce elected
representation more fully and rapidly, an innovation that was adamantly
resisted in other plural emirates in the North like Ilorin and Zaria141.
Although there were reforms in the circumstances of domination of the
non-Islamic groups in S. Bauchi, the activities of the tribal unions
maintained political resistance to manifestations of its reinstatement and
particular opposition was spear-headed by Christain adherents. When upon
the death of the chief of Biliri in 1951, for example, who had been the
first chief in the area that owed his direct appointment to the government
of British administration in the North, there was opposition championed by
christians against the eldest son to serve as successor to the throne in
place of the father 142 . In the same year, christian opposition to the
exercise of political authority by the Fulani District Head on the
non-Islamic groups and societies, centered on Lere Distict, stirred
sufficient tensions which conditioned a political tour of Southern Bauchi
areas by the Emir: "in order to establish closer relations between the
District Head and the Mission" 143 . A direct consequence of the tour was
that two Christians became appointed to the District Council and the chief
representative of the area, who was a Christian and a mixed farmer was
elected to the Provincial Electoral College, apparently with Moslem support
from the Lere area 144 .
Although political problems over Islamic leadership were central to
the patterns of protest that developed in S. Bauchi, these grievances were
compounded by economic inequalities between the Islamic and non-Islamic
communities. In 1951, for example, economic wealth was unevenly distributed
in the Tangale Waje areas:
"With the rich farmers on the borders of Kumo
and Pindiga, contrasting with the poor and
primitive people on the border of Adamawa. The
latter produce practically no cash crops and
many do casual labour in Gombe Emirate in order
to pay their tax. The population of the poorer
farming areas is showing a decline and there is
a movement into the richer farmlands of
Gombe... comparable results of mixed farming
with those of Gombe farmers can hardly be
expected among pagans with no knowledge of
cattle management"145.
It was from these under-privileged districts that there existed persistent
political demands for separation from the political control of the Emir in
Bauchi and to join fellow "tribes" that were essentially non-Islamic but
not necessarily poor, over the border in the Numan Division of Adamawa
Province146 . It was in the midst of the social and political domination of
Hausa-Fulani and Islamic leadership over the indigenous groups and
societies to S. Bauchi, compounded by severe economic inequalities with
increased social consciousness produced from christian missionary
activities on political issues, expressed in the "tribal" Union Movements
as political organizations, that the 1951 elections were contested.
Although all areas of Bauchi Province experienced what was described as
their "First touch of election fever", largely due to time spent on
election work and general tours undertaken to explain the procedure and
political importance of the elections:
"In some areas there was but a vague idea of
what it was all about and some pagans areas
were disturbed by rumours that those elected
would be drafted to the tin mines or the Korean
war. Generally speaking in most areas,
enthusiasm was hi	 and a high percentage of
the people voted"".
The "tribal" Unions with explicit social and political christian identities
in S. Bauchi, however, made an insignificant impact on the outcome of the
1951 elections. This was so because there were no political campaigns on
particular party lines except for the overt NPC political activities in the
Azare areas 148
. The electorate therefore voted for the local personalities
rather than principles preached by the particular political organizations
they claimed to belong to 149 . The report of the Resident in Bauchi stated
that the 1951 elecitons:
"revealled an excessive tendency toward
parochialism reflecting the determination of
each group to do its utmost to secure
representation at the next level and in the
absence of really outstanding personalities, it
was inevitable that electors should vote for
those whom they knew personally" 150.
In the instance, in an electoral college of ninety-one members for Bauchi
Province, there were eighty-nine nominations to secure places for seven-men
with the highest majority as reprsentatives in the NHA. As a result of the
high percentage of the nominations (97.8% of the members of the elected
college nominated), 75% of the contesting candidates failed to reach double
figures in the final election count 151 . Although there were common
socio-political and economic problems affecting the non-Islamic groups and
societies in S. Bauchi which led to the organization of the "tribal" Unions
with an explicit Christian religious identity, it was the tribal identity
that conditioned the political identity and this did not create much
electoral impact. Furthermore, although the religious and political
problems were as sharp as those in S. Zaria and Adamawa, the non-Islamic
groups and societies in S. Bauchi never crystallized their christian unity
into a solid electoral bloc for political action. As a result, of the seven
members representing Bauchi Province into the NHA from the 1951 elections,
only one was non-Fulani and non-Hausa, and although Moslem, he was
sympathetic to the socio-economic and political problems in S. Bauchi. He
was Yakubu Wanka, an accountant with the Bauchi/Dass Native Treasury, who
scored twenty two votes (24.2%) in an electoral college with ninety-one
members 152 . There was however evident competition among members of the
Electoral College to get elected into the NHA, with the strength of the
Islamic identity producing a political hierarchy in the voting patterns for
the different candidates among themselves. For example, Abubaker Tafawa
Balewa, subsequently to become the Prime Minister of the Nigerian
Federation in 1957, was top of the poll in the Provincial Electoral College
with 53 voters, Jauro Gombe, a visiting teacher with the Gombe NA scored 31
votes, Mallam Buba, supervisor of works in Gombe NA scored 26 votes,
Chiroman Bauchi, the eldest son of the Emir of Bauchi and District Head of
Galambi-Kirfi scored 24 votes and Mohammadu Kabir the son of the Emir of
Katagum and junior NA scribe scored 17 votes 153 . In additon, Mallam Bawa
was nominated by the Katagum NA into the NHA 154 . In Adamawa, S. Bauchi and
S. Zaria, therefore, Islamic dominance in representative electoral
processes, compounded the grievances over decision-making in the local
affairs of the non-Islamic groups and societies, a process that was
conditioned by numerical sizes of adherents to Islam and access to
accumulated economic wealth by positions in the NAs which enhanced the
status of the political personalities.
However, in the period between 1950 and 1965, socio-economic and
political grievances of the M-Belt movement were the accumulated and
contested issues and problems of the different M-Belt grups and societies
which varied in political gravity in their local circumstances and as they
were articulatedly organized by the tribal union movements. As evidence
will subsequently be produced in the explanation of the variation in the
decline of political support for the UMBC party and the demand for the
creation of a M-Belt Region, in the period between 1960 and 1965, there was
overt patron-client relationship in the politics of the Sardauna with some
of the political leadership in the M-Belt movement, from variations in
local problems. It was a political strategy meant to keep the North as one.
In the instance of that period, the M-Belt groups and societies politically
recoilled into their "tribal" identities and with those, they took up a
struggle to bargain for socio-economic infrastructural facilities from the
government of the NPC in the North, inorder for their societies to develop.
This was a tribal strategy that gained currency when the patro-client
mechanism was most effective in the politics of the North, before the
military intervened in Nigerian politics in January, 1966, despite previous
conceptions of being non-Islamic, christian and among the minorities, as
the driving force in the political identity of the M-Belt movement. In
other words, in the period between 1960 and 1965, the nature of politics in
the North, albeit in Nigeria, recycled the conditions that previously
caused the formation of "tribal" Unions in the period between 1940 and
1950. In the period between 1940 and 1956, the socio-economic issues among
the M-Belt groups and societies were raised as local political problems. In
the period after 1956, however, the political contest involving the M-Belt
movement that was organized in 1949, was centered on the solutions to local
socio-economic and political problems rather than a dominantly harmonious
problem affecting all of the M-Belt groups and societies. At the peak of
the heat of the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region (1956-1959) the
socio-economic issues contested by the M-Belt movement varied, with each
unique to the circumstances of the groups and societies in the M-Belt areas
but with Islamic domination of political roles of decision making in both
the government of the NPC at the Regional and Provincial levels of
institutions being the common grievance factor which cut-across issues that
were articulated. It was from a premise like that from which there was
developed the anticipation that a government in a M-Belt Region, organized
by its indigenes, will be directed at the solution of local problems which
the existing Regional government relegated to backwaters of public
policy 155 . However, by recruiting "tribal" Unions whose existence was based
on the contest of local political issues, the M-Belt movement was to open
up exit-voices within its ranks, once local problems were solved or
conciliated. The political organizations in the M-Belt movement were
therefore vulnerable to dislocation by the very nature of the way the
movement organized-in tribal Unions to become a political force in the
North and Nigeria from among the groups and societies in the M-Belt areas.
In the instance, "tribal" Unions with political support for the ideas of
the creation of a M-Belt Region articulated by the M-Belt movement easily
organized themselves out, when local socio-economic and political interests
became conciliated by the party in control of government. In the growth and
development of the M-Belt movement, the fissiparous nature of the political
organization in the period between 1952 and 1965 is explained by the
"tribal" interests within and outside the organization, rather than the
absence of a coherent political objective in the demand and political need
for the creation of a M-Belt Region.
The evidence produced in this section, therefore, suggests that
socio-economic and political problems of discrimination and deprivation
were not only causes of tribal Unions, who fed-in their political support
in identifying with the M-Belt movement. There was also the desire for a
political arena, removed from the domination of majorities, where cultural
minority "proto-tribal-nationalism" of the different groups might exhibit
itself. In the period between 1938 and 1965, "tribal-nationalism" in the
majority of instances with the M-Belt groups and societies, was fed into
christian unity and produced political support for the M-Belt movement and
its demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Furthermore, to the causes
of the emergence of "tribal" Unions and subsequently their support of the
M-Belt movements, were deep seated anxieties which were rooted in
anticipated consequences of British withdrawal from political control in
the North albeit Nigeria. These anxieties were an apparent political
development from the constitutional conferences, the translation of the
1951 Macpherson constitution in which electoral politics were introduced
and the subsequent settlements of the 1954 federal constitution in which
the North assumed more political powers and control of its wealth
independently of the Nigerian Federation. There was also the 'Eight Point
Programme' of the North, which was almost declaring the North as an
independent 'Nation within the Nigerian Nation'. These political
circumstances, in which the M-Belt and societies found themselves
encapsulated in an increasingly isolated North, were further compounded by
historically recollected experiences with the Islamic society of the period
between 1804 and 1900 and which increasingly found expression in political
rhetoric as reminders and which were correlated to the persistant
humiliation and subordination of the non-Islamic people to Hausa Fulani and
Islamic patterns of authority and control of society in the North. This
pattern of controlling society in the M-Belt areas compounded
socio-economic and political problems, particularly when the whole
processes were complicated by the thrust of Hausa-Fulani and Islamic
culture particularly with the penetration of the Hausa language toward the
M-Belt areas, which was backed-up by the authority of British rule. The
rejection of this thrust of the culture of the Hausa Fulani was a critical
factor in seeking a new Region, where a different identity might thrive, an
identity that might be the alternative to the dominacne of the Islamic
identity in the North. However, while the Hausa language served the purpose
of integrating the different "tribes" in the North and a strong force in
fostering the conception of the Northern identity, the same language served
as a medium for the propogation of the Christian religious faith among the
M-Belt groups and societies, which was the instrument for creating the
conceptions of a contrary identity, the Christian M-Belt identity, poised
against the Islamic conception of the Northern identity. In the growth and
development of the M-Belt movement as a political force in the politics of
the North and Nigeria, the differences in religious identities were
emphasized as causes of socio-economic and political discrimination and
deprivation affecting the M-Belt areas. The religious identity served as a
major political resource in the mobilization of political support in the
demand for the creation of the M-Belt Region. However, before the political
demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region was made, tribal unions among
the non-Islamic people in the North, had fruitlessly contested for the
control of their local socio-economic and political interests. Although
some of these interests were conciliated, the majority remaied unresolved
issues and problems. It was because of these unresoled issues and problems
that non-Islamic and Christian conceptions of the differences in identities
in the North, matured the ideas for the demands for separation, through the
organization of an all embracing political movement with political
interests which were beyond tribal identification. The NML, for example,
took over the common causes of the tribal Union movements with a unitary
conception of a political identity, reflecting the solidarity of
Christianity in the areas which subsequently grew and developed the
separatist tendencies in some of the tribal unions, into political
conceptions of a M-Belt Region.
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Additional Notes to Chapter 3
1	 The subsequent prohibition of large scale Christian Missionary
activity in Muslim areas in the North, ultimately worked to the advantage
of the growth of the Christian Church since the resources which would
otherwise have been spent more or less fruitlessly in a vain attack on the
citadels of Islam were freed to missionise the 'pagan' areas where the
prospects of building up a large scale church membership were far greater
and where in due course large Christian Communities in fact arose.
2	 Crampton 1975 p.151 quite explicitly states that zoning occured
among protestants and not among Catholics and the main reason was that most
of the missionary societies already had an understanding that they would
not enter areas where another society was already working. The RCM and
various other unconventional Protestant Bodies however did not respect the
principle of the community of Missions and have felt free to move and work
anywhere. This evidence conforms to the experience of M.J. Dent in Benue,
Bauchi and Kano.
3	 There were however significant distinctions between Catholic and
Protestant Missionary work in the North and among the M-Belt groups in
particular: the rather late arrival of the Catholics, their more easy going
attitude in the practice of the Christian religion in some areas, e.g.
tolerance of alcoholic drinking, their rather more worldly wise attitude to
Islamic power - so that at first Catholics were not so predominant in
M-Belt leadership and their priests were less keen on confronting Islam in
a political way than were most of the protestant Missonaries like the SUM
and SIM. In the end however both the Protestant stream and the Catholic
stream of Christian activity are equally involved in the M-Belt movement,
particularly in seeking guarantees for respect of basic human rights in the
North to protect Christians.
4	 It ought to be borne in mind however that the Ningi rebel connection
to the Isawa 'Christians' is quite unproven and is the idea not of
Crampton, but of Adell Paton, their connection with the martyred Islamic
teacher, Ibrahim in an earlier period in Kano is far better attested in the
history.
5	 A fair proportion of these 24.7% of Christian teachers involved in
work in the 'core of the Islamic centres' were in fact teaching the
children of Southern immigrants, working .in the administration, in business
or in trade; and this applies even more strongly to the calculations of
numbers of churches.
6	 For 'Sura' in all other sections of the thesis, read as Mahavul.
7	 Ayandele may be quite wrong on translations of the Miller version of
the Hausa Bible; a new translation of an approved kind was being produced
as early as 1955 by Sanderson in Katagum.
8	 By chief in this context, it is meant a chief that is independent
and not simply a district head who is subjet to an Emir or a British
created Paramount Chief. In Bauchi, for example, there was one such chief
in Dass and the others as the table scores is in reference to Tangale Waje.
9	 However, the fact that the Tiv took magical status from a title
conferred by the Aku and the Jukun people who had a reputation for magical
prowess does not make them subject to an oligarchy. There is no doubt
however about Jukun influence on the Tiv.
*10
	
Until 1931 The only officers to take the Tiv language examination
were education officers. Furthermore in the 1940s and 1950s MacBride was in
Tiv land and was present in the 'Nyam Buan' disturbances during the period
of the war of 1939-1945 and ended as Resident Benue in about 1954 when he
was posted to Lokoja.
*
11	 It ought to be borne in mind however that Emirate status, state
systems and strong headship of a community are not created western
institutions but Hausa-Fulani ones, and have many parallels in Africa from
periods long before European contact.
*
12	 With the creation of Tiv Division however, early in the 1930s by
Captain Downes, all trcAces of subservience to the Aku Uka ceased, except
for the large number of Tiv farmers (a majority of the population in Wukari
Division) who had emigrated and settled there.
*
13 It ought to be borne in mind that in the campaigns for the creation
of the Tor Tivship, the Tiv wanted the prestige of a single Chief, of first
class status. They did not want subordination on the Hausa Fulani pattern -
For detailed discussion of this dual requirement of the Tiv, See Dent 1966
Chapter on the UMBC.
*
14	 % total labour force means % of 1930 total labour force; Similarly
% on tin mining means % of total tin tonnage and value mined during the
same period.
*
15	 All tin exports paid a royalty to the Nigerian government of about
10%, but this benefited the whole Northern region rather than the Birom
people. There were also huge profits for the overseas companies.
*
16	 Total tin value, here means total value of tin extracted from 1903
to 1930. The reason for the very high percentage for the specific years is
of course that the price was still high then, and only fell
catastrophically with the slump of the post 1931 years.
*
17	 It ought to be borne in mind that the phenomenon of attacking a
smaller local rival, rather than a larger richer exploiting agency is also
common throughout many relationships, e.g. periodic anti-Asian movements in
East Africa, anti-Semitism in Tzarist Russia etc.
*
18	 The Lere districts were however not centred around Dass, but around
Lere town itself and also on Tafawa Balewa Dass, for most of the British
Colonial period had an independent NA, though a very small one, using the
Bauchi treasury. The Chief of Dass was never a Bauchi district head.
Similarly, Tangale Waje and Dass were never subject to the Emir of Bauchi
although they were a part of Bauchi Province.
*
19 Gowon was referring to Officer recruitment which was skewed to the
Ibo group before 1961 and then evened out by the quota policy. Recruitment
of other ranks was always skewed to Northerners and needed no rectification
by Northernisation policy.
*
20	 Among the founders of the TPU, was also Ayilla Yogh, the most
important of the Tiv radicals in this period and was closely associated to
Nnamdi Azikiwe, the leader of the NCNC party. Subsequently, he was also a
member of the Nigerian Parliament after 1954.
*
21	 However, James Adzakpe was a younger man, and discrimination
against him occured under the Sardauna in the mid-1950s and not in this
period.
*
22	 There are many versions of this story: M.J. Dent for example
suggests that his messenger alleged that the interpreter messenger at the
meeting mistranslated to give Makere the victory; but these explanations
are strange, the Pusu candidate was sure to win for there were more Pusu
clan-heads-only Iharev Masven Nongow intermediate area, plus Turan Ugondo,
Ikurav Tieu and Ikuravya clans are Chongo; thus out of 58 clan heads some
18 are Chongo and the rest Pusus. Furthermore, when M.J. Dent conducted the
Deputy Tor Tivship elections by long discussions (over 40 hours) in 1958,
every clanhead initially voted for his genealogical candidate and only
shifted ground when that candidate had been defeated.
*
23 It ought to be borne in mind however that the Igalla had an Attah
for a long time. The office was not created to fulfill the aspirations of
post war elite for tribal importance.
*
24	 This figure in the quoted document is presumably in reference to
sq. acres rather than sq. miles; 38,059 sq. miles is a larger area than the
whole of Jos Division!
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CHAPTER £4.
The political growth and development of the M-Belt Movement.
"Land of our birth the Middle Belt
Our love for thee is great and deep
We hope to grow soon and take our place
Like other Regions in our Nation
Land of Mineral Resources
Where the green, the Niger and Benue meet
To adore Nature's Beauty and Wonder
Bless the Region of Middle-Belt"
I Introduction
This chapter examines the growth and development of the M-Belt
Movement in the period between 1949 and 1965. It also examines the
conflicts that arose within the M-Belt Movement caused by the existing
differences in socio-economic problems and the political interests of
the leadership in the "tribal" Unions among the M-Belt groups and
societies. The differences in socio-economic problems and the political
interests of the leadership in the "tribal" Unions existing among the
M-Belt groups and societies were some of the underlying factors that
caused factions in the various phases of the growth and development
of the M-BeJ.t Movement from the Non-Moslem League (NML) of Northern
Nigeria to the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) of Nigeria. When
the M-Belt Movement grew and developed from the NML and became the
UMBC under the political leadership of 3.5. Tarka in 1956, with massive
1.	 A proposed National Anthem for the M-Belt Region, composed by
Bello Ejumu, a Yoruba from Kabba Province, first Oeneral-
Secretary of NEPU in 1950, with Moses Nyam Rwang organized
factions of the MZL into MBPP in 1954 as an affiliate of the
NCNC party, became AG organizing secretary for Kabba Province in
1957, rejoined UMBC as Party Organizing Secretary for Jos Division
in 1958; An Edition produced by Elizabeth Ivase, Commissioner for
Education, Benue State, January 1981.
support from the liv group and society, who were the majority in
numerical size in the population of the M-Belt areas, it vigorously
campaigned and struggled for the creation of a N-Belt Region, meant
to be a separate political unit from the Islamic society in The North
and politically autonomous within the Nigerian Federation, until Benue-
Plateau state was created in l967
The available literature that has been generated by both previous
academic and non-academic researches on the M-Belt Movement and its
demands for the creation of a N-Belt Region in The North suggest that
the analytical focus has been on its ultimate manifestation in the
1
IJMBC.	 This has been without careful explanations of the political
growth and development of the previous organizations that shaped the
demands subsequently articulated by the UMBC and the nature of socio-
economic and political problems and issues existing among the N-Belt
groups and societies in the period between 1940 and 1956,which con-
ditioned the political changes in the labels used as symbols of
cohesion in the demands for the creation of' a M-Belt Region as a unit
of the Nigerian Federation. In some instances the UMBC party has been
analyzed as a total M-Belt Movement, 2 even when it is the case that
1. Among other books for examples, see Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian
Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton,
1963; B.J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria,
London 1968; Bryan Sharwood Smith, "But Always As Friends" Northern
Nigeria and the Cameroons 1921-1957, London 1969; J.I. Tseayo,
Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration of the liv,
Zaria 1975; N.J. Dent, "A Minority Party - The Uniied Middle Belt
Congress", 1965 p.461-507, in J.P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government
and Politics, London 1965.
2. For example, see Tseayo 1975 p.193-198
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the parent organizations like the NML and the MZL experienced sub-
stantial changes and shifts in political identity in the demands for
the creation of a separate region from the Islamic society in The North.
For example, while the NML was politically articulate with the Christian
religious identity, the MZL emphasized the differences in the cultural
identities to the Islamic culture and the similarities of the cultural
patterns among the non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas
as symbols of political cohesion in a M-Belt Region even when it was
the case that the leadership was still Christian in outlook and
ideological emphasis. Although M.G. Smith, J.I. Tseayo and Bryan
Sharwood Smith suggest that the MZL shaped the political demands of
the UMBC for the creation of a M-Belt Region, the systemic forces of
politics in The North and Nigeria that caused the development from
the MZL to the UMBC remain u1 e) . rt cu ned) Furthermore, besides brief
mentions of the essentially parent organization of the M-Belt Movement,
the NML of Northern Nigeria, which was a conglomeration of Christian
leadership from both the "tribal" Unions and churches among the M-Belt
groups and societies, has received little analytical attention as an
organization that shaped the conceptions of the political identity of'
2
the M-Belt Movement in its different phases.
1. For examples see M.G. Smith, "Kagoro Political Development", Human
Organization Vol.19 No.3 1960 p.137-149; Tseayo 1975; Sharwood
Smith 1969; Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power
in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton 1963 p.345-350.
2. The inadequate focus of attention in the analysis of the causes of
the NML, the parent organization of the M-Belt Movement has been
largely due to the religious emotions which surrounded the emergence
of the organization and made the political climate of earlier
researchers difficult to give attention to the events surrounding
its inception as a political force.
"'S
The purpose of the chapter therefore is to examine whether the
diffusion of the political ideas in the demands for the creation of
a M-Belt Region, shaped by the growth and development of political
support for the M-Belt Movement were caused by similar socio-
economic and political problems and issues which were previously con-
tested by "tribal" Unions as political organizations among the M-Belt
groups and societies. In the period between 1949 and 1956 the
increased diffusion of political ideas among the M-Belt groups and
societies on the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region was
caused by the development of the M-Belt Movement from the NML of
Northern Nigeria to the UMBC, which became a national political force
in shaping electoral patterns in the non-Islamic areas of The North
when it became aligned to the AG party in 1956. When "tribal" Unions
among the M-Belt groups and societies were seen to be ineffective
political instruments of creating impact on government in the wider
political arena in The North in the struggle to transform the structure
of authority at the local level in order to solve the soclo-economic
and political problems of their groups and societies they gave support
to the organization of a wider social and political movement to produce
the initial M-Belt Movement, the Non-Moslem League. This movement
was crystallized in social identity by the Christian religion, a
process of crystallization which culminated in the demand for political
separation for existence in a M-Belt Region in The North, autonomously
independent of the Islamic society within the operations of the Federal
system in Nigeria in that period.
As it has been earlier suggested the majority of the non-Islamic
as well as the non-Christian population who were persons practising
African traditional systems of beliefs and worship among the M-BeJ.t
groups and societies identified for social and political purposes with
Christians and Christian leadership in the "tribal" Unions rather
than with Moslems and Islamic political organizations before 1954.1
In the period between 1949 and 1956 when there was the development
of the NML to become the UMBC in 1956 the socio-political and economic
circumstances of persons with traditional African religious practices
conditioned their political support for the M-Belt Movement. Their
political support for the M-Belt Movement was also conditioned by
historically recollected socio-economic and political experiences with
Moslems in the cause of the expansion of the Islamic society in the
period between 1804 and 1900; and their subordination to Islamic culture
and authority patterns in the period between 1900 and 1940 when there
was a government of British administration in The North.
The chapter also examines systematic growth and development of
the M-Belt Movement, in the nature of the patterns of political support
it gained which reflected the grievance over the political powerlessness
of the non-Islamic groups and societies involved in the struggle to
influence changes in the type of problems that seem to persist in all
political systems centred on equity in the distribution of welfare
amenities, the sharing of political roles and participation in
decision making in The North as well as the scab-economic and political
problems which develop when some groups and societies are distanced
from the centres of political power in a developing country like Nigeria.
In the period between 1949 and 1956 the different political phases
in the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement were characterized
by the development of factional tendencies, cleavages and splits within
the organizations that were the result of different perceptions of the
1.	 For detailed examples with discussions of how the Christian converts
held "attraction power" for non-Christians and non-Moslems to
become identified with them see Chapter 3 Sections III, V and VI.
1nature of the political system in The North and hence different
strategies of political organization to achieve objectives. It is
argued that although in the period between 1949 and 1956 the mode of
articulation adopted by the political leadership in the different
phases of the M-BeJ.t Movement varied greatly, suggesting that political
dissonance was characteristic of the growth and development of the
organization, available evidence dissolves equating political
differences with an absence of clarity in the objectives of the leader-
ship for the creation of a M-Belt Region. In other words, the fissi-
parous nature of the political growth and development of the M-Belt
Movement from the NML to the UMBC was conditioned by the absence of
a politically cohesive and committed strategy. In the instance some
of the political leadership from the initial founding fathers of the
Movement were easily brought into the fold of patron-client relation-
ship with leadership in the Islamic society with the concommitent
consequence of developing 'a political generation gap between the
original founders of the M-Belt ideas and a new younger breed of
European educated persons in the leadership. The European educated
who subsequently took over the organization and leadership of the
M-Belt Movement in 1956 were a more vigorous and radical set of leaders
who skillfully compromised their personal gains with their orientations
of the political objectives in the M-Belt Movement. Typically
characteristic of the leadership of political movements among sub-
ordinated groups and societies who are entangled in a colonial relation-
ship with a dominating group and society articulation of political
grievances tend to shift from specific issues to become broadly based
as the organization moves to gain support. This was the case in the
development of the M-Belt Movement among the non-Islamic groups and
societies in The North when it was organized as the NML to seek
political participation in the quest to protect Christian interests
and subsequently expanded that interest to seek separation from the
Islamic society in The North when it was the (JMBC, a political
process that was conditioned the prestigious notions of the practice
of Federatism of Nigeria in that period. Furthermore political
leadership in the developing organizations of subordinated groups and
societies in an internal colonial situation become subjected to patron-
client relationships with the concommitant consequence of the factions
becoming characteristic of the organization to try to meet differing
political objectives.1
Factual evidence on the growth and development of the M-Belt
Movement in the period between 1949 and 1965, derive from the
illuminating interview discussions held with politicians in Adamawa,
S. Bauchi, Benue, Plateau and S. Zaria, who participated in the different
phases of the organization. Many of the twelve major political
participants that were directly involved in the initial growth and
rlevelopment of the ideas for a M-Belt Movement and its subsequent
demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North were still
alive in the period of fieldwork interviews, (November 1980 - February
1981), except for three who died in the period between 1971 and 1981.
The personalities and politicians involved in the M-Belt Movement
who were interviewed in the period between November 1980 and February
1981 included Moses Nyam Rwang (Birom - Jos Division on the Plateau),
Pastor David V. Lot (Sura - Pankshin Division on the Plateau),
Jonah Assadugu (Bachama - Numan Division in Adamawa Province),
Mallam Cwamna the Chief of Kagoro (S. Zaria), Azi Nyako (Jarawa -
S. Bauchi in Bauchi Division), Isaac Kpum, Isaac Shaahu (Tiv - Benue
Province), Gayos Gilima (Kilba - Adamawa Division in Adarnawa Province),
Patrick Dokotri (Birom - Jos Division on the Plateau and secretary to
1.	 The theoretical perspectives of groups and societies in an internal
colonial situation which uses the conceptual elements derived from
the classical theory of colonial relationships are examined and
discussed in detail in 'c-.-C Lrti- b
the UMBC party)before his death in April 1980. It ought to be borne
in mind however that only brief interview sessions were held with
J.S. Tarka in London in March 1980. His other political intentions
with the M-Belt Movement and Nigeria used as evidence in this research
derived from his close personal friends like M.J. Dent, Senior Lecturer
in Politics, University of Keele and liv politicians like Isaac Kpum,
Isaac Shaahu and his son, Simeon Tarka. Bitrus Rwang Pam and his
father, Mallam Moses Rwang Pam, the Chief of Jos, both died in
June 1969.1 The roles they played and their political views on the
M-Belt Movement and conceptions of a M-Belt Region were derived from
their closB associates like Moses Nyam Rwang, Dudu Dalyop and Choji Bot.
Carefully unstructured questions were asked and discussed with
these political personalities. Some of these politicians kept personal
records of minutes of party meetings and diaries. The personal records
and diaries (in the Hausa Language) of Moses Nyam Rwang, for example,
were invaluable in exploring the relationship between BPU and the NML,
the initial organization that shaped the subsequent M-Belt Movement
and his documents on the development of the MZL to the Middle Belt
Peoples Party (MBPP), an organization that was a faction of the MZL
based on his own ideas of the M-Belt struggle for the creation of a
M-Belt Region when he experienced political differences and difficulties
with Pastor David Lot, the leader of the MZL. Although various other
party documents were used in this study in the custody of politicians
involved in the M-Belt Movement, the secretaries of the different
phases of the organization were reluctant to provide access "because
1.	 Northern States: Benue-Plateau and Kano States,Vol.l No.6,
Zaria June 1969 p.10.
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they were deep down in their stores". This was so for Patrick Dokotri.
Dokotri as well as other M-Belt politicians however suggest that in
most instances party files, documents and records of meetings in
the main secretariats of the M-Belt Movement in Bukuru and J08 do not
simply exist any more and nobody knows what has happened to them.
This is so because the NPC government in The North in the period between
1955 and 1965 was determined to eliminate opposition parties like
NEPU and the UMBC. In the instance there were always police raids
on the (JMBC headquarters and house of the leadership in which important
papers and documents were siezed) Although the "factual" evidence
derived from the interview discussions with the different leaders on
the causes of political factions within the political organization
have conflicting accounts, these were weighted against each other to
produce a balanced account of reality in the growth and development
of the different phases of the M-Belt Movement. The accounts of the
growth and development of the M-Belt Movement in Books, Journals,
Newspaper articles and Government Reports were also used as sources
of factual evidence to balance evidences derived from interview sources.2
1. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981; For more
examples, see also J.S. Tseayo, 1975 p.vii, in which it is suggested
that "because the Nigerian Police were in the habit of harassing
the leaders of the UMBC political party, the party never tried to
keep useful records."
2. These include: Northern Region of Nigeria, Secret Government
Publication No.194: Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from
the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957,
John Smith, "Twilight of Empire", Imperial College Review, London
No.22 February 1981 p.1-3; John Dyinbo, Nigeria: Crisis and Beyond,
London 1971; M.J. Dent, "The Military and Politics: A study of the
relation between the Army and the Political Process in Nigeria" 1971
p.367-300 and "Tarka and the liv: A Perspective on Nigerial Federa-
tion" 1971 p.448-462 in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, Nigeria:
Modernization and the Politics of Communalism, Michigan 1971;
Ahmadu Bello, My Life, Cambridge 1962 p.2l5-216; Bryan Sharwood Smith
"But Always As Friends" Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons 1921-1957,
London 1969 p.332-346.
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The sequence in the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement and
the political controversies that surrounded the factions which existed
within the organization were also derived from the Legislative Debates
in the NHA in Kaduna and the FHR in Lagos for the period between 1950
and 1965.1
II The Non-Moslem League (NML) of Northern Nigeria
In the period between 1940 and 1952 the Islamic Society in The North
was characterized by the development of Unions and societies as political
organizations that were concerned to examine and debate political issues
and the nature of political authority. They were also concerned to
offer political options for their adjustment in the development of
The North and Nigeria in socio-economic and political terms. Similarly
in about the same period of time that there was the development of
political activity in the Islamic society, although in the instance
of the Tiv it was as early as in 1938, among the M-Belt groups and
societies, "tribal" Unions dominated political activity and contested
solutions to the state of local social, economic and welfare problems
rather than those affecting the wider society of The North and Nigeria.2
1. For examples of the controversies which provoked some of the leaders
of the M-Belt Movement like Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot
to give different versions of the growth and development of the
M-Belt Movement from 1949 until 1955 on the floors of the NHA, see
"Motion on the Creation of a M-Belt Region" Northern Regional
Legislature: House of Assembly Debates, 29th February - 16th March
1956, Kaduna 1956 p.179-224; These are examined in more analytical
detail in Sections III, IV, V and VI of this Chapter.
2. For more detailed examination of the development of "tribal"
Unions among the M-Belt groups and societies with examples of the
socio-economic and political issues contested and the options for
solutions see Chapter 3.
The Unions and societies in The North as semi-political organizations
in the period between 1940 and 1950 developed into important political
parties in Nigeria, although there were significant variations in the
impact of their influences on the political arenas of The North and
subsequently on the whole country. The variations in political
influences they wielded were rooted in and caused by the political
identities which became mobilized to gain support.
The Local Unions and societies as political organizations in
The North, developed in the period between 1940 and 1950 because the
ground was fertilized with political ideas. The political actors on
the arenas also reached sufficient social and political maturity to
transform and handle the organization of small unions and societies
with political ideas into political parties, expanding their interests
to those of the wider society of The North and Nigeria. The existence
of a class of European educated persons with increased social con-
sciousness on the patterns and shape in the causes of the transformation
of society in The North was fundamental to these political developments
in both the Islamic society and among the M-Belt groups and societies.
Several factors suggest explanations to the causes of the political
developments in The North. Among the M-Belt groups and societies
for example, in that period there was a sense of general unease
directed against Islamic religious and political authority, particularly
that which was imposed from the period of British administration over
territory that was equivocally claimed to be non-Islamic and containing
the M-Belt groups and societies. In the period between 1940 and 1950,
this political grievance was reinforced by an already mature modern
sense of "tribal" identities among the M-Belt groups and societies
distinctively different from the Hausa-Fulani Islamic patterns in
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The North. As earlier suggested in a previous chapter, this was the
premise from which "1ribal" Unions were organized with political
meaning. The "tribal" Unions were subsequently developed into
separatist "Tribal-Middle-Belt-ethos" that were underlined by a
current of social and political atfraction toward European civilization
with a Christian ideology rather than to Islam. Furthermore, generally
shaping the needs for political organization among all the groups and
societies in The North, in the period between 1945 and 1954 there were
political changes from the Richards constitution in the constitution
that was produced by Mac herson, which came into effect in 1951 in
which political participation was broadened for the election of repre-
sentatives into the Federal Legislative House. Previous to 1950, the
elections of political represeni-atives to the National Levislative
House in Lagos was an exclusive prerogitive of Emirs and Chiefs in the
NHC of The North. 1
 The political need for organization of political
parties also arose from the impact of the political influences in the
thrust of Southern Nigerian based 'Nationalist Movements' on groups
and societies in The North in which some of their politicians claimed
leadership for the whole of Nigeria. 2
 This political claim caused
resentments toward Southern Nigerians by Emirs and Chiefs in The North,
as well as from the European educated classes in the Islamic society
also in Middle Belt areas. 3
 Finally, another fundamental factor which
explains the fertile grounds on the political arenas in The North for
1. Dudley 1966 p.20-25
2. Coleman 1958 p.156; p.193; Dudley 1966 p.22
3. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.l56-172
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the development of political parties, although influential in the
shape and pattern of politics among the M-Belt groups and societies
is that in the period between 1940 and 1950, Christianity achieved
organizational form as a social movement under indigenous converts
as Christian leadership. This was largely due to the growing
numbers in the membership of adherants to that religion whech required
indigenous Christian leadership over the expanded churches under
European Christian Missionary religious supervision.' With increased
socio-economic and political pressures from problems in the societies
of the area the growing numbers in the Christian social movement became
politicized and were sensitive toward Islamic patterns of dominance
in The North. In the instance, Christian leadership transformed the
religious flavours in the social movement into political forms, its
first manifestations being in the NML of Northern Nigeria.2
In the instance of the development of' political activities within
the very boundaries of the Islamic society in centres of political and
religious power and authority like Sokoto, Kano, Bauchi, Zaria and
Kaduna there were developed unions and societies that were concerned
with social, economic and political affairs of The North. The most
important social and political organizations that had direct influence
on party formations in The North were the Bauchi Improvement Union
3• I
and the Youth Circle of Sokoto.	 In the years between 1943 and 1944
1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
2. For detailed discussions with examples of the development of
Christianity as a social movement with covert political intentions
among the M-Belt groups and societies, particularly those in
Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau, S. Zaria and in SUM centres like
Ibi and Wukari, see Chapter3 Sections II, III and IV.
3. Sklar 1963 p.88
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Mallam Saadu Zungur organized the Bauchi General Improvement Union and
with it tried to infuse 'Nigerian Nationalist' ideas to Moslems in
Bauchi through the reformist Ahmadiyya Movement. 	 At about the same
time, Aminu Kanu and Tafawa Balewa, the subsequent Prime Minister of
the Nigerian Federation in 1960 were politically active in the Bauchi
Discussion Circle. 2 The Bauchi Discussion Circle constantly engaged
British political officers in political debates and arguments with
the European educated from the Islamic society over current political
issues affecting The North and Nigeria. 3 The majority of these Euro-
pean educated persons in the Islamic society were born into privileged
families and nearly all were exposed to "Nationalist Thought" from
Southern Nigerian origins and in England. 4
 Saadu Zungur was to later
support NEPA, the parent organization from which NEPU developed.5
The NEPU was the political party Aminu Kano used as base, to launch
political radicalism in The North. In l945,ne1u Shagari organized
6
the Youth Circle of Sokoto. 	 At about the same time there was
organized a Nigerian Citizens Welfare Association also in Sokoto by
Mallam Mohammadu San! Dingyadi as a political party, although it
never developed to become a political force as it was overshadowed
by the NPC. 7 In 1946 the Kano based European educated persons
1. Sklar 1963 p.88-89
2. Ibid p.88
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
7. Ibid p.89
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organized the first non-localized political society in The North
which they called the Northern Elements Progressive Association
(NEPA).' In the four years of its existence (1945-1949) with Habib
Raji Abdallah as its General Secretary in affiliation to the NCNC,
the NEPA program emphasized political reform, economic development
and equal educational opportunity for "promising Norther students".2
On September 26th 1948, Dr A.R.D. Dikko, the first medical officer of
"Northern Origin", a Fulani Christian trained by Walter Miller of
the famous CMS Christian Missionary Centre in Wusasa, organized a
political meeting of "prominent individuals" who were anxious to
promote the development of The North. 3
 Coincidentally, a few days
later in the next month on October 3rd 1948, D.A. Rafih organized
the Association of NorthernPeople of Today ("Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa
A Van"). 4
 On October 12th 1948 Dr Dikko and Abubakar Iman, a Kanurin
from Borno and an editor of the government owned Hausa Language
Newspaper, "Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabi" (Truth is worth more than a penny)
based in Zaria, organized the "Jamiyyar Jamaar Arewa" meant to be a
Northern Nigeria Peoples Congress in Zaria. 5
 This suggests that the
tempo of political development in Nigeria conditioned a rapid springing
of organizations by different socially conscious individuals with
similar political objectives for The North. When Mallam D.A. Rafih
participated in th subsequent political meetings organized by Dr Dikko
1. Skiar 1963 p.89
2. Ibid p.90
3. Ibid p.91
4. Ibid
5. I bid
and Ibrahim Imam in Zaria and Kaduna, the Northern organization,
"Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa" (the Northern Nigerian Congress) subsequently
the Norther People's Congress was born as the nucleus of a political
1
party.	 Thereafter, groups and societies in The North were sought to
be organized-into the Northern political organization through political
contacts with and political urges to sympathetic persons throughout
the Region "to form local branches in preparation for a general meeting".2
Among the Local Unions and Societies already politically active in The
North and which agreed to become affiliate branches and members of the
overall Northern organization were the Sokoto Youth Social Circle, the
Bauchi Discussion Circles and a Citizens Association that existed in
Kano. 3
 On June 26th 1949, the Northern Nigerian Congress held its
inaugural meeting at Kaduna with over 300 delegates in attendance
and officers were elected with Dr A.R.B. Dikko, a Fulani Christian as
its first President. 4
 However it was not until in October 1st 195],
that it became announced that the Norther People's Congress (NPC), with
%5 branches and over 6000 members", had been converted into a political
party. 5 When the NPC became a political party, A.R.B. Dikko, the Fulani
Christian, and all other civil servants who held elected executive posts
in the organization, were advised to resign. 6
 This opened up the political
path to which the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, used to become the
leader of the Northern Movement and the political party.7
Although in theory the 'Northern Nigerians Congress' was meant to
organize all groups and societies indigenous to The North for political
1. Sklar 1963 p.91
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p.92
4. Ibid
5. Ibid p.96
6. Ibid
7. Ibid p.96-97
purposes, the Unions and Societies that were affiliated to it and
became members before its inception in 1949 were from the Islamic
society, even when it was the case that "tribal" Unions and Societies
were already politically active among the M-Belt groups and societies
as early as in 1938. Furthermore, available evidence suggests that
there was no political representation to the Kaduna meeting in 1949
from any of the "tribal" and Christian leadership among the M-Belt
groups and societies. The delegations consisting of over 300 re-
presentatives were predominantly from the Islamic society in The
North and from groups and societies like Fulani, Hausa (Habe), Kanuri
and Nupe. Although two Christians became elected into executive posts
in the organization, Dr A.R.B. Dikko as President and Mallam Julde,
a Fulani Christian from French Cameroon, there was a predominance
of Hausa-Fulani, Nupe and a variant of Islamic leadership from both
government and NA employment as members elected into the executive
posts) It was not until in December 1950, when there was already
a political twist in the leadership of the organization as Dr Dikko
was replaced by the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, 2 that Christian
leadership in an already developed MZL was approached in the same
year to join in the Northern Political Movement. 3 This was at a
meeting in Gindiri between some of the leadership of the NPC led by
the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello and the political and religious
leadership in the MZL led by Pastor David Lot. 4 It was precisely the
political developments that surrounded the formation of the NPC which
excluded political leadership of the "tribal" Unions and Societies
1. Skiar 1963 p.92-94
2. Ibid p.94-96
3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1983; the
political and religious issues raised during the Gindiri Meeting
are examined with more analytical detail in Section III of this
Chapter.
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among the M-Belt groups and societies that compounded grievances
already in existence over the state of social, economic and political
problems, held to be caused by non-participation in government insti-
tution, that there was organized the NML. In the instance the NML
developed into the MZL with a demand for political separation from
the Islamic society rather than integration into the NNC subsequently
the NPC. This suggests that the development of "tribal" Unions
among the M-Belt groups and societies into the NML was as much con-
ditioned by the rapid development of political organizations that were
dominated by leadership with an explicit Islamic identity rooted in
the Islamic society in The North, as it was conditioned by the political
objective to achieve organized representation and participation in the
institutions of government for Christians and non-Moslems from among
the M-Belt groups and societies. This was one of the political premises
from which Skiar suggests that while "organized pan-tribalism has been
important among certain minority peoples of the M-Belt areas only,
leaders of the dominant cultural groups have espoused pan-regionalism
1,1
rather than pan-tribalism .
	 For example, the evolution of the NPC
took political shape from a territorial conception of a cultural
identity with a traditional periphery that was underlined by the
British creation of the political North but encompassed many groups
and societies that were bounded by the Islamic religion and political
identity. This resulted into a regionally based political party that
was based on historically rooted territorial claims which were trans-
lated as a cultural political identity of The North. Although it
temporarily concealed the internal political stresses toward the
dominant Hausa-Fulani Islamic culture and religious identity, it was
1.	 Sklar 1963 p.326
persistently projected as a homogeneous identity in that political Unit
of the Nigerian Federation before 1967. This was precisely what the
NPC sought to achieve and maintain, not only as a political strategy
in the context of overall Nigerian politics but also for political
stability within a heterogeneous North when it professed political
commitment to "inclusive-cultural-liberalism" which became cryst ilized
into its motto: "One North: One People, Irrespective of Religion,
Rank or Tribe". 1
 Although this was so, the social and political centre
of gravity of the NPC political party however remained in the Islamic
society in The North and on the Islamic religious identity.2
Implicit in these political developments in The North which caused
the organization of political activities in the Islamic society as well
as among the M-Belt groups and societies is that while political
formations in the Islamic society were conditioned by the causes of
events at the national level of politics in Nigeria, the "tribal"
Unions among the M-Belt groups and societies as manifestations of
political activity were a function of the state of local politics,
although they were also responding to the general pattern of politics
at the regional level rather than national politics. Similarly in
the development of the NML into the MZL (examined in chronological and
analytical detail below), it was not until in 1956 when the organizations
became the UMBC as representative of the M-Belt Movement that there was
response to the patterns shaping national politics, particularly so in
1. Sklarl963 p326
2. The patterns of political control in the NPC methods to maintain
"One North" in the period between 1955 and 1965 when there was
vigorous demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region are examined
in analytical details with examples in ChaptersQCh oi ..$ ,e1ai,.o
the nature of political alliances. In the instance, the UMBC Movement
assumed a political status beyond the regional base of politics in The
North in the politics of The Nigerian Federation. The political theme
of its grievances which conditioned the political movement for separation
into a M-Belt Region as a Unit of the Nigerian Federation however
remained constant and centred on exclusion from participation in
political roles and decision making in the institutions of goveiniient
in The North, because the control of government was in the hands of
politicians with an Islamic political identity.
The control of government, as suggested by the concentration of
a group and society with an identifiable socio-cultural and political
identity in the institutions and bureaucratic jobs of government which
enhances the domination of political decision making, has been a major
cause of anti-regime movements, particularly so among the excluded
groups and societies in Nigeria. 1 This has been so because it is
assumed that control of government is a major cause for the development
of a particular area with modern European infrastructural facilities
for the "tribal" constituencies of the incumbents of government. 2
 The
group(s) and society(ies) outside the political roles and decision
making bodies of government institutions see themselves as victimized
by the incumbents since they may be of a different group and society with
a different culture.
In the period between 1930 and 1950 one of the issues that was of
concern to Christian Missionary Bodies operating in The North, the
1. For some examples of these tendencies, see Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic
Politics in Nigeria, Enugu, Nigeria 1978 p.140-175
2. In the period between 1950 and 1980 there existed numerous examples
of civilian politicians and subsequently military politicians in
the Units of the Nigerian Federation who developed "their areas"
at the general expense of others. Some of these examples are
discussed in Chapters 5	 t3i?.
majority of whom were concentrated in their activities among the M-Belt
groups and societies, was the absence of Christian representation in the
institutions of government and participation in the political development
of the constitutional settlements in The Nopth and Nigeria. Christian
Missionaries were concerned that the absence of political representation
from among the M-Belt groups and societies will lead to the domination
and exploitation of the non-Islamic groups and societies, among whom
their already developed socially conscious Christian communities were
1
concentrated upon departure of' British control of political power.
Although there was political concern, it was rooted in the perennial
religious anxieties of the Christian Missionaries of the period between
1920 and 1940 in which there was a belief that the absence of Christian
representation in government in The North carried with it increased
o Coverstor
pôten1 into Islam. In the period between 1940 and 1950 this became
an even more critical religious problem when control of the institutions
of government systematically fell into the hands of Islamic leadership
in The North. In the period between 1938 and 1950 similar to the
political anxieties expressed by Christian Missionary Bodies in The
North, the developed political leadership in the "tribal" Unions among
the M-Belt groups and societies became concerned over the absence of
representation of their traditional leadership in the NHC. 2 In the same
1. For detailed discussion and examples of the Christian Missionary
concern for the M-Belt groups and societies in which they organized
the M-Belt 'Christian Communities' into a social movement in the
period between 1940 and 1950 through conventions, crusades and
conferences of Church leadership, see Chapter "3 Sections III, IV
and V.
2. For examples and discussion of this concern see Sections V and VI
of Chapter 3
period when there was increased political activity among the M-Belt
groups and societies generated by the "tribal" Unions, the domination
of political roles and decision making in the institutions of govern-
ment at the local level by non-indigenous Moslems were held responsible
for the persistence of social and economic problems. The problem
generated by the domination of the institutions of government at the
local level by non-indigenous Moslems among the M-Belt groups and societies
and the persistence of social and economic problems were compounded by
the non-existence and unequal share of the distribution of modern
European infrastructure and amenities for the development of the M-Belt
areas relative to Islamic society. Furthermore in the period between
1929 and 1950 political representation to the NHC in Kaduna (initially
the Northern Advisory Council) and the Nigerian Legislative Council in
Lagos (subsequently replaced as the Federal House of Representatives
(FHR) with elected membership in the majority of its members) were based
on the ranking in political status of chiefs in The North. Since chiefs
from among the M-Belt groups and societies were still to be appointed,
in the period between 1930 and 1940, the political representation from
the non-Islamic areas in The North was mainly by British Residents and
Senior Administrative Officers in the legislative institutions of
The North and Nigeria based in Kaduna and Lagos respectively. There was
also representation from among the M-Belt groups and societies centred
on mining and commercial interests and these representations were concerned
to raise issues on legislation to do with the economy of the mining industry
and the problems of law and order rather than the welfare of the majority
of the indigenous population.'
1.	 For detailed examples see Chapter 3	 particularly Sections
IV and V
However, in the period between 1940 and 1950, although a process
of developing the chieftaincy institutions among the non-Islamic M-Belt
groups and societies was accelerated by the appointment of indigenes
as paramount chiefs in the numerically bigger groups and societies,
the chiefs that were appointed by the government of British administration
in The North, remained outside the chambers of the NHC. This was the
general pattern until 1950 except for the Aku tika of Wukari, Atoshi
Agbumanu) As early as in 1931 the Aku Uka of Wukari was appointed
and considered as the political representative of the non-Islamic
groups and societies from the M-Belt areas in the NHC in The North.
He remained the only non-Islamic chief in the NHC until 1950. As latterly
as in 1952 the non-Islamic chiefs from among the M-Belt groups and
societies who were recognized by the government of British administration
as well as the pseudo-elected transitional government of the NPC in
The North were Ogiri Oko, the chief of Idoma, Makere Dzakpe, the Chief
of the Tiv and Atoshi. Agbumani, the Aku Uka of Wukari, Chief of the
Jukun, all who were ranked as second-class chiefs in political status.2
The chiefs of Batta, Birom and Kagoro who were also non-Moslem and were
Christians, recognized in the period between 1945 and 1950, remained
unranked in social and political status by the governments in The North
and consequently as latterly as in 1952 they were "nominated chiefs"
in political status in the NHC rather than chiefs taking up seats like
others representative of a political status.
It was this subordinated pattern of representation which compounded
the grievances already existing over social and economic problems among
1. Northern Regional Council House of Chiefs Debates, Fifth Session,
18th and 20th December 1950, Kaduna 1951 p.1.
2. Nigeria Year Book 1952, Lagos 1952 p.5-10.
the M-Belt groups and societies that control and participation in
government became associated with development or underdevelopment,
depending on who was the incumbent. In the instance subordinated and
excluded groups and societies saw representation in the Legislative
Houses and the developing bureaucratic jobs with politica] decision-
making powers as a means for the development of their areas with social
and economic infrastructural amentities derivable from government. Re-
presentation in the institutions of government also became seen as a
means of influencing the distribution of government facilities as well
as providing political channels through which socio-economic needs might
become communicated to the appropriate authorities.
In instances where there is a significant absence of political
representation and where some groups and societies are excluded from
the institutions of government, political tensions are endemic of the
Unit or Country. Under social and political circumstances where there
is a conscious class of persons and there is an absence of repressive
methods in the political control of dissenting groups and societies,
the excluded organize for inclusion in the processes of governing.
Sometimes they demand separation from the oppressors depending on the
nature of the political system. In the majority of political instances
of the phenomenon for example in Nigeria and India with astonishing
parallels, the operation of a Federal political system has tended to
condition the political demands for subdivision of the Federal units
that separate the subordinated groups and societies from the dominant
majorities either in terms of language, religion, as well as the degree
of political influence for access to roles in political decision-making.'
1.	 The Indian and Nigerian political parallels are examined with more
analytical details below.
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While Federal systems tend to condition political demands for subdivision
into smaller units of the Federation in which there is devolution of
political power and participation in the governing process for "minorities"
Unitary political systems tend to condition total separation when domi-
nated groups and societies activate their political grievances to contest
1
nationhood' for both the dominating and the dominated.
Conflict research has produced both theoretical and empirical
propositions to suggest that when discontent become translated into
deprivation the aggrieved party(ies) organize rebellion. 2
 Rebellion in
this sense does not necessarily mean political violence by taking up
arms to achieve political objectives. It can also mean the organization
of an anti-regime movement based on the perception of relative deprivation
when a specific identity becomemobilized to arouse political nationalism
that is directed at the achievement of an objective like total separation
or subdivision of the centres of political authority by constitutional
methods. Runciman has argued that the relationship between the perception
of relative deprivation for political purposes and objective social con-
ditions is variable both between different individuals and across different
dimensions of deprivation. 3
 This suggests that the influence of the
1. This is examined in more detail with examples in following sections
when we discuss the features in the conceptions of federalism in
the M-Belt Movement largely developed because of the Federal system -
in comparative perspective to the experiences of other areas of
the world, like the Sudan where socio-political "minorities" in
similar extraordinary circumstances of the M-Belt groups and
societies exist.
2. For examples, see W.G. Runeiman, Relative Deprivation and Social
Justice, London 1972; T.R. Curr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton 1970;
P.A. Lupsha, "Explanations of Political Violence: Some Psycholo-
gical Theories Versus Indignation" Politics and Society 1971,
Fall p.88-104; See also some detailed examination of the theory of
internal colonialism as a cause of the rise of separatist tendencies
and the demands for subdivision into smaller political units of a
Federal system like Nigeria in Chapter 1.
3. W.R. Runeiman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, London 1972;
See also Keith Webb and Eric Hall, Explanation of the Rise of
Political Nationalism in Scotland, Strathclyde University Papers,
1977 p.14.
objective environment like the nature of political relationships between
a dominating group and society over the dominated mediates the comparative
framework of the individual to perceive and act politically in circum-
stances of relative deprivation. This becomes a potent political force
in the development of anti-regime movements when relative deprivation
and political relationships in the objective environment are mediated
in the context of the historical experiences as was the case with the
M-Belt groups and societies. In the literature on conflict among
different groups and societies in a particular political system, the
widely used definition of relative deprivation has been produced by
Ted R. Gurr which is "the actor's perception of the discrepancy between
their value expectations and their value capabilities".' Although
severe definitional and operational problems have persisted in the con-
cept of relative deprivation, 2
 it has been generally accepted that it
is a mechanism whereby dominated and exploited groups and societies
become politicized. 3
 It ought to be borne in mind however that a wide
spread sense of relative deprivation is not a sufficient condition
for the emergence of political nationalism or an anti-regime movement.4
Any single cause of a social phenomenon only presents a very over-
simplified view of extremely complex reality. This is so because the
reality is an intermixing of numerous and seemingly unrelated influences
that come together to produce a new phenomenon in a political movement
1. For detailed discussions of the theoretical propositions in the
work of Ted R. Curr see Chapter 1 where plural and structural
theories of conflict and relative deprivation were examined in
relation to the political circumstances of the M-Belt groups and
societies.
2. Webb 1977 p.15
3. For examples, see Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic
Fringe in British National Politics, London 1975; Ian McLean,
"The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party", Political Studies
Volume 18, 1970 p.357-372.
4. Webb 1977 p.15
at a particular point in time. For example when Christian leadership
from the different "tribal" unions among the M-Belt groups and societies
met to examine and organize the formation of the NML in order to ensure
Christian and non-Islamic representation in the NHC and the NHA in 1949,
it initially had nothing to do with historically recollected experiences
of the M-Belt groups and societies with the Islamic society in the period
between 1804 and 1900. It also had little to do with the sense of
political disenchantment with their subordinated social and political
status in the period between 1900 and 1950 when there was effective
British political authority in The North. However, they subsequently
took advantage of these historically recollected experiences with con-
siderable political skills and efforts to mobilize political support
when they expressed fears about the Islamic society upon anticipated
British departure from political control in The North. What seemed to
have happened in the period between 1950 and 1956 in the cause of the
development of the NML to become the UMBC was that a number of incremental
changes occurred that in conjunction led to systemic political responses
within The North as a cusp is reached, conditioning changes within the
organizational strategies of the Movement itself with a view such as
this, the causes of the M-Belt Movement are therefore merely partial
contributors to the overall events and interact systemically and on
multiple levels as the organization grew and developed from the NML to
the umbc participating in National politics in Nigeria. The causes in
the political growth and development of the M-Belt Movement from the
NML to the UMBC were generally conditioned by numerous other effects
as intervening variables.
However the factual evidence collated for this study suggest that
one of the major causes for the organization of the initial parent
organization of the M-Belt Movement, the NML in 1949 took shape from
an accepted premise by political leadership in the "tribal" unions among
the M-Belt groups and societies was that "Christians" were deprived
of political representation relative to Moslems in the institutions
of government in The North, particularly so in the NHA and the NHC.
Previous to 1949 "tribal" unions among the M-Belt groups and societies
were concerned that there existed neglect of their socio-economic
problems by governments in The North and that there was domination of
political roles and decision-making in local affairs by Hausa Fulani
and non-indigenes to their territories. In 1949 therefore the "theory"
propounded for liberation by the Christian leadership in the "tribal"
unions was that collectively as Christians with non-Islamic groups and
societies they might assert political power and influence to serve
their interests in The North, only to the extent that the "tribes" among
the M-Belt groups and societies achieve and strengthen Christian solidarity
as a political identity) Although this "theory" previously conditioned
the organization of Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies
into a visible social movement in the period between 1940 and 1950, the
strategy that became adopted in 1949 with the already mobilized Christian
religious identity was that of the formation of an all Christian political
movement which was named the Non-Moslem League of Northern Nigeria. The
choice of "Non-Moslem" for the political movement was meant to attract
support from the non-Moslem as well as non-Christian elements of the
M-Belt groups and societies and to emphasize the developing Christian
1.	 Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang,
Jonah Assadugu and Mallam Gwamna in the period between November 1980
and January 1981 - It is suggested by Dudu Dalyop that Mallam Rwang
Pam, the Chief of Jos also held the same religious views on political
matters in 1949.
tAo
identity in the population of the area.' This was so because with in-
creased Europeanization of Christian converts with English civilization
in particular, persons with African traditional systems of beliefs and
worship, socially identified more with the Christian communities rather
than with Moslems. In the period between 1950 and 1965 the census
statistics for The North suggest that more non-Moslems became Christians
rather than accept the Islamic religion and faith, particularly so
among the M-Belt groups and societies. 2 It was from this premise that
the political fears existing among the M-Belt groups and societies over
the dominance of the Islamic society in the institutions of' government
became organized by Christians into the NML for the protection of the
religion and the political interests of Christians and the non-Moslem
population in The North. This was the case even when Christianity
itself was still a very small minority religion in relation to both
Islamic adherents and persons with traditional African systems of
beliefs and worship among the M-Belt groups and societies, albeit in
The North. For example, the numbers of Christian adherents among the
M-Belt groups and societies were less than 7% of the total M-Belt popu-
lation and less than 3% of the total population of The North in l952.
Christian leadership however attracted political support from many
communities of M-Belt groups and societies that were Itnon_Believersll
based on minority conceptions relative to the Islamic society which
were bolstered by historically recollected experiences of relationships
1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang,
Jonah Assadugu and Mallam Gwamna, the Chief of Kagoro, in the
period between November 1980 and February 1981.
2. E.P.T. Crampton, "Statistics of Religious Allegiance in Nigeria:
An Examination in the Light of David Barrett's Thesis", The Nigerian
Christian, Lagos 1981 p.4-6; Article 2 Vol.15 No.11, November 1981
p. 4-14.
3. Crampton 1975 p.220-221
efl
in the period of Fulani wars on their societies.' In the period between
1950 and 1960 the political and religious fears previously articulated
by their converts and by the European educated persons who were
associated with Christianity conditioned overt resentment of Moslem
2
attitudes toward the M-Belt groups and societies. 	 The Chief of Jos,
for example, invariably stressed to Bryan Sharwood Smith, who was
Governor of The North in the period between 1950 and 1957: "The
bitterness of what the many non-Moslems felt as disdainful attitudes
towards them by many Moslem chiefs and politicians" of The North.3
In the same period Sharwood Smith himself suggested that there was
prejudice in the attitudes of' Moslems toward the M-Belt groups and
societies because "social behaviour that seemed perfectly natural to
the robust and uninhibited Birom (for example) was in the eyes of the
older Muslims, uncouth and ill mannered", 4 even when it was the case
that the new generation of Islamic leadership and politicians in the
period between 1950 and 1960 had less exacting standards of social
behaviour expectations from non-Moslems. 5 The social and political
prejudices of the Islamic society toward the M-Belt groups and societies
were reduced after 1956 when Sharwood Smith persuaded the Sultan of
Sokoto to pay a visit to Jos: ".. as the guest of the Chief of Birom.
(although) Eyebrows were raised, the Sultan's natural charm and courtesy
were proof against any possible contretemps and the Birom were delighted...
1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assudugu, Pastor David Lot,
Moses Nyam Rwang and Barnabas Di'su, January 1981.
2. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.332.
3. Ibid p.333
4. Ibid
5. Ibid p.334
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At last they were being treated as persons of some account".'
One of the political consequences of prejudice from the Islamic
society on non-Moslems was that Christians and persons with African
systems of beliefs, and worship included social discrimination of their
groups and societies in their political fears upon anticipated with-
drawal of British political control from government in The North. 2 In
fact, this was the political premise from which Sharwood Smith suggested
that in the period of the growth and development of the M-Belt Movement
from the NML to become the UMBC under the political leadership of
Joseph S. Tarka: "On the face of things they had a good case, but they
spoiled it by exaggeration in order to secure support from outside the
region. In this they were successful, for there were many who did not
readily accept the regional government's assurance that all reasonable
grievances would be remedied .... the "Middle-Belt" Movement owed its
strenSth more to a mass state of mind, based on genuine fear, than to
3
specific causes"	 When the political fears of the non-Islamic groups
and societies derived from the social and political attitudes of the
Islamic society toward the M-Belt groups and societies became related
to existing grievances over problems among the M-Belt groups and
societies there developed political arguments and persuasions centred
on the theme that once the British left the political control of The
North in which there was already Islamic domination of political roles
and decision making in the institutions of government, 4
 the Christian
1. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.334
2. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot,
Moses Nyam Rwang and Mallam Owamna of Kagoro, January 1981.
3. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.333; this point is examined in more analytical
detail in Sections III, IV, V and VI where we examine socio-economic
and welfare deprivations in the grievances of the M-Belt groups and
societies and
	
where the grievances are brought before
The Willink Commission of 1957 when politics with the M-Belt
Movement in The North and Nigeria is discussed.
4. Moslem ministers, Moslem chiefs, Moslem members of parliament in
the NHA and the FHR and Moslem judges in the courts among the M-Belt
groups and societies.
and other non-Moslem populations concentrated among the M-Belt groups
and societies might be subjected to exploitation, victimization and
coercion to accept the Islamic faith. 1 The Christian Missionary converts
and the European educated, who were the bulk of the nucleus of leader-
ship of the NML suggested that there was potential for these patterns to
develop into reality because the non-Moslem population among the M-Belt
groups and societies were social and political minorities as much as
they were religious minorities relative to the Islamic society in The
North and were outside government.2
It was with this political mood on the atmosphere of politics on
the arenas in The North that the Non-Moslem League (NML) of Northern
Nigeria was formed on the explicit premise of Christian under-representa-
tion in the institutions of government in The North, 3 particularly in
the NHC which was the most powerful law making institution in The North
before 1951 when the NHA assumed the political role of Legislation.4
1. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.333
2. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.333; Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri
January 1981; In the debates in the FHR in the period between 1954
and 1958 Patrick Dokotri was to repeat the same arguments while
relating developing tendencies of the NPC to eliminate opposition
parties in The North, suggesting that there was need to separate
the Islamic society from the M-Belt groups and societies as
political units of the Nigerian Federation before independence in
1960. These points will be examined with more analytical details
beoj.
3. Post 1963 p.79
4. Interview discussions with Mallam Aminu Kano, March 1981; he also
expressed opinions suggesting that within the Islamic society itself
there was political concern over the powers conferred on Emirs and
Chiefs in the NHC and therefore tNEPU was a very similar version
of the whole M-Belt struggle: while NEPU was concerned to adjust
for vertical power relations to the Emirs, the M-Belt struggle was
a struggle for horizontal adjustments in power relationships where
in fact chiefs and emirs might have remained feudalistic: powerful
and oppressive on their subjects as were the patterns in the
Islamic society - This point is examined in more detail bIow
where patterns of politics with the M-Belt Movement in
both The North and Nigeria are discussed.
Even when the NHA became constituted as a Legislative Body for The North
there was political under-representation of the M-Belt groups and
societies, particularly so for the Christian, non-Christian and non-
Moslem groups and societies.1
Although the Northern Regional Council, the NHC and the NHA was
created in 1946,2 it was not until on January 20th 1947 that the NHA
met for the first time. 3 Both Houses were predominantly Islamic as much
as in the membership of the unofficial side of the NHA. 4 In the period
between 1947 and 1950 the NHA consisted of elected chiefs from the NHC
as members, government nominated provincial members, most of whom were
"known NA officials" as well as nominated members also by the government
of "special interests and representations" like the Adviser on Islamic
Legal Affairs, Mining and Commercial interests. 5 There was also initial
nominated representation by the government, of Southern Nigerian
Christian communities in The North, the majority of whom were concentrated
on the Tin Mining Camps centred on the urban townships of Bukuru, Jos,
Barkin Ladi and Gana Ropp, all in Jos Division of Plateau Province. The
"initial representation of Southern Nigerian Christian Communities" in
The North, became subsequently termed as the "representatives of
Christian interests" in The North.6
It is instructive to the causes of the rapid mobilization of
Christianity for political purposes among the M-Belt groups and societies
that the government in The North as latterly as in 1947 was reluctant
1. This is explicit in the figures suggested by Table4.l which is
given analytical attention below.
2. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.165.
3. Ibid p.166
4. Ibid p.165
5. Ibid p.l64-168
6. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
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to recognize "Christianity and the Christian Communities" sufficiently
to give it representation in an indigene from the area in the "new"
NHA. This was so even when it was the case that the religion through
the socialization processes of the Christian Missionary Bodies had
institutionalized its position in society with schools, churches and
social welfare projects like hospitals, dispensaries and clinics with
vigorous Christian religious ideological bases.' While before 1945
Christianity had in fact achieved organized indigenous Church leadership
which had caused the organization of "a Christian Social Movement"
within the Christian Communities among the M-Belt groups and societies,
in the period between 1945 and 1952 it was still largely considered in
the Islamic society in The North: "As a religious phenomenon of Southern
Nigerians who were in government services as well as employees of the
tin mines and commercial companies". 2 This was the premise from which
there was developed the social and religious conceptions on the identity
of the groups and societies in The North suggesting that it was underlined
by the Islamic religious identity. These notions were further accepted
because the Islamic religious identity was given a boost by the spread
of the Hausa Language among the M-Belt groups and societies as a
commercial language. In the instance the assimilationist assumptions
over the Islamic religion by the British officials in the government of
British administration in The North in the period between 1900 and 1930
were resurrected in a belief that the non-Moslem communities were
becoming Moslems rather than Christians. 3 Indeed in certain provinces
1. For more examples of the processes in the establishment of the
ideological bases of Christianity among the M-Belt groups and
societies, see Chapter 3 Sections III, IV and V.
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. Crampton 1981 p.4-5
bof The North like Ilorin, Kabba and Niger in the period between 1940
and 1952 there is evidence to suggest that more non-Believers became
Moslems.' However the reverse was the case for non-Christian and non-
Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau, S. Zaria
and Benue where in the period between 1940 and 1963 both the 1951 and
1961 censuses produced evidence that suggests increases in Christian
converts and rapid expansion of the churches. 2 In the instance however
the assimilationist patterns of the Islamic religion over the non-
Islamic groups and societies in The North, conditioned political focus
on Islamic leadership as nominated representation for some of' the M-Belt
groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, some parts of Benue and
Plateau Provinces as well as for S. Zaria. It was from these assump-
tions (the assimilation of non-Moslems into the Islamic culture of
the Hausa-Fulani) that in 1952 there developed overt emphasis on Islamic
leadership in the selection of political representation for the M-Belt
groups and societies into the legislative and governing insitutions of
The North and Nigeria. 3
 When the government in The North nominated
political representation for the M-Belt groups and societies into the
NHC for example, in the majority of instances, it picked on Islamic
leaders in the M-Belt areas rather than Christians and non-Moslems.
This was particularly so for the period between 1940 and 1950. While
there were two non-Moslem chiefs as political representation from
among the M-Belt groups and societies indigenous to the area in the
1. Crampton 1981 p.4-5
2. Crampton 1981 p.4-5; The explanatory reasons for the expansion of
Christianity are produced with more detailed evidence in Sections
below as well as in Chapter	 where the 'conversion tours' of the
Sardauna in 1964 are examined in the context of the M-Belt
Movement after 1960.
3. Interview discussions with T.H. Marshall, September 1981; see
also Crampton 1981 p.4.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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NHC, the Aku Uka of Wukari-Atoshi Agbumanu and the Attal of Igalla,
Ame Obene, there were seven Islamic chiefs who represented the remaining
M-Belt groups and societies.' In 1952, while there were thirteen
Moslem Chiefs and [mirs representing the Islamic population in the M-Belt
areas from about 251,510 households, there were six indigenous Christian
and non-Islamic chiefs as representatives of the non-Islamic population
from about 351,588 households. 2 Furthermore the very first Council of
Ministers proposed by the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, for The
North in 1951 were all Moslems. 3 In 1952 these were the Sultan of
Sokoto, the Emir of Zaria, the Sardauna of Sokoto himself as Minister
for Local Government and Community Development, Mallam Bello Kano,
Makama of Bida and the Wall of Bornu who were subsequently assigned to
the Ministries of Natural Resources, Works and Communications and
Social Services.4
The political tendencies to nominate Islamic leadership as political
representation for the M-Belt groups and societies by the government of
British administration in The North set a political precedent for the
subsequent ruling party, the NPC, particularly so in the period between
1955 and 1965. In the instance, for example, the choice of' electoral
candidates to contest elections in the constituencies in the M-Belt
areas became a prerogative of Islamic leadership of the NPC even when
it was the case that alliances were entered into with the objectives
5
that indigenous leadership contest on the party labels of the NPC.
Northern Regional Council: House of Chiefs Debates, January 1940-
December 1950, Kaduna 1952, First Pages Lists.
Northern Region of Nigeria: 1952 Census Report, Kaduna 1952 p.32-33;
Northern Region Legislature: House of Chiefs Debates, Kaduna,
17th January 1952 p.1-2.
See Sharwood Smith 1969 p.227-228
Nigeria Year Book 1952 p.5
The political tensions generated by the choice of Islamic leadership
from Kano, Bauchi, and Zaria as electoral candidates of the NPC Party
to contest elections in the constituencies among the M-Belt groups
and societies is examined with analytical detail in Sections III and
IV of this Chapter 4.	 '	 where there is a dis-
cussion of politics with the M-Bel Movement within the M-Belt groups
and societies as well as in The North and Nigeria.
As suggested by the figures in Table 1H , in 1952 when the choice of
representation was taken to the electoral market place as was the
instance with the indirect elections among the groups and societies
in Plateau end Benue Provinces in particular, the electoral outcomes
emphasized the choices of Christian representatives for the membership
of the NHA rather than Islamic leadershi	 For example, while fourteen
Christians and non-Moslems (15.6% of the total numbers in the NHA -
Table 4.1) were elected into the NHA, eleven Moslems won in some of the
Provinces with the M-Belt groups and societies where there was a con-
centration of an Islamic population. This was particularly so for the
M-Belt areas like Adamawa, S. Bauchi and 5. Zaria during the Indirect
Elections into the NHA in 1951.1 The political patterns of emphasis
on Islamic leadership were however clearer in the instance of nomina-
tions for membership into the NHC for th political representativeness
of the M-Belt groups and societies. In 1952 for example as suggested
by the figures in Table 	 while there were thirteen Moslem chiefs
(24.5% of the total numbers in the House) there were six Christian and
non-Moslem chiefs (11.3% of the total numbers in the House). There
was therefore a consistent pattern of emphasis on Islamic leadership
for the M-Belt groups and societies even when it was the case that it
contradicted the electoral patterns when politics was taken to the
electorate in order to choose political representation. Table 4.1
further suggests that although political under-representation was
characteristic of the membership of the legislative institutions of
The North as they stood in 1952, Christians and non-Moslems were more
under-represented than Moslems. This was so for non-Moslems in the
1.	 Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna
1953 p.1-19 and p.59-80.
See	 it	 & d 13 	 ii..
Islamic society, Yoruba irredentist areas and among the M-Belt groups
and societies in The North. For example, while Christians and non-
Moslems in the Islamic society with 6% of the total househo1d numbers
in the population of The North were unrepresented, Moslems in the
Yoruba irredentist areas with l6% of the total household numbers were
given 13.2% representation in the NHC, 5.6% in the NHA and 5.7% in the
FHR. Christians and non-Moslems in the Yoruba Irredentist Areas had
a comparatively lesser number of membership with 1.9% in the NHC,
2.2% in the NHA and 1.4% in the FHR. In the instance of the differences
in the political representation among the M-Belt groups and societies
between Moslems and Christians with non-Moslems, for the NHC, while
a Moslem member represented 19,000 households each "other" members
represented 58,000 in a regional average of one member representing
36.000 households in The North. In electoral outcomes where Christians
became voted into the NHA, the ratio of representatives to household
members of Moslems were smaller and more adequate in relation to the
regional average relative to that of Christians with non-Moslems among
the M-Belt groups and societies. For examp]e in an average of one
member, representative of 21,000 households in the elections into the
NHA in 1951 in The North, while a Moslem member represented 23,000
households, the Christian members represented 25,000 Christian and non-
Moslem households.
While the block Christian vote in Plateau and Benue Provinces in
the 1951 elections is equally explained by the "tribal" as by the
Christian political identity the determinate outcome of the elections
in those areas was also conditioned by the particular weaknesses of
the indirect electoral college system in the conduct of free and fair
elections. For example members of an electoral college can exploit
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the system by choosing only Christians or members of their "tribes"
into the Provincial College where it will become concentrated with
tribal or Christian members in a determinate way to condition the
outcome of the elections. This was the case with the Tiv in Benue
and Christians on the Plateau in which the Provincial colleges
automatically elected members with a specific political identity
into the NHA to be detrimental to the representation of other "tribes"
and other religious communities who equally aspired for political
representation in 1951. However, besides this weakness in the
Indirect Electoral College System, it ought to be borne in mind that
in 1951 there existed a high degree of both mobilized Christian
religious sentiments in the demands for political representation,
largely because of the development of the NML into the MZL as well
as mobilized "tribal" consciousness because of the political activities
of the "tribal" unions and administrative political pressures to keep
them maintained. The mobilized Christian religious identity for
political purposes was however more Vigorous and overtly expressed in
the 1954 elections into the Federal House of Representatives (FHR).1
In the perception of political discrimination against the M-Belt
groups and societies, indicated by the nomination and choice of a
Yoruba Christian as representative in the NHA for 'Southern Nigerian
Christian Communities in The North' as well as for those among the
1.	 Political representation from among the M-Belt groups and societies
as a result of the 1954 Indirect Elections into the FHR are
examined in Sections III and IV of this Chapter where electoral
successes from the political activities of the MZL and the political
parties developed in the factions of the M-Belt Movement before
the UMBC Movement in 1956, are brought into focus.
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M-Belt groups and societies, indigenous M-Belt Christian leadership
felt alienated.' In the period between 1947 and 1950, although
Christian leadership among the non-Islamic groups and societies in
The North was politically embittered by indigenous non-representation
in the legislative institutions of The North, 2 it was the European
Christian Missionary Bodies that increasingly showed concern over
indigenous political dormancy in the absence of an organization of
the 'Christian Communities' among the M-Belt groups and societies as
a political force in The North. This was so, largely because the
Missionaries themselves felt they had mismanaged the religious polities
in the European education of the initial Christian leadership which
caused lower educational standards of the existing Christian leadership
in 1945 that was trained and educated in the period between 1920 and
1940. The nomination upon the request of the government of British
administration in The North for 5.0. James to represent Christianity
itself was developed from the perceived relationship between European
educational achievement and a committed Christian by the European
Christian Missionaries for the articulation of Christian interests in
3
the legislative institutions of The North.
Although there was political concern over the dormancy of Christians
and church leadership among the M-Belt groups and societies and over
1. This was clear in the political mood in interview discussions with
Pastor David Lot (Sura), Jonah Assadugu (Bachama), and Moses Nyarn
Rwang (Birom), January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. For examples of expressed political anxieties, largely manifested
in the writings of J.L. Maxwell in the period between 1945 and
1952, over the Christian Communities and in which instance the
European Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups and
societies organized Christians by regular conventions in the
development of "A Christian Social Movement", see Chapter 3
Sections III and IV.
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their political exclusion from participation in the institutions of
government in The North, when British administration required the
nominations of potential Christian members to be chosen as representatives
into the NHA in 1946 as a recommendation of the European Christian
Missionary Bodies: "To represent Christians in the pagan areas" it
was a non-indigene to the M-Belt groups and societies who was nominated
and became accepted by the government.' This was the premise from
which 5.0. James, who worked for the ATMN Ltd. in Bukuru in 1947,
although as a previous employee of the VAC Ltd. in Jos he had been
accepted as a committed Christian by the European Christian Missionaries,2
eç'ore. he	 3
was chosen as member of the NHA.
	 Upon the acceptance of 5.0. James
into the NHA in 1947 by Bryan Sharwood Smith the Governor of The North.
he was the only indigenous Nigerian Christian in the NHA. 4 However,
although Christianity among the M-Belt groups and societies was already
organized into Christian communities under indigenous church leadership
and had expressed itself as a potential political movement in the form
of a Christian Social Movement through conventions and Christian con-
ferences that were held at different centres among some of the M-Belt
groups and societies in the period between 1940 and 1952, it had to
1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
2. Mainly the European Christian Missionaries who worked at the SUM
and SIM headquarters in Jos.
3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu (Bachama), Pastor David
Lot (Sura), Moses Nyam Rwang (Birom) and Barnabas Dusu (Birom),
January 1981; see also Skiar 1963 p.346 n.39.
4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu,
January 1981; Rather curiously however it was only in the period
between 1952 and 1965 that the name, 5.0. James, began to appear
in the list of "special members" in the Hansards of the NHA in
The North.
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await "a political space" to achieve organizational force in the shape
of a political party with ideological coherence, especially if the
success of the organization was to have permanence in focussing on
specific grievances.
A political spachas either to occur as a result of an "accidental"
political event in consequence of the interaction of the systemic forces
in the system or be created by the victims (the politically aggrieved
parties) of the systemic forces that condition change in the system.'
Analytical distinction can be made between internal features that can
cause "a political space" and thus an outburst of a political movement
in the interests of the aggrieved (malcontents) groups and societies
and systemic features that may be endemic in the political system
(with plurality as much as with pluralism). Systemic features form
the social and political environment within which a movement or a
political party has to act at any point in time. 2 In the circumstances
of a political movement (or party) responding to systemic features it
may attempt to change the system, perhaps by resorting to terrorism to
establish a new order and thus instituting a malign spiral of spasms.
On the other hand it may adapt itself to the requirements of the system
by demanding for political representation or subdivision and devolution
of authority and decision making within the system. 3 In either case
the internal political adjustments of the political movement (or party)
will depend upon the perception of "political reality" in the leadership
group, regarding the permeability of thes ystem, the evaluation of com-
peting strategies in the leadership in relation to political reality,
1. Webb and Hall 1978 p.30
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
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and the nature of the political clientele to whom they are ostensibly
appealing. 1 The nature of the decisions taken in relation to the
political problems that conditioned the organization of the movement
(party) will depend upon the normative beliefs in the politics of the
leadership group as well as their instrumental calculations as they
relate to the fulfilment of their goals and objectives. As it will
become apparent in the discussions below, in the instance of the growth
and development of the M-Belt Movement from the NML to the MZL and
then to become the LJMBC movement in 1956, important decisions were
taken by leadership of the different phases of the M-Belt movements
and subsequently the UMBC movement, which were in light of the
systemic features that were internal to The North and endemic in the
Nigerian Federation as well as the decisions that were forced on the
organizations by cleavages and splits within the general goals of the
mogement. To a large extent these resulted from different perceptions
in the perspectives of the nature of the federal system in Nigeria and
hence variation of political strategies of the leadership.
However, the political space which produced the Non-Moslem League
(NML) of Northern Nigeria, in the content of already organized
Christian communities on the political arena of the M-Belt areas, came
in the context of an unwritten "Religious Report" that had explicit
political intentions which has been attributed to S.D. James, the
representative of "Christians in the pagan areas" of The North in the
NHA. In 1948, after serving for about oneyearin the NHA, S.D. James
convened a meeting in one of the Christian Missionary headquarters in
Jos with representation from Christian Missionary Bodies whose religious
1.	 Webb and Hall 1978 p.30.
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activities were concentrated on the Plateau, particularly those of the
SUM and the SIM, church leaders from different Christian communities:
pastors, evangelists and some elders in the church councils, Christian
teachers and some ex-servicemen already politically active in the
"tribal" unions and in the presence of' twang Pam the newly appointed
Chief of Jos who was seen to be a paramount chief symbolic of Christian
unity on the Plateau. 1 Although this representation was centred on
Plateau Christian leaders the religious and political issues brought
out to the fore of the meeting concerned and were equally focussed on
the political status of non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa,
S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Benue Province as well as non-Moslems in
distant places from Jos like Kabba and Southern Ilorin Province and
the new Christian converts in the Zuru areas of Southern Sokoto
Province. 2
 These were areas where Christian Missionary activities
were concentrated in The North and had already produced results by
the existence of respectable Christian communities in the period between
1940 and 1950. The unwritten "Religious Report" of 5.0. James suggested
that: "There was Christian political under-representation in the
Legislative Houses of The North in Kaduna. 3 ....There was religious
discrimination4 in the Legislative Bills being passed in the NHC and
the NHA directed against the activities and restricting European
1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu,
Moses Nyam Rwang and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981; see also Sklar
1963 p.346 n.39.
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu,
Moses Nyam Rwang and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu (Bachama), January 1981.
4. Largely caused by the absence of' Christian representation as
Legislators in the NHC and the NHA.
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Christian Missionary Bodies operating in The North, essentially con-
centrated among the M-Belt groups and societies. 1 .. and suggested
that Christians must unite or Christianity and the Church will die in
Northern Nigeria .	 These were the religious premises from which there
was developed muscular conceptions of Christianity in the political
organization of the M-Belt Movement when it developed from the NML in
1949, into the MZL in 1950 and subsequently the UMBC in 1956.
Previous to the "Religious Report" of S.0. James however there
was widespread political sympathy over religious disunity largely
caused by the co-existing strength of "tribal" political identities
among the Christian communities of the M-Belt groups and societies.
The religious disunity of the Christian communities in the M-Belt
areas was always compared to the political performance of Islam in
The North where in the Islamic society it always found expression in
dominant political terms as an inherited and religious ideology for
a cohesive society. 3 In the period between 1947 and 1950 newspapers
and the radio in Nigeria gave publicity to the religious calls by
Francis A. Ibiaor Christian unity and Christianity to shape the
political outlook of Christian communities among the non-Islamic
groups and societies in Nigeria. 4 The religious cum political calls
of Francis A. Ibiam increased and were given particular serious
attention by Christian leadership among the M-Belt groups and societies
1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu (Birom), January 1961.
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. These perspectives are derived from interview discussions with
Pastor David Lot and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
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after the widely reported but now infamous political rhetoric of
A.T. Bale,a' suggesting that: "... if the British quitted Nigeria now
(1947)... the Northern people would continue their interrupted conquest
to the sea", a reference to the Fulani wars of the period between 1804
and 1900 which took a religiously fanatical conquering and slave raiding
cavalry to within one hundred and fifty miles of Lagos. 2 In the period
between 1947 and 1950 both Balewa and Ibiam were members of the Nigeria
Legislative Council in Lagos. 3 While Balewa stood for the political
and religious interests of the Islamic society, disguised as the total
political interests of all the groups and societies in The North by
persistently suggesting that separatist development of Federal regions
of Nigeria was centrali
	
because "the people of Nigeria themselves
are historically different in their background in their religious
beliefs and customs", 4 Francis A. Ibiam became famous among the church
leadership of the Christian communities in The North for his concerns
on the political need for Christian unity in Nigeria 5 Francis A. Ibiam
was to become President of the World Council of Churches, after serving
as Medical Missionary and holding several high offices in the Christian
Missionary World.6
Although Sharwood Smith suggests that a startled Federal House
of Representatives listened to the political rhetorics of A.T. Balewa
in March 1947: '... which left no doubts in the minds of Southern
Nigerians that a supposedly "Medieval North" with ancient traditions
1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
2. A.T, Balewa, in Nigeria Legislative Council Debates, 24th March
1947, Lagos 1947, cited in Sharwood Smith 1969 p.168.
3. SeeDebates in the Leqislative Council of Nigeria, 20th March
194] to 2nd March 1950, Xoyal Commonwealth Society Library, London.
4. Coleman 1958 p.320
5. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
6. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.434.
ocH	 4i-	 wa.	 Lb
i-ta	 -kcA-
-toe
and an outmoded system of government had overnight become a dynamic
,,l.factor in Nigerian politics , it apparently invoked historically
recollected past experiences of Fulani wars of the period between
1804 and 1900 in which some groups and societies within the very
political boundaries of the British created North. 2 The Fulani wars
were characterized by the conquest and enslavement of some groups and
societies in a process of political incorporation that was underlined
by the Islamic religion and ideology. The socio-economic and political
victims of that process of incorporation were the M-Belt groups and
societies where the consequences of the Fulani wars in terms of
creating conditions of undevelopment and underdevelopment only became
halted with the establishment of British rule by conquest in the period
between 1900 and 1950 in The North. 3 The military threats in the
political rhetorics of Balewa and the calls for Christian unity by
Ibiam were listened to and read with study-care by both European
educated church leaders as well as by Christian teachers and the ex-
servicemen among the M-Belt groups and societies, particularly those
centred on the Christian Missionary headquarters in Jos. 4 In the
instance, socio-religious and political fears which complimented each
other in the midst of existing economic problems among the M-Belt
groups and societies became translated into images of reality in which
"there was necessity for political action in order not to be overwhelmed
by Islamic dominance".5
In the period between 1940 and 1950 researched evidence suggests
that the "Religious Report" of 5.0. James to Christian leaders on the
Plateau which expressed concern over the political exclusion of
1. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.168.
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. For detailed discussions with examples, see Chapters 2..
4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
5. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
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Christians from the M-Belt groups and societies in the Legisl-'tive
institutions of The North and Nigeria conform to existing reality of
the time. Within the Legislative institutions of The North there was
virtually no indigenous Christian influence from among the M-Belt
1groups and societies until 1952.	 Furthermore, political representation
of The North in the Nigerian Legislative Council in Lagos was dominated
by eight European educated leaders from the core of the Islamic society
and the ninth, an Igbirra Moslem from the predominantly Yoruba irredentist
Province of Kabba. 2 In the period between 1947 and 1952 for example,
political representation of The North in Lagos was dominated by the
Emir of Cwandu: Alhaji Yahaya, the Emir of Katsina: Alhaji Usman
Nagogo, the Attah of Igbirra: Aihaji Ibrahmia, the Emir of Abuja:
Aihaji Sulemanu and the five nominated from The North in the persons
of Bello Kano, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa from Bauchi, Iro Katsina,
.3	 ..
Aliyu Makaman Bida and Yahaya Ilorin. 	 Similarly in the instance of
the suggested grievance over the discriminatory bi11 being passed in
the NHA and the NHC against the activities of Christian Missionaries
in The North but concentrated with their headquarters in Jos with
different religious centres among the M-Belt groups and societies, in
the period between 1930 and 1945 and subsequently more vigorously until
1950. there was enormous political concern expressed in the NHC and
the NHA over proselytization and the activities of Christian Missionaries
in their social welfare institutions and Islamic households. 4 Detailed
1. This is clear from the list of members to the Northern Regional
Council that was established in 1947.
2. Legislative Council Debates of Nigeria, 18th March 1946 to 2nd March
1950, The Royal Commonwealth Society Library, London p.1-4; Nigeria
Staff List 1945 to January 1950, The Royal Commonwealth Library,
London p.IV.
3. Ibid
4. For examples of the political rhetorics expressing this concern and
calling for government action as it related to the Islamic religion
in The North, see Northern Region Legislature: House of Chiefs Debates
for the period between 1940 and 1956 which were examined and discussed
in Chapter3r Sections IV, V and VI.
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examination of the contents of the debates however suggests that the
religious activities of the Christian Missionary Bodies in The North
and the methods they employed were sought to be restricted and changed,
rather than that detailed bills were passed on the European organizations
and the Christian religion. In the majority of instances, the Emirs
and Chiefs in the NHC were overtly concerned about the consequences of
Christian social and welfare institutions on the Islamic communities
and left the government of British administration in The North: "... to
do something about it") In 1947 for example, the Sultan of Sokoto
reminded the government of British administration in The North: ".. that
in any matter affecting our religion we are bound at once to advise
the government of the seriousness of our views on this subject. We
cannot pass any rules or orders that leave any question of religion in
doubt... In any matter that affects our religion, the government should
consult us or we should refer it to the government after all meeting
together... the opinions of only a few of us (Emirs and Chiefs) are
not enough". 2 In 1948 when there was increased concern on the issues
raised by the controversial subject of "The Mission Activities" in
The North, the government of British administration assured members of
the NHC that ".. their representations on the subject will be conveyed
1. That is how the Sultan of Sokoto, the Shehu of Borno, the Emirs of
Bida, Zaria, Kano, Katsina, Bauchi, Lafia, Wase, Keffi and Nasarawa
always ended up their speeches on the issue of the "Missions" in
The North. For examples, see Northern Region Legislature: House
of Chiefs Debates, January 1940 to December 1956.
2. Northern Region Legislature: House of Chiefs Debates, Kaduna
10th February 1947 p.4.
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to government.., and early steps will be taken to find a solution to
the problem ... (through) Residents and District Officers... The
question raised by the Sultan of Sokoto in regard to the attitudes
of Christian Missions to the Moslem Religion .. is a very important
one and a difficult one. I assure you it will be earnestly considered
and I shall myself make a point of telling the Missions what has been
said". 1
 In the period between 1940 and 1950 therefore political
complaints and rhetoric in both the NHC and the NHA produced political
pressures in developing pro-Islamic Bills in the Legislative institutions
of The North.
Although this was so, the suggestion by 5.0. James that "Christians
must unite or else Christianity and the Church will die in Northern
Nigeria" was a religious rather than a political urge. 3.0. James
apparently became strongly anti- the political demands of the M-Belt
Movement after 1950. In 1956 he voted against the motion in the NHA
which demanded the creation of a M-Melt Region as a separate unit
from the Islamic society in The North within the Nigerian Federation.2
The religious urge for Christians to unite suggested by 5.0. James
however became translated as a political call by church elders as
well as the European educated persons and ex-servicemen for the forma-
tion of an all Christian political movement in the interests of Christians
and the Christian religion in Northern Nigeria. After the "Religious
Report" of 5.0. James was discussed early in 1948, for example,
European Christian Missionaries, indigenous Church leaders to some of
the M-Belt groups and societies and a selected group of committed
Christians from among the European educated persons and the ex-service-
men among the Christian communities agreed that another meeting be
1. Replies of The President of the House of Chiefs, Captain E.W. Thompstone
and Secretary, Northern Provinces, L.H. Coble, Northern Regional
Council: House of Chiefs Debates, Kaduna 5th January 1948 p.26-38
2. The motion on the creation of a M-Belt Region is examined with more
analytical detail in Section V of this Chapter where the (JMBC movement
is discussed.
organized by indigenous Christian Church leaders as a committee: "To
examine what ought to be done about Christian under-representation in
the NHC from the non-Moslem areas of Northern Nigeria". 1 It was further
decided that the meeting be organized under the political auspices of
the Birom Progressive Union (BPU) the "Multi-tribal" political movement
of the indigenous groups and societies in Jos Division which was already
active in politics and its membership included sympathetic persons from
some of the non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and
.2	 .	 .	 .	 .
S. Zaria.	 This is the premise from which it has been widely and
erroneously suggested that "the initiative for the organization of the
NML of Northern Nigeria, subsequently the MZL was by the Birom, as
protest and oppositionist groups... aided by Christian Missions,
principally the Sudan Interior Mission and the Sudan United Mission".3
Before the Christian Movement was given a political lae. however, the
executive members of BPU were directly charged with the responsibility
of the Srw-work for political organization and the subsequent take-
off of the Non-Moslem League (NML).
In April 1948, "the selected group of indigenous Christian leaders"
from the earlier meeting convened by 5.0. James in Jos agreed to meet
at "Rahwol Kanang", 4 near Bukuru township, in a "secret" house, tucked
away in the rocky and hilly terrain of the area, which was owned by
Moses Nyam Rwang, an ex-serviceman and active executive member of BPIA
politics. 5
 It is interesting and in some way religiously significant
1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu (Bachama), Moses Nyam
Rwang (Birorn), Barnabas Dusu (Birom) and Pastor David Lot (Sura),
January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and
Pastor David Lot, January 1981; see also Chapter 4 Section VI where
the political activities of BPU as well as those of the other
selected "tribal" unions as political organizations among the M-Belt
groups and societies were examined.
3. For examples, see Sklar 1963 p.345-348; Dudley 1966 p.92-93;
Sharwood Smith 1969 p.333.
4. In the Birom language this means: "the hill of discussing conclusions"
5. Interview discussions with Moses Nyarn Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and
Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
that the present site of the Theological College of Northern Nigeria
is on the area where the house in which the very first meeting was held
that developed the religious conception for political purposes of the
Non-Moslem League (NML) of Northern Nigeria. This however was pure
coincidence rather than a religious effort to immortalize the NML as
a political organization.'	 Political and religious representation
at the "Rahwol Kanang" meeting came from indigenous church leaders and
elders, evangelists, teachers and ex-servicemen who wer p committed
Christians from among the non-Islamic groups and societies in Numan
in Adamawa Province, Fobur in S. Bauchi, Kagoro in S. Zaria and
different Christian communities on the Plateau with all the BPU
executive in attendance.2
Although there was no European Christian Missionary presence at
the "Rahwol Kanang" meeting as the case was with the previousmeeting
held at the Christian Missionary headquarters in Jos, The Missions
gave moral and indirect financial support by producing ideas on the
internal decisions to construct a political organization at this
formative phase of the Christian Movement. This was a crucial
development because: "organizations are not spontaneously generated".3
Comparative studies of the Nationalist organizations in the United
Kingdom suggest that separatist political movements like the Sco1.Esr
NationaUsc Party (SNP) in Scotland, Plaid Cymru in Wales and the
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in Northern Ireland created
1. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981. Dusu was
General Secretary to the SUM Missionaries and centred at their
headquarters offices in Jos in the period between 1965 and 1969
when the Theological College of Northern Nigeria was built.
2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor
David Lot and Gayos Gilima, January 1981.
3. Ian McAllister, "Party Organization and Minority Nationalism: A
comparative study in The United Kingdom", Studies in Public Policy,
CSPP, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow 1979 p.1.
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political impact on the central government in London to recognise
their separate identities only after they possessed a cohesive party
organization which caused a shift from political amateurism to pro fes-
1
sionalism with a readier commitment to electoral mobilization.	 The
M-Belt Movement similarly represents a particular example of the process
of endogenous organizational change for political purposes in politics.
Initially the groups and societies who subsequently supported the
M-Belt Movement existed as ill-organized collections of aggrieved
individuals and "tribal" unions with diffuse aims and lacking a
collective political strategy on their extra-ordinarily similar
circumstances. 2
 Beginning with the NML in 1949, subsequently in the
period between 1950 and 1960 endogenous change was to transform the
different political organizations into electoral.ly-oriented "political
parties" within the M-Belt Movement with cohesive organization and well-
defined and articulated aims even when it was the case that there were
competing identities between the "tribal" and the religious political
mobilization. 3
 The European Christian Missionaries also advised on
the issues on the agenda to be discussed and suggested topics that
decisions had to be taken on where there was point of agreement for
1. McAllister 1979 p.4-26.
2. For some analytical examples of the similar circumstances in
the socio-economic and political problems of the M-Belt groups
and societies and the issues raised and contested by the "tribal"
unions, see Chapter 3 particularly Sections IV, V and VI.
3. These points will be revisited and discussed in analytical detail
with examples in Sections III, IV, V and VI of this Chapter
where the 1954, 1956 and 1959 elections
are examined.
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the development of an all Christian organization for political purposes
at the "Rahwol Kanang" meeting. 1 Church channels of religious
communication became initially employed in circulating the political
ideas of the intended Christian Movement. The SUM and the SIM for
example used their religious machinery of communication to secretly
coordinate information on meetings in order to enhance the travel
timing and participation of different Christian representatives from
Numan, Fobur, Kagoro and Panyarn to Bukuru. 2 In the period between
1949 and 1954 both the SUM and the SIM as well as the FCM were to
extend indirect financial support to the NML and the MZL by approving
"leaves of absence" with full renumeration to some of its Pastors,
Evangelists and Teachers like Patrick Fom (RCM), Jonah Assadugu (SIM)
and Pastor David Lot (SUM) to travel for political meetings, particularly
so in the formative stages of Christian Movement. 3 There are however
emotionally emphatic rejections to the suggestion that Christian
Missionary Bodies who operated among the M-Belt groups and societies
in The North produced direct financial assistance. 4 There is no
concrete evidence which suggests that the NML and MZL received cash
and cheque payments from Christian Missionary Bodies in The North to
assist the developing all Christian political organizations.
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu,
and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
2. Ibid
3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, and Jonah Assadugu,
January 1981 - The initial European Christian Missionary support
to the NML and the MZL is discussed in more detail in the pages
below.
4. Apparently this is the widely quoted implied "fact" that one is
left with from Dudley 1966 p.90-93.
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The political and Christian religious leadership in the NML and
MZL however admit that direct financial assistance came through cash
payments to the developing Christian Movement from Southern Nigerian
Christians who worked with the tin mining companies centred on Bukuru
before 1950. Ibo and Yoruba political activists on the Plateau tin
minesfields for example gave political support to the developing
Christian movement in the form of the circulation of ideas and cash
payments to the indigenous European educated Christians: "To organize
a Christian political party after the "Religious Report" of 5.0. James
in 1948,1.1 The political ideas of Southern Nigerians circulated on
the Plateau suggested a Christian struggle for all of Nigeria which will
ensure political representation of the M-Belt groups and societies in
the Legislative institutions in Kaduna in The North and the FHR in
Lagos. 2 The political intention in the organization of the Christian
political party centred on the groups and societies in Jos was for its
potential in mobilizing political support of Christians and non-Moslems
in The North as members of the Nationalist Movement against British
rule in Nigeria. 3 It is also possible that the political gamble in
the attempt to organize a Christian political party among the M-Belt
groups and societies with the assistance of Southern Nigerian Nationalist
Movements was based on the political need to expand and create a
"Nigerian National Outlook" which previous to 1945 was a recurrent theme
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Choji Bot, Pastor
David Lot and Bature Bachit, January 1981.
2. Ibid
3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Bature Bachit, January
1981.
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in the criticism of their representativeness of all Nigerian by the
government of British administration in both Kaduna in The North and
1
Lagos the Federal Capital. 	 However before 1950, political activists
associated with "Nigerian Nationalist" organizations whose main
political support was with groups and societies in Southern Nigeria,
presented the movements as "Christian political parties" to church
leadership and the European educated among some of the non-Islamic
groups and societies in The North. This was particularly so to church
leaders and the Christians who were European educated among the groups
and societies on the Plateau where there was a high concentration of
a non-indigenous migrant labour force from Southern Nigeria with the
tin and columbite mining companies. 2 These increases in the development
of political activity were related to the changes in the MacPherson
Constitution after 1946 in which the indirect elections in The North
were anticipated for 1951. It ought to be borne in mind however that
the political penetration of Southern Nigeria based Nationalist move-
ments with the Christian religious identity as a political identity
was not confined to the Plateau groups and societies. As earlier
suggested, during the NCNC tour of The North in 1946 Southern Nigerian
political movements left behind political impact in Tiv land which
influenced members of the UMBC movement in the l950s like Isaac Kpum
and Elizabeth Ivase to become politically active in the demand for the
1. For examples of these criticism see Coleman 1958 p.150, 156, 193-194;
Sharwood Smith 1969 p.173-199.
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and
Patrick Fom, January 1981.
creation of a M-Belt Region in The North. In that instance however,
rather than Christianity, it was protest political identification
that was mobilized based on the socio-economic and political premises
of "a suffering people" under "the yoke of British colonialism" and
seeking political freedom.' In 1965 however, in a rather "unusual political
confession" S.A. Atum, the NPC elected member from Kwande in liv Division
suggests the deployment of the same Christian religious identity for
political purposes by Southern Nigerian politicians among the Tiv group
and society. In that instance he told the NHA: "... I have something
to say... and that is that we have very much associated ourselves with
the Southern Nigerian politicians. These people have a strong belief
that there would come a time when all the people whom they call the
Middle-Belters would come to fight for the creation of a Middle Belt
State... They suggested to us that we should make the demand on the
grounds of religion... They said that if we are serious about emphasising
the religious politics they would give us help of any kind. They further
told us that if we agree to take this line of action the Premier of
Northern Nigeria would be annoyed and then he would ask for our secession
from Northern Nigeria... but all these are in vain".2
However, the previous meetings to the "Rahwol Kanang" meeting near
Bukuru set a precedent for the religious and political cooperation between
SIM and SUM Christian Missionaries on the Plateau, Christian leadership
in the different communities among some of the M-Belt groups and societies
1. Interview discussions with Isaac Kpum and Elizabeth Ivase,
January 1981; For more details of the NCNC impact on these old-war-
horses of the UMBC Movement, see Chapter 
,3, Secbb-5,
2. A.T. Atum (Kwande Constituency), Northern Regional Legislature:
House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna 27th February 1965 p.106-107.
and the officials of the BPU executive with a developing objective of
establishing an organization which might produce Christian representation
in the Legislative Houses of The North and Nigeria. While admitting
that there was Southern Nigerian political influences in precipitating
the organization of the Christian Movement, the "Rahwol Kanang" was
independently convened by indigenous Christian and BPIJ leadership.1
As early as in 1948 therefore BPU became the instrumental political
base to achieve the organizational goals of the anticipated Christian
Movement. This was largely so in order to make European Christian
Missionary involvement less visible even when it was the case that they
remained closely associated and well informed about the political
progress of the movement. 2 It ought to be borne in mind however that
although Christian Missionaries laid the social and educational foun-
dations (based on the needs of consolidating Christianity and) on which
"tribal National" found expression, they were bitterly opposed to "tribal"
cultural and political identities taking precedence over the Christian
religious identity, particularly so when Christian solidarity was sought
to be organized for political purposes. This was particularly so in the
period between 1940 and 1952 when there was the political need for
Christians to participate in the constitutional conferences that were
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and
Jonay Assadugu, January 1981.
2. For examples of the contents of Christian Missionary political
anxieties over Christian solidarity in the developing Christian
Movement from the political reasons that were caused by the
constitutional changes after 1946 and the political developments
in Nigeria in the period between 1945 and 1952.
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effecting changes in the centres of political decision making and the
politicians in those roles. There was also concern for Christian
participation in the electoral processes that were anticipated in 1951.
In the instance of these political developments, the organization of
Christian solidarity from among the Christian communities among the
M-Belt groups and societies, assumed parcimount consideration because
each of the unions was based on a socio-cultural identity and was a
political minority relative to the Islamic groups and societies in
The North. This was considered as by the European Christian Missionaries
in persuading both Church leadership and Christian leadership in the
"tribal" unions because of the relationship between numbers of political
supporters and political parties in shaping the outcome of elections
•	 ••	 •	 1in competitive democratic systems.
	
The political logic was that
"tribal" unions organized into independent political parties among the
M-Belt groups and societies contained the predominant and ubiquitious
political factor militating against similar movements in other parts
of the world in the sense that the organization of their political
support will be affected by their minority status in numbers. 	 This
conforms to political reality because historically, few groups and
societies have been able to make the transformation from minority to
majority nationalism, except the pre-First World War Irish Nationalist
in the United Kingdom. 3
 As minorities in Northern Nigeria within the
1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyarn Rwang,
January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah
Assadugu and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. McAllister 1979 p.2
competitive democratic system which was sought to be established after
1946 as a result of the political reforms in the Macpherson constitution,
each of the M-Belt groups and societies had no prospect of winning an
electoral majority and only a little chance of influencing government
through the e].ectoral processes, unless they were united by the broader
Christian religious identity to increase their electoral numbers in
politics. 1 This became an even more critical consideration, because
there was a high concentration of Moslems in the population of some of
the M-Belt groups and societies, sufficiently to submerge the "tribal"
solidarity of the unions into minority status.2
In 1948 Church leaders and Christian European educated (mainly
already active in the political movements of the "tribal" unions) from
the SIM, SliM and RCM Christian Missionary denominations met on several
occasions at "Rahwol Kanang", 3 near Bukuru township, under the political
auspices of the BPU. 4 Although in a suggested list of participants
at the meeting there is explicit indication that it was an essentially
but not completely "a Plateau Christian affair" ) the political cum
religious agenda explicitly concerned the issues surrounding the political
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot,
Jonah Assadugu and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
2. For examples of the proportions in the concentration of Moslems
among the M-Belt groups and societies in places like Adamawa,
S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and in some parts of Plateau, curficienti.y
to constitute a majority in the electorate in those areas, see
Chapter Sectc,rs be..loi .	 The existence of this political
reality as it affected the anxieties of Christian solidarity in
political support for the developing M-Belt Movement before 1956
and in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The
North will be revisited for more analytical examination in
Sections	 e\c,	 of this Chapter.
3. Dudley 1966 p.92; Dudley however mistakenly suggests the name of
the village to be "Dahwol Kanang"
4. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and
Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
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participation of Christians and non-Moslem communities among the
M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Benue,
in the main stream of politics in The North.' The most important
issues on the agenda however were the need for the organization of an
all Christian political movement and the election of leadership to be
entrusted with the task of conducting the political activities of the
movement in a way that all Christians and non-Moslems in The North,
particularly those among the M-Belt groups and societies might become
aware of Christian aims and objectives for political purposes.2
Representative Christian leadership from among the M-Belt groups
and societies in the anticipated Christian political organization
that will seek Christian membership in the NHA which might influence
unfavourable ligislation on the Christian religion and the activities
of European Christian Missionaries were in the aims and objectives of
the "Rahwol Kanang" meeting. This was the case because the religious
activities of Christian Missionaries with roots in the civilization of
England were seen as social forces in the development of the M-Belt
groups and societies with modern European infrastructure. 3 The aim
of the meeting also centred on aggregating issues that affected the
soclo-economic and political grievances of Christian communities in
The North which might be contested with the government by the
organization, a process which might make their voices and opinions
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot,
Jonah Assadugu and Choji Bot, January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot
and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang,
Jonah Assadugu and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
heard on the political arenas of The North and Nigeria.'
To achieve these aims and objectives, three posts were created
during the 'Rahwol Kanang' meeting for de1egates to seek elections in
order to serve as executive officers in the still un-named Christian
Movement as President, Secretary and Treasurer. 2 In the elections that
resulted these responsibilities fell on Pastor David Lot, Sura, from
Pankshin Division as President, Moses Nyam Rwang, Birom, from Jos
Division as Secretary and Bala Yerima, Kilba, from Admawa Division and
subsequently politically active inthe Kilba State Movement. 3 In the
period between 19115 and 1950, Moses Nyam Rwang was also President of
BPLJ. In the instance he constantly brought into the discussions of the
Christian Movement examples of the issues and grievances of the groups
and societies in Jos Division as the microcosm of problems that affected
Christians and non-Moslems in the M-Belt areas. This was particularly
so for the social and political problems that were centred on control
of political authority in relation to the Islamic society as was manifest
in the drive for the Hausa-Fulani domination of political roles and
decision making in the NA institutions in Jos Division and the disputes
developed over their claims to the chieftaincy of the Jos township.
In all the months of 1948, and the early months of 1949 there were
several other private meetings of the protem-executive members of the
Christian movement. This was as a collective executive as well as each
executive member initiating political meetings with church leaders and
1. Interview discussions as above.
2. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and
Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. Ibid
elders and some of the Christian European educated persons indigenous
to their areas. This was one of the points that was agreed on since the
meeting convened in Jos by S.D. James, in order to disseminate the
1
social and political intentions of the developing organization.	 These
meetings were meant to infuse more Christians with the ideas of the
Movement and to publicize an anticipated future meeting that might have
wider representative attendance from different Christian communities
among the M-Belt groups and societies. 2 In the same period ie. 1948 to
about March 1949 the Christian Movement while still in its very formative
stages was severely handicapped in creating instant political impact
with its religious strategies of political mobilization on a wider area
on the Christian communities among the M-Belt groups and societies
because it simply had no financial funds to sponsor its activities. A
wider publicity of its political activities were also affected by the
secretive methods with which it initially operated to gain support from
committed Christian members. In the period between 1940 and 1960 the
initial financial difficulties of both the religious and political
leadership of the Christian Movement in 1948 and 1949 was to serve as
an instrumental experience which conditioned alliances from political
parties in Nigeria that were ready to be generous with funds for organi-
zation, mobilization and travel purposes. 3
 In the instance of the severe
financial limitations with funds, the financial burden of the initial
Christian Movement and the political efforts to convene meetings at Jos,
1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and
Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and
Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
3. The alliances which the M-Belt Movements contracted after 1950,
particularly with the AC in 1956 is examined with more analytical
detail in Sections IV, V and VI
TL
Bukuru and 'Rahwol Kanang' derived from individual expenses who com-
mitted their private monies for the interest of Christian action for
1
political purposes.	 In the periods of the meetings at Jos, Bukuru,
Rahwol Kanang and subsequently at Du for example, most of the delegates
put-up for their length of stay for the discussions with relations who
came to work in the tin mining fields near the mining camps of the
urban centres in the areas. 2 Since 'political labour' as well as
other sources of foreFsHy unpd labour on the tin mines fields had
been recruited from different groups and societies in Adamawa, Bauchi,
Zaria and Benue and from the different groups and societies on the
Plateau, there was always someone who spoke the same language with
a delegate to the meetings of the Christian movement and who usually
:øies
provided accommodation as a relation. 	 Furthermore, in the instance
of the financail limitations of the initial Christian movement before
1950, this problem served to condition the circulation of information
on convened meetings through church channels and Christian labourers
on the Mines Paddocks. 4
 The churches in turn contacted "committed
Christian" leadership local to the different non-Islamic groups and
societies in Plateau, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Adamawa and in certain
instances delegated members of its own indigenous Church Council as
1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang
and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and
Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nvam Rwang and
Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
4. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, and Moses Nyam Rwang,
January 1981; it is interesting to note that Christian converts as
labour on the tin-mines from the different M-Belt groups and
societies, in the period before 1950 were used as communication
channels. Pastor David Lot for example suggests that "a relation"
of his who worked on the Bukuru Paddocks every two weeks in a month
and rettirned to Panyam village on the Plateau, was a constant source
of "contact and messages" between himself and Moses Nyam Rwang in
the period between 1948 and 1950 when the NML was being organized.
ke e-	 ct'.cer-L-.
representation to the meetings of the Christian Movement.' In this
way leadership in the Christian churches became politicized about the
intended Christian Movement before 1949. Delegation of selected
Christian leadership from the Church Councils was an already familiar
religious practice among the churches in the M-Belt areas when in the
period between 1940 and 1950 there were regular protestant Christian
conventions and joint Christian Missionary conferences at different
centres in the Christian communities in The North. 	 The attendances
of the meetings for the intended Christian political movement seems
however to have been dominated by protestant churches and followings
rather than RCM adherents, although it was subsequently the case that
Catholics were to be concentrated in the high ranks of political
leadership in the M-Belt Movement. 3 Besides the financial limitations
which inhibited the publicity of the political activities in the
initial organization of the Christian Movement, it was also handicapped
in appealing to the existing wider Christian communities beyond those
immediately associated to Plateau because of the secrecy of its
operations. The second meeting of indigenous Christian leaders at
It Rahwol Kanang" for example was one in a series of secret meetings. A
religious and political departure from the first 1948 meeting in one
1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and
Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and
Pastor David Lot, January 1981; for more detailed discussions and
examples of the political intentions of the Christian conventions
and conferences and the political and the economic impact they
created, see Chapter 3 Sections III, IV and V.
3. Religious differences between Protestants and Catholics in the
M-Belt Movement as a Christian organization are examined in more
detail in Sections III, IV and V of this Chapter and subsequently
where politics with the M-Belt Movement among the
non-Islamic groups and societies in The North is brought into
analytical focus.
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of the Christian Missionary Headquarters in Jos however, was that all
the subsequent meetings held at 'Rahwol Kanang' were marked by an
absence of European Christian Missionary participants, although their
influences remained. This was largely caused by the religious sensitivity
with which the governments in The North saw European Christian Missionaries
as responsible for the politicization of the non-Islamic groups and
societies from the sympathy and vigour with which the Christian
Missionaries themselves campaigned for the solutions of the problems of
1
areas in which they operated.	 When indigenous Christian leaders
organized the 'Rahwol Kanang' meeting, European Christian Missionaries
therefore became less visible participants in the Christian Movement
for the very reasons that were centred on avoiding being seen to be
overtly mixing religion with politics. In the period between 1950 and
1960 when there was increased organization in the demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region, some European Christian Missionaries,
particularly so for the RCM became reluctant to support its religious
causes. This was so because there existed in that period substantial
indigenous Christian converts outside the sociological territories
claimed by the underlying ethos in the demands for the creation of a
"Christian" M-Belt Region in The North. A "Christian" conception in
the creation of a M-Belt Region might condition increased political
insecurit y to the Christian minorities in other parts of The North.2
1. For some detailed discussions and examples of this point on the
Christian Missionaries, see Chapter3 Sections III and IV.
2. Interview discussions with Father Burke, London, August 1981;
The reluctance of some Christian Missionary Bodies to support
the concept of a "Christian" M-Belt Region is examined in more
detail	 where representation brought before
the Willink Commission in 1957 and 1958 is examined as well as
the political recommendations of the Commission in terms of
quaranteing Human Rights and the socio-economic and political
objectives of the State are discussed.
The European Christian Missionary involvement with the religious
organization developing on the Plateau however remained covert and
almost exclusively limited to Protestants until Christian solidarity
became illusive when the NML grew and developed into the MZL and
subsequently the IJMBC Movement in the midst of severe political
cleavages during the period between 1952 and 1956. In the period
between 1945 and 1952 however for example, Lowry 3. Maxwell persistently
suggested that there ought to be a strong relationship in the develop-
ment of the Christian social movement and Christian action on political
issues in the same political sense that Islam conditioned social and
1
political unity over a majority of people in The North. 	 This suggests
that Furopean Christian Missionary involvement in the politics of the
M-Belt Movement was greater at it3 first beginnings rather than later
on, when in particular during the UMBC Movement, the organization
acquired a political momentum of its own while it de-emphasized the
religious factors in appealing for political support.2
In May 1949 however, there was a major break through in the
embryonic Christian political movement among some of the M-Belt groups
and societies in Adamawa, Plateau, S.Zaria and S. Bauchi. This was
largely conditioned by the rapid development of an all embracing
political organization for the groups and societies in The North in the
3
short period between 1948 and 1949.
	 ChrisLian leadership among the
1. For more detailed discussions of the religious perspectives of
L.J. Maxwell over the nature and patterns of politics in The North
see examples in Chapters Sections III and IV where the 'Christian
Social Movement' among the Christian communities of the M-Belt
groups and societies was examined.
2. This point is revisited in the sections below in this chapter
where it is examined with greater analytical detail when the NML
developed into the MZL and subsequently into the UMBC Movement
in 1956.
3. The development of the Northern Nigerian Congress into a political
party in 1949 has been examined in previous pages above.
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M-Belt groups and societies with an already developed and organized
Christian Social Movement under the leadership of the churches
however saw the "Jami'yyar Mutanen Arewa" (the Northern Nigerian
Congress -NPC) as an Islamic political organization which was meant
to serve the interests of Moslems only rather than both Moslems and
1
non-Islamic groups and societies in The North. 	 As a direct political
reaction to these political developments in The North, an urgent
meeting was convened by the three-man protem-Executive of the Christian
political movement at Du, a Birom village about six miles eastwrd1y
of Bukuru township. 2 The Du-meeting was meant to achieve two political
objectives: Elect permanent officers into the executive posts for the
movement and to establish a socio-religious and political tag for the
organization from a concensus of the anticipated wider representative
membership attendance of the different non-Islamic groups and societies
in the M-Belt areas where there was Christian leadership, Churches
and a community of Christians. 3 The need for permanent officers and
a political name for the Christian movement was conditioned by the
development and subsequent declaration of the "Jami'yyar Mutanen
Arewa", 4 as a political organization before its Kaduna election meeting
in June l949.	 Selective and delegated Christian representation for
the Du-meeting came from Numan, Fobur, Panyam, Ibi, Wukuri and Kagoro
with a representative concentration of membership of the BPU Movement
and their executive. 6
 The Chief of Jos, Rwang Pam, who himself
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang,
and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
2. As (1)
3. As (1)
4. As (1)
5. Sklar 1963 P.88-89
6. As (1)
Pastor David Lot
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originated from Du village was in attendance to give the meeting
political weight and "some prestige". 1 Political rhetoric on the
relationship between Christian action in unity and political partici-
pation in the legislative institutions of The North as conditions
for the formation of an active and politically visible "all Christian
organization" was dominated by Jonah Assadugu, SIM Teacher/Evangelist
in Gengule in Numan Division, Samson Nada, an ex-serviceman Sergeant-
Major with the NA in Nurnan Division, Gayos Gilima, an SIM Teacher!
Evangelist in Adamawa Division, BQ1a Yerima, a Christian Missionary
worker among the Kilba also in Adamawa Division. 2 Bala Yerima was
also protem-Treasurer of the still un-names Christian Movement when
the Du-meeting was convened in May 1949. Other Christian leadership
from Plateau and Adamawa that equally featured in political rhetoric
during the Du-meeting were Pastor David Lot, Sura, from Panyam
village in the Plateau, already well known among the Christian
communities through the Christian conventions and conferences,
particularly as Commander of the StJM/SIM Boys Brigade Movement;
Moses Nyarn Rwang, ex-serviceman, President of BPU and protem General
Secretary to the Christian representative movement; Patrick Fom,
BPU Secretary, an ex-serviceman,	 Teacher/Evangelist and politically
articulate being the most European educated of the Christian members
in the formative stages of the all Christian Movement. 3 Patrick Fom,
a Catholic, befenitted from European education in centres like Ibadan
and Lagos where he was sent by the RCM to train as a teacher. There
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyarn Rwang, January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Samson Nada in Numan
and Gayos Gilima in Lagos, January 1981.
3. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonay Assadugu,
Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
was also a political presence of many non-Islamic people at the
Du-meeting as supporters and sympathisers to the Christian Movement
who had travelled in "the manner of attending the usual Christian
conventions" who came from different groups and societies in S. Bauchi,
Plateau and S. Zaria, besides indigenous Christians from different
areas of the M-Belt, as mines workers who attended from the Bukuru
paddocks. 1 In all there was an estimated attendance of over 200
covenanted Christians at the Du-meeting.2
Both the objectives of the Du-meeting were achieved, to create
organizational mobility for the Christian Movement in order to make
the whole of the affected groups and societies socially and politically
conscious of the intentions of the organization. When Patrick Fom
suggested that the organization be called "the Non-Moslem Movement of
Northern Nigerian Christians", the name of the organization being
coined in the English language, even when it was the case that the
political rhetorics during the meeting had suggested the name of the
organization as "Jamiyar Krista a Arewanchin Nigeria" (the Congress
of Christians in Northern Nigeria), the nucleus of a M-Belt Movement
was born with total support of the representatives of non-Islamic
and Christian groups and societies from Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Lana
and Plateau? In the subsequent meetings of the elected executive
after May 1949, held with private consult3tions with some Christian
Missionary Bodies, particularly the SIM and SUM as well as with a
younger generation of more advancedly educated European Christian
persons, the political label of the Movement was refined to become the
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang
and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu,
and Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
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Non-Moslem League of Northern Nigeria.' This was largely so in order
to broaden its appeals for support from persons among the M-Belt groups
and societies who still participated in African systems of beliefs
and traditional worshipping practices and who had been seen to be
increasing in accepting identification with the social status and
political leadership of Christians rather than Moslems, while the
organization maintained the objective of carrying out a political
struggle that might protect the interests of Christianity and Christians
in The North.
In the subsequent elections that took place in May 1949, during
the Du-meeting which lasted a whole weekend, 2 Pastor David Lot was
confirmed as elected President of the Christian Movement, the NML,
Moses Nyam Rwang as General-Secretary, Bala Yerima as Treasurer and
Jonah Assadugu became elected into the newly created post of Travelling
Field Secretary whose task was the propagation of the ideas discussed
at the meeting to both Christian and non-Islamic communities among
the M-Belt groups and societies and to receive financial contributions
from the churches to assist the activities of the organization.
	
Other
members of the elected executive committee of the NML with advisory
political and religious roles included, Musa Kuku, a Birom transport
owner, Sukumso Bura, a Bura from Biu Division and also a transport
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot,
Jonah Assadugu and Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
2. The participants came on a Friday and departed on the following
Sunday after attending the local SUM church service. Interview
discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. Sklar 1963 p.346: Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu,
Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
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owner, Pastor Bagaya, an Nzit from Kagoro in S. Zaria and Patrick Fom)
The chiefs of Jos and Kagoro, Rwang Pam and Mallam Gwamna were also
elected to be Guardian-Patrons of the Christian Movement. 2 In the
period between 1950 and 1956 however both chiefs became increasingly
pressurized by the transitional government to Self-Rule and subsequently
Independence which contained both NPC politicians and officers of the
government of British administration in The North, to show less commit-
ment for the M-Belt Movement since as traditional rulers they ought
to be neutral with regard to religious and political matters. 3 The
NML fundamentally therefore was concentrated in its activities and
political mobilization among non-Islamic communities in Adamawa,
S. Bauchi, S. Zaria, Plateau with very insignificant religious and
political participation of Christians from the Tiv, Idoma and Igalla
groups and societies in Benue and Kabba Provinces. The groups and
societies in Benue and Kabba were however to join and some gave
1. Sklar 1963 p.346; Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang:
he suggests that although Patrick Fom was the most European
educated and very articulate in his political rhetoric in Enghsly
and Hausa, he was not elected into the executive of' the NML
because of' his preference to be involved with the BPU and his
old feeble age and health. There might also havebeen religious
reasons for the non-election of' Patrick Fom being Catholic in a
largely SIM/SUM Protestant organization. The rivalries between
the Catholics and Protestants in the M-Belt Movement which
affected Christian solidarity in the political demands are examined
with more analytical detail in Section IV of this chapter and also
where politics with the M-Belt Movement is
discussed.
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang
and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
3. Political pressures from governments in The North on some
Christian chiefs among the M-Belt groups and societies
o	 cer Ll.
134-
political support and sympathy when the Christian organization developed
to become the UMBC Movement which vigorously demanded the creation of
a M-Belt Region in The North for socio-cultural and political minorities
rather than an equivocal "Christian Region". Conceptions of the antici-
pated political actions in the NML Movement however included all Christian
and non-Moslems and emphasized Christian political leadership which
excluded Moslems.
The elected political posts into the executive of the NML Movement
were non-remunerative. 1 However for example, although Jonah Assadugu,
The Travelling Secretary of the Christian Movement was not remunerated
by funds of the Treasurer of the organization, the Christian Missionary
2
Bodies he served in 1949	 gave indirect financial support for the NML
by maintaing his nine-shillings monthly salary and gave an acknowledged
permission for his absence from duty as teacher and evangelist at
Gengule in Numan Division until he completed the political tours.3
The Du-meeting therefore was also to make gains in the financial con-
tributions from the attendants in order to enable the travelling-
secretary, Jonah Assadugu, to set about the task of mobilizing Christians
by travelling to different Christian communities with the objective of
diffusing the political ideas on the need for Christian unity in the
organization. 4 While the 1948 "Rahwol Kanang" meeting produced ten
shillings as financial contributions for the activities of the Christian
1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang
and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
2. Mainly the SIM in their Gengule Station in that instance.
3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot and
Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
4. As (3)
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Movement, at the inception of the NML during the Du-Meeting in 1949,
the 200 attendants raised ten pounds aa contributions to meet the immediate
travel needs of Jonah Assadugu.1
The political and religious objectives for the organization of
the NML in May and the subsequent demands for Christian political re-
presentation in the legislative institutions of The North made in
December 1949 were relatively mild and politically modest when cL;.pared
to the objectives in the demands of the MZL early in 1950 which were
subsequently and vigorously contested by the better organized and
more articulate tJMBC Movement after 19560. The NML for example only
sought to achieve the political participation of Christians in the
legislative institutions of The North rather than separation and con-
stitution into separate political unit of the Nigerian Federation. The
religious and political interests of the NML centred on mobilizing
Christians and non-Moslems among the M-Belt groups and societies by
activating the Christian religious identity for political purposes meant
to achieve Christian consciousness and solidarity. It was anticipated
that Christian solidarity might produce political pressures on the
government of British administration in The North such that there will
be Christian political representation and participation in the legis-
lative institutions of The North, particularly in the NHA if Christians
"were seen to be speaking over issues and problems with one voice".2
This means that the NML Movement itself was conceived of as a political
pressure group in The North rather than as a political party. This was
so, even when it was the case that the NML Movement was curiously
electoral in its strategies for political and religious mobilization,
when there were no elections to contest and no crusades. In a rather
1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyarn Rwang, Pastor David Lot
and Jonah Assadugu, January 1971.
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interesting contrast to the MZL Movement that was organized in 1950 to
take over the activities of the NML and subsequently the UMBC Movement
in 1956 there was little use of electoral strategy for mobilization in
the 1954 Federal and the 1956 Regional elections, in the sense that there
was no explicit touring political officer charged with that task. In
the period between 1950 and 1956, although the post of Travellinci
Secretary in the NML was substituted by that of Publicity Secretary in
the MZL and the UMBC, the political duties were centred on producing
membership cards etc. t••• rather than touring remote villages to meet
the people". 1
 It ought to be borne in mind however that this suggestion
coming from Moses Nyam Rwang must be treated with caution. It might
be a criticism of the organization of the MZL and the IJMBC Movements.
In the period between 1952 and 1956 Nyam Rwang was politically active
in the organization of rival "Middle-Belt Parties" and affiliated these
to different dominant Nigerian political parties, even when it was the
case that the Nyam-Rwang-Factions maintained the same political objectives
of a struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region to the mre organized
M-Belt Movements, the MZL and the UMBC. In 1956 however the Nyam-Rwang-
Factions reconciled their political interests with the MZL to condition
2
the development of the UMBC Movement. 	 The non-electoral strategies
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981;
Differences in the electoral strategies of the MZL, and the UMBC
are examined in more analytical details in Sections liv, IV and V
of this chapter	 where the politics
with the M-Belt Movement are discussed.
2. Sklar 1963 p.347; Factional tendencies to organize rival organizations
and movements with the same aims and objectives to the "Main Move-
ments" as political characteristics of the leadership of groups and
societies in a situation of internal colonialism in the period
between 1952 and 1956 are examined in analytical detail in Section IV
of this chapter with examples from the development of Middle Belt
Parties and Movements like: the Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP),
the Benue Freedom Crusade (BFC), the Middle Belt State Party (MBSP)
and the Middle Belt Congress (MBC), before their re-entry into
Nigerian politics in 1956 as the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC).
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of the MZL and the M-Belt Political Parties, which were emphasized in
the activities of the new-post of the Publicity Secretaries, contrasted
with the political impact and meaning in the tours of Jonah Assadugu
which produced Christian consciousness among some of the M-Belt groups
and societies. However after 1956, the LJMBC Movement returned to the
patterns of electoral strategies practised by the NML when both Joseph
Tarka as President to the IJMBC Movement and Patrick Dokotri as GL1eral
Secretary were conditioned by the Willink Commission in 1957 and the on-
coming 1959 general elections which determined an Independence government,
to tour and mobilize all non-Islamic chiefs and communities among the
M-Belt groups and societies in 1958, in support of the demands for the
creation of a N-Belt Region in The North before 1960.1 It ought to be
borne in mind however that the electoral strategies of the NML which
emphasized mobilization and activating the Christian religious identity
were not continued after 1950 because of the failure of the Christian
leadership to persuade the government of British administration and the
transitional NPC leadership in The North to permit the organization to
operate as a Christian political party. Furthermore as earlier suggested,
the Christian religious identity as the political identity in the NML
was eroded by 1950 with the ressurgence of triba1" identities as political
identities among the M-Belt groups and societies which were given a boost
by some of the politices of the government of British administration in
The North, particularly so in the choice of representation into the NHA
2in the 1951 elections.
1. Interview discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January 1981; The
electoral strategies of the UMBC Movement in the period between
1956 and 1960, the Willink Commission of 1957 and the 1959 elections
are examined in analytical detail beetu	 where politics with
the M-Belt Movement is discussed.
2. For examples of some of the policies and the strength of the
ressurgence of "tribal" identities in 1951, see previous discussion
in the initial pages above and also Chapter 3 Sections V and VI.
However, after 1949, the NML was concerned to mobilize Christians
and non-Moslem communities in order to choose only Christians in instances
where there were elections into the NA, Provincial and Regional political
institutions like the NHA. 1 The NML of Northern Nigeria was therefore
used by indigenous Nigerian Christian leadership as the political
instrument for the mobilization of Christians with the religious theme
of "saving the non-Moslem" groups and societies in The North in the
same religious sense that Western European Christendom set out to the
'Sudan' in Africa to liberate the "pagan souls" by mobilizing Christian
action through the Missionary societies to make converts from among the
groups and societies that were concentrated south and south eastwardly
in the territories that became The North in Nigeria. When there was
an increase in political activity in The North in the period between
1946 and 1950, caused by the direct consequences in the political
changes from the Richards Constitution to the MacPherson Constitution,
the Chief of Jos, Rwang Pam was used and accepted the political role
to make "passionate appeals at every opportune Christian gathering"
in which he called for Christian unity to translate itself into Christian
political solidarity for election purposes that were anticipated in 1951.2
After the Du-meeting however the religious propagation of the
political ideas of the NML were basically in the activities of its
executive members. Although the executive members and other persons
who attended the meeting became politically active in their local
areas, there was little organization of NML branches under a centralized
headquarters beyond the contacts with churches where an executive member
existed. 3
 In fact the task of mobilizing the Christian religious identity
1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and
Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
2. Interview discussion with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang,
January 1981.
3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and
Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
beyond local socio-cultural boundaries largely fell on Jonah Assadugu,
the Travelling Secretary of the NML, who with bicycle and Bible,
occasionally travelling by train, reached church leaders and their
Council of Elders among Christian communities in Adamawa, S. Bauchi,
S. Zaria and Plateau where he presented the issues discussed at the
Du-meeting on the political need for Christian unity and asking fpr
support and financial contributions. 1
 The Christian communities and
the churches collectively gave varied sums of money as contributions
2for the activities of the NML,
	 although support was less in terms
of cash payments and more in the acceptance of the political ideas of
the NML. There was also generous welfare arrangements for the Travelling
Secretary by the Christian communities and the churches. The dates for
his arrivals at a particular centre for example were always made known
in advance by announcements in the churches and elaborate plans for
food and accommodation were arranged. 3 Socio-religious and political
support for the NML was also expressed in the organization of outward
journeys of the Travelling Secretary by the different churches and
Christian communities some of the M-Belt groups and societies. For
example it was the churches and Christian Elders who arranged bicycles
for travels between different communities in addition to the political
task of convening meetings of their congregations of both Christians
and "non-believers" for Jonah Assadugu to address.4
1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
2. The amounts were unrecorded and are not remembered because the
sums were given to the travelling secretary who used the money
in the circumstances of financial emergencies that arose in the
course of his travels.
3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
4. As (3)
In the period between May and December 1949, Assadugu visited
all the major local Christian churches and communities in the territories
of the M-Belt groups and societies, except those among the liv. Idoma
and Igalla. He was expected to complete the task of his religious cum
political tour in September 1949 and report the progress of experienced
1
support in an NML executive meeting at Bukuru and Jos in the same month.
In September 1949 Jonah Assadugu reported to the executive of the ,ML
at Bukuru and Jos that there was mass Christian support with enthusiasm
for the political ideas of the NML. This was indicated by the social
receptions, organization of his travels (by arrangement of bicycles)
and the turn-out to meetings with the churches which he addressed
among the Christian communities, a turn-out that included "non-Believers"
among some of the M-Belt groups and societies. 2 This was so because
Christianity already existed as a mobilized social movement in the
Christian conventions and conferences and there was also the "tribal"
unions who were active in articulating political and economic issues,
some of whose leaders were covenanted Christians.
At the same time that Jonah Assadugu toured some of the Christian
communities in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and Plateau in the period
between May and December 1949, the President of the NML, Pastor David Lot
and the General Secretary to the organization, Moses Nyam Rwang, were
politically active engaging the audiences of the Chief of Jos and Kagoro,
3
Rwang Pam and Mallam Gwamna, 	 to persuade them to urge members of the
1. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
2. As (1)
3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang,
January 1981.
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NHC, the NHA' and the Governor of The North, Sir Bryan Sharwood Smith,
to recruit more Christian representation in the legislative institution
which will enhance the participation of Christians that might point
out the political trappings of discriminatory legislation on the
activities of European Christian Missionaries among the M-Belt groups
and societies and in The North in general. 2 The strategy to use the
chiefs of Jos and Kagoro as political lobbies among top government
officials and politicians in NHA created "very good friendship between
3
them and the subsequent Governor of The North, Sir Bryan Sharwood Smith.
In the instance the Christian anxieties over the pattern of legislation
on Christianity in the NHC and NHA was impressed on the Governor of
The North and the officials in the top hierarchy of politics by the
government of British administration to be among the causes for the
organization of the NML. The strategy however was a major cause in
the development of split political images of the leadership in the NML
on the target population in a specific Christian sphere of influence
for the mobilization and activation of the Christian religious identity
for the political purposes and conceptions of the organization in which
it presented itself as representative of Christianity and Christians in
provinces where there were "non-Believers" and Moslems among the groups
and societies. For example, in the period between 1949 and 1952
Sharwood Smith sowed the seeds of this split political imagery of the
1. Both chiefs were selected provincial members to the NHA as well
as "nominated" chiefs into the NHC in the period between 1949
and 1952 as representatives of the "pagan areas" - Sharwood Smith
1969 p.332-335.
2. Interview discussions with Mallam Gwamna, Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor
David Lot, January 1981.
3. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.333
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relationship between Christianity and political support for the NML
as an organization that also stood for "non-Believers" when on several
occasions he argued and suggested to the chiefs of Jos and Kagoro as
well as to some leaders of the organization like Pastor David Lot,
that: "The NML as a political organization for Christians was not
accounting for political realities of the area since it did not account
for the interests of non-Believers and Moslems who were their brothers
existing among the different groups and societies the movement suggested
it represented".' Pastor David Lot suggests that in certain instances,
political doubts were raised among some top officials in the hierarchy
of the government of British administration in The North on whether
"non-Believers" 2 might want to be represented by Christians as well
as confronted by whether: "They (the leaders of the NML) would want
and tolerate an organization which made equal political claims with
non-Believers as leaders, to represent Christians and Moslems without
political consultation". 3 It ought to be borne in mind however that
Sharwood Smith was concerned to v*id creating a precedent in which
political differences were reinforced by religious identities in the
development of political organizations in The North.4
1. Interview discussions with Mallam Gwamna, Moses Nyam Rwang and
Pastor David Lot, January 1981; see also Sharwood Smith 1969
p. 342-344.
2. A "non-Believer" was taken to be persons practising indigenous
traditional African religious beliefs and worship in which instance
they were neither adherents to the Christian and Islamic religions
Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
4. Interview discussions with T.H. Marshall, September 1981; for
examples of expressed political concerns by Sharwood Smith on
this issue in the period between 1944 and 1947 and his suggestions
that politicians in The North ought to avoid "tribal, class and
religious" bases by calling their organization SMAT: "Sarakuna
(chiefs), Mallamai (teachers), Attajirai (educated and merchant
classes), Talakawa (the peasantry)", an organization that will
articulate the interests of society as a whole - see Sharwood Smith
1969 p.161-164.
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The controversy that resulted from the political claims of the
NML brought indigenous Christian leadership into confrontation with
Bryan Sharwood Smith, the Governor of The North in the period between
1950 and 1957. While he was sympathetic to the political views held
and expressed tohim by Rwang Pam, Mallam Gwamna and Pastor David Lot
who were concerned to achieve political representation through the
NML to protect Christian interests in the institutions of government
in The North, 1 when there was political demand for the creation of
"a Middle Zone Region" by the subsequent organization to the NML, the
MZL, Sharwood Smith saw the remaining Christian leadership as 'Political
Opportunists': "... for whom the dazzling vision of a brand new region
with its ministries and public boards and corporations and all that
these implied in the way of power and patronage was argument enough".2
The political interpretations of the anticipated intentions of the
NML also compounded its problems to persist into a stable political
organization with a Christian religious identity. The government in
The North for example saw the NML as a political organization with
European Christian missionaries as its main backbone in the background
who meant to place Christian contestants in the 1951 elections that
were generally anticipated as a result of the adjustments in the
MacPherson constitution from that of Governor Richards in 1946.	 In
the period between 1947 and 1952, while government was concerned to
create a political premise from which it might acheve the political
representation of "tribal" communities from among the M-Beit groups
and societies in The North, the development of NML after 1949 was clearly
achieving "trans-tribal" political mobilization with the Christian
religious identity to achieve political representation which were
underlined by the political polarities between Islam and Christianity
1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
2. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.343-344.
3. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Barnabas Dusu and
Patrick Dokotri, January 1981.
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in The North. The political and social theme of a Christian crusade
against Islam in The North permeated the whole development of political
movements among the M-Belt groups and societies even when it was the
case that "tribal" interests superceded religious political goals
before their demands consolidated and persisted within the UMBC
Movement after 1956) In the instance some of the "tribal" leaders
with initial political loyalties to the executive leadership of the
NML accepted the political prescription of the government as early
as in 1950 that the NML was better organized at the level of "tribal"
loyalties rather than on the wider Christian religious identity in a
non-Moslem movement which stood as representative of the assumed
"Christian tribes". 2 In 1950 Sharwood Smith himself became impatiently
blunt with the NML and told some of its executive members that "a Non-
Moslem League was an offensive political label for the organization of
political interests in The North and the leadership ought to produce
a new tag for the movement". 3 Sharwood Smith also impressed on the
leadership of the NML through the chiefs, Rwang Pam for Jos on the
Plateau and Mallam Gwamna for Kagoro in S. Zaria and Pastor David Lot
as representative of church leadership that political consciousness
was better organized through "tribal" channels in the different unions
as political parties rather than in the NML as a Christian political
party. 4 Therc were also political pressures on the leadership of the
NML in which there was developed the administrative policy that the
1951 elections be contested through the channels of the "tribal"
unions to produce representatives rather than the NML as a political
1. The political crystalization of "tribal" and Christian religious
interests in the IJMBC movement are examined in more analytical
detail in Sections III, IV, V and VI of this Chapter.
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. As (2)
4. Interview discussions with Mallam Gwamna and Pastor David Lot,
January 1981.
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party producing representative Christians for elections into the
Provincial Colleges. As a collateral example in the development of
political parties in the Islamic society for participation in politics
in The North and Nigeria, the NPC and NEPU (subsequently pressurized
by the NAs) experienced less direct pressures and political manipulations
to create cleavages in their organizations from the government of
British administration in The North. For example in Adamawa, Bauchi,
Borno, Sokoto and Zaria Provinces, the 1951 Elections were contested
by politicians who were Moslems on the party political labels of the
NPC and NEPU. 1 The consequence was that political fragmentation
rather than unity became the characteristic of political development
in the politics of The North among the M-Belt groups and societies.
This was so becauseof the "tribal" element which was given emphasis
as the level of political participation for the M-Belt groups and
societies in the politics of The North. This situation was contra-
destructive to the development of an aLL embracing political organi-
zation in the Islamic society, the NPC and NEPU with leadership whose
political centre of gravity was in the Islamic society. While a
dominant and autonomous political organization developed in the Islamic
society, a dependant and fragmented pattern in the development of
political organization became characteristic of the M-Belt groups and
societies, a pattern that was increasingly subjected to political
interference by governments in The North. In the period between 1956
and 1966 there was increased interference in the political patterns of
participation among the M-Belt groups and societies with concomitant
1.	 For examples, see Northern Region of Nigeria: Provincial Annual
Reports 1951, Kaduna 1953.
7 See Cowe- 6± %€	 cc' Ckci.e r 4-.
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increases in the dependence of their leadership to politicians with
political objectives that emphasized Islamic leadership.'
However, as a result of the political position taken by the
government of British administration in The North on the NML, the
Christian political leadership saw itself in dual political capacities.
While admitting their political identity in the NML as representative
of Christian interests the pressures produced from government "advice"
and politicians with "Northern interests" conditioned their inter-
actions as "tribal" leaders with Christian interests. 2 In other words,
when Christian mobilization had activated political consciousness
among the M-Belt groups and societies it was only permitted to find a
stable political expression through the channels of the "tribal"
political machinery. This was dominated by the leadership that was
developed from the Christian communities as the self-accredited rep-
resentative of Christians and "non-Believers" among the M-Belt groups
and societies. 3 The consequence of the dual role of representing
Christianity and the "tribes" in the leadership of the NML showed
itself in the schisms that characterized the development of the
M-Belt Movement from the NML into the MZL, particularly so for its
1. Interference in political participation of the M-Belt groups and
societies by the transition government of British administration
and the subsequent NPC government in the period between 1956 and
1966 is examined in more analytical detail in Chapters 6 and 7
where the Willink Commission and patron-client relationships in
the patterns of politics with the M-Belt Movement are brought
into focus in this study.
2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and
Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. As (2)
development into the LJMBC in the period between 1952 and 1956. In
that period for example a major consequence of the dual roles of
leadership in the MZL was that members who lost political posts con-
tested for the all embracing executive of the movement, simply took
away with them their "tribal" followings and organized a new movement
with a "tribal" rather than a Christian base. In the instance the
rival organization to the MZL was given political recognition and
encouraged by governments in The North. While the political leadership
in NNL still maintained the objective of political representation for
Christians, the alternative "tribal" bases of the variants to the NML
became preoccupied with a struggle to solve socio-economic and welfare
issues of deprivation from both the regional government and its organi-
zations in the Provincial and Divisional NA administrations of the M- B elt
groups and societies. However some of the racalcitrant political leader-
ship of the MIL and subsequently the MZL organizations in the developing
M-Belt Movement seem to suggest the argument that the splits in their
Christian loyalty to that religious and political identity in the initial
period which activated previous political roles in the "tribal" unions
was not necessarily fragmentation of Christian solidarity and the political
interests it supported. It was rather "a sharing of responsibilities"
on the issues that involved the political struggle of the M-Belt groups
and societies: "While the NML and the MZL struggled for the cause of
justice to all Christians, the "tribal" unions struggled for social and
economic problems, unique to the different Christian communities among
the "tribes" in the M-Belt areas",
1.	 Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Dudu Dalyop,
January 1981.
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The NML however essentially developed as a political organization
conceived by Christian leadership as a pressure group that was based
on local issues affecting mainly the non-Islamic groups and societies
in the M-Belt areas. These were related to the local conception of
politics and society in The North rather than the developing Nigerian
political state. They were centred on the political controversy between
the dominance of the Islamic religion in the political process and the
subordination of Christianity, particularly so on the participation of
Christians in the legislative institutions of The North. The Christian
minority in the politics and society of The North in 1950 gained support
for their political appeals to the different groups and societies in
the M-Belt areas because their demands were related and became reinforced
by the state of socio-economic and political grievances already being
contested for solutions by the "tribal" unions. The NML was to develop
into a movement with a cuase for the creation of a separate region within
the Nigerian Federation, even when it was the case that Federalism itself
was not a political practice until in 1954. The NML however did not
achieve the political goal of producing pressure on the government of
British administration in The North, sufficiently to give representation
to the minority religion in order that Christian interests might be
protected. For example there was no Christian that was appointed into
the NHAasa result of the demands of the NML until in 1955 when there
were other M-Belt political organizations and the systemic forces in
the politics of The North had produced other demands and organizations
that overtook the exclusively Christian Movement. ' This was so because
1.	 Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981; this
point will also become apparent when we examine the development of
the MZL and Middle Belt Political Parties in the period between 1952
and 1956 which culminated in the more permanent tJMBC Movement in
1956 in Sections III, IV, V and VI in this Chapter.
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the government insisted on "tribal" political representation rather
than Christian representation from the different non-Islamic groups and
societies in the M-Belt areas. The NML was however successful in
bringing to the fore of politics in The North, the political scope of
a Christian Movement and the content of its political demands from among
previously assumed dormant political groups and societies. By the end
of 1950 the NML had succeeded in raising Christian political conscious-
ness into one unity and had used it to present its grievances and demands
for solutions to the highest political personalities in the government
of British administration in The North. Although this was so the
demanded solutions were listened to rather than acted upon to dissolve
political discontent. The NML had also created a political premise
for its anticipated political action which was meant to organize-in
political support for Christian representation into the NHA without an
alternative option of political action in the case of that objective
failing. In 1951 the NML had completely failed to pressurize the
government of British administration to nominate indigenous Christians
from the M-Belt groups and societies into the NHA. Instead it was
completely pressurized by the government to de-emphasize Christianity
in the Movement by changing the political lable into the Middle Zone
League. 1 In June 1951 the NML ceased to exist when the MZL with a newly
elected leadership took over the political ideas of the Christian
Movement. 2
 The NML however had achieved a huge success on mobilizing
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and
Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
2. As (1)
10
and creating Christian political consciousness which suggested that the
different "tribal" groups and societies in the M-Belt areas were "one
Christian tribe". This political mood however initially crystallized
into concrete reality from impact with the ideas of the NML on the non-
Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and S. Zaria
while similarly excluded Christian groups and societies from the main-
stream of politics in The North like the Tiv, Jukun, Idoma and Igalla
among others did not participate in the NML except for a few Tiv
Evangelists in Ibi where there was a strong SUM station. Other than
circulating the religious and political ideas that Christians were
organizing themselves in order to ensure Christian representation in
the legislative institutions of The North which was political action
against the dominance of Moslems by using orthodox Christian methods in
the rhetorics of: "Krista ku tashi" (Christians arise), the NML and
the leadership were lonely voices in the political wilderness of the
M-Belt groups and societies and tha maturing political arena of The
North. They were not considered as a serious political force beyond
the groups and societies where there were Christian communities centred
on a church. In this respect the NML might be seen in the Biblical
role of 'John the Baptist' to the later advent of the MZL and the UMBC
in the political sense that it was a potent force in politics rather
than an electoral campaigner and manipulator.
The political imprint of the NML as a potent force in politics in
The North was largely achieved through the inspired religious publicity
and propaganda it received in the initiated methods of Jonah Assadugu,
Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot in the period between 1949 and 1951.
Jonah Assadugu, with Bible and bicycle, travelled to mobilize and activate
the Christian religious identity among the communities in Adamawa, S. Bauchi
S. Zaria and Plateau.' Moses Nyam Rwang, perhaps the most emotionally
1.	 Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
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angry and politically disturbed over issues surrounding the organization
of the NML in its leadership, used the Bible and his military decorations
(,iect ) attained from military service in the Second World War to
suggest that they were respectively "Heavenly and Earthly Certificates"
to fight for the cause of Christian freedom and justice for the M-Belt
groups and societies and therefore calling for support.'	 Pastor David
Lot, Commander of the SUM/SIM Boy's Brigade (BB) on the Plateau, used
the movement to travel extensively among Christian communities by
marching young men through villages and towns on the Plateau with
political and religious messages that called for a relationship between
Christian unity and the political solidarity of the non-Islamic groups
and societies in the M-Belt areas. 2 The BB Movement always produced
tremendous political impact since people came out to listen and watch
the parade on the different "political Sundays" wherever a team camped.3
This was the extra-political dimension to Christian mobilization by
the NML which shaped and prepared public opinion among some of the
M-Belt groups and societies to support Christians in the 1951 elections
and the subsequent political demands for Christians and non-Moslems
to be arranged into a separate Region in The North as a different
political unit from the Islamic society within the Nigerian Federation,
an idea that had gained political currency with the MZL movement as
early as in 1951. The political issue of demanding the creation of
"a Region for Christians" did not arise with the essentially Christian
organization of the NML. The issue of a region for Christians and non-
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. Interview discussions with Barnabas Dusu, January 1981.
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Moslem groups and societies within the very leadership of the NML
awaited another 'political space' which was produced by Bello Dandogo.
In the period between 1947 and 1951, Bello Dandogo was a privately
nominated political representative as member from Kano Province in
1
the NHA, and was one of the most politically articulate in the
rhetorics on the floors of the NHA and the FHR. 2 In 1950 however,
Bello Dandogo put forward a private members motion beforethe NHA
suggesting the exclusion of European Christian Missionary activities
3*
among all the groups and societies in The North.
	 A beleagued NML
with a weakened ideological base of cohesion centred on the mobilized
Christian religious identity and solidarity, because the government
insisted on giving only "tribal" rather than Christian representation
to the NHA was given a cause to reorganize with new political momentum
in the midst of pressures to change its political label into something
less religiously overt. It is to the circumstances surrounding the
motion of Bello Dandogo, the political pressures to change the label
of the NML into "something else" in order for the movement to be
accepted as a political party in The North and the political demands
accompanying these issues that we now turn to, which conditioned the
development of the Middle Zone League (MZL) and the subsequent first
emergence of the political ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region
in The North in the period between 1950 and 1954.
1. Sklar 1963 p.346
2. For examples of the Language content and nature of the issues Dandogo
raised and articulated in the NHA and the FHR in that period, see
Northern Legislature: Northern House of Assembly (Advisory Council)
Debates, Lagos 1947-1952.
3. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981; Sjlar 1963
p.346; while Sklar suggests the date of the critical motion to be
1949 and uses the word "restrict Christian Missionaries" in The North
(It ought to be borne in mind that Christian Missionary activities
were already restricted activities before 1950). Interview dis-
cussions and the dairy dates of Jonah Assadugu suggest that the
the motion was made in 1950 and it was meant to "exclude/expel"
Christian Missionaries from The North.
\D See	 at e C
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III The Middle Zone League (MZL)
The Middle Zone League of 19501 as a political organisation
among the M-Belt groups and societies was conditioned by the political
outgrowth of the socio-religious grievances in the NML that was organized
in 1949. Although the political label of the Christian Movement was
changed from the Non-Moslem League to become the Middle Zone Leque,
the political actors and the socio-religious grievances which the NML
contested remained an issue in the MZL for maintaining the objective
of mobilizing Christian solidarity for the political purposes in
The North. This section examines the socio-economic causes and
political circumstances of the M-Belt groups and societies under
Christian political leadership in the development of the Non-Moslem
League (NML) Movement of 1949 which became the Middle Zone League
(MZL) in 1950. The section also examines the expansion of socio-
economic and welfare demands as political interests in the growth
and development of the MZL that were articulated by the leadership
which were different from those in the Non-Moslem League Movement.
The MZL Movement maintained the same social and political support
from Christian Communities among the M-Belt groups and societies until
"tribal" tendencies in the already mobilized Christian political identity
of the NF1L caused factions to develop within the organization after
1952. Previous to 1952 however when there began a vigorous demand
by the MZL, there still remained in the perception of the Christian
leadership of the Movement the notion that political representation
1.	 K.W.J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics
and Administration in a Developing Political System, Oxford
1963 p.78-81; M.G. Smith, "Kagoro Political Development" in
Human Organization, Vol.19, 1960 p.146; Richard Sklar, Nigerian
Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, Princeton
1963 p.346.
conditioned the favourable distribution and allocation of modern
infrastructural amenities for European patterns of developing their
societies. This political perception persisted collaterally to the
objective purposes of the Movement that were centred on safe-guarding
against anti-Christian Bills in the Legislative institutions of The
North. In the period between 1940 and 1950, European Christian Missio-
naries increasingly demonstrated that they were the visible ins..ruments
in the development of the non-Islamic M-Belt groups and societies.
When indigenous Christian political representation was denied in
response to the demands of the NML and when there was a motion in
the NHA to expel European Christian Missionaries from The North who
were concentrated and critical to the development of the M-Belt
groups and societies, the political consequence produced by that
motion was the instant demand by the MZL for separation from the
Islamic society in The North and the constitution of the non-Islamic
groups and societies in the M-Belt areas into a "Middle Zone Region".
However, when there developed the demands for the creation of
a "Middle Zone Region" in 1950, "tribal" factions, with socio-
cultural and political roots in the "tribal" Union Movements and
whose Christian religious identities became fed into the political
support for the organization of the MZL, surfaced to subsequently
reduce the impact of the mobilized political influences of the
Christian religious identity previously developed in the NML Movement.
In the period between 1950 and 1956 the MZL expanded the political
arenas of Christian mobilization for its political support in The
North and developed as the second phase of The M-Belt Movement. It
also developed to be an organized political party with well defined
and articulate political object'ives. As an organized political
party its main interests were focused on the political mobilization
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of Christians, based on the same strategies of the NML in order to
contest the 1951 elections in The North for the choice of membership
into the Northern House of Assembly (NHA). At its inception in 1950
it demonstrated very little concern with national politics in Nigeria
even when it was the case that the shape and pattern of politics on
that arena produced influences on its political demands and development
as a political party. In the period between 1952 and 1958 Chrician
solidarity of the "tribes" among the M-Belt groups and societies
as political support for the MZL Movement was further eroded in its
political activities by the development of numerous factions within
its organizational ranks. These factions were differently organized
as "Middle Belt Political Parties", with each directing its political
appeal to different sections of the M-Belt groups and societies. Some
of the M-Belt political party movements, like the Benue Freedom Crusade
(BFC) which was organized in 1958 with covert NCNC political encourage-
ment through H.0. Abaagu 1
 were developed among the M-Belt groups and
societies as independent organizations from the MZL and the UMBC
Movement. 2
 The "M-Belt Political Parties" however maintained the
same aims and objectives as the MZL. These were centred on the
political struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North
which might enclose non-Moslems as political minorities in a political
and administrative unit of the Nigerian Federation. The NML Movement
therefore developed to become the MZL political party, organized
among other causes, for the explicit demands for the creation of a
1. Post 1963 p.84
2. The political factions in the M-Belt Movement for the period
between 1950 and 1960 are examined in detail in Section IV of
this Chapter where the "Middle Belt Political Parties" are
brought into analytical focus.
15'
M-Belt Region.'
In a situation of internal colonialism, particularly so in
instances where subordination of political and cultural minorities
is buttressed by administrative and political measures which are
meant to consolidate the political power roles and interests of
an existing ruling class of the dominant group and society within
national boundaries (State, Region, Country) and where the periiieral
groups and societies have attained a measure of organized political
consciousness as a force in politics, a political and religious
movement as a pressure group, as was the NML, gets pushed to become
a separatist movement. 2
 In the instance of The North, which was a
dominant political unit in the Nigerian Federation and for a very
long time until in 1967, was conceived to be "a nation-state" within
a nation in the developing Nigerian political state by both Islamic
leadership and the government of British administration, 3
 there was
the consolidation of political power roles in the interests of an
existing ruling class. This was an advantage directed to the social
and political benefit of the Hausa-Fulani Islamic rulers and numerous
1. It ought to be borne in mind however that the MZL in 1950
demanded the creation of a "Middle Zone Region" before the
same demand was renamed in 1953 as a "Middle Belt Region" within
the Nigerian Federation. In the same year a faction of' the
MZL renamed the demand as a "Middle Belt State". This is
examined in more detail in Section IV of this Chapter.
2. For more detailed discussions of the theory of internal colonialism
with comparative examples of the historical experiences of
political and socio-cultural minorities in different parts of
the world with similar circumstances to those of the M-Belt
groups and societies, see Irodt&cko
3. For examples of the conceptions of The North as a distinct
political and religious nation within Nigeria, see Chapter
Sections III, IV and VI; see also A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, This is
Northern Nigeria: Background to an Invitation, Kaduna 1955;
Social and Economic Progress in the Northern Region of Nigeria,
Northern Regional Information Service, Kaduna, 14th December
1955; R.W. Baxter, Our North: The Story of Northern Nigeria in
its Self-Government Year 1959, Ministry of Internal Affairs,
Kaduna 1959.
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other variants of Islamic leadership among groups and societies
like the Kanuri, Nupe, Islamic Yoruba Communities in Ilorin in the
period between 1900 and 1950 when there was British political control
of Nigeria. 1
 The political consolidation of roles and interests in
the power structure in The North for an existing ruling class, while
the organized political consciousness among the subordinated political
minorities in the peripheral territories was undermined, a process
that was buttressed by administrative and political measures, con-
ditioned the initial development of the demands for the creation of
a "Middle Zone Region" by the NML in 1950.
The idea of a "Middle Zone" as a concept in the description of
certain territories in The North, albeit Nigerian territories, in
which there were existing socio-cultural and political characteristics
held by the government of British administration to be different from
those of the Islamic society was not conditioned by the emergence of
a political organization for the areas. The sociological and
political application of the concept predates the advent of the MZL
upon the subsequent political pressures on the NML as a Christian
movement to change a political label which emphasized an overt
religious identity for political purposes in the short period of its
existence between 1948 and 1950. In the 1931 Nigerian Census Report
for example, many of the M-Belt groups and societies in The North
were distinctively scored as belonging to the language group of a
"Middle Zone" Region. 2
 Among the linguistic categories suggested as
belonging to the "Middle Zone" Region, mainly found in the territories
of The North in Nigeria were: the Afo, Afudu, Arago, Bangi, Boritsu,
1. British rule and the social and political subordination of the
non-Islamic groups and societies has been examined in some detail
in Chapter	 in particular see Sections II, III, IV and V for
analytical examles.
2. Talbot 1969 p.136-137
Kagoro, Burum, Kaje, Dakakari (Chilila), Dukawa, Katab, Gungawa,
Gurmawa, Jaba (Ham), Kamberi, Ninzam, Kamuku, Chawai, Koro, and
Kurama which were concentrated in the territories of Southern Zaria;
Munshi. (Tivi), Bassa (Kaduna) and Shingini which were concentrated
in the territories centred on the Benue River; Yergam, Yeskwa,
Zumper (Mbarike), Anaguta, Barawa, Berorn (Forum), Buji, Buli,
Butawa, Dingi, Fachara (Teria), Ganawuri (Jal), Gbaiyawa, Geji
(Gezawa), Guram, Ikulu, Irigwe, Kwol, Jaku, Kadunu, Kentu, Kibollo,
Kitimi, Kolu, Kopti, Kudawa, Kurmi, Pai, Paiem, Piti, Pongo, Riban,
Rishuma, Rukuba, Rumaiya and Zar which were concentrated in the
territories of Plateau Province; Hill Jarawa, Jere, Jimi, Kadara,
Peda, Kaibu, Kaleri, Kare, Kikurku, Kinuku, Ngwoi, Ningi, Nungu
which were concentrated in the territories of Southern Bauchi; Kitimi,
Mama, Moroa, Sigidawa, Srubu, Taura, Zul, Chamba, Daka, Chamba-laego,
Fali Kugama, Vere, Vomni which were concentrated in the non-Islamic
and non-Fulani territories of Adamawa) It is possible therefore
to suggest that given the European Christian Missionary conversance
with literature on the historical accounts and characteristics of
the non-Islamic groups and societies in The North and their close
social and political association with the Christian Movements among
2the M-Belt groups and societies in the period between 1940 and 1952,
when political and administrative pressures conditioned a change of
political label for the Christian Movement, the ' tMiddle-Zone" as a
sociological category became easily transcribed as a substitution
1. Talbot 1969 p.137
2. For examples of the indicators of European Christian Missionary
close association with Christian political ideas in the social
and political movements among the M-Belt groups and societies
in that period, see Chapter3 Sections III and IV.
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of political label to the Non-Moslem League of Northern Nigeria.
In December 1949 however the NML arrived at a point where it
had nowhere to go for the solutions of its religious and political
grievances in the context of politics within The North. This was
so inspite of the impressive outline of political organization it
had developed for the activation of the Christian political identity
and its frantic religious mobilization of Christian communities for
political purposes. The organization of the NML and the Christian
propaganda it had so brilliantly mobilized in Adamawa, S. Bauchi
and some parts of the Plateau and 5. Zaria was undermined by the
government in The North. So also were the well spent energies of
Jonah Assadugu who had travelled extensively among some of the
Christian communities in the M-Belt areas. Although public opinion
and Christian religious feelings on political issues in The North
aroused among the Christians and non-Islamic communities remained,
they were effectively deflected and redirected back into the churches
rather than filtering into electoral patterns. The government in
The North refused the election of representatives into the NHA on
the political identity of a Christian religious movement. However,
instead of legislating against the organization of religious political
parties which might have automatically affected the Christian movement
the government of British administration in The North insisted that
the anticipated 1951 elections into the NHA be contested in "tribal"
political parties rather than by that phase of the M-Belt Movement,
even when it was the case that the "tribes" considered themselves
as Christians.' The political attitudes of the government of British
1.	 For some examples of the internal religious conceptions from
the "tribes" among the M-Belt groups and societies seeing them-
selves as Christians, see Chapter3 Sections II, III, IV and V.
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administration in The North on the organization of political parties
with exquisite religious identities, particularly as was typified by
the Governor, Bryan Sharwood-Smith for most of the period between
1950 and 1958
	 effectively undermined the political appeals of the
NML with the "tribal" political sentiments that also undercut the
Christian political sentiments which were the very base of mobilized
support in the NML Movement. The NML ended its activities as a
political pressure group in the interest of Christianity in December
1949 without contesting any elections and without achieving its
objectives of getting representation for the Christian communities
among the M-Belt groups and societies into the NHA with an explicit
Christian political identity. The ideas of the NML held by its
leadership on the relationship between Christianity, political
mobilization of Christians and non-Moslems and the representation
for the M-Belt groups and societies in the legislative institutions
of The North and Nigeria persisted until 1951. They were however
a political parcel of the MZL on its inception as a political
movement early in 1950. It was the task of the MZL to achieve some
of the social and political aims and objectives of the NML.
The Middle Zone League was the Non-Moslem League under a different
political label. This was so because the MZL maintained the struggle
began by NML in terms of political ideas, conceptions of the political
arena for its activities, the characteristic of the leadership main-
tained in the Movement and the target population from where it sought
to make appeals for support by activating the Christian religious
identity. The critical difference however was that in the period
1.	 Sharwood-Smith 1969 p;l63; John P. Mackintosh (Ed), Nigerian
Government and Politics, London 1966 p.33
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between 1950 and 1954 the MZL increased the list of political
demands over the socio-economic and welfare grievances as well as
broadening its base of support from among some of the M-Belt groups
and societies. For example, while the NML concentrated its political
activities among Christian communities on the Plateau with some re-
presentation from only a few of the non-Islamic groups and societies
centred on Numan in Adamawa, Fobur in Southern Bauchi and Kagoro in
Southern Zaria, in its phase as the MZL in 1952 the M-Belt Movement
expanded its influences and intensified its activities on groups
and societies in Southern Lana when Kafanchan and Kagoro became
important meeting centres for executive members and followers of
the organization. It was when there was a MZL Movement that there
was gradual political shift from the Plateau, southwardly to S. Zaria
and subsequently to Benue Province when in 1953 liv leadership in
the TPU became aware that there was a political organization which
was struggling for the interests of Christians and non-Moslems who
were political minorities in The North. 1 Subsequently in 1956 the
centre of political gravity of the M-Belt Movement, after its
turbulent period as variations of the MZL in the "Middle Belt Political
Parties" shifted more southwardly again to become concentrated among
the liv group and society in Benue Province in terms of political
leadership and electoral support. This was so, even when it was
the case that as latterly as in 1955 politics had not penetrated to
the massed of the liv people except for a tiny fraction of the
European educated in the TPU? The European educated from the liv
1. Interview discussions with Ajiva Aji, and Isaac Kpum, January
1981.
2. M.J. Dent, "A Minority Party: The UMBC" in John P. Mackintosh (Ed),
Nigerian Government and Politics, London 1966 p.467; Justin I. lseayo,
Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration of the liv,
Zaria, Nigeria 1975 p.194.
group and society were however able to shape the election of all
nine liv members in the NHA from the Benue Provincial Electoral
College although the liv composed only half the population of the
Province,' independently of the political influences from the MZL
Movement.2
When the MZL was organized in 1950 the religious ideas of the
NML, centred on the struggle to achieve the representation of members
from among the M-Belt groups and societies with a Christian religious
identity in the Legislative Institutions of The North, became filtered
into more political channels. The concentration of rhetorical protest
and the articulation of political grievances in the MZL became centred
on socio-economic and welfare issues, rather than the pure religious
rhetoric over Christian representation in the NHA as was previously
the case with the NML Movement. In the instance, the MZL Movement
became characterized by a systematic process of political mobilization
which took out the Christian religion as a political identity and
replaced it with the same socio-economic and political grievances
which had been issues that crystallized cultural identities in the
"tribal" Union Movements among the M-Belt groups and societies. It
was from these changes in political emphasis, among other causes,
that the MZL Movement became more of a political rather than a
religious organization although with concomitant increases in
factionalism based on "tribal" and territorial conceptions of
political identities developing within the organization.
1. Dent 1966 p.467
2. For examples of the political influences in the activities
of the TPU, see detailed discussions of "tribal" Union Movements
among the M-Belt groups and societies for the period between
1940 and 1950 in Chapter 3 Section VI.
As earlier suggested, for very many different reasons, some
of which are the task of this section of the study to examine and
unravel, the MZL expanded from the political need for Christian
representation in the legislative institutions of The North to
demanding for political separation from the Islamic society and the
constitution of Christian with non-Islamic communities into a "Middle
Zone Region" within the Nigerian Federation. However, there were
similar religious and political circumstances which previously had
conditioned the organization of the NML that operated again to
produce political stress on Christians who activated support for
the MZL based on the existing mobilized religious political identity
of the NML in the demands for separation from the Islamic society in
The North. The activating political situation was based on another
"Religious Report" in December 1949 that was produced by 5.0. James,
the Yoruba Christian in the NHA and representative to the non-Islamic
and Christian communities as well as Southern Nigerian Christian
communities in The North. The second "Religious Report" from the
NHA by 5.0. James at a meeting of Christian leaders in Jos in the
Christmas of l949 The bulk of the Christian leadership who attended
the Jos meeting in December 1949 were from the then beleaguered NML
Movement. 2
 In that meeting 5.0. James reported to the Christian
leaders in Jos that a motion had been moved by Mallam Bello Dandogo,3
a private member of the NHA from Kano who suggested that: "European
Christian Missionary activities in The North be suspended... the
1. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu
and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
2. Interview discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu
and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. Post 1963 p.79-80; Sklar 1963 p.346; Smith 1960 p.146.
Missions be asked to pack up and go home from the territories of
The North... because the religious activities of the European
Christian Missionaries caused religious confusion ... which in turn
caused disaffection between the "tribes" of The North".' Implicit in
this religious development in the political rhetorics in the NHA is
a suggested indicator of the social and political impact of mobilized
Christian solidarity from the political activities of the NML which
Islamic leadership in The North began to contest. It was however
the religious and political meaning given to the Dandogo motion that
was to set the pattern in the protest over socio-economic and welfare
deprivation and the political demands for the creation of a M-Belt
Region by the MZL, the M-Belt Political Parties and by the more
politically organized tJMBC Movement, particularly so when it
aligned itself with the Southern Nigerian based Action Group (AG)
Party. In the subsequent political development of the MZL among
the M-Belt groups and societies, political controversy was centred
on the political implications of the Bello Dandogo-Motion. The
issue that subsequently shaped the fears of Christian political
leadership, with the Bello Dandogo-Motion as background, was the
anticipated religious consequences of British withdrawal from the
control of political power in The North and Nigeria in the period
between 1950 and 1960, given the emerging dominance of Islamic
leadership in the institutions of government. It was the general
political belief among indigenous Christian leadership and the
European educated from the M-Belt groups and societies that once
political control of the institutions of society was in the hands
of Islamic leadership, in a North dominated by Moslem Ministers and
Moslem chiefs, the Christian and non-Islamic communities will be
1.	 Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
1L5
exploited, victimized by differences in religious faith and dis-
criminated against because they were political and religious mino-
1
rities.
5.0. James also suggested and explained to Christian leaders
how all the Moslem members of the NHA who were associated with the
NPC political organization, including the Sardauna of Sokoto,
supported Bello Dandogo and the motion to exclude the activities
of European Christian Missionaries in the social and religious
development of The North. 2
 The Sardauna of Sokoto at that time had
come to the fore of politics as the unquestioned leader of The North.3
According to the "Religious Report" by 5.0. James, although he was
"a lone Christian voice" in the NHA with no mandate from either the
Christian communities, the NML Movement and the European Christian
Missionary Bodies in The North: "He opposed the motion and no-one
listened to his reasons except the Governor, Bryan Sharwood-Smith
"4
who encouraged him to talk in the debate .
	 In the subsequent debate
on the motion, the report by 5.0. James suggests that he argued the
motion as anti-Christian in the cause of Christianity in The North
and Nigeria and was prepared to sacrifice all he had since: "He
was born a Christian, had lived as a Christian, will die a Christian
and will resurrect as a Christian".5
1. Interview discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang
and Jonah Assadugu, January 1981; see also Sharwood Smith
1969 p.332-333.
2. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang
and Pastor David Lot, January 1981.
3. Sharwood Smith 1969 p.227.
4. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January 1981.
5. Interview discussions with Jonah Assadugu,
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In the second "Religious Report" of S.O. James, it has been further
suggested that as a consequence of his protest arguments over the motion,
the governernnt of British administration in The North, for the first time
took sides with Christianty and privately reprimanded the Sardauna of
Sokoto, the then obvious leader of The North, for allowing Islamic members
in the NHA, to push through the debate on the Bello Dandogo motion and for
their unparliamentary behaviour when S.0. James spoke 1 . This was so,
because the European Christian Missionary Bodies in The North produced
certain welfare services that were in the benefit of both Moslems in the
core of the Islamic centres of religious power and politics and to
non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas from the activities of
their social and welfare institutions:
"Where upon and within the very Houses of the
NHA and the NHC, some British officials pointed
out that the "special-glasses" for the eyes of
some Moslem members and Emirs came from
Christian Mission Hospitals, particulrly the
services of the SIM Hospital in Kano"
Early in January, 1950, a meeting of Christian Leaders was arranged to take
place in Jos, with the objective of deciding on religious and political
issues and problems that became necessitated by the same second "Religous
Report" of S.D. James 3 . The new situation also conditioned the reactivation
of the controversy over the lingering political and administrative
pressures on the name, Non-Moslem League (NML), as a political label in the
same sense of a name for a political party. As earlier on noted this
controversy had forced the activities of the Christian Movement into a
virtual halt. Later in January 1950 however, Christian Leaders who were
already politically active in their identification with the NML movement
again met at Kafanchan 4 . In that instance they further deliberated over
Christian political action on the Bello Dandogo motion which had increased
social and religious fears in the minds of Christians about the potential
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expulsion of European Christian Missionaries from The North and the
political pressures on the NML Movement to change its political label. It
was at the Kafanchan meeting that Christian Leadership in the NML sought to
create a broader representative conception of the non-Moslem groups and
societies in the territories of The North which subsequently produced a new
name for the Christian Movement 5 . Contrary to what has been widely quoted
from R.L. Sklar and K.W.J. Post suggesting that the NML was organized in
1950 and became associated with an independently organized MZL in 19516,
these organizations are in fact inseperable political movements in the
sense that the former developed to become the latter7.
The European Christian Missionary influences with their detail
knowledge about different categorization of non-Islamic territories as a
distinct region within The North8 , Yoruba and Ibo Christian influences, on
some of the European educated executive members of the NML, particularly
those centred on the dos Plateau Tin mines fields and those in Kafanchan9,
combined to condition the change of political label from the Non-Moslem
League to the Middle-Zone League in March, 195010.
It ought to be borne in mind however that the development of Southern
Nigerian nationalist influences on politics in The North in the period
between 1945 and 1955, which subsequently conditioned political alliances
of the NCNC and with the AG in 1956 in particular, with some of the "Middle
Belt Political Parties" was caused by variation in the political interests
of the leadership of the "tribal" unions in the movements rather than
collateral political interests that fussed and political knowledge of The
North which explained the nature of conflict between the Islamic society
and the M-Belt groups and societies. In that period the leadership in the
"Middle Belt Political Parties" became concerned to raise distinct local
issues and problems in Southerrn Nigerian nationalist newspapers, the
British press based in London and on the floors of the FHR. For example,
this was so for the issues of the BPU movement which centred on the "Sabon
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Zawan Scheme" that affected groups and societies in Jos Division. In that
instance, Patrick Dokotry, among others, blew them open to the world by
sending photos reflecting the poverty of the groups and societies affected
by the "Zawan Scheeme", photos of the already planted barred-wires of the
"experimental European colony" in Gyel village to the West African Pilot in
Accra, Ghana, the Northern Star in Kano and the London Times and with the
suggested newspaper caption of "Another South Africa in Nigeria" 11 . The
effect of the publicity given to some of the social and economic problems
affecting non-Islamic communities in The North was the instant "leap-frog"
political support in 1955 for the causes of the BPU, NML, MZL and
subsequently the UMBC movement for the creation of a M-Belt Region which
Southern Nigerian politicians exploited to gain wider support form the
minorities in The North but with little understanding of the deep rooted
nature of internal colonial relationships which shaped conflict in the
area. As it will be subsequently argued 12 , while the M-Belt groups and
societies rejected the nature of the exploitative relationships with the
dominant Islamic society in The North, they strongly accepted being
Northern as a subnational political identity in the politics of Nigeria and
directed this against the intrusion of socio-economic competition of the
more educated Southern Nigerians in their midst. In the period between 1950
and 1965 the perception of the socio-economic competition that was faced
with the more educated and commercially skilled Southern Nigerians among
the M-Belt groups and societies felt by leadership of the M-Belt Movements
in many respects explains the volatility of political alliances between
Southern Nigeria based political parties like the AG and the NCNC and the
dominant party of The North the NPC, even when it was the case that the
UMBC movement culminated in an alliance with the Northern Progressive Front
(NPF) for the 1964 elections in Nigeria13.
It was, however, from the publicity given to the socio-economic and
political problems of some of the M-Belt groups and societies that the
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attention of Southern Nigerian politicians became focussed on non-Islamic
groups and societies that were seeking separation in The North,
particularly so for those whose leadership claimed the Christian
socio-political identity. In the period between 1945 and 1960, Southern
Nigerian politicians had very little knowledge of the socio-economic and
political problems that shaped conflict between groups and societies in The
North 14 . J.S. Tarka for example suggests that in aligning the UMBC with the
AG in the 1957 alliance, the joint leadership was unnecessarily afraid
(upon subsequent reflections) of the powers and political authority of the
Emirs and Chiefs mainly from the assumptions of Southern Nigerian
politicians who controlled the nature of the alliance, until in the
political turmoil of 1966 and 1967 when they, the opposition politicians in
The North strongly influenced the shape of public opinion and decision
making over the course of events in The North and Nigeria with the Emirs
remaining only in advisory roles 15 . Furthermore some top officials in the
government of British administration in The North who sat in the hearings
of the Willink Commission in 1957, suggest that Elizabeth Ivase, the only
female person from the M-Belt areas, who testified in support of the ideas
for the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North demonstrated more social
and political knowledge of The North when compared to Yoruba Lawyers that
had come from the Western Region to represent the' interests of the IJMBC
movement and had been sent to The North by the AG'6.
When the interests that were articulated by the NML movement for the
political representation of Christians with non-Islamic Communities
experienced political and administrative pressures from the government of
British administration, particularly so in respect to the change of its
political label constitute Christians as a ruling class in a separate
M-Belt Region in The North as a unit of the Nigerian Federation which will
be separated from the Islamic society. This was within content of the
specific interests that centered on the religious and political sense that
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suggest there were parallels in their demands with Islamic leadership
ruling over the majority of the Moslem population, albeit the M-Belt groups
and societies in The North. In the whole of the period between 1950 and
1952 however the political momentum in the demands of the NML movement
weakened, largely from the pressures placed on it to change its political
tag. There was also the political emphasis by the government of British
administration in The North on "tribal" identities as political identities
within the developing Christian movement that became the MZL which further
eroded the political vigour of the movement. In the instance Christian
solidarity for political purposes among the non-Islamic M-Belt groups and
societies needed another issue of controversy in the socio-religious
politics of The North for the issue of separation from the Islamic society
to become translated into an organizational form and to gain another
momentum in the MZL. As it has been earlier suggested, the new political
label "the Middle Zone League" itself had been largely caused by political
and administrative pressures of the government of British administration in
The North. These pressures were meant to discourage Christian leadership
from activating religious identities and the socio-political grievances of
Christian communities for political purposes in The North.
Although the NML movement had organized and appealed to a stronger
conception of a political identity in the mobilization of Christians and
the non-Islamic communities among the M-Belt groups and societies because
there was an easily identifiable population that was Christian and also a
type that practiced varied traditional forms of African religious systems
of beliefs and worships and therefore were non-Moslem in socio-religious
and political identity, the organization was forced to use a weak
conception of political identity when it took on the "new" label as "the
Middle Zone League" (MZL). This was so because social and political
identification with a "zone" for political purposes was a vague conception
and became as hopeless as a definition of the claimed socio-religious and
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cultural areas where the political problems of the non-Moslem population
existed in The North and which were contested by the NML. For very many
different reasons however, some of which are the task of this section of
the study to examine, the MZL ended up organizing - in, the interests that
previously existed in the NML movement and expanded those by suggesting the
need for Christian political representation in The North to include the
demands for political separation from the Islamic society as well as the
constitution of all non-Islamic groups and societies into a "Middle-Zone
Region" within the Nigerian Federation. It is from these promises that it
is argued that the movement for political separation rather than
participation and the subsequent demands to constitute the non-Islamic
groups and societies into a M-Belt Region, particularly so for those in the
politically defined M-Belt areas, as the objective characteristic of the
MZL movement was conditioned by the Bello Dandogo motion in the NIIA which
urged for the exclusion of the activities of European Christian
Missionaries from The North. Although this is so, the prestige of the
"Big-Region" syndrome of Nigerian Federalism in the period between 1950 and
1965 also conditioned the vast territorial claims in the political demands
of the MZL 17 . This claim further confused the nature of the problems of the
non-Islamic groups and societies and the search by the MZL for political
solutions to the problems of minorities in The North and in the Nigerian
Federation 18 . It is further argued that when Christianity was de-emphasized
in the grievances of the M-Belt Movement in its development from the NML to
become the MZL, the issues contested in the demands for separation from the
Islamic became centred on socio-political and economic discrimination as
well as deprivation over the distribution of economic and welfare
infrastructure by the governments in The North until 1967. These issues
became reinforced by the grievance of deprivation in political
representation and participation in decision-making roles within the
institutions of government in The North and those closer to the ordinary
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people at the grassroots, in the Provincial and Native Authority
Administrations (NAs) among the M-Belt groups and societies.
After the 1950 Christian leaders meeting at Kafanchan, who were
previously associated with the NML movement and after they had agreed to
change the name of the NML to become the MZL movement, there was an
established mood for the political mobilization of Christians as well as
non-Islamic Communities in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, Plateau and S. Zaria 19 . At a
subsequent meeting in Jos, elections into the executive posts of the MZL
took place. During the same meeting in Jos, the Township of Bukuru was
chosen to be where the structural headquarters of the MZL party will
exist 20 . It ought to be borne in mind that in the period between 1950 and
1954 there were constant and regular meetings of the leaders of the M-Belt
Movement in its phase as the MZL, in Jos rather than at Bukuru until 1956.
These meetings at Jos shaped the establishment of the UMBC headquarters in
Jos.
The controversy between the leadership of the NML and the government
of British administration in The North, over the change of political label
for the essentially Christian movements and the insistance of the
administration that the 1951 elections be contested on "tribal" political
identities rather than with religious labels initially caused the MZL to
carry on its political activities with a dual status in its roles. While
the social as well as the political Christian identity, already mobilized
and actively inherited from the NML movement, for example, conditioned the
continuity of a religious identity on the MZL, "tribal" identities
persistently wore down the cohesion of Christian consciousness in the
movement. The "tribal" identities were maintained on the insistance of
government in The North and this was experienced through political and
administrative pressures on the leadership. This greatly affected the
organization of the MZL and initially reduced its impact on the targetted
population for political mobilization. As it will become apparent in the
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discussions below, "tribal" identities created factions and a lack of
cohesion in the MZL movement in the period between 1952 and 1956. Among
other causal factors however as from March, 1950, the controversy with the
administration in The North, caused leaders of the MZL to demand the
creation of a Middle Zone Region, separated from the Islamic society:
"since Christians in The North were not free to express Christian
sentiments in a Moslem dominated Region" 21 . Although this development
indicates the genesis of the demand for the creation of a Region in The
North as a unit of the Nigerian Federation the organization of the MZL
movement was initially and explicityly aimed to achieve the political
mobilization of Christians and non-Moslems to contest with Moslems in the
election of Christians into the NHA in the 1951 elections. In other words,
the aims and objectives of the NML movement did not initially change with
the change of political label to become the MZL. There was also however
another underlying intention in the development of the NML to become the
MZL which centred on the organization of Christians in the same political
sense that Moslems had made formations to be in the majority support for
the NPC and NEPU in The North 22 . Furthermore, in the early 1950s there were
strong northern desires, mainly expressed by leadership of the Islamic
society in the NPC to pull out The North from the evolving Nigerian
Federation23 . The Christian leaders in the MZL were prepared to organize in
order to halt this tendency that was developing among Islamic politicians
in The North 24 . This suggests that the strength of the Northern Identity
which had roots in the Islamic society in that period and which produced
northern separatist tendencies had the unintended consequence of activating
M-Belt separatism from the Islamic society in The North, a cause that was
championed by European educated Christians in the M-Belt areas. The support
that was subsequently given to the ideas on the creation of a
Middle-Zone-Region and the Middle-Belt Region from specific areas, revealed
the extent to which religious identities corresponded with the geographical
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location and identity of the M-Belt Movement in the religious bi-polarity
of politics in The North in the period between 1950 and 1960. The groups
and societies that gave their political support for the Middle-Zone and the
M-Belt Region, for example, were Christians and non-Moslems, who were
concentrated to the south and south-eastern parts of the Islamic society in
The North. These were also the areas, where European Christian Missionary
activities in The North were more successful in producing a European
educated elite and had consolidated Christian churches and leadership
before 195025.
In the March 1950 elections into the executive posts of the MZL
movement, however, there was a virtual retention of the previous NML
leadership with no one as yet in political positions from Benue Province.
Thus Pastor David Lot (Sura) became President, Moses Nyam Rwang (Birom)
became Vice-President, Secretary-General and Treasurer, Jonah Assaduga
(Bachama) was Field-Secretary, Bala Yerima (Kilba - Adamawa) was also
Field-Secretary and Publicity-Officer 26 . In the previous executive of the
NML movement, however, Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyani Rwang had jointly
held the post of President in addition to Nyam Rwang being the Treasurer of
the movement 27 . A source of conflict from this arrangement among the
leadership was centred on the combination of these executive positions by
one individual. One such conflict developed from the fact that Moses Nyan
Rwang was given about six hundred pounds to pay rents on MZL headquarters
at Bukuru and subsequently to build permanent building structures as
headquarters for the party organization in the same town from the funds28.
Early in 1951, just when the MZL was consolidating its party structure and
organizational form to contest the 1951/52 elections it was faced with
crisis within the executive. The crisis centred on the mismanagement of the
£600.00 by one of its members, Moses Nyam Rwang. It has been suggested that
Nyam Rwang used the funds entrusted to him to hire his personal houses for
both the NML and the MZL temporary headquarters 29 . Furthermore when the
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permanent buildings were erected for MZL headquarters through contracts
that were personally awarded by Nyam Rwang, the other executive members
alleged he had embezzled the money and produced sub-standard buildings:
"not worth the value of money he had been given" 30 . It was from this crisis
that Nyam Rwang developed animosity toward the organization of the MZL
movement and became increasingly distanced from the rest of the MZL
executive which culminated into his total exclusion from the subsequent
meetings of the movement that were held at Kagoro, Jos, Kafanchan, Bukuru,
Minna, Ilorin as well as Lafia in anticipation of the 1951 elections31.
Furthermore, it was this crisis that conditioned a permanent personality
clash with difficulties of cooperation between Rwang and Lot who eventually
claimed to be both Presidents of the MZL movement and for Rwang to organize
the Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP), all with the ostensible goal of the
creation of a M-Belt Region in The North32.
Although cash donations given to the MZL caused problems of unity and
factionalism within the leadership of the movement, the political goals of
the different factions remained unaltered in context of the objective for
the creation of a M-Belt Region in The North. Indeed the sources of the
funding remained fairly broad based and constant, sufficiently for
political support to persist for the different groups to achieve political
mobilization of some of the M-Belt groups and societies. The major sources
of the MZL funds albeit the factions that developed, came from sales of
party membership cards, different christian missionary lump-sum donations,
particularly the Protestant Missionary Bodies (SIM and SUM 33 . There were
also personal individual donations who were either wealthy Yoruba or Ibo,
who had made their wealth from the Tin Mines Fields and held sympathies for
the social and political cause of the MZL movement. One such individual for
example was Churchill Menta, a Warriman from the Delta areas of the former
Western Region of Nigeria and who belonged to the Mid-Western State
Movement contesting, in that Region 34 , the creation of a Mid-Western State.
-777-
Churchill Menta also owned a private Tin Mining company in Jos35.
As earlier mentioned, the change of political label, for the
essentially Christian movement, the NML to become MZL, had come about
largely because it was contested and rejected by the government of British
administration in the North. Analytically however, although "Middle-Zone"
was accepted in the sense that it was more of a geographical rather than a
political category to evoke emotional attachment for party loyalty, none of
the leadership in the MZL movement was particularly worried on the
government pressures to change. The explanation for the situation was aptly
summarized in the words of Jonah Assadugu who suggested that this was so
...."because we knew who we were ... and where we were to be found ... and
what our interests were ... what was wrong with the matter if they wanted
us to have a different name from being a Non-Moslem League?!" 36 . Pastor
David Lot however suggests that Ibo and Yoruba friends on the Tin-Mines
fields near Jos and who held sympathies for the socio-econornic and
political problems faced by the groups and societies in S.Zaria, S.Banchi
and Plateau urged them to replace the name NML with the MZL 37 . This
suggestion was based on the assumption that most of the non-Islamic groups
and societies found in The North were geographically concentrated in a
"Middle-Zone" of Nigeria and sandwiched with Islamic populations in
territories to the north and the rest of Nigeria to the south. The obvious
attribute to Ibo and Yoruba suggestions of the name "Middle-Zone" League to
replace the NML reflects the initial NCNC and AG political interests to
influence anti-Islamic political movements that were rapidly developing as
political forces in the M-Belt areas. This was in context of the dominant
position of the NPC party which Southern Nigerian based political parties
sought to counter. It cannot therefore be assumed that it was political
friendship and sympathies in a vacuum without specific political
interests 38
. Whatever was the nature and origins of the name, MZL, by the
end of 1951 and with the outcome of the 1952 elections, the leadership,
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followers and supporters of the MZL movement agreed to belong to one common
front in the Houses of Assembly 39 . The common front was meant to be a
continuity of the religious and socio-political identity already
established by the NML which it was hoped will bolster the demands of the
MZL for the creation of a Middle-Zone Region, separated from the Islamic
Society in The North 40 . This was the basic contention, since each of the
elected members contested the elections on different "tribal" identities
which in some instances were constituencies, from which they made their
entries into the NHA in Kaduna and the AIR in Lagos rather than on the
support and sponsorship of the MZL. The social and political leadership of
MZL which found entry into the NI-IA and the FHR in 1952 were six in number
and came mainly from Tangale Waje in S.Banchi, Plateau and S.Zaria. Dudley
however suggests that the MZL with its affiliates won about twelve seats in
the 1951 elections even when it was the case that they were won by people
who contested the electors as members of one particular ("tribal") union or
the other41 . This figure is rather high and misleading for the MZL and its
territorial spread of support in 1952 because it takes account of Tiv
members from Benne Province as well as members from Kabba and Ilorin who
were christians but only remotely connected and unaware of the activities
of the MZL at that time. It was only after 1952 when the NHA met that the
Moslem majority in the NPC conditioned the awareness of the Tiv, Kabba and
Ilorin members to the MZL struggle42.
The MZL leadership that was elected from the NI-IA into the FI-IR in Lagos
Included Pastor David Lot who was sura and Michael Audu Buba, a Catholic in
religious identity, who was from the Arikwei tribe, both persons from
Pankshin Division on the Plateau 43 . It also included sypathetic individuals
to the socio-econoniic and political problems existing in S. Bauchi, like
Yakubu Wanka, who was a close associate of Azi Nyako - the pan-Jarawa
leader, although Wanka himself was never associated with any phase of the
M-Belt movement. Unlike Pastor David Lot who was President of the MZL,
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Michael Audu Buba was however not committed to the ideas of the MZL,
although from time to time he expressed political sympathy for the cause of
the movement44 . The MZL leaders elected into the NHA included Pastor David
Lot, Sura from Pankshin Division in Plateau, Moses Nyam Rwang, Birom from
dos Division also in Plateau, Patrick Fom, Birom and a coopted member of
the MZL executive from dos Division on the Plateau, Anta Ninzam, from
Ninzam, at that time S.Zaria was still with Plateau Province 45 . Others
elected into the NHA and who held sympathies for the MZL movement and party
without political commitment to its ideas and objectives included Yakubu
Wanka, Banchi and Michael Andu Buba, an Ankwei from Pankshin Division in
Plateau Province 46 . This suggests that the initial struggle by the MZL for
the Middle-Zone Region subsequently to be the struggle for the M-Belt
Region in the period between 1952 and 1954 was essentially focussed on
Adamawa, particularly in the Numan areas, S.Bauchi, Plateau and S.Zaria.
Furthermore, a close examination of most of the leadership of the MZL who
won elections into the Legislative Houses in Nigeria in 1952 shows that it
was very much a Plateau affair. All the five members of the NHA from
Plateau in 1952 were Christians, indigenous to their constituencies with a
high degree of political consciousness which transcended the numerous
Plateau "tribal" boundaries and which was in the specific context of the
Christian religious identity 47 . This situation on the Plateau contrasts
sharply with the political situation in Benue Province. The Tiv for example
voted in all the eight members for Benue Province into the NI-IA at Kaduna
and three of these gained seats in the FHR in Lagos in 195248. In the early
1950s until about 1954, members of the TPU, the "tribal" organization which
produced political leadership in Tivland and who subsequently became
members of the NHA and the FHR some were affiliated to the NCNC and the
majority to the MPG 49 . In that period also, the ideas of the NML and the
MZL in its demand for the creation of a separate region from the Islamic
society in The North had not yet filtered down to the Tiv group and
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society 50 . Indeed in 1951, organized political parties beyond the TPU had
nothing to do with the elections of liv members into the NHA and the FHR,
as was the case generally with most of the other M-Belt groups and
societies, except for the Idoma who were evidently affiliated to NEPU
through the IHRU but lost the elections, largely due to their own schisms
and Tiv solidarity 51 . Similarly in 1951, the situation in Ilorin and Kabba
area contrasted with the political mood of on the one hand that in Benue
Province and on the other that in Plateau, S.Zaria and S.Bauchi. In Ilorin
for example, although the members elected into the NHA in aKaduna and
subsequently the FHR in Lagos were NPC, with increased tempo in the
activities of the AG after 1954, the lIP party became sponsored to advocate
for the ideas of Yoruba Unity for a merger with the then Western Region of
Nigeria 52 . These irredentsist feelings dating from 1948, were to continue
into the run-up for the 1959 elections in Nigeria 53 . After 1954 therefore
there existed clear indicators which suggested that the M-Belt Movement in
its phase as the MZL and Yoruba sympathies and support from Kabba and
Ilorin might part ways. This was so in the sense that irredentism was quite
a different political phenomenum from the demands for political
constitution into a separate region (the Middle-Zone-Region) from the
Islamic society in The North as a unit of the Nigerian federation which was
the issue being advocated and in the objectives of the MZL. Yoruba
irredentism in itself served to defeat the very conception of a
Middle-Zone-Region since it advocated a merger with the Western Region
rather than an autonomous unit. This was unlike the case with the demands
of the M-Belt movements.
Although the leadership in the MZL had agreed to the "tribal" formula
of representation insisted upon by the government of British administration
in The North for the contest of the 1951/52 elections, those of them that
gained entry into the NHA, organized to form a common front under the
leadership of Pastor David Lot in that Assembly 54 . Their objectives were to
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press for equality for all groups and societies and for Christian freedom
of expression and organization in The North 55 . They also agreed to have
"one voice" in the discussion of issues, both inside and outside the NRA,
surrounding the demands for the creation of a Middle-Zone-Region 56 . One
consequence from this political development and the strategy of the MZL
front in the NHA was that their political activity became restricted to the
issues raised in the Assembly which they perceived to affect them rather
than raising specific issues themselves. It took, for example, over five
years (1951-1956) for leadership of the M-Belt movement from its phase as
the MZL and subsequently the tJMBC, to raise the issue of the creation of a
M-Belt Region in a motion on the floor of the NRA 57 . Even when this was the
case the motion was not raised by any of the UMBC leadership in the NRA but
by Ibrahim Iniam from Bornu 58 . Indeed Ibrahim Imarn himself wanted to
withdraw the motion under circumstances that may be described as suspicious
political manipulations59.
However, once the leadership of the MZL movement was outside
parliament although the executive still met from time to time, their
members usually went back to their different "tribal" constituencies in the
very nature of the politics of parliamentarians with constituency
support60 . This weakened support for the MZL movement at the grassroots
level because "tribal" identification of the leadership in the NHA began to
overtake the religious identification of being Christian and non-Moslem or
persons practising traditional African systems of beliefs and worship.
Furthermore the executive members became increasingly detached from each
other because their contact depended on when the NHA in Kaduna met for
their meetings as leaders of the MZL to also take place 61 . In essence
however, while in the NRA, the members of the MZL made efforts to raise the
grievances and problems which affected the generality of the M-Belt groups
and societies62.
Another factor that weakened the MZL front in the NHA was the
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attention its members gave to hitriball and provincial identities in the
demands for the distribution of socio-economic and welfare infrastructure
and ammenities for development. As earlier suggested, only a few of the MZL
leadership raised issues on the needs for roads, hospitals and schools etc.
on an overall basis of the development that might affect all of the M-Belt
groups and societies on a comparative level to the Islamic society in the
period between 1952 and 1956 in the NHA. In that period, the task almost
entirely fell on Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Fom, who used the Plateau
indicators of under development to suggest that they equally applied to all
of the M-Belt areas 63 . This contrasted rather sharply with what other
members of the NHA from Plateau, Benue, Kabba and Ilorin (if at all these
last two areas are considered to represent M-Belt sentiments) who before
1956 argued that the M-Belt people and areas were developed proportionate:
'... to the rest of the people of The Northu64. While Ahman Pategi (Member,
Ilorin Province) for example suggested that the under development of the
M-Belt areas was due to the unreasonable requests of the people of the
area, for Benjamin Akija (Member, Benue Province), the areas were not rich
enough to maintain a road network and least of all, sufficiently developed
to become a state and therefore must look up to the Government of The
North; in a similar vein, for George Ohikere (Member Kabba Province), the
development of every part of The North cannot take place simultaneously for
the M-Belt areas to be developed and even:
'.. When we get that Middle Belt Region, would
there be no criticism? ... If one asks any of
these politicians who preach such idealism (on
the creation of a M-Belt Region) one will get
the answer - no development. Whose fault is it
when there are four Ministers from the Middle
Belt in the Executive Council and when there
are representatives from all sections of the
people in this House and when the present
Government is so pliable as to make such
arrangements to allow every particular area a
council or something that is peculiar to their
own way of living or custom? If there is no
development why not ask in this House or bring
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a motion?65
It is however quite instructive to note that even within the MZL
leadership, in the period between 1951 and 1956, there was strong
attachment to the Northern Identity, even when it was the case that they
sought for separation from the Islamic society. All the opposition elements
to the Government of The North before 1956, who were in the MZL and the
UMBC as well as other members in the NHA from the M-Belt areas acknowledged
that they were Northerners and had the indigenous right to demand from the
government what other Northerners whom they represented required66.
Finally another factor which weakened the MZL and created factions
within the movement when the demand for the creation of a Middle Zone
Region was echoed in 1952 was the categorization of the leadership into two
types: Responsible and Irresponsible, by both British officials and NPC
leadership in the government of The North 67 . NHA members and individuals
who were outside the Assembly and who were rhetorical and politically
articulate as well as committed to the demand for the creation of a M-Belt
Region were classed as irresponsible and actually scorned with laughter in
the NHA when making their points in debates, while MZL and UMBC leaders who
were concerned with their "tribal", Provincial and Northern interests were
termed responsible, listened to and applauded in their rhetorics in the
NHA68 . This situation was very contributive to the premise from which
patron-client political relationships were developed in the period between
1952 and 1956 between the NPC leadership and some of the leadership of the
M-Belt Movement as well as with other members of the NHA who expressed
sympathies toward the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region. Such
persons included Pastor David Lot, George Ohikere, Haruna Dauda Kwoi, P.C.
Okpanachi, Michael Audu Buba, who gained acceptance over other M-Belt
politicians in the NHA before the eyes of the Administration in The North.
Within the ranks of the M-Belt leadership, however, when it was in its
phase as the MZL, Pastor David Lot was singled out as responsible while
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Patrick Fom, Moses Nyani Rwang and Jonah Assadugu, who was outside the NHA,
were persistantly termed as irresponsible 69 . One outcome of a situation
like that was the development of severe jealousies, accusations and
factions within the MZL leadership, not only within the NI-IA but also these
found their way to the press and also at the different meetings that were
held to seek for ways to create unity within the movement, which culminated
in the formation of the UMBC in 1956. Furthermoore, the recriminations
caused some members of the MZL leadership like Pastor David Lot to loose
commitment to the causes and ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region;
while to others like Moses Nyarn Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and Patrick Fom there
was the impetus for new organizational forms to handle the struggle for the
creation of a M-Belt Region. Indeed, when the MZL movement was organized in
1950, Pastor David Lot advocated a policy for the party to struggle for the
creation of a M-Belt Region before 195670. In 1954 and 1956 when he was
Minister without Portfolio in the NPC government in The North his position
completely changed when he argued:
'... My people are not ready for a separate
region now ... (because) It is the policy of
the government to give almost complete autonomy
to the Provinces. This will give each Province
an opportunity to look after its own interests
and progress at its own speed. Until this new
idea is tried, the creation of a new region is
unnecessary ... we shall continue to work under
the present constitutional arrangements until
it becom	 necessary to have a region of our
own
The general situation of tension and the laxity in commitment for the
idea of the creation of a M-Belt Region within the leadership of the MZL
movement, dating from 1952 became compounded by the wide publicity in the
press and ridicule in the NI-IA suffered by Moses Nyam Rwang, who had been
accused of embezzling funds that were meant for the building of permanent
headquarters at Bukuru for the MZL 72 . It was against this background that
another MZL meeting, wider in scope of participation and territorial
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representation than previous ones, was convened at Kagoro in December,
1952. Among other things, the meeting was meant to resolve the tensions
that had developed within the MZL leadership, to discuss the need for
expanding its support base beyond Adamawa, S.Bauchi, Plateau and S.Zaria
and also to seek the inclusion of Benue Province as well as the support of
Christians and non-Islamic leadership in Kabba and Ilorin but not
necessarily for inclusion in a M-Belt Region74.
The December 1952 general meeting, which was termed conference of the
MZL movement at Kagoro, brought essentially Christian leadership and
European-Christian educated representatives from Adarnawa, S.Bauchi,
Plateau, S.Zaria, Benue, Kabba and Ilorin 75 . This conference was in essence
the first full-blown general meeting of representatives from the majority
of the minority groups and societies of all the M-Belt areas. According to
M.G. Smith, while the first Kagoro meeting, which inaugurated the MZL
movement brought together delegates from "ninety eight pagan tribes", the
second conference in the same Christian Missionary Station drew an even
larger attendance76 . Many of the delegates were new faces, younger and more
educated than the war-horses of the NML and the MZL itself 77 . Prominent
among the new and younger more educated faces who were to become active and
committed in propagating the ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region were
Bello Ijumu (an Igbirra from Kabba), Josiah Olawoyin (a Yoruba from
Ilorin), Patrick Dokotri (a Birom from Plateau), Isaac Kpum (a Tiv from
Benue), Dauda Kwoi (a Kaje from S.Zaria and a special member in the NHA)
and Azi Nyako (a Jarawa from S.Banchi) 78 . It was this broad based
representativeness in the delegates from among most of the M-Belt groups
and societies as well as other minorities in The North that there was a
shift from the main objectives of the Kagoro meeting, which was meant to
reduce tensions within the MZL leadership, to an initial emphasis at the
opening of the beginning of the conference, that among other things, there
ought to be the election of new officers for the movement before other
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issues were discussed 79 . This initial emphasis on the election of a new
executive at the Kagoro meeting may however be attributed to the specific
contents of the tensions that existed between Pastor David Lot, the
President of the MZL and Moses Nyam Rwang, the Secretary-General of the
Movement and also Vice-President. Although the chief of Kagoro Mallam
Gwamna attended the conference and made efforts to resolve the tensions
between Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang, their tempers were deep
seated and much too complex for a settlement, particularly so when Lot
insisted that Rwang must make refunds of the money that was given to him to
build the MZL headquarters at Bukuru80 . It was against this background that
elections were held at the Kagoro meeting to establish the new executive.
Moses Nyam Rwang was the only MZL leader who was voted out of his post as
General Secretary and Treasurer as well as loosing the post of
Vice-President81 . In fact the post of Vice-President in the MZL movement
was abolished at the Kagoro meeting. The other members of the previous MZL
executive maintained their posts, although certain positions of
responsibilities were combined by some of the executive members. Thus, for
example, Pastor David Lot was re-elected as President, Jonah Assadugu
became General-Secretary as well as Field-Secretary, Bala Yerima was
elected Treasurer and Chief-Publicity Secretary82 . Other elected positions
were Deputies of Publicity and these were on a representative basis from
the zoned non-Islamic communities of the M-Belt groups and societies such
as Benue, S.Bauchi, S.Zaria, Adamawa, Plateau, Ilorin and Kabba. The
Deputies of Publicity were entrusted with propagating and selling the ideas
of the creation of a M-Belt Region to "tribal" union movements and people
at the grassroots level 83 . These included Gayos Gilima for Adamawa, Azi
Nyako for S.Bauchi, Patrick Dokotri for Jos Division, Isaac Kpum for the
liv areas, Bello Ijumu for Kabba Province and Josiah Olawoyin for Ilorin
areas84.
Although the structure of the new executive temporarily stabilized the
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MZL movement, one detrimental development that resulted from the Kagoro
conference was the stormy tensions with bitter recriminations, delegates
witnessed and the political intrigue which both the executive and those
outside it, deployed in lobbying the new entrants into the movement. Moses
Nyam Rwang, for example, publicly castigated Pastor David Lot as an
extortionist religious Minister, incompetent and loosing grip with the
spirit and tempo of the MZL movement and the demand for a M-Belt Region85.
Furthermore, Rwang threatened (a threat that subsequently became translated
into reality in 1954) to organize a new political movement to struggle for
the creation of a M-Belt Region, since it had become impossible to belong
to the same camp with Pastor David Lot 86 , lie claimed to have already gained
the support of new entrants into the M-Belt Movement; among others, like
Bello Ijurnu, Isaac Kpum and Josiah Olawoyin, whom he claimed were prepared
to work hand in hand with hini87 . It ought to be borne in mind that these
three newly elected Deputies of Publicity for the MZL were either
associated with the AG or the NCNC and were already very active in local
politics before 1952. Their entry into MZL in 1952 prepared the way for the
initial political affiliations of the MBPP, which Rwang subsequently
organized in March, 1954, to the NCNC, the MBSP to which he belonged to,
also in 1954 and which was affiliated to the AG, until it became the UMBPP
and the MBC of 1955 which urshured in the UMBC in 1956 and the UMBC-AG
alliance of 1957.
After December, 1952, the M-Belt movement in its phase as the MZL
party remained alive only in the rhetorics of politicians to the press when
they gave accounts of the leadership crisis that took place during the
Kagoro meeting88 . It virtually ceased to be politically active on a
front in the NHA89
 and was increasingly failing in creating any organized
political impact on society in The North by mobilizing its targeted
population to gain support for the causes of the demand for the creation of
a M-Belt Region90 . In the period between 1952 and 1955, each of the rival
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movements that developed from the Kagoro conference gave conflicting
accounts of the points of disagreement on the Lot-Rwang problem, the
formation of a new executive without Rwang and the political threat by
Rwang to organize a new movement with the same goals as the MZL. This was
the premise from which the Nigerian Citizen rushed into print by calling
the whole M-Belt Movement and its ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region
in The North a movement as a conception of confused and irresponsible
politicians91 . Although most of the leadership knew that the political
vigour of the MZL movement declined with the kagoro meeting, the ideas of
the creation of a M-Belt Region for Christian and non-Islamic communities
in the North spread wider than before. Both the NML and the MZL movements
had previously concentrated their political activities on the rather narrow
and less populated confines of Plateau, Adamawa, S.Zaria and S.Bauchi.
Indeed, it was Isaac Kpum, one of the new entrants into the M-Belt Movement
in 1952, who subsequently "imported " the ideas of a M-Belt Movement to the
European educated in the TPU and the Tiv people, a group and society that
was to be the main instrument in maintaining the vigour of the demands for
the creation of a M-Belt Region, until 1967 when states were created as
more units of the Nigerian Federation92.
One of the outstanding achievements of the MZL movement however, was
that it had so achieved sufficient organizational form by 1952 that it
brought in many of the representatives of Christian and non-Moslem
Communities that were affected by the socio-economic and political
grievances previously articulated by the "tribal" unions to a common
discussion forum, even when it was the case that the new entrants into the
movement also witnessed severe factionalism and a lack of cohesion,
afflicting the leadership of an organization they had held great hopes of
for their liberation. The factional tendencies that were developed and
became manifested at the MZL conference at Kagoro, did not, however,
discourage the spread of the ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region
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among the new entrants into the Movement. Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick
Dokotri, for example, constantly met with Martin Achihiga Abuul in Jos, who
was a Tiv man and son of the great Chief Abuul of Ukan and encouraged him
to spread the ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region in Benne Province,
particularly among the Tiv group and society so that the movement gains a
wider geographical spread of support and strength of population 93 . The Tiv
people were easily the most numerous in population size when compared to
other non-Islamic "tribes" of the M-Belt areas and as early as in 1938,
they had organized a "tribal' 1 union movement which was effecting political
development of the area 94 . Besides the numerical strength of population the
Tiv were expected to produce for the M-Belt Movement, their support wwas
crucial in terms of what both Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokolri
described as "the Tiv-Character" which contained elements of a determined
commitment until the objective was achieved, no matter the odds95.
However, after the Kagoro Conference in December 1952, Nyam Rwang at
first sought solace by concentrating his time on the political activities
of BPU and on the politically oriented electoral activities of the Birom
Tribal Party (BTP) under the leadership of Patrick Dokotri who was
President. As members of the NHA, Nyam Rwang and Patrick Foni became the
spokesmen of the BTP in the Assembly and raised issues that concerned the
problems created on agricultural land by tin mining companies on the Jos
Plateau96 . Besides this preoccupation with local political commitments,
Nyam Rwang also spent most of 1953 in travelling extensively and these took
him to Numan, Yola, Fobur, Minna, Kagoro, Kafanchan, Makurdi, Kabba, Ilorin
and Okene97 . Obviously from the trend of subseqent events and political
group formations, this was also the time he used to organize support to
create the MBPP in March 1954, with the objective of struggling for the
creation of a ft-Belt Region. This was particularly so because in 1953, the
existing leadership of what remained of the MZL movement, resolved upon a
policy of cooperation with the government in The North and entered into an
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alliance with the NPC party 98 . This suggests that Nyam Rwang interpreted
the new policy of the MZL movement under Pastor David Lot and the
negotiated alliance with the NPC party, as having reached a dead end in the
struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Early in 1954, the M-Belt
political movements were in the news all over again, with the announcements
that Moses Nyam Rwang with the support of Bello Ijumu (an Igbirra from
Kabba Province and the first General Secretary of NEPU), and E.G. Gundu (a
NCNC liv MP in the NHA from Benue Province and one of the founders of the
TPU and who became President of the new party) had organized a new party
which they called the Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP) 99 . The ostensible
objective of the MBPP was to disassociate itself from the MZL because it
felt betrayed and to continue the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt
Region, separated from the Islamic society in The North' 00 . This
development came at a time when the MZL movement had barely recuperated
from the factional tendencies which affected its previous leadership at the
Kagoro conference of 1952 and was only beginning to settle-down into its
new alliance and cooperation policy with the NPC party and government of
The North. With this development also, the MZL movement under Pastor David
Lot never picked up any substantial support from most of the M-Belt groups
and societies. Indeed it became narrowed and only enjoyed half-hearted
support from Jos Division, S.Zaria, S.Bauchi and sections of the
non-Islamic communities outside Numan and Adamawa Province' 01 . The bulk of
its political support came from Pankshin, Shendarn and Adarnawa, particularly
centred in the Numan Federation' 02 . In the period between 1954 and 1956,
another factor that further eroded the popularity and political support of
the MZL was the constant defections of the leadership which shuffled
between the MZL and the MBPP as well as some of its leaderships solid
confi nement of thei r activities within the "tribal" uni on movements with
claims of individual "tribes" that they represented the struggle for the
M-Belt Region. This was the case, for example, with Patrick Fom, Moses Nyam
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Rwang and Patrick Dokotri in the BTP, although in reality they were engaged
in mobilizing a conglomerate of support from the different "tribes" in Jos
Division. Despite the unsettling crisis of the MZL movement, with the older
leadership factionalized into different camps, it never lost bearing of the
initial objective of the need for the creation of a M-Belt Region. It
however tenaciously kept to itself the prerogative of being the accredited
representatives and spokesmen of the whole of the M-Belt groups and
societies even when it was the case that it was slowly losing its positions
and support as leaders to a younger, energetic and more educated
generation, whom it had sponsored as Deputies of Publicity at the Kagoro
meeting in 1952.
The MZL movement was however the political organization among the
M-Belt groups and societies that set the tone of the demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region in The North. Despite its factions riddled
leadership in the cause of organizing its demands on the system, in its
development, it left for its successor organizations a functional
secretariat headquarters at Bukuru near Jos. Although the leadership
factionalized the objective was maintained. In one respect this was due to
the encouraging political response of its expanded membership with a wider
territorial spread, even when it was the case that the factions revealed
how the leadership was itself dissatisfied with its reasons for commitment
on the political strategy and the existing state of affairs in its
organizational structure in mobilizing the targeted population to fulfil
the objective of the creation of a Region for Christians and non-Moslems in
The North. Furthermore, it was the MZL party that first successfully
mobilized electoral support in 1951, to gain representation in the NHA in
1952 and to subsequently create political impact in that Assembly. This was
particularly the case for the population and representation from Adamawa,
S.Bauchi, S.Zaria and Plateau. Members of the MZL party in the NHA were
able to raise issues that reflected the fears and grievances of other
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non-Islamic communities in The North. In this instance also, government was
for the first time made aware from the rhetorics on the very floor of the
NHA of the desires and demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region which
would include soclo-religious and political minorities in The North.
Furthermore, the insistance of the older leadership of the MZL to recruit
into the M-Belt Movement, a much younger generation, as Deputies of
Publicity, who were more educated and much more dynamic, indicated how the
MZL movement responded to the challenging and changing circumstances of the
Nigerian political arena, which required a lot of energy and enlightened
educational skills to revamp a floundering political organization.
Disappointing as it was in the end, because the initial leadership split,
the MZL conference at Kagoro marked a turning point for the political
recruitment of a new energetic generation of younger-men, more educated and
much more broad-minded about the nature and real direction of the forces
shaping the political events in Nigeria than were the previous generation
of older leaders. The new generation was less thorough in outlook on the
Christian practices. Essentially they were politicians with a religious
oriented platform rather than Christiandom in politics. It was this younger
generation in the MZL that eventually took over the management and
leadership of the M-Belt Movement, and not only did they vigorously contest
for the creation of a M-Belt Region with government and the NPC party in
the North, but they also took the issue to the national political arena in
the Federal House of Representatives (FHR) in Lagos. More fundamental
however, the Kagoro conference of the MZL, witnessed a shift in the
committed support base of the movement, from the groups and societies on
the higher planes of Plateau, S.Bauchi and Adamawa to the lower Southern
parts of the M-Belt areas which included S.Zaria and subsequently the Benue
valley among the Tiv, where it settled down under the leadership of J.S.
Tarka and with political support from the Yoruba irredentist areas of
Ilorin and Kabba Province. However, the southern lower parts of the M-Belt
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areas, particularly Tiv country, did not assume political control and
leadership of the M-Belt Movement until the MZL, the MBPP and the other
numerous factions had resolved their political differences to become the
UMBC in 1956 under the leadership of Joseph Tarka. In the period between
1954 and 1956, however, the M-Belt Movement in its phase as the MZL party
witnessed its greatest political turmoil. This virtually drowned it as a
force in politics in The North when the rival MBPP set about mobilizing the
non-Islamic and Christian communities for political support, although it
continued to exist until after 1956 and was finally eclipsed by the UMBC in
1957 when Pastor David Lot retired from active politics 103 . Political
mobilization by the MBPP in that period was meant to create cohesive
support of the Christian and non-Islamic communities in the M-Belt areas
for another set of elections into the FHR in Lagos in 1954 and the NHA in
Kaduna in 1956. It also had the objective of intensifying the demand for
the creation of a M-Belt Region before the London constitutional conference
that was expected to resolve the date for self-government in The North and
the Independence of Nigeria.
The MBPP became an active phase of the M-Belt Movement in 1954 and was
organized by Moses Nyam Rwang as a direct result of the controvercies and
leadership problems which grew into the open after the MZL-Kagoro meeting
of December, 1952 and from the political consequences of the MZL-alliance
with the NPC party in 1953, an alliance that was entered into in the light
of a new policy of cooperation with the government in The North by some of
the leaders of the MZL 104 . There has been some confusion and muddle of
dates in the explanations of the growth and development of the M-Belt
movements in their phases as the MZL to become the IJMBC in the period
between 1952 and 1956. This study attempts to correlate the sequences of
the dates with the events that conditioned changes of organization in the
movements as basis for correction. The confusion of the dates, however,
largely arises from dating the threats which Nyam Rwang produced at the
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Kagoro meeting of December, 1952 and to his wide travels for the series of
meetings he organized in 1953 in anticipation of the formation of the MBPP
rather than its actual date of take off. The inaccurate dates also have
roots in previous researches which have explained the MBPP as a direct
consequence of the clash between Lot and Rwang, without taking into account
the political meaning that was given to the MZL-NPC alliance and the MZL
policy of cooperation with government in The North which was shaped in
1953. It was only after the alliance had become clear in political terms
and the 1954 elections were being anticipated for December of that year,
that the MBPP assumed an organizational political structure after March,
1954105.
The Middle Belt Peoples Party (MBPP, 1954), which developed to become
the Middle Belt State Party (MBSP, 1955), and subsequently the United
Middle Belt State Peoples Party (UMBSPP, 1955), and the Middle Belt
Congress (MBC, 1955), were the shortest lived phases of the M-Belt Movement
of all the previous political organizations of the Christian and
non-Islamic communities in The North, before the advent of the United
Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) in 1956. The UMBC was a formation of all these
factional political parties which broke off from the MZL and eventually
brought in the MZL party as well. In the whole of the Nigerian political
arena, there has hardly been any political movement which exhibited as many
factions and remained constantly under the shadow of factionalism as the
M-Belt Movement. Yet it succeeded in coming together in unity with the
objective of achieving its goals, managed to bring in even more other
sub-tribal factions and groups within the M-Belt areas, as well as others,
well outside its political interests. Some of these included the Benue
Freedom Crusade (BFC), the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement (SZFM), the
Middle Belt Democratic Party (MBDP) which was led by Malomo Babatunde and
focussed on the Offa-Yorubas, the Katagum Peoples Union (KPU), which was
rather curiously referred to in the NHA as "the Katagum Middle Belt
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Movement" by Josiah Olawoyin and the Habe-Fulani Tribal Union (HFTU),
sometimes referred to as the Habe-Fulani Peoples Party (HFPP) 106 . All these
political developments took place within a very short period of five years
(1955 to 1960). Although the formation of the UMBC subsequently stabilized
political unity and organization of the M-Belt movement after 1956, there
were still factions and defections toward the NPC party in The North and
toward Southern Nigerian based political parties (the AG and the NCNC).
These developments were largely due to the political vigour of some of the
"tribal" unions who attempted to superimpose their identities over that of
the M-Belt Movement and as a result of their failure, they became political
clients to the NPC in order to bargain for socio-economic and welfare
amenities for their areas. This was so for the Idoma State Union, the
lybirra Tribal Union as well as the Birom Tribal Party when Bitrus Rwang
Pam, the son to the Chief of Jos became its secretary in 1954107. The
politician who set into motion the factional tendencies which afflicted all
the phases of the M-Belt Movement was Moses Nyarn Rwang, who organized the
MBPP in 1954 and who himself became a client of the NPC in 1959 in the vain
hope of shaping the Chieftancy of Jos into the family dynasty of Moses
Rwang Pam from the Birom village of Du108.
Moses Nyam Rwang and his supporters who were previously in the MZL
organized the MBPP in 1954 with the intentions of having a more dynamic
political version of a movement with the initial goals of the MZL party for
the M-Belt groups and societies 109 . The MBPP was also meant to contrast the
articulation of objectives and political strategy of the MZL group that was
still under the leadership of Pastor David Lot and which had grown cold
feet over the causes for the demand of the creation of a M-Belt Region1'0.
The organization of the MBPP was also conditioned by the bitterness Moses
Nyam Rwang felt over the political and personality clash with Pastor David
Lot which was made worse by allegations of embezzlement of MZL funds. He
also particularly believed that the Lot-group had lost the motivating
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political momentum in the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region and a
scape-goat (himself) had to be found to explain the loss, a view that was
shared by many others, including Balla Yerima, Anta Haniza, Patrict Dokotri
and Patrick Fom 1 . These others, as much as it was the case that they
belonged to different camps, they still had sympathy for the causes of the
MZL and the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region. On several
occasions in the period between 1954 and 1956, for example, Pastor David
Lot was asked whether he had ceased to be a Minister of Religion in
preference for a Minister of Politics in the House of Assembly (NHA)U2.
Obviously, this was in reference to the motivating Christian religious
force and identity, which was in the minority and concentrated in the
M-Belt areas. Although the period between 1954 and 1956, Pastor David Lot
was still widely regarded as the main spokesman and the driving force of
the M-Belt Movement, the organizational growth and development of the MBPP
under Moses Rwang in the end proved more fundamental in the processes that
maintained the political persistance of the demands for the creation of a
M-Belt RegionU3.
The political support that was given to the MBPP initially came mainly
from BPU and BTP as well as from numerous tribal unions in the heteregenous
area of Jos Division' 14 . This support may be explained by the local
sentiments attached to Moses Nyarn Rwang as being "son of the soil" and the
fact that he circulated more easily among the groups and societies in Jos
Division more than any of his other distant colleagues (Assadugu and Lot in
particular), rather than any new message he might have preached on the
demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region for Christians and non-Moslems
in The North. This is so because the image of a Region (for Christians and
non-Moslems on the Plateau in particular) was at that time already firmly
rooted in the leadership of Pastor David Lot. The political activities and
the ideas of Moses Nyarn Rwang were however well received and given support
in Benue, particularly among the Tiv, Kabba, Ilorin and subsequently those
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ideas developed by the leaders with the alliance between the UMBC and the
AG in 1957 (then under the leadership of Joseph Tarka). The M-Belt Movement
also enjoyed support from the rather bizzare Katagum Peoples Union (KPU),
the Habe-Fulani Peoples Party (HFPP) which became the Habe Tribal Party
(HIP) under Ibrahim Dimis in 1957 as well as from the earlier organized
Bornu Youth Movement (BYM) with Ibrahim Imam as Patron' 15 . In that
instance, while the HFPP advocated for either a separate Habe Division
within Bauchi Province or the separation of the Southern districts of
Bauchi from the rest of that emirate and their inclusion in the proposed
M-Belt Region 116 , the BYM had a party policy which suggested the creation
of a North Eastern Region in The North to comprise of Bornu, Adamawa,
Bauchi and Plateau Provinces, excluding some of the core M-Belt areas like
S.Zaria and Benue Province 117 . The creation of a North Eastern state,
however, was certainly not what the M-Belt Movement was all about since it
would have enclosed a dominant Islamic "tribal" group and society, the
Kanuri in particular and would have taken along with it, numerous Christian
and non-Islamic minority "tribes" as well as excluding the Tiv in Benue and
S.Zaria, even when it was the case that aggrieved and vocal agitators for
the political division of The North were included in the proposed Region,
from Adamawa, S.Bauchi and Plateau.
For the coordination of its political activities as from 1954, the
MBPP used the BPU and BTP headquarters at Bukuru as a secretariat 8
 This
shows how closely associated, the MBPP movement was to the Birom political
leadership in the BPU and BTP and to that group and society in general. The
Birom were the numerically dominant group and society in Jos Division and
in most instances shaped the nature of political influence on other
minority groups in the area. The MBPP headquarters were however shifted to
Jos in the same year and stayed there until in 1956, when the UMBC occupied
the buildings as headquarters after the numerous factions of the M-Belt
movement became united under the leadership of Joseph TarkaU9. The UMBC
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headquarters were however very much unsettled in one place after 1958 and
were moved from one house to the other of the leadership, because the NPC
government, through the NPC controlled dos NA revoked the rights to use the
buildings since the party (UMBC) had not processed its Certificate of
Occupancy (C. of 0.) - one of the many strategies the NPC employed to
incapacitate the political activities of the UMBC. The MZL party
secretariat, however, remained at its headquarters in Bukuru and its
political activities were mainly confined to Plateau Province, except for
dos Division where there was ambivalent support 120 . In Adamawa, Jonah
Assadugu with some of the elected Deputies of Publicity from that area, as
well as with the different leaders of the non-Islamic, but essentially
Christian "tribal" unions, maintained an almost independent M-Belt Movement
with the banner of the MZL, although they were still sentimentally and
emotionally attached to the MBPP and the leadership of Pastor David Lot'21.
The Adamawa, group under the leadership of Jonah Assadugu therefore never
associated itself with the Katagum union, which was NEPU and the
Habe-Fulani unions under Ibrahim Dimis even though it maintained some
political links with the AG122.
The first organized meeting of the MBPP with individuals who had
broken off from the MZL party took place in Ilorin in July, 1954 under the
protem-Chairmanship of Moses Nyam Rwang as the co-ordinating leader of the
new party123 . Although the news had circulated that a faction of the MZL
party had organized itself into a new party as a result of politiccal
differences and financial misunderstandings among the leadership during the
December 1952 meeting at Kagoro, it was not until the July 1954 meetingng
at Ilorin that the MBPP announced itself as a political party to contest
elections into the FHR in Lagos and avowed itself to continue the struggle
for the demand, until a M-Belt Region was created in The North' 24 . At that
inaugural meeting, the objectives of the MBPP included: the unity and
progress of the people of the M-Belt areas, the demand for the creation of
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a separate M-Belt Region (state) from the Islamic society in The North with
its House of Assembly and a House of Chiefs, agitate for self-government in
or before 1956125, oppose the NPC "Eight Point Programme" that called for
the abolition of legislative and executive bodies at the centre and for the
reorganization of Nigeria as a loose federation of autonomous regions'26,
and support a Nigerian Federation with a strong central government to
control the Regions 127 . Coleman further adds that these objectives of the
MBPP were identical to NEPU and NCNC aims. In other words, the MBPP had
some political influences of the NEPU (in opposition in The North) and NCNC
(the NEPU ally in Southern Nigeria). This suggested affiliation with NEPU
and NCNC was however repudiated by the President of the MBPP'28.
At the Ilorin meeting in 1954 the party structure initially consisted
of only three posts: The President was E.G. Abuul, the General Secretary
was Moses Nyam Rwang and the Publicity Secretary, was Bello Ijumu'29.
Before the elections in December, 1954, numerous other meetings of the MBPP
were held at Jos, Minna, Lafia, Kafanchan and Kagoro and these were
attended by some of the new entrants into the M-Belt Movement, most of whom
were primary school teachers working for Christian Missionary Bodies in the
rural, rather than urban environments' 30 . These meetings were meant to
bring MBPP members to a common forum to discuss the approaching elections
and the strategy to be followed for political mobilization' 31 . As expected,
the political leadership of the MZL party under Pastor David Lot was
excluded from such meetings, as well as those individuals who had expressed
ambivalent sentiments over an alliance with the NPC and support for the
MBPP, like Patrict Dokotri, Danda Kwoi, Balla Yerima and Auta Harnza132.
Although no clear cut and permanent leadership surfaced from the MBPP
movement for the M-Belt groups and societies, there was constant political
cooperation between Gundu, Rwang and Ijumu who stood like a triumvirate of
authority in the party. Within this authority however there were different
perceptions of M-Belt political needs over who to best align with for the
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1954 elections into the FHR in Lagos. While Moses Nyam Rwang (Birom from
Jos Division) and E.G. Gundu (Tiv from Tiv Division) favoured an alliance
with the NCNC, the latter having had his disillusionment with the NPC,
Bello Ijumu (Igbirra from Kabba Province) who was increasingly coming under
the influence of Josiah Olawoyin (Yoruba from Offa) favoured an alliance
with the AG133 . It was also at about this time (1954) that the AG through
Bello Ijemu and Josiah Olawoyin were systematically influencing Isaac Kpum
and had in fact offered to him as well as to Kundu Swem the posts of
Secretaries of the party in Tiv Division 134 . It ought to be borne in mind,
however, that most Tiv members in the NHA before 1956, joined the NPC after
the 1951 elections and only Ayila Yough and E.G. Gundu, as well as the
majority of the liv intelligentia were attracted to the NCNC135.
In the 1954 elections into the FHR in Lagos, even when the MBPP had
not consolidated its support base, when compared to the MZL party, both
parties fielded and won the elections from their different areas of
strength 136 . As much as the elected members had some M-Belt political
sentiments, the outcome was based on ethnically oriented votes in support
of a particular candidate that were anti-Islamic and directed at
Hausa-Fulani over local issues, rather than unequivocal issues raised on
the creation of a M-Belt Region or the socio-economic and welfare
deprivation from the government in The North that affected the M-Belt
groups and societies and to contest the electorate with the NPC party on
such matters. Jos Division, where Patrict Dokotri won the 1954 elections
Into the FI-IR in Lagos for example was based on BPU and BPT support'37
Jonah Assadugu, for another example, who won the 1954 elections from Numan
Federation did so on purely anti-Fulani, anti-Islamic political feelings,
what the Provincial Report for that year in Adarnawa described as an
election in which:
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Numan, still smarting from the insult of
1951, when the Provincial College elected five
Fulani but no one from Numan ... Jonah
Assadugu, on a straight local Middle Zone
League ticket (which has little connection with
the regional party policy) got in with no
difficulty ... under his leadership the local
Middle Zone League could eit	 run the (Numan)
Federation or break it ... I'
In the specific context of the movements for the creation of a M-Belt
Region in The North, however, the 1954 elections into the FUR were
significant in the sense that both the MZL and the MBPP succeeded in
standing behind two dynamic young men to the centre of political power in
Nigeria. These were Joseph Tarka who won in Jemgba and Patrict Dokotri, who
won in Jos Division; both men were to benefit from an experienced and older
stalwart support of the M-Belt Movements in the person of Jonah Assadugu
from Numan 139 . In all, the M-Belt movements won a total of five seats to
the FUR in Lagos in 1954, even though some of them were in alliance with
the NPC party, all of them felt some sympathy for the political causes for
the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region 140 . In the 1954 elections
the NPC won a majority of seats (79) whose numbers were increased by the
alliance with the MZL party (2 seats), the Idoma State Union Party (2
seats), the Igbirra Tribal Union (1 seat) and subsequently from all the
candidates who won four seats as independents of any other party' 41 . The
only reinforcing seat in the numbers in support of the M-Belt Movement in
the 1954 elections came from the Ilorin areas where the AG won, but then,
the support was only in principle since the area was Yoruba irredentist
rather than for inclusion in the anticipated M-Belt Region142.
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Although both the MZL and MBPP won some seats from the M-Belt areas in
the 1954 elections, they still had grave dissatifaction about their
electoral performances, the state of their party strength from among the
M-Belt groups and societies and in particular the MZL alliance that had
been entered into with the NPC party, in which the NPC had emphasized the
concept of 0ne Northu in order to win the elections, rather than accept
the M-Belt politicians on equal terms with Moslem politicians in the north.
Jonah Assadugu, for example, suggests that contrary to the Ministerial
power sharing and other political patronage posts among other things,
between the NPC and the MZL, which had conditioned the alliance, Pastor
David Lot was only given a Ministerial post without a portfolio while his
close associate at that time, Patrick Dokotri was taken away from the arena
of politics in both the north and the M-Belt areas to become a
Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Minister of Land, Mines and
Labour143 . It was against this background of the political developments
affecting the leadership of the M-Belt movements as from 1954 that in the
period between 10th June and August 1955 that there were negotiations to
amalgamate and merge the MBPP and the MZL party into a comon front in
order to contest elections, particularly so with the 1956 elections into
the NHA in mind, as well as to increase the unity of the struggle for the
creation of a M-Belt Region 144 . Although the dates suggested by these
authors (Post, Sklar, Dudley etc.) on the negotiations to reconcile and
merge the MBPP and the MZL with each other, conflict, my own evidence on
the dating, comes from the dates given by the M-Belt politicians in debates
in the NHA and the FHR. From these sources, it is clear that 1955, after
the 1954 elections, was the year in which there were attempts to unite the
M-Belt parties into another common front of the M-Belt Movement. The
political effort rather unfortunately, culminated in the Novemeber 1955
into reciprocal expulsions of the MBPP and the MZL leadership in Ilorin.
Furthermore, 1955 was certainly not the year in which the IJMBC was
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organized under the leadership of Joseph Tarka as suggested by Skiar, Post
and Dudley who have been widely quoted and the tendency has been to
reinforce an inaccuracy 145 . While there were moves to create unity in the
M-Belt Movements by merging the MBPP and MZL as well as their affiliated
"tribal" Unions into a common front, the NPC government in The North gave
political appointments to Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri.
Lot became a Minister without portfolio in the Northern Region
Government and his close assoicate and second in command in the MZL
Leadership, Patrick Dokotri, became a Parliamentary Secretary at a Ministry
in the Federal Government. This development again created dissenting voices
within the negotiation process which were aimed at uniting the MBPP and the
MZL to become one political organization for the M-Belt groups and
societies in The North. The negotiations however did not break down. In
August, 1955, during the MBPP conference at Jos, a committee comprising the
members of the MBPP and the MZL was formed to examine the question of
merging both parties 146 . In the same August, 1955, the two parties also
agreed that the name of the new party, from the merger of the MBPP and the
MZL was to be the Middle Belt Congress (MBC) 147 . It ought to be borne in
mind that before the political name of the M-Belt organization, United
Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), was in use, the MBPP developed to become the
Middle Belt State Party (MBSP), then to United Middle Belt State Peoples
Party (UMBSPP), and then to the rather eltist Middle Belt Congress (MBC),
all under the political mechanization of Moses Nyam Rwang until the
different factions, including the MZL party, united to become the UMBC in
1956 under the leadership of Joseph Tarka 148 . However, through the
persuasive efforts of Bello Ijumu, the various factions of the M-Belt
movements agreed that a joint conference of the MZL and MBPP be held at
Ilorin in the period between, 17th and 19th November, 1955149.
In the period between 17th and 19th November, 1955 therefore, the
executive members of the MBPP and the MZL party with their delegates
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assembled in Ilorin. Although they agreed on a merger of the parties, the
question of leadership and strategy to fulfil the creation of a M-Belt
Region still remained a thorny issue in the organizational development of
the M-Belt Movement.
As Coleman has observed this organizational development of the M-Belt
Movement, reflected two initial stands that had grown as early as 1952 in
the political orientation of the leadership:
"One leaning toward accommodation to and
integration with the Muslim North and the other
toward the creation of a separate Middle Belt
Region as arneans of undermining the traditional
domination of the Fulanin-Gida and the
potential domination otshe numerically
superior Fulani-Hausa"
In the instance, the NPC exploited the circumstances by dividing an
otherwise cohesive movement and sought to encourage and establish an
alliance with the integrationist wing - that is, the Pastor David Lot -
faction of the M-Belt Movement. While NEPU with the assistance of the NCNC
and subsequently the AG as well, endeavoured to work with the separatist
wing under the leadership of Bello Ijemu and Moses Nyam Rwang and
eventually under Joseph Tarka and Patrick Dokotri after 1956151. It was,
however, from these premises that the M-Belt Movements, albeit the
leadership and followers entered into the arena of national politics and as
there was ever increasing involvement with elections and representative
delegations to constitutional settlements, the M-Belt political leaders
found themselves at the centre of a political tug of war, between the
dominant Nigerian political parties - the NPC (in the north), the AG (in
the west) and the NCNC (in the east). In 1957 they eventually settled down
into a fairly stable alliance with the AG, until 1964, when they realigned
themselves and organized into the Northern Progressive Front (NPF) jointly
with NEPU152.
The meeting of Ilorin in November, 1955, did not go well for Pastor
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David Lot. According to Moses Nyarn Rwang, Pastor David Lot was expelled
from the coalition of the MBPP and the MZL party, a union which they
suggested its name to be the United Middle Belt Congress Party 153 . However,
a different version of what happened at Ilorin during the meeting, suggests
that after Pastor David Lot and his group had been persuaded that both the
MZL and the MBPP were to give way to the UMBC and that fresh elections
should take place into posts of the new organization and having been
assured of maintaining leadership, he found himself voted-out' 54 . This was
so, because of his stand on the NPC alliance and insistance on a policy of
cooperation with the government of the NPC in The North which he argued as
justified in order to protect The North from the increasing political
influence of the AG, began firstly in the Ilorin areas and then into the
core M-Belt areas of Plateau, Benue and S. Zaria 155 . In the place of Pastor
David Lot, as President of an organization in which he was seen as the
spokesman of the M-Belt Movement, Moses Nyam Rwang became President, Jonah
Assadugu was elected General- Secretary, although he saw the election as
essentially that into the MBPP, a party label which he kept through 1956
until the 1959 elections despite the intermediate names of the M-Belt
Movement such as the MBSP, the UMBSPP, the MBC and the all enibrassing
organization, the UMBC 156 . A new entrant into the executive of the M-Belt
movement at the Ilorin meeting was Bello Ijurnu who was elected as Publicity
Secretary, previously a Deputy of Publicity in the MZL and Publicity
Officer in the MBPP 157 . The MZL leadership under Pastor David Lot and its
delegates at the Ilorin conference however did not take kindly to this
out-maneuvering which took place during the elections. Their delegates
therefore called their leadership and followers into a different meeting in
the same Ilorin arena of November, 1955, reinstated Pastor David Lot as
President of the MZL with Balla Yerima and Dauda Kwoi maintained in their
former positions in that party and also voted over-whelmingly in support of
a motion which denounced Moses Nyani Rwang as President of the newly agreed
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UMBC movement or any other subsequent party or faction in the M-Belt
Movements 158 . In other words, the MZL as a faction of the proposed UMBC
took a position of non-compromise with any other composite movement of the
M-Belt groups and socieities in which Moses Nyam Rwang was leader or
assoicated himself with. The Ilorin meeting however marked the decline of
Moses Nyam Rwang from being active at the centre of political events in the
M-Belt movement as he became systematically eclipsed by a more educated,
dedicated and politically able to reconcile factions within the
organization, such as Patrick Dokotri and Joseph Tarka. Although the Ilorin
meeting of the MBPP and the MZL party in November, 1955, was meant to
reconcile the two parties, existing as factions of the M-Belt Movement,
both ended up giving reciprocal expulsions to each other and maintaining
their previous political organizations, independent in policies and
political identity 159 . While the MZL saw itself as Northern Christians
within context of religious tolerance in The North and therefore, did not
wish to polarize the region on Christian - Moslem lines, but rather wished
to cooperate with the NPC government that was anti- Southern Nigeria, the
MBPP also saw itself as northern Christians as well, who shared a
minorities status along with other non-Islamic cultural systems and who
ought to be constituted into a separted "Northern Region" (M-Belt Region)
from the Islamic Society as a unit of the Nigerian Federation. The
leadership and followership of both parties saw themselves as northerners.
The initial logic of this political position of the MBPP, on the demand for
the creation of a M-Belt Region, was that there were also two seperate
regions in Southern Nigeria and the North, too, ought to have two160.
Despite the unintended consequence on the outcome of the Ilorin
meeting, there were far reaching political influences that were gained and
which resulted form the joint sessions of the different groups in the MBPP
and the MZL. This was particulary the case from the presence of and
participation of the more modern educated elements of the M-Belt groups and
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societies, who were mostly equiped with modern occupational skills in
status and who, therefore carried with them to their different areas the
ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region 161 . Another important source of
political influence that developed from the Ilorin meeting in terms of the
diffusion of the ideas on the M-Belt Region was in the Tiv - delegation
which came with E. G. Gundu, Isaac Kpum and H. 0. Abaagu 162 . H. 0. Abaagu,
however, subsequently went into alliance with the NCNC in 1958 and
organized the Benue Freedom Crusade, even when he previously served as
party manager as well as being the protem President of the UMBC 163 •
 Abaagu,
however, changed and turned to become NPC before the 1959 elections,
contested the elections of that year but lost his deposit 164
. This
development, like many others within the leadership of the M-Belt
movements, suggests that before the advent of J. S. Tarka in 1956, severe
problems of committed leadership was a major inpediment in the articulation
of the demands for the creation of the M-Belt Region, rather than, that of
a defined objective and the grievances on existing socio-economic and
political problems affecting the non-Islamic communities, even when it was
the case that most of the M-Belt groups and socieities had become
politically involved.
The Tiv group and society, however, effectively entered with their
support and became politically involved in the M-Belt movements through the
MBPP and particulary so only after the political developments from the
November, 1955 Ilorin Conference, when the movements were still clouded
with the problems of leadership and the strategy for the fulfillment of the
creation of a M-Belt Region. In the period between 1950 and 1956, however,
most liv politicians from the "tribal" base of support, the TPU, were
either sympathetic to NPC or NCNC. Dent, for example, su g gests that during
the period, once Tiv members were elected they joined the 1'IPC and only two
radical ones (E. G. Gundu and Ayila Yough) joined the NCNC 165
. The AG only
began to influence Tiv political leadership in the TPU in 1954. Although
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party political differences existed among liv members in the NHA, they
always agreed to take a stand on an issue under debate. In March, 1956 for
example, some of the Tiv members in the NHA were so ultra-NPC and pro-North
that they opposed the motion on the creation of a M-Belt Region. This is
explicit in the speech of Benjamin Akiga in the NFIA in 1956:
"I rise to oppose this motion. Not only myself
but all the members from Benue Province will
oppose this motion. We the people of the Middle
Belt - I personally was born in the Middle Belt
- are not at all dissatisfied with the
administration. We enjoy it. We get a fair
share in proportion to the rest of the people
of The North. We do not get everything but the
same applies to every other part of the
Northern Region. There is no reason for me to
bring a Motion to divide the North and thus
weaken this strong region. This question of
separation of the Middle Belt from the rest1g
the Northern Region is just political talk"
However, in the period between 1950 and 1960, subsequent Tiv political
support for the NPC and the NCNC withered out with the years. This was so
for the NPC because the party, through the liv NA, subjected and oppressed
the Tiv in subordinate positions, as early as in the period when there was
Hausa government messangers 167 . In the instance of the NCNC, Tiv anxieties
were centered on whether that party (dominated by Ibo and based in the
heart of Iboland) had the capacity to protect their farm lands which Ibos
from the Eastern Region:
".....were already nibbling industriously on
their Southern borders and who would, they (the
Tiv) were convigd, absorb them piecemeal if
given a chance"
It was for such economic reasons, which were interwoven into the
socio-religious and political problems in the north, that the M-Belt
movement found its most solid support among the Tiv, rather than the group
aligning itself with either the NCNC or the NPC. Indeed, the Tiv were also
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suspect of the NPC despite its policies of Northern inclusiveness and
anti-southern Nigerian stands, because of a different kind of threat when
the Tiv experienced economic pressures of competitions from the Hausa
migrant population, particularly in the township of Makurdi169.
In the particular period between 1952 and 1956, albeit before 1960
when the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region gained support among
the Tiv, the MPG lost a life chance of bringing-in the Tiv into successful
incorporation with the party through the European educated Tiv who might
have build up support among the group and society, through giving the local
leadership government patronage posts in Kaduna. In the general suspicion
of the loyalty of the Tiv political leadership in the NHA, the NPC refused
to give them any Ministerial position and to promote their political
careers from which to consolidate their support in the area' 70 . While the
Idoma, Igala and Jukun (Kwararafa), who were in the numerical minority as
far as shaping the outcomes of elections are concerned in Benue Province,
were given Ministerial representation in the Northern Executive Council,
there was no Tiv leadership that was considered, despite their numerical
strength 171 . The suspicious neglect of the Tiv, seems to have taken roots
from the colonial period, during which time, the liv group and society was
seen to be ungovernable and difficult to control in a working relationship
because of their excessive independence of mind, action and in the words of
Sharwood Smith: "fiercely individualistic in outlook", except when
threatened by outside interference in their internal affairs do their
activate their strong "tribal" consciousness and identity'72
It was against that backgound that the majority of the more educated
Tiv, who were both inside and outside the NPC party converted in bulk
through their leadership in the TPtJ to give their political support to the
MBPP after November, 1955173. The political appeal to the more educated
classes among the M-Belt groups and societies that was developed by the
MBPP was not however confined to the Tiv alone. Infact it was in the
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general pattern of political development effecting change on most of the
M-Belt areas after 1955. This contrasted rather sharply with the static
political posture of the MZL party, whose appeal did not expand very much
beyond a literate church following and leadership. The more educated
elements in the MBPP who subsequently constituted the bed-rock of
leadership in the UMBC did not constitute the core-leadership directing the
movement until after 1956. When they gave their support to the MBPP,
however, their political involvement only succeeded in making the M-Belt
movement more articulate, more dynamic and radical in the reforms they
demanded and their opposition to the NPC party and generally to the Islamic
society in the North. The new entrants also assumed an uncompromising
political position on the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region and
produced a Middle Belt Anthem in anticipation of the region. It was the
political thrust of one of these new entrants into the movement (Bello
Ijumu), for example, that an Anthem for the M-Belt Region became produced
which was circulated during the Ilorin meeting in 1955 and found its way to
become widely taught to school children in the M-Belt areas 174 , The Anthem
emphasized the creation of a M-Belt Region which would be: "A Region like
other Regions" in the Nigerian Federation175.
Although the production of an M-Belt Anthem on the party platform of
the MBPP suggests a more dynamic and "nationalistic" commitment to the
ideas of an independent M-Belt Region, separated from the Islamic
leadership and society in the North, the leadership of the MBPP was still
Interested to bring in the MZL in order to widen its territorial base of
support. In that respect, despite the failure of the Ilorin meeting in
November, 1955 efforts still continued, to reconcile the different factions
of the M-Belt movement, particularly the MBPP and MZL, through the sole
political efforts of Bello 1Jumu176. The issue of the need to merge both
parties became even more pressing because of the coming 1956 elections.
When these efforts were on, however, some of the executive members of both
-811-
the MBPP and the MZL, apparently were still inclined to cooperate with the
Regional government and the dominant party, the NPC, in the North and
wished to enter into an alliance 177 . This was the case with E. G. Gundu,
who had been protein - President of the MBPP and who joined Pastor David Lot
and Patrick Dokotri who had accepted, in late 1955, political appointments
in the Regional and Federal governments respectively 178 . Thus late in 1955,
the M-Belt movements through the MZL, entered into another formal alliance
with the NPC party and this time with the assistance of E. G. Gundu in the
MBPP and the TPU approved of the alliance 179 . When this political move,
became public knowledge, the General-Secretary of the MBPP, Moses Nyam
Rwang and the Publicity-Secretary of the MBPP, Bello Ijumu, opposed the
alliance and dissented to organize an opposition party which they called
the Middle Belt State Party (MBSP) 180 . The aims andobjectives of the MBSP
remained quite unchanged from those of the MBPP which Gundu attempted to
moderate into the NPC party through Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri.
The MBSP, however, in additon, opposed any alliance with the AG to fit with
the NPC opposition to southern Nigerian political involvement with
opposition groups in the North 181
 The problems of the M-Belt Movement
therefore remained perenially, those of leadership as well as political
strategy to contest elections and to achieve more membership in the
legislative houses to produce pressure for the creation of a M-Belt Region.
In another meeting at Ilorin in March, 1956, the new opposition party
(MSBP) to the MZL and the MBPP, elected H. 0. Abaagu (Tiv) as President,
Abdul Ado Ibrahim (an Ibgirra) 182 , as General Secretary, Bello Ijumu
(Igbirra and former Secretary-General of the MBPP) as Publicity-Secretary
and Jonah Assadugu (Bachama from Numan Division) as Field-Secretary183.
Moses Nyam Rwang himself was part of the executive as general coordinator
of the political activities of the MBSP 184 •
 All these political
developments, factional as they were, point to the significant degree to
which Tiv political leadership began to feature and shaped the directions
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of the M-Belt movement after November, 1955. In both factions of the M-Belt
movement outside the MZL, for example, Tiv were Presidents: E. G. Gundu
(MBPP) and H. 0. Abaagu (MSBP). Furthermore, E. G. Gundu, a Tiv, was the
sole political influence that shaped the alliance of the MBPP with the MZL
into the NPC early in 1956.
The dissent between the different factions of the M-Belt movements
(MZL, MBPP and MBSP) in 1955, however, did not last long, before there were
fresh efforts to reconcile the different groups into a common front in the
specific interest of fielding candidates for the 1956 elections and
representation for the May and June 1957 constitutional Conference in
London. In the 1957 conference, however, Joseph S. Tarka was th UMBC sole
representative, while Patrick Dokotri also tJMBC but went to London as
Chief-Advisor to the UMBC 185 . Previously, the leadership in the M-Belt
Movements was not given serious political attention in terms of
representation and participation at the earlier Constitutional Conferences
of the early 1950s, until the MZL party achieved some organization
structure and created impact on the electorate and on the floor of the NHA,
particulary so when it demanded the creation of a Middle-Zone-Region in the
North in 1952. Even when it had created political impact in the North and
effort was made to co-opt the leadership into the NPC, as was the case in
the MZL-NPC alliance after 1952 and was given representation, non-Islamic
leadership was subjected to intimidation and threats of being excluded from
open participation in instances where it was suspected that it was not
going to tow the dominant party policy. When Pastor David Lot, for example,
attended the 1954 Constitutional Conference in London he points out that he
was completely overwhelmed by specific instructions to adhere to the NPC
policy of "One North" right from Kaduna and subsequently on the train, NPC
delegates will not give him a chance to sleep to rest during the long
journey to Lagos 186 . He was so silenced by the NPC party touts that he
failed to raise any issues on the creation of the Middle-Zone-Region'87.
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Furthermore, during subsequent constitutional conference trips to Lagos and
Ibadan in the period between 1955 and 1956, he was subjected to
intimidation by some of the NPC delegates to ensure that he towed NPC party
positions in the discussions. In one Instance, for example, the NPC
leadership was so distrustful of his loyalty that they went to the extreme
of stopping the train in the night, right in the middle of the Niger Bridge
on its way to Lagos, to cross-check, among others, the political stands of
individual delegates: whether they were for "One North" or against - simply
to know that the North was going to the South with one voice188.
It was however another political controvercy between the NPC and the
MZL, that brought together the MZL, the MBPP and the MBSP in search for
political unity for the struggle in the demands for the creation of a
M-Belt Region, rather than any resolved differences on the thorny problem
of leadership and political strategy. The controvercy centered on the
conditions, both parties agreed to adhere to in the MBPP/MZL-NPC alliance
for the fielding of candidates to contest in the 1956 elections into the
NHA in Kaduna. As earlier promited out, a few weeks before the 1956
Regional elections in the North, Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri
resigned from government political appointments in Kaduna and Lagos,
respectively. Thereafter, they became the very instruments in causing the
collapse of the MZL and NPC alliance, arguing that it had not been helpful
for the cause of the M-Belt Movement and the struggle for the creation of a
M-Belt Region 189 . At about the same time, the TPU also terminated its
alliance with the NPC which it had sponsored in 1955 through E. G. Gundu in
the MBPP movement 190 . Sklar suggests that from these developments, some
eleven members in the NI-IA who were associated with one or the other of the
factions in the developing UMBC movement, organized "a Unity Meeting" 191-
This Unity Meeting resulted into the formation of the United Middle Belt
State Peoples Party (UMBSPP) early in 1956 which brought into a comnon
political camp, Some of the leadership in the MZL, MBPP and the MBS1192 At
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a subsequent meeting in Lafia, before the May, 1956 meeting at Kafanchan,
the UMBSPP elected H. 0. Abaagu as Protein-President and Patrict Dokotri,
also as Protein-Secretary Genera1193
The break-up of the MBPP/MZL-NPC alliance before the 1956 elections
was however another failure in the political effort to establish a working
relationship with the NPC government in the North. In all the effort to
develop a working relationship between the NPC and factions in the M-Belt
movement, right from the time of the MZL through to the UMBC, the alliances
only held on for a while, when the NPC dictated the conditions in the
particular context of southern Nigerian domination of the North, rather
than coming from the political exigencies of the M-Belt Movements in the
rather similar circumstances of resisting domination from the Islamic
Society in the North. Moses Nyam Rwang, for example, succintly expressed
this political mood in debating the M-Belt Motion in the NHA in 1956:
".....the people of the Middle Belt have strong
support for this motion to create a Middle Belt
Region .... the United Middle Belt Congress is
simply supporting the creation of a Middle Belt
Region .... since the party in power asked for
the division of Nigeria into three regions at
the London Conference in 1953, they must now
agree to this Motion of dividing the Northern
Region into two. They state (in London) they
were afraid of Southern domination. We now say
that we are afraid of domination of ou
brothers by people from the far North"
However, before the elections in 1956, two members of the MZL in the FHR in
Lagos (Jonah Pssadugu and Patrick Dokotri) contacted the NPC in the hope of
securing an alliance for more members of that party to gain entry, on
behalf of the M-Belt Movements, into the NHA 195
. Earlier before the
orgainzation of the UMBSPP, both Assadugu and Dokotri apparently had
discussed their political intensions on the proposed alliance with the NPC
with Joseph Tarka in Lagos, a situation which was marked by the entry of
the political influences of Tarka into the M-Belt Movement196 Tarka, it is
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said, objected to the alliance, suggesting that before any agreement could
be made, the UMBC as representative of the M-Belt movements ought to get
the NPC to commit itself to the creation of a M-Belt Region, and ensure
that UMBC representation was made to the 1956/57 constitutional conference
in London. He also reechoed a third condition, which had influenced the
resignation of Pastor David Lot and Patrick Dokotri from governemt
political appointments - that the NPC should not field candidates to
contest the same constituencies with the UMBC party' 97 . Just before the
1956 elections, the MPG was accused of breaking its promise, not to
challenge either IJMBC or MZL candidates, particularly so, in the
constituencies in the M-Belt areas, an accussation that broke the alliance
and created a premise for solid support for Tarka to subsequently press for
the new state, even when some of the MZL leadership led by Pastor David
Lot, returned to cooperation with the NPC 198 . An MZL Manifestor, for
exampl, released before the 1956 elections severely conflicted with the
UMBC version on the conditions for the alliance with the NPC on the same
elections. In the Manifesto the MZL suggested that while unity was sought
of all the components and factions that were in the UMBC, there should be
no affiliation with other parties and that those who were members of other
political parties were to resign their membership 199 and that although a
new Region was desirable, it was not practicable in 1956 and that the party
representatives in the NI-IA were adequate to protect the interests of the
M-Belt groups and societies in the North 200 . Pastor David Lot strongly
reechoed these positions when he opposed the Motion on the creation of a
M-Belt Region, tabled by Ibrahim Iniarn in the NHA on 6th March, 1956201.
The contradictory manifestor, which the MZL produced under the
leadership of Pastor David Lot cost the M-Belt Movement split support from
the electorate in the 1956 elections into the NI-IA. Both factions contested
the elections under their different party labels: the MZL and the MBPP202•
Despite the political moves early in 1956 to affiliate the two parties into
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the suggested name of the UMBC as a M-Belt Front for the 1956 elections, in
certain instances, the MZL and the MBPP fielded candidates to contest over
electoral support in the same constituencies. In Jos Divison (Jos Rural
Constituency), for example, Moses Nyam Rwang (Birom from Du-village and
MBPP) contested with and was defeated by Bitrus Rwang Pam (Birorn from
Du-village and MZL), the son of the paramount Chief of Jos 203 . Obviously, a
political situation like this is explained by the differences in party
commitment on the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region as against
cooperation with the NPC government in the North which conditioned
intra-"tribal" opposition in the M-Belt Movement. In the 1956 elections,
however, the NPC won over one hundred seats into the NHA, in addition to
seven other seats won by Independent candidates that were allied to the
NPC204 . Most of the Seven Independent candidates were from Idoma, Igala and
Igbirra, whose factional "tribal" Unions contested the elections between
themselves without party affiliations and on each count the victorious
group, joined the NPC to bargain their support for the share of
distribution of socio-economic and welfare resources to their areas. In
particular, this was the case with the Igbirra Tribal Union in which
intra-tribal differences created a unique situation for the NPC to support
a catholic leadership faction of the "tribal" Union Movement in preference
to support for a Moslem majority 205 . The rival wings of the UMBC (the MZL
and the MBPP) won a total of eleven seats 206 . These included six for the
MBPP out of which five came from the liv areas and one from Pankshin East
on the Plateau which was won by Gabriel Wuyep (a Yergam) 207 . The MZL won
five seats, out of which, two were from S. Zaria (Zaria S. E. and Zaria S.
W.), two from Plateau (Jos Rural and Pankshin West) and one seat from
Adamawa (Numan Divison) 208 . From the forty three seats in the
constituencies of the M-Belt areas, the NPC won twenty eight (65.1%), while
groups with the political identity of the M-Belt Movements (i.e. the rival
factions of the UMBC - the MZL and the MBPP) won only about 28% of the
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seats. However, the results of the 1956 elections demonstrated a political
shift in the commitments for the creation of a M-Belt Region, among the
M-Belt groups and societies. While political support and commitment was
previously centered on the Plateau, it moved southwardly to become
concentrated in Benue Province, particularly among the Tiv through the
MBPP, who became the back-bone of the party. This is apparent in the
results of the 1956 elections into the NHA in which the MZL won a total of
five seats from widely distributed pockets of support in Adamawa (Numan),
Plateau (Jos Rural and Pankshin East) and the two S. Zaria constituencies,
when compared to the five seats, all among the Tiv group and society in
Benue Province. To a large extend, this shift in political support and
commitment, is explained by the half-hearted support of the MZL politicians
who were concentrated on the plateau and who maintained an ambivalent
policy of cooperation with the NPC party and government in the North as
against the uncompromising position of the MBPP over the demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region which was inherited by the (JMBC in 1956 and
found solid support among the Tiv. Although the 1956 elections into the NHA
show a remarkable political development in support for the parties of the
M-Belt Movement over the 1951 elections (as well as over the 1954 elections
into the FHR in Lagos), given that there was a wider geographical spread in
the distribution of declared electoral support in the political
identification with the ideas of the M-Belt Movement, the election was
characterized by increased christian support for the NPC party from both
Plateau and Benue Provinces, the core socio-religious and political areas
of the M-Belt groups and societies. On the Plateau, for example, christian
adherents like Michael Audu Buba (an Ankwei from Lowland Divison) and Jatau
Gwani (a Katab from Jemaa), were NPC, while in Benue, all the Idoma in the
NHA who joined the NPC after the elections were christains like Jallo Tanko
Yusufu who won in Wukari and who in the 1960s was Secretary-General of the
Northern Christian Association (NCA) 209
. The NCA in the Northern Region of
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Nigeria was an Association of Christians, indigenous to the North and its
objective purposes included: The glorification of God; To openly proclaim
Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour; To safeguard the christian religious
interests of persons, churches and institutions and to bring to the
attention of all concerned, the fact that the christian religion was a
native and integral part of the life of Northern Nigeria 210 . The NCA had
objectives which were similar to those of the NML, the parent body of the
M-Belt movements that was organized in 1949. The critical difference,
however, was that by 1960, the NCA saw itself as sub-Northern in political
identity in christian religious terms, unlike the NML which maintained
features of a total political identity, contesting the socio-economic and
political dominance of Islam in the North.
In the 1956, as well as other subsequent elections, however, christian
political support increased for the NPC party, without any similar Moslem
support for the M-Belt Movements, even when some Moslems had grown
socio-economic and political roots by their long period of residence among
some of the M-Belt groups and societies. Significantly, it was after 1956,
that the M-Belt Movement began to lose its christian religious identity in
the emphasis of the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region as each
group began to emphasize local socio-economic and political problems within
the all embracing movement for a M-Belt Region. Furthermore, after the 1956
elections, Pastor David Lot, on his own account, retreated from active
participation in shaping the cause of events in the M-Belt Movement, in
order to give the tJMBC a lesser christian religious emphasis for its
political purposes 211 . With the advent of the leadership of Joseph Tarka in
the UMBC, the issue and problems of political minorities in the North,
became central in the M-Belt Movement rather than that of religious
minorities which were in the emphasis of the NML and the MZL party. This
was the base from which Tarka ultimately tied the fate of the M-Belt groups
and societies to other minorities in the developing Nigerian Federation,
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where in each Region, in the Three-Region-Federation, a concentration of
minority cultural systems existed in the south and south-eastern fringes
with a dominant "tribal" group and society controlling social and economic
activities and in particular, in control of political power 212 . The
religious element in the M-Belt Movement in the demands for a separate
Region from the Islamic Society in the North, unlike in the South of
Nigeria, where the social and political minorities were basically of the
same religion as the majority tribes, from where, because of tribal
hegemony they wanted to be separated. The shift in the emphasis of issues
in the causes of the M-Belt movement, from the purely religious identity,
to a political form of minorities identity in terms of access to power was
critical in gaining the support of Southern Nigerian minorities during the
crisis months, after July, 1966 when the Nigerian Federation was threatened
with disintegration and the minorities managed to hold the system together,
culminating into the state creation exercise in May, 1967213.
However, the ambivalent political position of Pastor David Lot in the
MZL and subsequently in the UMBSPP and the UMBC, caused a political ginger
group to develop in the M-Belt Movement in order to work toward political
compromises. The ginger group consisted of the more educated elements from
among the M-Belt groups and societies and who felt some political sympathy
for the causes of M-Belt Movement and the demands for the creation of a
M-Belt Region in the North 214
 The ginger groups within the different
factions of the M-Belt Movement subsequently called themselves the Middle
Belt Congress (MBC) and among other things, recruited people from different
areas of the M-Belt, to circulate party material with strongly worded
grievances on the differences between the Islamic areas in the North and
the non-Islamic areas of the M-Belt, over the concentration of
socio-economic and welfare infrastructure as well as complaints about the
lack of respect for the non-Islamic chieftancy institution 215 . It was the
MBC under the collective leadership of its members that was most effective,
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in the period before May 1956, in organizing meetings in Kagoro to discuss
the Unity of the Congress with Pastor David Lot; At Lafia with the
leadership of the MBPP and at Kafanchan with the MBSP 216 , In 1956, although
it was clear that the centre of gravity of the M-Belt Movement had shifted
from the Plateau, southwardly to the lower Bennue Valley with political
support from among the liv group and society, Kagoro, Lafia and Kafanchan
were regular meeting places of the MBC and subsequently the UMBC, because
they were centrally located and well served by a communications net work
such that delegates could easily come from Numan, S. Banchi, S. Zaria,
Plateau, Benue, Kabba and Ilorin by car, train and even bicycle 217 . The MBC
was about the last organization that served as a screening house, to weed
out non-committed membership of the M-Belt Movements in preparation for the
inauguration of the UMBC in May, 1956. There were three problem areas in
the organization of an all embracing M-Belt Movement, which the MBC
identified; the political unity of the different factions for the movement
to maintain solidarity and continuity in its policies; finance to enhance
political mobilization and to contest elections by effective and genuine
alliances in order to meets its objectives; and of course, the perenial
problem of effective leadership that can maintain abalance of interests for
all of the M-Belt groups and societies 218 . These problems were examined and
discussed by members of the MBC, at its, very last meeting in April, 1956
at Lafia, before the advent of the UMBC in May of the same year 219 . The
Lafia meeting was convened through the efforts of H. 0. Abaagu, where
suggested heuristic solutions were proposed 220 . To meet its financial
problems, a section of the leadership in the MBC was asked to meet AG
leadership in Ibadan in the specific context of responding to AG attempts
to persuade some liv politicians (i.e. Isaac Kpurn) to serve as agents as
early as in 1952, while another, went to solicit an alliance with the NEPU
and NCNC221 . On the problem of political leadership, the MBC meeting
resolved that a dominant "tribe" from the M-Belt groups and societies
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should produce the President of the M-Belt movement, so that at the very
least, strong "tribal" support can sustain and stablize the movement and
the liv group and society was chosen to fulfill this political exigency,
because of the weight of their memebers and their characteristic solidarity
that could not be contested by the other smaller groups and societies in
the M-Belt areas 222 . To create unity within the different groups and
societies in the M-Belt areas, it was suggested that a non-compromise-stand
on the issue of creating a M-Belt Region will be pursued and that an
elected leadership will tour all of the affected areas to mobilize
political support from minority groups and societies who might be
christians and persons with African traditional systems of belief and
worship and appeals for support were also to be made to resident Moslems
among the M-Belt groups and societies 223 . In addition to outlined political
strategy, the MBC agreed on an exclusive date for a conference of all the
factions in the M-Belt Movement, where the proposals might be examined and
discussed, elections for a new executive to be held, which would once and
for all resolve the claims by Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot to be
the Presidents of the LJMBC 224
 and the new executive be entrusted with the
task of implementing the policies 225 . The date for the meeting was fixed
for May, 1956 and the venue was suggested to be Kafanchan. At the same
meeting in Lafia in April 1956, the MBC formally converted its name to
become the United Middle Belt Congress and summoned the Kafanchan meeting
under that political label. One of the developments on some of the issues
and decisions taken by the MBC at the Lafia meeting was the rejection of
the Hausa Language, which was the common language in the North, but was
less understood by the liv, diffused from the Islamic society to the M-Belt
areas, to be used in taking down minutes of meetings during UMBC
deliberations and in its place the English language was chosen as a
preference226 . While in one sense, this might be interpreted as a rejection
of Hausaization which was Northernization and to some, Islamization, it
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more fundamentally served as an effective strategy and weapon that
instantly excluded the older-war-horses of the M-Belt Movement like Pastor
David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and Jonah Assadugu from being secretaries to
the movement, because they were inadequate in the uses of the English
language. The issue, however, remained controversial because UMBC rallies
were in either Hausa or the local language of the audience rather than
English ad only minutes of the executive-meetings were taken down in
English227 . Indeed, most of the written communication between the top
M-Belt leadership which was sent to local leadership at the "tribal" union
levels of organization were either in Hausa or the local languages 228 . In
Plateau, Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and some parts of Northern Benue
Province, the Hausa language was used extensively in political
communication. In these areas there was a large Hausa-Fulani Islamic
population which had influenced the social and political norms of behaviour
of the local people such as in areas of attitudes to authority and respect
for law and order, even when it was the case that there was hostility
toward the Hausa-Fulami Islamic groups and societies in general. In Jos
Division, for example, the Hausa migrant population, which settled in the
area as labour for the tin mines fields, created sufficient anxieties in
1956 for the Birom and other smaller non-Islamic groups and societies to
swing in support for the MBC, a departure from their previous ambivalent
political position that had divided their votes between the NPC and the
MBPP/MZL alliance and their support for the UMBSPP. In 1956, the year which
marked the entry of Bitrus Rwang Pam, the son of the Chief of Jos into the
NE-IA, the Hausa-Birom tensions had been heightened by: I. Hausa claims to
the cheiftancy of Jos 229 ; II. An enquiry, conducted by an NPC official
before the SDO, into the conduct of affairs by the Cheif of Jos; and III.
The allegeal imprisonment of persons with traditional practices of African
Systems of beliefs and worship in Bauchi (S. Bauchi in particular) for
refusing to accept a Hausa-man (Moslem) as their chief 230
 Through the
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political pressures of Bitrus Rwang Pam, who at that time had become
Secretary General to BPU, Divisonal Secretary to the Jos NA and also
General-Secretary of the MZL-UMBC under the leadership of Pastor David Lot,
there was the final break in the alliance between the MZL and the NPC party
before the 1956 elections into the NHA 231 . It was because of tensions like
these that the Hausa in Jos maintained distinct political identity among
the local population, with which they mobilized themselves to increase
opposition on the creation of a M-Belt Region, even though their stand
contravened NEPU/NCNC policy which were their parties. In the debates on
the Middle Melt Motion in 1956, for example, Alhaji Aim Iiiya, a speical
member in the NHA representing Hausa elements on the Plateau said:
"I rise to oppose the Motion for the creation
of a Middle Belt Region. All the 1-lausa elements
in the Plateau Province, whom I am specially
representing, do not support the Motion and are
not in favour of it. The member from the
Plateau, who spoke in favour of the Motion was
not sent by anybody from the Plateau Province:
he only brought his own views 23 e has himself
been expelled from his party"
At about the middle of 1956, although almost all the political
leadership among the M-Belt groups and societies had come under the
influence of the UMBSPP and its elitist wing, the MBC, in anticipation of
the inauguration of the IJMBC, in the organization of a single all embracing
party of the M-Belt Movement for the creation of the M-Beit Region, in the
period between 1956 and 1960, two factions still developed within the
leadership and the UMBC organization. The central discordant political
issues were focussed on who to choose as an ally for the 1956 elections in
the North and who to join sides with on the National political arena for
the Constitutional Conference in London in 1957233.
Firstly, at the opening meeting of the UMBC at Kafanchan in May, 1956,
some members of the UMBSPP, predominantly, those from the MBSP (Rwang and
Ijumu in particular) who had approached the AG for funds and an alliance,
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were accussed of "subversive action" against the party 234 . Moses Nyam Rwang
and Bello Ij umu consequently walked out of the meeting, taking with them
their Supporters, a political action which cost them expulsions from the
tJMBC movement235 and in reaction they resurrected the MBSP and indeed it
survived to Contest two constituencies in Tiv Divison (Gaav-Shangev Tiev
and Kunav) in the 1959 elections, but failed to win any seats 236 . The
resurrected MBSP was joined by Achiga Abuul after he experienced political
frustration at the UMBC conference at Kafanchan in 1956, where Joseph Tarka
was elected as President of the UMBC 237
. After 1959 the MBSP declined in
political function and by 1961 its political activities were untraceable
and the party ceased to exist because some of its members withdrew from
party politics, while others joined the NPC 238 •
 The systematic decline of
the MBSP in the period between 1956 and 1958 also marked the exit of Moses
Nyam Rwang from the centre of the M-Belt movement. When he joined the NPC
in 1959, he discredited himself by contradicting his previous beliefs and
public statements in saying that he did so:
"...because it (the NPC) is the only stable
political py in the country catering for the
common man"
However, Moses Nyam Rwang remained curiously one of the most visionary
leaders in the M-Belt Movement as early as in the days of his political
involvement with the NML and the MZL and subsequently with the MBPP, the
MBSP, until the inception of the UMBC in 1956, on the future potential of
the minorities in the North to create the M-Belt Region. He was always
rhetorically prohetic in persisting to warn his colleagues in the NHA about
future reversed roles in decision making processes which will be created by
a fortuitous event and which will tilt the political advantages to the
minorities in the North and thereafter, a M-Belt Region will be created, a
view that was always shared by Ibrahim Imam in the NHA from Bornu 240 . In
the debate on the Motion for the creation of a M-Belt Region in March,
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1956, for example, Moses Nyam Rwang pointed out:
"...As I have already said sometime ago in the
House, the party in power (the NPC) will in
future be a very pitiful party..."
Those so called small political parties of
"...unscrupulons politicians will one day be so
strong as to capture the Government of this
Region... I will like to point out to the NPC
members of this House that the Middle Belt
Region will not be created by the NPC..... the
NPC must know that we are not demanding support
from that party... Our own party was set up for
the declared purpose of setting up a separate
region for the Middle Belt.... The Middle Belt
Region is already a foregone conclusion, for it
is not going to be created by those people who
are in this House. I say this because I know
that this House will be dissolved in due
course, and that will be the pitiful end of
those mers who refuse to support this
motion"
The second discordant political issue that affected the organization
of the UMBC in the period between 1956 and 1960 centered on who to join
sides with on the National political arena for the London Constitutional
Conference in 1957. After the inaugural meeting of the UMBC in 1956 the
party entered into an alliance with the AG, apparently, the AG having made
contacts as early as 1952 and in this instance also made offers of
financial and organizational support and also promised to raise the issue
of the creation of a M-Belt Region in the North in the remaining
constitutional talks in the settlements of self-Government in the North and
Independence for Nigeria before 1959 and 1960242. The persuasive political
efforts of the AG centered on the ideas that it wanted the M-Belt grups and
societies to be:
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"...free from the reactionary rule of the
Fulani clique...(and) their area constituted
into a new region or state. The new state will
have its own House of Assembly and House of
Chiefs. It will have its own Governor. It will
have its own Premier who will be a Middle Belt
man. It will have its Ministers who will be
Middle Belters. It will have its own Chiefs and
Assembly men who will all be Middle Belters. No
Westerner or Yoruba men will contest
	 ctions
to the Middle Belt State Legislature"
Obviously this political propagander of the AG influenced some of the
politicians of the M-Belt areas and the glamour of power seem to be enjoyed
at Kaduna created similar images for a new Region and this found its way
into the attitudes of some leadership of the M-Belt Movement, sufficiently
for Bryan Sharwood Smith to reduce the causes of the movement and the
majority of the leadership, to very simplistic terms as:
"....opportunist ... for whom the dazzling
vision of a brand new region, with its
Ministries and Public Boards and Corporation
and all that these implied in the way of power
and patronage was argument enough.... (while)
the main issue was fundamentally one of 244
confidence between Muslim and non-Muslim"
However, the UMBC in return for the AG patronage on the struggle for the
creation of a M-Belt Region was to acknowledge and give political support
to the demands of the AG-lIP alliance for the merging of some Divisions in
Kabba and Ilorin with substantial Yoruba House-holds which were christian
in religious identity with the Yoruba dominated Western Region of Nigeria,
where the Northern Yoruba wll be freed:
"...from the oppressive yoke of their fulani
rulers by having them regrouped with the
Yorubas of the Western Region. They wish to be
ruled from Ibadan rather than from Kaduna. They
like to attend legislatures where their own
language (Yoruba) is spoken rather than those
in which a foreign language (Hausa) is spoken.
They desire to have.., the same Legislatures
with those having the same origin, the same
tradition, the same culture and the same
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language with them"245•
In a subsequent AG publication in 1959, Awolowo was very blunt on the
harm - Kabba merger with the Western Region of Nigeria:
"...If the Middle Belt State is created, the
merging of hlorin - Kabba Divisions with the
Western Reg
	 is ipso factor a foregone
conclusion"
The Ilorin - Kabba merger with the Western Region had been a long standing
political issue before the M-Belt movement came to the arena of Nigerian
politics. The government of British administration in Nigeria, however
consistently resisted demands for the revision of the conquered boundaries
by the Fulani between the North and West as early as in 1904, 1917 by
Lugard and subsequently in 1936 right through to the Macphersons Review of
the Boundary Issues in 1952 in which he preserved the status quo ante; but
this was never accepted by Awolowo, albeit any Yoruba in the AG247.
However, through the persuasive efforts of Joseph Tarka, who had been
chosen by the AG as one of its representatives to the London 1957 talks,
most of the Tiv UMBC/TPU members accepted these conditions of the AG,
except H. 0. Abaagu, who opposed any move to merge hlorin and Kabba with
the Western Region of Nigeria248 . This opposition by Abaagu, temporarily
split the UMBC/TPU wing of the M-Belt Movement in Tiv Division and ended
with Abaagu organizing the Benue Freedom Crusade (BEG) in May, 1958 and
aligned the movement with the NCNC until 1959 when it switched its support
to the NPC 249 . The political objective of the BEG were not very clear and
indeed were not spelt out in terms beyond that of a protest movement over
the hlorin - Kabba irrendentist feelings which remained whithin its
divisional organizational structure of the UMBC/TPU among the Tiv. Similar
to the resurrected MBSP under Moses Nyam Rwang and Bello Ijumu, the BEG of
Abaagu had a very short life span and its leader with most of his
supporters joined the NPC early in 1959 and their Benue protest identity,
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directed at the M-Belt identity in the UMBC became submerged by Northern
250
socio-religious and political identity of the NPC party	 . Except for
these two factional developments in the UMBC (the resurrected MBSP and the
BFC), after 1956 the M-Belt Movement, in the period between 1956 and 1960
enjoyed stable political support, the bulk of which came from christians
and non-Islamic groups and societies in Adamawa, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and
most particularly Plateau and Benue predominantly from sections of the
Birom, totally from the Jarawa that were centered around the christian
missionary centre of Fobur and solidly among the liv. According to Dudley,
the Idomas, Igbirras, Igalas and Jukuns, who were under the patronage of
their respective chiefs found it convenient to support the NPC rather than
the UMBC 251 . It was from political premises like these which prompted Auta
Anzah Ninzam, a member from the Plateau in the NHA, to suggest that in the
demands for the M-Belt Region:
"...to be frank, it is only the two Provinces
of Benue and Plateau which could constitute
this so-called Middle Belt Region... (sing
some of these rebels now reside in Benue"
	 ,
because of the intensity of the UMBC political activities in those areas
after 1956, an observation which was complimented by the ridicule of Abutu
Obekpa an Idonia elected member of the NHA from Benue Province, who also
pointed out that:
'....the party (UMBC) now confines itself only
to Plateau Provine. The so-called Middle Belt
Congress should be known as the Plateau Middle
Belt Congress.... under the leadership of
Pastor David Lot as Prime Minister of
Plateau..... Patrick Fom as Deputy-Premier2d
Moses Nyam Rwang as Secretary or Minister"
It is to the development of political cohesion and the tactics adopted for
political mobilization in the M-Belt Movement after the Kafanchan meeting
in May, 1956 which was achieved when the UMBC party came under the
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leadership of Joseph Tarka, that we now turn to, in the focus of our
analysis. It ought to be borne in mind, however, that Joseph Tarka had been
an elected member of the FHR as early as in 1954 and had shared ideas on
the creation of a M-BeIt Region with Jonah Assadugu, Pastor David Lot and
Patrick Dokotri, who were also elected members in Lagos. The cohesion and
political mobilization, took on a different pattern, after the turbulent
and rather zig-zag path to unity, with the formation of an all inclusive
front by the M-Belt groups and societies, through the activities of the
UMBC movement as a political party in the demands for the creation of an
alternvative Northern Region, the M-Belt Region in the North, within the
Nigerian Federation.
IV. The United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC).
The politics and political organization of the M-Belt Movement in its
phase as the UMBC party was the politics of alliance formation for
financial resources to support the organization of political mobilization
of the M-Belt groups and societies on the issue and ideas of the creation
of a M-Belt Region in the North. This development was in sharp contrast to
the previous phases of the M-Belt movement in which politics was very much
that of organized protest over religious differences and the control of the
governmnt apparatus by Islamic leadership that had ramification on the
interpretation of the law and the unequal distribution of socio-economic
and welfare resources and infrastructure. The assumption of politics that
had created instability in the previous movements and some incoherance in
the use of resources, centered on representation and participation in the
institutions of government and society in the North, which the leadership
in the M-Belt movement, took as adequate in order to bring about
infrastructure for modern development to their areas. However, while the
UMBC emphasized the politics of mass mobilization after 1956, particularly
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so among the Tiv, it also used almost all of the grievances which its
preceeding political organizations, like the NML, the MZL and the MBPP had
used, to prop-up political support from the ordinary people among the
M-Belt groups and societies, in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt
Region. As it will become apparent below, variation in political strategy
was so, because different images of the problems of the M-Belt areas
existed and these centered on issues that were unique to a particular area.
Furthermore, the issues had their different patterns in appealling for
political support in the search for solutions. As it has been earlier
pointed out, in the period between 1952 and 1956, some of the M-Belt
leadership saw the solutions to their socio-economic and political problems
through the maintainance of the boundaries of One North in context of the
Northern Identity, while to others, the viable option to a solution was in
the creation of a M-Belt Region. It was the acknowledged variation on the
M-Belt issues that conditioned differences in the strategies that were
deployed by the leadership in its initial thrust for political mobilization
in the period between 1956 and 1958. In 1959, however, the fundamental
issue of the M-Belt Movement, the creation of a M-Belt Region, was taken to
the electoral market place of the M-Belt groups and societies during the
campaigns for the elections into the FHR in Lagos. The issue of the
creation of a M-Belt Region was also taken to the electoral markets place
in the M-Belt areas in the specific context of the consequences of
Self-Government for the North and Independence for Nigeria. This section
examines the political development and impact of the M-Belt Movement in its
phase as the UMBC, it being the highest niainfestation of the demands and
support for the creation of the M-Belt Region in the North and Nigerian
politics. The section also examines the extent and how the M-Belt
leadership coped with government pressures and the strategies of the MPG
party, to contain the demands and the political paths the movement followed
until the approximate of the M-Belt Region was achieved in May, 1967, in
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totally different political circumstances under the military administration
of General Yakubu Gowon. The Nigerian Federal Elections of 1959 are,
however, given a critical analytical focus, to test the political identity
the UMBC in the M-Belt Movement under the leadership of Joseph Tarka and
the Tiv maintained in the context of the political instruments used in
mobilizing support for the creation of a M-Belt Region.
The organization of the political activities of the UMBC were began at
Kafanchan in 1956254. In May, 1956, the protein- President of the UMBSPP,
H. 0. Abaagu and its Secretary, Patrick Dokotri as well as the bulk of the
members of the elitist MBC, convened a meeting at Kafanchan 255
 The purpose
of the meeting was to elect a new executive for the UMBC, Which will stand
uncontested as a representative body to speak on the interest of the M-Belt
groups and societies, particularly on the issue of demanding the creation
of a M-Belt Region and in the negotitations of alliances with political
parties of its independent choice in Nigeria. The Kafanchan meeting was
also quite subjectively meant to elect as President of the UMBC a Tiv
person, in the over all interest of the M-Belt movement and its struggle
for the creation of a M-Belt Region. The Tiv people, it was argued at the
Lafia meeting in April 1956, deserved and ought to be given the leadership
of the movement because of their numerical strength. The weight of the
numbers of their members would be able to keep the movement in a stable
political position and direction of interest against collective defections
by neighbouring tribes or any other M-Belt people, when they support the
party in mass 256 . In addition to their numerical strength, some of the
leadership of the M-Belt Movement suggested that the Tiv ought to be given
the Presidency of the UMBC because of what they curiously percieved and
described as the uniqueness of ssthe Tiv-character", which the movement
needed in order to achieve the objective of the the creation of a M-Belt
Region. The liv people, it was argued by non-Tiv, do not give up a struggle
once they have taken sides until the objectives is achieved 257 . In other
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words, the Kafanchan meeting was a conscious political effort to bring the
Tiv group and society into the centre and the main stream of the M-Belt
movement258
 A new Executive was elected which was fairly representative of
the M-Belt groups and societies with the Presidency and Secretaryship
located to persons from among the core of the M-Belt people in Plateau
(Birorn) and Benue (liv). From the outcome of the election of a new
executive, however, it was clear that leadership of the movement passed to
the control and direction of a new breed of persons, the more European
educated class, who had been to colleges and secondary schools. The meeting
also chose Jos, on the Plateau, as its central headquaters.
The highly significant, although controvertial outcome of the meeting
however was in the election of Joseph Tarka as the President of the UMBC
party. It is not clear to what extent J. S. Tarka had been previously
involved in M-Belt movements, like the MZL, MBPP and MBSP or even the
elitist MBC, in terms of regular attendance of meetings and political
contributions of ideas before the Kafanchan meeting and his election as
President. His political inclinations before 1954 were toward the NCNC
which had attracted some of the radical elements among the educated Tiv,
but there was no real following among the people because the NCNC was
regarded as an Ibo organization and the liv feared Ibo competition and Ibo
incursion on their land from the southern parts of Tiv land 259 . It is
however clear that Tarka had indicated political sympathies for the ideas
and causes of the M-Belt movement and the demands for the creation of a
M-Belt Region before 1956, although he had not party political
affiliations 260
. There is, however, evidence which shows that Joseph Tarka
had been politically involved before 1954 and had gained from that,
experience in political organization. He had also attained some radical
political consciousness from his teachers while a student in Bauchi,
noteably from Aminu Kano and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who taught him at the
Bauchi Teachers College where Tarka graduated as a Rural Science
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teacher261 . While at Bauchi Teachers College he organized a student protest
group which demonstrated against the school authorities over sanitation and
feeding conditions in the hostels 262 . Futhermore, the involvement of Joseph
larks in political activities in Benue Province, although local in
political shape, were sufficient backgroud experience for becoming the
leader of an organization and movement such as the UMBC party and these
were some of the factors taken into consideration by Partick Dokotri who
was disappointed at the election of Abuul and thought there were better Tiv
persons for the post. J. S. Tarka, for example had been General-Secretary
of the Benue State Peoples Party (BSPP) in 1955, a political wing of the
MBSP an organization from which Abaagu developed his ideas of the Benue
Freedom Cursade (BFC) in 1958263. Furthermore, besides his teaching job as
a grade two Rural Science teacher, he had been Secretary-General of the
Tiv-NA staff union when he won the elections into the FHR in Lagos in
1954264. Tarka had won that election with the support of the TPU, at that
time, the most influential political organization in Tiv Division 265 , and
had represented the IPU to the convened meeting of the UMBSPP and MBC at
Kafanchan in 1956266. In that respect and capacity, it is clear that Joseph
Tarka was at Kafanchan as a participant to support other more influential
Tiv candidates in the Presidency which had been unequivocally reserved for
the liv, rather than a political hopeful with liv support. Indeed in 1956,
there were much more powerful and influential Tiv politicians, than Joseph
Tarka in the delegation of the BSPP to Kafanchan. There was, for example,
Ugor Iwoor, a building contractor and motor transport owner, although not
well educated, was the most influential person in the politics of Tiv
Division and who had been President, of the TPU since 1949267. The
political influence of Iwoor in liv Division was considerable because he
had financially supported many Tiv parliamentarians in previous elections
to the NHA and the FHR and could therefore influence particular
candidates268 . Furthermore, there was also Achiga Abuul, the explicit Tiv
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candidate for the UMBC Presidency, whom Ugor Iwoor supported with finance
and lorries to transport supporters to Kafanchan and Isaac Kpum, who
infact, was the most widely travelled and had been the most politically
active Tiv person before 1956 in the cause of the MBPP, the MBSP, the
UMBSPP, the MBC and as the political agent in Benue Province for the AG
party269
. In the period between 1952 and 1956, Isaac Kpum, more than any
liv leader single-handedly and with fanatical commitment, politicized some
European educated liv youngmen and women with ideas on the struggle for the
creation of a M-Belt Region and urged them to support the M-Belt
movement270 , Furthermore, it was Isaac Kpum who taught his school children
and Tiv village associates, the M-belt Anthem, among whom, was Elizabeth
Ivase, in anticipation for the creation of the M-Belt Region271.
Despite all these strong and influential political "opponents" from
the liv group and soceity, however, Joseph Tarka emerged in the 1956
elections of the UMBC executive, as President of the M-Belt movement. Other
contestants for the post of Presidency were, surprisingly, in the context
of the Lafia agreement that a liv person be President: Jonah Assadugu
(Bachama, MP in the FHR from Numan Division), H. 0. Abaagu (a liv MP in
the FHR) and Achiga Abuul (a Tiv contractor and bussinessman) 272
. All of
the contestants for the UMBC Presidency in 1956, including Joseph Tarka
were members of the FHR in Lagos, having been elected in the 1954
elections, except for Achiga Abuul who was in private bussiness as
contractor273 . Besides being outside the main stream of politics before
1956, Abuul was also the most relatively low in educational standard when
compared to the other three contestants to the Presidency of the UMBC
party274.
There are conflicting accounts of the elections of th Presidency and
on what happened at Kafanchan which cost Abuul the Presidency to the
advantage of Joseph Tarka. These have varied from a direct election contest
between Tarka and Abuul, in which Tarka won to a quiet-room-corner-decision
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in which the liv delegates chose Tarka to be the President with subsequent
endorsement by the conference; and of course the version which suggests:
"Dokotri made Tarka President of the UMBC" 275 . According to Patrick
Dokotri, who became Secretary-General of the UMBC as a result of the same
elections, the candidate that was collectively presented by the Tiv was
Achiga Abuul and who had ensured his election victory by bringing to
Kafanchan, lorry-loads of his supporters from a broad-spectrum of liv
society. The numerical strength of the supporters for Abuul alone
overwhelmed other contestants for the Presidency. The other contestants in
the first round of the elections included Jonah Assadugu and H. 0. Abaagu
who were subsequently joined in the second round by J. S. Tarka 276 . In the
first round of the election, however, Achiga Abuul totally won the
Presidency by an undisputed majority. As normal conference practice
required, the elected President addresses the delegates. Achiga Abuul, who
was neither fluent in the English language nor could speak the Hausa
language, insisted on addressing the delegates in the liv language, without
appreciating the problems of the Secretary who had to take down minutes and
other delegates who did not understand the Tiv language. Although there was
an overwhelming presence of the liv people at the Kafanchan meeting, a fact
which marked their emerging influence in the M-Belt movement, delegates
came from other M-Belt groups and societies who did not understand the liv
language and more significantly, the elected secretary of the UMBC party
was Birom and needed to understand the language of the political discourse
in order to take down minutes of the conference. Furthermore, the speech of
Abuul in the Tiv language might have contravened the Lafia agreement of the
elitist MBC decision for English to be the language of political discourse
and for minutes of meetings to be taken down in English. Patrick Dokotri,
the General-Secretary to the Conference therefore protested over the
address being given in the liv language and opted to resign his post rather
than "serve under an illiterate President" 277
 In the instance, the liv
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then decided to put forward, H. 0. Abaagu, who declined to take the offer
on the grounds that Abuul had been sudemocratically elected° 278
 It was in
the intervening confusion that the Tiv got together, nominated J. S. Tarka,
the literate person Dokotri required, while other non-Tiv delegates
persuaded Jonah Assadugu to withdraw his candidature. The singular act by
Patrick Dokotri shaped the political fortunes and career of Joseph Tarka,
frustrated Abuul, but, effectively brought in the Tiv people into the
centre-stage of the M-Belt struggle and the whole political momentum of the
movement was given a new and vigorous sense of direction in the demand for
the creation of the M-Belt Region. However, the Kafanchan meeting produced
for both Joseph Tarka and Patrick Dokotri, a political experience that was
complemented by their previous exchange of ideas on the M-Belt movement
while as resident politicians in Lagos which they exploited to work closely
with ecah other in the cause of the struggle for the creation of the M-Belt
Region. Mutual political cooperation existed between Tarka and Dokotri in
the period between 1956 and 1962, despite the ainbivalance in political
allegiance previously exhibited by the latter, in which he wished to see a
certain degree of political concensus of the tJMBC with the NPC party and
government in the North. In that period, however, both Tarka and Dokotri
solidly supported the creation of the M-Belt Region. Indeed, much of the
reported political activity of the M-Belt movement in the same period
centered on the activities of the two personalities in their engagement in
politcal mobilization of the M-Belt groups and societies over the issues
the 1957 commission on minorities was investigating, attendance of
constitutional conferences in London, negotations of alliances and
subsequently, the campaigns for the 1959 elections279 . Dokotri was
instrumentally contributive in persuading J. S. Tarka on the UMBC-AG
alliance. This might not have been unconnected to his attendance at
secondary schools in Ibadan and Benin where he had built up friendship with
some of the Yoruba 280 . Indeed, it has been suggested that Awolowo preferred
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Dokotri to be President of the UMBC and leading figure in the M-Belt
movement, rather than Joseph Tarka, were it not for the critical electoral
advantage that was rooted in the numerical strength of the Tiv which far
exceeded that of any other M-Belt group and society 281 . In the eyes of
chief Obafemi Awolowo, Patrick Dokotri was much more a loyal client than
the challenging and independent personality in the leadership of Joseph
Tarka.
Besides the election of J. S. Tarka as President of the UMBC and
Patrick Dokotri as its Secretary-General, Isaac Kpum was also elected in
1956 as Financial Secretary of the party, a post he combined with that of
the Editorship of the Middle-Belt Herald based in headquaters at Jos282.
Strictly speaking these were the three functionally occupied posts in the
UMBC executive. These were however complemented by the elections of
Divisional Organizing Secretaries from the Divisions among the Provincial
administration that existed in the M-Belt areas and where there were
elements of UMBC political support 283 . This organizational structure of the
UMBC became tied up to the organization of the AG after January, 1957 when
a formal alliance was agreed upon. In the instance, additional to the post
of President, Secretary-General, Finiancial Secretary and the Divisional
Organizing Secretaries, the UMBC executive consisted of elected members,
two each from liv, Idorna and Birom and one member each from any of the
other non-Islamic M-Belt tribes who wanted to be involved in the policy
formation and decision making of the movement 284 . Subsequently when the
movement gained the support of and entered into alliance with other parties
in the North associated with the AG, some members of the UMBC-AG-BYM
alliance suggested in 1961 that the organization of the alliace be zoned,
such that a 'Far North' and a 'Lower Norht' executive exist. The structure
of the Lower-North executive however remained that of the UMBC structure,
previously reorganized by Joseph Tarka, until in 1963 when the IJMBC broke
off with the AG and became the NPF in alliance with the NEPU 285
. It ought
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to be borne in mind, however, that before the demands for a Kano State and
a Borno State became political issues which reinforced the realignment of
the UMBC into the NPF, the aims and objectives of both the NEPIJ and the BYM
were contradistinctive to those of the LJMBC. The political aims and
objectives of the NEPU and BYM were meant for reform on the Northern
Identity and particularly centered on the reforms of the NA systems in the
North286 . These goals, as such, were not as revolutionary as those of the
UMBC, which were on the subdivision of the North, such that an independent
and antonomous M-Belt Region will exist, separated from control of Islamic
leadership but within the Nigerian Federation, which obviously would have
ruptured the Northern Identity. In 1957 however NEPU party policy was
clearly pro-UMBC and at the London Conference Aminu Kano clearly stated:
"It was essential that the Northern Region
should be broken down into smaller units. For
instace, the Middle Belt
	 a claim to a
separate regional status"
However, after the alliance with the AG in 1957, the political aims and
objectives of the UMBC remained the same as those of the previous
organizations of the M-Belt movement. These were imbedded and given a new
impetus in the immediate alliance the UMBC entered into the AG which
included the creation of a M-Belt Region with the motto: "freedom for all,
life more abundant for us (in) a Middle Belt state"288.
With the election of Joseph Tarka, as President of the UMBC and
Patrick Dokotri as its Secretary-General the M-Belt movement assumed a
completely different political posture and stategy. Not only did it expand
its focus of political rhetoric from relgious issues to socio-economic
grievances, but also significantly ex panded its arena of political activity
from the NHA in Kaduna to the FHR in Lago 5
 in raising the need for the
creation of a M-Belt Region in the North 289
. In 1957, for example, Patrick
Dokotri presented the needs for political preparedness against 1959, having
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in mind the London Constitutional Conference in May 1957, Northern
Self-Government and the 1959 elecions into the FHR and pointed out:
"...It is the policy of the United Middle Belt
Congress that we will welcome Self-Government
of the Federation and the Regions only when
adequate safeguards have been made for the
minorities... We want Self-Government that will
provide adequate safeguard to secure the basic
human rights for individuals and bodies to
practice and propagate their religions without
undue restraint... If regional Self-Government
will mean that those in authority will be
placed in a position to trample on the rights
of minorities, as happened in the Sudan
(Republic), it will be very necessary to remove
such dangers and threat... The British must not
allow our three giants (Northern, Western and
Eastern Regions in the Nigerian Federation) to
play the game alone... We attach certain
conditions to the attainment of
Self-Government... The country should have been
broken up into more states... Adequate
safeguards are made in the constitution to
protect minorities and basic human rights... In
Decemeber 1958 there should be a constituent
Assembly to cnsolidate the constitution and
finally Self-Government and Independence...
Self-Government will not mean what we all wish
it to be, until the various agitations and
aspirations of 9 ople have been taken into
consideration"
It is significant to note that these statements were made before the
Minorities Commission, headed by Sir Henry Willink, was set up in the same
year (1957) and that from its findings, most of its conclusions and
recommendations in 1958 were similar to the conditions of Independence in
the policies of the UMBC as put forward by Patrick Dokotri, except of
course, the "break up" of the Federation 291 . This political position in the
rhetoric of Dokotri however was very much the policy of the AG after the
UMBC-AG alliance, and its thrust to become a nation-wide party by winning
the political support of opposition groups in the East and the North. For
this purpose, the AG was prepared to rely not only upon its efficient
organization and ample finance:
-840-
"...but also upon a strong appeal to tribal
discontent among the minority peoples of the
Regions... (furthermore) the AG could point to
a record of social welfare policies in the
Western Region to back up its promise of 'Life
more abundant' the driving force behind its
appeal	 9the local level among the minority
tribes" '.
Although the appeal and support subsequently given to the UMBC was a boost
to the struggle for the creation of a M-Belt Region, it was also an
evocation of the cruder and more divisive elements of tribal politics which
was calculated to cause extreme distrust between the UMBC and the Regional
government in the North 293
. Patrick Dokotri, for example, highlighted this
resultant extreme distrust at result of AG ideas toward the NPC government
in the North, when he pointed out:
'...We (the IJMBC) will welcome Self-Government
only when a central state is carved out of the
present Northern Region and as long as the
rights of the minorities are at stake, we are
convinced that it will be impossible for the
sectional groups now agitating for the creation
of more states, particularly the central-state,
to be given	 sideration by those in power in
the Regions"
In other words, Dokotri was arguing that if the political demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region failed, there might be severe social-welfare
and economic reprisals on the leadership of the UMBC as well as on groups
and societies who gave their political support to the demands, as indeed it
eventually happened, among others, the Tiv people in the period between
1960 and 1965. In that period retributive measures in the distribution of
socio-economic and political benefits compounded the problems of the
underdevlopment of the M-Belt areas with modern infrastructure, relative to
the Islamic society in the North. In the M-Belt areas there was a
correlation between support for the NPC party in government in the North
with allocatebale resources which became directed to where the support was
gained, such that there existed enclaves of "developed" areas relative to
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other parts of the M-Belt. Soclo-economic and welfare infrastructure for
Benue Province, for example, was concentrated in Idonia Division where there
was strong support for the NPC when compare to Tiv Division where there was
solid UMBC support and some hostility toward the NPC government in the
North.
The 50Gb-economic and welfare deprivation as much as the political
grievances among the M-Belt people, held against the Islamic society and
leadership of the NPC part were at the heart of the matter in the demands
for the creation of a M-Belt Region re-invigorated in 1956 when Joseph
Tarka assumed leadership of the UMBC. There were also strong cases over
religious discrimination, particularly so over inequality before the laws
in Northern Nigeria in the application of Moslem Law. These issues however
were only the rudimentary aspects of the existing reality that contrasted
with what was basic in the Islamic society as against the M-Belt areas and
which crystallized into support for the UMBC-AG alliance in the appeal and
promise for adjustment for "Freedom for all and Life more abundant for us
in a Middle Belt State". In 1956 the socio-economic and political
grievances of the M-Belt people were well summarized by Moses Nyam Rwang
(elected Member into the NHA form Jos Division on the Plateau), when
explaining to the members of the NHA why there was a political need for the
creation of a M-Belt Region in the North:
"...the United Middle Belt Congress is
supporting the creation of a Middle Belt
Region... (because) the NPC, the party in power
asked for the division of Nigeria into three
regions at the London Conference in 1953...
They stated that they were afraid of Southern
(Nigerian) domination. We now say that we are
afraid of domination of our brothers by people
from the far North. Our purpose for (demanding)
a separate Region of the Middle Belt was
(because) the Northern Region was too vast...
the Middle Belt (as a result) has not been
greatly developed. There are no fine roads, no
electrical supply and there is no water
supply... in Jos the electric power and water
supply have not been provided for the
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indigenous people... They were provided because
of the tin in the area and Europeans residing
in the area... Makurdi is the headquaters of
Benue Province.., with no electrical supply in
the place... the women usually rise at about
four in the morning to get water from the
river. At Kabba you get a lorry once a week in
order to travel to other places. This is
because the roads are not good. In Ilorin in
1955 no amenities in the town. There is no
place to go and get water. In the town of
Ilorin, there is only one road that is tarred
and the width of that road is not more than
five feet. Now, I turn to education in the
Middle Belt. We have only one school and that
is Keffi Secondary School... One Trade Centre
at Bukuru... Another at Vom for training
Veterninary Officers; but in Zaria alone, there
are innumerable schools... established with the
funds of the Northern Region. There are about
ten schools in Zaria Province and about five in
Kano. These schools have not been set up with
Provincial funds but with Regional funds...
turning to health. We have no hospitals in the
Middle Belt... only one big hospital at Jos;
the one at Barkin Ladi was built for European
miners living in the area.., there is another
at Pankshin... Dispensaries in the area
(Shendam and Kafanchan) cannot be regarded as
hospitals... turning to the status of Chiefs in
the Middle Belt which is different fom the
status of Chiefs from the far North. In Yauri,
District Officers salute the Emir. In the
Middle Belt we find that the chiefs are not
respected by the District Officers. If a chief
is taking his meal the District Officer may
come and say he wants to see the chief and the
chief must leave his meal and go and see the
District Officer.., although he may be much
older than the District Officer, as well as
being a chief. When we examine the salaries of
the chiefs in the Middle Belt we find that many
of the chiefs, the taxes of whose areas are
many thousands of pounds, live without any
salaries and there are some places where
District Heads are only paid about thirty
shillings and as for that thirty shillings,
there are places where an ordinary (tin mining)
labourer would earn more than that. And that is
how the chiefs in the Middle Belt are being
treated while the chiefs in the other parts of
the region are given about $2,000 a year...
These are the reasons which have led us to set
up the political party known as the United
Middle Belt Congress and that is why we say we
shouglike a separate Region for ourselves
now "	'.
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This particular catalogue of socio-economic and political grievances as the
causes for the M-Belt Movements and its demands for the creation of a
M-Belt Region were strongly repudiated by NPC politicans and NPC surrogates
from the M-Belt areas in the NHA and these repudiations subsequently found
their way into the submission of the NPC government in the North in 1957.
In the instance, the NPC government made a careful break down of the
grievances in terms of the distribution of allocatable resources to show,
who was getting what and where government projects were located. These were
statistically manipulated to show that the M-Belt groups and societies were
getting more than a fair share of government resources in relation to the
concentration of the population in the area. Furthermore, the figures were
skewed through defining the M-Belt problem as existing in the whole area
comprising the geographical middle of the Nigeria Federation. However,
educational and medical expenditure grants to Christian Missionary
institutions in the M-Belt areas were disproportionate to those of any
other areas in the North. This was so because government gave these grants
from public funds for the purposes of assisting Christian Missionaries in
their social and welfare work and many primary and post-primary
institutions as well as Dispensaries, Maternity Clinic and Hospitals were
more concentrated in the M-Belt areas than in the Islamic areas. In the
period between 1952 and 1957, for example, Capital and Recurrent Grants for
medical and health services alone, given to Beriue (14.5%) and Plateau
(15.8%), totalled 29.3% for a population that was 14.0% of the North as
against 8.9% that went to Kano with a population that was 20.1% of the
total North 296 . The government in the North also exploited the inadequate
familiarity of knowledge on local circumstances of the members of the
Commission. The chariman, Sir Henry Willink had been a Minister in the
wartime British Cabinet and then became the Head of Magdalene College at
Cambridge University; Philip Mason, who wrote most of the report, was
Director of Race Relations Institute in London; of tJ remaining two
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members: One, Gordon Hadow had been in the Indian Civil Service and the
other, the only one with West African experience, J. B. Shearer had been
Deputy-Governor in Ghana (the former Gold-Coast) 297 . It was therefore
suggested to the Commission by the government in the North:
"Charges of discrimination in economic
development and the provision of social
services have been shown not merely to be
unfounded but generally the reverse of the
truth.., the question which the Regional
Government has to answer is not why these
suspicions exist but whether they have any
justification infact. In the material field the
charges of discrimination have been shown to be
completely baseless. Far from being less
developed, either in natural resources or
social services, the minority areas of the
Middle Belt have actually been much more
favourably treated than those of the Moslem
North. In staff, in grants, in institutions, in
communications, in virtually every branch of
official activity, the minorities have received
from the Regional Government not less but more
than due to them had the division been based on
population, derivation of reue or any
strictly material principle"
On the surface of the submission it would appear that government in the
North had made a judicious case of its M-Belt problem. Beneath the evidence
the government produced however the wrong indicators were used to measure
completely different phenomenum on different areas. On closer examination
of the "facts" on what was presented as the areas of the M-Belt problem as
against the areas claimed by the M-Belt movement (i.e. the UMBC) for the
proposed M-Belt Region, there is an obvious falsification in the analysis
of the evidence collated for the submission. The explanation to this will
become apparent in the next few pages below. In additon, the fact that
justice/injustice is a difficult concept to measure, particularly so in the
application of Islamic law in the nature of dispensing judgement and which
was unaccounted for in the submission of the NPC government and the issue
was played down as area of legal reform. Yet, this issue ambivalently held
by the NPC leadership and government in the North and which brought to the
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fore the religious anxieties of christians and non-Moslems among the M-Belt
groups and societies, particularly over discrimination that was rampant in
the 1950s at the grassroots in the application of Islamic law. Furthermore,
the government in the North in its submissions was particular on the
geographical definition of the M-Belt areas to avoid where the problems
existed, although it was aware that the problems of politics in some
Divisions in Ilorin and Kabba were on Yoruba irredentism and not a
political parcel of the M-Belt Region. Indeed, the government in the North
pointed out these differences in its problems with Yoruba irredentism and
the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region in its submission which it
argued against the merger of Ilorin Emirate and Kabba Division with the
Western Region. Curiously, however, the government in the North went ahead
to include Ilorin and Kabba in the break down of statistical material on
the allocation of deriveable resources as those of the M-Belt people. The
submission of the government in the North further compounded the issues on
the M-Belt Region before the Commission on Minorities by suggesting that
the government of the East might also want a revision of boundaries such
that the Tiv, Idoma, Igala and Jukun will be included in the Eastern Region
of Nigeria 299 . The problem with the submission however was that the
government of the North fallaciously defined the socio-political and
cultural areas of the M-Belt groups and societies in the demand for the
M-Belt Region:
"...to comprise the whole of Ilorin, Kabba,
Benue and Plateau Provinces, the southern parts
of Bauchi and Zaria Provinces, the whole of
Niger Province except for the area north of
Kontagora and the whole of Numan Division of
Adamawa together with the Districts of Muri and
Wurkum in.e same Division of the same
Province'
Apparently, this was also the area defined by the UMBC and claimed for
inclusion in the proposed M-Belt Region at the London Constitutional
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Conference in the period between May and June, 19573O1 While explanatory
reasons have been suggested on why Ilorin and Kabba was not part of the
M-Belt problem and was therefore outside the Conception of the M-Belt
Region, Niger Province is also outside this conception, because it formed
part of "the Northern System" with the Nupe tribe who were Moslems and
developed a centralized Islamic kingdom in political authority and was
subsequently tied to Sokoto in religious authority and political power
before the British creation of the North in i9003°2.
When Ilorin, Kabba and Niger Provinces are removed from the
tabulations and statistical break-downs of the Memorandum of the government
in the North to the Commission on Minorities on the distribution of
benefits to the M-Belt areas, a glaring picture of deprivation emerges on
the non-Islamic people that were centered on Numan Division, Muri Division
- north of the river Gongola, S. Bauchi, S. Zaria and in particular on the
core M-Belt people in Plateau and Benue Provinces. An analytical list of
suggested indicators derived from the Memorandum of the Northern government
and the explanatory reasons given by Moses Nyani Rwang as the causes for the
demands of the UMBC in the NI-IA have been used to produce the statistical
figures in Table 4j-.l. These stand as measures of socio-economic and
political deprivations of the M-Belt areas relative to the Islamic society
in the North. These indicators also examine justification for the rhetoric
of the M-Belt movement on their situation of discrimination and deprivation
which caused underdevelopment and therefore the demands for the creation of
a M-Belt Region, separated from the Islamic society where development as
equal partners in the Nigerian Federation might take place. The years
between 1952 and 1960 are particularly chosen for illustrative purposes in
Table Li. •Z because: of the census data of 1952, the M-Belt motion of 1956,
the London Constitutional Conference in 1957 where the issue of the M-Belt
Region was raised, the critical alliance of the UMBC with the AG in 1957
and the inquiry and findings of the Commission on Minorities in 1958 and
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the concommitant extensive mobilization of the M-Belt people on support for
the UMBC before the Commission in 1958, an appeal for political support
which centered on socio-economic and political grievances of discrimination
and deprivation as well as the Issue of of the creation of the M-Belt
Region which combined all the above in the campaigns of the 1959 elections.
The year 1965 is included in the analysis of Table L .Z to indicate the
state of deprivation in the grievances of the M-Belt Movement before the
military intervention in 1966 which led to the creation of BP state, an
approximate fulfillment of the M-Belt Region.
The statistical figures in Table 4-•Z indicate that there was unequal
representation in government, in the distribution of social welfare
amenities and some economic infrastructure among the groups and societies
in the North, which produced aggrieved feelings among the non-Islamic
communities of the M-Belt areas when their situation is compared to the
concentration of amenities in the Islamic areas. Although more people were
concentrated in the Islamic society in the North the disproportionate
concentration of government resources in the development of Ilorin and
Kabba, when compared to the M-Belt areas with more people suggests that
political policy rather than rational policy determined the distribution
and allocation of resources by the NPC government in the North. It is
possible therefore to suggest from the patterns of figures in Table 14.2..
that the NPC government in the North gave attention to allocate resources
to Kabba and Ilorin in order to stem down the tide of Yoruba irredentism, a
more severe political problem threatening the maintainance of the Northern
Identity than the threat of the creation of an 1 alternative Northern
Identity" in a M-Belt Region. In other words, the M-Belt areas might well
have been sacrificed in the allocation and distribution of resources in the
North, because of that political interest, a situation which only served to
increase the vigour of demand for the creation of the M-Belt Region
separated from the political and religious control of Islamic leadership.
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This explanation does not however take away the exigency of political
support enjoyed by the NPC party and government in the North from certain
elements in Ilorin and Kabba. Indeed the NPC enjoyed more electoral support
from those areas than it did the M-Belt areas, particularly from the Igalla
and Igbirra tribal unions who exhibited intra-tribal electoral competition
and each tribe that won joined the NPC party and were rewarded by being
represented in government to produce some christain elements in the
executive council of the North. In all other aspects of representation in
government in the North, however, there was a disproportionate
concentration of Moslems to Christians. Furthermore, while Moslems could
represent christians in the NHA from among the core of some of the M-Belt
groups and societies, Table L-..l suggests a significant absence in christian
representation of Moslems in the central Islamic areas of religious
authority like Sokoto, Katsina, Kano and Borno. However, the table also
shows that as lately as 1957 and 1965 Christian Missionary Bodies, remained
as the sole agents of development in the M-Belt areas by their provision of
social and welfare institutions. Furthermore, as lately as 1965, Industrial
development in the North was concentrated in the Islamic Society, mainly in
Kano and Kaduna, with only two established industries by the government in
the whole of the M-Belt areas located in Jos in Plateau Province and these
produced grammaphone records and ply-wood furniture material 303 . There was
therefore an obvious premise for the M-Belt people to fell alienated and
neglected in social and economic development which were initiated by
government in the North, given the contrasting evidence in the North in
TableL . a as against what was produced in the submission to the Minorities
Commission. Indeed, it was the Yoruba irredentist areas in the North that
got far more than their fair share of allocateable resources from the
government, since they only had 6.9 of the total population of the North,
contributed about 4.7% deriveable government revenue in 1956 and got more
in terms of representation in government, distributed social amenities and
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economic infrastructure when compared to the M-Belt people with 18.8% of
the total population in the North and contributing about 25.% of the
revenue of the government in the North.
After 1956 therefore the issues that were raised by the UMBC party in
both the NHA and the FUR focussed on deprivation in social welfare,
economic and political grievances which were interpreted as a policy of
discrimination on the minorities in the North who were mostly non-Moslems
in a region where the government was controlled and dominated by Islamic
leadership. The emphasis on social welfare and economic issues after 1956
was also characterized by a shift in de-emphasizing religious grievances in
the M-Belt movement which became relegated to the background of issues
raised in the causes for the creation of a M-Belt Region. It was against
the background of these political developments within the UMBC that Ibrahim
Imam tabled the motion on the creation of the M-Belt Region:
"In order to be in keeping with the principle
of federation and to maintain a smoother
administration in the Northern Region; be it
resolved, that the creation of a Middle Belt
Region, comprising Niger, Ilorin, Kabba, Benue
and Plateau Provinces, with parts of Southern
Adamawa and Zaria be placed on the	 nda for
the 1956 Constitutional Conference"
As it is explicit in the Motion, there was no direct demand for the
creation of a M-Belt Region, although the Motion was vigorously and
emotionally debated as if the Region was demanded instantly305.
Furthermore, before the debate, Ibrahim Imam, on his own, desparately
sought to withdraw the Motion because:
"it may have a sort of adverse effect on the
Constitqona1 Conference to be held in
London" U
A Parliamentary regulations, however, was enforced, whereby the Motion had
to be debated and NPC members in the NUA opposed the Motion with atirade of
personal attacks and exposition which were directed, not only on Ibrahim
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Imam but on all persons associated in one way or the other to the UMBC and
the previous M-Belt movements, including Pastor David Lot, who at that time
was a member of the Government Bench 307 •
 As it is indicated by the figures
in Table 11.3) the voting pattern defeating the Motion was not a surprise
since it was strongly opposed and that, with other considerations dictated
the votes of many members who were indigneous to the M-Belt areas. Rather
curious, however, the Motion was particularly opposed by Pastor David Lot
who saw it as mischievous, frivolous and a political plot:
"by certain unscrupulous political renegrades
who wished to exploit the iination of the
people in the M-Belt areas"
Lot further argued to suggest that the Motion was not related to the
socio-economic and political forces that were dictating the demands for the
separation of the M-Belt people for constitution into a M-Belt Region in
the North, such as: religious affiliations and discriminatory deprivation,
which according to him had become secondary and absolute in the unity of
the M-Be1t309 . More fundamental, however, Pastor David Lot opposed the
Motion because as leader of the M-Belt Movement, Imarn had devised the
Motion without a proper mandate from either the UMBC or the people of the
M-Belt areas:
"and as the accredited representative of the
people in the House... my people are not ready
for a separate region at present. We shall
continue to work under the present
constitutional arrangements... until it becomes
necessary to have a region of our own and when
the time comes we shall not wait for a Kanuri
man to force us into it. We shall make the
Motion ourselves.., we sub6ibe to the common
maxim 'Unity in Diversity'
Surprisingly, while haif-heartedly supporting Ibrahim Imam, Patrick Fom,
similar to Pastor Lot, accused Imarn of raising the Motion without a mandate
and without adequate consultation with all the UMBC officials. The only
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strong support for the Motion came from Moses Nyam Rwang. It is not clear
who sponsored the Motion through Ibrahim Imam or as he was in 1956, acting
independently on the Northern political arena with no party political
identity. Although Imam seemed to have been on his own, he obviously was at
that time under the influence of the AG and that of J. S. Tarka in context
of the specific AG interests of building up alliances with opposition
forces in the North. Patrick Fom succinctly summarizes the political effort
of Imam on the M-Belt issue by analogizing him to the familiar Biblical
story as a man who:
"sympathises with the people of the Middle
Belt. The people of the Middle Belt are just
like a man who saw his brother lying in the
road without giving help... Ibrahim Imarn,
though not from the M-Belt is giving help to
that brother who is lying down... he did3t on
the terms of 'Charity to your neigbour'"
Table 4.1 on the votes on the Motion for the creation of a M-Belt
Region shows rather contradictory voting patterns by the majority of
members from the M-Belt areas in the NHA, despite the existing UMBC
influences in 1956. Almost all the members indigenous to the ft-Belt areas,
except for Moses Nyam Rwang, either voted against the Motion or abstained.
Perhaps the biggest contradiction came firstly from S. 0. James who
abstained312
 He was a Yoruba, chosen as the special christian member in
the NHA from the Plateau, representing christian communities from Southern
Nigeria and who had strongly contributed to activating the social and
political forces, particularly the christian religious identity, which led
to the initial organization of the M-Belt Movement - the NML, before 1950.
Secondly, Pastor David Lot, who was the first President of the NML and the
MZL and who in 1952 had demanded the creation of a Middle Zone Region
before 1956, not only opposed the Motion in the debates, but voted against
the creation of the M-Belt Region. A number of reasons explaining the
voting patterns in Table 4.3 therefore suggest themselves. The Idoma
Table 4.3
The Vote in 1956 in the NFIA on the Motion for
the Creation of a M-Belt Region in the North.
Area in	 Political	 Religious	 Votes on the Motion	 Total
the North	 Identity	 Identity	 Yes	 No	 Abst.
Islamic	 NPC
Areas	 NEPLJ	 Moslems	 1	 32	 1	 34
Independ.
IJMBC	 Moslem
Xtian	 5
Benue	 NPC	 Moslems	 2	 10
Xtian	 3
Others	 Mosi ems!
Xh an
UMBC	 Moslems
Xtian	 1	 3	 1
Plateau	 NPC	 Moslems	 1	 11
Xtian	 1
Others	 Moslems!
	
1	 3
Xhan
Adawawa:	 tJMBC	 Moslems
Numan &	 Xtian	 1
Muri -
	 NPC	 Moslems	 1	 2
NR	 Xtian
Others	 Moslems!
Xhan
IJMBC	 Moslems
Xhan
S. Bauchi	 NPC	 Moslems	 2	 3
Xhan
Others	 Moslems!
	
1
Xhan
UMBC	 Moslems
Xtian	 3
S. Zaria	 NPC	 Moslems	 3
Xhan
Others	 Moslems!
Xhan
Yoruba	 ITP/AG	 Moslems	 1
Irredentist	 Xtian	 2
Areas:	 NPC	 Moslems	 4	 12
Ilorin &	 Xtian	 4
Kabba	 Others	 Moslems!
	
1
Xhan
Moslems	 1	 46	 1	 48
Total Votes	 Xtian	 1	 22	 4	 27
Total	 2	 68	 5	 75
Sources: Northern Regional Legislatue, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th
March, 1956 p222-224; Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the
Government of the Northern Region, Kaduna, 1957 p72.
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members, for example, who were voted into the NI-IA on the tickets of the
IHRU, joined the NPC party and therefore voted in line with the NPC policy
of "One North". Furthermore there were a number of Moslems in the NI-IA, as
representatives of some of the M-Belt people on the Plateau and in the
northern parts of Benue Province who voted in line with a party that
identified with the Islamic religious identity in the Northern Identity and
were against the creation of a M-Belt Region where christians and
non-Moslems might be dominant. More fundamental however, although there
were UMBC members in the NHA, party identification was still affected by
the factional tendencies and the leadership tussle was still unresolved
such that they could not vote in support of the Motion. Indeed, it was not
until after May, 1956 that party political identity began to permeate
popular consciousness in both the representatives and mass following of the
tJMBC organization when J. S. Tarka became President of the movement,
particularly so for the liv people. In other words, unlike in previous
organizations of the M-Belt movement, when J. S. Tarka took over the
leadership of the UMBC party, social and political support was also party
political identification, a goal that was achieved through party control of
membership and political mobilization. The vote on the Motion in 1956 was
also not reflective of the religious affiliations of the members from the
M-Belt areas, just as it did not show party political identification. For
the majority of members in the NI-IA, it was solidly pro-North in political
identity, which cut across party and religious identification. Ibrahim Imam
(Moslem and BYM) and Moses Nyam Rwang (Christian and UMBC), the only two
members of the NI-IA to vote in support of the Motion had to a large extent,
fallen out with the Northern establishment and with their local party as
their political base of support in the Constituencies. Moses Nyam Rwang,
for example, lost the Decemeber 1956 Regional elections to Bitrus Rwang
Pam, both of whom contested with the IJMBC party political label and
identity. The 1956 vote on the M-Belt Motion however was about the last
-853-
political effort beyond rhetorics in the NHA on the demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region, except for the threat by Isaac Shaahu a Tiv
member in the NHA in 1965 suggesting that since liv Division was
increasingly being rejected in Northern Nigeria the Tiv might secede from
the Region and the Nigerian Federation as a whole, to declare an
Independent Republic of Tiv land 313 . The members of the UMBC party who
gained entry into the NHA after the election of J. S. Tarka as President of
the UMBC in May 1956 and after the Regional elections in December 1956,
however, maintained an effective opposition front in the Assembly in the
North, remained critical of NPC policy on the M-Belt Region and constanly
re-echoed the soclo-economic and political grievances on the deprivations
of the M-Belt areas34 . The issue of the creation of a M-Belt Region in the
period between 1956 and 1965 was characterized by a shift in the emphasis
of the political arena from the Northern House of Assembly (NI-IA) to the
Federal House of Representative (FHR), where J. S. Tarka, Patick Dokotri
and Jonah Assadugu within the AG policy, sought the subdivision of the
Nigerian Federation and produced political pressures in alliance with other
Nigerian minorities agitators outside the North at Constitutional
Conferences in London, Lagos and Ibadan.
After his election as President of the UMBC and leader of the M-Belt
movement, however, Joseph Tarka appears to have gone to see the
President-General of the NCNC party, Nnamdi Azikiwe in Enugu, in search for
assistance in building up a Middle Belt political party 315 . Azikiwe however
referred him to his lieutenants and Tarka made no progress with them, so he
went to Ibadan, also seeking and obtaining financial assistance from chief
Awolowo and the AG, a political interest that the AG had been anxious to
achieve since 1952, when it made effort to penetrate Tiv politics through
Isaac Kpum and had him as paid AG secretary for Tiv Division 316 . That J. S.
Tarka went to Enugu and Ibadan rather than to Kaduna in solicitating for
political support on an issue that affected the subdivison of the North in
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the Nigerian Federation created bitterness with the Islamic and NPC
leadership in Kaduna and this developed beyond political differences with
disquieting proportions until 1966. After that period Joseph Tarka was seen
to be an enemy of the North, particularly so when he was also the leader of
a political organization with anti-Islamic religious sentiments.
Furthermore, the NPC party leadership itself had wished that the leaders of
the M-Belt Movement go to them for consultations. It was a recurrent
political assumption of the NPC leadership to wish to listen to the
"complains" of the political movements in the M-Belt areas and to assure
them of help317
. In January, 1957, the newly elected executive of the UMBC,
convened a conference at Lafia to ratify the alliance that had resulted
from the efforts of J. S. Tarka who had gone out of the Region to search
for assistance from the AG318 . The meeting at Lafia, also experienced the
political reprimand of Bello Ijumu and Moses Nyam Rwang who previously had
entered into negotiations of the alliance with the AG on behalf of the UMBC
without authorization. Subsequently however both men were brought into the
political activities of the alliance: Bello Ijumu, who had favoured an
alliance with the AG was assigned as the UMBC-AG Organizing-Secretary for
Kabba Province, while Moses Nyam Rwang who favoured an alliance with the
NCNC also became Organizing-Secretary of the alliance for Jos Divison in
1959318. Before the 1959 elections however Nyam Rwang joined the NPC along
with Bitrus Rwang Pam, a new entrant into the UMBC from the MZL leadership
after the 1956 elections 320 . This re-alignment of the Birom political
leadership, significantly excluded Patick Dokotri and the re-alignment was
a direct response to the pressures from the government in the North on the
chieftancy of Jos in which the Hausa migrant population came up with the
issue again to be resolved before Independence 321 . The move by some of the
Birom leadership to take sides with the Northern establishment was
therefore to safeguard the chieftancy of Jos under the British appointed
Rwang Pam and a political strategy to make it a dynasty of that family from
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the Birom village of Du where the Rwang Pam family as well as Moses Nyarn
Rwang came from. The NPC was itself very keen to do this and Bitrus Rwang
Pam, the son to the Chief of Jos, saw the advantages of this and towed the
NPC line, a political approach to the chieftancy issue in Birom politics
that was opposed by Patick Dokotri. This rift in Birom politics affected
political support of the tribe, for the UMBC party and the for the creation
of a M-Belt Region, political issues that were contested at electoral
levels in the 1959 elections322.
However, by the decisive political reprimand of non-committed members
of the UMBC movement, who had a record of changing their political
identities, like Bello Ijumu and Moses Nyarn Rwang, the newly elected
executive, under the leadership of J. S. Tarka were able to keep the
organization on a steadier political cause after 1956 on the struggle for
the creation of a M-Belt Region. This was within the agreed provision of
the Lafia meeting in January 1957 which suggested that alliances were a
prerogative of the executive to negotiate with any party within and outside
the North323 . Any dissenters and revionists to the ideas of the movement on
a negotiated alliance were free to go their political path. On 6th March
1957, a formal accord was signed between the AG and the UMBC and was
announced in October of the same year and it was also agreed that party
publicity material was to be produced in the joint name of the Alliance and
that the Palm Tree, popular among the Yoruba and the Tiv was to be the
symbol of the alliance, to enhance the identification of the party with
illiterate voters. After the accord therefore the Alliance produced
Membership Cards with the Motto: Freedom for all; Life more abundant; For
us a Middle Belt State324 . The provisions of the accord, were further
ratified at the Minna Conference of both the AG and the UMBC parties in May
1958, in which the strategies for political mobilization and the fielding
of candidates for the 1959 elections were discussed as issues following
from a previous outlined document (in English and Hausa) on the political
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meaning of the Alliance that was produced in February, 1958325. The UMBC-AG
alliance met again in Jos in September 1958, mainly in response to the
outcome of the London Constitutional Conference on the Report and
reinstated its commitment for the creation of a M-Belt Region, albeit other
Minorities Regions that were being demanded at that time, COR and MWS:
"to ensure that the minority ethnic groups in
the country do not continue to live in awful
dread of their majority ethnic neighbours as
they do at present... and where the minority
ethnic groups (will) enjoy equality of status
and human respect vis-a-vis the majority groups
and where there is freedom for all and life
more abundant irrespective of religion326
political beliefs and social standing"
Although the UMBC became a formal political party in Nigerian politics
after May 1956 with the election of Joseph Tarka as President, party
organization was not structured until late in 1958327. By this time the
party was committed to campaigning for electoral support in alliance with
the AG party, all over the M-Belt areas and also in support of the AG over
the rest of the North and after the AG found it possible to generously
provide the UMBC with financial aid 328 . It was, however, not merely a
question of committed financial expenditure and money that produced
political support for the alliance from the UMBC. The AG party politically
desired the creation of a M-Belt Region. Furthermore, it was also the
readiness of the AG party and leadership to provide organization personnel
and material equipment which was complemented by financial commitments that
combined to produce the capacity for mass politicization of the non-Islamic
people in the M-Belt areas through the UMBC and the leadership of Joseph
Tarka. Indeed, the AG was not covert in its willingness to disburse
resources for the alliance and for the political activities of the UMBC:
-857-
"The reason for this was the fact that the UMBC
was a local party which was being opposed by
the powerful NPC party that ruled the North.
The only course open to the IJMBC was to form an
alliance with a national party that had
sympathy with it in its aspirations. That
national party happened to be the Action Group
of Nigeria.... because of the political
experience and resources of the Action Group,
the organization of the AG/UMBC Alliance
throughout the Middle Belt area is assure; and
the chances of fut
	 election victories are
greatly increased"
The alliance subsequently contested the 1959 elections and won twenty five
seats in the M-Belt areas 330 . In the conduct of its political activities in
the period between 1956 and 1958 and subsequently on political mobilization
for the 1959 elections the AG disbursed over $50,000 to the UMBC party as
organizational expenses in the M-Belt areas 331 , spent $100,000 on behalf of
the UMBC-AG alliance in the 1961 Regional elections, its expenditure on the
UMBC in 1961 alone was over $20,000332. It was partly because of dimishing
financial returns from the AG after 1961 that the alliance grew cold feet
and caused the UMBC to realign itself with the NEPU to form the NPF in 1963
for the 1964 general elections. The NPF alliance, however, was not the only
instance in which the UMBC aligned itself with fellow opposition parties in
the North. In 1956, for example, there was close association in friendship
between Ibrahim Iniam and Joseph Tarka At that time Imam had broken his
political ties with the NPC despite his pro-Northern rhetoric at the London
Conference and the earlier 'Eight Point Programme' of the NPC which had
been submitted in his name 333 . Furthermore, when in 1956, he tabled the
Motion on the M-Belt Region in the NHA, that polticial act, distanced him
from the Northern establishment and brought him closer to the tJMBC and AG
leadership. The climax of this political development was that in June 1958,
Imam and the BYM severed political relations with the NEPU-NCNC parties,
previously supporting him in his political rummage and entered into a new
pact with the AG-tJMBC organization in the North. Among the reasons given by
Imam and the BYM leadership for the re-alignment were:
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"The alleged intent of the NCNC to effect an
alliance with the NPC (which subsequently
proved to be correct), the failure of the NCNC
to assist minority elements in the North during
the presence in Nigeria of the Commission of
Inquiry into Minority fears, alleged in order
to appease the NPC, and the unequivocal support
of thetion Group for the creation of a Bornu
State"'
Furthermore, Ibrahim Imam, himself, had grown ambitious and did not feel he
was getting enough independent political support from his association with
the NCNC through the NEPU. Ibrahim Imam did not feel he could fill-up a
position in NEPU and NCNC, equal to his status as a former
General-Secretary of the NPC and the Grand-Patron of BYM, the Kanuri tribal
union movement 335
, In particular, he needed money and was unable to get
this directly from the NCNC, the ally of NEPU 336 . This political support
from BYM and the UMBC for the AG party caused sufficient anxiety for the
NPC government in the North to react inorder to contain the demands for the
political division of the North in the policies of the AG, particularly the
issue of the creation of a M-Belt Region.
Political reactions, by the NPC party and government in the North to
stem down the tide of increased political activities and and support for
the ideas of the M-Belt movement and demands for the creation of a M-Belt
Region predates the setting up of a Commission •that was appointed in 1957
to inquire into the fears of Minorities in Nigeria and the means of
allaying them. The pattern of political reaction in the period between 1950
and 1965 was conditioned by conceptions of the North as 'a Nation within
the Nigerian Nation' with a district socio-religious and political identity
and a political system of its own such that a contesting identity as that
of the M-Belt was not tolerable. This political conception of the North
however did not emerge in the 1950s. Evidence of the historical evolution
of the North within the Nigerian Federation before 1950 suggest that
British officials set a precedent in the conception of the North as a
distinct political entity. As lately as 1955, however, when there was
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already organized political demand by the MZL and the emerging UMBC party
for the creation of a separate Region from the Islamic Society in the
North, Bryan Sharwood_Smith, the Governor still impressed on elected
members of the NHA: "the Northern ship of state is now on course... and
gathering speed" 337
 In the specific context to preserve the Region as a
single political unit, the NPC leadership constantly initiated conciliatory
and extremely friendly efforts to compromise the interests of "One North"
with political organizations in the M-Belt areas who sought seperation338.
In 1951 the MZL attracted sufficent political attention of the NPC
leadership in the North and they organized a meeting between the Sardauna
and the executive of the MZL at Gindiri. In that meeting:
"The NPC leadership and the Sardauna, wanted to
hear what worried christians in the North and
how the aims of the new Christian organization
(the MZL), differed from Northern
	 erest
which were articulated by the NPC"
The subsequent tempo of political development in the North and Nigeria in
general precluded further contact political meetings between the two groups
as was agreed upon in Gindiri. However, political identities in the shape
of specific interests, in the 'Far North' - which was Islamic and the
M-Belt areas - which was non-Islamic and increasingly christianized,
crystallized and polarized political group formations into their
geo-political areas. While the MZL in that instance became preoccupied with
the articulation of the interests of Christian cornunties as well as those
of non-Islamic communities in the M-Belt areas, the NPC was occupied with
the overall interests of the North on the Nigerian political arena, with
the centre of political gravity increasingly shifting to the Islamic
society. The political means of containing the M-Belt movement and its
demands for the subdivision of the North, therefore, took on an
institutional form whereby, Commissions were appointed (Hudson in 1956 and
Willink in 1957) and patron-client mechanism became used in the practice of
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politics to manipulate out some of the M-Belt politicians in the UMBC. The
M-Belt movement was therefore subjected to institutional political control
and depended in many respects to political parties that were in power or
closer to the corridors of power either at the Regional levels or
nationally. There were also political efforts to coopt some leadership of
the M-Belt movement into the NPC party. Pastor David Lot, for example,
experienced these tendencies when he was given a government job in the
North and included as a Northerner in the NPC delegation to constitutional
conferences that were going on at the time.
These initial political reactions to the M-Belt problem by the NPC
government in the North were not very successful. Although inclusion into
NPC delegations and government in the North meant participation in the main
stream of political development in the North and Nigeria, some of the
M-Belt leadership continued to function with dual political roles and
identities. While they were Northerners in the NPC delegations and
government in the North, they remained politically active at local levels
in the cause of the M-Belt movements. In the period between 1952 and 1956,
for example, the MZL party continued to preoccupy itself with mobilizing
political support exclusively from Christians and non-Moslems, over
elections (1952, 1954 and 1956) and activating anti-Islamic as well as
anti-migrant Hausa sentiments on the local population among some of the
M-Belt people. This was the case, despite the existence of its factional
tendencies and the participation of some of its leadership in the NPC
government in the North. As a direct result of these political activities
local protests erupted in some areas of the M-Belt, which indicated the
extent of achieved mobilization on the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt
Region and which activated local political feelings that created a
political mood of disaffection toward Moslems and migrant Hausa people
involved in local political affairs. These developments happened in the
period between 1952 and 1956 and with such spontaneity that the government
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of British administration and the NPC party in the North increasingly found
difficult to ignore340 . In Adaniawa, for example, support for the ideas of
the M-Belt movement was so overzealously expressed that it produced the
first martyrs of the M-Belt movement during the Wurkuni riots of 13th July
1954341. The causes of the Wurkum riots centered on anti-Fulani campaigns
and protests. These were organized by the Wurkurn Tribal Union (WTU), which
was politically affiliated to the MZL party. The WTU consisted of over 800
exclusively christian male members and had SUM Christian Regligious
Instructors, teachers and other employees as officials of the organized
village branches of the union. The protest campaigns were activated by
resentment to the appointment of a Fulani District Head and his chosen
associate village heads. The protests were also over resentment at some
traditional religious practices, which found expression in mocking the
"Dodo" processions (a traditional invocation of ancestoral spirits of
elders who were dead, as a symbol of authority), refused to pay tax to the
Fulani District Head who insisted that his villages heads perform the
ritual and also other socio-economic and political issues touching on
religious sentiments that surfaced during the campaigns for the 1954
elections which the administration termed: "the spreaching of false rumours
about the elections" 342
. The WTU increased its protests on these issues and
over the newly appointed Fulani District Head in particular, by
intimidating the Tax Scribes and effectively excluded them from visiting
certain villages in the cause of tax collection. On occasions when the Tax
Scribes ventured to those areas, their papers and ink were seized by
members of the WTU. At a meeting of the Eniir, the DO with about 500 members
of the WTU to resolves the issues and tensions:
"the crowd became out of hand and openly
hostile when it was proposed that the new
District Head be given a trial.., three shots
were fired at the knees of the ringleaders,
causing 3 casualties, one of whom died later.
The intensity of the fighting can be judged by
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the fact that the rioters.., evacuated their
three casualties and continued fighting against
baton charges... 49 of the ringleaders (a
regretably high proportion being Sudan United
Mission evangelists and teachers) were
sentenced by the Magistrate Grade I to terms of
Imprisonment up to 4 years; 342 others pleaded
quilty before the District Court on ciit and
recieved fines ranging from 5s to 30s"
In 1954 in S. Zaria and in particular in the Kagoro NA areas, where the SIM
concentrated its socio-religious and welfare activities and institution,
the MZL sufficiently mobilized christians and non-Moslems communities, that
it brought the NA council to a head - on collusion course with the
government of British administration in Kaduna and the Emir of Zaria
through its surrogate Emir in Jernaa. Using a crisis that had developed from
1951 and which was ressurected, the tribal council was influenced by
leaders of the MZL and demanded the transfer of Kagoro NA to Plateau
Province, a demand which was carried further by a threat to withhold tax
payment unless this was done344 . A violent situation was averted in the
same year, when Kagoro NA was merged with others in Southern Zaria where
non-Islamic communities existed and were in the majority and transferred to
Plateau Province as Jemaa Federation Native Authority. In 1954, in dos
township areas, there were riots and clashes between, on the one hand, the
Birom and the Hausa over the chieftancy of dos and the Hausa - Fulani
instigation of the Rukuba tribe, whose substantial members were Moslems to
break-away from the dos NA and on the other hand, Birom and Hausa joined
their grievances and clashed with the Ibos, over the allocation of plots in
the metropolis and market stalls in the dos main market345.
Initially, the government in the North and the political leadership of
the NPC party did not interpret these developments in relation to the
political activities of the M-Belt movement, in its phase as the MZL and
the mobilized sentiments in the demands for the creation of a Region in the
North, which will separate a Moslem majority, from christians and
non-Islamic communities, as well as a wish to dismantle the whole structure
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of Hausa-Fulani and Islamic rulership which affected most severely the
"pagans" in the M-Belt areas. British residents in the Provinces where
Christians and "pagan" majorities existed in the population and where
anxieties were most accute from the apprehension of Self-Government in the
North - that is, the withdrawal of British protection and administration -
would mean the domination and ill-treatment at the hands of Moslem
leadership, explained away violent political trends in the M-Belt areas as
"little events " invigorated:
"by pagan, educated youngmen from Christian Missionary
institutions, who do not want to pay respect to their chiefs or pay
taxes to their Fulani overlords.., and these youngmen have little
support among the bulk of the local populace... gen the speed
with which the situations returned to normality"
In certain instances at the institutional level, the government of British
administration and the NPC leadership in the North, dismissed demands for
the creation of a M-Belt Region and the Ilorin-Kabba merger with the
Western Region of Nigeria, as rumours. In 1950, for example, the government
told the Emirs in the NHC that the demand to organize the Provinces of
Kabba, Ilorin, Benue and Plateau into a separate Region in the North "was
an incorrect rumour" 347 , In the period between 1950 and 1956, however, the
chiefs of the North continued to press for explanations on how the
government was reacting and containing the demands of the M-Belt movement
and the more religious and politically sensitive issue of the boundary
dispute between the North and the Western Region of Nigeria, until in
December, 1956, when on their own account, they flared up a debate on the
issue. This outburst was when it had become apparent that a Motion on the
M-Belt Region had been made in the NHA and with increased AG political
activities in the Ilorin and Kabba areas they were apprehensive as to
whether the Yoruba populated divisions in the North might go to the Western
Region. When there was a debate on Yoruba irredentisin in Northern Nigeria
there were unequivocal conclusions on the issue suggesting that:
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"Ilorin was part of Northern Region before the
coming of the British... The chiefs would never
agree to let an inch of Ilorin to be cut off
and merged with the West. Let whoever wants
that come out openly and lay his gauntlet. The
causes that made Ilorin a part of the North are
still there, nothing has changed... any group
of people who do not like to remain can pack up
and leave.., not an inch of the land itself
will go anywhere else... Land is not usually
taken away from people by mere talk. Land is
taken away by force and not by talk... every
chief in the whole Region is prepared to help
in the ev	 of any trouble as we use to do in
old days"
V. The Hudson Report in the North and the Willink Commission on Minorities
Fears in Nigeria.
In 1955,	 largely from the increased tensions caused by the
political growth and development of the M-Belt Movements and the
articulation of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region with the
increasing involvement of the AG in Kabba and Ilorin as well as with the
MBSP, there were propositions for Provincialization in the North. The
propositions suggested the reallocation of some powers of the Regional
government to the Provinces and the ideas of the propositions were strongly
supported by the Premier of the North Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of
Sokoto349 . The idea seemed at that time, among top government officials to
be one way to reassure the Northern Minorities and thereby cut the ground
out from under threatening separatist organizations of the non-Islamic
M-Belt people350 . The conception of Provincialization was however
tantamount to a proposal to create a Federal System, in one Region, within
the Nigerian Federation and the plan was enthusiastically referred to
within official circles in Kaduna as "the twelve pillars policy" 351 . In
1956, R. S. Hudson of the colonial office in London was assigned to draw up
detailed proposals for Provincialization in the North; the submissions
subsequently became known as the Hudson Report 352 . In 1957, the government
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in the North hurried the Provincialization scheeme, to give aboost to its
political image on showing concern and commitment in solving the M-Belt
problem, because demands were going to be made on the creation of a M-Belt
Region in the North and the issue debated 353 . At the conference, the
delegates representing the North publicly committed themselves to
Constitute Provincial Administration in each of the Northern Provinces and
requested that the Constitution be amended to allow for implimentation354.
The Constitutional Conference of May to June 1957 in London, as well as,
the Commission on Minorities which the conference set up in September 1957
were apprised of the work of Hudson	 The Hudson Report therefore
influences the decision of the Commission on Minorities not to recommend
the creation of a M-Belt Region or any other alternative form of greater
authority for the M-Belt areas in the North, when compared to its treatment
of minorities issues in the East and the Western Regions of Nigeria. Two
months after the Commission on Minorities produced it Report, the
government in the North shelved the ideas in the propositions by the Hudson
Report and explained to the Resumed Conference in London:
"the Northern Government had not so far found
it possible to establish Provincial
Administration in the form for which pe5ssive
provision was made in the Constitution"
After 1957, the ideas of creating Provincial Administrations along the
lines laid down in the Hudson Report were dropped and the Report itself was
filed and shelved, but kept resurfacing each time there were political
pressures to break-up the North into more Federal Units. Significantly in
the months of the Nigerian crisis following from the January 1966 coup and
leading to the political events that caused the creation of states in May
1967, the Hudson Report was again brought out for reconsideration and
implimentation by both politicans and top government officials in Kaduna,
although General Yakubu Gowon had made it clear that more states were going
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to be created as Federal unitis within the Nigerian Federation 357 . The fate
of the Hudson Report was therefore to a very large extent, a function of
the political strategy of government in the North over the M-Belt problem.
The government held out Provincialization as a counter to the separatist,
but once the crisis represented by the investigations of the Commission on
Minorities and other related pressures on the M-Belt movement, like the
delay of independence for the creation of more states had subsided, the
government in the North found it convenient to withdraw implementing the
proposals in the Hudson Report 358 . The government and the NPC party in the
North found converts, from among the leadership of the M-Belt Movement, to
the ideas in the proposals and some who believed that the Hudson
recommendations were an alternative to the creation of a M-Belt Region.
Pastor David Lot in 1956 for example, argued against the creation of a
M-Belt Region:
"Since it is the policy of the Government to
give almost complete autonomy to the Provinces.
This will give each Province an opportunity to
look after its own interests and progress at
its own speed. Until this new idea is tried,
the creatio 5 f a new Region at present is
unnecessary	 ".
The Hudson Report and its recommendation were strongly rejected by the
M-Belt politicans in the LJMBC and the AG parties and subsequently the
findings and recommendations of the Commission on Minorities eclipsed its
political objectives.
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In November, 1957, for example, southern Nigerian based intellectuals
associated with the AG and Chief Awolowo, pointed out that the political
scheme of provincialization was:
"an integral part of local Government and
therefore the creations of the Regional
Governments, which has a right to make and
unmake them. They (the Provincial Authorities)
cannot provide the psychological satisfaction
which autonomous units will give those
Northerners who advocate more states. It may
merely help to establish a situation which is
superficially stable, but within which there is
latent discontent, thus generating pathogical
tensions which corrode the body politic"
The Committee also argued against the demands for the creation of a M-Belt
Region/State, albeit the MWS and COR state: because it will merely separate
out the minority groups from the major ethnic ones and advocated that the
existing Provinces in Nigeria were the most conducive long term solutions
to the minority problems361.
However, the institutional political efforts by the government of
British administration and the NPC party in The North, which were
influenced from London, Lagos and Kaduna and which were meant to stem down
the tide in the growth and development of political support for the M-Belt
movement, were nowhere more expressive than in •the appointment and
subsequent report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the fears of
minorities and the means of allaying them as well as in the submission from
the NPC government in The North to the Commission under the chairmanship of
Sir Henry Willink362 . The recommendations of the Commission on Minorities,
just like the propositions of the Hudson Report were perhaps the most overt
political manifestation of institutional response and initiative by both
British and NPC leaders to do something on the M-Belt problem or at least
demonstrate that something else could be done, rather than the creation of
a M-Belt Region in The North, while at the same time maintaining a posture
of no commitment on changing the status quo over conceptions of The North
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as a single political unit of the Nigerian Federation.
The Commission was appointed by the British government through Alan
Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the colonies in September, 1957 and
consisted of Henry Willink (Chairman), Gordon Hadow, Philip Mason and J.B.
Shearer as members 363 . It arrived in Nigeria on the 23rd November, 1957,
and between that date and 12th April, 1958, it held public settings and had
private meetings and discussions in each Region, in Lagos and in the
Southern Cameroons with representati tons of governments, political
organizations and individuals representative of specific interests 364 . The
terms of reference of the Commission included:
"To ascertain the facts about the fears of
minorities in any part of Nigeria and to
propose means of allaying those fears whether
well or ill founded. To advice what safeguards
should be included for this purpose in the
constitution of Nigeria. If, but only if, no
other solution seems to the Commission to meet
the case, then as a last resort to make
detailed recommendations for the creation of
one or more new states and in that case: to
specify the precise area to be included in such
state or states; to recommend the Governmental
and administrative structure most appropriate
for it; to assess whether any state recommended
would be viable from an economic and
administrative point of view and what the
effect of its creation would be on the Region
or Regions from which it would be created and
on the Federation. To report its findings and
recommendatio,to the Secretary of State for
the colonies"	 .
In the period between November 1957 and April 1958, the UMBC and specific
individuals, organizations and tribal unions associated with its interests
from among the M-Belt groups and societies appeared and made representation
before the Commission, arguing for the creation of a M-Belt Region and in
certain instances, against the creation of a M-Belt Region 366 . The
Commission submitted its report and findings on 30th July, 1958.
It was however against the background knowledge of the intended visit
and tours of the Commission on Minorities to centres like Kaduna, Zaria,
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Jos, Bauchi, Makurdi, Yola and Kafanchan, among other centres in The North,
that the UMBC executive decided to organize their own tours too, to effect
more political mobilization of the whole of the M-Belt groups and
societies, as well as, other non-Islamic communities in The North.
Furthermore, the tours of the UMBC Executive in 1957, were also meant to
create awareness and political support for the issues to be raised before
the Commission, on the socio-economic and political grievances of the
M-Belt areas and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Although
all the executive members of the UMBC movement were involved in the process
of mobilization, the tours of the whole M-Blet areas were done by Joseph
Tarka (President of the UMBC) and Patrict Dokotri (the Secretary-General of
the UMBC), largely using initially allocated funds from the tJMBC-AG
alliance. In the period between November, 1957 and April, 1958, Joseph
Tarka and Patrict Dokotri, travelled extensively in the M-Belt areas and in
particular visited influential chiefs in the area, like the Tor Tiv, the
Bwong Gwom Jos, the Ochi Idorna, as well as other non-Islamic chiefs in
Pankshin, Shendarn, Bauchi, Wukari and Numan areas, to persuade them to
support the ideas for the creation of a M-Belt Region before the Minorities
Commission. During the tours by Tarka and Dokotri, there were also numerous
public rallies in the urban and semi-urban centres of the M-Belt areas.
Apart from the increased political consciousness which these tours created
on the purposes of the Commission on Minorities, from the rallies and the
consultations with chiefs and community leaders, there was also an element
of cementing the unity of the M-Belt groups and societies. Government in
The North and the NPC party were alarmed by the achieved political
mobilization in support of the ideas of the M-Belt movement and its demands
for the creation of a M-Belt Region and pro-statu quo forces organized
opposition from within the indigenes of the M-Belt areas to testify against
the creation of a M-Belt Region which the Commission admitted to suggest
that: "one witness expressed the view succinctly in the statement that he
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preferred the Fulani because they were further away", rather than be in a
state which the Tiv would be the dominant element 367 . The Commission
however, discovered that strong political support existed:
"In Plateau Province, the Birom are strongly in
favour ... In Southern Bauchi we heard of
support for the proposed state from the Jarawa
District; in Adamawa support appeared to be
practically confined to the Numan Division.
Benue Province ... from its total population of
1468000, 765000 are Tiv, a tribe who are
generally in favour of the state and indeed
share with the Birom the distinction of leading
the movement ... The seven Southern districts
of Zaria ... usually ruled by Fulani District
Heads have never been completely absorbed into
the Northern system, which they regard with
some fear and aprenhension; this areas is a
stronghold of the M-Belt movement ... Thus if
the whole long and sprawling area which is
included in the proposals for the Middle Belt
area is considered, we believe that support
would be strong in Jos Division ... the Tiv
area, the Numari Division of Adamawa, in
Southern Zaria and in Pankshin West. Opinion is
divided in the Laf QDivision, Akwanga and
Lowland Divisions	 'j.
Soclo-religious and political support for the creation of a M-Belt Region
before the Commission was explained by frictions between the Biroms and the
immigrants from other tribes who had come into Jos, a town that developed
rapidly as a result of the tin mines; in Adarnawa, because of traditional
resistance to Fulani conquest and independent outlook from the Fulani
group; in Benue, among the Tiv by distinction of leading the movement and
their size; and in Southern Zaria, because of Fulani District Heads and the
failure to accept absorption into the Northern System 369 . Opposition to the
creation of a M-Belt Region was explained by non-indigenous anxieties over
the emergence of Birom influence and domination over local affairs in Jos
and indigenous as well as non-indigenous anxieties over the Tiv as a
dominating element in the anticipated new region. The Commission however,
also noted the sprawling nature of the Region claimed by the M-Belt
movement, the fear of Moslem religious and political intolerance and was in
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the view of the Commission that they were externally induced by European
Christian Missionaries and political and social interests outside Northern
Region 370 . The Commission however, suggested an identifiable total of about
seventy two "fears and grievances" that were brought before it by M-Belt
representative and other special interests in the causes of the creation of
a M-Belt Region and representatives of Christian Missionary Bodies, who
were concerned over constitutional safe-guards on basic human rights,
liberties and freedom371.
An analysis of these "fears and grievances", demonstrate the social
and political identity which dominated the uniform concern in the
representation from among the M-Belt groups and societies in the demand for
the creation of a M-Belt Region. Furthermore, by examining the Report of
the Commission, it is possible to categorize nine different types of fears
and grievances, which were at the root of the polarized socio-religious
identities on political dissent in the unity of The North and the tensions
between the Islamic society and the non-Islamic M-Belt groups and
societies372 . The nine fears and grievances centred on a swing back toward
Islamic conservatism and the autocratic rule of Emirs to religious
intolerance with concommitant negative consequences on how far they might
be able to influence the distribution of socio-econo,nic, welfare and
political benefits to their areas. As they are carefully sub-headed in the
Report of the Commission, the nine fears and grievances included: issues on
traditional rulers, socio-ethnic discrimination on persons outside the
Northern System in the Northern Public Service Commission, uncertainty over
repression on Christians and non-Moslems upon British departure, lack of
political influences/powerlessness because of numerical size, NA
appointments at the local levels of administration, neglect in development
and the allocation of resources to increase wealth and the conduct of
foreign policy in favour of the dominant religion in The North rather than
the national interests of Nigeria 373 . Under these general categories,a
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number of specific complains are also identifiable in the Report of the
Commission which give a total of one hundred and twenty five indicators of
fears and grievances. A further examination reveal that a rough estimate of
about 72 (57.6%) of the fears and grievances analyzed by the Commission
directly affected the M-Belt areas of Benue, Plateau, S.Zaria, S.Bauchi and
Numan; 36 (28.8%) affected the non M-Belt areas of Kabba, Ilorin and parts
of Niger Province; and 17 (13.6%) affected the Islamic society itself, as
particularly was the case with issues raised by NEPU and BYM and these
centered on personal freedoms and liberties, which were problems of
politics that were also shared and shown in support of the UMBC party in
the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region 374 . Table 4. k further
breaks down the nine categorized fears and grievances suggested by the
Report on the frequency of a number of specific indicators, to produce the
total of seventy two that affected non-Islamic groups and societies in
Nurnan, S. Bauchi, Plateau, Benue and S. Zaria; For example, this is based
from a category like social fears and grievances on tribal discrimination,
in which case the indicators counted might be: contemptous expressions in
calling non-Islamic persons names, rejection to the observance of Purdah,
prohibition of alcoholic consumption, refusal to eat with non-Moslems
etc375 . Table 4.t. therefore suggests a number of conclusions: Contrary to
the emphasis of the government in the North, in its submission to the
Commission on Minorities on issues of discriminatory deprivation in social
and economic infrasturcture and welfare benefits as a major grievance of
the M-Belt movement and which it went into great pains and details to
disprove, the critical grievances of the non-Islamic people centered on
Moslem law and religious intolerance, which affected everyday existence.
This does not, however, mean that there was equitable distribiution of
socio-economic and welfare infrastructure for evenly increasing wealth
among all the groups and societies in the North; as illustrated by the
figures in Table 4.2.. Indeed, Bryan Sharwood-Smith, one of the Governors of
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Fears and Grievances of the M-Belt groups and societies
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fears of minorities and the means of allaying them, London, 1958, p57 -
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the North that served for a long period of time admitted for example, that
despite increased prosperity in the Region as a result of the great things
the Sardauna did, the Tiv did not benefit much 376 . Table	 also suggests
that by the very nature of fears and grievances the Commission
acknowledged, the M-Belt groups and societies testified with political
claims of a Chirstian and non-Islamic religious identity. The frequency of
their complaints all touched on M-Belt antipathies toward Islam,
institutions of society which were associated with Islam and Islamic
attitudes and and practices. Indeed, the only female person to give
evidence in support of demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region,
Elizabeth Ivase, suggests that she was as much a representative of Tiv
women as she was of Chirstianity and Christian women in general against the
fear of Moslem rule in the North with practices of Purdah which inhibited
the educational development of women and young girls 377 . Elizabeth Ivase
testified before the commission when she was still at Sacred Hearts College
at Kaduna and she was also General-Secretary of the Tlv Christian Women
Association 378 . She very much impressed the members of the Commission by
her Knowledgeable arguements on the M-Belt problems in the North, far
exceeding the Yoruba lawyers who had been expensively sent from Ibadan in
defence of the M-Belt movement 379 . However, although she had a strong
political identity of the UMBC party and its demands for the creation of a
M-Belt Region through Isaac Kpum, she did not independently appear before
the Commission without the political influences of Joseph Tarka as well as
those of her teacher, Isaac Kpum, who encouraged and sponsored her380.
Altough there is abundant evidence both in the Report and outside it,
to suggest a genuine need for the separation of the M-Belt groups and
societies from the Islamic society in the North, to constitute another unit
of the Nigerian Federation the recommendations of the Commission strongly
suggested the preservation of the British created unit of the North within
the Nigerian Federation. Rather contradictory to the strong historical
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perspective that was taken as the reasons for the maintainance of the
socio-religious and political unity of the North, the Commission endorsed
the arguements of the government which suggested that the M-Belt people
were very functional entities to the Islamic society:
"The North would be seriously affected by its
loss. Many from the M-Belt area were in service
in the rest of the Region, and might on the one
hand, be reluctant to leave their present
service, while on the other they would leave
the rump of the North without experienced
officials.., we require strong evidence of
popular support for a separate state to make it
worthy of consideration... the UMB 8 o not
indicate very settled convictions"
Although the Commission used these arguements, which were largely presented
by the NPC party and the government in the North, to dismiss the demand for
the creation of the M-Belt Region, it was this seeming cultural division of
labour in which the non-Islamic M-Belt people occupied subordinate
functional roles, mainly in the professional classes, rather than in policy
administration and political decision making roles, that there was
resentment on and bitterness which conditioned the demands for separation
and constitution into a M-Belt Region. The circumstance were particularly
seen to have ramification on when and who gets what and why, in he equation
of distributing and allocating deriveable socio-economic and welfare
benefits from the government of the day. Indeed, Table 4.8 shows, that the
senior top posts in the public service of the North went to persons from
the core of the Islamic society and this was compounded by the fact than
many of the chiefs from the M-Belt areas, were second class in status and
were not Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri-Nupe, whose chiefs were predominantly first
class in status in the NHC. Futhermore, the first class chiefs were
concentrated in the Islamic groups and societies that made up the Northern
System382.
In anycase, using a number of arguments that reinforced the British
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government opposition to fragmentation of the existing Federal arrangements
of three regional units in general and yet with one, outsized in territory,
population, plurality and with a unique religious cleavage between Moslems
and non-Moslems - Christians and pagans, which territorially polarized the
North, the Commission on Minorities put forward alternatives that excluded
the creation of a M-Belt Region. These arguments revolved on the earlier
British government propostions that suggested it would not consider the
creation of more than one new state and that the Regions had to be big to
be viable:
"the United Kingdom Government would have to
take into account the effect of the
establishedment of any such new states on the
existing Regions in the Federation and on the
Federation as a whole
(and) would also have to be satisfied by
the Commission that any such new state would be
viable from both the economic and
administrative points of view, since it was the
view of the United Kingdom Government that
administrative and other practical reasons
would inevitably limit most severely the
possiblity of further sub-division of Nigeria
into states modelled on the present Regional
system... while the creation of even one more
state in any Region would create an
administrative problem of the first order, the
creation of more than one such state in any
Region could	 at present be
contemplated"
This became the official British government position and political attitude
to the issue of state creation in Nigeria and particularly directed to the
Commission on Minorities, even when it was the case that the Secretary of
State acknowledged that: the discussions about the creation of new states
had led to expressions of fear that went beyond normal political
differences384.
Subsequently in its Report in July, 1958, the Commission on Minorities
endorsed an already existing posture of the British government on the issue
of the creation of more states and the doubts about the sizes of the states
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and the potential to be viable as units in relation to the already existing
and established units and pointed out:
some years ago, before the relations between
the Federation and the Regions had
crystallized, it was possible to conceive a
larger number of states with smaller powers,
but a new state created today would have to
compete with the existing Regions and the
cost... would be hi9h. This consideration, when
combined with the difficulty of finding a clean
boundary, was i 8gach particular case to our
minds decisive"
A major conclusion of the Commission was that while there remained a body
of genuine fears, the creation of separate states would not provide a
remedy for the fears expressed. The Commission placed in the forefront of
its recommendation to meet this situation suggestions of comprehensive
provisions in the Constitution concerning human rights and the maintainance
of a single Police Force for the whole of Nigeria, with arrangements to
enable the Regional Governments participate in the management of the
Force386 . The Secretary of State for the colonies, further pegged down the
chances for the creation of States in Nigeria by argueing that since
delegates to the Constitutional Conference were one in pressing for a grant
of independence in 1960, the additional request for the creation of more
units of the Federation was not compatible:
"If the United Kingdom were asked after the
elections next year by majority opinion in
Nigeria to provide for the creation of new
states forthwith, he could not regard it as
consonant with his responsiblities to transfer
power in 1960 while small new Governments,
lacking experience, trained staff and a proper
framework of administration were yet
established. Furthermore, according to the
Minorities Commission, the case for new states
was weakest in the Northern Region... it was
unlikely that such a demand would make possible
the creation of a coherent new state in any
area of the North which could hope to stand
with full Regional status. If therefore new
states were created in the southern part of
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Nigeria alone, this would bring about still
greateer imbalance in the Federation, with an
overwhelmingly powerful North fac 	 four or
five smaller states in the South
In the circumstances, the Secretary of State to the colonies, Alan
Lennox-Boyd, left the Nigerian delegates with two choices:
" on the one hand to abandon the request for
independence in 1960 and instead to put the
question of new states to the test at the next
election or at a series of plebiscites next
year; on the other hand to accept that if there
was to be early independence, no new states
could be created either now or as a result of
next year's elections, so that the present
structure of the Federation would continue in
existence at least until aft 3the strains of
independence had been taken"
The representatives of the interests of the Nigerian minorities movements
were so disappointed by these developments that they could only make a
recorded political regret. However, all these different stands on the
political controvercy on the issue of the creation of more states in
Nigeria reinforced the arguments of the government of British
administration and the NPC party in the North, against the creation of the
M-Belt Region as it is clearly suggested in the submission it made to the
Minorities Commission when it stated:
"The Northern Region as it is today is the
product of geography, history and the character
of its people. Geography has combined in these
latitudes to produce a people who, though in
many ways diverse, are nevertheless capable of
unity, and history, long before the advent of
the British, has been busy with the process of
unification... For generations Kanuri have been
spreading all over the Fulani Empire. More
recently, Fulani herdsmen have moved with their
cattle into the J05 and Mambilla Plateau.., in
every corner of the Region, the Hausa tongue
unobtrusively advances its frontiers.., in
outlook, in interests, in values, in culture,
in modes of life, there is much more to
identify than to distinguish the people of the
North... it is during the last decade, with the
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introduction of representative Legislatures and
the creation of a Regional Government, that the
growth of this new spirit has been most
spectacular. In a continent whose curse has
been fragmentation, unity is a precious
quality, not to be lightly tampered with. The
overwhelming majority of the people are
vehemently opposed to the creation of a new
Region or any revision of Regional boundaries.
The Regional Government shares their
feelings.., takes its stand unequivocally upon
the contention that fragmentation and boundary
revision are justified neither by history, nor
by ethnology, nor by any past record of
oppression and discrimination, nor by the
wishes of any substantial parts of the
population, nor by any combination of these
factors whatsoever.., the solution to the
problem of Minorities must be found by
entrenching safeguards for them in the
Constitution and above all by cultivating in
every part of Nigeria the spirit of liberty,
tolerance and respect for law which alone, in
the long run, can quarantee the rights of the
weak against the strong:
"Every kingdom divided against itself is
brought to desolation; a 3 5use divided
against a house falleth"
In dismissing the prospects for the creation of the M-Belt Region, on top
of the arguments in opposition to political fragmentation, the Commission
pointed out that the area in demand was long and sprawling and would be
difficult to practically administer 391 . The Commission accepted and
predicted that at Independence the sincerity in the views of the NPC
government in the North on political and religious tolerance would be sound
because of the conviction in the growth of importance of the Nigerian
Federation, with Regional bases of political unity, which were bound to
occur after Independence. The political circumstances of the Federal
balance of power were, for example, going to reinforce the ideals of
tolerance expressed by the NPC party and accepted by the Commission since
the NPC political interests would be to obtain every seat they could get in
the Regional and National Legislatures. It was argued that this political
strategy was unlikely to be effective with the alienation of outlying areas
to the dominant Islamic society in the North. Furthermore, the Commission
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believed that the political strategy of winning the votes of the minorities
constituted a better safeguard for the position of the minorities rather
than the creation of a separate M-Belt Region 392 . In the subsequent
practice of politics after the Report of the Commission on Minorities,
however, the majority groups in each of the Nigierian Regions infact found
it easier to coerce their minorities into political support rather than to
canvass for their votes and to conciliate them. In 1962, Ahmadu Bello, the
Sardauna of Sokoto who was Premier in the North described the Commission on
Minorities as the most embarrasing body of investigation set up by the
British government that ever visited the North:
"This wandered round the country listening to
scores upon scores of people who thought their
area should be carved out of the Region...
claiming they did not get a fair deal from the
party in power in the Region. There were three
groups which made the most noise.., the third
was the group advocating the so-called
'Middle-Belt' - along slice of the country
running along both sides of the Rivers Niger
and Benue, with an extension to cover the
Plateau and Southern Zaria... there was nothing
to show that the various people making up this
group would agree amongst each other, if they
found themselves involved in a new Region: it
would be only further fragmentation soon after
such an arrangement had been made... further,
the people of the area had much greater
advantage than the people of the four extreme
Northern Provinces: in schools, in hospitals,
in roads and other amenities the riverirte
people were well ahead of the semi-desert
people and having the greater proportion of
educated people, the numbers of their men and
women who are in Government Service now is
greatly in excess of those from other areas:
this means that in a few years, they will
inevitably hold positions in this Region... I
am forced to the conclusion that there is
nothing in it beyond the personal
aggrandisement of its leaders and a desire to
embrass us. It is abundantly clear that the
whole movement is inspired by our political
opponents, who are doing their utmost to
destroy the Northern Region and so reduce its
membership in the House of Representatives. It
must never be forgotten that almost the whole
of the Region as it is today and a great deal
outside it, was ruled by my
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great_great_grandfather s s family through their
lieutenatns or by the great Shehus of Bornu:
the only important exception is the Tiv area
South of the Benue River... The Commission
agreed that the North should be left as it was.
They did not accept the proposals put forward
to constitute a Middle Belt Region and were
against any interference with out boundaries...
since then (1958) the whole agitation has died
away into a few infraquent ramblings on the
horizons of the Tiv Division 3 d the Birom
Country on the High Plateau"
In many respects the demands of the M-Belt movement for a M-Belt Region
were a rejection of the political conceptions of the North as an
inheritance from dan Fodio. The M-Belt politicians also resented the
historical recollections and reminders of the colonial expansion of the
Islamic society in the period of dan Fodio and after which were constant in
the statements of the Sardauna. In terms of the Western European
modernization sectors, which the Sardarna also made reference to, it is
clear that he was alarmed by the educational development of the non-Islamic
groups in the North, particularly those in the M-Belt areas, and its
relationship to jobs in government. The potential of reverse domination of
the jobs in government with ramifications on the allocation of scarce
resources on the Islamic society by the M-Belt groups in the future years
because of their monoply of education was therefore foreseen and had to be
checked by political instruments which Islamic leadership controlled. The
demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region were therefore also caused by
the anxieties over their rapid modernization and educational development
which was checked by the Sardauna. However, as J. P. Mackintosh suggests,
it is quite apparent, from the statements of the Secretary to the Colonies
over the issue of the subdivision of the North in particular and Nigeria in
general during the 1957 and the subsequent resumed constitutional
Conference in 1958 and also in the report of the Commission on Minorities
and the submission of the government in the North, the British were
interested in the group that took over control of political power in the
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North as well as over all of Nigieria and as such were equally playing
politics in Nigerian politics with the political groups in the North, as
much as the major organized political group (the NPC) itself was involved
in manoevering its political advantage and manipulating political opponents
in southern Nigeria in order to maintain the political unity of the North
to dominate the Nigerian political arena 394. The need and strong desire for
the creation of more states/regions in Nigeria and in particular in the
North were reduced by the stonger nationalist sentiments to first achieve
Independence and then to hope to resolve the political issue of state
creation. In 1958, the two delegates that represented the M-Belt areas in
the AG delegation, were persuaded by Mallam Aminu Kano and others who
suggested that the issue of state creation could be resolved and sorted out
upon the achievement of independence since it was an internal domestic
matter395 . Arninu Kano, like most of the other political interests at the
conference as well as the interests of the government of British
administration in the North, initially considered that political solutions
to the separatist tendencies of the M-Belt groups and socieites were better
in constitutional safeguards that removed fears and grievances. Removing a
fear by Constitutional safeguards, statements of policy and promises of
sincere implementation in the contex of practical reality was, however, not
the same thing as removing a socio-religious and political identity which
was in the very nature of the problem of the M-Belt groups and societies
and what the M-Belt movement was all about.
As early as in 1954 and in the particular period between 1956 and
1960, however, Regional interests dominated and dictated the political
strategy of the NPC party and the government of British administration in
the North and this took precedence over the national considerations of
Nigeria. This was the political policy that the NPC subsequently followed
until 1966 and the policy conditioned non-interference in the matters of
other Regions on an equal basis of autonomy, as if it were a distinct
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country on its own, just as it abhored other regions interfering in "things
Northern", political relationships and interaction within one country which
James O'Connel described as "international relations without
safeguards" 396 . The NPC at that time, was a collection of Northern notables
predominantly from the Islamic society, satisfied with the establishment in
the North and ready to maintain the status quo and was rigourously
protective of itself from southern Nigerian domination 397 . it was this
group and the interests behind it, that seven out of nine TIv members in
the NHA initially joined in politics before 1956398. The political position
of the NPC party is more properly understood and explained by the
conception of Federalism in Nigeria of both the NPC leadership, which was
Islamic and the government of British administration in the North and this
centered on the political efforts meant to preserve a specific identity,
whose roots were shaped by the Fulani Empire and was glorified by its
successes of political incorporation of the majority of groups and
societies in Nigieran politics, rather than pure electoral advantages of
the North which quaranteed democratic domination. To achieve these ends,
the NPC party and government in the North responded by reforms, to remove
some of the grievances and fears that were echoed by the M-Belt
politicians, before Northern Self-Government and the Federal elections of
1959. This was particularly so for the much dreaded aspects of Muslim law
and its application on which some of the non-Islamic M-Belt people were
most affected and over which Christian religious bodies expressed the
greatest anxieties399 . Previously, there existed instances of
discrimination and injustice, which Christians and non-Moslems feared it
might continue after the British handed over political control to the NPC
party whose political leadership was predominantly Islamic. The scales were
therefore more weighted in favour of Muslims and against those of any other
faith in the North. For instance:
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"The testimony of a male Muslim is held to
carry more weight than that of a Christian or a
pagan of any woman, whatever her faith. To
Muslims, their law was a familiar thing, to
non-Muslims it was unknown and therefore to be
feared.., but direct interference with Muslim
law by persons of anoth5faith... was an
attack on Islam itself"	 .
Furthermore, under Muslim criminal law, there were a number of distinctions
drawn between Muslims, Christians and non-Muslims:
"In case of murder (where the most extreme
provocation is irrelevant), the penalty awarded
depends upon whether the relatives of the
victim demand the killer's life, require blood
money, or choose to let him go. But the
relative of a pagan can never demand the life
of a Muslim killer and can demand only
one-fifteenth of the blood money that would be
due had a Muslim been killed. The status of
Christia 1 is half-way between pagans and
Muslims" '.
The reforms were effected as a direct consequence of development from the
recommendations of the Commission on Minorities and the increased tide of
the UMBC party in highlighting on-going religious intolerance and
discrimination in the application of the law in the North, in the FHR in
Lagos 402 . The modernizing reforms, however, were implemented after a Panel
of Jurists had made investigations and reported to government in the North,
in the period between 28th August and September 10th, 1958 and were clearly
meant to repudiate the allegations of the UMBC and to stem down its tide of
political and religious support in the cause of the demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region in the North. Furthermore, a criminal code was
introduced to replace Muslim criminal law as a procedural code to replace
Islamic criminal procedure. These reforms were personally handled by T. H.
Marshall, who was a Q.C. and Attorney-General in the North and J. N. 0.
Anderson, a Professor of Oriental Law and Director of the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies in the University of London403.
The effect of the reforms in the tripartite legal system that existed
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in the North was that it loosened support for the UMBC party, among
non-Islamic communities that were on the edges of Islam ans where Christian
communities were not strong. Previously, non-Muslims identified vigorously
with the M-Belt movement when the UMBC made Islamic law and its
application, an issue showing discrimination and injustice on non-Islamic
people in the North. The decline of support for the UMBC party because of
the legal reforms showed up significantly in the share of votes for the
UMBC-AG alliance in Adamawa, S. Bauchi and some parts of Plateau where
there was a high percentage concentration of Muslims in the population.
However, the general decline of support for the UMBC party before the 1959
elections was apparent, among other areas, in Muri areas north of the river
Gongola, Wukari, Nassarawa Eggon, Keffi, Jema'a Federation, Wamba, Wase,
Kanam, Mangu and also with the Fyem people around Gindiri. Political and
religious opposition by some of the leaders of the M-Belt movement toward
the NPC party and government in the North on the issue of Muslim Law and
its application also became less vigourous. As a result the ground was
prepared for some of the UMBC leaders on the Plateau and in S. Zaria, to
identify with government and the NPC party in the North as political
clients:
"Since things were changing for the comon-man,
particularly for people at the grassroots
level, who were most affected by Muslim law and
its application, an issue that had served as
direct evidence on the M-Belt groups and
socieities as premises of inequality before the
law with discrimination and injustice which
produced causes for the demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region, 5arated form the
Islamic society in the North"
The reforms in the North were institutionalized just before 1959 when the
Penal Code Law was substituted for the unjust aspects in the application of
Muslim and Customary law and by 1961 it became applicable in the Alkali and
Native Courts405 However, the introduction of the Penal Code was 'a
-885-
straw_man a
 because in 1958, Muslim Law in the North ceased to be repressive
on a significant majority of the non-Muslim population. It was only in a
few instances that there existed friction which brought Christians and
non-Muslims into direct confrontation with Moslems which were contested in
the Courts. These were mainly in the rural areas where the British legal
system and supervision was distant and therefore made the Native Courts
stronger.
The demands of the M-Belt groups and societies in the M-Belt Movement
for the creation of a M-Belt Region were however further dismissed by the
Commission on Minorities because it felt that Regions in the Nigerian
Federation had to have socially and politically meaningful sentiments,
attached to the territorial unit and not simply just a matter of viablity
in resources if they were to survive in the system and contribute to
nation-building in Nigeria. The Commission therefore emphasized regionalism
of the North, that had the built-in sentiments of an Islamic
socio-religious and Hausa linquistic identity, which was generally accepted
as the political identity of the North. To give a boost to this argument it
was emphasized that the M-Belt areas consisted of disparate "pagan-tribes",
constantly quarelling among themselves with no common sentiment that binds
them together because the groups were always jealous and hated each other
and therefore there would be no common factor to cement unity in the M-Belt
Region as a political identity. By argueing that sentiments ought to exist
in a Region of a Federation in order for the unit to hold together, the
Commission endorsed the argument In the submission by government in the
North which had underlined its position by references to the sentimental
attachment of the Sardauna and leadership in the Islamic Society - to the
historically recollected experiences of political incorporation processes
that took place before the British creation of the North in the period of
the Hausa Kings, the Jukun (Kwararafa) Empire and more significantly the
Fulani ruled Islamic Empire of dan Fodio and the Kingdom of Bornu with a
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proud scholarship in Islamic culture and identity and an abhorance to
westernized culture of the South of Nigeria which was increasingly gripping
the M-Belt groups and societies 406 . Behind the refusal to recommend the
creation of a M-Belt Region in 1958 was also the fact that members of the
Commission on minorities were influenced by notions of Federal Systems and
Federalism in British experiences outside West Africa. These centered on
conceptions of Federations with big units in the system and the ideas were
dominant in the movement of political thought among high British officials
in London in the 1950s. The members of the Commission therefore had a
background knowledge of the political efforts to establish and maintain the
central African Federations and there was political interest to apply the
scheme to Northern Nigeria along with other units in Nigeria 407 . The
insistance of the Commission to maintain the North as a single unit is
therefore also explained by the intervening influences of these thought
patterns. In many respects, it is this image of the "big-Regions" as
Federal units in Nigeria, rather brilliantly maintained by Lord Alan Boyd
that had the consequence of a persisting definition of an amophous area
claimed by the M-Belt Movement as the M-Belt Region which was used to
defeat the claims of the tJMBC by both the NPC government in the North and
the Commission on Minorities. Furthermore these notions left behind a
psychology of 'big-Regions' as prestigious units of the Nigerian
Federation, which never really departed from the minds of some M-Belt
politicians like Joseph Tarka. In the creation of BP state, for example,
which excluded alot of strong supporters of the M-Belt Region, Joseph Tarka
anticipated that groups in S. Zaria, S. Bauchi, some parts of Kabba with
the Igalla and the Numan areas will agitate for inclusion into the BP state
for a more reflective M-Belt Region to emerge408 . As much as this can be
interpreted as a political drive to enclose the supporters of the M-Belt
Movement excluded from the creation of BP state, with the assumed
concomitant advantage of electoral support, it can equally be seen within
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the general conception of the big-Region influences and images of Nigerian
politics of the period between 1952 and 1967. However, the emphasis by Lord
Alan Boyd that the Nigerian Federation had to have big units to be viable
and to sustain themselves was fallacious in the light of subsequent
political developments in Nigeria in 1967 and 1976 when there was
subdivision of the big units and smaller Regions/States emerged and had and
still have sentimental attachments to their existing boundaries.
The Commission on Minorities however was explicitly anti-M-Belt on a
number of indicators. On a comparative basis to its handling of other
Nigerian minorities demands for the creation of separate Regions from
dominant "tribes" closest to them in southern Nigeria, for example, there
were pseudo-Regional devolutionary proposals recommended for minorities in
the Western Region and Eastern Regions for the restablishrnent of "Special
Development Areas 1' with no such recommendations for the M-Belt groups and
societies in the North, despite the stonger social and religious emotions
expressed on the creation of the M-Belt Region. Its skepticism over
political support for the creation of a M-Belt Region might well have been
disproved in a referundurn as was the case with that of the Mid-West in 1963
where there was almost total electoral support for a separate region from
Western Nigeria. In 1958, particularly after Joseph Tarka and Patrick
Dokotri had completed their tours to mobilize political support on the
issues to be presented before the Commission on Minorities and after the
report had been submitted there was positive popular consciousness on the
creation of a M-Belt Region in all of the M-Belt areas. However, the
Commission, generally underestimated the strength of separatist sentiments
in the population at the grassroots of the areas where the movements
operated. In the particular instance of the M-Belt groups and societies,
political sentiments were greatly concealled, partly because of the rampant
use of repressive methods through the NA system and becuase of assumptions
that overt political expressions of M-Belt sentiments might make worse, the
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already existing conditions of deprivation in the distribution of amenities
and benefits from the government of the day. In other words, political
leadership among the M-Belt groups and societies in the M-Belt movement was
caught up in the contradictory circumstances in which they demand
separation from the existing government in the North and at the same time
looked-up to that government and demanded for the allocation of the scarce
resources of society. There was an apparent lack of allocatebale scarce
resources among the M-Belt groups and societies, where the political
leadership and followers combined in the electoral processes to show
opposition to the NPC party, government in the North and political clients
in the particular society. The Tiv, for example, when compared to the Idoma
in Beriue, were among the most deprived groups and societies in the M-Belt
areas, as were the Montol to the Ankwei in Lowland Division on the Plateau.
After the 1959 elections and by 1961, the political cohesion the
M-Belt groups and societies had achieved through the M-Belt Movements in
the decade of its political activity, particularly in its phase as the UMBC
under the leadership of Joseph Tarka it was destablized by the NPC through
the successful building of patron-client relationships and its operational
mechanisms on the politics of the North. Although patron-client
relationships were strongly detested by some of the M-Belt groups and
societies, particularly of the Tiv people it worked to the benefit of the
NPC in Numan, S. Zaria and Plateau areas where the M-Belt Movement arouse,
and had its greatest success among the Idoma and Igalla. These intruding
strategies in the handling of the M-Belt movement in the 1960s weakened the
political organization, an institutional approach to the problem that had
been set by the Commission on Minorities. This, it had done by carefully
treating and reducing the movement into a pressure group that was in search
of reforms of existing fears and grievances rather than as a political
party with a specific objective and mobilizing an almost nationalistic
identity to contest the nation-hood of Northern Nigeria within the Nigerian
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Federation. This revisionist tendency of the Commission on Minorities in
Nigeria did not take into account the changes in the political growth and
development within the movement itself as a political party, particularly
after 1956 and thus in 1958 it dismissed the UMBC on the issue of the
M-Belt Region as having inadequately settled convictions on the creation of
another Federal Unit of Nigeria in the North. The Commission in very subtle
ways ended up emphasizing the effects of political events outside the
conceptions of the movement and its demands for a M-Belt Region. The UMBC
was however a political party with a definite organizational structure and
objective which it mobilized support for and was an independent cause of
some of its own successes, particularly when there was effective political
direction and leadership under Joseph Tarka who combined political
pressure, style and rhetoric in the mobilization of the followership that
went far beyond the demands for reforms in the North. Before 1960 effective
mobilization of the M-Belt groups and societies in the demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region caused changes in the conduct of government
affairs and politics of the NPC party in the North. There was for example
means of discovering the problems of M-Belt groups through a commission of
inquiry and an attempt was made to include some of the leadership, thought
of, not as equal partners but as clients in the affairs of the North. They,
however, remained outside the main stream of politics because they were
tied in specific ways, as clients in the NPC leadership who produced
patronage since they controlled government.
The system of patron-client relationship and its mechanism for control
¼ in the politics of the North was developed for the purpose of the crucial
1959 elections, the philosphy of one North, irrespective of tribe, race and
religion. In other words patron-client relationships between the NPC party
and selected M-Belt political leadership which survived until 1965 predated
the 1959 elections in the North. Northernization policy was ofcourse tied
up to patron-client relationships in the politics of the North and this was
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a fundamental political strategy for the 1959 elections and to neutralize
the the strong alliance that the UMBC had developed with the AG as from
January 1957.
The UMBC-AG alliance in the period between 1956 and 1961 was perhaps
the most critical political act which altered the growth and development of
the M-Belt movement in its demands for the creation of the M-Belt Region.
Although the UMBC entered the alliance because it found the AG committed to
policies for the subdivision of the Nigerian Federation, it was AG
financial and organizational assistance which conditioned the alliance and
which produced increased political vigour in the political activity and
mobilization for support for the creation of a M-Belt Region. When Tarka
built up support of the UMBC and was equipped with AG money he set about
the processes of mobilizing the masses in Tiv Division and subsequently
with Patrick Dokotri , the whole of the M-Belt group and societies. The
first step that Joseph Tarka seemed to have taken was to make a
sub-alliance within the UMBC-AG framework, with Ugor Iwoo the President of
Tiv Progressive Union 409 . Ugor Iwoo the President of the TPU, though of
limited education was a respected Tiv elder who wielded considerable local
political influence; but at that time was short of funds and found the AG
finance through Joseph Tarka as welcome as the political alliance410 . In
1957 therefore he united the TPU with the UMBC and in turn this entered an
alliance with the AG and thus formed a structure in three tiers:
TPU/UMBC/AG411 . This became generally, the structure of political
organization of the alliance among the M-Belt groups and societies before
March 1961 when the UMBC made efforts to assume its posture as an
independent party in an attempt to resist being swallowed up by the AG at
the time of the 1959 elections when it was proposed that all supporters of
the alliance should be known only as AG members and the alliance was to
campain under the 'Palm Tree' symbol 412 . Aided by the AG however, Joseph
Tarka used his great charismatic powers and political rhetoric in order to
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gain support for the UMBC and the idea of the creation of a M-Belt Region.
He told the Tiv the good things that would come to them, when he obtained
the creation of a M-Belt state:
"No longer would they be denied the benefits of
the buildings and institutions which existed in
the big centers of the North, in Kano, Zaria and
Kaduna. No longer would they be looked down upon
by the Hausa. Education and development would
proceed far faster than at present. In the new
Middle Belt the Tiv would be the dominant tribe
and fulfill their tribal aspirations and create
a kind of kingdom 	 .heaven on earth conceived
in material terms"	 .
Besides this direct appeals to the masses of the Tiv, based on visionary
promises, Tarka also consolidated his political role by winning the Tiv
chiefs to his side from whom he enjoyed sympathy for his plans for a M-Belt
Region, but kept them out of politics 414 . In the period between 1957 and
1959 in order to gain electoral support for the UMBC, Tarka mobilized the
Tiv by deliberately playing upon themes which appealled to tribal loyalty,
to tribal distrust of other neighbouring tribes, particularly the Hausa, to
religous prejudice toward Islam, to historically recollected events of the
past Fulani wars of slave-catching and raids and crowned that with the
existing circumstance of cheating by the MPG government in the North and
persecution by its linkages in the NA apparatus 415 . M. J. Dent for example
further suggests that in the tJMBC political rallies, the audience would be
asked:
"Ungu Tiv shin Ungu Uke? (are you Tiv or are
you Hausa?). At once, the audience would reply
that they were Tiv and would be told that the
NPC was a Hausa party and that the UMBC was
their own party. The speakers would say that
since the Tiv were not Muslims and ate pig they
could not have anything to do with the Northern
Region, which was Muslim dominated. It was
insinuated into the minds of the audience that
to continue to remain in the Northern Region
was eveal1y to be forced to become
Muslim"
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To reinforce the rhetorics in the political rallies, the UMBC in liv land
produced derigratory political songs on the NPC party, Moslems in their
midsts and their liv political clients in the Division4l6b. The songs and
the political propaganda were diffused and their influence was taken to the
furthest corners of the bush all over Tiv land by paid party secretaries
and agents 417 . The songs in particular were stereotype phrases of Tiv
prejudices on the Hausas and the Islamic religion and opposed their
practices in liv land as well as- requesting permission from their leaders
to deal with these enemies 418 . This propaganda appeal was backed-up by a
liberal distribution of AG money by Tarka in the form of hospitality,
presents to elders and help to various people in paying school fees and
other dues 419 . By the 1959 elections the effects of these properganda
methods as a political strategy were so profound that the UMBC had
established a firm support of ninety per cent of the Tiv people:
"and for the first time had introduced politics
to the masses. The name of Tarka, who before
956 had been in no way outstanding, had become
a household word among the young and old,
literate and illiterate, A en though many of
them had never seen him"
In contrast to the build-up of support in the tribal political
strategy in the method and scope of political mobilization employed by the
UMBC through Joseph Tarka in Tiv land, on the Plateau, in Adarnawa and S.
Zaria formal political meetings and rallies still brought together
different tribes under the same religious conceptions of the M-Belt
Christian identity and which also highlighted socio-economic and political
problems of deprivation and discrimination with the promises of adjusting
for the inequalities in a M-Belt Region where the good things of life would
be obtained faster. The political manifestation of the UMBC-AG alliance was
visible in the readily available party propaganda material which was
translated into the Hausa language, the motorcars, the motor-bikes and the
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bicycles with which party officials and loyalists were freely given for
their political activities. Furthermore, on the Plateau particularly in Jos
Division among the the Birom, leaders like Patrick Dokotri, unlike Joseph
Tarka did not establish reliable working political relationships with their
own tribal union movements albeit with those in other smaller tribes and
their relationships with traditional leaders were far from cordial. Both
Moses Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri at one time or the other quarrelled
with the family of Moses Rwang Pam, the Chief of Jos and his son Bitrus421.
Furthermore, the tribal strategy in political mobilization was difficult to
achieve because al most all the tribal union movements on the Plateau did
not consist of one cultural group and society on a clear cut basis as was
the TPU. There was nothing Birom, for example, about the BPU and the BTP
which consisted of numerous other tribes to be found in the Division and as
such political meetings and rallies were held in the Hausa language. The
socio-economic and welfare issues which Tarka translated for the masses of
the liv in the processes of political mobilization were however collateral
with the issue that worried the "tribal" unions in Adamawa, Plateau, S.
Bauchi and S. Zaria, which the MZL had previously made familiar to the
M-Belt groups and societies in those areas. It is however clear that Joseph
Tarka brought in the liv by mobilizing them on that common platform of
similarly deprived and aggrieved people in support of the causes for the
creation of a M-Belt Region. Collective tribal consciousness in the
political mobilization on the other M-Belt groups and societies went no
where near, as far as what Joseph Tarka did with the Tiv, except for the
brief spasms in S. Bauchi, where Azi Nyako, a very close associate of Tarka
invoked similar images to create anti-Hausa Fulani sentiments among the
Jarawa in 1960 and 1964 sufficiently for them to resort to violence against
the Nigeria Police Force which virtually excluded any NPC influence in the
Fobur area in 1964.
Apart form the UMBC-AG alliance which produced funds for
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organizational mobility, organizational personnel and equipment in support
of political mobilization for the 1959 elections in particular, the IJMBC
also made effort to influence trade union movements in support for the
creation of a M-Belt Region and to vote for the alliance in the 1959
elections. This was particularly the case with the Mines Unions that
existed on the tin fields of the Jos Plateau. It is therefore critical to
the understanding of support for the M-Belt movement in Jos Division on the
Plateau and the explanation of the votes in that area during the 1959
elections to examine the political forces that interplayed to influence the
development of the Mines Unions. This is so because the minesworkers, right
from the 1940s formed the main, effectively mobilized social group in Jos
Division and their wage earning existence under European management and the
indigenous capitalist state system of Nigeria temporarily made them devoid
of triba acrimonies 422 . How the mineworkers in Jos Division voted, because
of the numbrs of their members, determined the outcome of any elections in
the Division. The organized form of the Tin Mines Workers Unions were begun
in Bukuru in 1949, the same year that the parent organization of the M-Belt
Movement, the NML was organized. The issue that led to the organization of
the first Tine Mines Workers Union in January 1949, the Nigerian African
Minesworkers Union (NAMU) were, however, much more structured as class
issues within the tin mining idustry, rather than the socio-religious and
political problems that surrounded the organization of Christians in the
NML. However it was an internal conflict within NAMU over wages that split
their organization and brought in the politics of the North and the M-Belt
movement into the conduct of Union affairs 423 . The Mining Industry on the
Plateau was dominated by four European companies out of fifty three
registered companies: the Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria (ATMN) which was
the largest and employed 35% of the total labour force, Bisichi Tin
Company, the Ex-Lands Nigeria Limited and the Gold and Base Metal Mines of
Nigeria which combined, employed another 20% of the labour force 424 . Labour
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on the mines, particularly with the ATMN Ltd., existed on roughly two
grades: skilled workers which consisted of southern Nigierians, the
majority of whom were Ibo and unskilled labourers, made up of Ibo as well
as some Birom and other persons from the M-Belt tribes, but predominantly
Hausa migrants from the Islamic society in the North 425
 To this cultural
division of labour, which corresponded to the class divisions based on
earned wages between Skilled and unskilled workers, all under European
management, became added in the 1950s, party political divisions into the
NPC, NEPU and the UMBC 426 •
 When these differences surfaced, the NPC party
overtly exploited the divisions in the Unions in order to weaken support
for the UMBC and to Swing the votes of the opposition Unions to its side,
since initially, the alien population in the ATMU Union in Jos Division
supported and had encouraged the idea of the creation of a "Middle-Zone
Region" when there was a MZL party. Political divisions in the Tin Mines
Unions began in late 1949 when NAMU skilled workers organized a strike to
demand for higher wages for all categories of tin minesworkers in
Nigeria 427 . In the final negotiations to end the strike however the skilled
workers came out with a better bargain than the general mass of the
labourers. Since there was a cultural division of labour between the
skilled and unskilled workers, the Hausa treasurer of NAMU, Isa Haruna,
criticized the Union on the g round that it was southern or rather, Ibo
dominated and resigned his post428
 Indeed, Audu dan Ladi, a close
associate of Isa Haruna who organized the Northern Minesworkers Union
(NMW), subsequently wrote a p ersonal letter to the Sardauna of Sokoto,
Ahmadu Bello who was the Premier of the North, on the political state of
the Plateau Mines Unions and referred to the President of NAMU as "this
Ibo" in Hausa 429 . At the end of it all, the strike was interpreted as an
attempt by the Ibo to obtain better working conditions for themselves
alone430 . This had taken place within NAMU with the majority of members as
ATMN workers. The crisis caused a split in NAMU, which resulted into the
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organization of an alternative union, the ATMN - African Workers Union
(AWU) in April, 1952431. However, both NAMU and AWU had Presidents that
were non-Northern. A further political crisis was introduced in the
Mineworkers Union Movements when its southern Nigerian leadership
encouraged members to vote non-Northern tickets in the urban elections in
Jos Division where NEPU had strong political influences 432 . It was with
this background that the NMU was organized in August 1954 by Isa Haruna and
Audu dan Ladi, directly involving itself in politics and took sides with
the NPC party whose policy of Northernization was already developed 433
. In
1956, the tribal nature of NMU reflected complete Northernization which was
in line with the policy of restricted membership of the Union to
Northerners and as NPC party policy required: 70% Hausa, 14% Birom and 11%
other tribes of the North 434 . In 1957, NMU opposed attempts to merge into a
single body all the existing Unions on the Tin Mines fields in Jos
Division435 . This increased pressures on Northerners in NAMU and AWU to
join NMU and by 1960, 95% of NMU members were Hausas 436 . Furthermore, the
whole executive members of NMU consisted of persons who were either Hausa
or Fulani and held posts in the Provincial organizational structure of the
NPC party437 . With the increases in the division of the Unions on political
and tribal lines - NAMU and AWU for Ibos or more correctly non-Northern
tribes and connected to Southern Nigerian based political organizations,
particularly the Ibo dominated NCNC, NMU for the Hausas and overtly
associated with the NPC and NEPU - and each Union apparently oriented
toward securing better working conditions and propects for its supporters,
the Birom with the encouragement and assistance of the UMBC-AG alliance and
who were fully aware of the domination of Hausa-Fulani in the affairs of
NMU and their political loyalty to the NPC or NEPU, broke-off from NMU in
1957 orgainzed the Birorn Minesworkers Union (BMU) in 1958438. In April
1959, with the 1959 Federal elections in mind, the BMU converted its name
to become the Middle Belt Minesworkers Union (MBMU), giving rise to very
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strong and sinister protestations from the NMU to government in the North:
"There is no M-Belt Region f59a Middle Belt
Minesworkers Union to exist"
With the increased political influence of the UMBC, the MBMU was able to
maintain itself independently of other Union pressures and produced local
support in the 1959 elections. The NEPU however won the election in Jos
township constituency largely because of NAMU and NMU support and campaign
influences. After the 1959 elections the composition of the Unions
reflected the tribal composition of the main groups employed on the
tin-mines that were centered around Bukuru township: NMU 65% of the
workers, NAMU/AWU 30% and MBMU 5%440 In 1961 the NMU and the AWU(ATMN),
united and became Nigerian Workers Union (NWU) but split again into AWU and
NWU in 1964 giving way to a union of NMU and MBMU - an uneasy Union that
was largely conditioned by the UMBC - NEPU alliance in the NPF. By 1965
however government in the North had brought suffienct pressure on the Tin
companies to recognize only two trade unions, the NMU and the NMU and this
effectively neutralized the existence of the MBMU and its overt political
activities in support for the UMBC and the demands for the creation of a
M-Belt Region 441 . The MBMU however covertly maintained its identity under
the NMU until 1966 and with strong feelings against the domination of posts
in the ATMN by NWU members on the mine fields who were mainly Ibo they were
easily mobilized in May and September, 1966 to participate in the brutal
killings of Ibos and 'Easterners' living in Bukuru, Ray-Field, Barkin Ladi,
Gana Ropp, Kurra Falls, Dorowa Babuje and Bisichi 442 . Before May, 1967, as
a direct consequence of the Ibo exodus to the Eastern Region of Nigeria,
which created vacuum in the top management positions of the tin mining
companies, virtually all the top posts in the ATMN which had Ibos, became
occupied by either NMU or MBMU officials443
The UMBC-AG alliance however wasted funds and energy in the
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organization of rival mineworkers Unions in Jos Division, resources that
might well have been concentrated on particular tribal mobilization as was
the case with the liv. One political consequence of this misdirection of
funds was that Patrick Dokotri lost his seat in the 1959 elections to the
President of NMU in Jos South Constituency 444 . The AG-UMBC involvinent with
the mineworkers Unions further brought to it disfavour from both the NPC
and the NEPU who in that period were strongly concerned about Northern
Nigerian interests. It was against this background that the NPC party in
particular sought the destruction of the AG party. In seeking to destroy
the AG however, the NPC was directly destroying the UMBC movement. Indeed,
as it is the case with separatist movements in most parts of the world,
where the political demands threatened the political positions of the
dominant groups, institutional pressure is brought to bear on it and to
create fissiparousness and factions. The development of the M-Belt movement
and its efforts to organize into itself political support from the trade
Unions in Jos Division was characterized by factions and pressures which
indicated how far the government in the North was prepared to use different
means and methods to destablize and destroy support for any party or
political group that stood in opposition of Northern Unity. This was
particularly so for the MBMU which was forced to function under the NMU.
Politicians of the M-Belt movement seem to have aligned themselves to
nearly all the Nigerian parties and to any organization or political group
that showed indication of support for the creation of the M-Belt Region. In
the period between 1950 and 1965, the movement in its different phases
aligned itself to the NPC, AG and the NEPU-NCNC parties 445 . The UMBC also
aligned itself to BYM and LIP, both groups associated with the AG, in that
southern Nigerian party effort to penetrate into the electorate in the
North. Complementing the generous financial and moral support for the UMBC
and other political groups in the North to fulfill local aspirations
however were needs to gain support for Yoruba irredentist interests for the
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establishment of a pan-Yoruba Region in Nigeria as well as the hope of
winning seats in the minorities areas in sufficient numbers to produce AG
control of the Nigerian Federation. The party political reactions of the
NPC which controlled the government in the North to the AG strategy, dating
from the UMBC-AG alliance was that of repulsion and the UMBC party under
Joseph Tarka was increasingly seen as an AG-surrogate. With increased
tightening of the AG control of its party structure and organization of
other groups associated to it, which almost swallowed the UMBC, tensions
developed and the UMBC retorted after 1961, to a Northern base and aligned
itself with the NEPU to contest the 1964 elections. At a critical level,
however, the M-Belt movement as political organization, itself was a
combination of alliances of different tribes and Christian oriented
°tribal" Unions and parties who had the common aim and objective of
struggling for the creation of a M-Belt Region. The political leadership in
the tribal Unions and parties carried with them tribal identities into the
UMBC, while at the same time acknowledging a common Christian religious
identity for the struggle for separation from the Islamic society and
constitution into a M-Belt Region in the North. The political loyalties of
the leadership in the M-Belt movement therefore on several occasions,
conflicted between loyalty to the tribal identity and the different
elements of the moblized M-Belt identity: Whether this was in terms of its
religious conceptions as Christians/non-Moslems or minority tribes as
non-Hausa-Fulani-Nupe-Kanuri, the Islamic numerical majorities in the
North. This conflict of loyalty to the two broad types of identities in the
M-Belt movement created perenial cleavages in the political organization
and made the different tribes vulnerable to manipulations by the NPC party
in the North such that support from some groups was volatile and in some
instances effectively nuetralized. In the period between 1956 and 1965
however there was more political cohesion in the organization of the M-Belt
movement when it was in its phase as the UMBC party under the leadership of
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Joseph Tarka. This cohesion was given a boost in the status of the party
and its political demands when it also expanded and shifted its arena of
politics from the North to the Federal centre when there was an alliance
with the AG.
There were three deriveable patterns of the alliances of the M-Belt
movement in its different phases in the period between 1951 and 1967.
Firstly, there existed internally concieved political alliances explicitly
responding to the strength of the British created Northern identity in
Nigerian politics which in effect was traceable within the separatist
M-Belt movement itself. The MZL-NPC alliance from 1952-1954, for example,
fits into this category, although it was not a total alliance because some
of its leadership wished to organize outside NPC political control for the
creation of a M-Belt Region as against those who wished to work within the
NPC to gain the experience of the working of government which will be
benefitial in the instance of the creation of the M-Belt Region. Secondly,
there existed externally concieved alliances with parties whose political
bases were outside the North. The UMBC-AG alliance in 1956 was of this
nature. This brought the UMBC into the mainstream of national politics and
widened its scope of publicity by the attention that was given to it by a
nationally circulated press, particularly that controlled by the AG.
Thirdly, there existed alliances for the UMBC with other opposition parties
in the North and who were associated to political parties whose base of
support was outside the North, independently of the political interests of
the UMBC-AG alliance. This nature of alliance was with political groups
that included the LNY/ITP, BYM, HFTP and NEPU, who had political sympathy
and understanding of the need for the demands for the creation of a M-Belt
Region and these they correlated with their own demands for reform of the
political system in the North. These allies did not require any mergers of
their political parties or organizations in the alliances, since political
identities were separately maintained. Furthermore, in this pattern of
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alliance, although the groups had come together in a common political
front, local leaders in the alliance contested elections with their
previous party labels unchanged except in the unique case of Ibrahim Imam,
a Kanuri from Borno who contested the Regional elections in 1961 in
Jemgbar, a Tiv constituency where he was a non-indegence and won under the
UMBC party label and with support and influence from Joseph Tarka.
Underlining this pattern of alliances within the North however was a common
desire by all the political groups for reforms of the NA system to take
place in the North and the subdivision of the Region into smaller units of
the Nigerian Federation. The BYM, for example, which was organized in 1954
with the objective of struggling for the creation of a North Eastern state
to comprise of Bomb, Adamawa, Bauchi and Plateau Provinces, although it
was sympathetic to the UMBC, did not enter into a formal alliance with it
until in 1958. Even when it did, the BYM remained more of an independent
organization within the AG party which had financed its activities to the
tune of $12000, rather than as an ally of the UMBC. Similarly the HFPP
which was organized by Ibrahim Dimis in 1957, following its de-alignment
from the NEPU-NCNC alliance, entered an alliance with the UMBC via the AG
and expressed sentiments and desires for S. Bauchi to be included in a
M-Belt Region only in the instance where the authorities failed to create a
Habe Division, separated from the Bauchi Emirate. Another significant
political group with southern Nigerian political connections, which the
UMBC associated itself to, was the LNY/ITP. This was organized by Josiah
Olawoyin, a Yoruba In Ilorin Province. Although politically sympathetic to
the UMBC movement and objectives, its explicit aims were irredentist dreams
in the merger of some Yoruba populated divisionsin Ilorin and Kabba toward
a pan-Yoruba Western Region of Nigeria. This was a political interest
independently maintained in the instance of the creation of a M-Belt
Region. Furthermore, although members of the LNY/ITP party belonged to some
of the factions during the development of the M-Belt movement before 1956,
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It was not until there had been a formal lIP-AG alliance and the subsequent
UMBC-AG alliance in 1957 that Yoruba organizations had the shared political
identity with the UMBC party. Strickly speaking, therefore the ITP had
independent political interests that were not directly tied up to the UMBC
party and the general problems of the demands of the M-Belt people for the
creation of a M-Belt Region.
By 1958, however all the political parties and groups in opposition to
the NPC party and government in the North that were of any consequence,
were affiliated with one or the other of the two major political parties
that were outside the North, in Southern Nigeria: For example, UMBC was
allied to and financed by the AG and NEPU to and partly financed by the
NCNC. Thus, for examples, the NCNC was allied to NEPU, BFC and MBSP in Tiv
areas and Southern Zaria; the AG was allied to UMBC in the majority of the
M-Belt areas, BYM in Borno, HFPP in S. Bauchi, lIP in Ilorin, as well as,
some independent candidates in Adamawa and Kabba. These political
formations were made in preparation for the contest of issues in the 1959
elections and the specific party political policies and positions on the
reasons and commitment for the creation states/regions in the
re-arrangement of the Nigerian Federation 446 . In the development of the
campaigns toward the 1959 elections which were based on these political
formations, three patterns of leadership dominated the political arena in
the North, as they appealled for political support from the electorate:
there was Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, with the conservative NPC
party of the Northern establishment; Amina Kano with populism in the NEPU
party espousing northern radicalism to "all sons and daughters of Northern
Nigeria" and directed against the establishment and what the party pointed
out as "the family compact rule and rulers" in the NA system in the North;
and populist Joseph Tarka with the tJMBC vigourously pushing the issue of
separation of the M-Belt people from the leadership of the Islamic society,
the rump of the establishment forces in political control in the North.
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VI	 The 1959 Elections in the North.
The greatest electoral test of the UMBC-AG alliance over political
claims on support for the ideas of demands for the creation of the M-Belt
Region came in the 1959 elections. The elections in themselves represented
the highest water mark of electoral political support for the tJMBC-AG
alliance in the North. In the M-Belt areas, for example, the alliance won
twenty four seats out of the allocated fourty three, with a total share of
364213 votes which were 45.9% of the total votes cast in the area during
the 1959 elections. This compares with the minorities votes in the other
two regions (East and West) in support of the demands for the creation of
more states in their areas within the Nigerian Federation; For example, of
the total of eighty five seats in the minority areas all over Nigeria, the
dominant political parties in favour of the creation of new states 447
 won
fifty one seats, largely from the votes of minorities.
However, in the 1959 elections for representation into the FHR in
Lagos, there were clear trends of electoral support for the tJMBC party in
alliance with the AG and the votes also reflected political support for the
ideas of the creation of the M-Belt Region. These ideas were particularly
articulated by the UMBC and the AG in the 1959 elections. In examining the
results of the 1959 elections, there is therefore focus of analysis on
whether they expressed M-Belt support, both in terms of the purely
political support for the UMBC as a party and as they expressed the
Christian religious Identity of the M .-Belt movement as well as in the
conception of different tribal identities as a political identity within
the UMBC party. The analysis of the 1959 elections further seek to
highlight the political differences with any of the other elections on the
manipulation of a political identity for a specific cause between the
Islamic society and the non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt
movement in the North. The elections are therefore examined and analyzed as
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the fundamental indicator of the peak of M-Belt political consciousness and
as their voting patterns were affected by initial expressions of "tribal
nationalism". The elections are also examined in the ways they reflected
the organizational effectiveness of the UMBC party and the aligned tribal
Unions within it, in the overall Nigerian political identity, which caused
it to act in concert with other Nigerian 'minorities interests' that the AG
ambitiously coordinated to control political power in the Federation. This
was the basis from which the AG party and leadership, for example, gave the
UMBC generous financial support and assisting organizational personale.
However, the political assistance from the AG, was also based on the images
of the future that were presented to the electorate in the 1959 elections
in the North which contrasted with those of the other contesting parties
and their conceptions of the balance of political power in the Nigerian
Federation. Thus, for example, for the 1959 elections, the political
resistance of Southern Nigerian domination (mostly quoted as Ibo and
Yoruba) of the North was articulated by the MPG as the political issue over
the rejection of the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region and the
insistance on the preservation of political unity of the North as one
entity in the Nigerian Federation. To encourage this, the NPC had developed
a policy of Northernization, which in some instances translated into
Hausaization and Islamization and this was meant to crystallize the unity
of the North and neutralize the separation of the M-Belt movement that was
articulated by the UMBC as well as isolating itself from the diffusion of
southern Nigerian political Influences in the North. The political position
of the MPG party for the 1959 elections therefore stood against the
subdivision of the North and against the issue of S. Nigerian domination
because of their monoply of Western European skills of modernization, an
issue that appealled to all sections and tribes in most areas of the North.
Indeed in the period of the campaigns for the 1959 elections, there were
propaganda efforts to neutralize the claims of the UMBC party for a
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distinct political identity from that of the North by constant references
in the NPC government press to: "harm Northerners", "Okene Northerners",
"Kano Northerners", "Jos Northerners", "Makurdi Northerners" and "Idoma
Northerners" etc. 4 . This pattern of appeal, was particularly directed to
areas where there was some organized form of protest and opposition to the
MPG party and the conception of the Northern Identity. In contrast to the
NPC party position and propaganda, the NEPU in alliance with the NCNC for
the 1959 elections articulated as a political issue, the oppressive nature
of the NA system and stood for the reform of the system in the whole of the
North and did not reject either Northernization or the political
conceptions of the Northern Identity. The NEPU shared this political
position with the UMBC party. However, the UMBC party, in alliance with the
AG presented to the electorate in the North, particularly to that of the
M-Belt areas, the issue of the domination of the tribal minorities by the
majority tribes who consisted of the Hausa-Fulani, Kanuri and Nupe and this
was made dramatic by the polarities between tribes with Christians and
non-Moslems and the unity of Moslems in themselves in the North. There was
therefore the need to protect the socio-economic and political minorities
who were Christians with many non-Moslems as brothers, in the creation of a
M-Belt in the North. The UMBC campaigns in the 1959 elections, therefore
centered on the problems of politics, some, historically recollected, which
affected the tribal and Christian religious minorities as well as others
who were non-Islamic in the North and envisaged their solutions in the
creation of a M-Belt Region as a unit of the Nigerian Federation.
Table 4.5 , shows the distribution of electoral support for the
UMBC-AG alliance, which contested the 1959 elections specifically using the
creation of the M-Belt Region as the political issue in the non-Islamic
areas of the North. The intension to make the creation of states a
political issue in the 1959 elections was apparent in statements of chief
Awolowo, the leader of the UMBC-AG alliance, in 1958 and from the political
Table 4.5
Percentage Distribution of UMBC and NEPU Votes by Provinces in
the M-Belt Areas in the North During the 1959 Federal Elections.
Provincial Total	 UMBC	 NEPU
Area	 Votes	 AG	 NCNC
Cast	 Votes	 Votes
Benue	 320 699 178 912 28 576
Plateau	 159 906	 70 392 25 940
Southern	 75 401	 29 870 10 765
UMBC-AG NEPU-NCNC Opposition
Votes	 Votes	 Votes
55.8	 8.9	 64.7
44.0	 16.2	 60.2
39.6	 14.3	 53.9
Zaria
Sourthern
Bouchi
Adarnawa
TOTAL
51 127	 19 187	 8 478	 37.5
185 817
	
65 852 25 815	 35.4
793 050 364 213 99 574 	 45.9
	
16.6	 54.1
	
13.9	 49.3
	
12.6	 58.5
Source: K. W. J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and
Administration in a Developing System, Oxford, 1963, Appendix D p451-474.
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controvercy that surrounded the interpretations of the 1958 London
Constitutional Conference between the AG and the NCNC party. As a result
chief Awolowo, clearly made it public that he would make the question of
creating new states before October 1, 1960, an issue to be contested in the
Federal elections of 1959. This was against the background of NPC-NCNC
propaganda suggesting that: "those who vote for the creation of states
would in effect, be voting for the postponement of Independence" 449
 As
suggested by the figures in Table 4.5 , electoral political support for the
alliance in the 1959 elections, came mostly from Benue Province, when other
areas of the M-Belt are compared and support decreased toward M-Belt areas
that were on the edges of Islam, where there were powerful Emirs and
District Heads in places like Adamawa, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria as well as
some parts of the Plateau. Thus, the UMBC-AG percentage share of the total
votes cast were 55.8% in Benue, 44.0% in Plateau, 39.6% in S. Zaria, 37.5%
in S. Bauchi, 35.4% in Adamawa and with 364,213 (45.9%) share of a total of
793,050 votes in the M-Belt areas. However, it is not only the vote for the
UMBC party that indicates opposition to the NPC party in the M-Belt areas
and support for the creation of the M-Belt Region. People who did not cast
their votes for the NPC party as well as the UMBC-AG alliance were also
politically saying something a rejection of the Northern System, a
rejection of the NPC party and policies, protest over subordination on
social and political status as much as it might have been a display of
cultural voting behaviour, anti-Islamic sentiments and the Christian
religious identity. These were issues that were interwoven in the matrix of
factors that might explain the electoral rejection of the NPC party in
Benue where it scored 35.3% of a total of 320,699 of the votes cast, the
lowest in the whole of the M-Belt areas. As will become apparent below, the
vote for the NPC is not that of the dominatnt tribe in Benue Province
itself but rather of the Idoma, Jukun and Hausa-Fulani Islamic elements
that were concentrated in Northern Benue and the Wukari areas. However the
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total opposition votes in the M-Belt areas therefore are politically
significant and indicate support for the demands for reforming and altering
the political arena as were articulated by the UMBC and the NEPU parties.
The figures in Table 4.5 therefore also suggest opposition to the Northern
establishment as represented by the NPC party which was against the
creation of a M-Belt Region in the North. This opposition was a gain
strongest in electoral expression in Benue where a percentage total vote of
64.7% was cast for the UMBC and the NEPU, regressing in other M-Belt area
with the weakest percentage in Adamawa with 49.3%. The M-Belt areas
produced about 58.5% of the total electoral votes in opposition to the NPC,
out of a total of 793,050 votes cast. This means that the NPC scored less
than 50% of the votes in the M-Belt areas in the 1959 elections.
In examining tribal electoral support for the UMBC party in the 1959
elections, the figures in Table 4. é suggest that almost all of the Tiv
votes were cast for the UMBC-AG alliance. In the seven liv constituencies
in the 1959 elections, the electorate voted 86.9% of their political
support for the alliance, with only 9.6% for the NPC party. Indeed the liv
vote alone constituted about 38.0% of manifested electoral political
support for the UMBC-AG alliance, of the total votes cast for the alliance
in the 1959 elections 450 . This means that the Tiv electoral support as
expressed in the 1959 elections for Joseph Tarka and the UMBC party in the
demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region was politically unique in the
sense that total tribal identity was also a political identity, only
comparable to the Chamba tribe in Adarnawa with 68.6% expressed electoral
support for the UMBC-AG alliance. Furthermore, the strong liv support for
the alliance is also explained by the very presence of Joseph Tarka as the
leader of the UMBC in the same sense that the Sura showed stong support for
the UMBC, because they associated one of their members, Pastor David Lot,
with the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region. Indeed Tseayo
suggests that the UMBC was presented to the masses of the Tiv by local
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leaders, as a liv political party: 'being Tiv was synonymous with being
UMBC" 451 . On the Plateau, strong electoral support for the UMBC-AG alliance
came from the Sura with 63.6%, Angas with 58.1% and the Ankwei with 56.9%.
Both the Sura and Angas vote are explained by the political identification
they held for the UMBC party from the previous influences of Pastor David
Lot in the MZL. The Ankwei vote for the UMBC was more of an internal tribal
protest against Michael Audu Buba, whose association with the NPC as a
client of the Sardauna was locally detested. The Birom in Jos Division, who
shared with the Tiv, the leadership of the M-Belt movement in the LJMBC
party, might have had their electoral support skewed by the presence of
migrants in their midst who voted for the alliance and for other parties.
However before the 1959 elections, Birom political support for the UMBC
party had declined because the leadership was split. Most of the leadership
joined the NPC and took with them their loyal supporters. While Patrick
Dokotri remained in the UMBC, for example, the more populous Birom villages
of Du, Vwang and Forum had become NPC members under the influence of Bitrus
Rwang Pam and Moses Nyam Rwang. The figures in Table 4.	 also show that
there was strong political support for the political ideas of the UMBC-AG
alliance from the electorate in S. Zaria where the Katab tribe for example
voted 58.7% of their support for the alliance, However, both the Bachama
and Jarawa whose tribal unions and local leaders like Jonah Assadugu and
Azi Nyako were polititcally active in supporting the UMBC party and the
ideas of the M-Belt movement show low electoral support for the UMBC-AG
alliance. This was not a rejection of the ideas on the creation of a M-Belt
Region; rather the voting pattern is explained by the presence of
indigenous tribesmen who competed the elections as independent candidates
with the support of the NPC party and who ended up joining the NPC. It may
also as well be explained by the general characteristics in Nigerian
politics in which an illiterate electorate simply fails to assume a
political identity and votes for the party in government, largely through
Area and Tribe in
the M-Belt
liv
Benue	 Jukun
Idoma
Others
Sura
Plateau	 Angas
Ankwei
Bi rom**
Others
Southern	 Katab
Zaria	 Others
Areas with
Sourthern Jarawa
Bauchi	 (SE + SW)
Others
Chamba
Adarnawa	 Bacharna
Others
TOTAL
Table 4.G
Part Territorial Distribution in the Estimates of Tribal
Electoral Support and Opposition for the UMBC in the Demand for the
Creation of a M-Belt Region During the 1959 Elections.
Total Votes
Cast
159 356
35 689
62 899
62 355
23 256
17 976
27 088
65 355
16 973
14 997
60 406
33 365
17 762
14 846
20 347
150 624
793 050
%UMBC-AG
Share
86.9
57.0*
23.0
36.5
63.6
58. 1
56.9
32.2
32.7
58.7
45.6
30.0
51.6
68.6
32.8
30.9
45.9
364 213
%NPC Share
9.6
35.1
54.8
43.3
32.6
38. 5
29.4
40.7
34.3
27.5
23.0
59 . 1
18.4
24.3
27.7
50.2
41.6
329 116
%NEPU and
Independents
3.5
7.9
22.2
20.2
3.8
3.4
13.7
27.1
33.0
138
31.4
10.9
30.0
7.1
39. 5
18.9
12.6
99 574
Sources: K. W. J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Elecion of 1959: Politics and
Aministration in a Developing System, Oxford, 1963 Appendix D p451-474.
Key
* - The 57.0% vote refers to the total population of Wukari Constituency of more
than half of whom were Tiv farmers who migrated over the border from liv land.
** - This statistic is rather misleading without an explanation: All the Birom
Constituencies had a significant concentration of Hausa Fulani Moslems, Yorubas
and Ibos, beside the concentration of other Nigerian tribes, who had been
particularly attracted to settle in the area as Labour on the Tin Mines and
whose camps existed in almost all the Birorn villages. The low showing of
electoral support for the UMBC is therefore most likely skewed.
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the influences of District Heads and Emirs. In all, however, from the
voting patterns suggested by the figures in Table 4., and 4.7 , it may be
taken that more people in the electorate and more minority tribes in the
M-Belt areas supported the creation of a M-Belt Region. About 45.9% of the
M-Belt electorate voted in support of the UMBC-AG alliance, a movement that
was politicaally committed to the creation of a M-Belt Region. However,
there was a substantial number of people and a few of the non-Islamic
tribes who also opposed the political idea of the creation of the M-Belt
Region, by voting for a party that did not wish to even entertain the idea.
The statistical figure of 41.6% of the M-Belt electorate who voted for the
NPC party may be taken to have voted against the creation of a M-Belt
Region. The strongest manifestation of this came from S. Bauchi and Idoma
areas, whose electorate voted about 59.1% and 54.8% for the NPC party
repsectively of the total votes cast in their areas.
Although the voting patterns in the M-Belt areas and other parts of
the North were influenced by tribal identities which subsequently, in
certain instances, became fed into a particular party political identity,
they also reflect party political identification that was shaped by
religious identification. The figures in Table 
.-i show how the votes for
the NPC and the (JMBC-AG alliance were either massive in support of the NPC
or split and shared with the alliance, depending on the numerical
concentration of Muslims in a particular area of the North when compared to
areas where the numerical strenght of Muslims declined and became mixed
with Christians and non-Islamic elements in the population. Where there was
a high concentration of Muslims in the population in the North, the NPC
consistently scored a high share of the votes. Table 4.
-
i , for example,
shows that in Kano, where there was 98.0% Muslims in a population of
3,396,350, the NPC won 77.0% of the total votes cast when compared to Niger
Province where Muslims consisted of 44.1% members in a population of
715,728 with the NPC gaining 67.9% of the votes in the total electorate.
Table 4.7
Political and Religious identification in the voting
patterns during the 1959 Elections in The North
POLITICAL IDENTITY & %PARTY
	
RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND
AREA IN THE	 SHARE OF VOTES IN 1959
	
%POPULATION IN 1952
NORTH
	
Total
	
Total
	
Votes *
	
(a)	 (b)	 (c)
	
Pop*	 (d)	 (e)	 (f)
Central
To The
Islamic
Society
Ka no
Katsi na
Sokoto
Borno
Niger
	
705547 77.0	 3.5 19.4 3396350 98.0
309922 61.4 11.3 27.3 1483400 95.2
	
490730 73.5	 5.2	 5.9 2680333 94.0
	
315865 77.3	 9.2 10.0 1595708 83.5
	
149497 67.9	 8.1 23.3	 715728 44.1
	
0.4	 1.6
	
0.3	 4.5
	
0.5	 5.5
0.6 15.9
3.0 52.9
Central
To the
M-Belt
Groups
Bauchi
Zaria
Adamawa
Plateau
Benue
239304 56.6 13.9 29.5 1423825 74.1	 1.6 24.3
169501 33.5 24.5 33.9
	
805095 61.4
	 7.8 30.8
176734 45.7 34.3 20.0 1181024 30.1	 3.2 66.7
159906 37.5 44.0 18.5
	 891386 24.1 12.9 63.0
320699 23.1 55.8 13.0 1468229 10.6	 6.9 82.5
Central to
Yoruba
Irredentist Ilorin
	
95114 44.8 39.4	 3.6	 530595 62.6	 6.0 31.4
Areas	 Kabba
	
140462 28.3	 6.8 64.9	 663909 22.4 18.5 59.1
Total	 3126050 61.7 17.7 20.7 16835000 69.3 	 3.3 27.4
Key:	 (a) = NPC
	
(b) = UMBC-AG
	 (C) = NEPU and Others
(d) = Moslems
	
(e) Christians
	
(f) Other Religions
Sources: K.W.J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and
Administration in a Developing System, Oxford, 1963, Appedix D p451 - p474; S.B.
Chambers, The Report on the 1952 Census of the Northern Region of Nigeria,
Kaduna, 1952, p32; E.P.T. Crampton, Christianity in Northern Nigeria, II
Edition, 1975 p209; Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government
of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957 p147.
* Excludes Sardauna Province because of their absence in the 1952 census for a
correlation of the breakdowns on Religious identification.
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This contrasted with the NPC electoral performance in areas where there was
a higher concentration of Christians and non-Moslems. In Benue Province,
for example, where there was the highest percentage of non-Moslems in the
North (82.5%) and some Christians (6.9%) in a population of 1,468,229 the
NPC party gained the lowest share of the electorate for the whole of the
North - 23.1%. Muslims constituted about 10.6% of the total population of
Benue Province in 1952. The UMBC-AG alliance on similar lines of religious
identification, performed well, where there was a concentration of
Christians and non-Moslems (other religions, like the variety of African
systems of traditional beliefs and worship) in the population surpassing
Muslim elements. Benue Province again reflects this trend in the voting
pattern. Futhermore in Plateau, where 63.0% was non Muslims and 12.9%
Christian in a population of 891,386 with Muslims consisting 24.1% of that
total, the UMBC-AG alliance scored 44.0% of the electorate as against 37.5%
that was scored by the NPC. Similarly in Kabba Province, although outside
the conceptions of the M-Belt movement, the vote for alternative parties,
which were mostly tribal group formations under Christian political
leadership, other than the NPC and the UMBC, reflects the intervening
influences of religious identification in the voting patterns. However, the
electorate in Kabba voted for their tribal unions: Igalla and Igbirra
rather than NEPU in the share of 64.9% of the electoral vote as indicated
in Table •i . Kabba Province itself had the highest Christian
concentration in its population (18.5%) in The North and this was given a
boost in its tribal identification by a respectable non-Moslem percentage
share of the population (59.1%). The tribes in Kabba Province were,
however, not pro-UMBC in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region,
although the Igalla wished to be merged with BP state in 1967 and with
Benue in 1976.
-911-
Although the leadership of the UMBC-AG alliance did not overtly make
religion an issue in the 1959 elections, the voting patterns clearly
suggest there were conceptions in which the very political issue of the
creation of the M-Belt Region was seen in Christian religious terms, since
the demands for the region were deemed as separation from Muslims in The
North, an overtly religious expression of a political interest and identity
which influenced political behaviour. Thus without the concentration of
Muslims in their midst, Table 4 .1 suggests that collectively with a
minorities religious identity, the M-Belt people were flatly voting with a
religious identity directed against Moslems, when non-Muslim and christian
identification is accounted for, as was particularly the case with the Tiv,
where very few Moslems existed. Furthermore, there is a correlation between
increases in the percentage of Christian population in the Provinces in The
North and the percentage share of UMBC-AG votes from the Islamic society
toward the M-Belt areas. In Kano, for example, where there was a 0.4%
Christian concentration in the population the UMBC-AG alliance scored a
3.5% share of the electoral votes, the lowest in the whole region, while on
the Plateau where there were 12.9% of Christians in the population, the
IJMBC-AG alliance scored was 44.0% of the total electoral vote.
However if one compares the election in minority areas in the other
two Regions (Calabar Ogoja and Rivers) COR provinces, where the AG
supported a demand for a separate state for non-Ibo peoples or the Mid-West
where the NCNC supported the demand for a separate state for non-Yoruba
people, one finds an inherent electoral support, although there was no
extent of religious differences involving the percentage of the votes cast
for parties supporting state creation, which was higher than that in the
M-Belt areas. One might have expected religious differences to have
produced a greater polarity of voting behaviour on the M-Belt groups and
societies since religion in whatever colouring: "is an issue that does not
pemit bargaining or even dispute about the authorities of this world"452.
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Religion, as the Irish experience in British politics suggests, has
enormous potential in crystallizing into a political identity that does not
get easily resolved. This however was only slightly the case with
Christianity in the M-Belt areas and rather more rigorously so with the
Islamic religion among the dominant groups in The North. Table 4.
suggests there was more electoral political cohesion among southern
Nigerian minorities movements for separation from their dominant
neighbours, than was the case in The North during the 1959 elections. The
Mid-Western State Movement (MSM) which begun to exert political influence
in 1952, much later than the M-Belt movement, for example, won 57.7% of the
votes in an electorate of 501598 and 80.0% of the seats in a total of 15 in
the areas it claimed for the creation of a state. Similarly the CUR
movement which was also only effective in 1954, again much later than the
M-Belt movement performed better in the 1959 elections than the UMBC party.
The CUR movement won 52.6% of the votes cast in an electorate of 824230 and
55.6% of seats in a total of 27 in the areas it claimed for the creation of
a state. In the M-Belt areas, however, the UMBC party won only 45.9% of the
total votes cast and 55.8% of the allocated seats and this was in some of
the core areas of the non-Islamic groups and societies rather than in the
areas it claimed for the creation of the M-Belt Region which included
Yoruba irredentist areas and strong holds of Islam like Niger Province. An
important factor that explains the rather lower electoral performance of
the UMBC party when compared to other Nigerian minorities movements for the
creation of states (the CUR and the MSM), is the mere geographical size of
the M-Belt areas in The North. COR and MSM in southern Nigeria, coped with
relatively smaller areas in the organization of their movements and
campaigns when compared to the territorial size of the M-Belt areas. For
example, the M-Belt areas of Adaniawa, Benue and Plateau Provinces, covered
some 73530 sq. N1s.of land area (about 26.1% of the land area in the
North), the whole of the CUR areas covered about 20737 sq1s . (70.3% of
Table 4.
The vote of minorities in the 1959 elections expressive
of electoral support for the creation of states in Nigeria
1inorities
	
Pro-State	 Number
rea in
	
Votes	 Number	 Creation	 of seats
Nigeria
	
Cast	 of seats	 Votes*	 wont	 %Votes	 %Seats
M-West Areas
in the Western	 501598	 15
	
289453
	
12
	
57.7	 80.0
Region
CUR Areas in
the Eastern
	
824230	 27
	
433412
	
15
	
52.6	 55.6
Region
M-Belt Areas
in The North	 793050	 43	 364213
	
24
	
45.9	 55.8
Total	 2118878	 85	 1087078
	
51
	
51.3	 60.0
;ource: K.W.J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and
dministration in a Developing System, Oxford, 1963, Appendix 0 p451 - p474.
rVotes and seats for UMBC-AG in The North; NCNC-MSM in the West; AG-COR and NDC
n the East.
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the Eastern Region) and the Mid-West only 14922	 (32.9% of the
Western Region 453 . Geographical distances and financial resources were
strong inhibiting factors to monopolize the electorate and shape the
outcome of the 1959 elections in the M-Belt areas, particularly so, with
the poor standards of communications in the M-Belt areas in that period.
Furthermore, the M-Belt movement did not have ready financial resources for
the organization of an overall M-Belt party until after 1956, when Joseph
Tarka negotiated an alliance with the AG party and leadership and only in
January, 1957, barely two years before the 1959 elections, did AG funds
become available in p ractical terms for the organization of the political
activities of the UMBC 454 •
 Thus the imminence of the 1959 elections meant
very little could be done besides the employment of an army of canversers
as organizing secretaries and polling agents 455 . As much as the issue of
state creation met the political needs of the UMBC party and the M-Belt
groups and societies in The North as well as other Nigerian minorities
movements and conditioned political support for the AG, the political
strategy of the AG leadership in supporting the minorities movements was
meant to gain political advantage over the dominant electoral political
position of the NPC in Nigerian Politics. Two fundamental reasons therefore
explained the UMBC-AG alliance in the particular period between 1957 and
1959 for the elections: AG had an avowed ideology to respect the
self-determination of minorities in their struggle to obtain a unit of
their own in the Nigerian Federation and therefore had both privately and
publicly committed its political rhetoric for the territorial rearrangement
of Nigeria, in which a M-Belt Region will be curved out of the North;
secondly the UMBC vote in the alliance, was meant to suggest political
identification of the electorate of the M-Belt areas with the AG party
rather than with the UMBC party in the struggle for control of political
power in the federation. An AG victory in the 1959 elections was therefore
meant to serve twin political purposes: to condition the fulfillment of
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"the M-Belt dream" of a Region separated from the Islamic society in The
North and give the AG political control of federal power.
From the point of view of the AG party, however, the alliance with the
UMBC was purely a tactical one. Chief Awolowo, for example Informed the
Nigerian Federal electoral commission that all votes and candidates counted
under 'the Palm Tree Symbol' were to be considered as Action Group, thus
absorbing the political identity of the UMBC party into the monolithic AG
party which he controlled directly456 . Chief Awolowo and the AG leadership
regarded the UMBC as more controlled by themselves rather than by Joseph
Tarka and others in the alliance and indeed this explains the confusion in
the party labels that were used in the M-Belt areas in 1959 in which some
areas were voting AG, while others as UMBC-AG and MBSP etc., rather than
the agreed common party label of UMBC-AG457.
However, in assessing votes apparent for the idea of the creation of a
M-Belt state, one must allow for the element of support for the government
in power in the NPC votes. Nowhere outside Tiv land, did the NPC party win
less than 20% in the constituencies in The North. Furthermore, the
subsequent Mid-Western example shows that the NCNC vote of 57.0% in the
1959 elections was increased to 582077 affirmative votes to 7218 negative
votes favouring the creation of the Mid-Western State with 98.8% in the
1963 Referendum for the creation of the state 458 . It is not unreasonable
therefore, to conclude that the 45.9% vote for the UMBC-Ag alliance in the
M-Belt areas in the 1959 elections might have substantially increased to
well over the constitutionally required level of at least 	 had the
inhabitants of the M-Belt areas ever been offered a plebiscite to approve
the creation of the new state.
Nevertheless, the electoral vote in the 1959 elections showed
political support for the alliance from among the M-Belt areas. After 1959
however, there was increasing decline of support for the UMBC and the AG
parties in the subsequent elections of 1961 and 1964. On the surface, this
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electoral decline can easily be taken to mean that there was also decline
for the political support of the ideas for the creation of the M-Belt
Region. However, the leadership of Joseph Tarka and the political support
of the liv people, complemented with some support coming from S.Zaria,
Plateau, S.Bauchi, Numan and Gwoza areas in Adamawa, continued to maintain
the interests of the creation of a M-Belt Region, despite reduced AG
support and the political impact of the effectiveness of the NPC party in
The North in suppressing the UMBC party by using different political
mechanisms, until the army came to control government and politics in
Nigeria in 1966. The AG, therefore, did not remain "a father-like-figure"
in the politics of the leadership of Joseph Tarka and other UMBC party
leaders as was put in the 1959 elections. Indeed, the UMBC-AG alliance in
itself, came third in the electoral contest in the 1959 elections, with the
NPC and the NCNC parties coming first and second respectively in the
electoral performance and thus forming the coalition government at
Independence in 1960. From that time onwards, UMBC support began to ebb,
all over the M-Belt areas, including the strong hold of the M-Belt movement
in liv Division. Many members of the UMBC in the NHA and the FHR joined the
NPC party after the 1961 elections. By 1965 only four members and one
Kanuri UMBC member effectively represented UMBC interests in the demands
for the creation of a M-Belt Region. These included: J.A. Amaichigh
(Ukum-Shitire), Isaac Shaahu (Gaav Shangev 11ev), Ibrahim Imam (Jemgbar),
Juliuos Ayua (Itiare/Masev) and Hong U. Uyeh (Kunav) 460
 Furthermore, of the
fourty eight members of the NFIA, elected from M-Belt constituencies only
five were UMBC party members against fourty three others who were either
NPC members or had become pro-Northern in their political statements and
activities on issues in the debates 461 . Ibrahim Iman, for example, had by
1965 become very pro-NPC and Northern in his statements, deeply sympathetic
to the causes of Northern unity in the Nigerian federation and was full of
praise for Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who was Premier of the
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Region 462 . Similar to the composition of the NHA, in FHR in 1965, of the 48
members in Parliament as representatives from constituencies in the M-Belt
areas, with twenty six of them adherents of the Christian religion, there
were only about ten who politically identified with the UMBC party 463 . The
party realignment of some of the supporters of the M-Belt movement from
(JMBC to the NPC party was so spontaneous that it is sometimes difficult to
explain adequately; for example, J.T. Orodi, the brother-in-law of Tarka
and the newly elected member into the FUR in Lagos from Ukum-Shirtere in
liv Division, 'crossed the carpet' to become NPC within a week of winning
the election on a UMBC ticket464.
Barely one year before the military coups of 1966 however support for
the ideas of the creation of a M-Belt Region was so split in liv land that
S.A. Atum, for example, suggested that the Tiv were slowly and
systematically becoming NPC and pro-North:
"We have very much associated ourselves with
the southern politicians. These people have a
strong belief that there would come a time when
all the people whom they call the Middle
Belters would come to fight for the creation of
the Middle Belt state. They suggested to us
that we should make this demand on grounds of
religion ... they say that if we are serious
about emphasizing the religious politics, they
would give us help of any kind. They further
told us that if we agree to take this line of
action (the Sardauna) would be annoyed and then
he would ask for our succession from the
Northern Nigeria, but this was in vain ... The
liv people have lost hope in the United Middle
Belt congress. We (the NPC) have aleady won
three safe seats from the United Middle Belt
Congress in Tiv Division and time will come
when the whole seats will be cleared by the
Northern Peoples Congress ... Everyone knows
that the agitation for the creatg of the
Middle Belt is now a dead issue"
Far from this assumed political exposition, there was still strong liv
opposition to the Northern establishment in the NPC party and support for
the UMBC, to the extent that secession was put forward as an option in the
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solution of the political problems in Tiv Division, albeit in other M-Belt
areas. Isaac Shaahu suggested that since there were failures of law and
order in liv Division:
"initiated by the Regional Government,
controlled by the Northern Peoples Congress,
because the NPC thought that it would not get a
single seat in Tiv Division as the opposition
party in the area is a stumbling block to their
victory ... the only course we can take now
since we are not wanted in the North, is to
pull out of the North and the federation as a
whole. We shall be a sovereign state. We shall
be joining nobody (the Eastern Region). We are
1200 000 in population bigger than the Gambia
and Muritania and we have the manpower and
every other thing ... if Tiv Division is going
to be split into smaller Native Authorities,
why can't you do the same to the 30 000 000
people of this Region. The liv are one. The
trouble in liv is internal, created by you
because you do not want justice to prevail
the liv will 4 ggll out of the Federation if they
are divided"
This extremely threatening demand by Isaac Shaahu was, however as a result
of spontaneous 'political pressures in the air' in the NI-IA rather than
serious political party policy of the UMBC or even representative of the
Tiv tribal union movement (TPU). Before the end of 1965, two other
developments further reduced the vigour of the IJMBC members in both the
NI-IA, Kaduna and the FI-IR in Lagos, who were still in opposition to the NPC
party and demanding the creation of the M-Belt Region. Firstly, the reports
which were constantly referred to in the NHA in 1965 and the personal
experiences of the FHR members and Civil Servants of Northern origins in
Lagos, suggesting that Northerners of all shades of opinion in religion and
politics, whether they were Christians or Moslems and whether they were
NPC, NEPU or UMBC:
"When once you are seen in the Northern attire
you become a victim irrespective of your party
affiliation ... some are intimidated, beaten,
locked up and goaled, because some of the
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policemen have UPGA inclination ... some
Northerners are even killed. Some members of
Parliament molested and even their cars thrown
at with stones ... civil servants of Northern
origins are asking for transfer back to Kaduna
because UPGA deceives the public that the
troubles (in Nigeria) are between the North and
South ... our lorries have been shot at with
guns, once they see that the lorries carry
plate numbers KA, KG, BE etc. Our convoy of
lorries from Kano had to pass through Ijebu
area during the day because they will never be
allowed to pass free at night ... Northerners
are being booed whenever they see them in
Northern costume; not only booing of the man
inside the car as the case may be, they have to
call the names of Sir Ahmadu Bello and Tafawa
Balewa ... (saying) go back to your Region,
this is not yourgjon. We (in the North) have
to take courage"
The second major factor that caused the decline of M-Belt movement and
supportthe UMBC party was the enactment of the Penal Code (Amendment) Law
1965, which effectively clumped down the political activities of opposition
forces in The North in general, but most particularly, those of the NEPU
and the UMBC parties. The Penal Code Law stated that no public gathering
ought to consist of more than three or four people without permission and a
section of the law stated: "it also covers abuse or bad language directed
from such an abuser to a group of persons or class of persons" 468 . However,
the reports on the troubles experienced by Northerners in Lagos and Western
Nigeria, caused bitter political resentments, because as much as they were
social and political they also concerned economic needs and interests of
Northern politicians who were businessmen and who had lost some of their
merchandise. As a result there was resurgence of the Northern identity in
both NPC and NPF (NEPU/UMBC) members in the NHA. While this was the case in
1965, the Penal Code Law created severe political constipation in the
practice of politics in The North with the Northern identity. The Penal
Code Law became the political instrument that destroyed popular
consciousness on the remaining political force of the UMBC and the demand
for the creation of a M-Belt Region, because it stopped the opposition from
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organizing for political purposes and campaigning, by the very nature of
its provisions which cut off freedom of speech, freedom of movement to
associate with others etc. As a direct result of this law, many liv
politicians as well as others politically sympathetic to the cause of the
UMBC party in Plateau, S.Bauchi and Numan were put in jail or under
political trails, when there was the military coup of 15th January 1966.
However in 1965 the NPC government admitted that the problems of the
political unity of the North remained unsettled largely because the
situation in liv Division,Loccassionally flaired up into rioting,
destruction of life and property; and the political unrest in the affairs
of Jos NA, directly involving the Birorn which led the government to appoint
a sole conunissioner 469 . lhe political effects of these developments were
that the ideas of the M-Belt Movement and the UMBC party were virtually
driven to remain only in the hearts of men with very little visible
political expression of their existence, except in small underground
circles and apparently by both the clients of the NPC as well as the
staiwaiks of the UMBC movement. In Tiv land the hidden quarrel between
Joseph Tarka and br Tiv had been dramatically ended in a public
reconcilliation two weeks before the 1966, January coup. Furthermore the
political dependence of Joseph Tarka upon Chief Awolowo who had been in
prison since 1962 was greatly reduced and his previous relations with NPC
parliamentarians had become quite close. The ground was therefore prepared
for his repproachrnent with the NPC and NEPU in a common Northern Front
after the January coup470.
The development and patterns of the alliances of the tJMBC party, with
other opposition parties to the NPC suggest that in the growth and
development of the M-Belt movements, as much as they generated a lot of
political attention from the government, the consistency of the demands
right from 1950, independently created new political interests and demands
from other dissatisfied groups in The North over the existing political
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arrangements. Thus, for example, the political interests in the demands of
the BYM, HFPP, ITP and those of the subsequent development of the KPP
within the organizational structure of NEPU, are as much explained by the
influences of the demands of the UMBC as by the peculiar circumstances of
the political and socio-economic conditions which caused the development of
subnational consciousness on some of the groups in The North. Although the
activities of the M-Belt Movement were essentially based in The North and
directed against the NPC party and government in the Region, it sought from
Southern Nigerian based political parties and other opposition groups
within The North, political support to achieve its goals with an overall
emphasis on the political re-arrangement of the Nigerian Federation for
national stability. Indeed, it was this outward looking conception of
Federalism in the political thought of the leadership in the UMBC that
contributed to the organization of the conditions of the Alliance with the
AG to contest the 1959 Federal elections and the 1961 Regional elections
and which subsequently influenced the realignment of the movement to join
the two broadly based political groups (NPF and UPGA) that emerged on the
Nigerian political arena to contest the 1964 and 1965 Federal and Regional
elections respectively. In both instances of political association with the
NPF and UPGA, the specific interest of the UMBC was to ensure the creation
of a M-Belt Region. Both the NPF and the UPGA had a commitment to the
creation of more states in Nigeria and the M-Belt State in particular. As
much as this was meant to adjust for an unbalanced Federation, it was also
an electoral strategy to neutralize the dominance of the NPC. In the NPF
manifesto for the 1964 elections, for example, it was unequivocally stated
that:
"The Northern Progressive Front shall see to it
immediately we come to power measures are taken
to revise our constitution so as to ensure
(that) more states are created after
ascertaining the views of the inhabitants of
the area concerned. This is to ensure stability
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and lasting unity for the Federation"471.
The NPF which was formed in 1963 was clearly an alliance of fellow
opponents of the Northern establishment but with significant ideological
differences in the NEPU and UMBC. Both parties in the NPF however aimed for
a radical revolution which could alter the existing state of political
arrangements in The North. The radicalism of NEPU contained 'Socialist
Thinking' and was directed at reforming the NA system in The North without
fundamentally departing from the territorial conception, albeit other
elements of the Northern Identity, while the UMBC envisaged a total rapture
in the Northern identity in the creation of an alternative North in a
M-Belt Region both in different ways remaining very committed to
maintaining a variant of the Northern Identity and northern interests in
the Nigerian polity. NEPU accused the NPC of destroying The North because
its political power base was founded on feudal roots and on first and last
defence of property and privilege and rear-guard action against equality,
entrenched over the years by the family compact rule and rulers, the
undemocratic electoral college system and the evil of the 10%
nomination 472 . NEPU found its main political support from among the
'Talakawa' which it defined as "the simple people of Nigeria": the
teachers, the clerks, the petty traders, the farm peasants, the lorry
drivers, the truck pusher, the women and the ex-servicemen etc" 473 . The
party advocated the introduction of political democracy (for example,
giving the people what they want which was an anti-thesis to the chief
giving commands on what the people want. This fitted very much to M-Belt
ethos who were not used to centralized authority patterns) which will
dismantle feudal political control in The North 474 . The socialist flavour
of the language of the NEPU reflects their militant radicalism. For NEPU,
for example, the political struggle in The North was a class struggle:
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"Owing to the family compact rule of the so
called Native Administration in their present
autocratic form ... this unscrupulous and
vicious system of administration by the family
compact rulers and which has been established
and fully supported by the British Imperialist
Government ... there is today in our society an
antagonism of interest, manifesting itself as a
class struggle, between the members of that
vicious circle of Native Administration on the
one hand and the ordinary 'Talakawa' on the
other ... this antagonism can be abolished only
by the emancipation of the Talakawa from the
domination of these privileged few by the
reform of the present autocratic political
institutions ... this emancipation must be the
work of the Talakawa themselves ... the
Talakawa must organize consciously and
politically for the conquest of Government
both nationally and locally ... in order that
this machinery of Government ... may be
converted from an instrument of oppression into
the agent of emancipation, and the overthrow of
Bureaucracy and autocratic privilege ... all
political parties are but the expression of
class interest, and as the interest of the
Talakawa is diametrically opposed to the
interest of all sections of the master class
the party seeking must naturally be hostile
to the party of the oppressors. The Northern
Elements Progressive Union of Northern Nigeria
being the only political party of the
Talakawa enters the field of political action
determined to reduce to nonentity any party of
hypocrites and traitors ... calls upon all the
sons and daughters of Northern Nigeria to
muster under its banner to end ... this vicious
system of administration which deprives them of
the fruits of their labour and POVERTY may give
place to COMFORT, PRIVELEGE to EQUALITY and
politica,, economic and social SLAVERY to
FREEDOM" ''i.
The radicalism of the UMBC also contained 'Socialist Thinking' in the sense
that it had avowed commitment of defending the poor and the opressed. What
therefore joined the UMBC and NEPU in the NPF was a common hostility toward
the NPC and the Northern establishment which manifested these
characteristic and advantages, particularly in the period between 1960 and
1965. The UMBC therefore directed its organization of politics at the
destruction and alteration of the political power base of the Northern
establishment manifested in the NPC by its demand for the creation of a
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M-Belt Region as a means of liberation. One of its committed pledges within
the NPF alliance was a stated belief in socialism: "I acknowledge the
arrangement and conduct of affairs of the land for the benefit of the
'Talakawa'": the simple people of Nigeria" 476 . Thus the demand for state
creation by the UMBC became connected to a radical progressive cause both
in terms of the content of the NPF program whose contents were directed at
the twin-goal of revolutionary transformation and reform of the NA system,
the power base of the northern establishment and the NPC party. The
UMBC-NEPU alliance in the NPF subsequently developed its influence into the
Nigerian political arena and joined forces with the AG and the NCNC and
their allies to assume the name, United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).
Among others, the stated objectives of the UPGA were that once elected to
control political power in the Federation:
"An UPGA Government will minimise minorities as
much as administrative efficiency will permit
perform a once-for-all exercise to settle
the question of states for all time ... (by)
breaking up the federation into such number of
states as will ensure national unity and
progress. A Middle Belt state, a Kano state, a
Calabar state and all other states for whose
creation there is popular demand in the areas
concerned will be created SIMULTANEOUSLY and in
conformity with the principles of national
unity, economic viability and economic
progress. The Alliance Government will set up
without del 7a constituent Assembly to create
new states" '.
Despite this alliance, however, it was clear that the NPF by its name alone
stood for the interests of The North foremost and then those of the
Nigerian Federation. In addition to the territorially defined interest in
the label of the party, for example, the NPF manifesto made a clear pledge
to the Northern electorate for the 1964 elections:
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"To protect the interest of the people of the
North and ensure that Northern Nigeria's due
share in the national cake is always given to
its people. To draw up special training schemes
for training northerners in various fields
with a view to obtaining necessary personnel
from the North in all branches of the federal
government set up. To extend federal
institutions of higher learning such as
univeristy, teaching, hospitals etc., to the
Regions ... and to establish industrial
projects in places like Kano, Plateau and
Sokoto, where none at present exist. To put
into effect immediately our plans for the
indigenous Northern Traders for their full
participation in our economic life. To restore
individual liberty, re-establish the rule of
the law, respect for human dignity and
fundamental human rights to every inhabitant of
the North and the federation. The party stands
for freedom, justice, ocracy and prosperity
for the common people"
The political association of the UMBC with NEPU in the NPF alliance, is
explained by the withering away of the AG alliance with the UMBC because
funds ceased to be forth coming to the UMBC after the 1961 regional
elections, the subsequent AG crisis in 1962 in which many UMBC politicians
were tried in court and Awolowo ended up jailed for treason. The NPF
alliance was also conditioned by the UMBC effort to wriggle itself out of
increasing pressures to assume total identification with the AG, a
situation which might have caused the party to loose its political identity
to the AG and for Joseph Tarka to become a total client of Awolowo and the
AG leadership. Indeed it became apparent that with the enormous increase of
the political influence of Joseph Tarka in the period between 1956 and 1962
there was little political sense in resisting patron-client relationships
with the NPC in The North, only to end up being a client of the AG from
Ibadan and a different region. However, the alliance of the northern
opposition parties as equals in the NPF to Southern Nigerian political
parties, is explained by the consistent inclusion of the issue of the
creation of a M-Belt Region in the manifesto of the AG as well as by the
re-alignment of the NPC party with the United Peoples Party (UPP) which
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became the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) under Samuel Akintola
and subsequently the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), the political rival
to the UPGA, in the 1964 elections.
The volatile nature of the alliances of the M-Belt movement in the
period between 1952 and 1965 are explained by a number of factors. In many
respects this was due to the composition of the leadership in the
organization which came from different tribal backgrounds; how the
leadership had cultivated itself from different factions in the movement
rather than as a spontaneous group that emerged and organized itself with
continuity in holding its leadership posts; and the state of local
political issues affecting the different tribal representatives in the
M-Belt movement. Thus, for example, when tensions between Birom and Hausa
surfaced in Jos onto the local political arena, there was division between
the NPC and the Birorn, with consequent support for the IJMBC from the Birom.
In certain instances, when some Birom had derivable political interests
from the NPC government in The North like creating a Rwang Pam dynasty on
the chieftaincy of Jos, they joined the NPC, while those in protest
remained in the UMBC. This was a recurrent situation in Birom politics,
although not unique to them since many other M-Belt groups shuttled their
political support between the NPC and the UMBC for similar reasons. However
most of the leaders all shared a communality of identity in the M-Belt
movement which had roots in the christian religion and which was the
initial driving force that brought together local leaders as social and
political minorities in The North. Political cleavages in the M-Belt
movement which also conditioned changes in alliances are also explained by
personality clashes and recollected histories of local acrimonies between
neighbouring groups. Furthermore, the interpersonal relationships in the
evaluation of the different leaders of the tribal unions and parties in the
organization of the M-Belt movement which had no indigenous patron or
coherent party policy and machinery to which members could be accountable
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compounded the problems of leadership and the difference in party political
policies remained unsolved. These tendencies resulted into constantly
changing strategies and political alliances. Despite these organizational
defects, the sentiments and dreams of the M-Belt movement survived until
1966 when the military intervened in Nigerian politics and were to
influence the cause for the eventual subdivision of the country into more
units of the federation in 1967. This suggests that the aims and objectives
of the M-Belt Movement never really changed. What seemed to have
consistently changed was label, strategy, direction of appeal and
leadership of the organization until 1956 when Joseph Tarka and the liv
took over the organization and leadership of the M-Belt Movement with over
90% of the Tiv support. These developments in the M-Belt movement however
provided stop gaps for political reflections in which some of the leaders
not only narrowed the areas claimed by the founding fathers of the M-Belt
movement but also expanded the conceptions of Northern minorities on the
practice of Nigerian Federalism to include other Nigerian cultural
minorities in the context of the Nigerian national identity, and how the
nation might develop with stability when there are smaller units in the
Federation. However, in its growth and development, the M-Belt movement
exhibited political characteristics which indicate a number of elements in
the political behaviour patterns of movements and organizations reacting in
circumstances of colonialism, which in this instance is internal
colonialism within the British created borders of The North: the movement
which starts off very well with coherent unity from a mobilized political
identity, soon becomes characterized by factional tendencies despite avowed
commitments to the aims and objectives by the leadership; the factions are
largely developed from the penetration and influence on the activities of
the movement by forces of the establishment; where a Messiah like figure
does not emerge to take over leadership and sufficiently influence
revisionists within the initial aims and objectives of the movement, the
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factions soon give way to the antics of scrupulous leaders who exploit the
internal divisions among themselves to make personal advancement as they
become functional middle-men in the cause of the establishment. The
majority of the middle-men from among the M-Belt people existed dependently
on the groups in control of political power and government in The North.
For those that functioned to neutralize the M-Belt movement, particularly
the UMBC, they were tied in unequal relationships as clients to the Islamic
politicians in the NPC and government in The North, as the grand-patrons.
The fundamental political mechanism besides the use of the repressive
instruments of the government in The North, like the courts, the prisons,
the NA administration, the police and the army, which was the main
anchorage in holding and maintaining The North as one political unit in the
Nigerian Federation was in the useage of patron-client relationships in the
conduct of politics of The North to handle the M-Belt problem.
Patron-client relationships in themselves are often apparently inadequate
in the practise of politics. The deployment of the mechanism becomes
critical in a plural society as The North and particularly so where there
are disparties in the public policy priorities of the leadership which was
from different socio-religious and cultural backgrounds as well as unequal
access to decision making and the control of economic wealth from the
historical evolution of the particular society whereby some of the
leadership was given advantages over others. Although with endemic
inequality, patron-client relationship in politics tend to hold a diverse
society together and minimize conflict. The assumed tendency is directed
toward integration, particularly so when the geographical size of the
territory is vast as The North was, as a unit of the Nigerian Federation
since the relationship is emphatic of an existing subordinate (the client)
to a superordinate (the patron) who are slike_mindeds on issues affecting
their society. The relationship also emphasizes working together toward
each others interests: the periphery person (the client) is instrumental in
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producing political support for the centre (the patron) and the centre
reciprocates by meeting certain inputs from the periphery and also produces
certain services. The success for such a relationship to benefit the total
society is however depended on the role the individual decides to perform
as the functional client. The client can fulfill pro-status quo objectives
or set out a role in which he defines the needs of his tribal people or the
people he represents and uses his unique advantages of being close to
political decision making to bargain from the government, the distribution
of amenities to his area479 . The critical factor in the smooth operation of
patron-client relationship in the functioning of the components however is
whether the objectives in the relationship are imposed from above or
conciliated as equals. Thus, it is possible for example for clients to
perpetuate conflict and political resistance to integration among the
people they represent when their roles are parasitic and neferious on the
patrons as well as being non-representative by picking on the wrong
personality to the detriment of the group and society they claim to
represent480 . Objectively however, clients usually can be instrumental in
resolving parochial images in the divisions of society at the lower levels
and can be concerned to solve problems at the local levels and thus
decongest the central leadership particularly so where the patron is an
independent arbitrator. In The North albeit in the practice of Nigerian
politics political clients usually assumed local leadership as maximizers
of government benefits to their areas, since they bargain for the equitable
distribution and share of scarce resources to their areas while they canvas
support for the ruling party or stand as the nerve of the community as
opinion leaders to produce support and explanations of a government.
The patron-client relationships that characterized the politics of The
North in the period between 1959 and 1965, managed to hold that unit of the
Nigerian Federation as one political entity, despite the existence of
political tensions, dating from 1950, which had resulted into the
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organization of a M-Belt movement and the demands for the subdivision of
The North into a M-Belt Region, a Borno State and Kano State. In the
instance of Kano in 1963, the Emir had been humiliated, having challenged
the authority of the Sardauna. The Emir was probed and exposed in the
Muffet Commission and subsequently deposed and exiled. These political
events cut off the discipline of Kano as effective actor in the Islamic
fold under Sokoto in The North. Subsequently the resentment over the
treatment of the Emir by the Sardauna compounded the political tensions
between the NEPU and the NPC, and found expression in the organization of
demands for the creation of a Kano state by the KPP. In consequence there
was political support of the causes for the creation of a M-Belt Region in
the NPF. However, in the early 1950s some M-Belt political and religious
leaders became clients of the NPC party and leadership and were given posts
of responsibility in the NPC governments in The North and at the Federal
Centre of power. Patron-client mechanisms in the relationships between the
NPC and the M-Belt movement were therefore responsible for the decline of
political opposition in The North in general. More specifically, the
patron-client relationships were responsible for the decline of political
support for the M-Belt movement in the period between 1960 and 1965. In
that period the NPC party and leadership successfully built up
patron-client relationships with some leaders of the M-Belt movement on the
Plateau, S.Bauchi, Numan areas and in S.Zaria as well as in Benue among the
Idoma and the Jukun of Wukari. They were, however, less successful in
establishing clientage among leaders of the M-Belt movement in Tiv land,
where they ended up recruiting unpopular local persons as clients and most
of the popular Tiv leadership under Joseph Tarka was not penetrateable.
The building up of clients from among the M-Belt groups and societies
and the effective role of the grand patron relationship was to a large
extent the function of the charismatic leadership of Ahmadu Bello, the
Sardauna of Sokoto. His charismatic qualities as a leader were acknowledged
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to be powerful, not only in the Islamic society and the M-Belt areas in The
North, but also in other Regions of Nigeria as well as in other parts of
the world, particularly in the Arab countries and the Middle East where
Islam was strong. In The North, the charismatic leadership of the Sardauna
was complimented by his personal human qualities: He was a tall man who
dwarfed others in height and body build; and by nature, a very generous
man. He gave friends, close associates and of course his clients generous
gifts: gowns, money, watches and entertained lavishly. The need for
patron-client relationships arouse out of the need to bring into the main
stream of the affairs of The North, political leadership from among the
non-Islamic groups and societies in the M-Belt areas, in support of the
causes of consolidating the Northern identity which was in the philosophy
of the NPC party that was dominated by leadership from the Islamic centres
of religious power in The North. There was also the need to maintain The
North as one Region to serve as an effective homogeneous bloc solidly
poised against electoral political competition with Southern Nigerian based
political parties for control of political power in the Federation and who
were increasingly gaining grounds in political support in The North.
Although there was some success in the establishment of political clients
from among the M-Belt movement as well as from other opposition groups in
The North, the increased recourse to use of suppressive political methods
to protect the clients suggest that the Sardauna, the grand patron of the
relationships chose the wrong clients from the M-Belt areas, Borno and
Kano, where there were overt demands for the subdivision of The North in
the period between 1960 and 1965. The suppression of rival political
leadership who contested with the clients of the NPC party in the exercise
of local political influence in the M-Belt areas, where the UMBC party
actively operated, was rampant in the 1961 (Regional) and 1964 (Federal)
elections. Suppression of opposition leadership was also rampant in Bomb
where there was the BYM, which was previously in the NPC, but subsequently
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changed and aligned itself with the UMBC and the AG. In Kano, the strong
seat of the radical NEP(J opposition party, the NPC also used suppressive
political methods 481 . In 1965 alone, for example, there were over 500 Tiv
people as political prisoners who were in jail as a result of te 1964 riots
in Tiv land and whose political identity was that of the UMBC party 482 . In
the two post-independence elections in The North it was not only a question
o neutralizing political opposition leaders and some of the members of
their political organizations by putting them into prisons, but the NPC
methods of suppression also involved the intimidation of the electorate in
the particular areas where it was assumed, anti-NPC sentiments were
strongest. However political thugs were used by all political parties to
intimidate the electorate. In Benue Province, for example, supporters of
the NPC party by the 'Young Pioneers' of Joseph Tarka just as the
supporters of the UMBC party were similarly tackled by the 'Youth Brigade'
of the Sardauna 483 . However, political thugs of the NPC, who carried out
intimidation on tJMBC party supporters, were usually protected by sections
of the arms of the law enforcement agencies: the police and the courts,
whose agents were in support of the party in government. The extra legal
methods that were employed by the NPC party and its supporters in the
electoral processes were meant to ensure total victory in the elections in
The North. The use of patron-client mechanisms and the methods of
protecting the clients by the government of the NPC, virtually drove the
M-Belt movement underground in its political activities as well as
expressions of sentiments for the organization, except for Tiv-land where
in reaction to the circumstances, there were riots and political unease
over the creation of the M-Belt Region until 1966 when the Nigerian Army
intervened in Nigerian Politics. One consequence of the establishment of
patron-client relationships with some of the leadership of the non-Islamic
groups and societies in the M-Belt areas, was a resultant dependency on the
authority of the Sardauna, whose clients managed the M-Belt areas on behalf
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of the Islamic society and within the overall interests of The North. The
client became tied in this relationship by underlining Islamic ethos and
Hausa culture in their social and political behaviour in the name of the
preservation of the Northern Identity. Furthermore, the style and pattern
of recruiting the political clientele and their subsequent political and
social behaviour upon recruitment which in most instances was characterized
by despising UMBC leaders, indicated the gradualist processes by which
patron-client relationships were increasingly translating themselves into
Islamization and these were complimented by enormous material rewards. The
Sardauna always hand picked the clients himself from the M-Belt groups and
societies. The choice of client was based on the strength of local opinions
on the particular individual which were passed on to him by planted
observers in the Islamic communities among the M-Belt areas and in some
instances, by pro-status-quo Administrative Officers (the Residents, DOs
and ADOs) who served in areas where a client was required. Particularly
implemented in seeking support for the NPC was the creation of the
institution of the Provincial Commissioner with the overtly political role
of heading the Provincial Administration and subsequently took over more of
the roles of the colonial Residents as they existed before Independence in
1960.
In addition to the patron-client relationships in the practice of
politics in The North, which were used to check political opposition in the
M-Belt areas and to neutralize the leadership of the UMBC, who were
demanding the creation of a M-Belt Region, there was developed a policy of
Northernization by the NPC party in control of government in The North in
the period between 1952 and 1956. This policy was vigourously implemented
in the period between 1956 and 1965 and it negatively affected the M-Belt
groups and societies who still held sentiments for the UMBC, particularly
so, after the attainment of self-government by The North and the Federal
elections of 1959. However, the policy surfaced into the political arena
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with the Increased political influence of the NPC party in the 1952
elections and the political power of the government in The North, after the
Regionalization of wealth in 1954484. Thereafter, the party formalized the
policy into a declared political philosophy of the leadership and followers
of the NPC. The roots of the policy of Northernization were shaped by the
"Nigerianizatjon" of the civil service, particularly in the period between
1954 and 1955485 Nigerianization had developed from the political
pressures of Southern Nigerian based political parties, who pressed for the
wholesale rep lacement throughout the country of British officials by
Nigerians486 The NPC party and political leadership in The North however
claimed: N i g erianjtion would mean "Southernization" and they would have
none of it 487 In reaction therefore, the Northern leadership insisted that
in The North:
" in future, posts requiring no particular
qualification must be the exclusive preserve of
their own people (Northerners). Other posts
requiring special qualifications must only be
filled from outside when no Northerner in any
way suitable was available and any importations
must, come from Britain or from other foreign
countries, for they would in due course return
to their homeland. Only if there was no
alternative source of supply would they be
recruite 0 roni the Eastern or Western
Regions"
Before the policy was defined, Northernization created confusion and both
backbench members in the NEIA and other influential political personalities
produced pressures on Ministers: To replace "alien" civil servants,
wholesale from an apparently inexhaustive though purely hypothetical pool
of "deserving Northerners" 489
, until the Sardauna made the policy clearer
in 1954:
"Nearly every week I get over 100 applications
from Northerners for employment ... people
think being a Northerner is the only
qualification required ... These letters mostly
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come from people with Elementary IV
qualifications, asking either for senior
service posts or Chief Clerks jobs in the
Administration. May I warn members that being a
Northerner is not a qualification. Many people
have taken it for granted that so long as I am
a Northerner I must be given the privilege of
being a Northerner. If he is a genuine
Northerner, let him prove that he is the type
of person who has come forw
	 to work for the
people and not for himself"
This conception of the "genuine Northerner" introduced a lot of suspicion
on the whole policy of Northernization among the M-Belt groups and
societies. Indeed, the majority of people with Elementary IV Primary School
Certificates and above in The North according to the 1952 census were from
Plateau, Numan S.Zaria, Benue, Kabba and Ilorin areas and were produced
from Christian Missionary Institutions 49 . The philosophy of the NPC party
was that of the preservation of The North and this was strongly reflected
in its Motto in the Constitution and Rulers: One North, One People,
Irrespective of Religion, Rank or Tribe. Furthermore, among other
objectives and requirements of membership, the NPC party was committed:
"To inculcate in the minds of the Northerners a
genuine love for the Northern Region and all
that is Northern and a special reverence for
Religion, Laws and Order and the preservation
of good customs and traditions and the feeling
that the sorrow of one Northerner shall be the
sorrow of all and that the happiness of one is
also the happiness of all ... membership (of
the party) is open to all people of Northern
Nigerian decent irrespective of creed, rank or
tribe and members shall submit to Party
discipline and loyalty 4 d accept the
leadership of the NPC"
Thereafter the policy was redefined consistently in terms of jobs and other
Northern interests as a whole on the Nigerian political arena. In 1956, for
example, according to Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of The North,
Northernization policy meant: "the filling of posts in this our Regional
Public Service by the sons and daughters of the North, duly qualified by
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education, training, experience and intelligence" 493 . The policy was
initially pushed so hard that it produced enormous increases in the jobs
that Northerners gained with the Regional government within a very short
period of time; for example, while in 1952, there were 1,633 Northerners in
the Junior Posts of the Public Service and twenty five in the Senior Posts,
by 1956 there were 2356 Northerners in the Junior Posts, an increase of 48%
and sixty two in the Senior Posts, an increase of 148%. In 1958, the
policy was such a political issue largely from the leakage of top
government secrets on the submission of the Government of The North to the
Commission on Minorities that the Sardauna suggested to members of the NHA:
"The policy of Northernization is more or less like our pillows .. each one
of us sleeps on it and gets up Ofl it"495 As lately as in 1965,
Northernization was expanded in definition by Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of
The North to mean a situation whereby the government in The North:
"can Northernize everything in the North
since it happens in the East and West and
throughout the Federation. Northernization does
not mean the clerks in the office. A Northern
Doctor, Engineer and Planning Officers are
parts of what we call Northernization. Not only
this but I would want to see that our market
stalls are being held and run by Northerners. I
would like to see that whenever any of us want
to build a house and in whatever remote corner
it may be, the labourers and the supervisors be
Northerners. That in actual fact,
Northernization does not just stop in the
office of
	 Government or the Native
Authority" '.
Symbolically, Northernization was also strongly associated with the mode of
dressing in the Hausa-Fulani Islamic culture in The North and any person(s)
who dressed otherwise were regarded as outsiders: S.A. Atum, for example, a
Tiv member and christian, who cross-carpeted to become NPC, accused UMBC
members in the NHA thus:
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"It is quite clear from the dresses worn by
these United Middle Belt Congress members in
this chamber that they have excluded themselves
from us. They are in 5 glish dress while we are
in National Costumes	 , which we are so proud
of. They are wearing this type of dress
purposely in ordg5 2to enter into any village
and kill people"
The political instruments that were used to translate the policy of
Northernization into reality and into acceptance as the Northern Identity
was in the building up of patron-client relationships who in turn were
Hausanized and sometimes Islamized. There were also generous material
rewards to individuals who responded positively to the acceptance of the
Northern Identity and with the support of their tribal groups and societies
they also gained shares of social-welfare, economic and political benefits
from the NPC government. Northernization policy however was largely
responsible for causing the reinvigouration of Hausaization and
Islamization. In the period between 1961 and 1965 for example, proficiency
in the Hausa language became a measure for screening for
"genuine-northerners" and for a successful career in the Northern Civil
Service. Furthermore, being Moslem fitted with the social and political
culture of The North and was also a boost to new opportunities with greater
material rewards and money. This became apparent in context of the Islamic
'conversion tours' of Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, in the period
between 1964 and 1965. Among the non-Islamic M-Belt groups and societies
and in particular, among the Christian Communities on the Plateau, Numan
areas In Adamawa, S.Bauchi, and S.Zaria, these political developments in
context of the campaigns for the 1964 Federal elections and the 1965
Regional elections, were religious developments by the use of government
power, to complete the Islamic eclipse of The North and making Northern
Nigeria 'an Islamic State' while increasing Islamic influences within the
Nigerian Federation. Although there were ambivalent reactions from the
M-Belt groups and societies to these political developments, they
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systematically wore down political support for the tJMBC party, whose
electoral victories became narrowed to liv land. In Benue and Plateau
Provinces, where there was a core concentration of the non-Islamic groups
and societies in The North for example, actual votes as a % of Registered
votes for the UMBC party declined from 51.1% in 1959 to 38.3% in 1961 in
Benue and from 39.2% in 1959 to 21.1% in 1961 in Plateau 503 . In all of the
other M-Belt areas and the Yoruba irredentist areas of Kabba and Ilorin,
there were substantial decreases in votes for the UMBC party in the 1961
elections within the average decrease of 6.1% for the whole of the Northern
Region 504 . Subsequently in the 1964 federal elections, there was a decrease
of about 21.8% in the votes cast in support of opposition groups in the
NPF, when compared to their political performance in similar elections in
1959505. In the midst of declining political support for the UMBC party the
reactions to the political antics of the NPC party by some of the M-Belt
groups and societies included organized riots - as was the case with the
Tiv in 1960/61 and 1964/65. The 1964 riots in Tiv land, being far more
bloodier than those of 1960; clashes and skirmishes between members of
different political parties - as was the case with the NPC, mainly
consisting of Hausa migrant workers and traders against the UMBC,
consisting of Birom, indigenous to Vorn in November/December 1964; and the
tribal revolt of the Jarawa against the NPC in 1964 centred on Fobur.
However, while the Tiv riots of 1960/61 had been over resentment on the
failure to create the M-Belt Region as well as over the increased
oppression in the NPC policies in the government of The North acting
through the Chief of Tiv and the NA apparatus in which the Tiv were coerced
into supporting the NPC as against the UMBC/AG alliance, the 1964/65 riots
were ostensibly against the political behaviour of NPC clients in Tiv land,
who victimized the NA staff sympathetic to the UMBC, arrested and
intimidated party political opponents and the dismissal of some tax
collectors 506 . There was also resentment over attempts by government in The
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North to plant NPC surrogates to dominate the Provincial Council for Benue
and the Tiv Advisory Council 507 . In both instances of the 1960 ad 1964
disturbances however, the Tiv were reacting against the imposition of MPG
political authority and the abuse of power that was exercised by NPC
clients in liv land and of course the activation of this political
consciousness by the UMBC party 508 . A much more broadly based reaction to
the political developments that affected the Christian religious identity
among the M-Belt groups and societies, which criss-crossed tribal political
identities in context of Northernization policy, the processes of
Hausaization and Islamization in the building of patron-client
relationships with some selected M-Belt Leaders, was the Northernization of
M-Belt christian organization. The collective Christian reaction expressed
itself in the formation of the Northern Christian Association (NCA) of
Nigeria in 1964°. The NCA was supportd by the different European
Christian Missionary Bodies in The North. The organization of the
Association however was in direct response to the anxieties that were
caused by the Islamic Religious posture that were assumed by the Sardauna
of Sokoto. A part from his socio-religious and political roots in Sokoto,
as a direct descendant from dan Fodio, the Sardauna visited holy places in
Saudi Arabia and made rather more frequent pilgrimages to Mecca than usual,
was instrumental in getting grants of money for Islamic work in The North
(mainly for the building of prestigious memorial Mosques and the purchase
and circulation of Islamic literature) from wealthy Arabs, was
Vice-President of the World Islamic Congress and began religious campaign
tours which were given great publicity on the numbers of convertions he
achieved each day 510 . The publicity given to the tours created false images
when it was suggested that "pagan" communities converted wholesale to Islam
and the non-Christian population was being increasingly Islamized 511 . The
new converts were encouraged to maintain the Islamic faith by instant cash
payments, given cows, blankets, foodstuff, as well as cash donations to
I
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errect Mosques, by the Sardauna and members of his enormous entourage. The
anxieties created by the Islamic postures and conversion tours of the
Sardauna, were not only restricted to christians in The North. In January,
1964, M.Tijanai Gago Au, the Secretary in the Central office of the NEPU
party in Jos, whose support came from Moslems, was obliged to advise the
Sardauna:
"To stop speaking as 'the voice of Islam' in
Nigeria, because he was the Premier of The
North and not the Chief Imam ... To conduct
himself like Aminu Kano, who goes outside
Nigeria, only with the permission of the
Federal Government of Nigeria ... and that if
the Premier was not ready to listen to advice,
he should resign as Premier of the North to
become the Chief Imarn of Nigeria ... soonest he
does that, then will he be in line with his
great-gat grandfather, the Shehu - Usman dan
Fodlo"
Among other reasons, the NCA was formed to watch over the interests of
Christians in The North irrespective of their tribe, party or
denomination5l2b. The Association was also meant:
"To safeguard the Christian religious interest
of persons, churches and institutions. To bring
to the attention of all concerned the fact that
the Christian religion is a native ang1ntegral
part of the life of Northern Nigeria"
The headquarters of the NCA was at Kaduna, the seat of the NPC government
and capital of The North, a political and religious decision that was made
to distant the Association from any suspicion of European Christian
Missionary influences, were its location to be in Jos 514 . The President of
the Association was Joly Tanko Yusufu, who was a prominent top member of
the NPC party and also provincial commissioner for Benue 515 . In his
capacity as President of the NCA, he tried to allay the arxieties of
Christians in The North with an article in the leading newspaper, the
Nigerian Citizen in November 1965516. Furthermore, he frequently denied in
-9 40-
public that there was any intolerance in the Northern Government and his
committee in the NCA always investigated cases of alleged religious and
political intolerance in The North and always urged Christians to
evangelise without fear517.
Although the NCA used a geographical conception of identity which made
it very Northern in political identity its major roles were centred on the
Christian religion rather than the politics of the M-Belt movement in The
North. It however symbolically represented religious pluralism in the
Northern Identity and support for the NPC party. The NCA was subsequently
used to score political goals against alleged Islamic domination and
Islamic intolerance of non-Islamic faiths in government and society in The
North. This became particularly the case when the NCA was politically
involved in defussing tensions between Christian and Moslem institutions
that were generated by Northernization in which certain elements of
implementing the policy contained Hausaization and Islamization.
Furthermore, the NCA did not have a political role in the UMBC movement and
infact, did not influence or create any religious political impact on the
causes of the M-Belt movement and the organization of demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region. If anything else, by the very nature of the
political identity of the President, Jallo Tanko Yusufu, who was NPC, the
NCA stood for One North in conforming to the philosophy of the NPC and was
against the creation of a M-Belt Region. Mallam Jallo Tanko Yusufu was
infact accused by Isaac Shaahu, a Tiv member in the NHA for master minding
the Tiv riots of 1964:
"The 1963 troubles were introduced by the
Commissioner. He planned, organized promoted
and also supervised (the troubles). In the
samev 1963, it was Tanko Yusufu who led the
Northern Peoples Congress lecture in Gboko (in
which) he instructed Clan Heads, District
Heads, Chiefs and everybody (that was NPC) to
start oppression on United Middle Congress
Supporters ... He forgot one important thing;
that Clan Heads and Members of the judiciary
-9 41-
are not supposed to take part in PoliticsuSlB.
Since 1964 the NCA has remained articulately religious and maintained
its avowed interests over the protection of Northern Christians. It was the
organization that laid the foundati on for the "New Life for All" Protestant
Christian movement which after 1965 was vigourously involved in Christian
revivalist crusades on the Plateau and in S.Zaria and subsequently expanded
these to other M-Belt areas. The crusades were the direct reaction to the
assumed productive results of the conversion tours of the Sardauna, in the
expansion of Islam in The North. In 1965, in particular, the 'New Life for
All' campaigns involved evangelisation on a large scale and the
participation of indigenous Christians not previously involved in it519.
30,000 attended weekly classes and there were 700 prayer groups in Plateau
and S.Zaria alone 520 . Most of these participants were however from the
reserves of the unemployed Primary School leavers. The figures for
unemployment for this category of persons were unusually high in S.Zaria
and Plateau, most of whom had passed from Christian Missionary Primary
Schools 521 . The response to the 'New Life for All' campaign however
demonstrated that in reaction to the conversion tours, the church was
concerned not only with the calling of individuals, but entire communities
which had been systematically visited. The largest crowd ever to gather was
at the massive Ahmadu Bello Sports Stadium at Kaduna at the final rally of
a week long campaign in the town in 1965 which Christians from all over The
North participated 522 . However the NCA movement was not intended to be
political, but it ended up having an important political effect in
solidifying the cause of identities of the non-Muslim North. In a sense, it
was a political surrogate to replace dwindling UMBC oriented political
support.
By 1966 the power of the Sardauna over The North was personalized and
appeared to be irrernoveable by political means. He personified what the
Hausa termed as "Ikko" or "prestigious power" and apparently his power,
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albeit conceptions of power in Nigerian politics, had an inherent
attractiveness. By 1966 also, the M-Belt movement had been gradually
reduced in its strength except in four constituencies in liv land where
elections were still won by the opposition force. The NPC had consistently
won elections in The North as a result of defections by members of the UMBC
party who joined the NPC and by the blatant election rigging that were
particularly characteristic of the 1964 elections. The effects of these
political developments were that the desire for the creation of a M-Belt
Region was driven underground rather than extinguished. It was only revived
in the two coups of January and July 1966 and from the acceptance of power
by a man of M-Belt origins, dedicated to preserving the Nigerian Federation
by creating more states and thus deciding to break up The North.
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1. Interview Discussions with JOnah Assadugu, Moses Nyam Rwang and
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11. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotry, January, 1981; For more
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12. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
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MacKintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics, London, 1965,
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17. Sharwood-Smith, 1969, p333.
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19. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Azi Nyako, Moses Nyam Rwang
and Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
20. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and
Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
21. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
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24. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor
David Lot, January, 1981.
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26. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang and
Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
27. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and
Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
28. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and
Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
29. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu,
January, 1981.
30. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu,
January, 1981; Moses Nyam Rwang however maintains that the funds were
given to him when he was Treasurer and Pastor Lot was President of
the MZL movement and further suggests that the structures he built as
MZL headquarters were standard buildings; and that the lots of money
he is alleged to have had at the time and build personal houses, was
from his Army pension benefits.
31. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lotot,
January, 1981.
32. The factional tendencies which weakened the cohesion of the M-Belt
Movement in the period betwee 1951 and 1956 are examined in Section
IV of this chapter where the M-Belt Political Parties for the
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33. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, Moses Nyani Rwang and
Pastor David Lot, January, 1981; See also Dudley, 1968, p92 - 93.
34. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
35. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and
Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
36. Interview Discussions with Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
37. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
38. This point will be revisited in Section VI of this chapter, where the
political alliances of the UMBC, particularly that with the AG after
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39. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot,,
January, 1981.
40. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang and Pastor David Lot,
January, 1981; See also Post 1963, p81, and Dudley, 1968, p93.
41. Dudley, 1968, p93.
42. Dudley, 1968, p93; Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses
Nyam Rwang, Isaac Kpum and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
43. Nigeria Year Book, Lagos, 1952, p7.
44. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and
Pastor David Lot, January, 1981.
45. Nigeria Year Book, Lagos, 1952, p8 - p9; Interview Discussions with
Moses Nyani Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
46. Nigeria Year Book, Lagos, 1952, p8 - p9; Interview Discussions with
Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
47. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and
Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981; See also, Nigeria Year Book, Lagos,
1952, p9 and Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports
1951, Kaduna, 1953 p59 - p60: where it is suggested that "even in
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58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
48.
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55.
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57.
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what it (the election) was all about ... and the stronger groups of
tribal delegates did not use their strength to sweep the board: in
the results there were representatives from four of the five
divisions.
Nigeria Year Book, Lagos, 1952, p7 - p8.
Discussions with M.J. Dent in the period between January 1980 -
September 1983.
Interview Discussions with Ajiva Aji and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981.
Northern Region of Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports 1951, Kaduna,
1953, p14 - p15.
Post, 1963, p84 - p88.
The Yoruba irredentist feelings as they affected the M-Belt Movement
and its alliance with the AG are examined in detail in Section V and
VI of this chapter.
Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang,
January, 1981.
Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang,
January, 1981.
Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang,
January, 1981.
In examining the Northern House of Assembly Debates for the period
between 1952 and 1956, there is no trace of a motion on the creation
of a M-Belt Region until in the fifth session of 6th March 1956, when
Ibrahim Imam from Borno later a leader of opposition in The North
tabled one before the House under circumstances which he described as
"opposing forces in the House" and had previously wished to withdraw
the motion because it ... "may have a sort of adverse effect on the
constitutional conference to be held in London".
Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th
March, 1956, p176 - 178.
Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th
March, 1956, p176 - 178; If the MPG politicians in the NHA had not
insisted, the motion on the creation of a M-Belt Region might not
have been tabled and debated at all. For examples of the controvercy
and the political mood inside the NRA which led to debating the
motion on the creation of a M-Belt Region, see Northern Regional
Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956, p176
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Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, and Moses Nyam Rwang,
January, 1981.
Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwarig and Pastor David Lot,
January, 1981.
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concerned the conceptions of deprivation and discrimination of the
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between 1950 and 1956, see the rather extended speech of Moses Nyam
Rwang who summarized the problems raised in the NRA in the period
between 1952 and 1956 in Northern Regional Legislature, House of
Assembly Debates, Kaduna, 6th March, 1956, p197 - p203.
For examples, see Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly
Debates, Kaduna 1952 - 1956.
Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna,
1956, p18.
Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna,
1956, p184 - p194.
For examples, see the parliamentary speeches in the Northern Regional
Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, of Pastor David Lot,
Dauda Kwoi, Ibrahim Imam, Fate Dass, Benjamin Akiga, Patrick Fom,
George Ohikere, Moses Rwang, Jauro Gombe, Auta Anzah and P.C.
Okpanachi, during the period between 1952 and 1956, particularly
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creation of a M-Belt Region before the NHA and in the midst of its
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67. Bryan Sharwood Smith, "But Always As Friends", Northern Nigeria and
the Cameroons 1921 - 1957, London, 1969, p133 - p139; see also
Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna, for
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68. For examples, see Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly
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Rwang made his speech on the motion for the creation of a M-Belt
Region. This was equally so for Ibrahim Irnam and Patrick Fom whenever
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70. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu and
Pastor David Lot, January, 1981; See also Northern Regional
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71. Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates, Kaduna,
1956, p186 - p187.
72. For an example of the reflections on this financial misunderstanding
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Province in Northern Regional Legislature, House of Assembly Debates,
Kaduna, 1956, p204.
73. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah Assadugu, Pastor
David Lot and Isaac Kpum, January, 1981; See also M.G. Smith, "Kagoro
Political Development", Human Organization, vol.19, 1960, p146; One
should not however confuse this meeting with that of December, 1950,
to suggest that it was the formation of the MZL - rather it was
another meeting that took place at Kagoro in December, 1952, during
which there was reorganization of the leadership in an already
existing MZL movement.
74. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot,
Patrick Fom, Patrick Dokotri and Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
75. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, Jonah Assadugu, Moses
Nyam Rwang and Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981.
76. Smith, 1960, p146.
77. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyarn Rwang, Patrick Dokotri and
Isaac Kpurn, January, 1981.
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79. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981.
80. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, Jonah
Assadugu and Mallam Gwamna, the Chief of Kagoro, January, 1981.
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85. Interview Discussions with Pastor David Lot and Moses Nyam Rwang,
January, 1981.
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Kpum however suggests that the claim of their support by Rwang was so
because they gave him a sympathetic audiance in the hope of resolving
the leadership crisis of the MZL rather than support to form a new
political party.
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90. Interview Discussions with Patrick Dokotri, Jonah Assadugu and
Barnabas Dusu, January, 1981.
91. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Pastor David Lot and
Patrick Dokotri, January, 1981; See also, Sharwood Smith, 1969, p343
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92. Interview Discussions with Isaac Kpum and Ajiva Aji, January, 1981.
93. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, Patrick Dokotri and
Ajiva Aji, January, 1981; Ajiva Aji suggests that he was one of the
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whether the Tiv people should join the Christian and non-Islamic
movement as was advocated by Patrick Dokotri and Moses Nyam Rwang; It
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the Kagoro meeting he narrowed the circulation of ideas on the M-Belt
Movement to the Christian European educated, who were mostly
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94. J.I. Tseayo, Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration
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Jonah Assadugu, January, 1981.
103. Post 1963, p82.
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105. Interview Discussions with Moses Nyam Rwang, January, 1981.
106. For examples, see the detail discussions of these movements and
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1968, p94 - p96 and p113.
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London, 1966, p.505.
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134. Discussions with M.J. Dent, 1980 -1984; also see a mild reference to
the AG search for an alliance with the M-Belt movements from as early
as in 1954 in, Post 1963 p81.
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203. Post 1963 p81.
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well as the Lagos State Movement; and of course in the Northern
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Additional Notes to Chapter 4
*
1	 The North became a dominant political unit in 1954. This was from
the agreement that the North should have 50% of the seats in the Federal
Parliament and the subsequent agreement that representation should be based
on population thus giving the North 56% of the representation according to
the census of 1952 and later 54% according to the 1963 census.
*
2	 The Provincial electoral colleges as used in the elections, worked
on a winner takes all basis, enabling a group with a bare majority to get
all the Provincial seats by use of a block vote.
*
3	 Although Francis Ibiam became famous among Church leadership of the
Christian communities in the North, he was not a Northerner but an
Easterner and was later to become one of the leaders of the East at the
time of secession.
*
4	 The pro-Islamic Bills were essentially in reference to legislation
on the restrictions of Christian missionary religious activities in the
Islamic centres of power and religious activities in the North.
Subsequently in the late 1940s and in the 1950s there were suggestions for
the exclusion of Christian Missionaries from Northern Nigeria.
*
5	 Political labour on the tin mines fields suggests government
recruited labour through the Chiefs which at times was forceful recruitment
but the labourers got fixed wages. Forced labour on the tin mines however
was greatly reduced with the end of the war.
*
6	 Among the Igbirra, there existed two tribal parties. These contested
elections against each other, but whoever won, joined the NPC party in
control of government in the North. Such a pattern of controlled tribalism
was clearly more acceptable to the champions of Northern unity than were
the pan-tribal non-Muslim and Christian identity of the NML and UMBC.
*
7	 This maybe a serious understatement, since the British
administration did not pressurise the NPC. The British administration and
the NPC of course were hand in glove for most of the early period; and
indeed, the administration assisted the NPC in its early period fairly
directly; for instance the Northern 8-point programme plan of a confederal
Nigeria advanced in 1953 was drafted in the office of POL.! or II
(political secretaries in the regional government in Kaduna).
*
8	 The descriptions of the way the NML and the MZL handled the problems
of tribal cleavages ar' the extent to which they preserved a tribal and
Provincial balance in their office holders is examined in the relevant
sections below.
*
9	 However, the government could hardly be expected to give explicit
"religious representation", since it held, like the NPC party, to the view
of 'One North' regardless of religion, while the Muslims, although dominant
in legislature were not specifically represented as Muslims but rather
territorially representative, as chiefs or elected members from certain
areas, who saw themselves as Northerners.
*
10	 The dan Dogo motion is untraceable in the Hansard material of the
period between 1947 and 1952 when it is suggested as having been made in
the NHA. Some of the rather lengthy speeches made by dan Dogo however are
conspicuously missing in the sequence of available Hansard in Kaduna and
other archives. There is no doubt that the motion had to do with the
exclusion of European Christian Missionaries from operating in the North.
It was however a back-bench motion and not a government affair. Its
political importance and impact therefore might have been more symbolic
rather than in terms of actual legislative effect although it also produced
unanticipated political reaction from among Christians in the NML and the
MZL.
*
11	 There is evidence to suggest that the Northern Awakening, apart
from NEPU, became primarily a movement of Regional separatism directed to
protection against a supposed threat of being over-run by Southerners. This
in turn provoked M-Belt separatism, inspired by the fear of being dominated
by Northern Muslims, as became apparent in the developmernt of the M-Belt
Movement after 1953. This was strongly expressed in the speech in March
1956 by Moses Nyam Rwang - analyzed below.
*
12	 It must be noted, as observed by Sklar, that Sa'ad Zungur devoted a
lot of his time in Lagos to nationalist politics and to the reformist
Ahmadiyya movement, which he tried unsuccessfully to introduce among
Muslims of Bauchi. He was a critic and an intellectual much at odds with
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. He did not succeed in making Bauchi or other
Northerners, Ahmadiyyas, for they are pious and traditional Muslims of the
Kadriya or Tijaniya Brotherhood, nor was he 1 nationalistic' in the sense of
dedication to the Nigerian nation, Y'ather they concentrated on a Northern
Regional awakening and expression of Regional identity. In the end Saadu
Zungur himself succumbed to this Regional separation as can be seen in
contrast to that of Shehu Shagari praising Nigeria as a whole.
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Chapter 5. Political influences of the M-Belt Movement under Military
Governments in Nigeria which developed from the Coups d'etat of January and
July 1966 and the creation of Benue-Plateau (BP) state.
"You all know... (that) God in his power has
entrusted the responsibility of this country of
ours, Nigeria, into the hands of another
Northerner.., which is a 1 responsibility that
cannot be taken lightly"
I. Introduction.
At the beginning of 1966 it was apparent on the Nigerian political
arena that what kept the North together as a political unit in the
Federation, was the combination of persuasion, coercion and the charismatic
leadership in the very political personality and style in the practice of
politics of Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who was Premier of the
North. Ahmadu Bello generated what became termed as "the fear of the
Sardauna": His ('IKKO'). This political situation in the North was sought
to be extended to Western Region of Nigeria through the alliance between
the North and Western Nigeria in the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). The
alliance consisted of the NPC and NNDP, a faction that had developed from
the AG party under the leadership of Samuel Akintola 2 . Other members in the
Alliance included the Mid-Western Democratic Front (MDF), Niger Delta
Congress (NDC), Dynamic Party (DP), Republican Party (RP) and the Lagos
State United Front (LSUF), all based in southern Nigeria 3 . The NNA was
under the leadership of Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the North and Samuel
Akintola, whose party had won the 1964 elections under very suspicious
conditions in the Western Region. He took control of political power in the
midst of protest and violence which was perpetrated by the AG party
supporters in the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) 4 . Joseph Tarka
and the UMBC party at this time were aligned to the NPF in the UPGA and the
AG was systematically being destroyed by the NPC in the Western Region of
Nigeria. Indeed, by the end of 1965, the NPC party in the North was the
964-
centre of political power in that alliance with southern Nigerian factions
who had broken off from the NCNC and AG and it also exerted direct
political influence on other smaller political groups that were in
opposition to the dominant parties in southern Nigeria like MDF, NDC, DP,
RP and the LSUF 5 . While in the period between 1952 and 1962, the recurrent
political complaint on the Nigerian arena had been over Southern Nigerian
domination of the North, the political alignments of 1964 and as they stood
just before the January 1966 coup d'etat threatened some southern Nigerian
political groups sufficently to suggest that the NPC leadership were trying
to dominate the south in order: "to dip the Koran into the sea" 6 . The
political developments affecting the Western Region, were closely watched
by Ibo politicians and it was believed that after dealing with the West,
the Sardauna would turn on the Eastern Region. The Sardauna was already
giving moral and financial assistance to the Niger Delta Congress (NDC), a
minorities movement with strong anti-Ibo sentiments on the hope for the
creation of a Rivers Region. When Ironsi became President of the Federation
Military Government of Nigeria, Isaac Boro based in Yenagoa, on behalf of
his people took up arms and declared the Niger-Delta rivers areas of the
Eastern Region an Independent State 7 . From this political background, we
can see that a great deal of power was concentrated in the NPC party in the
North with the Sardauna and with his death there was a leadership vacuum
which in due course, caused it to fall apart.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the political influences of
what remained as the force of the M-Belt Movement in its terminal phase as
the IJMBC party in the period of the Coups d'etat in 1966 and on the causes
of political events in that period which led to the creation of states in
1967, particularly in the context of the leadership vacuum in the North
from the death of Ahmadu Bello, the Premier. The chapter also examines the
political circumstances and conceptions of the political identity which led
to the creation of Benue and Plateau (BP) state, a minorities state that
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was created, among others, from the state creation exercise on 27th May,
1967.
II. The January and July 1966 Coup d'etat in Nigeria.
The first ever military coup d'etat in Nigeria took place on 15th
January, 19668. One consequence of the January coup was that it introduced
a new era in Nigerian politics. Of far reaching political consequences on
the Nigerian polity however was the blood bath which characterized the Coup
and which caused the deaths of a number of important civilian and military
leaders, among whom, was Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. The death of
the Sardauna and the leadership vacuum it created in the North came about
because Major Chukwkma Nzeogwu with a unit of the Nigerian Army consiting
of about thirty-six armed-men, attacked the residence of the Premier as one
of the planned military cum political acts that were organized to overthrow
the governments of the Nigerian Federation 9 . The plan to overthrow the
Nigerian governments by military force was hatched by Army Officers most of
whom were Majors in rank and from among the dominant groups and soceties of
S. Nigerian origins and led by an Ibo, Major Ifeajuna 10 . Furthermore all
the eight ring leaders in the political plot, who were also members of a
wider "inner circle" of an estimated group of about 150 officers and other
ranks involved in the plan and execution of the coup d'etat in January
1966, were Ibos11 . These included: Majors Chukwumah Nzeogwu, Onwuategu,
Okoro, Akagha, Ifeajuna, Okafor, Annuforo and Captain Nwobosi 12 . This group
of majors expected military support from other Ibo majors and officers of
the Nigerian Army upon successful execution of the coup on a purely tribal
identity rather than on the Nigerian identity' 3 . This was based on the
concentration of Ibos in that rank in the Nigerian Army. For example of the
thirty officers in the Nigerian Army with the ranks of Majors in 1965,
twenty-two (69%) were Ibo Majors 14 . However, under the leadership of Major
Nzeogwu, who led the operations, the group successfully established
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political control over the North, by removing the government with the
killing of the Premier, Ahmadu Bello, two of his wives and a soldier of the
attaking Platton who at the last moment desisted and was shot dead by
Nzeogwu 15 . Others killed in the coup operations in Kaduna included the
Commander of the 1st Brigade, Brigader Ademuleguri and his wife, Colonel
Shodeinde, who was second in command to an Indian at the Nigerian Defence
Academy (NDA) 16 . In the military operations that took over the government
of the Sardauna in the North, most of the men under the command of Nzeogwu
were Northerners, most probably men of M-Belt orignins. This was unlike the
operations in Lagos, the west and the mid-west where the men used by the
Coup leaders were southerners, with the preponderant majority being Ibos'7.
In using Northerners to kill the Sardauna and overthrow the NPC government
in the North it is not clear whether Nzeogwu, who was Ibo told the men that
the plot included the murders of the top command of the Army, including the
elimination of well beloved and admired Northern officers of the Nigerian
Army including Brigadier Zakari Mai Malari, Colonel Kur Mohammed, Lt.
Colonel Abogo Largema and Lt. Colonel James Yakubu Pam as well as Lt.
Colonel Yakubu Gowon (who narrowly escaped death) and the Yoruba officers
like Brigadier S. Adernulegun and Colonel R. Shodeinde' 8 . Obviously in the
instance, it is unlikely the men would have fallen in with the plot of
Nzeogwu and the other Majors. Furthermore, the claims of Nzeogwu that
Hassan Katsina supported this coup is a bogus claim, because Nzeogwu spoke
to him almost as a threat and more significantly, Nzeogwu had a gun in his
hand when he faced Hassan with the option of support or opposition, to the
Coup d'etat 19 . In all, about twenty-seven people were known to have been
killed in the coup of January, 1966 20 . These included: four out of five
Senior Northern Officers, the fifth (Gowon) just managed to escape death;
two out of six Senior Yoruba Officers from the Western Region; and one out
of ten Senior Ibo Army Officers who was accidentally killed. The Coup,
however, represented a victory for nationalism over regionalism:
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Typologically, for example, the Ibo Junior Officers, personified by the
young Major C. K. Nzeogwu, who killed the Northern Premier, reincarnated
the radical Zikists of the later 1940s who had been frustrated by the
growth of regionalism and the conditions of bourgeois nationalism 21 . The
Majors aimed at destroying the authority of the old, conservative order and
to put an end to the political dominance of the North in the Nigerian
Federation. In the process, the most important event in the subsequent
moulding of a hostile political mood in attitudes toward the alleged
'January Revolution' in the North and the Ironsi-Regime in Lagos included
the deaths of the Prime Minister, Abukakar Tafawa Balewa, a Gerawa Muslim
from south-eastern parts of Bauchi; the Premier of the North, Ahrnadu Bello
a Fulani from Sokoto and four out of five Senior Army Officers of Northern
origins in the Nigerian Army: Mai Malari, Mohammed and Largema, Kanuri
Muslims from Bomb and Pam, a Christian Birom from Jos in the M-Belt areas
who strongly identified with the causes of the North through the influences
of Sharwood-Smith whom he served as ADC 22 . The political and military focus
of the Coup of January 1966 was therefore clearly directed at elerninating
both military and political leadership of the North, while others that were
killed were seen to be sympathetic toward Northern interests and in one way
or the other gaining from the Northern political control of the Nigerian
Federaion. This was so because the political and military leadership from
the East and in particularly, that which was Ibo was not eliminated in the
January Coup except for Lt. Colonel Unegbe who was accidentally killed23.
Muslims and Christians therefore expereienced losses and felt threatened
and in both the Islamic society and among the M-Belt areas, there was grief
over the deaths of three Muslim officers and one Christian. Although Lt.
Colonel Pam had commanded the troops who put down the revolt in Tiv land it
did not alienate the Tiv from maintaining the deep respect they held for
Northern Officers in the Army and indeed the Tiv themselves, of whom there
was a great many in the Army spoke well of the soldiers during the riots24.
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It was the Mobile Police Units the Tiv hated and despised for brutality,
most of whom were Ibos. The great significance in the elimination of
Northern leaders however was in the ways the deaths fostered a Northern
attitude and political identity from all sections of the North. The whole
Region was brought together in common grief: "all could mourn the Prime
minister, (Abubaker Tafawa Balewa), even if few tears were shed for the
Sardauna"25.
The political objective of the Coup d'etat of January, 1966 was meant:
°to establish a strong united and prosperous
nations, free from corruption and internal
strife... (achieve) national integration,
supreme justice, general security and
properties recovery.., freedom from fear or
other forms of oppression, freedom from general
inefficiency and freedom to live and strive
(reach the sky) in every field of human
endeavour both nationally and internationally.
We promise that you will no more be ashamed to
say that you are Nigerian... we have set for
ourselves the job of establishin 6a prosperous
nation and achieving solidarity"
Although the 'Manifesto' of Nzeogwu and other Majors in the broadcast to
the North in the name of 'a revolutionary council' echoed the general
problems of political disintegration that were affecting nation-building
processes in Nigeria he subsequently refined these broad objectives and
suggested that they did not wish to establish a Unitary Government:
"we wanted a strong centre. We wanted to cut
the country to sma} pieces making the centre
inevitably strong"
However, from the tribal nature of the coup and the path of subsequent
political devlopments after 15th January and the tribal affiliation of the
above quoted sources to Chief Awolowo, Dudley suggests that the accounts on
the political program of Nzeogwu ought to be treated with caution 28 . The
initial reactions to the January 1966 Coup d'etat in the North and among
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Northern Army Officers in Lagos was that of shock and disbelief 29 . Infact,
many of the Northern Army Officers in Lagos, Ikeja, Apapa and Ibadan were
ignorant and uncertain about what happened, although their bitterness was
instantly built up by the distress at the loss of their Battallion
Commanders and other Senior Northern Army Officers of the Nigerian Army30.
In Ibadan, where the commanding officer (CO) had been colonel Largema, the
troops shot dead an Ibo Major and displayed utter disloyalty to Major
Nzefili, an Ibo who was second in command and had taken charge of the 4th
Battalion until he was driven away by the NCOs demanding an explanation of
the whereabouts Largema 31 . The NCOs of the 4th Battalion, the majority of
whom were Tiv as well as the other rank and file demanded that a Northerner
be sent as their CO and remained disloyal to all Southern Nigerian Military
Officers until Colonel Joe Akahan, a Tiv from The North was sent from Lagos
to take charge of restoring discipline 32 . Almost similar to the reactions
of the majority of the Northern Army Officers, the reaction of the Northern
political classes in Lagos, was that of disbelief. Unlike the soldiers
however, the Northern political classes were in disarray and some of them
left Lagos for The North and in Kaduna some escaped to their
constituenci es33.
However, the January coup by Nzeogwu was unlikely to result into the
subdivision of the Nigerian Federation such that a M-Belt Region might have
been created. The Military regime of Nzeogwu in The North itself was short
lived for any clear cut political program to emerge. It collapsed after two
days, when Nzeogwu went down to Lagos to surrender on specific terms to
Ironsi. The collapse of political control by Nzeogwu in The North was
caused by failure of the other Majors in Lagos to take control of political
power, despite the killings. Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, who had just
returned from England and who narrowly escaped death in the coup d'etat of
the Ibo Majors, foiled the whole operations in Lagos and arrested some of
those involved34 . This he did by moblilizing some officers, particularly
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Northern officers of the federal guards, and putting himself at the head of
the ranks and Northern NCOs who had already began to act and with these
soldiers, he was able to rally pockets of loyal troops from the various
units in Lagos behind the legitimate command of the Nigerian GOC, although
General Ironsi who held that command post initially was nowhere to be
found35 . Furthermore, in order to neutralize the coup d'etat of the Majors,
Gowon went into full battle-gear and led a convoy of armoured vehicles:
"manned by fierce looking soldiers and assured
(Northern civil servants and politicians in
Lagos) that troops loyal to government would
crush the rebellion and flush out the coup
plotters and executors ... the GOC of the Army
was nowhere to be found to alert the troops and
seek their.00peration in crushing the
rebellion"
The activities of Gowon with officers and men of the Federal Guard Troops
therefore turned the tide against the insurgents in Lagos and Ironsi
assumed overall command. After Gowon had warned Ojukwu to desist from
suporting the dissident troops in The North with the 5th Battalion in Kano
Nzeagwu found himself isolated in Kaduna and ended up pledging allegiance
to Ironsi 37 . The coup d'etat of the Majors therefore failed and with that
failure there seems to have taken place 'a coup within a coup' which
brought Ironsi, an Ibo as Head of the Federation Military government in
Nigeria on 17th January 196638. The coup of Nzeogwu and the Majors
essentially was a political development that would have subordinated The
North and further treated the M-Belt problems and demands as non-issues,
given the emphasis of Nigerian nationalism in its objectives and course of
subsequent developments as well as the dominance of achieving the goals
through the nationalism of a dominant tribe, the Ibos, in the process. What
had begun as political acts of Majors of the Nigerian Army to reform the
system ended up very much as a process of tribal domination of the Nigerian
political arena, which became characteristic of the Ironsi-Regime.
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Although the Northern Army Officers, NCOs and their men who formed the
bulk of the Nigerian army rank-and-file, largely M-Belt, were loyal to the
command of Ironsi because of the persuation of their brother-officers,
there were severe tensions existing between them and non-Northern Army
personnel, particularly those in Lagos, Ikeja Ibadan and Abeokuta 39 . The
subsequent reaction of M-Belt interests within the Nigerian Army
rank-and-file took the form of a collective Northern interest in reaction
to the deaths that were caused to Northern officers, rather than to the
Sardauna and Tafawa Balewa and rather than in sympathy to the deaths of
other civilian political leaders. It was after the Northern identity had
been used in reaction to the events of January and to the subsequent
governance of Ironsi which led to the July 1966 Coup in the cause of
Northern secession that M-Belt interest began to penetrate popular
consciousness of the Army rank and file in the interest of a M-Belt Region
through the activities and political influences of J. S. Tarka on Akahan
and other soldiers. However in reaction to what happened in the January
Coup d'etat, Northern NCOs in the 4th Battalion, many of whom were liv,
shot dead the Ibo Officer who had come to take over as commanding
officer40 . The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions in Enugu, Lagos (Apapa) and
Ikeja respectively had a concentration of Northern NCOs with a mixture of
men in the rank and file from the different Nigerian tribes. In general the
officer corp of the Nigerian army was dominated by persons from Southern
Nigerian groups; for example 60 out of 81 of the Nigerian officers were
Ibos, ten Yorubas and eleven Northerners, four of whom were murdered in
January 196641. The mixed concentration of Nigerian tribes in the army
locations in the country however varied with their situation in Ibadan. The
4th Battalion in Ibadan was dominated by Tiv NCOs and the other rank and
file came predominantly from the M-Belt areas with a huge concentration of
the Tiv people in the fighting units 42 . It was against this background of
unease with an underlining political mood of suspicion of Ibo dominance in
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the Nigerian Army that the Ironsi Regime begun to perform the functions of
government on the 16th January 1966.
In the first major statement of J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi to Nigerians as
Head of the Federation Military Government and supreme commander of the
Nigerian Armed Forces, he directed his Internal Affairs policy to
neutralizing political hopes on the subdivisions of the country and
threatened minorities movements for the creation of more states as well as
the Western region of Nigeria, where there were disorders largely caused by
a political party that had aspirations for the creation of Regions in the
minorities areas. On 16th January, for example, Aguiyi-Ironsi announced the
determination of the Federation Military Government:
"to supress the disorders ... in the Tiv area
of the Northern Region ... it will declare
Martial law in any area of the Federation in
which disturbances continue; it is its
intention to maintain law and order in the
Federation until such a time as a new
consti4tion for the Federation is brought into
being"
In this major statement of Internal policy, Ironsi did not indicate what he
was going to do about the political problems of the M-Belt Region and in
particular, liv political prisoners who were still in jail over the causes
of the UMBC party for the creation of the Region in The North. In any case
the liv disorders had ceased, six months before the coup d'etat of January
1966. The Ironsi-Regime therefore, right from the start, relegated the
minorities In The North and Eastern Region into non-issues, the majority of
whom formed the backbone of the rank-and-file of the Nigerian Army,
particularly those of the M-Belt areas whose Kith and kin were political
prisoners in jail. M.J. Dent estimates that there were over 500 Tiv
political prisoners in prison as a result of the 1964 disturbances in liv
land and Ironsi did not agree they were political prisoners 45 . Joseph larka
in particular had two interviews at his own request with Aguiyi-Ironsi in
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which he was completely unsuccessful in persuading the General that it was
the moment to release Tiv political prisoners and create the M-Belt
Region 46 . Tarka was sent away from Lagos in rather humiliating
circumstances and some of the Ibo advisers around Ironsi apparantly tried
to offer him some kind of financial grant to set up as a businessman. He
refused to be bought and to be organized-out of politics in this way.
Ironsi therefore lost the opportunity of winning liv political alliance and
instead further alienated them by allowing the circulation of a map showing
the frontiers of the Eastern Region advanced to the Benue River. When
Professor James O'Connell warned him of the political dangers of discontent
among the Tiv soldiers he changed discussion of the subject matter to the
fanaticism of the Tijaniyya in Kano47 . The decision to ignore Joseph Tarka
and the minorities in The North from which he could have driven an early
political wedge between the M-Belt and the Islamic society in The North was
to cause his overthrow and cost him his life because it was the impressive
unity of the M-Belt with the other Northern officers and men that was
instrumental in the success of the July 1966 coup.
With the increasing interpretation of the January 15th coup d'etat as
an Ibo tribal plot to dominate Nigeria, there was a considerable increase
in the growth of anti-Ironsi political sentiments in most parts of Nigeria
and more seriously, among soldiers of Northern origin within the Army 48 . In
The North the ordinary man in the street had apparently become increasingly
irritated by the reaction of the Ibos to the coup. Ibo market traders,
often mocked their northern customers, pointing out that their former
'master' the Sardauna was dead and openly displayed and sold in their shops
the pictures of Major Nzeogwu as a 'hero' of a New Nigeria 49 . Furthermore,
picture of Nzeogwu with one foot over the corpse of the Sardauna, symbolic
of the downfall of The North and the ascendency of the Ibos and the Eastern
Region in the Nigerian Federation were also on sale in markets 50 . There
were also many recorded songs portraying Northerners in very derogatory
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light, the sale of some of these were later forbidden and banned from
transmission in Radio and TV stations. To compound the tensions, the June
1966 issue of Drum Magazine with a wide readership in Nigeria and other
African countries, was curiously in circulation in May and contained an
article entitled 'Sir Ahmadu rose in his shrouds and spoke from the dead'
and accompanied by a faked picture in which a prone Sardauna, robed in
white lay upon a bed flanked by Coz Idapo although himself not an Ibo, but
the columnist. He was a southern Nigerian 'radical' and the Drum Magazine
picture showed him backed by a huge crowd 51 . The photograph did not only
offend Muslims but the article also contained alleged "confessions" by the
Sardauna in which there was mention of: "the foolish belief that I was the
Othman dan Fodio of modern times" 52 . This social and political humiliation
was on all sections of The North (Moslem and Christian-Islamic society and
M-Belt groups and societies - Hausa and non-Hausa etc.) and those who may
never have felt much allegiance to either the Sardauna or the NPC, like
UMBC party loyalists Northernized on their own, because they did not relish
being sneered at by Southerners, particularly manifested in Ibo attitudes
after the coup 53 . When these events and other petty humiliations were
reported to the Attorney-General of the Federation, Gabriel Onyinke, an
Ibo: "He dismissed them as harmless practical jokes and refused to take any
action" 54 . These social relations crystallized Northern unity against
obviously conceived outsiders and the Northern identity temporarily
submerged any conceptions of a M-Belt identity and the demands for the
creation of a M-Belt Region. In the circumstances, the M-Belt areas saw
their political fate intimately tied to the Northern identity in the
politics of the Nigerian Federation.
However in terms of the political demands for the creation of more
states as units of the Nigerian Federation, it s significant that the most
serious organized anti-Ironsi political act came from the minorities area
of the Niger-Delta rivers. There, Isaac Boro, an Ijaw, indigenous to the
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area and a former President of the Students Union of the University of
Nigeria, Nsukka with a few supporters took up in arms:
"in the name of the peoples of the delta area
proclaimed that section of the region an
'independent state'. This revolt posed an
immediate threat to the government of the
Eastern Region and of the Federations as a
whole ... It had to be crushed, but with the
difficulty of communication and transport in
the area, this was no mean task. Not until some
four weeks later, after the employment of a
battalion of troops, supported by a large
contingent of Police, was the new regime (of
Ironsi) capable of restoring order and
re-establishing federal control in the area"
The political interpretation that was given to the conduct of the Military
operations to crush the quasi-Military revolt of Isaac Boro, by the
Niger-Delta people was that of invigorated Ibo domination over the
minorities, particularly to protect the local resentments over Ibo
domination of economic life and colonization of PortHarcourt 56 . This
interpretation was given dramatic political meaning with Ibos in Executive
capacity in both Enugun and Lagos and the Battalion having come down from
Enugu.
Although Ironsi appeared to be the 'supreme' authority in Lagos, he
allowed the Regions to operate independently. In some instances the Regions
within a very short period of time were operating much more vigorously in
legitimate authority than the governments the military overthrew, almost
like countries unto themselves 57 . In The North for example, where there was
demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region, among other causes, against the
political authority of the Emirs, the Military government brought back the
Emirs to control local political power, in some instances with political
status not dissimilar to that of the old sole NA5 58 . This, among other
explanatory reasons, was meant to create support for the Regime, the
Islamic society having experienced the most severe leadership losses from
the January coup in the deaths of Ahmadu Bello, Tafawa Balewa, Mai Malari,
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Kur Mohammed and Largema. The political emphasis in conciliating the
Islamic society in The North by the Ironsi-Regirne only served to further
alienate M-Belt aspirations because the trends reinforced the problems they
had organized the (JMBC party in search for their solutions by the demand of
a M-Belt Region. Furthermore to maintainance of the status quo, Ironsi
allowed the Eastern Region to unilaterally demand Foreign Aid investment
and in the West there were administrative changes by the creation of eight
s provincesi to replace the existing six without comparable changes occuring
elsewhere59 . Much more serious, however the Ironsi-Regime did nothing about
Northern Civil servants, together with a majority of Western Region Civil
servants, to build up a Federalist lobby with the political impressions
that all of the North was politically united with sentiments toward that
political direction in the organization of the Nigerian Nation 60 . On 18th
January 1966, Ironsi appointed Governors for the Regions of the existing
Nigerian Federation: Hassan Katsina (Muslim and Hausa-Fularii) for The
North, Fajuyi (Christian and Yoruba) for the West, Ojukwu (Christian and
Ibo) for the East and David Ejoor (Christian and Edo) for the Mid-West61.
With the appointment of Military Governors to the Regions, it could be said
that this political act marked the final collapse of the first Republic in
Nigeria and the formal take over of political power and government by the
Military under Ironsi 62 . The political act however gave more strength to
the conception in the political belief that the North was still intact in
the appointment of Hassan Katsina, the son to the Ernir of Katsina as the
Governor. Besides the initial mainainance of The North as an integral
political unit, therefore Ironsi was also seen by M-Belt politicians like
Joseph Tarka, to be maintaining a pro-status quo position in the claims of
the rulership of the North to be a prerogative of the Islamic Society.
Thus, for example, although Hassan Katsina was not the only senior military
officer of Northern origin and was junior to Gowon, he was made Governor of
the North. Furthermore, Aguiyi-Ironsi made special effort to make peace
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with the Sultan of Sokoto, premier-chief of the North and a Kinsmen of the
Sardauna, Ahmadu Bello. The Sultan was invited to Lagos and was accorded
every honour by Ironsi including giving him a present of a silver kettler
for prayer63 . These developments also increased the suspicions by the
political leadership of the M-Belt Movement in its 1 silent' phase under
military rule and which still aspired for the creation of the M-Belt
Region, as it in creasingly became aware that there were no political
benefits to be derived from the Ironsi-Regime.
When these suspicious political developments built up, 'the problem of
the Majors' had not yet found its way directly into the Nigerian political
arena. When this happened, it seriously threatened the whole command
structure of the Nigerian Army. This was so because, initially both
Northern Army Officers and the rank and file in the first week of the coup
had been urged to exercise restraint from unleashing military retribution
on equal measures against Ibo and other southern Nigerian officers, to
revenge the murders of Northern Officers, on condition that those who led
the January coup which brought Ironsi into power were to be punished and
that Ironsi, himself ought to explain why, after telling soldiers that the
coup had failed: "instead of restoring power to legitimate government, he
had asked for power to be mandated over to him" 64 . Apparent in this new
movement of thought among Northern soldiers, was the consciouness that the
January Coup was a political plot to destroy the hegemony of the North and
to alter the power base, which will give Ibos and southern Nigerian groups
political advantage. The Northern troops were kept loyal to Ironsi by Lt.
Col. Yakubu Gowon, in the midst of humiliatory manipulation and distrust
coming from fellow Ibo and Southern Nigerian Officers to the extent that
the authorities had some of the Northern Officers monitored and their
telephones offensively tapped 65 . Despite these apparent provocation, 'the
problem of the January Majors' remained foremost in the minds of Northern
Officers and in the rank and file. In the light of existing controversy on
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the issue in Nigeria, the problem centered on whether the January Coup
plotters were to be regarded as rebellious troops, who had murdered their
officers and therefore liable to be court-niartialled and face a sentence
which carried a death penalty 66 . These developments, independently of the
deaths of Northern officers in the January Coup, systematically on their
own account, built up a feeling of Northern solidarity among the soldiers
from tribal groups in the North and created a military sub-culture within
the Nigerian Army - "Yan Arewa - Yan Gida" literally translating itself
into social and political relations of trust and safety: "Northern sons -
Sons from home". The options on the political opinions which Ironsi faced,
on what to do with the 'January Majors' were divided within both the
Military and more importantly in the light of subsequent events, among the
civil population almost exactly on the party political divisions that
existed on the Nigerian political arena before the Coup d'etat. Northern
opinions, for example, particularly among soldiers that were from the
M-Belt, suggested that the plotters should stand trial, not only because
they thought Military laws demanded this, but also to maintain discipline
on which the hierarchy of command of the Army depended; In the West and in
the top hierarchy of the Army including the majority of Senior Ibo
officers, it was maintained that the leaders of the Coup should be released
from detention and if not reinstated into their respective offices, should
at the worst be dismissed from the Army - this view was apparently shared
by the influential southern Nigerian intellectual community that was
centered at Ibadan University who infact stated:
"we should not in any event allow them to be
used as scapegoats to appease the fears and
sentiments of certain groups".
To Ibos in the East and those who were in other parts of Nigeria as well as
the majority of Ibo junior army officers and Southern Nigerian 'radicals',
the coup plotters were 'heroes' whose trial and possible execution would
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alienate support and good will from many Nigerians, which the regime
needed67 . Ironsi however was a personality who believed that "things" left
alone would "right themselves" and preferred to leave matters as they were:
"The leaders of the coup were kept in detention and continued to receive
their full salaries and other entitlements" 68 . When it was decided by the
Supreme Military Council that the 'January Majors' were to be tried, Ironsi
kept postponing the date of trial despite constant reminders by Gowon who
was in the Council and the disaffection that was growing on the particular
issue, both within the Army and among the civil population in the North69.
In the end, among other causes, the solution lay on the organized section
that controlled the monopoly of force and violence in the Army and the
readiness and timing to use it. This came in the July Counter - Coup d'etat
that was organized by officers and men of the Nigerian Army of Northern
Origins, after they had become disillusioned by the policies and political
direction of the Ironsi-Regime.
The most critical and of far reaching political consequence in the
policies and political direction of the Ironsi-Regime which unfolded a
clear pattern of Ibo and Southern Nigerian political intrigues and
manipulations to dominate Nigeria and which further alienated both Northern
and M-Belt interests, was in the enactment of Decree No. 34 of 24th May,
1966. The Decree was pushed through the Supreme Military Council (SMC) by
Ironsi as a partail enforcement of the recomendations of Francis Nwokedi.
Nwokedi had recommended the total merging of all Regional Officers in a
Unified Federal Service of the ranks of Executive Officer and above into
the Federal Civil Service. The Decree appeared as a forced intention of the
plan which would have resulted in massive Ibo domination of the Northern
Civil Service. The Unification Decree, as it became known, among other
provisions, stated:
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"Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
Nigeria shall on 24th May, 1966, cease to be a
Federation and shall accordingly as from that
day be a Republic, by the name of Republic of
Nigeria, consisting of the territory, which
immediately before that day was comprised in
the Federation... As from the appointed day,
all offices in the Service of the Republic in a
Civil Service capacity shall be offices in a
single service to be known as the National
Public Service; and accordingly all persons who
immediately before that day are members of the
public Service of a Region shall on that day
become mqqbers of the National Public
Service"1 J
Decree No. 34 therefore struck a direct blow at the developing Northern
territorial conception of political identity which served instrumental
purposes in Nigerian politics, apparently, constantly used by persons who
were Muslims and Christians from both the Islamic and M-Belt areas in the
North. The Decree provincialized Nigeria and centralized political power
and decision making in Lagos. Intially Hassan Katsina appeared to support
the abrogation of Northernization policy and only became alarmed at its
social and political consequences when there was a huge flow of
applications from Ibos and other Southern Nigerian groups for jobs in the
Northern Civil Service, where it was alleged there was alack of qualified
expertise with Western European modernizing skills. Hassan Katsina had
encouraged the tendency when he stated in a broadcast to the people of the
North:
"We believe whenever people have to live
together, there must be a spirit of give and
take. It is for this reason that the
Unification Decree was introded. Its aim is
to treat all Nigerians alike"
Gowon too, seemed to have been manipulated into giving tacid support to the
Decree within the Supreme Military Council, by the very personalized nature
of political decision on the issue72 , although he strongly warned Ironsi
against certain provisions of the Decree, particularly the abolition of the
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Regions, which an already aggrieved North might not accept 73 . It is
therefore, not unreasonable to suggst that the reservations of Gowon who
was a member of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) was in itself opposition
to Decree No. 34. This subsequently found expression in the mystifying
language of Hassan Katsina, another Northern Member of the SMC, on the
coming announcement of the Decree, in which he was quoted as saying "in a
few days the egg would be broken" 74 and the strong language used by Ironsi
which was clearly meant to suppress opposition in the announcement of
Decree No. 34:
"I want to leave no doubt in the mind of
anybody, that the provisions of this decree
will certainly be enforced. This is a Military
Regime and soldiers do not allow themselves to
be diverted from or obstructed in the
fulfilment of their objectives. With us the
objectives will be pursue9 5with supreme
determination and vigour"
With Decree No. 34 Ironsi and a powerful Ibo lobby, stood solidly
against Nothernization and the creation of the M-Belt Region. Infact, after
the statement of policy of the new regime on 21st February 1966, Ironsi was
against Federalism in Nigeria and was anti-regionalism, directed at its
practice in the North by the Sardauna. As far as the creation of the M-Belt
Region was therefore an issue, which the Tiv riots represented before the
Coup d'etat, Ironsi simply did not understand their causes and saw them as
irrelevant and unnecessary arson. He threatened the Tiv with severe
reprisals, although Tiv soldiers in Nigerian Army were sympathetic to the
causes of the UMBC party 76 . Some of the Tiv soldiers in the Nigerian Army
rank-and-file had infact been supporters and mobilizing agents of the tJMBC
party at the grassroots level under the leadership of Joseph Tarka before
they joined the Army. Some Tiv joined the Army after 1960 because of the
political and economic difficulties at home. Most of those who joined the
Army in the rank-and-file had been toughened when they were either in the
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Sardauna Youth Brigade or in the Young Pioneers of Joseph Tarka and had
been strong admirers of Military activity on the political riots in Tiv
land during the operations of the Nigerian Army in 1964.
The Ironsi Regime therefore set about creating a Unitary Government in
the country when infact the majority of opinion in the minorities area was
demanding subdivision of the Federation. In other words, the Military
government was ignorant of the critical political needs and the problems in
the country which had caused stagnation in the political performance of the
civilian regime. Thus, for example, Ironsi made the Tiv riots an issue in
his very first statement of internal domestic policy when the riots had on
their own ceased to be a threat to internal security in the North, largely,
from the dramatic reconcilation between Joseph Tarka and the Tor Tiv before
the end of December 1965 and the death of the Sardauna in January 1966
removed support for the NPC clients in Tivland and the Tiv therefore looked
forward to reforms and the creation of the M-Belt Region with the control
of government by the military78.
Decree No. 34 however was made even more politically suspicious
because of the way it had been formulated under great secrecy by southern
Nigerian advisers who surrounded Ironsi: A tightly knitted group, combining
the interests of Ibo intellecutals, Civil Servants and Army Officers whose
political opinions on Nigeria, filtered through spokesmen like Christopher
Okigbo, Francis Nwokedi and Ojukwu, to Ironsi 79 . This group was insenstive
to opinions and interests from other parts of the country and made access
to Ironsi, difficult for other tribes, while Ibos had ease in seeing Ironsi
on the political policies for Nigeria80 . The Ironsi-Regime therefore made
serious political mistakes by cutting itself off from political advice that
might have assisted it in judging the political mood of opinion from other
parts of the country, a mistake whose lesson Gowon was quick to learn after
the July 1966 Coup d'etat. Subsequently after the creation of states in May
1967, he brought in some civilian politicans into his cabinet, each from
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the twelve states of the rearranged Federation, whose varied opinions were
vital in maintaining political stability of the Nigerian nation as it
successful fought the Civil War. The 'Special Group' of Ibo advisers Ironsi
surrounded himself with, as from March 1966, in men like Francis Nwokedi,
Gabriel Onyinke, Pius Okigbo, J. C. Edozie at Ibadan, Dr Eke of Nsukka and
the late Christopher Okigbo, increasingly misled him with a southern
Nigerian stereotype attitude in dealing with the North as a monolithic
traditional and static area centered on Sokoto and unbroken by
modernization81 . Another unfortunate feature of the Unification Decree was
in the propostion to have Military-Prefects as the administrators in the
Provinces, a process which Ironsi himself described would make real the
true national political identity:
"by removing the last vestiges of the intense
regionalism of the recent past and to produce
that cohesion in the government structure which
is so necessary in achieving and maintaining
the pamount objective.., namely national
unity"
To adjust for the process of implementing Decree No. 34, there was to be
the rotation of existing Military Governors, a process that was going to
take away Hassan Katsina from the North and most probably brought in an Ibo
or Yoruba to rule over the North. Given the dominance of Ibo as officers in
the Nigerian Army with the ranks of Majors and above - the category of
officers from which the Military-Prefects might have come from and the
promotion of eighteen Ibo majors to the ranks of Lt. Colonels in the same
period, this was taken as another measure in establishing Ibo dominance,
particularly over the North 83 . To further compound the tense political
atmosphere of suspicion in the North, which the 'May Decision' had
generated over apparent Ibo advancement of personal as well as the
collective group interest, there was the interwoven issue of the incautious
withdrawal from W. Germany and subsequent dismissal on 'educational
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grounds' of some Nigerian Air Force cadets of Northern origin, the majority
of whom were from the M-Belt areas, although some had completed about one
and half to two years service and reportedly coping with the training84.
However, the crux of the matter over resentment to Decree No. 34 in the
North was in the way it set out to restructure Civil Servants from the
Northern Public Service to the bottom of the proposed National Public
Service, relative to the advantages it produced to Ibos from the Eastern
Civil Service as well as to those already in the Federal Service in the
recommendations of Nwokedi. Decree No. 34, however, only applied to a
handful of superscale officers, but the Northern fear was that it was only
a first installment of the policy and would subsequently apply to the whole
'Senior Service' of Executive Officers and above. The most influential
class, in terms of political consciousness and modernization, in the North
in that period, were the Civil Servants because they were closest to the
corridors of political and economic power. An act which upset this class in
the Unification programme of Ironsi, came from a colleague of Nwokedi and a
fellow Ibo, the Permanent Secretary (PS) of the Military of Establishment
in Lagos. The PS drew up a staff list of those affected by certain
provisions of Decree No. 34 and placed them in order of Seniority by salary
and date of appointment of the salary group85 . However, the manipulative
aspect that embittered the Northerners, was that while permanent
secretaries in the North had lower salaries, largely becaus of frugality
and the continued presence of expatriates than elsewhere, their opposite
numbers in the Federal and Regional Service, the Eastern Service in
particular paid highest86 . Seniority was to be judged by salaries and
salaries in the East were on the whole higher than in the North. The result
of this exercise was that an Ibo, the Chief Secretary of the Eastern Region
Service, headed the combined list placed above even the head of the Federal
Service and Northerners who were permanent secretaries with just as much
experience or more experience than their Ibo or Southern counter-parts,
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found themselves well down the list 87 . This important service-issue
distorted the Unification exercise out of all political proportions in the
North. A memorandum submitted to Hassan Katsina by Adamu Fika the Secretary
of the Northern Civil Service Union circulated among Senior Civil Service
Colleagues, summarized the Northern political mood on the Unification
Decree No. 34:
"Federalism was introduced in the country
gradually over a period of about ten years. But
we are now being asked to go back to a unitary
form of Government within three months,
unconditionally and without proper safeguard
for or the consent of the majority of the
people... The fact is that the feelings of the
great majority of the people are not known and
are not considered. It is either taken for
granted by the top Civilian advisers of the
Federal Military Government that the opinions
expressed by Lagos Newspaper-men reflect the
majority opinion in the country or they are
taking advantage of their position to impose
their will on the people... the great majority
of the people in the country are opposed to the
idea of indiscrimiate unification and return to
a complete unitary form of Government, but they
cannot express their opposition in wring or
otherwise owing to lack of education"
As aptly summarized by Mallam Fika, it was the lack of expression of
political opinion in the North, and the inabiltiy for the northerners to
find appropriate channels of expressing their political grievances that the
Ironsi-Regime rather curiously interpreted the "wait and see" attitude of
the North as political confomity toward the violent change of leadership in
Nigeria and the rapidly developed policies of Unification embedded in
Decree No. 34. However, most of the Northern opinion on the Regime and the
Unification Decree was built rather secretly and the rest of opinions on
the January Coup and 'Ibo-plans' were shrouded with rumours. This made it
difficult for Ironsi to know exactly what the North was up to, although
there were correct intelligence reports from Kano, Zaria and Kaduna that
Northern political leaders had closed their ranks and were holding regular
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meetings in Kaduna, Zaria, Jos and Kano89 . It is not clear whether this
mystification of the political mood in the North toward the Ironsi Regime
was a deliberate political act. However it was from these regular meetings
that political 51tasks" came to be shared which were meant to activate the
Northern political identity to influence all classes in the North: The
radical elements - Aminu Kano and Joseph Tarka, were to influence the Army,
Imarn and Makama, the traditional rulers, through whom the grassroots were
to be penetrated with the NA apparatus and the Civil Service Unions were to
influence opinion among the students of Ahmadu Bello University and the
mass media in Kaduna: the New Nigerian, 'Gaskiya Ta Fl Kwabo' (Truth is
worth more than a penny) and Radlo-Televelon Kaduna, corporations that were
owned by the regional governnient 90 . The 'Gang of Fours was formed almost
immediately it was apparent that the January Coup and that the military and
political murders reflected a political bias, which gave Ibos and the South
political dominance of the country and they started to scheme the overthrow
of Ironsi 91 . However, the assumption by all Northerners of a common threat
of Ibo domination as a result of the January Coup, brought together
previous opponents. Arninu Kano, for example, was former leader of a radical
Muslim opposition group to the Northern establishment and J. S. Tarka,
leader of M-Belt separatist movement to the Northern establishment as well,
but made common cause with the Northern establishment in opposition to the
government of Ironsi. Under civilian rule the two leaders had been in
alliance with southern Nigerian based political parties, the NCNC and the
AG respectively. Under the Military rule of Ironsi however they changed to
Northern solidarity because of the specific content of the political
meaning of Decree No. 34 as it affected their previous political interests.
It was against the background of manipulation of political interests
with Decree No. 34 by Ibos and Southern Nigerian groups, seeking to
dominate Nigeria that reaction to the Ironsi-Regime is to be understood
from both the Islamic and the M-Belt areas in the North, where there were
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already in existence, whipped-up Northern sentiments, although they
remained for along time seemingly suppressed. There was political response
to the sentiments because all sections of the North saw themselves as the
underdogs in the Unification processes that were set into motion in May
1966. In particular the Ironsi-Regirne did not analyze the interwoven
political identities within the North in Nigerian politics. It infact
failed to bargain and compromise with the apparent maturity of the idea
that it was expected of its reforms to create a M-Belt Region and neglected
to destroy the political networks of the overthrown civilian regime in the
North, particularly the NPC. This was largely due to the failure of Ironsi
to see a distinction in social and political identities between the Islamic
Society in the North and the M-Belt groups and societies in which case
there was also the failure to realize the interlocking of the M-Belt
identity with the Northern identity when it came to issues of southern
Nigerian political control of the national government, largely because of
the unequal diffusion of Western Europeans influences of modernization in
Nigeria. Thus as it became apparent after the January Coup and the events
surrounding Decree No. 34, when the M-Belt people rejected the Islamic
society in the demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region, they were not
rejecting the political conception of being Northern in identity. Indeed,
this was little understood in the interplay of political forces and
indentities that were already actively at work after the January Coup and
which became related in the organized response to Decree No. 34 and aimed
at an overall drive of mobilization in protection of Northern interests and
within that conception, also, there was the protection of M-Belt interests.
When Ironsi had snubbed the political advances of Joseph Tarka and Aminu
Kano for reform and subdivision of at least the North, after the January
Coup, he had simply thrown them back to organize Northern unity in a
political vacuum of leadership. By April 1966, all Northern politicians
irrespective of previous political identity had closed ranks and met each
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other regularly, to discuss what was to be done on the political state of
affairs in the country as their development affected the North92 . These
included Makaman Bida (NPC), Ibrahim Imam (BYM/AG), Aminu Kano (NEPU/NPF)
and Joseph Tarka (UMBC/NPF) 93 . Also in April, 1966 there was political
resurgence of the Northern identity among Senior Civil Servants in Kaduna
under the organization of Adamu Fika, whose pro-Federation political
opinion on Nigeria found expression in the New Nigerian and the Gaskiya Ta
Fl Kwabo94 . On the 19th April, 1966, for example, Suleirnan Tarkuma of Radio
Television Kaduna, wrote an extremely provocative pro-Northern article for
the New Nigerian under the title 'Federation is Good for Nigeria' in which
he argued:
"No-one has been bold enough to point out the
demerits of the manner of the change (from
civilian to the military government). The
attitude of silence and indifference to what is
happening in the country on the part of the
indigenous sons of the North is neither born
out of fear nor is it born out of lack of views
to present... it is partly born out of shock.
The shock that even if the Military regime
demanded the lives of those politicans who
allegedly spoiled this country, how could such
a bloody consequence be restricted to a
particular part of the country? The shock that
never in the history of Military Coups had it
occured that the lives of innocent army leaders
(from a particular part of a country) should
also be claimed along with those of the
politicians... Those shocks are some of the
reasons that kept us quiet, not to mention the
mad rush of application letters for jobs
pouring into the North from other parts of the
country... a Nigerian Unitary government does
not necessarily unite the people of Nigeria.
Especially the events that led to the
introduction of that desired unitary
government. I could advise the breaking of the
Federation... The Federation may be modified,
but must remain.., we are bound to wait and
see"
Similarly, Ibrahim Imam, a former radical opponent of the NPC party, for
example, produced lengthly and well argued cases for Federalism in Nigeria,
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which the New Nigerian serialized in four articles in mid-May 1966 . These
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outbursts were meant to discourage the implementation of the
recommendations of the Nwokedi Commission on Unification 97 . Before 24th May
1966, therefore, a very clear pro-Federal Northern position was already
well articulated by a cohesive Northern group, whose response in opposition
to the Ironsi-Regime had caused the neturalization of political and
socio-cultural differences in the North. The political issue on the
conception of cohesion in the resurgence of the Northern identity was clear
cut: domination of the North by more educated southerners, ochestrated by
an Ibo controlled government. This meant the fear that educationally
advanced southern groups will occupy occupational roles in the institutions
of government and society in the North to the detriment of indigenes of the
North.
Thus, four days after Decree No.34 was announced the first political
reaction to the issue of domination apparent in the provisions, came from a
demonstration on 28th and 29th May 1966, by students of the Ahmadu Bello
University in Zaria, a substantial number of whom came from the more
educationally advanced M-Belt tribes, who had been influenced by the civil
servants from Kaduna98 . The civil servants brought and invoked sharp images
to focus in the contrasts of advantages between Northernization policy and
the unification policy of Decree No.34, particularly as it affected those
of them that had administrative career prospects in the Northern civil
service. Distinction is however, pertinent among students of Ahmadu Bello
University (ABU), Zaria. The university has two campuses in Zaria: the
Kongo campus located near Zaria city and between it there was the 'Sabon
GarY and then, the Samaru campus, which was isolated on the Funtua road to
Katsina. The Kongo campus had the facilities of Law and Administration and
trained a substantial number of indigenes who were on In-service
Administrative Courses on the Northern civil service sponsorship as well as
undergraduates who were mainly Northerners. It was the Kongo campus which
effectively began the demonstrations in May 1966, marching from the main
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street of Zaria city toward 'Sabon Gari ' and chanting 'Araba - Aware'
(Division - Separation). The Samaru campus, however, was where the main
Faculties of the University were: Engineering, Pharmacy, Vetinary Medicine,
Arts and Social Sciences, Education etc. Only a few Northern students were
to be found on the Samaru Campus and it was predominantly Ibo and Yoruba in
both staff and students in 1966. The few Northern students mostly from the
M-Belt areas at the Samuru campus, joined the demonstration of the Kongo
campus on 29th May 1966. The demonstrations which began peacefully
degenerated into a riot99 . This was so, because the students were joined in
the protest by segments of the lowest stratum of society who seized on it
as an opportunity to vent their own grievances against the humiliations of
the previous months before May 100 , and significantly they carried in the
streets of Zaria, banners which proclaimed 'Araba - Aware', other than just
chanting the slogan' 01 . When the political mood of the demonstration
developed into rioting, Ibo men were attacked, their property destroyed and
as much as between 400 and 500 were killed in centres like Zaria, Kaduna,
Kano, Funtua, Gusau and Bauchi town where NPC support had been strongest
before the January coup d'etat 102 . In the May 1966 riots, besides the
involvement of students from the M-Belt areas in ABU, Zaria, there was no
particularly manifest M-Belt mass resentment to Decree No.34 and to Ibos
and to demands of "Araba-Aware" and no concommitant killing of Ibos in
townships like Jos, Bukuru, Makurdi, Yola and the sub-urban areas of Gboko,
Oturkpo, Kafanchan, Kagoro, Numan, Biliri, Barkin Ladi, Pankshin, Shendam,
Lafia, Keffi and Katsina Ala etc.103.
The initial Northern reaction to Decree No.34 in the 'May riots'
seemed to have been a political message of discontent to the Ironsi-Regime
on the political mood in The North. This was in context of the specific
demands, like those of Federation, with The North still intact or its
subdivision in which a M-Belt Region was to be created. Indeed this was
demonstrated in the political solidarity of The North, in which 'a Gang of
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four' prominent Northern politicians: Makama, Imam, Aminu and Tarka,
appeared on the arena to calm down the riots, protests and prevent the
killing of Ibos. The group jointly toured the main towns and cities of The
North as its leaders. According to Aminu Kano, they virtually undermined
the authority of Hassan Katsina, the seeming surrogate of the Ironsi-Reginie
in The North. However Hassan Katsina later was ambivalent in his support to
the Ironsi Regime and there is also evidence that he tacitly encouraged
Northern renaissance. Behind this demonstrated rejection of Decree No.34 in
May 1966, by the Northern intelligentsia (the civil servants and the
students in particular), the Northern masses who had joined the students to
riot and the demonstrated unity of The North in the realignment of party
political leadership into a collective Northern cohort, there was a
remaining last option - that of overthrowing the Ironsi-Regime itself if
Decree No.34 was not dropped. The Northern politicians rather curiously
thought they could do so with ease 104 . They set about to overthrow the
Ironsi-Regime by mobilizing Northern soldiers with the still impending
issue of what was to be done about inaction on the 'January Majors', After
30th May 1966, there was political calm in The North and in June, Ironsi
invigorated government determination to implement Decree No.34'° 5 . The same
month, however, was used by Northern politicians to influence the Army "to
do something" on the one-sidedness of the deaths of officers and
politicians during the January coup and on why those involved had not been
tried. The Northern politicians were also actively creating the image that
the Ironsi-Regime with the unitary scheme was imposing the will of a few on
the majority of the Nigerian population, to create a political atmosphere
for the Northern coup, by openly advocating for Federalism for Nigeria
through the New Nigerian 106 . Ironsi, however persisted with the policy of
unification. These political developments in The North showed clearly a
rejection to Unification and a preference for federation. They culminated
in the July coup that was staged by Northern officers and men of the
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Nigerian Army, the majority of whom came from the M-Belt areas. They acted
however within context of an activated Northern political identity.
Whatever the real Nationalist motives of the January coup-makers, the
Unification Decree left a wide spread belief among the Northern elite,
politicians who influenced Northern soldiers in the Nigerian Army and the
mass of the population in The North, that there had been an Ibo plot. This
belief was encouraged by the failure of Ironsi to prosecute the
conspirators of January, an issue that remained alive until the Northern
rank and file had taken retribution on Ibo officers in the July coup.
The pressures to effect the July 1966 coup d'etat by Northern Officers
were militarily induced as well as politically. Militarily, both the
Northern officers in the Nigerian Army and particularly, the rank and file
had been very uneasy since the January coup d'etat. The officers were under
pressure to act in revenge on Ibo officers, who had caused the deaths of
their much loved and admired officers and were abused by Northern ranks as
cowards for their inactivity. The rage and bitterness over the deaths of
Senior Army officers of The North, whom the Northern rank and file regarded
as heroes because of their Military experience was compounded by suspicions
that there was going to be "a second Ibo coup d'etat" to complete the
annililation of Northern Military officers in order that the top command
structure properly came under Ibo military leadership 107 . This was made
apparent by the existing regional imbalance in the Army as a result of the
January deaths and the Military promotions that took place in April 1966.
1-lowever Muhammed Shuwa and Murtala Mohammed enjoyed accelerated promotions
from captains to Lt. Colonels, which indicated there was a deliberate
attempt at regional balancing designed to placate the North, particularly
so when both officers were from the core areas of the Islamic society108.
The changes that were salient in the eyes of the junior Northern Officers
and NCOs were on the gross overall changes toward greater Ibo numerical
dominance at the higher levels' 09 , particularly the alterations which were
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thought of as a symbolic deprivation for the Northerners as a "tribe". This
impression was heightened by the fact that most of the new postings put Ibo
officers into command assignments rather than into staff or specialist
positions. In the Army for example, the commanders of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd
Battalions, the 2nd Brigade, the Abeokuta garrison, the Zaria Military
Depot, the Nigerian Military Training college and one of the two RECCE
squadrons were all Ibo, leaving only the 4th (with Joe Akahan) and 5th
(with Mohammed Shuwa) Battalions in Ibadan and Kano respectively and the
1st Brigade in the commands of nonIbosUO. In March, 1966 Ibo Army
Officers held ten of the thirteen unit command positions, whereas in
January, barely three months earlier, they held only five out of twelvelU.
The conspicuous position of the Ibo officers in the command structure of
the Nigerian Army therefore fitted the perceptions of The North on the new
political positions, namely the loss of political power and leadership
which the Ibos in the East had gained. These circumstances were made worse
by the widely publicized incidents at the Army and Air Force recruiting
centres at Zaria and Kaduna where it was felt that Northerners no longer
had a fair chance in the recruitments into the Nigerian armed forcesU?.
Military and political considerations therefore combined to make the issue
of Ibo and southern Nigerian domination more threatening on The North,
particularly on the grim prospects of what Ibos can and might do with their
effective control of Nigeria in the light of existing trends of policies.
In an effort to adjust for the existing circumstances by using military
action, the method that produced Ibo and southern Nigerian advantages, the
rank and file from the tribes in The North were enraged that their officers
had let them down by allowing the January coup d'etat to occur and not at
once take swift action to avenge
	 What alarmed the Northern combatant
officers even more was that the Northern riflemen threatened and were
prepared to effect a coup d'etat themselves in which they would deal with
both Northern and Southern Army officers' 14 . When it is accounted for the
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fact that about two thirds of the rank and file in all the Battalions of
the Nigerian Army, was M-Belt, it is not unreasonable to suggest that these
pressures were essentially M-Belt pressures on Northern officers, again the
majority of whom came from the M-Belt areas 115 . In Lagos, Apapa, Ikeja,
Abeokuta and most particularly Ibadan, where there was a concentration of
Northern soldiers, the rank and file were "rolling on the ground in sorrow"
when they heard the death of Abogo Largema and Kur Mohammed who were both
previous COs in the 4th Battalion at Ibadan' 16 . Before impact with British
influences, all the M-Belt groups, traditionally mourned their dead in this
manner, even when new funeral ceremonies through the influence of Islam and
Christianity had affected them. In other words, these soldiers were from
among the M-Belt groups and societies. Furthermore, this felt identity on
the death of Army officers, conditioned the fact that the soldiers were
ready to obey orders only when Lt. Colonel Joseph Akahan, a Tiv Northerner
from the M-Belt areas who understood their feelings of sorrow was appointed
as the new CO to the 4th Battalion in IbadanU7.
There were also direct political pressures on the Northern officers
which came from their relations and politicians in the North, to interpret
the January coup d'etat in wider political terms rather than just the
overthrow of a corrupt government which had resulted into the deaths of
fellow Northern Officers. This line of persuasion was made credible in the
context of Ibo political behaviour after the January coup and the political
interests surrounding Decree No.34. Northern officers like Murtala Mohammed
were relations of NPC politicians and businessmen like Inuwa Wada who was
ready to use his personal wealth in order to increase his support in the
MilitaryU8. Furthermore, in the period between January and the July 1966
coup d'etat, Joseph Tarka became close to Joe Akahan a fellow Tiv and from
the discussions of the issue of the creation of the M-Belt Region and the
state of politics in the country in general Akahan was able to introduce
Tarka to General Gowon' 19 . Other officers that were close in their
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relations to top Northern politicians were also put under pressure "to do
something" to retrieve the honour of The North - "Mutunci", which had ben
"eaten up" in the January coup d'etat 120 . Furthermore, among the civil
population of The North, there was hatred and derision that was directed at
the Northern Army Officers. The civilian population was so hostile to
Northern soldiers on the particular issue of overthrowing the
Ironsi-Regime, to the extent that some top Northern public officers refused
to socialize with the army officers and there were sugggestions that
parents of the wives' to the officers were to be pressurized to encourage
their daughters to desert the soldier-husbands because they were cowards
for failing to restore the honour ("mutinci") of the Northern people 121 . It
was the combination of these pressures on Northern soldiers that produced
the military action to overthrow the Ironsi-Regime during the Night of 28th
July 1966.
However, it ought to be borne in mind that when Gowon, with the
assistance of other Northern officers and men foiled the January coup they
were indirectly effecting a coup themselves because they had the Army under
control and Yakubu Gowon subsequently persuaded the soldiers to give their
allegiance to Aguiyi-Ironsi and after restraining them from taking instant
revenge on Ibo officers. Since Gowon and Northern officers could rally
round the Army behind the command of Ironsi they equally could deploy the
same capacity against him and that was exactly what happened after the
regime committed political blunders. However, the overthrow of the Ironsi
regime had to wait for both military and political timing if the need
arose. This came when the Ironsi-Regime had demonstrated almost total
incapacity to respond to the political inputs of the system and an increase
of rumours about Ibo plans to eliminate all non-Ibos of age five and above
to create a situation for the "Iboization" of Nigeria. The events that led
to the overthrow of the Ironsi-Regime began with an argument in the
officers-mess at Abeokuta in which two particular Northern officers,
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Captains M. Remawa and D. Bali opposed disarming troops because of rumours
of a coup. The rumours had heightened tensions between Northern and Ibo
officers in the Garrison. The argument ended with the exchange of gun-fire
and in the mutiny that resulted only Ibo officers were killed. This event
in Abeokuta caused a chain reaction of military activity in Ikeja, Apapa,
Lagos and very critically at Ibadan where Ironsi was on a visit and where
he was captured by Northern troops and executed. Thereafter, a Northern
officer travelled by road from Ibadan in the night to activate the coup in
Kaduna 122 . The July 1966 coup was, therefore a series of poorly coordinated
military operations. Unlike January 1966 when the plans for the coup had
been put into operation simultaneously in Kaduna, Ibadan and Lagos, which
suggest a high degree of planning and coordination, the July rebellion
exhibited every sign of a lack of formal plan. However, the intention to
overthrow Ironsi was by this time general among Northern officers, but the
time and place may have been accidentally activated. This may be explained
by the initial political differences in the identity within Northern troops
themselves. Political identification with The North within the Army was
initially not uniform among Northern soldiers, because many of the
non-Islamic soldiers particularly the Tiv from the M-Belt areas, were as
hostile to the political dominance of the Sardauna and the Northern Islamic
elite as they were to Ibos and other Southern 1igerian groups in Nigerian
politics 123 . The abduction of General Agulyl-Ironsi was, however carefully
planned in conjunction with the 4th Battalion in Ibadan, where there was a
Northern CO, Joe Akahan, who was Tiv and where there was also a
predominance of the rank and file of the Army from The North, the majority
of whom were Tiv 124 . Joe Akahan was to freely deploy his troops in the July
coup d'etat and further spoke out openly in support of the coup, suggesting
that "Northern troops had their orders" 125 , and congratulated the
performance of his troops in capturing Ironsi as an end to "bloodshed,
since events had now balanced out" 26
 The success of the July coup
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therefore is explained by the tie of tribal loyalties to acceptable
military commanders and these combined to produce military action with the
Northern political identity against a regime that alienated The North,
particularly the liv and the demands for the creation of a M-Belt region.
In the 4th Battalion in Ibadan, for example, reason and commitment to a
political identity correlated with the occupants of the command structure,
which enabled effective military action in the overthrow of the
Ironsi-Regime. The July coup d'etat resulted in the deaths of General
Ironsi (Ibo) and Colonel Fajuyi (Yoruba), the Military Governor of the
Western Region 127 . The coup also halted the unification drive of the
military government. The victims of the coup d'etat were mainly Ibo
Nigerian Army officers and men: of the 39 officers killed in the coup 27
were Ibo and of the 171 other ranks and file of the Army that also died,
154 were Ibos from the Eastern Region, besides Midwestern Ibos who also got
killed in the coup'28.
The July 1966 coup d'etat was almost in all cases in the different
units of the Nigerian army, carried out by men of the other ranks and file
who were led by NCOs of Northern origin. In certain instances, the NCOs
temporarily took over command from the commissioned officers. However, many
of the commissioned officers of Northern origins, feeling militarily and
politically aggrieved themselves, assisted in the coordination of the coup
although some of them assisted fellow Ibo officers to escape death in the
hands of the Northern rank and file in Ikeja, Apapa, Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna
and particularly in the 5th Battalion in Kano' 29 . It was, however Ibadan,
Lagos, Abeokuta and Ikeja that were the focus of military activities in the
July coup and the events in these centres activated the coup in Kaduna,
Zaria and Kano. In Ibadan, the whole operation was under the leadership of
Major Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma, a Christian Jukun who organized the
neutralization of Ironsi 130 . Also in Ibadan, Lt. Colonel Joseph Akahan, a
Christian Tiv produced military support for the operations of the coup and
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the overall coordination of officers and men as the CO of the 4th
Battalion 131 . In Lagos, the coup was effected by almost all Northern
officers, the key figures being Murtala Mohammed, a 1-lausa Muslim from Kano,
Martin Adamu, an Ankwei Christian from the Plateau, S. Alao, a Christian
Yoruba from Ilorin and Baba Usman. These officers commanded Northern units
to take control of the LGO-Apapa and also ceased control of Ikeja. Lt.
colonel (later general) Yakubu Gowon coordinated the military activities of
the coup d'etat to overthrow the Ironsi-regime, from the central operations
room at Army Headquarters in Apapa, where he was able to telephone through
to Major (later General) Yakubu Danjuma: "To arrest the Supreme Commander
but please make sure there is no bloodshed. We have had enough
bloodshed. When you have done it ring me"132.
However, the July 1966 coup was planned by all officers of Northern
origin, although ostensibly executed by M-Belt officers whose tribal origin
correlated with that of the majority rank and file of the military units
where, besides the use of the English language they easily understood each
other with the Hausa language and these factors complemented obedience in
the hierarchy of military command. These characteristics were particularly
the case with the notorious 4th Battalion in Ibadan, where there was a near
perfect "tribal" correlation between the top command structure and the NCOs
and others in the ranks and file, many of whom were liv people and the
Northern dominance of the 4th Battalion was given a boost by the existence
of other non-Southern tribes in the Battalion. The ease with which
Aguiyi-Ironsi was captured in Ibadan is explained by the loyalty which
these characteristics produced within the Northern identity. In the
processes of the coup, Ibos and other non-Northern tribes in the 4th
Battalion were easily neutralized or disarmed. The officers of M-Belt
origins who were directly involved in the July 1966 coup included: In
Ibadan there was the active involvement of Joe Akahan (Tiv), Yakubu Danjuma
(Jukun), William Walbe (Angas), Jeremiah Useini (Yergam), Ibrahim Bako
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(Rukuba) and Onoja (Igalla); In Ikeja, Lagos(Yaba) and Apapa, there was
active involvement of Yakubu Gowon (Angas - who became Head of State after
the coup), P.C. Tarfa (Nupe), Martin Adamu (Ankwei), Paul Dickson (Idoma),
Ochefu (Idoma), Joe Garba (Yergam), Clement Humbe (Tiv) and S. Agara (liv);
In Abeokuta there was the active involvement of 0. Bali; In Kaduna, M-Belt
officers involved in the July coup included: B. J. Dimka (Angas), M.
Wushishi (Bassange) and Nasco (Bassange)133 Other Northern Army Officers
from the Islamic society who were centrally involved in the July coup
included: Murtala Mohammed (Hausa from Kano), Isa Bukur (Kanuri), Ibrahim
Taiwo (Yoruba from Ilorin), Hassan Katsina (Hausa-Fulani from Katsina),
Abba Kyari (Kanuri), Mohammed Shuwa (Kanuri) and Gora (Hausa from Kano)'34.
However, of the 126 officers and men of the Nigerian Army from The North
who were named by the Eastern Nigerian Region Government as the core
participants in the July coup, about 70% of their total names were
Christian and relate to have come from among the M-Belt groups'35.
Furthermore, of the 52 commissioned officers of Northern origins that were
central to the execution of the coup, about 58% were M-Belt officers136.
Most of these officers played important roles in the subsequent coups
d s etat in Nigerian politics: Garba (Yergam), helped to announce the success
of the 1975 coup against Gowon (Angas) to put the Murtala (Hausa) -
Obasanjo (Yoruba) - Regime into power; in 1976 - B.S. Dimka (Angas), led an
abortive coup that attempted the overthrow the above regime; in 1983 - Sani
Abacha (Kanuri), announced the coup which brought the present Buhari (Hausa
Fulani) Regime into power. However, it is from perceptions in the
concentration of M-Belt officers and men in the ranks and file of the
Nigerian Army in 1966 that James O'Connell suggests that Gowon was put into
power by M-Belt NCOs and soldiers' 37 . The coup was however staged by the
majority of the officers and men from the M-Belt groups initially with an
explicit Northern political identity. In that period M-Belt political
interests had not manifested themselves Ofl the centre-stage to be
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influential on the political area. The military action which the soldiers
from the M-Belt groups took centred on the controversies surrounding the
murders of their fellow officers, as much as, they were Northerners and
officers of the Nigerian Army. The major cause of the coup d'etat in July
however had been over inaction of Ironsi to deal with the January plotters.
Thus, the very first words of Yakubu Danjunia upon the arrest of
Aguiyi-Ironsi reflected the issue in the Government Guest Uouse in Ibadan:
"You are under arrest. You organized the
killing of our brother officers in January and
you have done nothing to bring the so called
dissident elements to justice because you were
part and parcel of the whole thing ... You have
been fooling us. I ran around risking my neck
trying to calm the ranks and in February you
told us that they would be 1 ied. This is July
and nothing has been done"
There is, however, no doubt that there were political interests in the July
1966 coup, particularly in respect to how the Northern identity had been
used in mobilizing reaction to Decree No.34, which was seen to give to Ibo
and Southern Nigerian groups, advantages in the domination of political
control of Nigeria and The North. The crunch of the political identity that
had been used to overthrow the Ironsi-Regime came to a head when the
success of the coup d'etat began to translate itself into the political
objectives of the planners. Almost immediately the objectives of the coup
became apparent, variation developed within the Northern political identity
which became based on previous political lines in Nigerian politics before
15th January: some politicians and Army officers from the Islamic North
maintained the principles of the NPC party while some, the pro-federation
stand of the NPF alliance as was previously expressed by the UMBC party
which stood for the interests of the non-Islamic groups and societies. This
variation initially expressed itself over the choice of a leader for the
soldiers who had overthrown the government of Ironsi, a choice that as
would become apparent was conditioned by the balance of force in the
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military control of soldiers with the monopoly of the instruments of
coercion. It was this stalemate after the coup d'etat that was to condition
the path toward either the secession of the North or the processes for the
restoration of the Nigerian Federation after the unitary efforts of the
government of Aguiyi-Ironsi. In the period between 15th January and July
1966, politicians from both the Islamic and M-Belt areas in the North had
common cause to stand together in political opposition to the government of
Ironsi, essentially, because of its location of political power among Ibos
and other southern Nigerian groups. However when the overthrow of the
Ironsi-Regime was successful, differences in political identity began to
assert themselves between the Muslim majority and the minorities of the
M-Belt areas, who were in control of the Army after July 1966 and these
differences in The North began to be used for political purposes.
The January coup d'etat therefore had the demonstrative effect on
M-Belt soldiers in the Nigerian Army in the sense that it effected a value
change toward political relationships with the dominant groups in The
North, largely derived from the way the Ibos had used force to overturn the
system to its own advantages and reversed roles such that Ibos were more
effective in participating in political decision making, particularly in
policy areas where they were previously excluded. These perspectives of
political power relationships which enjoyed the backing of military force
however built up gradually among military and political leadership from
among the M-Belt groups. Firstly, there was a collective identification
with Northern interests and later, the M-Belt interests found expression
within the context of the Northern identity in the demands for the
subdivision of the Nigerian Federation in which the creation of a M-Belt
Region was given support. The political processes in which there was this
shift in identity from the Northern to the M-Belt, among the M-Belt
leadership cut through the main currents of the unsettling events that
determined the fate of the Nigerian Federation after the July 1966 coup
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d'etat. These events included: I. The critical decision on the choice of
who was to be leader, after the coup, in which case a pro-Federalist
Military officer emerged in the person of Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon as the
leader of Nigeria. Gowon was in this case the most senior Northern Army
officer. II. The controversy on the secession of The North in which again
with the influences of a reluctant M-Belt to go into secession with The
North while still aspiring for the creation of the M-Belt Region, produced
the options on Federating the North in a modified Nigeria. III. The Ad Hoc
constitutional conference in which M-Belt pressures on the collective
Northern position influenced the support for the creation of more units as
states of the Nigerian Federation and IV. The subsequent Ibo led threat of
secession in the Eastern Region of Nigeria, carrying along with it the
unwilling oil rich minorities of COR movements which created the political
atmosphere for the creation of a twelve state structure of the Nigerian
Federation by General Yakubu Gowon on 27th May 1967. These main currents of
political developments in the period between July 1966 and May 1967 and
whose outcomes were determined by the nature and shape of M-Belt
influences, particularly that in the remaining force of the UMBC party are
briefly examined below until the creation of states on 27th May 1967 in
which Benue-Plateau state was created among others.
Although the coup d'etat of July 1966 was successful in overthrowing
the Ironsi-Regime and creating relief because retaliatory military measures
were taken on Ibo Army officers and men in a way similar to how Northern
officers had been killed in the January coup a leader for the new Nigerian
Military regime did not emerge until two days after the coup. Thus, for
example, although by the 29th July, political power was already firmly
re-established by force in the hands of Northerners, it was not until on
1st August 1966 that General (at that time Lt. Colonel) Yakubu Gowon
emerged as Head of the Nigerian armed forces. This was so, because
contradictions developed in the initial objectives of the coup d'etat.
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Gowon, having been in Lagos as Chief of Army Staff when the coup occurred
and had been sent by Brigadier Ogundipe (the next ranking officer to
Ironsi) to deal with the "rebels" at Ikeja went and found himself in the
middle of the contradiction. On the one hand, there were officers who saw
the Northe rn coup d'etat as a retaliatory measure against Ibos and
Southern Nigerian officers and once the military measure was taken, it
would be followed up by the breakup of the Federation, in which case The
North would become an independent autonomous unit and exist as country of
itself. The majority of Muslim officers of Northern origins, under the
leadership of Lt. Colonel Murtala Mohammed, saw the July coup d'etat in
these terms. Not only did this group send their families to The North, but
also advised Northern Civil servants and others of Northern origin residing
in Lagos to leave before a dateline. Many Northern civil servants actually
left Lagos and were temporarily settled in Ilorin and Kaduna as well as
other Northern towns on the edges of the border with Western Nigeria.
Furthermore, a VC1O plane of the British Airways was detained by Northern
officers at Ikeja Airport in order to air-lift the remaining families of
the soldiers of Northern origins to Kano. Although almost all Northern
soldiers were involved in this exercise, the group which ostensibly wished
to cause the secession of The North was more under the leadership of
Murtula Mohammed and Martin Adamu 139 . On the other hand, within the general
political mood of Northern secession after the July coup d'etat there was
the group of Northern officers most of whom came from the M-B1t groups and
societies who were opposed to the break up of the Nigerian Federation:
"because their oath of commission into the Army was on allegiance to
protect the territorial integrity of the country" 40 . Yakubu Gowon, who
articulated these views at the meeting of Northern officers in Dodon
Barracks, subsequently assumed the leadership of the group. The M-Belt
officers who shared the same views with him, in the rather lively political
debate that took place in Dodon Barracks, included Joe Akahan, Yakubu
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Danjuma and Joseph Garba as well as several other subalterns of Northern
origins from the Brigade of Guards in Lagos and others who had come down
from Ibadan 141 . As much as this group also saw the coup d'etat in terms of
retribution on the pains and losses caused by the January 15th coup it
wished to see Nigerians negotiate their political existence after the
'January Majors' and their associates had been punished. Only when there
was no solution to the unity of the existing units in the federation in the
light of existing political experiences, was there to be some kind of
confederal arrangement or total disintegration.
The delay that surrounded the assumption of leadership of Nigeria by
any single Northerner or group of Northerners after 29th July 1966, when it
was apparent that the government of Ironsi had been overthrown was largely
caused by the variations of the political intentions of these two groups
and at the same time, because each of the groups had not established
loyalty over the rank and file to its side. The rank and file remained in a
mutinous state with gross indiscipline in the Army, long after the
overthrow of the Ironsi-Regime to the extent that the Provost Marshall
Major Ekanem was shot dead on 1st August when apparently on an errand for
Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, himself 142 . Furthermore the Northern soldiers had
also created a situation in which they would not obey orders from any
Southern Nigerian Army officers and were opposed to a Southerner being the
Head of a Military government. After the overthrow of the Ironsi-Regime for
example, the next highest ranking officer of the Nigerian Army, who
attempted to take control of the Armed forces was Brigadeer Ogundipe' 43 . He
was subsequently forced into resignation and on 31st August, 1966, left
Nigeria to seek refuge in England when he discovered that the Nigerian
crisis had created a perfect correlation between the Northern political
identity and the Command - Compliance Structure of the Nigerian Army:
Northern ranks and file in the Nigerian Army only obeyed orders from
Northern officers. It remained therefore for Northern troops to choose a
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Head of State for Nigeria, although they were bent on packing up and
returning to the North. It would appear that the choice was to be either
Lt. Colonel Murtala Mohammed who had been very active in coordinating the
coup in Ikeja and Lagos areas and had rallied troops behind him with the
assistance of Majors Baba Usman, S. A. Alao (HQ. NAF) and Captain Isa Bukar
or Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon who had similarly coordinated the coup and kept
in touch with the progress of events in the military units boths in Lagos
area and more distant areas like, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Kaduna, Kano and Enugu,
as the Chief of Army Staff and the most Senior Northern Army Officer. It
was apparent after the July coup d'etat that besides the important
consideration of militarty seniority over Murtala Mohammed, Gowon had more
officers and men under his influence to command, than was the case with
Murtala Mohammed. His influence was particularly significant with officers
and men of the Federal Guard troops and in the 4th Battalion in Ibadan,
consisting of M-Belt men in the ranks and file, under Joe Akahan and Yakubu
Danjuma, whom he had ordered from Lagos to capture and neutralize Ironsi
and Fajuyi 144 . Furthermore, it may not be unreasonable to assume that Gowon
himself as Chief of Army Staff in the short period between January and July
1966, had developed skills and knowledge of "coup matters", having
controlled the findings and the report of the enquiry on the January coup
d'etat staged by 'Ibo Majors'.
However, Gowon became leader after Brigadier Ogundipe ordered him to
approach the "rebellious" troops at Ikeja, to find out the exact nature of
their grievances and report back to him 145 . When Gowon arrived at Ikeja
with these orders, the soldiers siezed him and virtually "arrested" him for
two reasons: As the most Senior Northern Army Officer, they wanted him to
take over the command of an Army that was predominantly Northern and once
he became Commander of the most powerful instrument of coercion in Nigeria,
they wanted him to be their spokesman, ostensibly in the interest of the
declaration of secession of the North. Initially, Gowon was sympathetic to
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Northern soldiers at Ikeja and appears to have supported their reasons and
commitment to the causes of ideas of Northern secession. He, however,
refrained from endorsing them in the strong terms that Murtala Mohammed
already did, who infact had assumed leadership of the rebels at Ikeja,
before Gowon arrived 146 . In the period between 29th and 31st July 1966,
when the Northern Civil Servants pressurized Gowon to take over military
and political leadership, he was concerned to do so only after Northern
soldiers had been persuaded to drop their propositions of Northern
secession and political intentions of breaking up The Federation' 47 . This
became particularly crucial to him in the context of the challenge and
rivalry over leadership which had developed from Lt. Colonel Murtala
Mohammed. It was based on this problem and the demands of Northern Civil
Servants to have more discussions with the soldiers that the negotiations
moved from Ikeja to Dodon Barracks. The new demands were also intended to
establish a more broadly based Northern decision by seeking the opinions of
Northern Army Officers and Civil Servants who had converged on Kaduna under
the leadership of Hassan Katsina' 49 . In Lagos the political position of
Gowon on the preservation of the Nigerian Federation was complemented by
the support of some eight Northern Civil Servants who were largely
organized by Sule Kataguni (Hausa Fulani) the Chairman of the Nigerian
Public Service Commission and Mr Atta (an Igbirra), the Federal Permanent
Secretary to the Ministry of Finance. There was also support for the
preservation of the Federation after the July coup from Kam Salem (a
Kanuri), who was the acting Inspector General of Police, Justice Bello (a
Hausa Fulani), a Northern Judge of the Supreme Court, M. D. Yusufu (Hausa
Fulani), Head of the Special Branch, Nigeria Police. The
Gowon-Military-Group of Northern Officers which was already supported by
the Northern Civil Servants in Lagos also gained support from Adetokumboh
Ademola (Yoruba), the Chief Justice of the Federation, as well as some,
other Southern Nigerian Civil Servants, predominantly from the Mid-Western
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Region, a minorities area whose independent authority from the Western
Region was achieved barely three years before the coup d'etat since it was
created as a unit of the Federation in 1963.
For a number of political reasons before the Dodon Barracks meeting
however Lt. Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon clearly emerged as the
spokesman and the critical factor among the Northern Army Officers on the
political interestss surrounding the preservation of the Nigerian
Federation.
Although not yet quite clear in the extent of influence as a political
force in the negotiations that took place in Dodon Barracks on the fate of
the Nigerian Federation there were differences among Northern Soldiers in
loyalties to Gowon and Murtala Mohammed. These differences had roots in the
conception of the political and social meaning given by the troops to
"Yan-Arewa-Yan Gida" (Northern Sons-Home Sons). On the one hand, all
Northern Soldiers shared the sentiments of being Northern ("Van Arewa") and
on the other hand, within that conception and significantly distinctive in
terms of military loyalties, soldiers from the M-Belt areas saw each other
as "Van Gida", not hostile to Muslims, but with sufficient coherance that
it consituted a sub-group culture within the Northern identity. The
conception however assumed a distinction in social and political identity
which placed Gowon (Christian Angas from a minorities area) in a position
of advantage over Murtala Mohammed (Muslim Hausa from a majorities area),
by producing loyalties from both sides of an aggrieved North with the
minorities dominating and controlling the instruments of coersion after
July 1966. In the controversies surrouding the negotiations on the
political objectives of the July coup d'etat and after Gowon became Head of
State, social conceptions of "Van-Gida" increasingly assumed subtle
political distinctions in the patterns of identification among soldiers
from the M-Belt groups, the majority of whom were Christians. This
increasingly contrasted with and eroded assumptions of the monolithicness
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in the concept of "Van Arewa" (Northern Sons). This, however, did not
destroy identification with that conception. In July 1966, "Van Arewa"
fundamentally referred to Northerners and the Northern identity in general
terms, while "Van Gida" (Home sons) became used by M-Belt soldiers in
reference to themselves within the Nigerian Army. Thus, for example, while
Gowon openly asserted to be "another Northerner", who has taken over
control of political power of Nigeria, M-Belt officers and men, saw him
first and foremost as their own man: "Dan Gida" (Home son) as well as "Dan
Arewa" (Northern son). In the July coup d'etat, however, Gowon was clearly
concerned over Northern interests rather than M-Belt or other Nigerian
minority interests and indeed the Nigerian national identity seemed to have
been submerged by the Northern identity until in September 1966, when he
shifted political emphasis from regional to National solidarity in emphasis
of preservation of the Nigerian Federation. In the instance, Gowon openly
made statements on the creation of states as a means of preserving the
Federation and the interests in the creation of a M-Belt Region were
reinvigorated. Gowon himself admited that he was "another Northerner" but
in an important sense it was the soldiers who imposed the identity on him.
To restore discipline in the Army, therefore, Gowon accepted the image of
the Northern identity and in very subtle ways the M-Belt minorities
identity and the soldiers were loyal to him as he himself acknowledged:
"Those soldiers were very loyal to me... but it
was military discipline and loyalty rather than
'a Middle 1 5lt tribal identity' or 'a Northern
Identity'
Gowon is very ambivalent on the political identities he manipulated in July
1966 until he had stablized the Nigerian Federation by the clear cut policy
of State creation. If, as he suggests, for example, the soldiers were loyal
to him because of military discipline outside the context of a specific
identity, then any other military officer might have been able to exercise
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authority in the military hierarchy to stop the 4th Battalion and other
Northern troops in Ibadan and Lagos areas, from the killings of
non-Northerners that resulted from the July coup d'etat. The conceptions of
both "Van Arewa" and "Van Gida" produced fanatical loyalty among the
soldiers for Gowon, not only as a Head of State of Nigeria, but in the very
nature of his person as an individual, right from the critical moments at
Dodon Barracks in July 1966 and through the Civil War until his overthrow
in July 1975. However, by May 1967, when Gowon created states in Nigeria,
Lt. Colonel Murtala Mohammed had lost much of his support in the Army by
the polarity of identities within the Northern troops. This was largely so,
because the M-Belt officers and men in particular, were not prepared to
countenance any challenge to the leadership of Gowon' 51 . Furthermore, many
M-Belt soldiers did not take it lightly, when Murtala Mohammed
unsuccessfully challenged the appointment of Joe Akahan, as Chief of Army
Staff, seemingly based on the ideas that, since the Head of State and
Supreme Commander of the Army, Gowon, came from the M-Belt areas, the Chief
of Staff, ought to come from soldiers from the Islamic Society in the
North. However, a purely political reason which caused Murtala Mohammed to
lose military support from th Northern troops, was that while he eventually
supported a strong Federation behind the scenes at the Ad Hoc Conferences
in 1966, he failed to show great enthusiasm for the ideas of the creation
of new states in which a M-Belt Region was anticipated'52.
The concept of "Van Gida" was a prerogative that was preciously
nurtured by soldiers of the Federal Brigade of Guards, Lagos, after July
1966, until it was politically misused in 1976 by Lt. Colonel B. S. Dimka
in an attempted coup d'etat that caused the death of Murtala Mohammed and
the executions of over thirty officers and men of the Nigerian Army, most
of them from the M-Belt areas. This resulted into a very large scale
re-organization of the Nigerian Army to the extent that all the Units
consisted of a "mixture" of the Nigerian tribes such that it is difficult
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for a specific group identity to develop within the ranks beyond that of a
military formation. In very many ways, besides the overt mention of name,
therefore, the Dimka abortive coup d'etat was based on military loyalties
that were held for Yakubu Gowon and the supposed political coherance within
the Nigerian Army which the "Yan-Gida" concept had developed and was
assumed to have achieved coherance for political action,
In July 1966, however, the main concern of the Northern Civil Servants
that were still in Lagos and the few Southern Nigerian groups who still
believed in the existence of the Federation, was to persuade Gowon against
the secession of the North. In the process, they highlighted the
socio-economic and political disadvantages of secession for the North. The
British High Commissioner and the American Ambassador in Lagos, who
attended the meetings at Dodon Barracks, in conjunction with expatriate
officers (mainly British) in the North who were clearly influencing the
military officers and Civil Servants in Kaduna, also advised Gowon against
the secession of the North. The Northern officers discussing the fate of
the Nigerian Federation at Dodon Barracks, Lagos were in constant telephone
contact with the Kaduria group. The group, which was based at the official
residence of the Military Governor at Kaduna among others, consisted of
Hassan Katsina (Hausa Fulani Muslim), Abba Kyari (Kanuri Muslim), A. R.
Alabi (Muslim Mid-Westerner), B. S. Dimka (Angas Christian), Sani Abacha
(Kanuri Muslim), Fl. I. Wnshishi (Bassange Christian) Mohammed Shuwa (Kanuri
Muslim and CO of 5th Battalion in Kano) as well as top Civil Servants among
whom was Joly Tanko Yusufu (a Jukun Christian and President of the NCA).
Similar to the group in Lagos, some military officers and a few Civil
Servants insisted on the dissolution of the Federation' 53 . The majority of
the Civil Servants including Joly Tanko Yusufu however opposed dissolution
of the Nigerian Federation 154 . The opposition group was of the view that
since the North had secured military and political control of the
government in Lagos:
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"it should not hand over on a platter of gold
to other people. The least that could be done
was to keep (the Federation), 1 d if necessary
preside over its liquidation"
The Kaduna group, similar to the ranks and file in Lagos, insisted on a
Northerner being the Head of State and Supreme Commander, an issue on which
they could not compromise. It was this group that highlighted the grim
point on Northern secession, suggesting that it might produce an
opportunity for a Southern Nigerian Army Officer to assume control of the
government of the Federation as Head of State of Nigeria and invite foreign
troops in the name of a rebellion, to crush Northern troops 156 . This line
of persuation was made credible by references to Brigadier Ogfendipe
(before he left for England on 31st July 1966), the next Army Officer in
rank to Ironsi, who was possibly looking for such opportunity 157 . After the
assumption of power by Gowon, Ogundipe travelled 'incognite' on a passenger
boat to London and subsequently took-up the position of Nigerian High
Commissioner. It was these arguments that persuaded the pro-secessionist
forces to rally support around Yakubu Gowon and stopped the declaration of
secession with a rather poorly modified original draft of the speech by
Northern Civil Servants in Lagos 8 . Underlying the hesitations of
Northerners to declare secession and in the political calculations that
were too open to contemplate, however, was the fundamental fact of a
pro-Federation Lt. Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon at the head of a
political army, whose members were from the M-Belt, an area in itself that
was a microcosm of the socio-political and economic tensions of the
Nigerian Federation. Gowon and many other Northerners: both Military and
Civil Officers and indeed most people with any knowledge of the North, knew
very well the centrifugal forces within the North itself. Once the troops
carried out their threat to withdraw from Lagos and Southern Nigeria, there
might be nothing left to hold these forces in check, particularly so in the
way the soldiers were already politicized on issues on Nigerian
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politics 159
. It was from political considerations like these that Gowon
made up his mind to accede to the demand of the bureaucrats if and only if
the men could be persuaded to desist from their position of breaking up the
Federation by secession of the north' 60
. Late on the 31st July 1966 after
Northern soldiers had forced Brigadier Ogendipe to resign and had taken a
ship to England, Gowon finally made up his mind to assume the leadership of
the nation and the Army in which the political nature of the soldiers he
inherited was fundamental in shaping the decision on interests to preserve
the Federation of Nigeria 161
. On 1st August 1966, Gowon told Nigerians in a
broadcast as Head of State and Supreme Commander:
"the basis for trust and confidence in our
unitary system of government has been unable to
stand the test of time... suffice to say that
putting all considerations to test, political,
economic as well as social, the basis of unity
is not there, or is so badly rocked not only
once but several times.., we should review the
issue of our national standing and see if we
can help the country from drifting away into
utter destruction.., a decree will soon be
issued to lay a sound foundation of this
objective... I shall do all I can to return to
civil rule as soon as it can be arranged. I
also intend to pursue most vigourously the
question of 6 he release of political
prisoners"
In this maiden broadcast therefore Gowon committed himself to conciliate
three basic interests that almost instantly reduced the high political
temperature in the country: preservation of the Federation for all
Nigerians centred on a collective review of political arrangements; the
release of political prisoners affecting the Yoruba and Mid-Western
leadership whose Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Antony Enahoro were still in
prison; and most particularly he was conciliating Tarka, the UMBC party and
Tjv soldiers in the Nigerian Army whose associates were in prison, an issue
that Ironsi failed to exploit when he was in power. The Tiv who comprised
some 20% of rifle-men of the Nigerian army, supported Yakubu Gowon and
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emerged as a most important element in the political process'63.
After 1st August 1966, when it became apparent that Gowon had
established political control, events moved rapidly for the restoration of
the Federation and the promised review of the constitution. On 3rd August
1966, he ordered the release of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Enahoro, which
was followed with the release of Michael Okpara from detention on 4th
August 164 . After appeasing the South, he shifted to the North, where on the
17th August 1966, he ordered the release of Tiv political prisoners, who
took part
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in the Tiv riots of 1964 and had been in prison since that
The offences of the political prisoners were in most instances
tied to the political interests of the demands for a Federal system for
Nigeria, in which the existing Regions were to be subdivided into smaller
units. This was particularly so for the Tiv political prisoners in the
North, where the liv riots were connected to the demands for the creation
of a M-Belt Region that was articulated by the UMBC party under the
leadership of Joseph Tarka. More significant for the direction of political
developments of Nigeria to re-Federation, however, on 31st August 1966,
Gowon signed Decree No. 59 which restored the Federal system of government
with four Regions.
III. The Ad Hoc Constitutional Conferences of 1966 and the creation of
States on 27th May, 1967.
The month of September 1966, opened up with the politics of
re-arranging the Nigerian Federation, which Gowon earlier indicated on 8th
August, 1966 would be by a Constitutional Review Assembly. The Assembly was
meant to make political recommendations that were suitable for the plural
system of Nigeria in a forum with delegates representative of opinions from
the previously existing regions before the coup d'etat of January 15th and
Decree No. 34 of the Ironsi Regime166.
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The more direct political influences of the M-Belt movement were
apparent in the political developments after the July coup d'etat. These
centered on the political pressures produced on both the 'Leaders of
thought' movement in the North and officers and men of the Nigerian Army
from among the M-Belt groups, particularly those of them that were Tiv. The
M-Belt politicians having given support to the cause of the Northern
identity were admitted into the central arena of political power in the
North, where they renewed the demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region.
After the establishment of authority by Gowon and the provisions of Decree
No. 59, a series of political opinion circles developed in all the units of
the Nigerian Federation which were known as Regional "Leaders of thought"
which met from time to time to discuss the 1966 Nigerian crisis in each of
the Regional capitals: Kaduna in the North, Enugu in the East and Ibadan in
the West 167 . In the period between January and August 1966 and before the
Ad Hoc Constitutional Conferences were began in Lagos, Northern
politician's had built up themselves into an over all 'Common Front' which
was easily converted into the Northern 'Leaders of thought' movement,
largely developed from the sharp polarity produced by the killings of
January and the political meaning of Decree No. 34 in context of
socio-economic and political interests of the North. As early as in April
1966, for example, Joseph Tarka, Aminu Kano and Maitama Sule of the old NPC
party met in Kano considering that they faced a comon threat of Ibo tribal
domination over Nigeria 8 . Indeed, because of the political association of
Tarka with these politicians and largely deriving from the assumptions in
the political parrarels of the Tiv riots, after the May 1966 riots, in
which some Ibos were killed in the North, Ironsi thought of detaining him
on the mistaken information that he was in some way responsible, while
infact, Tarka and the br Tiv kept the peace in Gboko and Makurdi169.
However, in August 1966, Tarka was called to constitute one of the members
of the 'Leaders of thought' Conference at Kaduna and there, he soon found
1 015-
politcal support from his former opponents and persecutors from the M-Belt
areas' 70 . These opponents of Joseph Tarka had functioned, before January
15th, as political clients of the Sardauna and such, stood for the
preservation of "One North" as against the creation of a M-Belt Region.
With the leadership vacuum that the death of the Sardauna created, there
was re-alignment of support toward Joseph Tarka in the cause of a M-Belt
Region,. Both Orodi (a Tiv brother-in-law and Joly Tanko Yusufu (a Jukun
and the former NPC Provincial Commissioner for Benue) supported him in
asking for the creation of states in the North as part of the political
strategy in the preservation of the Nigerian Federation 171 . The proposals
of Takra for the creation of states in Nigeria, including the subdivison of
the North put to Northern Leaders of thought in Kaduna, were subsequently
accepted and from within that Assembly, Tarka was chosen as one of the
three Northern delegates to go to the Ad Hoc Conference in Lagos with Aminu
Kano as adviser172 . The choice of Joseph Tarka was due to both military and
civilian political pressures and support 173 . The military pressures, for
example, were sufficiently profound for the Northern leaders of thought at
one stage demanded from Army headquaters in Lagos the tribal break-down of
Northern officers and men in the Nigerian Army, only to discover that the
bulk of the rifle-men came from groups in the M-Belt areas, particularly
from among the Tiv; and those that came from outside the M-Belt areas were
Zuru Christians from the southern parts of Sokoto. It was further pointed
out at the Northern Leaders of thought meetings at Kaduna, that Officers
and men of the Nigerian Army, mainly those of them from the M-Belt areas,
supported the political ideas of Joseph Tarka for the creation of a M-Belt
Region or State and the subdivision of the existing Regions into smaller
units of the Nigerian Federation 175 . Within the North, therefore,
altruisitic political demands by leadership of the UMBC party for the
creation of a M-Belt Region, were complemented by military demands and
support.
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When the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference assembled in Lagos on 12th
September 1966, the Northern delegation consisted of Kashim Ibrahim (the
leader of the delegation and a Muslim Kanuri NPC), Buba Ardo (Fulani Muslim
NPC), J. S. Tarka (a Tiv Christian and former UMBC party leader) and Aminu
Kano (Hausa Fulani Muslim and leader of the radical NEPU party, as adviser
to the delegates) 176 . Other delegates that were in Lagos in Septembr 1966
for the Ad Hoc Conference included: the Western Region - Chief Awolowo, Dr.
Oluwusamia and 0. Akinfosile; the Mid-Western Region - Chief Enahoro, Onyia
and Dr. Odie; the Eastern Region - Dr. Eni Njoku, Mojekwu and Edern; the
Lagos Federal Territory - T. 0. Elias and L. Jakande 177 . In an address to
the delegates on 12th September, 1966, Gowon indicated his intentions to
maintain the Federation of Nigeria and with a covert principle for its
subdivision into smaller units when he states:
"We must not minimize the advantages that will
derive from our remaining together as one
strong political and economic entity... we can
find ways and means of eliminating fear and
restoring trust and confidence as well as
mutual love and respect among our people...
consider and recommend in broad outlines the
form of political association which the country
should adopt in future.., discounting the
tendencies to extreme unification that a
country as big as Nigeria and comprising such
diversity of tribes and cultures cannot be
administered successfully under a unitarian
form of Government... It is very clear to me
that it will be economically and politically
suicidal to harbour any idea of a complete
break-up of the Federation. Therefore, we seem
to be left with the alternative of (among
others)... the distribution of powers as
between the regional Governments and the
central government; the territorial division of
the country... Two things for the present
exercise I feel should be ruled out viz:
complete br,-up; a unitary for of
Government"
As a political strategy in the context of the uncertainties on the survival
of the Nigerian Federation, which were prevailing in 1966, none of the
existing Nigerian Regions, except for the Mid-Western Region, seemed to
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have had a committed stable policy on the creaton of more states and to
wish to implement the policy guide-lines in the speech of Gowon.
The Mid-Western position in the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference was
dominated by the political views of the non-Ibo educated elite in the
Region. These views were organized under the leadership and articulation of
Chief Enahoro, who was advised by Dr. Billy Dudley, at that time a Lecturer
in Political Science at the University of Ibadan. The Mid-West, like their
counter parts in the North were aware of the centrifugal forces, inherent
in the Region. They were also conscious of the threat which would be posed
by their neighbours, particularly the East, with 16% of its Ibo speaking
members in the Mid-West and the West with a substantial Yoruba population
in Akoko-Edo areas of the Region 179 . In the specific content of these
threats therefore the Mid-West depended for their 'survival' on the
continuance of the Nigerian Federation, right from the start of the
conference until the Ad Hoc meetings were suspended indefinately. This
position was succintly put by its leading spokesmen, Chief Enahoro:
"I would like to open, as I would close, that
the Mid-Western Nigerian delegation believe
that the answer to Nigeria's problems lie in a
Federation (belief in a Federation of Nigeria);
not withstanding the situation which has
emerged or which appears to be emerging at this
confernce in the last few days. We do not
abandon that stand. We believe in a Federation
and we do not think that because we cannot have
a strong Federation, 1 6
 cannot, therefore, have
a Federation at all"
Unlike the Mid-West, the political position of the Western Region during
the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conferences was guided by the historical demands
that all Yoruba should enjoy a monopoly of power in "territory" they
claimed to be theirs. As a strategy, therefore, just before the Ad Hoc
Conference, the Western Chiefs and Leaders of thought elected Chief Awolowo
as 'Leader of the Yorubas' in all of Nigeria 181 . Within the pan-Yoruba
political interests, however, there were people who wanted to see Lagos
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created into a state within the framework of a reconstituted and
restructured Federal system, but were not importantly influential in the
dominant trend of opinion in the West among the Yoruba. The West and
delegates from Lagos, therefore, advocated a confederal arrangement in
preference to the existing state but were willing to negotiate a possible
future state in which:
"What is now the Federation of Nigeria should
become a 'Commonwealth of Nigeria' comprising
the existing Regions and such other regions as
may be subsequently created, with Lag forming
part of the present Western Nigeria"
The most extreme position was taken by the Ibo speaking peoples of the
Eastern Region, largely from the strong influence of Ibo dons at the
University of Ibadan, under the direction and organization of Professor
Modebe, who became personal adviser to Ojukwu 183 . Although the initial
demands of the Ibo intelligentsia was secession, because of the murders of
Ironsi and Ibo Army officers and men and the May 1966 killings of many Ibos
in the North, as well as, the recriminations which accompanied their loss
of political power at the centre of the Nigerian Federation, it was
subsequently moderated into a confederal preference. This was clearly put
by its Chief spokesman, Professor Eni Njoku: "the sort of association we
envisage is therefore one which will be very loose indeed"184 Based on
their bitter political feelings therefore, the Ibo made a huge political
leap from a Unitary System, they wished for Nigeria to a Confederal system
and susbsequently attempted secession with the Eastern Region. Within the
Ibo led political position of the Eastern Region in the Ad Hoc Conference,
however, there were strong demands for the creation of states in the south
and south-eastern parts of Ibo land where there were socio-economic and
political minorities. After 27th May 1967, a number of political leaders
from the minorities areas in the East managed to escape and found their way
to Lagos, where they became a strong pressure group with the Federal
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Government. The strong demands for the creation of states came from both
the minorities areas of Calabar-Ogoja and the Rivers areas (COR) and were
articulated within the Nigerian army by Lt. Colonel Ekpo, the Military
Secretary to the SMC185 . Futhermore, during the Ad Hoc Conference, there
was strong lobbying for the creation of states for the COR areas, which
resulted into a set of memoranda being sent to the Conference by the Rivers
Natural Rulers of Eastern Nigeria, the Calabar-Ogoja Community, by E. 0.
Eyo and others of Calabar Province and by a Mr M. A. McElfie of Lagos
University 186
 All these demanded the political subdivision of the East as
units of the Nigerian Federation, such that non-Ibos are separated from the
dominant Ibo position in the Region.
At the Conference, there was a strange volte-face by the Northern
delegation. It brought forward confederal proposals as a form of political
association for the persistance of Nigeria as a country, modelled on the
East African Common Services Organization 187 . This was so, despite the
initial political assurances of the 'Northern Leaders of Thought' to Joseph
Tarka, that a Federation with a strong centre was to be negotiated during
the Conference in Lagos. The volte-face apparently came about because just
before the Conference Ojukwu telephoned Hassan Katsina to ask him to keep
the states issue out of the Conference 188 . However, this was also the
political position of the powerful Northern figures, who did not wish to
see the dismemberment of the Region, rather than the influence of Ojukwu on
Hassan Katsina. Although Joseph Tarka, as the leader and spokesman of the
demands of the creation of states to benefit Northern minorities, was
personally hostile to the new proposals, for unclear reasons, he subscribed
to the Northern political propositions that were taken to Lagos from
Kaduna'89 . Isaac Kpum, an independently minded politician and a strong
supporter of Joseph Tarka on the political ideas of the UMBC party, also
added his voice in support for the creation of states and suggesting that
there should be no sell-out.
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However, when the talks began in Lagos, a military pressure group of
some officers and men in the Nigerian army from the M-Belt areas, was
organized to contest the political issue of the creation of states in the
North, albeit in Nigeria and for Federation with a strong political centre.
This group was led by formidable military figures like the liv Lt.
Ichovol 190 . The main link between the political and military pressure group
within the Nigerian army that had developed in Lagos during the Ad Hoc
Conference and Gowon as Head of State and the SMC, was in two senior
Northern army officers from the M-Belt areas: Joe Akahan (a liv Christian)
and Yakubu Danjuma (a Jukun Christian) 191 . The poltical interests of the
group of M-Belt officers and men, who were daily gaining in the realization
of their new position of power, were to demonstate their dissatisfaction
with the Northern stand in the Ad Hoc Conference and sponsor the production
of a new document, which forced the Northern delegation to change its
position from confederation to one of maintenance of Federal power and the
creation of more Regions/States'92 . Colonel Murtala Mohammed, who had been
the advocate of the breaking away of the North in the July 1966 coup
d'etat, was instructed in September, to tell the Northern delegation that
the army did not accept confederalism' 93 . The Northern delegation,
therefore, changed its views and submitted another memorandum in which
there was provision for the creation of states. This provision was
suggested through the Chairman of the Northern delegation to Lagos, Kashim
Ibrahim, who stated:
"My delegation is convinced that Nigeria should
not be allowed to disintegrate... The
Conference may wish to note that this
represents a modification of our stand as
indicated in the original memo... To embody the
right of secession of any part of this country
from the rest is to invite a break-up of the
country. Accordingly, the relevant section in
our memo is, therefore, withdrawn. In order to
allay the fears of domination by sections of
the country, the principle of creation of
states must be agreed. A system of ascertaining
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the wished of the people of areas where demands
for creation of states have been made should be
devised and these wishes should be ascertained
and states created in the areas concerned
before the administration of this country is
returned to civilian hands. In this connection
my delegation recommends very strongly that a
machinery should be adopted in the light of
present Nigerian circumstances for ascertaining
the dems for the creation of more
states"
It would seem that political leadership of the North, which came from
the Islamic society was displeased by the military pressures from the
M-Belt areas that had caused modification of the political position on the
issue of state creation. The systematic massacres of Ibos in September and
October 1966 that followed may be seen as mobilized Northern mass protest
at the loss of political control over the direction of political
development by leadership of the Islamic society in the North, which
disrupted the Ad Hoc Conference. By the very nature of the spread of the
violence, they were organized and meant to demonstrate a falsified unity of
the North as still capable of acting as one in its interests. The
organization and funds for the massacres were provided by a combination of
the former politicians and traditionalists, most of whom had connections
with Northern merchants, who resented Ibo competition and thought that in
terms of the new political scheme of things, this competition would grow
more intense195 . In all the urban centres of the North, Ibos were summarily
killed by some indigenes of the North. The number of Ibo persons killed is
estimated variously as up to 10,000, besides other persons of Eastern
Nigerian origins 196 . However, during the civil war, the 'Biafran
authorities' claimed that as many as 30,000 Ibos had been killed in the
North. A reasonable estimate is put at eight hundred Ibos perishing in the
first round of killings in May and as many as six to eight thousands in
September 1966. The killings were not spontaneous, since infact they had
their activating forces of thugs, mostly Hausa Fulani Muslims, who
travelled and carried wild rumours on the issues affecting Nigerian
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politics at that time, which threatened Northern interests. There were
rumours, for example, that war, was to be fought between the rest of the
country and the East in which Ibos will get military support from Israel
and the USA; that Ibos in the North had poisoned the water supplies and had
prepared to blow-up important buildings in the North and Nigeria; that
Northern traders had been killed at Onitsha, Aba and Owerri; that Tiv
students at the University of Nsukka had had their eyes gouged out; that
J.C. Obande (an Idoma) had been killed at Enugu; that a train coach load of
Birom dead from the East stood at Bukuru Station 198 . The rumours most of
them untrue, produced strong anti-Ibo sentiments and with these, people
acted and collectively killed Ibos. The killings began slowly and
accompanied by looting of Ibo property in Kaduna, Minna, Makurdi, Jos and
Gboko earlier in September 1966, gathered a terrible momentum and ended in
a final blood bath in Kano on October, 1, with the unruly participation of
the 1st Battalion units, which were previously stationed at Enugu 199 . One
of the explanations of the participation of men of the 1st Battalion,
suggests that they were urged by other troops of the 5th Battalion and
politicians "to do something" for the North, since they had done nothing in
the January and July 1966 coups d'etat 200 . In the period between 28th and
30th September 1966, the whole of the North was ablaze and the fires were
directed at the Ibos. The killings sporadically continued on the Plateau as
in other parts of the North, until January, 1967 when dead bodies could
still be seen by the main roads.
After the September 1966 massacres of the Ibo tribe In the North and
the break-down of the Ad Hoc Conference, the Federal Government and colonel
Yakubu Gowon seemed to seek to resolve the conflicts in the country through
a compromise approach to politics, a procedure which infact Gowon not only
consistently followed but which also seems to have suited his nature and
temperament. Indeed, at a personal level, and right from July 1966, Gowon
was all along in favour of a federalist position and of the creation of
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more Regions/States 201 ,Thus, when he adjourned the Ad Hoc conference
indefinitely in September after the departure of the Eastern delegation, he
made it clear in mid-October 1966 that: "Nigeria shall continue as a
political entity with the central authority having all the paraphernalia of
an effective government" 202
. On 30th November 1966, he further made a Radio
Broadcast announcing that his long term aim was the preservation of "One
Nigerian Army and One Country" 203 ; that he envisaged a constitutional
solution to the political problems of Nigeria, which would include the
creation of at least eight and not more than fourteen new states or
regions; that he would set up a new Constituent Assembly and that he would
have the Assembly discuss a prepared draft of the constitution on federal
lines, rather than allowing it to formulate its own p roposals 204
 In this
firmer new political initiative which was largely in response to Army and
Civil Service pressures Gowon backed the policy out-line with a threat: "If
circumstances compel me to preserve the integrity of Nigeria by force, I
shall do my duty by my country" 205 . In the new policy of restructuring the
Nigerian Federation, Gowon further made the issue of State creation
obvious, when he indicated that no single Region was to be in a dominant
political position, relative to other units in territorial and population
206
size
By the end of 1966, therefore, the outlined policies of Gowon,
satisfied the political demands of minorities and the organizational
pressures from the military. The policy on state creation, however, did not
find its way into the agenda for discussions at Aburi in Ghana, where the
Supreme Military council met on 4th-5th January 1967207. This is explained
by the fact that Aburi was seen by Gowon, as well as by other members of
the SMC, except Ojukwu, as a military rather than a political arena, where
purely military matters that had caused the political problems in Nigerian
politics, might be discussed in order to restore a unified command
structure in the Nigerian Army. It was after the Aburi experience that the
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question of the location of political and military authority had to be
resolved in the exercise of power by Gowon if he was to maintain the
Federation. Thus the experience of Aburi, revealed that the fate of the
Nigerian Federation was intimately tied up to the issue of the creation of
states in order to maintain the Federation and to undermine the
secessionist stand of Ojukwu. The SMC-Aburi meeting and its aftermath was,
however, an important stop-gap in the political search to restore the
Federal system of Government in Nigeria and the consolidation of the
demands for the creation of states as more units of the Federation. The
Aburi document itself, contained internal inconsistencies; on the one hand,
they were confederal settlements, while on the other, they appeared to
advocate going back to the Federal balance as on 14th January 1966, before
the coup d'etat.
In the period between January and April 1967, when political
controversy on the interpretations of the Aburi agreements ensued and
became public knowledge, there began intensive underground manoeuvring and
realignments of previous political positions and interests that
characterized the Ad Hoc Conference. The political realignments were meant
to create an atmosphere for the preservation of the federation and the
creation of states. This political activity was undertaken by leaders of
the former political parties: UMBC, AG, NPC and NEPU. The realignment of
these political forces were particularly meant to persuade the Northern
leaders from the Islamic society that subdivision of the North was not
necessarily the destruction of the political North, but rather, a
socio-economic expedience to accelerate development 208 . It was in this
period that political maps, suggesting varying federal units to consist the
new Nigerian Federation were in wide circulation 209 . Thus political leaders
of the 'old' North, like Aminu Kano, increasingly saw the rationale and
were also willing to acquiesce in the subdivision of the North. Politicians
from Kano in particular, one of the riches Provinces in the North, were
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prepared to agree to the creation of new states because of an existing Kano
state tradition and also because it was widely felt that the Islamic
Provinces paid an undue proportion of the costs of the Northern Region in
relation to the benefits, in terms of jobs, University places, educational
expenditure and the like, mainly because of their educational backwardness
relative to some of the M-Belt areas 210 . Diplomatic activity, however,
proved much more fundamental to changing the political attitudes of the
core of Northern Islamic leadership to the ideas of subdividing the North
into more units of the Nigerian Federation. After the failure of the Ad Hoc
constitutional conferences in Lagos, for example, further conferences of
Emirs, chiefs and sNorthern Leaders of Thoughts took place in Kaduna. It
was from one of these meetings that J.S. Tarka, Aminu Kano and Makaman
Bida, were asked to tour the North to demonstrate their unity as
representatives of the three political forces, previously in conflict-UMBC,
pj nsI	 .	 .nru anu nr	 • It was from these experiences of joint political tasks in
the interest of the whole North that a deep trust and friendship developed
between Tarka and Makama and for Tarka from the Northern establishment,
which made the previous hatred by the Kaduna based NPC, seem all the more
gratuitous 212 . Tarka used the political intimacy to persuade Northern
leaders to create states in the North and Nigeria. One political lesson
that was apparent in these developments, which Tarka learnt very quickly
was that to achieve the dream of the M-Belt Region, it was not simply a
question of obtaining M-Belt political support and the influence of M-Belt
officers and men In the Nigerian Army. Equally important, was to gain the
political support of politicians outside the immediate interests of the
M-Belt people, particularly from the Islamic leadership, who curiously had
claims of rulership on land and people of all of the North. After making
the political ideas of subdivision of the North acceptable to the Northern
elite, Joseph Tarka sought to influence the Eastern Region with the same
political arguments, until he was rebuffed 213 . Subsequently he was
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strategically afraid, that to go to the East again, would expose him to
political suspicion and danger from both sides214.
In the period between October 1966 and May 1967, however, Joseph was
successful in establishing trans-Regional political alliances from the
North, with the Mid-Western Region. The alliance with the Mid-West was
ostensibly aimed at producing support for the demands for the creationo
more states and a M-Belt state/region as a unit of the Nigerian Federation.
In that period, Joseph Tarka and Chief Enahoro emerged as the two leading
proponents of the Federal cause, advising Gowon to take a firm line over
the defence of the powers of the Federal government 215 . The prominent
political roles of Joseph Tarka from the M-Belt and Chief Enahoro from the
Mid-West, in that period, increased minorities pressures on the dominant
tribes and general political opinion in the country, on the political shape
of the Nigerian political arena. These political pressures largely derived
from the behind the scene bloodless battles on the creation of states and
which had included pressures that the names of state Governors and state
capitals be named and made public 216 . These pressures were sufficiently
overwhelming that a conference of the North 'Leaders of Thought' at the end
of January 1967, recommended that Nigeria be divided into eleven to
thirteen regions, as against the propositions of Gowon, suggesting between
eight to fourteen states, earlier in December 1966217. Subsequently in May
1967, a joint Assembly of Emirs, Chiefs and 'Leaders of Thought' of the
North, passed a resolution in support of the creation of new states,
whether or not they were created In other regions of Nigeria 218 . In the
same meeting, the leaders of important political opinion in the North,
proclaimed itself to be in favour of federation with a strong political
centre219.
After January 1967, therefore and with the political controvercies
surrounding the location of authority in Nigeria, it was left to Gowon to
produce a decisive initiative on resolving the fate of the Nigerian
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Federation, within context of the creation of states and the drift of the
Eastern Region into secession. The creation of new Regions or states was
however not a practical proposition unless some kind of effective centre
could be ensured from which authority could be generated. The demands for
the creation of states had been resurfaced by a particular combination of
circumstances, at a time of waning influence for the old-styled
politicians, who preferred confederation or the secession of the North, if
the region as a whole could not be certain of controlling the country, as
in the days of the MPG hegemony. In the period between January and April
1967, an apparent hurdle that Gowon had to surmount was one in the North,
from the influences of NPC old warhorses, on Hassan Katsina, who had
surrounded him. When it became apparent, for example, that the political
options on the Nigerian crisis of 1966 had been narrowed to the creation of
states, Hassan Katsina began to systematically re-create the image of 110ne
North" by openly activating a Northern political identity within and
outside the Nigerian army. On 24th December 1966, he referred to the 3rd
Battalion in Abeokuta, as 'Northern troops' as well as 'Nigerian troops'
and it was not clear which of these identities had the prevailing loyalty
in the circumstances 220 . Subsequently in 1967, he addressed the 4th
Battalion in Ibadan as Northern troops and talked of them as Northerners
who had been very loyal on Yorubaland and to colonel Robert Adebayo, the
Military Governor of the West:
"These men are human beings. The mere fact that
they are in Khaki does not mean that they have
no feelings and no souls. They have been under
strain for almost 18 months now ... These men
are first-class soldiers and have their pride.
The Governor, as you know paid them glowing
tribute several weeks ago for their loyalty and
excellent service during the many years the21
have been stationed in Ibadan and Abeokuta"
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On the anniversary of the first coup d'etat in January, 1967, he wrongly
eulogised the late Sardauna of Sokoto as being "to Northern Nigeria what
Ghandi was to India" 222 . Furthermore, Hassan Katsina also resuscitated the
Northern Nigerian Self-Development Fund, into which donations poured in, as
a sign of renascent regional loyalties 223 . At the same time, he quietly
allowed the committee on Provincial Authorities to cease meetings 224 ; but
this might have been accidental. In the past the plan for Provincial
Authorities had been held as a protection against state creation.
With these new developments in the Hausa-Fulani dominated North, the
Ibo-East still unconciliated and the Yoruba-West increasingly detaching
itself from the Federal cause and authority, Gowon responded by depending
on support from the Nigerian army, the M-Belt minorities who were acting in
concert with Southern Nigerian political minorities (from the Mid-West and
COR) people in organizing political opinion for the creation of states. In
the period between January and April 1967, Gowon was engaged in a vigorous
political offensive, designed to secure the loyalty to the Federation of as
many of the Nigerian tribes and groups as he could muster 225 . Of the M-Blet
groups that responded to the political offensive of Gowon, the students of
Ahmadu Bello University were the most active in designing the proposed
M-Belt Region/State 226 . While the majority of the M-Belt students strictly
saw the composition of the M-Belt Region/State to consist of Benue,
Plateau, S.Zarja, S.Bauchi and including Numan and Yola areas, a few from
the Plateau areas were against the inclusion of Benue in the proposed
creation affecting the M-Belt areas 227 . This was so because while Plateau,
S.Bauchi, S.Zaria, Numan and the Yola areas with the Jukun were seen to be
balanced in educational development and as political minorities in
numerical size, it was perceived that Idorna and Tiv might introduce an
imbalance and therefore dominate in the new federal unit in the M-Belt
areas228. The political leadership from the non-Benue areas however had
crystallize d their support behind Joseph Tarka, which in most instances was
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seen to be support for Gowon. This developed from their regular meetings
with Joseph Tarka in Jos, which included among others, Bitrus Rwang Pam
(Birom), Jonah Assadugu (Bachama), Azi Nyako (Jarawa), Joly Tariko Yusufu
(Jukun), Pastor David Lot (Sura), Wilson Onazi (Idoma) and Isaac Shaahu. By
this time the politics of localism and the 'son of the soil' appeal had
strongly began to replace the M-Belt minorities political and Christian
religious identity. It was, however, this group that had organized the
visit to Lagos in September 1966 to "greet" Gowon and to express Northern
Christian support for his government. The delegation included the chiefs of
Jos and Kagoro, who were both symbols of Christian unity in the M-Belt
areas.
On the 25th May 196'7, plans were announced to withdraw all Northern
troops from the West, in response to both political and military pressures
from Chief Awolowo and Colonel Adebayo and to be redeployed to Lagos and
the Northern boundary at Jebba and Ilorin before the end of May229.
Implicit in these manoeuvres was a move to threaten the West, if it fell
out of step with the creation of states, which was apparently going to be
effected given the Eastern Region determination to secede. The redeployment
of troops from the West, also had the effect of reinforcing troops already
loyal to Gowon in Lagos, to support, if the need arose, the political
exercise of the creation of states. On 27th May 1967, Gowon announced the
plan for the creation of states, which himself and both civilian and
military collaborates had been planning in secret for some time. He
declared a state of emergency all over Nigeria, repealled Aburi Decree No.
8 and replaced it with Decree No. 13. These political acts abolished the
existing Regions and replaced them with a twelve state structure of the
Nigerian Federation 230 . In the National broadcast announcing the new
rearranged territorial political units of the Nigerian Federation, Gowon
was aware of the potential of resistance from all the Regions, particularly
from the East, where a declaration of secession followed the creation of
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states. Thus to give reason and commitment to the exercise, Gowon pointed
out:
"It is my fervent hope that the existing
Regional authorities will ensure the smoothest
possible establishement of the new states. It
is also my hope that the need to use force to
support any new state will not arise. I am,
however ready to protect any citizen of this
country who are subjected to intimidation or
violence in the cse of establishment of
these new states"
The outcome of the political exercise was that six new states were
created out of the old Northern Region and three out of the old East. Of
the six created in the North, one comprised of Benue-Plateau (BP) state
with its capital in Jos, from the merging of the Provinces of Benue and
Plateau. Benue-Plateau state significantly excluded powerful Fulani Islamic
Emirs. The Hausa-Fulani Islamic Emirs and Chiefs that were included in
Benue-Plateau State were second class in political status and controlled
relatively small areas of authority. In a subsequent reform of the Native
Authority system after 1st October 1968, Joseph Gomwalk graded three Chiefs
as first class, all non-Muslims: Chief of Jos and Ochi Idoma, the Tor Tiv
having been Fist Class in status since 1956, eight as second class; five as
third class; four as fourth class and the rest as fifth class Chiefs in
status 232 . The first class chiefs, the Aku Uka of Wukari and one Muslim
Chief, the Emir of Wase Aihaji Abdullahi Maikano, constituted the
Benue-Plateau State Council of Chiefs, which was made up of the Tor Tiv,
Gondo Aluor (Chairman), the Aku Uka of Wukari, Adi Bvewi, the Bwong
Gwom-Chief of Jos, Rwang Pam and the Ochi Idoma, Abraham Ukpabi 233 . Another
state created in the North affecting M-Belt interests was North-Eastern,
which enclosed the demanded M-Belt areas of Southern Bauchi, Nurnan and
Adamawa, with its capital firstly at Bauchi, but later changed to
Maiduguri. These M-Belt areas were enclosed together with the powerful
traditional Islamic authority in the Emirs of Bauchi, Yola, Gombe, Dikwa
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and the Shehu of Borno. There was also the creation of a North-central
state, with the capital firstly at Zaria, but later changed to Kaduna, the
seat of the old NPC government. The state included the M-Belt areas of
Southern Zaria. Rather interestingly, in all the states that contained the
M-Belt territories that were excluded from Benue-Plateau state, like
North-Eastern and North-Central states, the concept of Justice, also became
included in their mottos on the Armorial Bearings of the states. M-Belt
groups like the Igalla and Bassange in Kabba Province were uncomfortably
enclosed in the Central-West State, with its capital in Ilorin. The name of
the state was however later changed to Kwara State (the Hausa name for the
River Niger: siRafin Kwara") to give it a Northern element in political
identity and to under-cut Yoruba irredentism . The state contained a
majority of Yorubas and Igbirras with a dominant Islamic population under
the traditionally powerful Ernir of Ilorin.
An explanation of the rather rigid and neatly created boundaries of
the twelve state structure, is that the territories which became enclosed
in any particular state followed as much as possible Provincial boundaries.
This was done, partly to ensure a continuous collection of statistical data
and partly because of administrative needs 234 . The boundaries were however
not arrived at by arbitrary drawing. The number of states to be created in
the North was to a large extent, dictated by the number to be created in
the South. Gowon wished to politically deemphasize the intention to detatch
Lagos areas from the West by giving it a separate state 235 . Since the
Mid-West had already been created, Lagos plus the former Western Region
produced three states in that area of Nigeria. A similar number was needed
in the Eastern Region, both to balance the three in the former West and to
enable two minorities states to be created among non-Ibo Easterners.
Apparently, the Rivers- Calabar and Ogoja Provinces, did not agree with
each other to create one single COR state in the East 236 . To make an
attractive political offer in order to win the support of the Eastern
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minorities, without which it would have been difficult to win the civil
war, Gowon therefore had to create two non-Ibo states: the South-Eastern
and Rivers States 237
 Thus Gowon had to create six states in the South, and
this required six in the North as well, to preserve the political balance
in the Nigerian Federation. The Northern States were also the outcome of
consultations between Federal Civil Servants and various interest groups in
the North. The political boundaries and nature of the states in the North,
for example, came from decisions made by politicians and other interests in
the Islamic and M-Belt areas themselves 238 . 1-lowever, all the territories to
be included in the different states had been decided upon before the
Supremen Military Council met in April 196 7 239 . Although this was so, Gowon
was extremely secretive on which states were to be finally announced
because of rampant leakage of classified information, to Ojukwu in the East
and was also uncertain about the political reaction of Hassan Katsina, who
was increasingly under the influence of NPC politicians240.
However, the creation of BP state in the old North, satisfied the
demands of the political soldiers and the civilian population that had
electorally supported the UMBC party. Gowon had also sought to secure
loyalty to the Federation from the East with the creation of two minorities
states in that Region: the South-Eastern state with its capital in Calabar
and the Rivers State with its capital at Port-Harcourt. The aim of these
creations were not only political in the need for subdivision to balance
the Federation, but also to detach the socio-economic and political
loyalties of the minorities from the causes of the Ibo-led secession in the
Eastern Region. The minorities from Calabar, Ogaja and Rivers areas,
already existed in Lagos in the Nigerian Army and these were supplemented
by a large number of recruits fleeing from the East to join up to fight for
the liberation of their areas, particularly people from the Rivers
State241 . There were also a number of politicians from the minorities areas
in exile in Lagos, who already surrounded Major ti.). Esuene, the appointed
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Governor of South-Eastern State and Lt. A. Diete-Spiff of Rivers State,
lobbying for political posts in the new states, while they awaited the
liberation of their states from Biafran troops. The political support that
Gowon won in these areas was later to be crucial in the success of the
Federal military offensive in Ogoja, Calabar and Port-Harcourt and other
areas of the Rivers, during the Civil War. Furthermore, the adherence of
the Western Region had to be secured and this necessitated the wooing of
Chief Awolowo and Colonel Adebayo 242 . Lt. Colonel Gowon, therefore, did not
cut into the power base of Chief Awolowo, in the same political sense, he
divided up the North and the East, except for the small portions of the
West that became Lagos State. Rather interestingly however, Gowon suggests
he would not have cut the North into six if the Sardauna had remained alive
as Awolowo did, in the West. He would have just "dealt" with Ojukwu and the
Eastern Region 243 . In any case Gowon saw the subdivision of the North into
more Federal units of Nigeria as the creation of "Six Norths" rather than
the political division of "One North", a premise from which increased
socio-economic development, might take place, which indeed, it did 244 . The
political master-stroke of Gowon in stabilizing Federation in Nigerian
Politics after 27th May 1967, was to invite Chief Awolowo on 3rd June 1967
to become Vice-Chairman of the Federal Executive Council and then to make
him Commissioner for Finance 245 . This political act associated Chief
Awolowo and the West, closely with the military regime as its most senior
Yoruba civilian participant in the Federal cause 246 . To further strengthen
loyalty to the Federation of Nigeria and broaden the base of concensus,
Gowon appointed eleven more political civilians, one from each state of the
Federation, as members of the Federal Executive Council of twelve and this
produced more legitimacy. This political strategy was of crucial importance
because it realigned the Eastern minorities by associating some of their
leaders like Arikpo and Wenike Briggs with the Federal cause 247 . Gowon also
recruited and used the political skills and experiences of leaders in the
I 034-
Federal Executive Council 248 . The appoint of Chief Enahoro was particularly
strategic, because it helped to secure the loyalty of the Mid-West to the
Federal cause, instead of being only haif-heartedly in support. Its
political identification with the Nigerian Federation, however became
uncontested with the experiences it had of the Ibo supported invasion of
Biafra in August 1967249.
In the whole of the processes of the political developments after the
July coup dsetat, Gowon opposed secession of both the North and the East
for the preservation of the Nigerian Federation. Yet, he had clearly stood
for and represented the Northern political identity. Within less than a
year, however, he was knocking down the very territorial basis of the
existence of the Northern identity in response to the political needs of
the Nigerian minorities when he sought to preserve the Nigerian National
identity, particularly the minorities of the M-Belt areas (many in the army
he used to fight and win the Civil War) and the COR areas (all of whom were
threatened by secession). The paramount Nigerian political identity largely
derived from his having been indoctrinated as a Nigerian army officer. In
this, he was supported by the forceful political position of the Mid-West,
other minorities areas and by the army whose majority of the rank and file
members came from the M-Belt groups: the Tiv, Jukun, Bachama, Birom, Angas
(Gowon's tribe) and Idoma who comprised the bulk of the rank- and file
soldiery both in the colonial and after the colonial period. Benue-Plateau
state emerged in the state creation exercise by Gowon in 1967 to enclose
the majority of the minorities in the North who also dominated in the
rank-and-file soldiery of the Nigerian army. This military factor alone,
besides the political influences of Joseph Tarka increased political
leverage that became exercised by minorities at the expense of
Hausa-Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba, in both the previous regional and the new
national political arena in Nigeria. The microcosm of Nigerian Nationalism
in the "nationalism" of Benue-Plateau state and the Mid-Western State, for
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example, replaced the tribal-nationalism (tribalism) of the Ibo,
Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba over Nigeria. The fundamental political consequence
is that it reduced the influence of the major tribes on Nigerian politics
and communalism became replaced by concensus building and corruption as the
principal driving motor behind Nigerian politics and coups d'etat.
The creation of Benue-Plateau state in May 1967, however, was not
purely a military judgement in the heat of the Nigerian crisis. It was also
a political judgement foreshadowed in an exposition as early as 1956. In
that year, Auta Hamza, an elected member of the NHA from Plateau pointed
out:
"To be frank, it is only the two Provinces of
Benue and Plateau which could constitute this
so called Middle Belt Region ... because some
of theg0 (Northern) rebels now reside in
Benue"
In the context of Nigerian politics after May 1967, therefore,
Benue-Plateau State as a political unit of the Nigerian Federation assumed
the status as the epitome of the fulfillment of the dreamed M-Belt Region.
Although it did not include M-Belt areas like S.Bauchi, S.Zaria and the
Numan and Chamba areas of Adamawa, where there was strong UMBC support as
against equally strong NPC sentiments, it was expected that a greater
M-Belt Region might emerge with the restoration of civilian rule by 1970 as
promised by Gowon. J.S. Tarka, for example, expected that with subsequent
political development, demands would come from these areas for inclusion
into Benue-Plateau state, in which case the state would expand to enclose
the core M-Belt areas (Benue, Plateau S.Zaria, S.Bauchi and Adamawa) where
the socio-economic and political problems of colonial relationships had
caused the organization of the M-Belt Movement. Indeed, in the period of
political consultations earlier in 1967 for the creation of States in the
North and after the emergence of Benue-Plateau state as the approximate of
the M-Belt Region, there were intensively written political pleas and
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memoranda to the SMC and personally to General Yakubu Gowon, for the
inclusion of Southern Zaria, Southern Bauchi and the Igalla/Bassange groups
into Benue-Plateau State, immediately after the state creation exercise in
May 1967252. The Igalla submission was signed by 176 representatives of the
tribe and argued the wish to be merged with BP state: "because those groups
were their kith and kin" 253 . In Southern Zaria, the submission suggested
they desired separation from the Islamic society in North-Central State:
"because the non-Islamic gropus and Societies were administratively worse
than black Africans in Rhodesia today" 254
. In Southern Bauchi, the
submissions from the Lere Districts argued the demands for political
separation and the merger with Benue-Plateau State:
"because of the existence of waves of
persecution directed against the people of Lere
District ... subjection to police brutality and
economic exploitation for decades and the
situation does not show any sign of improvement
subjection to segregation of the most
painful type .. suffered political and Muslim
religious provocations. We therefore have been
wronly politically grouped (in the
North-Eastern State) ... We are forced to
request the Head of State to excise Lere
District from the State and merge it with the
Benue-Plateau State, where our fellow "arnas"
(pagans), the Angasawa, the Surawa, the
Pyemawa, the Jarawa a 5the rest of them will
welcome us as equals"
However, in 1968 BP state settled down into political existence as a
unit of a restructured Nigerian Federation. Joseph Gomwalk (a Christian
Angas, a young University Graduate and a Chief Superintendent of Police)
was the Governor. He had jurisdiction over 41,744 sq. mls. in area of land
in the North, a population of about 4,009,408 (1963 census) and about 7.0%
share of the National revenue. The population of Benue-Plateau State, its
territorial size and the share of revenue guaranteed to the state from the
Central Government was not disproportionate to other units of the Nigerian
Federation 256 . The physical and independent existence of Benue-Plateau (BP)
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state was established on the 1st April 1968, although its legal existence
started from 27th May 1967257. The first political act in 1967 when BP
state assumed legal existence was the appointment of commissioners258.
Thereafter, there was the physical movements of administrative and
personnel from Kaduna to Jos 259 . When these movements were completed and
there was the creation of twelve Ministries, with Commissioners as their
political heads, the administration of the state settled down to face the
problems of governance.
Government therefore, began to function in BP state, after April 1968,
when Gomwalk appointed twelve Portfolio Commissioners, in a cabinet of
fifteen members, including himself: ten of these had M-Belt sentiments,
were indigenous to the tribal groups of the area and were Christians; one
NEPU Hausa-Muslim Member, two NPC Hausa-Fulani Muslims, former NPC members;
and two officers of the Nigerian armed forces, which was obligatory to have
in the new state cabinets: Adamu Suleiman (Hausa-Fulani and Muslim police
officer - later substituted With L.C. Meme) and Major Yakubu S.Adejo (an
Igalla Christian army officer) 260
. Joly Tanko Yusufu, a strong advocate of
the creation of states and supporter of Joseph Tarka after July 1966, was
appointed Chairman of the newly organized BP state Public Service
Commission: Gomwalk had a high opinion of his sincerity, seemingly rooted
in commitment to Christian ethics. However, Pastor David Lot, the first
President of the M-Belt Movement which first demanded the creation of a
M-Belt Region in the North, Moses Nyam Rwang, also one of the founding
Fathers of the M-Belt movement, and Michael Audu Buba (a former Minister
with the NPC government in Kaduna) were significantly excluded from the
politics of Benue-Plateau state, for very unclear reasons. The exclusion of
Patrict Dokotri, another old UMBC war-horse, was explained by the
conditions of his medical health which had made him obsessively religious,
since 1963, after the Awolowo trial.
The cabinet under Joseph Gomwalk, chose a deliberate combination of
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words: "Liberty and Justice", as the motto on its Code of Arms for
Benue-Plateau State, which reflected the social origins and political
foundations of the struggle of the M-Belt Movement for the creation of a
M-Belt Region 261 . Liberty, was representative of the Christian religious
theme and its influences on the identity of the M-Belt areas and the UMBC
party and also to immortalize the impact of European Christian Missionary
work in the area; Justice, was meant to emphasize the purely political
philosophy in the theme of the M-Belt struggle and to stand for its decade
and seven years of political struggle in the demand for separation from the
Islamic society, particularly in its political phase as the UMBC party.
With these arrangements Joseph Gomwalk began to effect political and
administrative reforms that were seemingly anti-North and they demonstrated
a new found political freedom which systematically detached the state and
alienated some Islamic groups within the state, from the rest of the
Northern political identity. In 1968, Gomwalk, for example, effected
administrative reforms in Benue-Plateau state, which included the abolition
of the Chief-in-Council system and replacing it with the Chief-and-Council;
on 1st June, he abolished the post of Senior Councillor; on 1st October
1968, he also abolished Provincial administration and replaced it with ten
Divisions with DOs, directly under the Office of. the Governor; In the same
month he renamed "Native Authorities" as "Local Administrations" because
the previous title: "derives from a colonial past ... with all the
derogatory connations attached to it" 262
. Gomwalk subsequently created a
Benue-Plateau state Council of Chiefs which included four Christians and
one Muslim Emir263 . This produced an instant political Outcry from Muslims
in the state and in the rest of the North, that BP state discriminated
against Muslims in its institutions of legislative opinion 264 •
 Furthermore,
Joseph Gomwalk dealigned Benue-Plateau state from the North by increasing
interacting with the Mid-Western State, another minorities state in the
South of Nigeria. One of the most controversial educational cuni political
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schemes which Gomwalk undertook was the exchange programme of secondary
school students, between Benue-Plateau state and the Mid-Western
Government. Apparently, this was in the midst of great political caution by
the Interim Common Services Agency (ICSA) to preserve the Northern
political identity in the equal distribution of assets and wealth of the
former NPC government in the North to the new states created from the 'old'
region. When Goniwalk continued with his 'reformist nationalism' in
Benue-Plateau State, which demonstrated a new found freedom from the
dominance and control of the area by the Islamic society, he became a
problem child in the North. The Northern Islamic elite grew weary of him.
They siezed on every opportunity to create political problems of unity in
BP state. In 1969, the problems of internal divisions within Benue-Plateau
State, caused by political groups both inside and outside the state created
a situation in which Gomwalk had to warn:
"enemies of states' creation have taken
advantage of the misfortune of tribalism and
are trying to cause confusion in our midst.
While entreating you to cooperate, I would like
to warn that I will not spare any trouble-maker
or saboteur. Such people will be identified and
severely dealt with ... I urge everyone to
think first as a Nigerian and second as a
citizen of Benue-Plateau state to build a
prosperous Benue-Plateau Stag of Nigeria where
Liberty and Justice abound"
However, after seventeen years of political struggle (1950-1967), to
achieve the approximate of the M-Belt Region in the creation of
Benue-Plateau State, it took less than a decade (1968-1976) for the M-Belt
minorities to show that they were politically incompatible in living
together in the demanded unit of their own. Tribal and Provincial political
identities resurged and submerged the conceptions of the M-Belt political
identity in Benue-Plateau State.
The creation of States, therefore took effect from 1st April 1968, and
the Governors assumed powers. The polarity of power around the state
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Governments enabled them quickly to become the foci for new loyalties as
well as effective administrative units. The sense of the Northern political
identity was, therefore, reduced, but not entirely extinguished from the
State creation exercise. The sense of the M-Belt political identity
received at the same time, its fulfillment and its eclipse. In terms of the
provisions of the 1952 census figures, Benue-Plateau state comprised only
about 49.5% of the population of the areas claimed for the creation of the
M-Belt Region 266
. However, in terms of other identities that were used in
the mobilization of political support for the M-Belt movement,
Benue-Plateau state comprised 63.5% of Christians in the M-Belt areas,
57.0% of Christians and non-Muslims and 16.5% of the Muslim population in
the M-Belt areas 267 . Furthermore, in terms of electoral support in the 1959
elections, the UMBC party scored about 68.5% of the M-Belt votes in
territories that became enclosed as Benue-Plateau State 2
	As BP state was
seen to fai1 to become the nucleus for the M-Belt Region, which Joseph
Tarka had hoped for and as its aimed unity came under threat from
increasing rivalries of Benue and Plateau provinces, the sense of a M-Belt
Regional unity became increasingly overlaid with local loyalties to smaller
units.
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Epilogue.
In the period between July 1968 and April 1976, Beriue-Plateau state
carried a status in political identity as a minorities state in the North
and in the Nigerian Federation. This was seen to have been achieved through
the political organization of the M-Belt movements, particularly in the
conceptions of the political struggles of the UMBC party under the
leadership of Joseph Tarka, who was appointed to the Federal Executive
Council in May 1967 and continued to be an influential figure in the
Federal Government under General Yakubu Gowon. However, although the
political boundaries of BP state did not correspond to the areas demanded
by the M-Belt movement in the struggles of the minorities political
organization in the particular period between 1949 and 1967 in the North,
there are a number of socio-political indicators to consider the Federal
Unit as the approximate of the dreamed M-Belt Region in political identity
in Nigerian politics.
Firstly, it enclosed the tribes and the political groups on the
Plateau, who on the one hand, introduced the organization of political
demands for separation from the Islamic Society and the concept of the
M-Belt Region; and on the other hand, the tribes and political groups in
Benue Province, who vigourously maintained the political interests of the
demands and the concept of the M-Belt Region, until its approximate
objectives were fulfilled in the creation of Benue-Plateau State. Secondly
the tribes enclosed in BP state constituted a colony of minorities in
culture, wealth and access to previous political power in the North and
Nigeria. Thirdly, the composition of the first cabinet of Joseph Gornwalk
comprised influential UMBC party politicians, like Isaac Shaahu (Tiv from
Benue), Bitrus Rwang Pam (Birom from Plateau) and those politicians of
other political parties, whom Tarka had won over to support the subdivision
of the North after July 1966. The first cabinet, significantly excluded
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persons who had been outright in rejecting the demands for the creation of
a M-Belt Region, like the veteran NPC politician Micheal Audu Buba from
Shendam on the Plateau. Fourthly, the image of BP sate at the National
level, was also significant in the political conceptions of the state as
the fulfillment of the M-Belt Region. At the Federal level, Joseph Tarka
was appointed as the political representative to the Federal Executive
Council of BP state and indeed, he stood as the voice of minorities
political opinion from the North in the twelve-man Cabinet of General
Yakubu Gowon. The government of Gowon selected political individuals, one
from each of the new states based upon the merits of their previous
performances to reflect a broadly based tribal and community political
opinion, predating the entry of the army in Nigerian politics and after.
Fifthly, the political appointments in 1967 and 1968 in both BP state and
representative of its interests at the National level, took account of
individausi, who were politically sympathetic to the cause of the M-Belt
Region before January and after July 1966. The initial emphasis of Joseph
Gomwalk however was to work with the opposition politicians, indigenous to
BP state, who had been in the NPF which consisted of the UMBC and NEPU
parties. This subsequently changed and after 1970, he increasingly relied
on the political opinions and advice of former NPC politicans like Vincent
Ojirme (Tiv), Chia Surma (Tiv), Yahaya Sabo (Hausa), Wilson Onazi (Idoma,
Mohammed Wada (Hausa) and dropped Isaac Shaahu (liv) from the BP state
Executive Council. However, Joseph Gomwalk himself saw Benue-Plateau (BP)
state as the fulfillment of the M-Belt Region:
"This state was born out as a result of one of
the measures required to bring greater social
justice to the people of this country... (and)
the desire for a state of our own had been
agitating 1the minds of our people for
sometime"
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Furthermore, the reforms of the Local Government System and the
administration of Justice in the state which Gomwalk effectd in 1968,
touched directly on the grievances which the M-Belt movement articulated in
the demands for separation from the Islamic society in the North 2 . Gomwalk,
adjusted for the unequal political status of Chiefs in BP state. Before
1967, there was only one first class Chief, the Tor Tiv, 8 second class
Chiefs including the Emir of Wase and 10 third class Chiefs from the areas
enclosed by BP state. In 1968, BP state had three first class Chiefs and
the Chiefs of Sura-Pyem and Angas were upgraded from 3rd to 2nd class in
status and Gomwalk down-graded the Emir of Wase to 3rd class in status 3 . In
1969, Gomwalk also created a BP State Marketing Board and thus detaching
the economic activities of many farmers and the Hausa middle-men from the
control of the Northern Nigerian Marketing Board, although the state had
little produce for the role of the Board, except for Soya-Beans from among
the TIv. The whole philosophy of political and economic reforms effected by
Gomwalk seemed to be strongly tied to a desire to demonstrate the
independence of the state from the North and to serve as a form of "a
quiet-Revolution" which had taken place against the leadership of the
Islamic Society4. Benue-Plateau State, therefore, carried on the tradition
of the M-Belt struggle. By this, it created a political consciousness in
which Muslim interests in BP state were place in the reverse role as
minorities, in the same sense that the non-Islamic M-Belt groups existed in
the wider society of the North before 1967.
Apparently, there was a break-down of the ideas of the M-Belt
political identity in the conceptions of BP State as a M-Belt Region, by
the very success of the destruction of dominance on the M-Belt areas by the
Hausa-Fulani Islamic group. Within the very political conceptions of BP
state as a M-Belt Region, however, competing socio-economic and political
interests began to manifest themselves and produced socio-political
tensions that subsequently caused the separation of the state into Benue
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and Plateau States. The tensions that developed in Benue-Plateau state were
a microcosm of the North-South divisions in Nigerian politics, but with
significant reverse variations of the socio-economic and political
problems. There existed social and economic inequalities on the territories
and among the groups that comprised the state. While the Benue groups, the
Tjv and the Idoma in particular, were numerical majorities in the state,
their dominance was complemented by a higher educational development, when
compared to the miniature Plateau groups which were not as educationally
advanced; For example, the Tiv (with 174) and Idoma (with 155) areas alone
had a total of 327 Primary Schools as against 190 that were to be found in
Jos (with 101), Pankshin (with 54) and Shendam (with 35), similarly
organized tribal areas of the Plateau 5 . Futhermore, of the twenty eight
Secondary Schools in the State in 1969 with a total enrollment of 5,955
students, 46.4% of the schools and 43.7% of the enrolled students were from
among the Tiv and Idorna alone, while Jos, Pankshin and Shendam Divisions
had 39.3% share of the schools and 38.9% of the enrolled students in the
state6 . The advantages in the educational development of the Benue groups
were that there was a progression in their domination of bureaucratic jobs
in both the public and private sectors of the state, which were
concentrated in Jos, the BP state capital. In particular, this made the
presence of the liv and the Idoma very visible among the Plateau groups,
without similarly compartive developments taking place in Benue. However,
while groups from Benue, the southern parts of the state were educationally
advanced and therefore dominated jobs in government, Plateau, which
constitued the Northern parts of the state had the advantages of having an
already established social welfare and economic infrasturcture which was
developed before 1967. While Plateau, for example, had a well established
electricity supply by NESCO Ltd., producing about 18,000 kilowatts from the
hydro-dams at Kurra-falls, Benue towns like Makurdi and Oturkpo, still
depended on Nigerian Railway Corporation station-generating-plants for
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electricity supplies 7a . Furthermore, of the 17 hospitals in BP state, 11
were on the Plateau, with 5 in Jos town alone, when compared to six that
were widely dispersed in the Benue areas7b. How to reconcile these images
of deprivation was a major policy issue which the government and
administration of Joseph Gomwalk in BP state struggled with and bungled and
totally failed to resolve, until it was removed from office in 1975 in the
military coup d'etat that also removed Gowon as Head of State of Nigeria.
To compound problems in BP state on these images of deprivation, the
Gomwalk-Administration developed a quota system of benefits in its
educational policy equally allocated to the Divisions in the state in which
"educationally underdeveloped and catchment areas" were given the same
attention in educational development and scholarship awards as the
"educationally developed areas". In terms of University scholarship awards,
for example, if each Division in the state had about 100 scholarship awards
and Idoma Division produced 200 candidates it could never exceed its quota,
even if Jos or Pankshin Divisions produced only 20 students to take up
their allocated awards, the situation being rationalized, as funds
allocated for the remaining 80 places can be used for the development of
the Divisions in other ways. The 'quota system' in the educational policy
of Gomwalk benefitted the educational development of the Plateau groups
without an equal economic policy to balance for the felt deprivation in the
Benue areas of the state. This meant that the educational development of
the Benue groups was being deliberately slowed down until the Plateau
groups caught-up. The policy recieved the most severe criticism from the
Tiv and the Idonia as it was seen to discriminate on the more educationally
developed Benue groups. However, it was not dropped. The image of Joseph
Gomwalk, an Angas from the Plateau, seen to be systematically creating
advantages for the Plateau groups, therefore, crystallized into opposition
from the Benue groups.
In barely two years from its creation Benue-Plateau State was
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therefore faced with tribal divisions which polarized the state on the
political lines of the abolished Provinces, in which, on the one hand, the
groups on the Plateau united to grumble and expose the domination of the
Idorna and liv on the Plateau and on the other, the Benue groups openly
began to point to the lopsidedness of the government in the administration
of the state with bad socio-economic and political policies. In May 1969,
Joseph Gomwalk acknowledged the existence of ethnic political tensions in
BP State to a convened meeting of representatives of the various groups in
which he states:
"since the creation of States we have passed
through very difficult times in this state in
the sphere of co-existence. Our problems are in
no way unique. Every state in Nigeria has its
own ethnic or sectional problems. It is
unfortunate that the newspapers have blown up
our own problems out of all proportions.., let
me say outright that Benue-Plateau State has
come to stay. It belongs to all of us. No
single8 thnic group has a monopoly of the
state"
The problems affecting the unity of the state were, however, identified by
Gomwalk as rooted in the enemies of state creation (members of the Northern
Islamic establishment, both within and outside the state), who used the New
Nigeria to make issues graver than they were and this led to the subsequent
establishment of the BP state government owned Nigerian Standard. The
problems of political unity in the state also had roots in rumours in
which, for example, the establishment of the Jos Metropolitan Development
Board (JMDB) was interpreted by its definition of the urban development
area of authority to mean that the Jos NA had been abolished and that the
Birom and other tribes in Jos were to be driven out of their land for
government development purposes8t . Other problems in BP state included
distrust for non-tribal Commissioners and Civil Servants and an absence of
social integration in Jos itself among the Civil Servants in the State
Capital9.
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Although there was consensus on the need to reduce fears resulting
from mututal tribal suspicions the problems persisted and found expressions
on issues that crystallized the conceptions of political identities within
the state and also generated sympathies on the lines of the already
polarized state into the Provincial identities of Benue and Plateau.
Firstly, there was the issue between Morgan Ogbole (an Idoma) and the Jos
Divisional Students Association in which the death of a Birom man from a
motor road accident caused by a car driven by Idornas became a politicized
issue in which an Idoma judge from Benue was seen to exercise a tribal bias
when he acquitted fellow Idomas. The Jos Students Association obtained
financial support to pursue the case from top individuals in the state who
were determined to established that the judgement was tribally influenced
and therefore unjust. Secondly, there was the case of Andrew Obeya, who was
Secretary to the Military Governor and Head of BP State Civil
Service,involving a sexual scandal with the wife of a junior Civil Servant
in the State, Bala Abashe. A purely private problem was allowed by the
government to systematically find its way into a public political and
social arena, again with financial and moral encouragement to Bala Abashe
from top officials in BP state government, whose origins were from the
Plateau. The case polarized BP state on Christian religious lines, in which
the traditional values of promiscuity were brought forward in the case to
explain the sexual indulgence of an Idoma man on a Plateau married lady.
These were further presented by the press as fundamentally clashing
with the Christian ethics predominating on the Plateau which contrasted
with traditional values of the Benue groups. When Obeya was forced to
resign his post as Secretary to the Military Governor and and transferred
his State Civil Service career to the Federal Service, congratulatory
messages were sent out to Gomwalk from Plateau tribal unions and others for
accepting the resignation and exit of Obeya without hesitation. Thirdly and
most critical in increasing tribal tensions and the credibility of the
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persistence of BP state was the denounciation of Joseph Gomwalk (an
Angas-Plateau man) for corrupt practices, by Aper Aku (a liv Benue man) in
a series of affidavits, sworn at a High Court of Justice. What was
significant and was the cause of increased political tensions between
Plateau and Benue was not that Goinwalk was being accused by a liv; but that
Tiv Civil Servants had used their positions to filter out top government
secrets to Aper Aku, to bring down a Plateau man. This was clear from the
detailed nature of the affidavits. This was given credence by the fact that
Aper Aku worked in Kaduna rather than Jos or any other place in the state
which might have enabled him access to government files and other contract
files.
At the Federal level, Joseph Tarka was also denounced by Godwin Dabo
(a fellow Tiv) for corruption. Many liv responded to the circumstance by
suggesting that Gomwalk had encouraged Dabo to do this, although Joseph
Tarka himself believed that Chief Awolowo was behind the allegations of
Godwin Daboh 10 . Relations between Gomwalk and larka in themselves had been
far from cordial. Infact, they had become bitter soon after the creation of
BP state. In almost every one of the 12 states, there was considerable
rivalry between the Military Governor and the Civilian Federal Commissioner
from the state. However, Tarka had seen Benue-Plateau State, not as a stage
towards further subdivision, but as a nuclues to which he hoped that other
M-Belt peoples would later adhere. Benue and Plateau were two of the major
parts of the old M-Belt force. If they quarrelled, this was a betrayal of
all his hopes for M-Belt people and for Nigeria, for Joseph Tarka believed
in the building up of political unities and not in their distruction by
"son of the soil" politics 11 . Joseph Tarka, however, witnessed the tragedy
of the break up of the unity of Benue-Plateau state. Not only did Benue and
Plateau fight out their battle day by day in the Executive Council meetings
and elsewhere, but Joseph Tarka himself, much against his will was drawn
into the battle 12 . Gomwalk, who had started as one of the greatest, the
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most brilliant and the most pure and dedicated of the Governors, fell under
the influence of Okon and others in Jos in the politics of contract awards
and the shares of the kick-backs which promptly spoilt his Government and
administration. The relation between Joseph Tarka as Federal Commissioner
and Joseph Gomwalk as Governor of BP state, therefore, deteriorated 13 . The
relationship is never easy and political tensions between Governors and
Ministers from the same state are in some instances, almost as bad under
the second Republic as they were under the Military.
One of the issues on which the dispute between Joseph Tarka and
Gomwalk centred was the delicate one of the plan by Gomwalk (which were
supported by Paul Unongo, a former assistant of Tarka, who turned against
him and sought to replace him), to divide Tiv Division into three 14 . The
unity of Tiv Division had been a cherished heritage of the last thirty five
years, ever since the Patriarchal District Officer, Captain Downes had
founded Gboko at its centre to be the Capital and focus of liv Unity' 5 . The
issue was a complicated one and as so often in Nigeria, great issues of
administration were inter-twined with issues of power politics. Joseph
Tarka saw the change as more than just an administrative change, he
suspected (and with justification) that part of the motive was political -
the desire to undermine his base in Tiv Division' 6 . What Joseph Tarka
failed to realise was that even if liv was divided into fifty divisions it
would still give him overwhelming loyalty and more development might have
taken p1 ace.
However, the problems of politics and the elusive political unity in
BP state was not simply a question of the quarrells over deprivations of
one kind or the other in socio-economic and welfare development between the
Plateau and Benue groups: Idoma and Tiv and the Plateau groups. When
Gomwalk established the BP State Bus Corporation in 1970, he touched
directly on economic interest areas that were monopolized by the Hausa
Islamic Communities in the state. In 1970, he also passed an Edict,
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restricting the movement of foodstuff from the state, another economic
business areas that hit hardest on the Hausa-Fulani Islamic traders who had
the monopoly as middle-men in the yam trade from Benue and the potatoe from
the Plateau, to distant urban centres like Kano, Zaria and Kaduna and
Lagos. Although the majority of the Hausa traders were non-indigenes to
Benue-Plateau (BP) State, there was a substantial concentration of Muslims
that were sandwiched between Plateau and Benue that were found in areas
like Doma, Wamba, Keffi, Lafia, Toto, Awe, Nassarawa, Obi and Akwanga, who
were equally affected by the Edict on the movement of foodstuff. Many of
them migrated to Bauchi, Zaria and Kaduna in protest. It was the former
group, however, concentrated in dos and Bukuru, whose economic interests
were most severely threatened by the Edict and who were referred to by
Gomwalk as:
"elements from outside the state (who) pose as
if they were friends of one of th 7other of our
many ethnic groups in this state"
This group also took and reported their problems to political leadership in
Kano, Zaria and Kaduna and also reported some of their difficulties in BP
state to the New Nigerian, which took an interest in critically analyzing
them in its reports18.
In the period between October and December 1974, it was apparent that
BP state could never hold together as the epitome of the M-Belt Region and
as a political unit of the Nigerian Federation. Four political
advertisements appeared in the daily newspaper, the New Nigerian,
advocating for the division of Benue-Plateau State into: Plateau, Benue and
Nassarawa States 19 . Furthermore, the political tensions that existed in Jos
had been increased by the affidavits that were sworn against Joseph Gomwalk
by Aper Aku. These were already seriously threatening the break-down of law
and order in the state capital. There were also a series of letters and
written petitions from very many different political groups which were in
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wide circulation in the state capital, alleging hideous misconduct and
maipractices by Commissioners and Civil Servants from particular tribes.
Some of the letters and written petitions threatened to take reprisals on
the liv and Idoma Civil Servants for making available details about the
alleged corrupt practices of Joseph Goinwalk. In Jos one of such letters in
ciruclation and addressed to J. 0. Orshi (a liv), Solicitor-General and
Permanent Secretary in the Benue-Plateau state Ministry of Justice stated:
"Better warn your people. The liv people and
the Idoma cannot continue to dominate us. You
cannot! You are all the same. Tell your people
(Tivs and Idomas) that what happened to the
Ibos, will soon 9 appen to them. You
know...ARABA!!"
The letters and written petitions that circulated in 1974, also contained
the basic theme of dissillusionment with Benue-Plateau State and desire for
the dismemberment of the State into Benue and Plateau States "because it
had been an unholy-alliance".
However, within Plateau itself, some of the tribal political groups
accused Joseph Goinwalk of concentrating development in Pankshin, which had
suddenly been transformed "overnight" from a Rest-House-Station to a
burstling town with social and welfare institutions as well as modern
infrastructure including an automatic telephone system connected to Jos and
other parts of the Federation. This alienated many of the Plateau groups,
like the Ankwei and the Yergam, when they compared the slow pace of
development in the towns that served as their Divisional headquaters. In
Jos Division, the Birom and other tribes were aggrieved and economically
threatened by the ten-mile land radius of authority given to the Jos
Metropolitan Development Board (JMDB) for the development of "a greater Jos
Urban Area" and felt embittered that most of the modern infrastructure in
Jos and Bukuru townships were of little benefit to the local population.
Clearly, therefore, localism replaced regionalsim as tribal identities
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became more significant in the development of the conceptions of the
political identity of the M-Belt movement, particularly when the
approximate of the region was achieved in the existence of Benue-Plateau
State. Now that the M-Belt groups had freed themselves from a common
experience of subjugation in a Muslim dominated North, they fell out among
themselves in Tribal, Provincial and personal rivalries.
Although conceptions of the political unity of the M-Belt groups as
personified by the existence of Benue-Plateau State, were very badly shaken
by the serious allegations of corrupt practices made in 1974, firstly,
against Joseph Tarka (a Tiv Federal Commissioner and representative of BP
State in Lagos) by Godwin Daboh (a fellow Tiv man) on the national arena of
politics and subsequently followed by those of Aper Aku (a Tiv) denouncing
Joseph Gomwalk (an Angas and Governor of BP state), the state as a unit
persisted for another year. Gornwalk made a desperate effort to revive the
political unity of the state by references to the causes for the creation
of BP State and to the socio-economic and political developments that had
taken place since 1967 as well as the great potential that its persistance
as one entity hald for the future21.
The bloodless coup dsetat of 29th July 1975, which overthrew the
government of General Yakubu Gowon and which removed Joseph Gomwalk as
Governor of Benue-Plateau State, signaled the final collapse of the state.
This was so because the new regime under Murtala Mohammed was committed to
the creation of more states in the midst of intensified demands that dated
from 1974 and which directly affected the existence of Benue-Plateau State
as a unit of the Nigerian Federation 22 . In direct response to the demands
for the creation of more states in the Federation, the new Military Regime
appointed a panel of five members under the chariman of the Justice of the
Supreme Court, Justice Ayo Irikefe on 7th August 197523. With the
inauguration of the Irikefe Panel on the creation of more states in
Nigeria, there was increased vigour in the organization of demands for the
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division of Benue-Plateau State. The main proponents of the creation of a
Benue State came from the Idoma and Igalla intelligentsia, while the
generality of the Tiv remained neutral. The main proponents in the demands
for the creation of a Plateau State came from the Plateau students at
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, the Plateau Civil Servants, Businessmen and
some Plateau Chiefs, particularly the Chief of Jos, Dr. Fom Bot 25 . In a
personally written submission to the Panel, the Chief of Jos on behalf of
the traditional rulers on the Plateau and the people of the Plateau
demanded the creation of a Plateau State because:
'When in 1967 our Plateau Province was merged
with the then Benue Province to form one state,
we were outrightly repulsive. For eight years
the Benue-Plateau State has been struggling to
stablize (itself). Our assessment is that the
experiment has failed to justify its
existence... we (on the Plateau) have suffered
moral insults, generating from disagreeable
cultures. We have failed to appreciate each
others' cultural peculiarities... The
historical and socio-cultural differences
between the Plateau tribes and those of the Tiv
and Idoma in Benue have inevitably generated
suspicion, witch-hunting, blackmailing, fear
and disunity. We deplore this development and
appeal for separation. Numerically, the liv
alone are more populous than the over forty
tribes of the Plateau put together. We believe
that in a parliamentary democracy, the ultimate
system of government for this country, the Tiv
and Idorna will totally ounumber our small
tribes in the ballot-box" V
This speech was partly based on the calculation that because of the size of
the liv electorate, when electoral politics were re-established in Nigeria,
the Tiv in BP State will determine the outcome of any elections in the
State. The more pathetic aspects of the address of the Chief is that it
revealled the extent to which the conceptions of the political identity of
the M-Belt had shrunk to the British created Provinces of the Plateau and
Benue. Similar cultural differences were used in the 1950s and early 1960s
to demand for the creation of a M-Belt Region and for separation from the
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Islamic Society in the North. The Birom Chief (the Chief of Jos) knew very
well that there were as many cultural differences between the Birom and the
Tiv/Idoma of Benue as there were between th Biroin and the Jarawa in
Southern Bauchi, whose inclusion he demanded into Plateau and later
quarrelled bitterly with, because after settling down in Plateau State,
they promptly claimed the ownership of Jos in 198027.
However, the main proponents of demanding the retention of
Benue-Plateau State in 1974 in its existing form, came from Lafia and
Nassarawa 'Leaders of Thought' and the majority of the Tiv intelligentsia
who argued that the problems of Benue-Plateau State: "were the problems of
a bad government rather than the problems of politics" 28 . Judging from the
existing political mood in the different groups in Benue-Plateau State in
the period between October 1974 and February 1976, it was only the liv
people who remained in advocate of the preservation of BP state as a unit
of the Nigerian Federation within the specific content of the political
identity that it was a state that represented the struggle of the UMBC
party, previously supported by both Benue and Plateau 	 However,
the demands for the dissolution of BP State and the political feelings from
the Plateau groups which these had generated, were too strong to be ignored
by the Panel and the new Military Government of Murtala Mohammed 30 . At
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, for example, where the Benue-Plateau
Students Association earlier met in April 1975 to decide on what advice was
to be collectively given, as a non-partisan body in the controversies, to
the government on the contesting issues of preservation of Benue-Plateau
State or its subdivision into Benue and Plateau State, the meeting ended up
polarizing the students into Provincial Students Associations and also
resulted into files of the record of activities of the BP State Students
Association being torn to pieces in a fracas. When the Irikefe Panel
submitted its report to General Murtala Mohammed in December 1975, it was
obvioius that BP State had collapsed, because the activities of the State
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Government, for the next three months, except for the functions of Law and
Order came to a stand still in the Ministries and Corporations, as Civil
Servants awaited the announcement of the creation of Benue and Plateau
States.
On February 13th, 1976, however, there was an attempted coup d'etat to
overthrow the new Military-Regime of General Murtala Mohammed. The Coup was
announced by Lt. Colonel B. S. Dimka (an Angas) and succeeded in
assassinating the Head of State, Murtala Mohammed, but did not remove the
new government from office. The regime that overthrew Gowon continued with
the political program for the restoration of Civilian rule in Nigeria,
under the leadership of Lt. General Obasanjo, a program that included the
creation of more states and restoration of Civilian rule in Nigeria. By the
end of Februrary 1966, most of the abortive coup-makers had been arrested
and their tribal origins revealled that the officrs and men of the Nigerian
army who planned and executed the coup came from Plateau, Southern Zaria
and Adamawa (subsequently Gongola state), significantly excluding the Tiv,
the Idoma and the Jukun, but with a few from the Islamic Society in the
North, the West anf one from the Mid-West. In the subsequent executions
that took place in Lagos, of the 38 persons found guilty after the military
trails, 22 persons came from the Plateau, 6 from Southern Zaria, 4 from
Adamawa, 3 from the Islamic Society in the North, 2 Yorubas and one
Mid-Westerner. The political outcry over the executions of the officers and
men was tremendous from the top to the bottom of society on the Plateau.
This had ramification on political behaviour in the subsequently created
new unit of the Nigerian Federation of Plateau State. The grief on the
loses, initially isolated Plateau politically, from the rest of the North
and from among the M-Belt groups in the rapid pace of the processes to
restore Nigeria to Civilian Government, as it sought solance in its loses
by mobilizing the Christian identity in mourning the dead and consoling the
bereaved. Plateau was to emphasize the activated Christian religious
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identity of this period in the campaigns of the 1979 elections as the
political identity of the State, sometimes quite overtly, as for instance,
in the liberating theme of the NPP party, from Hausa-Fulani and Islamic
control and domination of the North and the State in particular. It was
widely believed on the Plateau, that the Islamic Society in the North had
used the coup to break-down Christian influence in the institutions of
Society in Nigeria by the hurried execution of some M-Belt officers and
that the Benue groups had betrayed the Christian and minorities identity in
the political identity of the M-Belt groups by failing to support the coup.
However, the officers and men of the Nigerian army from the Plateau
who planned the coup, contrasted the trends of political opinion of the
students, Civil Servants, the businessmen and the traditional rulers from
the Plateau, in effecting a coup d'etat that was meant to restore Nigeria
into a twelve state structure in which Benue-Plateau State was to be
re-established as a unit of the Nigeria Federation. One of the objectives
of the abortive coup makers was to bring back Gowon, with the former
military Governors in power, ruling over Nigeria 31 . The deposed military
Governor of BP State was an active participant of the coup and was one of
those executed in Lagos on 25th May 197632. The coup of 13th Februrary
1976, was however a Plateau affair and did not have the participation and
support of the Tiv, Idorna and Jukuns, whose members were equally strategic
in the Nigerian army. This suggests that the coup itself was planned
without accounting for or misjuding the strength of political opinion and
the political mood in the M-Belt areas, particularly in BP State.
On April 1, 1976, the final break-up of BP State was formalized, when
the new states in the M-Belt areas, albeit others in the Nigerian
Federation, began to function as autonomous units of the Federation, with
Plateau, Benue and Gongola States, sharing out the territory and people
that previously comprised Benue-Plateau State 33 . In the 1976 state creation
exercise, there was effort to make the Nigerian Federal units more equal in
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size and in some cases entities hitherto regarded as sacrosanct were
divided 34 . In the M-Belt areas, the flag-bearing emirate of Bauchi, for
instance, lost its non-Muslim districts of Jarawa to Plateau State, but
this was balanced by the creation of Bauchi itself, as State a Capital35.
The government, however, ignored the firm political demands of the Tor Tiv
that if Plateau groups rejected the existence of Benue-Plateau State as a
unit of the Nigerian Federation because of the Tiv and Idorna in Benue and
demanded a separate Plateau State, then that State should not on no account
take away any bit of the former Benue Province 36 . However, based on the
political demands of Lafia and Nassarawa 'Leaders of Thought' in these
Divisions, they were attached to Plateau State; and Wukari Division with
the Jukun and about 50% of the population being liv was attached to the new
Gongola State 37 . In compensation, however, the Igalla and Bassange parts of
Kwara, were excised and joined to the new Benue State whose capital was
situated in Makurdi on Tiv land38.
With these new political arrangements of 1976, the territorial
conceptions of the approximate of the M-Belt Region, epitomized in
Benue-Plateau State ended tragically with the M-Belt political identity
inanimated until the Sharia controversy of 1978. Some of the most severe
quarrels in Nigerian politics ensued between the Benue and the Plateau
groups, as Tiv and Idoma Civil Servants left Jos to the new State Capitals
of Makurdi and Yola. It was not uncommon to hear references being made to
Jos as a "sho-sho" Capital by the departing Benue groups, just as the liv
and Idoma were in turn referred to as "munchi" and "okpoto" respectively,
rather curiously the Hausa language derogatory names for these non-Islamic
groups (Birom, liv and Idoma respectively) of the M-Belt areas besides the
general name of "ama" (pagans) for all of them. Some civil servants from
among the Benue groups left Jos with keys to offices of the Ministries and
Government Houses they previously occupied, as well as with files of the
Government of BP state, allegedly to create frustrating conditions for the
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Government of Plateau state39.
A number of factors, therefore, combined to destroy the political
conceptions and existence of BP state as the territorial nucleus of a
M-Belt Region: the political infiltration of external dominant tribal group
and Islamic religious interests (Flausa-Fulani of the Northern
establishment) on the politics of the state which produced tensions and
clashes between the Plateau groups and the liv and Idoma; the absence of
socio-econornic and political policies to maintain and conciliate the
different tribal elite interests within the M-Belt political identity in BP
state, which led to political tensions over the share of contracts and
subsequently led to corruption, personified in the allegations of Godwin
Daboh on Joseph Tarka and Aper Aku on Joseph Gomwalk; the Dimka coup dsetat
and the subsequent executions which increased localism in the regionalism
of the political identity of the M-Belt movement, as it alienated and
politically isolated Plateau state. In that respect, many of the M-Belt
minorities in S.Zaria, S.Bauchi and Adarnawa (Gongola state) also felt that
the Idoma and liv elite did not sympathize with the fall of Gowon, the
Dimka coup and the subsequent execution of men and officers from the
Plateau and those of other M-Belt areas, since they did not join the coup
nor condemn the hurried executions. Seemingly, therefore, there was
widespread belief from within and outside the M-Belt areas that the
political influences and identity of the minorities in the North had come
to an end, since the different groups mutually suspected each other and
there was a premise for perpetual future political quarrels.
It was against this background that constitutional processes toward
the transfer of political power from the military to civilians continued
after the creation of states in April 197640. These processes included the
appointment of 50 distinguished and accomplished Nigerians from various
walks of life in September 1976 to constitute the Constitutional Drafting
Committee (CDC) and the inauguration of an indirectly elected constituent
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Assembly (CA), which considered the draft constitution on 31st August 1977,
comprising of 223 members 41 . Of the 50 CDC members, 5 were Christians from
the M-Belt areas and held sentimental attachments to the social and
religious identity of the M-Belt groups and societies. These were: C.S.
Abashiya (Hausa Christian from Wusasa), M.S. Angulu (Bassange), P.R. Belabo
(Tiv), D.D. Dimka (Angas) and G.P. Unongo (Tiv) 42 . The CDC submitted its
report on 14th September 1977 and the CA had its inaugural meeting on 6th
October 1977. Of the 49 indirectly elected members of the CA, from the
elections of 31st August 1977, in the states with M-Belt groups, 23 were
Christians and the rest Muslims: 2 out of 10 from Bauchi, 3 out of 10 from
Kaduna, 3 out of 10 from Gongola, 9 out of 10 from Benue and 6 out of 9
from Plateau 44 . Joseph Tarka, although elected from Jerngbar, was
disqualified from participation in the CA by the Military Government with
whom he was not in favour. He was disqualified because of non-payment of
certain outstanding taxes. This saved him from taking sides in the Sharia
controversy. He was infact distanced from the issues by his stay in London.
However, unlike the membership of the CA, Christians from the North (M-Belt
Areas) were hopelessly outnumbered in the COG and were manipulated out of
certain Committees of the body. This explains the initial inclusion of the
provisions on the Sharia in the draft constitution 45 . When Christopher
Abashiya, one of the Northern Christian members of the CDC, made his views
known to the public on the inclusion of the Sharia in the draft, he was
promptly removed from his job as Director of the Polytechnic in Kaduna,
established by the former NPC government in the North. However unlike the
other states in the North, which contained some of the M-Belt groups
(Kaduna, Bauchi and Gongola) groups in the former territories that
comprised Benue-Plateau state produced CA members, the majority of whom
identified with the Christian religious identity: out of a total of 19
elected representatives in the CA from the two states of Benue and Plateau,
15 were Christians with only 4 Muslims, 1 from Benue and 3 from Plateau46.
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In addition, there was also the nomination by the Government, of Professor
J.I. Tseayo, a Tiv man with a Christian identity, to be one of the special
members of the CA 47 . It was this group that organized social and political
support which combined with Southern Christian support, produced the
rejection of the establishment in the Nigerian constitution of the Federal
Sharia Court of Appeal, both from within the CA and from all of the M-Belt
areas. The Sharia controversy produced a temporary flash of political unity
and Christian religious solidarity against the Islamic society in the
North, despite the tragic collapse of BP state.
The proceedings of the CA were more controversial than those of the
CDC. They produced some painful drama, perhaps because the majority of the
members were elected, even if indirectly and therefore, were more certain
of their mandate and also because everybody was imbued with the apparent
finality of the decisions to be taken then. Despite the fact that Muslims
inhabited half of the Federation and over half of the total population of
Nigeria, they were a minority in the CA, due largely because the members
were elected from the Local Government areas. One of the most heated and
controversial debates was over the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal. The
opposition to the Sharia courts was spearheaded by Christian members in the
Assembly, particularly those from Benue and Plateau States, under the
organized articulation of their chief spokesman, Paul IJnongo. This group
became known as the anti-Sharia group because they were against the
specific provision of section 184 on the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal.
The draft constitution had provided, in that section for a Sharia court of
Appeal
"which shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion
of any other Court of Law in Nigeria, to hear
and determine appeals from the Sharia Court of
Appeal of a state ... and in Section 179(c)
that ... The Federal Sharia Court of Appeal
shall consist of a Grand Mufti, a Deputy Grand
Mufti and sh number of Muftis not being less
than three"
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Its appelate jurisdiction on matters of Islamic Personal Law were exactly
as provided for in the Constitution of Northern Nigeria of 1963, Section 53
(a) to (e) 49 . The difference this time was that, whereas the Sharia Court
of Appeal in 1963 was a regional (state) court, in the draft, it was to
become a Federal institution, presumably because whereas before, there was
only one region involved, in 1978 there were many states. It was this
exposition of the correlation between the previous Islamic Laws of Northern
Nigeria and the provisions of the draft constitution on the Federal Sharia
Court of Appeal that produced prompt hostilities by the anti-Sharia group,
largely from the findings of Christopher Abashiya 50 . The Constituent
Assembly rejected these two principal provisions regarding the Federal
Sharia Court of Appeal and other consequential provisions 51 . A sixteen-man
sub-Committee headed by Chief Simeon Adebo, further recommended a
compromise provision suggesting that there should be a single federal court
of appeal which was to be duly constituted if, in the case of appeals from
the Sharia Court of Appeal of a state, it consists of not less than three
justices of the Federal Court of Appeal hl learned u rather than ssversedlu in
Islamic Personal Law 52 . In the case of appeals from the Customary Courts of
Appeal of a state a similar provision was made, thus giving Customary Law
and Courts the same Constitutional status as Sharia Law53.
However, the real bone of contention in the Sharia controversy, which
produced a dramatic walk-out and boycott of the proceedings of the Assembly
from 6th-24th April 1978 by the pro-Sharia group, the Northern Muslim
members of the CA, was whether the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal would be
constituted by judges manifestly more competent in Islamic Personal Law
than the Grand Khadis and Khadis whose decisions would be reviewed hence
the provisions of Section 179(c) in the draft constitution 54 . The
pro-Sharia group, comprising all Muslims from both the Islamic society and
the M-Belt areas in the North, saw this as the crux of the matter on the
Sharia controversy, all other considerations being extraneous. The
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anti-Sharia group on the other hand argued variously:
"that Islamic Personal Law was discriminatory
against non-Muslims and should not be elevated
to Federal status; that only a Muslim could
become a judge in the Sharia Court; it
discriminated against women and thus ran
counter to the political objective of equality
and that if a parallel Federal Sharia Court of
Appeal were granted now, it would amount to
sanctioning two separate national systems of
Law and the 'Logical progression' in the
future, would be the ggeation of a Federal
Supreme Sharia Court"
The Sharia controversy was regarded as one of principle, by both sides in
the religious divide on the issue. Infact, it did not amount to a large
breach of legal cases but there was Christian apprehension and they reacted
to the provisions on Islamic law in the draft Constitution symbolically.
The most vociferous and unyielding of the anti-Sharia group were those from
Benue and Plateau states. This was so, because they were non-Muslims in the
majority and from previous social and political experiences, the majority
of their people chafed in the past and were persecuted under the political
abuses of Islamic Laws in the system in the North. Indeed, one of the
strongest factors which caused an earlier generation of Christian
politicians to organize and demand the creation of a M-Belt Region,
separated from the Islamic society, as a unit of the Nigerian Federation in
the North, was over the fear that Muslim Law would be extended and applied
on non-Muslims and Christians when the 'Christian' British administration
departed and political control passed onto the Muslim majority. Similar
anxieties were expressed within the context of a Nigerian Army departing
from control of politics, the majority of whom were Christians from the
M-Belt areas.
The Christian population on the Plateau in particular and among its
Christian members in the Constituent Assembly (CA), had strong political
and religious feelings against the Sharia provisions in the draft
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Constitution. This was so, because there was an increase in the political
influences of the Hausa-Fulani Islamic communities in their areas after
1976. The administrations of Governor Abdullahi (a Hausa-Fulani Muslim) in
BP state (before April 1976) and subsequently that of Daniel Suleiman (a
Christian Jukun) in Plateau State for example, alienated Christians in the
state in three ways: There was political effort to revert the emphasis of
Joseph Gomwalk on the "Christian Minorities Nationalism" in BP state in
which there had been covert Christian religious interests in making key
political appointments, by refocussing appointments on Muslims who were
minorities in the State from Wase, Lafia, Keffi, Nassarawa and Kanarn; there
was also the incautious take over of Christian Missionary Social and
Welfare Institutions, mainly hospitals and schools, which had a
concommitant decline in moral and education-standards in the institutions;
and finally on the Plateau, there was the enactment of the "Twenty Years
Indigenization Edict" in which anybody who showed evidence of having lived
on the Plateau for twenty consecutive years, qualified as an indigene of
the state. The Edict was manipulated to enhance the share of benefits of
only the migrant Muslim population in Plateau state. It was however
subsequently repealled by the Plateau state civilian government under
Solomon Lar, because it was only unique to Plateau and no similar
arrangements for non-indigenes existed in other states of the Federation.
Furthermore, this was so because so strong is the conception of "Son of the
soil" sentiment In Nigerian politics that the Plateau elite felt threatened
with submergence by surrendering such rights.
The Sharia controversy was therefore not only over religion, custom or
"a way of life"; it involved all of these and was also primarily a
political issue. Similar to the causes of Christian solidarity in the 1950s
and 1960s, it effectively brought to the fore of Nigerian politics, the
Christian religious identity in the North and the fears of non-Islamic
groups in the M-Belt areas, although Christianity among "Northerners" was
JO 71-
suspected by many Southern Nigerian CA members 56 . The critical difference
with the earlier period however was that in 1978 the issue of Islamic Law
was being contested on the national arena rather than in a regional one
with an overtly Christian religious identity by a more socially mobilized
and more educated political group from the M-Belt areas. In the heat of the
Sharia controversy, it was suggested by some of the members of the
anti-Sharia group that "a Federal Canon Court of Appeal" be included in the
constitution to balance the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal57.
However, in 1978 the Sharia controversy portended far reaching
consequences if an amicable solution was not found as 92 members of the
pro-Sharia group, boycotted the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly58.
The Nigerian Head of State, General Obasanjo had to intervene to try to
conciliate the contesting groups on the Sharia issue which had openly
polarized only the North into two religious and political camps: the
Islamic society and the M-Belt areas. He appealed to the Muslims to return
to the Assembly and they agreed. Furthermore on 19th April 1978, the Head
of State, with members of the SMC met the Constituent Assembly (CA) in an
informal session and cautioned them against any course of action which
could threaten the stability of the country 59 . Although the pro-Sharia
group returned to the CA on 24th April 1978, they subsequently
disassociated themselves from the specific compromise on the issue provided
for in Chapter seven of the Constitution and threatened to reopen the issue
at the appropriate time 60 . The activated Christian religious identity on
all of the M-Belt groups and societies in Adamawa (Gongola State),
S.Bauchi, Plateau, S.Zaria and Benue, which produced the most vocal
opposition through Professor Tseayo, Paul Unongo and Mvandega Jibo with
support from Southern Nigerian Christians, was successful in stopping the
Sharia Law over Nigeria. The unity and sense of political power of the
M-Belt identity however, remained illusive in the light of political
development that followed the acceptance of the draft Constitution. When
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the ban on politica activities was lifted in Nigeria on 21st September 1978
and the Constituent Assembly formally dissolved, local issues and political
interests in the M-Belt states resurged and took precedence in the
determination of political alignments that shaped political party
formations for the 1979 elections. The provisions of the Electoral Decree
of 1977, further prevented the organizaton of an exclusively M-Belt
political party, because the new political parties had to have a National
character and not ethnic, religious or parochial outlooks61.
The anti-Sharia movement, had looked-up to Joseph Tarka for leadership
in the organization and direction of political alignments in the M-Belt
areas 62 . He, however, was more interested in building up national
coalitions, because in 1978, it seemed possible that he might become the
NPN Presidential candidate 63 . Furthermore, he had remained in London
throughout the Sharia controversy in the Constituent Assembly, the period
when the M-Belt groups were aligning themselves in political formations.
However, the overt religious identities manifested in the Sharia
controversy were submerged in the processes of coalition building before
party formations. The political parties in themselves were only allowed to
form after the preamble of the constitution. Overt appeal to religious
identities in the organization of political parties were against the
preamble in the Constitution. Tarka had also dealigned himself from former
political associates, particularly those under the leadership of Chief
Awolowo and gloried in the careful building up of friendships among
notables all over Nigeria who became the political foundation of the NPN64.
The bulk of the M-Belt minorities political leadership therefore joined the
Northern based PRP under Aminu Kano and the GNPP under Ibrahim Waziri, the
alternative political parties to the NPN, except for Plateau State which
was out of step with the rest of the North, by joining the NPP under the
leadership of the Ibo with Azikiwe as Presidential Candidate after the
splits with Ibrahim Waziri 65 . Indeed, the party support and subsequent
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votes of the other M-Belt minorities outside Benue state were protest votes
rather than rejection of the NPN party and these went against Tarka 66 . In
the elections in 1979, half the Tiv and Idoma intelligentsia were against
Tarka snd the NPN party in Benue, although the loyalty of the mass of the
people to Tarka and the NPN remained quite profound and produced the
largest percentage majority to the NPN party, of any state in Nigeria:
76.4% in the Presidential elections results for Shehu Shagari 67 . In Plateau
itself the turn-out and the votes cast in the Governatorial elections were
more than those in the Presidential Elections: 585 588 as against 548
4Q568 Furthermore, Plateau produced 70.4% of its votes for Solomon Lar, a
Plateau man, the NPP Governatorial candidate and cast only 49.2% for Nnamdi
Azikiwe, an Ibo who was the Presidential candidate of the NPP party. This
means that Plateau was voting for its " son of the soil" rather than for the
NPP party and Azikiwe.
In the period between 1978 and the elections of 1979, however, the
Christian religious and minorities political identity of the M-Belt groups
which had been activated in the Sharia controversy was submerged by local
sentiments existing in the five states that contained the M-Belt groups:
Gongola, Bauchi, Plateau, Kaduna and Benue. In Plateau, Gongola and
S.Zaria, the issue of Hausa-Fulani Islamic domination persisted and the
executions of army officers from these areas, as a result of the abortive
Dimka coup d'etat assumed salience in 1979 as a political issue which
conditioned the rejection of the NPN party (seen to be the symbol of
Hausa-Fulani domination) and the UPN (a Yoruba party) 69 . As an alternative
therefore, there was political alignment of Gongola to the Maiduguri based
Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) under the leadership of Ibrahim Waziri,
of Southern Zaria to the Kano based Peoples Redemtion Party (PRP) under the
leadership of Aminu Kano and of Plateau to the Enugu based Nigerian Peoples
Party (NPP) under the leadership of Nnamdi Azikiwe. In Benue, the
commanding political influence of Joseph Tarka, as one of the founders of
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the NPN and the lessons of previous experiences in opposition politics to
the dominant party, shaped support for the NPN party. Both Benue and
Plateau states, who had led the anti-Sharia crusade and activated the
Christian religious identity among the M-Belt groups in the North, ended up
assuming different political identities in the 1979 elections. This was
barely two years after having solidly stood together with religious and
political unity to oppose and stop the Sharia over Nigeria. In 1979, the
M-Belt identity was fragmented into five political party identities, with
only Plateau State in the NPP still maintaining the tradition of the
Christian religious identity and the liberating theme from the Islamic
society, in politics with the M-Belt movement in the North and Nigeria.
Only scattered political support for christian solidarity and the
liberating theme of the NPP on the Plateau, came from Numan, Southern
Bauchi (South West and South Eastern parts of Bauchi Division but mainly
the Tangale Waja and Lere areas), Southern Zaria and Benue State.
Table E.1 suggests that in the M-Belt areas the votes cast for the
five different political parties were as follows: the NPN had 49.3% of the
M-Belt vote, NPP 19.0%, GNPP 15.9%, UPN 10.5% and the PRP 5.2%. The highest
vote for the NPN in the M-Belt areas came from Benue with 76.4% which was
also the highest vote in support of the NPN when all states of the
Federation are compared. The lowest vote for the NPN in the M-Belt areas
came from Southern Bauchi with 28.9%. The NPP party which made political
effort to symbolize the interests of the minorities in the North had its
highest share of votes on the Plateau, with 49.2% and the weakest support
from Gongola with 4.4%. In all of the M-Belt areas, the NPN scored
substantial votes in the Presidential elections. This suggests that the
votes for other parties were essentially votes in protest, rather than a
rejection of the NPN. The votes for the NPN party, a party that strongly
represented the symbol of the Northern political identity, however,
regressed from areas where Hausa-Fulani domination was less visible (ie.
Table E.1
The M-Belt Vote in the Presidential Election of 1979
M-Belt	 Votes	 NPN	 %	 NPP	 %	 GNPP	 %	 UPN	 %	 PRP	 %
Area	 Cast	 Share	 Share	 Share	 Share	 Share
Benue	 538879 411648 76.4 63097 11.7 42993 7.97 13864 2.6 	 7277 1.4
Southern
Bauchi	 272254 150003 55.1 39964 14.7 43844 16.1	 13139 4.8 25304 9.3
Gongola	 739138 327057 51.2 27856 4.4 217914 34.1 138561 21.7 27750 4.3
Plateau	 548405 190458 34.7 269666 49.2 37400 6.8	 29029 5.3 21852 3.98
Southern
Zaria	 218722	 63190 28.9 40475 18.5 27318 12.5
	
49764 22.8 37975 17.4
Total 2317398 1142356 49.3 441058 19.0 369469 15.9 244357 10.5 120158
	
5.2
Sources: The General Elections 1979: Report by Federal Electoral
:ommission, Lagos, 1979 p8 - p470; Ahmadu Kurfi, The Nigerian General Elections:
.959 and 1979 and aftermath, Lagos, 1983 p273.
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Benue), toward areas where its most visible forms were still an issue to
contest (le. Southern Zaria, Plateau and Gongola); the most agitated group
in southern Bauchi the Jarawa, having been conciliated by their merger into
Plateau. The outstanding electoral performance of the NPN party in the
M-Belt areas is explained by the 'Band-Wagon Effect' which was national in
the light of other elections and minorities like the Tiv made their
political calculations and identified with the NPN. However, given that the
NPN had its strongest support from a minorities area (Benue), largely from
the political power of Joseph Tarka, the NPN won the election on the
strength of minorities votes. More fundamental in the interplay of
political identities in the 1979 elections, the figures in Table E.1 show
how very much the M-Belt areas still held sentiments for the Northern
identity which caused the NPN to win the elections in the M-Belt areas with
the NPP coming second. It was only in the isolated case of the Plateau that
the NPN lost to the NPP party. Table E.1 however shows the extent to which
political behaviour in the M-Belt areas contrasted with conceptions of the
solidarity of the M-Belt political and Christian religious identity.
To compound the problems of a fragmented M-Belt political conception
of unity in different states with different political party identities,
there was developed a curious political demand for the dismemberment of
Plateau State. Politics within Plateau State and its image on the national
arena had continued on the traditions of one element of the identity of th
M-Belt movement: a blend of Christian religious identity on the shape and
nature of the tribal and political minorities identity of non-Islamic
groups. In the predominantly Islamic parts of the State, particularly those
within but sandwiched between Benue State, there was demand for the
creation of "a middle belt state" in 1981. In contrast to the Christian
religious identity of the fundamental M-Belt movement of the period between
1950 and 1967, Muslims in the southern parts of the state were actually
"hijacking" the political label and sought to turn the religious concept on
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the heads of the Christian politicians in Plateau state by simplifying the
political meaning of the wider Middle Belt concept to refer to a Muslim
minorities "middle belt state" in the Southern parts of Plateau. The Muslim
minorities in Plateau state were demanding a "middle belt state:
"based purely on a desire to give deprived
people of the area, the right and opportunity
to be masters of their own destiny and develop
their long neglected and deprived area ... and
not on sentiments or the desire to sat}fy any
particular tribal or sectional groups"
In 1982 the movement suggested that the creation of the "middle belt state"
was demanded in order to immortalize Joseph Tarka who died earlier in 1980;
but most probably to win over the support of the Tiv in Benue and their
large concentration who had migrated a long time ago to Lafia, Nassarawa
and Doma areas. However, the military coup d'etat of December 1983,
overtook the demands and in anycase it was a conceptual abuse and the
demands were bogus because there was strong opposition by the many
Christians and non-Muslims in the areas. The new state itself might have
simply duplicated the problems of plural politics of the M-Belt areas - an
incessant regression from regionalism to localism. Indeed in almost every
one of the 19 states of the Federation there was found a vociferous demand
for the creation of a new state in 1982, based on "Son of the soil"
politics of coalition, regardless of peviously existing Regional
identities, until the establishment of military rule in 1983. After the
coup the 'State Creation Movements' ended and the military ordered all
their assets to be confiscated.
Although the M-Belt identity seems to be quite fluid and illusive in
maintaining political unity over the groups who had claims to it, the
political identity assumed a crucial role in always resurfacing to balance
the centrifugal Northern forces in Nigerian politics within the federal
system. Sometimes this balance is purely religious in which the M-Belt
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Christian religious identity wedges the fears of Islamic hegemony over the
Nigerian Federation by Southern Nigerian groups; when this happens the
M-Belt groups exhibit the Christian religious identity and point to the
liv, Idoma, Jukun, Bachama, Kaje, Birom, Angas, Sura etc. to suggest that
not everyone in the North is Muslim and in the dominant political majority
tribal group. Sometimes the whole of the North is referred to as
Hausa-Fulani and to have its centre of political and religious gravity in
Sokoto. This was particularly critical in the period of the civil war when
Gowon and the majority of the soldiers who fought in the civil war and
whose majority came from the M-Belt areas were readily used as references
to defuse the claims by Ojukwu that the Muslim North was destroying Ibo led
"Christian-Biafra. Furthermore, after the 1979 election results in which
Shehu Shagari won the Presidency and Chief Awolowo lost, Ishaya Audu (a
Wusasa Christian) was appointed Foreign Minister and Samuel Mafuyai (a
Challa Christian from Plateau), Aviation Minister. This defused Yoruba
propaganda which was spearheaded by the Tribune group of newspapers
suggesting that a feudalistic Islamic North of the old NPC party of the
Sardauna was extending its sway over the rest of Nigeria. Largely because
of the socio-religious and political identity of the M-Belt groups which
was distinct from the Islamic society in the North, once the national
government in Nigeria is controlled by Muslims, political caution is
exercised to structure appointments reflecting the M-Belt factor in
Nigerian politics. This is usually used to counter southern Nigerian
stereotype fears over a monolithic Islamic North dominating the Federaton.
There is, therefore, still in the Nigerian political arena recognizable
M-Belt character, which with other minority groups in the south, shapes the
political calculations of dominant groups wishing to capture power.
Ironically, due to the split in the Muslim North leadership, between Shehu
Shagari (NPN) Waziri Ibrahim (GNPP) and Aminu Kano (PRP), the NPN won at
least as high a percentage share of votes in the majority areas as its
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votes in the minorities areas in the North. The interplay of the M-Belt
political identity is between the different big cultural and religious
groups as a political bridgehead. However, although successful in balancing
the political power struggles in Nigerian politics between the dominant
cultural groups, it has completely failed to achieve a territorital unity
of its own, where the political identity might have crlystallized over an
area, in the same sense of the Northern identity. The curious fact about
the M-Belt identity in both its political and religious dimensions is that
it never gets mobilized until there are overt threats of a developing
Islamic hegemony in the North and Nigeria. This makes the M-Belt identity a
constellation of identity that is latent, more religious than political.
Yet it is from the political arena that the religious always gets
activated. Thus, for example, the great anti-corruption crusader became
corrupted in office as Governor of Benue State, his affictavits having
destroyed Gomwalk, increased the tensions that led to the final collapse of
the Gowon-Regime as well as BP state. Yet, in 1981, it was the same Aper
Aku in conjuncture with Solomon Lar that remembered Gowon as 'a
Middle-Belter" and jointly demanded his repeal from being a wanted man,
following from the events that surrounded the abortive Dimka Coup d'etat in
1976.
However, the M-Belt identity has remained very crucial in the
political processes of both military and civilian governments in Nigeria,
where their balance of support is still very crucial for success. It is
because the M-BeIt military factor is still very strong in the Nigerian
army, for example, that has ensured that their share of government
patronage is disproportionate to those of other Nigerian groups after the
coup d'etat of 31st December 1983, which brought the Buhari Regime into
power. Thus, for example, from one M-Belt tribe alone, the military factor
conditioned the appointments of Brigadier Jerry Huseine (Yergam) as
Governor of Bendel State, Domkat Bali (Yergam), Minister of Defence,
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Group-Captain Bernard Banfa (Yergam), Director of Nigerian Airways, and
retired Major-General Joseph Garba (Yergam) as the Nigerian UN permanent
representative. Given the socio-political and military scope of the M-Belt
groups, the identity is still very much alive and like a sleeping giant, it
awaits to be awaken by the tremours of the directions of political
development in Nigeria. Although the territorial conceptions of the M-Belt
political identity as one single unit have been permanently smashed, the
process also served to remove the socio-economic fears that threatened the
identity, but did not disperse its political and religious conceptions. The
identity is thus overlaid by sentiments of localism (son of the soil-ism),
but remains potent and has potential force in the state Government in the
M-Belt areas. Like many other religious forces in politics in other parts
of the world, the Christian religious identity of the M-Belt is powerful,
although submerged, because the political system frawns on religious
political organization. It however remains the nerves of Nigerian politics.
It is also the muscles in the body of politic of Nigeria.
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APPENDIX I
Defining Key Terms and-Categories used in The Research
Ethnic Groups:
For the purpose of this study we use the term ethnic group to
refer to groups characterized by a sense of identity and by the
cultural features which they may have. This may be a common
language that shapes their communicative world views on socio-
economic and political problems and also the cultural values that
shape similarities in their life style. The group may be con-
centrated in a specific geographical space and make claims that they
are natural to the area. The basic feature of an ethnic group there-
fore is the existence of a wide and advanced level of cultural and
physical intercourse between individuals in the groups of which it
is composed within the geographical space. It ought to be borne in
mind however that each society in the modern world contains sub-
sections or subsystems more or less distinct from the rest of the
population even within an ethnic group.
On account of the potential for variations within categorized
population R.A. Shermerhorn therefore defines an ethnic group as:
"a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common
ancestry, memories of a shared historical past and a cultural focus
on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their
people".'
1.	 R.A. Shermerhorn, A framework for Theory and Research:
Comparative Ethnic Relations, New York 1970 p.12
Examples of such symbolic elements associated with an ethnic
group are: kinship patterns, physical contiguity as localism or
sectionalism or the underlying notions in the conceptions of 'son
of the soil', religious affiliations, language or dialect forms,
tribal affiliations, nationality, phenotypical features or any com-
binations of these; but a necessary if not paramount accompaniment
is some consciousness of kind among members of the group.
Socio-Cultural Identity:
For the purpose of this study, we use the term soclo-cultura].
identity to refer to the way the culture of a specific society shapes
the personality of individuals that belong to it. Socio-cui.tural
is thus taken to mean the way of a group of people that affects mdi-
viduals in specific ways who may be an ethnic group: 	 the configuration
of all the more or less stereotyped patterns of learned behaviour which
are handed down from one generation to the next through the means of
language and irnmitation account for all particular socio-cultural
identities .
Personality in this context is taken to mean a more or less
enduring organization of forces within the individual associated with
a complex of fairly consistent attitudes, values and modes of perception
which account in part for the individual's consistency of behaviour
from his soclo-cultural environment that is crucial in determining a
socio-cultural identity 
•2 
Essentially however, a socio-cultural
identity is a reconciliation of private and public identities that
come together into a stable relationship with a community of relation-
1. Perspectives of this definition derive from W.J.M Mackenzie
Political Identity, Middlesex, England 1978 p.42
2. Mackenzie 1978 p.43
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ships within a collectivity for the collective identity to be usable
as a political identity. 1 A socio-cultural identity is therefore
tied to the ethnic cultures of societies.
Implicit in this definition is that the existence of an ethnic
group becomes a sufficient indicator of a socio-cultural identity.
The crucial difference between a socio-cultural identity and an ethnic
identity however, is that the former may expand and contract to enclose
and incorporate other groups by proximity of residence while ethnic
identities are essentially static identities. This means new socio-
cultural identities may be learnt and assume saliency when they become
built up by socially and culturally meaningful influences and religion
that cut across ethnic boundaries and patterns of identity as was the
c*ti4 SociekiE
case with the M-Belt groupsupon impact with the Christian religion
and Western modernization and educational influences which created
new values, and new languages like Hausa and English.
Outsiders:
For the purpose of this study, the term 'outsiders' is used to
refer to conceptions of the central problems in socio-cultural,
ethnic and political identity: 'I' and 'we' ., 'us' and 'them', as
they affect the specific 'culture context' of an ethnic group identity
or an identity that becomes mobilized for political purposes. 2 Con-
ceptions of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' however tend to revolve or
the fear of domination of 'insiders' by those that may be branded as
'outsiders'.
1. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernization
in The Middle East, London 1958 p.408
2. For more elaborate discussions of these categories see Mackenzie
1978 p.40-48
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The fear of domination is the atavistic force that binds people
together, since it is about things unfamiliar, unknown or simply
different brought in by new entrants from other places. The creation
of such a category, by let us say, politicians, religious priests etc.
seems to be what holds people together as a unit. This may provide
the cement for people who may not necessarily be considered distinct
or having a persistent cultural system in terms of sharing a common
language, a religious faith, a cultural heritage with roots in history
and way of life.'
It ought to be borne in mind, however, that all distinct
categories of people cling together, united by a specific identity
which serves as a psychological fortress when there is intrusion from
outside, by people considered as strangers, in the context of per-
ceived differences in the ways of doing things or in life styles and
values. In a situation like that new ideas and life styles, that are
perceived as threats to the integrity of their distinct identities,
tend to increase fears which assume greater intensity in times of'
socio-economic and political conflict. All through the history of man,
the 'outsider', has been the scape-goat in the recriminations of the
'insiders'.
It has, however, always been a matter for politically motivated
agitation to arouse the fear over strangers, who may be menacir
1.	 For discussions and examples, see article by Edward H. Spicer,
'Persistent cultural systems: A comparative study of Identity
systems that can adapt to contrasting environments', Science,
Oct-Dec 1971, Vol.174 p.795-BOO
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the very sanctity of the insiders' homes and identity. This conception
of 'outsiders' as against 'insiders' also becomes directed at political
recalcitrants in which case they are branded as collaborators, and
a collaborator with outsiders is an 'inside outsider'. In a situation
like that, shared interests and shared space become the criteria of
cooperation between practical men to brand all others as 'outsiders'.
People who share an interest share an identity. The interests of each
require the collaboration of all within the presumed identity.'
Conceptions of 'outsiders' are powerful factors that reinforce
political and social identities since their social space conditions
interact in communicative networks and those who share a network
share an identity. Those excluded from that network of communications -
interaction, in context of the specific shared interests and identity
are the 'outsiders'.
Political Identity:
For the purpose of this study, we use the term, political identity,
to mean identification and political loyalty of an individual, or a
socio-cultural community, to an organization, to resolve questions
that are concerned with power and authority, with other contestants,
to secure them and with their exercise within a recognized frame-
work of government. 2 To define political identity, therefore, means
defining politics.
The ordinary usage of the word 'politics', is primarily con-
cerned with such things as parliaments, congresses, presidents, parties,
1. Mackenzie 1978 p.124
2. Ibid p.107
public officials, cities and city bosses, enforcement of law, civil
liberties, dictatorships: "It is concerned with "them", the big boys,
the fixers, the "high-Heidyins", not in general, but as a special
trend or sector of our grumbles, about the human situation... That
is where 'politics' bites first and most deeply."
More fundamental however, the meaning of politics reflects
the issues that concern society as public servants, beneficiaries
or victims of government. A definition, often employed by political
scientists, describes politics as, the articulation, choice and
reconciliation of conflicting demands for government action. 2 Politics
in any society, is about calling issues to public attention, whether
through testimony before committees or testimony in the streets by
a demonstration. It may even be testimony and communications with
government through planting a bomb, hijacking a plane or kidnapping
a dignitary, causing the death of a charismatic political leader and
overthrowing a government by any means. Politics is also about re-
conciling competing demands for governments to act or to ignore an
issue in dispute. In the instance of politics some issues are
"organized-in" while others are "organized-out". 3
 In the circumstances
politics is conflict-prone. Conflicts in politics concern what govern-
ments ought to do about specific issues, such as the creation of a
M-Belt region, armed robbery, crime in the cities or rural housing,
1. Mackenzie 1978 p.107
2. For extended discussions of definitions of politics, see
Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 3rd Ed. New Jersey
1976, Chapter 1
3. Rose 1978 p.10
Iocci
provision of electricity, pipe borne water or tarred roads. It also
concerns disputes about which individuals or institutions should make
decisions about political actions to be taken in the name of the
people in society. In that respect, politics also concerns, how
institutions are used by politicians to achieve their objectives in
the governing process.
The governing process involves officials in many different
institutions, as much as it involves those outside governments who
press demands for government to act and those who receive the goods
and ills produced by the process.' Politics also involves governing.
Governing is about a place, a territory, as much as it is about people
in the territory. 2
 Where electoral patterns exist the mechanism
that organized politics to produce governing is the political party.
Essentially as used in this study therefore, a political identity
is party identity which is generated toward achieving specific objectives
of society when it takes control of political power and may have public
interest at heart as much as it fulfils the private interests of mdi-
viduals .
1. Rose 1978 p.9
2. Ibid
3. See more elaborate discussions in Mackenzie 1978 p.106-132;
Philip E. Jacob et al (Eds), The Integration of Political
Communities, New York, 1965 p.270-283; Michael [aver,
The Politics of Private Desires: The Guide to the Politics
of Rational Choice, London 1981 p.106
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Majority(ies)/Minority(ies):
For the purpose of this study, the term majority is used to
mean an ethnic group that has greater numerical size than other
groups and societies in a wider plural society, like a Region or a
State in Nigeria or in context of the whole Nigerian Federation
relative to other Nigerian groups and societies. This suggests
that there are no numerical majority ethnic groups, unless there also
exists a numerical minority ethnic group. This discinction is
analytically crucial, because a numerical minority can dominate a
numerical majority like in Burundi.
In this study however the problem was Islamic majorities which
dominated non-Islamic minorities. This distinction also highlights
the point that the existence of minorities and majorities in a plural
society, suggests that there are various types of relationships which
occur between them. The nature of the type of relationships is
politically crucial since groups relate to each other in terms of
differential prestige of social status and control of political power.
A minority may therefore be either a dominant group or a subordinate
group. Such relationships imply definitions of this category in
terms that suggest that groups cannot relate to each other as
minority and majority unless the members of those groups establish
ways of recognizing one another in terms of political advantage.1
In using the term majority ethnic groups we recognize the
meaning of its political dimension in electoral numerical sizes,in
1.	 B. Eugene Griessman, Minorities: A text with Readings in Inter-
Relations, Alabama, USA, 1974 p.viii
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context of political identities and access to political power as
characteristic of the groups within the larger society as well as
their joint political behaviour patterns. Similarly by combining
the characteristics of groups in terms of size, power and ethnicity
we use the term minority ethnic group to signify a group(s) that has
less than half the population of a given society and is in an
appreciable subsystem with limited access to roles and activities
central to the economic and political institution of the society.1
Furthermore, a minority group may be taken as a group of people who
are discriminated against and who regard themselves as objects of
discrimination. This may be an ethnic group that is distinct
because of culturally identifiable patterns, a racial group that
has distinct physical characteristics or a restricted membership
religious group.
The thesis takes account of all these dimensions in the usage
of these categories but is emphatic in using the term 'minority',
restricted to groups that are small in numerical size by their cultural
patterns and lacking access to political power in the wider society.
The term 'majority' group is used to refer to numerically large
groups that are also dominant groups in society. 2The problem however
remains, whether one can really generalize that all claims in the
demands for a separate state into a new political unit of a federation
1. Schermerhorn 1968 p.14
2. See more elaborate discussions of these conceptual categories
and their definitions by Donald E. Celfand,Ethnic Relations
and Social Research: A Re-evaluation',in Donald E. Gelfand and
Russell D. Lee, Ethnic Conflict and Power: A Cross-National
Perspective, London 1973 p.9-10
originates from conceptions of "minorities". In the instance of
the Nigerian experience of a federation, minority groups and
societies established the political precedence rather than the
"majorities" where political recalcitrants conditioned separation
into a new political unit within the majorities. For example
while the M-Belt political, social and cultural minorities demanded
the creation of a M-Belt Region as early as 1950 it was not until
in the l960s that a Kano and Borno Region became political issues.
The Nature of socio-economic and political relationships:
For the purposes of this study, the terms nature of socio-
economic and political relationships, between groups in society are
used in reference to the distribution of political power, authority
and political decision-making on socio-economic matters that make some
groups dominate others, with the dominated in subordinate positions
deëison	 Kind
in,roles played in society. The focus therefore is on levels of
distribution of ethnic groups to socior economic and political roles,
who may get politically manipulated and why, as much as which group
is patron and which is a client and the dictatorial forms of power
and authority that is involved and their institutionalization by the
politically advantaged group(s). In the situation, exploitation
discrimination and prejudice become characteristics of the nature
of socio-political and economic relationships.
Prejudice, which is almost a form of racism, based on stereotype
attitudes, is the underlying cause of exploitation and discrimination.
A popular usage of prejudice refers to hostility between ethnic or
racial groups within society. This definition does not however
specify whether the hostile relationship is one solely of unfavourable
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attitudes or of both unfavourable attitudes and actions. A narrower
definition restricts the term to an attitude which is not justified
by reality. In the situation, the prejudiced group may just lack or
may distort information with the result that its attitudes do not
fit the actual situation, or the actual attributes of the group which
is the object of the prejudice. A more precise definition limits
prejudice specifically to an unfavourable or favourable attitude
towards a group, which may or may not lead to overt hostile or
friendly action. We use prejudice here as an attitude that pre-
disposes a person in authority to think, perceive, feel and act in
favourable and unfavourable socio-political ways towards a group or
its individual members.'
As a measure in this reserach, it is reported attitudes and
statements on specific groups, by other groups that are used as
indicators of prejudice to determine both positive and negative
attitudes and their accompanying "mental-blocks" on other groups and
societies. This mainly concerns analysis of British political
attitudes in the period between 1900 and 1960 toward the Islamic society
and the M-Belt groups and societies in The North and the socio-political
attitudes of political leadership in the Islamic society in the period
between 1804 and the present, toward the M-Belt groups and societies
and also toward Southern Nigerian groups.
1.	 See more elaborate discussions of prejudice in C. Duncan Mitchell (ed)
A New Dictionary of Sociology, London 1979 p.'46
ic
Prejudice, to subordinate groups and societies may result from
differences in magico-religions, cultures, language, lifestyles,
food, dress styles and traditional levels of social, political and
economic development which may be seen as inferior by the prejudiced
group. The political advantages enjoyed by groups in positions of
authority may become compounded by the prejudices that exist in
society which usually result in discriminatory practices and the
exploitation of the subordinate groups. Discriminatory practices may
be on economic, occupational and social roles in the institutions of
society based on language and socio-cultural identities as much
as it can result in segregated residence. 	 Exploitation is not narrowed
to the purely Marxian notions of labor and raw materials since in
certain instances groups may be exploited in terms of their social
for	 c*.wi..pe.
status and prestige:subordinate groups may be seen to be fit only
for specified functional roles in the institutions of society and
pegged down into the positions with little chance of upward mobility
within the system of institutions, whether these be economic, political
social, occupational roles as in the administrative services to do with
1
political decision-making.	 Typical reaction to the resulting
patterns of conflict in a situation like that is that there is
cultural alignments of both dominant and dominated populations in
order to improve their positions.
Region/State:
For the purpose of this study, the term Region and State is used
synonymously to refer to a particular geo-political, administrative
territory and economic space. This is in particular reference to
the political Units whose boundaries were contained in the Nigerian
Federation more concretely from 1946, consolidated in 1954, restruc-
tured in 1967 and which became further subdivided in 1976. Within
the geo-political unit claims always exist that their cultural and
political ties make their spaces distinct from the rest. It must
be noted however that international, national, regional or even
local government boundaries are artificial and do not respect or
correspond exactly to socio-cultural and political reality. This is
a universal phenomenon. No-one has as yet produced an absolute
classification that produces uncontested boundaries since it is not
possible to take into account every conceivable criterion that might
be relevant to produce boundaries that correspond to exact socio-
cultural and political reality. 1
 To some extent however political
boundaries, whether they are international or within the political
units of a nation state like in a federal system, have a characteristic
of consolidating political identities, particularly so when an
administrative system has held the enclosed citizens for a long
period of time. For example the Northern and provincial identities
in The North of Nigeria were largely built up on an administrative
system over a longish period of time until they were politically
altered in 1967 by the Nigerian Military Government under General Gowon
1.	 See more elaborate discussions of this definitiOrr'i'ñ
J.F. MacDonald "The lack of Political Identity in English
Regions: Evidences from Mps", Studies in Public Policy,
No.33, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University
of Strathclyde, Glasgow 1979 p.2-4
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and subsequently under General Mohammed with the identities still
existing. This suggests that a common administrative system is
also crucially important in the definition of a Region/State and the
political unity conceived of by its citizens.
Government Policy:
For the purpose of this study, the term government policy is
used to refer to what governments do with policy. In other words
we use the term to describe governing in policy terms.
The word policy itself is used in at least three different
ways by political scientists. 1 In its most general use, it is
synonymous with issues or problems that point to an area of life on
earth that governments can do something about. We use the term
however to emphasize the intentions of politicians who find themselves
governing rather than the intentions of the programmes politicians
ideally wish to achieve. Doing this concentrates attention upon
the purposes of governing. 2 In this way the choice of means to
achieve a given purpose is undoubted1y important but then,
desirable purposes are usually abandoned if the means prescribed are
politically unacceptable and the choice of ends itself is even more
important for it reflects what governing is about.3
1. For more detailed discussions on the use of the term 'policy'
see Rose 1978 p.13-14.
2. Rose 1978 p.13-14
3. Rose 1978 p.14; see also David Apter, Choice and The Politics
of Allocation: A Developmental Theory, London 1971 Chapter 5
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Distribution of Socio-Economic, Political and Welfare Amenities and
Benefits:
For the purpose of' this study, the term Distribution of Socio-
Economic, Political and Welfare Amenities and Benefits is used in
reference to the production and distribution of an infrastructure for
more welfare in society, since welfare of society is the central
purpose of government and governing. The founding fathers of the
social sciences viewed welfare as of central importance to government
and governing. For example, in the days before economics, sociology
and political science were separate academic subjects, Jeremy Bentharn
(1748-1832) used the word "happiness" in place of "welfare", writing:
"The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of
morals and legislation.
The use of the term welfare in this research is however not
directly concerned with the greatest good to the greatest number of
people in society since this can create enormous problems in a plural
society like Nigeria where majority ethnic groups control governments.
Instead the focus is with the promotion of particular infrastructural
programmes that enhance the welfare of society. In the instance all
pluralities whether they are majorities in government or minorities
outside government benefit. Another problem is that the difficulties
of measuring welfare are so great that, giving it practical meaning
in legislation as well as in academic circles is itself a subject of
political controversy. Unlike economics, governing is about providing
1.	 Cited in Rose 1978 p.47
8particular benefits rather than benefits in the abstract. To assume
that there exists or ought to exist a consensus about what con-
stitutes welfare is to try to take politics out of government.1
Psychologists and sociologists suggest there are three
important measures of welfare or well-being of society: what an
individual has (resources), what an individual is (social status)
and what the person loves (affection and social solidarity). 2 In this
research we also take account of conceptions of what individuals or
groups think they ought to have or government and governing ought to
produce for them in order to achieve the three important measures of
welfare in society.
In the narrow sense, welfare may refer to payment of cash to
people by governments as it happens to social security benefits in
most Western European societies. In the broader sense of the term
however, welfare benefits accrue to virtually all tax-payers in
society because far larger sums than cash payments are spent on
education, health, pensions and other programmes that indirectly affect
welfare benefiting a cross-section of society in creating welfare
infrastructural facilities in all societies. Of interest to this
study infrastructural facilities 3 would include means of transport
and communications (roads, railways, bridges, sea ports, airports,
post and telecommunication services), electricity and water supply,
education, curative medicines and housing. 4 Such services are
1. Rose 1978 p.49
2. Ibid p.l8
3. Commonly understood to mean services or capital assets helping
to provide them that are basic to economic activity in its
modern or industrial forms.
4. Douglas Rimmer, 'The Economy since 1970', in Anthony Kirk Greene
and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria since 1970: A political and
Economic Outline, London 1981 p.109
provided not only as intermediate products for industrial use; they
also serve human wants directly. Thus for example, the demand
for electricity is partly industrial and partly household, education
and health care can be regarded as a means of raising labour
productivity or as a source of personal gratification; mail and
telephones facilitate both economic activity and social intercourse)
Uneven distribution of these would mean some groups benefit and have
such infrastructural facilities disproportionate to others. The
nature of politics compounds acceptable formulae for the 'even
distribution' of infrastructural facilities. For example, an ethnic
group outside the control of government may interpret the distribution
of government socio-economic and welfare infrastructure as unevenly
distributed. Where there is a pattern that suggests that there was
government policy tied to patron-client relationship this affects
'even distribution' since it is the case that not everybody can be
a patron or a client in society.
Control of Government:
For the purposes of this study, the term Control of Government
is used in reference to mean a particular breed of politicians have
their "hands on" the institutions of government and governing. Usually
this is achieved through an election, political manipulation or through
a military coup. The political advantages in the situation of control
1.	 Rimmer 1981 p.109
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of government are obvious: a government is usually associated with
rewards for the political community and individuals in it. Because
it has political power it controls policy and political decision-making
at the highest level. This has ramification on the distribution of
socio-economic, political and welfare amenities and benefits. The
result is uneven distribution reflecting a hodgepodge of welfare
programmes depending largely on the political bargaining strength
than social needs of groups in society.
Bureaucratic Jobs:
For the purpose of this study we use the term bureaucratic jobs
to refer to bureaucratic, that is civil servants appointed for life
on the grounds of expertise and skills. Usually, they are by far
the most numerous group of office holders in any governed society,
assumed secure in their position, whatever the political colouring
of the political group in control of government. They have their
"hands-on" power, so to speak, for they are the persons who carry
out laws enacted for society by elected political leadership to
benefit interested groups in society. The most successful of the
bureaucrats can realize the literal meaning of the term bureaucracy:
rule by bureau chiefs. 1 Most of the work of government and governing
is therefore undertaken by civil servants of all categories who are
the unobtrusive politicians rather than the campaigners for public
office. The term is therefore used to specifically refer to government
1.	 Richard Rose, What is Governing: Purpose and Policy in
Washington, London 1978 p.11
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employees from where in the study it is analyzed to see whether such
are recruited from the dominant or subordinate groups in a plural
society to determine which group dominates government posts and jobs.
Domination of Government Posts:
For the purpose of this study, we use the term domination of
top government posts to refer to politicians in government and in
high ranking bureaucratic jobs.' Collectively, elected officeholders
and high ranking bureaucrats are the politicians that run government
in society. The term politician cannot however be restricted solely
to elected officials, since Presidents, Governors, Prime Ministers,
Premiers of Regions in a Federal system, make their own appointees
who may belong to the same party or individuals that share certain
political sympathies with the governing party.2
Political Power:
For the purpose of this study, political power is used to refer
to the political capacity to mobilize resources of society for the
accomplishment of intended effects with recourse to some type of
3
sanction(s) to encourage compliance. 	 Donald Gelfand identifies five
power bases in society that may be directly or indirectly related
to political power: Attraction power, Expert power, Reward power,
Coercive power and Legitimate power.4
1. Rose 1978 p.11
2. Ibid
3. This definition derives from John Walton's definition of power:
Walton 1968 p.449, cited in Gelfand et al (eds) 1973 p.12
4. Gelfand 1973 p.13
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Attraction power or reference group power, which is power
based on a group's liking for another group - for example, the
destruction of traditional African culture made Europeans able to
exert power over some Africans because their appearance and life style
appeared more rewarding and valuable. In the instance of The North,
the style of political leadership in the Islamic society made
British administration shape M-Belt political leadership along such
lines giving rise to a Northern Identity. Expert power, is the ability
of one group to provide specialized knowledge and information for
another. For example, in traditional African societies, priests were
in a position to provide this assistance. In modern societies
specialists in such occupational roles as psychiatry, law, medicine,
assume this function. Conflict in society may result when dominant
groups seek to maintain this power by controlling admissions into
these occupations. In the instance of The North it may here be pointed
out that most of the technical and professional jobs in the civil service
were an exclusive list for the recruitment of the M-Belt groups and
societies into the bureaucracy in The North. Only a few M-Belt people
were recruited into political decision-making jobs like in the
administrative services. Reward power, refers to a group's ability
to provide another group with gains either of a material or spiritual
nature. Coercive power refers to the ability of a group to mediate
punishment for another group. Legitimate power is based on the
acceptance of a group's right to prescribe opinions and behaviour.
These forms of power are however not mutually exclusive. For
example control over different components of the social structure may
provide groups with access to more than one base of power. 	 This is
IIQ.,
particularly so for the control over solidary groups in a community.
These solidary groups may be able to induce individuals and groups
to move into a community or prevent unwanted ethnic groups from doing
so. Furthermore groups and individuals who possess one structural
base of power may eventually attempt to extend the scope of their
power.
This means that there are obvious differences in the power
resources of various ethnic groups in a plural society. These differences
are politically crucial in determining which of these various bases of
power can be most effectively utilized by a particular group. The
primary resources that enhance the bases of power for groups giving
them political advantages include money, property, prestige, authority,
control of resources, access to supernatural powers, physical strength,
voting strength in voting rights and various rights achieved by formal
education, apprenticeships or membership of certain organizations.'
Possession of any of these resources may be countered by the resources
that others possess and may result into intense political conflict.
Intensity of Political Conflict:
For the purpose of this study, the term intensity of political
conflict, is used to refer to the amount of energy, resources and time
invested in the conflict to resolve issues or problems by the con-
testing groups or individuals. It may be measured by such indicators as
time and number of meetings, travel distances and extensiveness and
financial contributions. Intensity of political conflict therefore
refers to the amount of energy a group may invest on a conflict
situation. The intensity of conflict and violence is usually character-
istic and higher when engaged in by subordinate groups.2
1. Celfand 1973 p.13
2. Ibid
IIDL.
Political Hostilities:
For the purposes of this study, the term political hostilities
is used to refer to violence (although this may not be in all instances),
and the weapons utilized as a means of resolution. Violence refers
to the weapons chosen for a particular conflict. Conflict refers to
disagreements in society over issues or problems. Generally, conflicts
vary within society with an extreme point occurring when a group
attempts to overthrow another group's political position by force of
1
arms.
At less extreme levels, violence is commonly practised on
individuals in organizations by exerting authority or by verbal
assaults. 2 Contemporary social theory suggests and contends that
manipulation has replaced coercion in organizations although there
are times in all organizations when coercion by threats of jobs or
pay and mild forms of violence are used. 3 The intensity of conflict
and violence is characteristically higher when engaged in by sub-
ordinated groups than by superordinate groups. This is because the
avoidance of physical violence allows dominant groups who may be in
control of government to exert power while maintaining the facade of
an open democratic egalitarian society. 4 On the other hand subordinated
groups often than not resort to physical violence to a degree not re-
quired by groups with greater resources of power.5
1. An example of this in Nigeria is the Ibo led attempt in January
1966 to overthrow the dominant position of The North in Nigerian
Politics.
2. Gelfand 1973 p.13
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.l4
5. Ibid
lbs
Dominant Group:
For the purposes of this study the term dominant group is used
to refer to that collectivity within society which has pre-eminent
authority to function both as guardians and sustainers of the con-
trolling values of the system and as prime allocators of rewards in
the society.' A dominant group may be a group of greater or lesser
intensity. For example, a restricted elite, incumbents of a govern-
ment apparatus, an ethnic group who is a majority controlling govern-
ment, a temporary or permanent coalition of interest groups or a
pure numerical majority from a particular ethnic group. The emphasis
on a dominant group in this study signifies numerical size, access
and control of government by a socio-religious and cultural group.
This means that an overwhelming preponderance of ethnic groups are
subordinate rather than in dominant positions particularly so in
context of The North where ethnic group numbers vary from 100 people
to as many as 7 million people.
Subordinate Group:
For the purpose of this study, a subordinate group means a
group that has little access to political power to influence socio-
economic decision-making in the cause of the development of the wider
society including its own territorial spaces. It is therefore
dependent on a dominant group's political leadership. It may also
be due to superior cohesion from language and culture, self-confidence
rooted in the traditions of command in the ruling group and traditions
of dependence of the other groups. This is the premise from which a
minority as much as a majority group dominates. In a large measure
1.	 Schermerhorn 1968 p.12-U
however, subordination is conditioned by members and hence a minority
in numerical size. Strictly speaking, "majority-minority" usage in
this study is restricted to ethnic group numbers while "dominant-
subordinate" usage is in reference to access to political power and
the political process which in certain instances is compounded by
"majority-minority" conceptions of numbers in electoral processes.
This is crucially important in electoral democratic regimes given
that the command vote is still salient in shaping electoral outcomes
in Nigeria.
Historical Recollections:
For the purpose of this study, the term historical recollection
is used to mean any remembrance of ideas and events from the past as
affected individuals in a particular society. Ideas and events of
the past are however only important when they become socially and
politically meaningful to individuals in their present context and
as it affects their relationships with other individuals or groups.
Knowledge of such ideas and events and the way they become trans-
mitted by ancestors affects and shapes socio-political relationships
in society.
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Appendix II
A definition of the M-Belt areas in the nature of socio-economic and
political problems of incorporation in the North.
Distinction is made in this study between the conception of a
geographical M-Belt in the territories of the Nigerian Federation and the
sociological and political M-Belt in the North in Nigerian politics. The
geographical definitions of the M-Relt have always been anti-the M-Belt
political identity and created some confusion in the conceptual
understanding of the political M-Belt where there were socio-economic and
political problems of politics in th plural society of the North. It is
therefore crucial to the understanding and explanation of the M-Belt
movement in the North and Nigerian politics to produce a sociological and
political definition of the M-Belt in more than just determinate
geographical terms.
More than in any other part of Nigeria that contained separatist
political movements for the subdivision of the Federation into more units,
the M-Belt areas have been subjected to a stereotype political definition
that derived from the submissions of the Northern Regional government to
the Willink Commission of enquiry on the fears of minorities and the means
of allaying them in 1957. The Commission had defined the area to comprise:
"the whole of Ilorin, Kabba, Benue and Plateau
Provinces, the Southern parts of Bauchi and
Zaria Provinces, the whole of Niger Province
except for the area north of Kontagora town and
the whole of the Numan Division of Adamawa
Province together with the Districts of Muri
and Wurkun in the Muri Division of the same
provi nce" .
Following from this definition James Coleman in 1958 in his academic
classic on the development of Nigerian nationalism defined and described
the M-Belt areas as: "the lower half of the (Northern) Region" 2 . This
definition is more geographical than political and tows the political line
of the Northern Regional government which produced a definition that went
beyond the scope of the sentiments of the M-Belt movement. The areas of the
"lower half" of the North contain more Muslims than Christians and with
powerful Emirs as those of Ilorin, Bida, Minna, Kontagoro, Bauchi and
Zaria, whose allegiance was strongly focussed on Sokoto as the centre of
politics and religion. In 1963 Post, with some slight variation to the
definitions of Coleman and that, produced by the Northern government in
1957, suggested that the M-Belt areas consisted of the Provinces of:
"Ilorin, Niger, Kabba, Benue, Plateau and Adamawa" 3 . This definition leaves
out substantial tribal minorities that exist in Southern Zaria and Southern
Bauchi, whose political support the M-Belt movement enjoyed and who shared
the social and political identity of the movement, them being Christians
and non-Muslim.
Protogonists of the M-Belt movement and the creation of a M-Belt
Region, also never clearly defined the M-Belt areas. Article three of the
UMBC constitution and Bye-Laws of 1956 gave the definition of the M-Belt
areas as Ilorin, Kabba, Niger, Benue, Plateau, Adamawa, Southern Zaria and
Southern Bauchi Provinces 4 . This definition later received the endorsement
of the UMAC Lafia conference on l5th-l7th January 1957 g . Slightly different
definitions were given by Bitrus Rwang Pam and Ibrahim Imam which excluded
Ilorin Province and the Ibgirra in Kabba Province but included the Igalla
and other smaller groups in the area, and still included the "Lower North
syndrome" definition by Coleman 6 . Subsequently scholarly research tended to
use one variant or the other of those definitions which essentially
remained within the domain of the geographical conception of the M-Belt in
the North7.
One of the major political problems of the M-Belt movement in its
efforts to moblilization Christians and non-Muslinis for support of the
demands for the creation of a M-Belt Region was its ambivalence on the
areas for the region. While it concentrated its politcal leadership and
activities in Adamawa, S.Bauchi, Plateau, S.Zaria and Benue, it all along
claimed Ilorin and Kabba areas, mainly from its alliance with the AG and
the financial assistance it enjoyed. Some divisions in Ilorin and Kabba had
strong pan-Yoruba irredentist feelings which the AG encouraged, in the hope
of the merger with Western Region of Nigeria. There is no doubt that there
is a geographically descriptive M-Belt of Nigeria. However a
socio-political M-Belt also exists in the specific context of religious and
political problems in Nigeria, particularly problems in the North. It is in
the latter case that constituted the foundations and origins in the growth
and development of the M-Belt movement in Nigerian politics, which this
study undertakes. Although a descriptive definition was brought to bear on
a political concept, the geographical M-Belt areas did not correlate with
the socio-political and economic problems of the political M-Belt that led
to the organization of the M-Belt movement in the demands for the creation
of a M-Belt Region in the North as a unit of the Nigerian Federation. The
unclear definition of the M-Belt areas has arisen from the failure to
disentangle the geographical M-Belt of Nigeria from the political M-Belt,
from which the name derived, a failure that was due to official attitudes
and political pressures on the M-Belt movement from both the government of
the North and AG strategy to achieve the merger of the Yoruba divisions in
the North with the West. One of the ways the government of the North
created pressures on the concept of the M-Belt was to discourage in
official circles any references to the Southern areas of the North as
"Middle-Belt" and in its place the areas were referred to as "the riverain
areas" 8. The riverain concept was still very much a geographical
definition. The logic of the geographical definition of the M-Belt might be
something like this: the territories of the Nigerian political state are
found roughly between latitudes 4 degrees and 14 degrees North and between
2 degrees 50' and 15 degrees East; the M-Belt areas, using a purely
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geographical definition would therefore be the areas from West to East
between latitudes 7 degrees 10' and 10 degrees 4VN 9 . The geographical
M-Relt of Nigeria by this logic of definition, cuts off the southwardly
parts of the Jukun, Tiv, Idoma and Igalla land and people and includes the
Yoruba of Western parts of Nigeria as deep down as to Ondo and Oyo.
Northwardly, the geographical M-Belt of Nigeria enclosed all of Kwara state
(former Ilorin Province), some parts of Southern Sokoto, all of Niger
state, and Southern half of Kaduna State, including Kaduna town, the
Southern half of Bauchi including the towns of Bauchi and Gorube and a
Southern bit of Borno and all of Adamawa. Using the geographical definition
of the M-Belt movement without a precise distinction is therefore political
meaningless. The geographical conception of the M-Belt does not reflect the
socio-economic and political problems of minorities in the North, which is
what the M-Belt movement was all about.
The correlation of the sources of political tensions between the
Islamic society and the non-Islamic groups in the North and the subsequent
political support the Fl-Belt movement enjoyed from specific areas, with the
socio-political characteristics of certain non-Islamic groups can produce a
more precise definition of the sociological and political M-Belt areas, in
the North and Nigeria, which is more useful in the analysis of the problem.
The M-Belt areas in the North were characterized by unique geographical
features that made them stand out as distinct and different from the rest
of the North. This varied from the hilly and rocky geographical features of
the Plateau, S. Bauchi and S. Zaria, interspersed by the plains and hilly
terrain of the Adamawa areas and the Manbilla Plateau, to the forested land
areas with tall grassy plains in the Niger-Benue Valley. This natural
setting of the M-Belt areas created sharp constrasts with the flat and
plain woodland of the rest of the North, which stretched to the edges of
the desert. There was no desert in the political and sociological M-Belt
areas of the North in Nigeria. In the earlier years of the 20th century,
I III
the non-Islamic groups in the North were differentiated from the rest of
the Islamic Society by such descriptive labels as "the cannibal-belt" (Lady
Lugard 1905; Tremearne 1912), "the pagan-belt" where Christianity might be
established to wedge the southward expansion of Islam in the 'Sudan' (Kumm
1904) and laterly in the 1950s and 1960s as the "Bible-belt" in the
North 10 . The government of British administration in the North also
described the M-Belt areas as "pagan areas" and as an animistic area, where
there was little and in some instances, a total absence of Islamic
influences and civilization. Furthermore, the people of the M-Belt areas in
the North were non-Hausa speaking non-Fulani, non-Kanuri and non-Nupe, the
dominant Islamic groups in the North and they were also non-Muslims". The
M-Belt groups who spoke the Hausa language were apt to be Christians or
animist as were the Birom of Jos Division; the mixed religious tribes in
the M-Belt areas spoke their own tribal languages as were the Pyem in
Gindiri on the Plateau. Many of the other M-Belt tribes are neither Muslim,
nor Hausa speaking like the Tiv in Benue 12 . The conception of the M-Belt
areas also has a cultural and historical significance in the experiences of
the non-Islamic groups in the North who by and large were not part of one
of the Hausa-Fulani emirates established in the days of dan Fodion and
Sultan Bello and reinforced by British rule' 3 . However, besides the above
characteristics, there was simply no way of identifying or distinguishing
the M-Belt people from the people of the Islamic society. Racial
characteristics and the physical structure of the human beings were not as
pronounced as they were between the North and the South in the Republic of
the Sudan. In the Sudan, the negroid population in the South contrasted
sharply with the Arabs of the North, who controlled political power in
almost the same circumstances of Northern Nigeria, where religious
identities reinforced political differences. In the North however the
Fulani and the Kanuri, tended to be slightly different from the M-Belt
people being fairer in skin pigmentation and taller with slimmer
MU..
body-build.
The M-Belt areas also have the highest concentration of minorities
tribal groups in the North and Nigeria in terms of culture, population,
religious beliefs, members who speak the same language, territorial area of
claims to rights of ownership of land. It was from these conceptions that
the "minorities" political identity of the M-Belt movement developed in
relation to the domiance of Islamic groups in the control of politics and
society in the North. However, a perfect correlation does not eixst between
the geographical boundaries of the M-Belt and the boundaries of politics of
the M-Belt areas and the Islamic Society. This is so because there were
areas with population that held strong allegiance to the Islamic Society
which were in the middle of the M-Belt areas; for example, Keffi, Lafia,
Kanam and Wase.
The definition of the M-Belt areas for the puposes of this research is
focussed on the centres of gravity of the M-Belt Movement, the areas it
directed its social and political appeal and also the areas that stood to
be affected in benefits of the objectives of the dreamed M-Belt Region from
the goals of the parent organization the NML to the all embracing political
organization, the UMBC party under the leadership of Joseph Tarka. This
therefore includes the whole societies whose boundaries differentiated and
create conceptions of minorities in relation to the Islamic society in the
North in socio-political and cultural terms.
However, to get into the innerness of the definition of the M-Belt
areas, a periodization of the political experiences that characterized the
non-Islamic groups in relation to the Islamic society in the North, is
important. Three periods are critical to the definition. Firstly, there is
the period that witnessed the establishment and functioning of an Islamic
society in the North: the period before 1804 and between 1804 right through
to 1900. In that period the M-Belt groups and people were essentially
non-Islamic, although some were under varying degrees of control by the
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Islamic society ie. those in Adarnawa, S. Bauchi, some parts of the Plateau
(Keffi, Nassarawa, Lafia, Kanani, Wase) and Southern Zaria; while others
were beyond the boundaries of the Islamic society ie. the Tiv. In the same
period, the M-Belt groups were also seen as peripheries to be exploited by
the Islamic societies of the Hausa and Borno Kingdoms and eventually by the
more elaborately centralized Islamic Society under the authority of Sokoto,
established and expanded by the Fulani Jihad. As a result of the expansion
of the Islamic Society, the M-Belt groups were raided for slaves that
served the functional social and economic purposes of both the Islamic
centres of Borno and Sokoto. The non-Islamic groups that were the
socio-economic and political victims of the expanding Islamic Society in
the North, were therefore the M-Belt groups and these later became the
political focus of the M-Belt movement to gain support for the creation of
a M-Belt Region. Secondly, there was the period of the establishment of the
North and Nigeria by the British, in which the M-Belt areas were
characterized by a non-Emirate structure of authority under British
Residents and District Officers. The M-Belt groups in this period therefore
were the non-centralized entities in authority patterns and this created
difficulties for the Brtish in their application of the indirect rule
system. Also characteristic of the M-Belt areas in this period were the
revolutionary activities of European Christian Missionary Bodies in the
North, who were delibrately restricted to the non-Islamic parts of the
North by the government of British administration. The M-Belt areas were,
therefore, those areas of the North, where there was a concentration of
European Christian Missionaries with social and welfare institutions which
produced a Christian religious identity. Christianity, Christians and
non-Christians as well as non-Muslims were therefore to be found in higher
proportions in the M-Belt areas when compared with other parts of the
North. A further significant trend which was began in the 1940s was that
more non-Muslims and non-Christians in the M-Belt areas were becoming
committed Christians rather than Muslims in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally,
in the period approaching Self-Government and Independence for the North
and Nigeria in the 1950s and also in the period after 1960, the M-Belt
areas were characterized by anti-NPC sentiments with the increased
religious and political consciousness when it was perceived that the NPC
government was predominantly Islamic apparently clear in the political and
religious expressions of the Sardauna. The M-Belt areas were therefore
areas that contained political opposition to the NPC government, an
oppostion that was reinforced by anti-Islamic sentiments developed from the
Christian religious identity.
The M-Belt areas in the North therefore were to be found in the
South-Eastern parts of the Sokoto ruled Islamic Society and the Southern
parts of the Borno Centred Islamic Society. These areas comprised Adamawa,
S. Bauchi, Plateau, S. Zaria and Benue. In terms of the contemporary
Nigerian political scene, the areas comprise of Gongola, Plateau and Benue
states as well as the Southern parts of Kaduna and Bauchi states.
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1. Memorandum to the Minorities Commission from the Government of the
Northern Region of Nigeria, Kaduna, December 1957 p46-p47.
2. James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, London 1958
p18-p24.
3. K.W.J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and
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4. Dudley 1968 pll2n.80.
5. Ibid 1968 pll2n.80.
6. Ibid 1968 pll2n.80.
7. J.T. Tseayo, Conflict and Incorporation in Nigeria: The Integration
of the Tiv, Zaria, 1975 passim; Magid 1971 p360n.4; Skiar 1963 p344.
8. Discussions with M.J. Dent 1980-1984; Interview Discussions with A.
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the Minorities Commission from the Government of the Northern Region
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determine the geographical M-Belt of Nigeria and for provision of
maps.
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Lot, Patrict Dokotri, Barnabas Dusu and Elizabeth Ivase, January
1981.
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